In the wake of the People’s Liberation Army exercises in August, the Communist Party of China (CPC) released a new white paper on its goal of “reunification” with Taiwan. Much of the change in this paper compared with the most recent white papers (in 1993 and 2000) is tonal – Cherry Hitkari of the Lowy Institute notes it is “far more assertive, elaborate and emotionally charged.”
But there is also an added sense of urgency, as the resolution of the Taiwan question is now seen as a necessary condition for the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation,” the catch-all term for President Xi Jinping’s ambition for great-power status.
Rhetorical flourishes aside, the 2022 white paper is by no means revolutionary. Mentions of “peaceful reunification,” “one country, two systems” and “people-to-people exchanges” continue to litter its pages.
The differences, however, are indicators of Chinese intentions toward Taiwan, and the prospects for preventing further escalation.
‘One country, two systems,’ but …
The CPC reiterates its stance on pursuing “peaceful reunification” under “one country, two systems,” the policy of successive Chinese leaders since Deng Xiaoping. According to the paper, the Party will pursue “people-to-people” economic and cultural exchanges, leading to “consultation and discussion as equals” as the process by which unification will be achieved.
It continues to discuss one country, two systems as the “only” and “inevitable” solution for Taiwan.
These calls will likely remain unanswered in Taiwan, which views one country, two systems as “wishful thinking.” Unification and moves toward unification have all-time low levels of support in polls of Taiwanese people. The most recent poll, conducted before US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit, found that just 6.4% of respondents wanted either to unify “as soon as possible” or to “maintain status quo, move toward unification.”
The experience of Hong Kong under one country, two systems further diminished the already-bleak outlook for the policy. The steady dismantling of Hong Kong’s autonomy, starting with the Chinese State Council’s 2014 white paper on the region, and now the “overly broad interpretation of and arbitrary application” (per a UN report) of the Beijing-imposed national-security law in 2020, showed Taiwanese exactly what to expect under the policy.
The 2022 white paper, despite its talk of “peaceful reunification,” also provides ominous signs for the (im)balance of carrots and sticks the CPC has used and will continue to use against Taiwan.
The paper notably removes more conciliatory language present in the 1993 and 2000 white papers, including prior promises to grant the island a high degree of autonomy and to refrain from deploying military and administrative personnel there.
The noted absence of the latter assurance is especially worrying, as the CPC has declared its intention to prosecute members of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party for “secession,” made a crime under the Anti-Secession Law in 2005.
The absence of the military-deployment promise also comes alongside worrying pronouncements by Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye that Taiwanese people need to be “re-educated” in a unification situation.
Thus the Chinese are doing little to rehabilitate the one country, two systems plan in Taiwan.
The white paper advocates “peaceful reunification” under a discredited system rejected by the Taiwanese, a majority of whom are now willing to fight to prevent its imposition on the island.
The Chinese leadership are apparently aware of this and defend their actions in Hong Kong: According to the 2022 white paper, the Party “made some appropriate improvements,” which “laid a solid foundation for the law-based governance of Hong Kong.” Thus Beijing is aware of the discredited status of one country, two systems and makes no effort to rehabilitate it.
Mainland domestic politics
In this light, the question is: What, then, is the purpose of the white paper?
The answer is probably domestic. On the one hand, the paper may be geared toward CPC cadres ahead of the 20th National Party Congress, slated to occur later this year.
Observers have remarked that Xi’s administration, as he seeks an unprecedented third term, relies less on economic growth to legitimize his rule – as had been the case for the prior three paramount leaders Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao – and more on nationalist sentiment and delivering on the plan for national rejuvenation.
Xi faces increasing headwinds internationally with (further) growing great-power rivalry with the United States, souring opinions of the Belt and Road Initiative among some partners and failure to conclude a trade deal with the European Union.
The more in-depth discussion of post-unification Taiwan and setting a (rather ambiguous) deadline for not “leaving the Taiwan question to the next generation” could demonstrate the Party’s intentions to escalate pressure on Taiwan heading into Xi’s third term.
The other answer is that the white paper serves as a nationalist “anti-inflammatory.” The Party has stoked nationalism as another plank in its domestic legitimacy platform and often refers to this sentiment – allowed to flourish on sites like Weibo – to justify its more aggressive moves abroad.
Meanwhile the nationalistic sentiment the Party created and stoked has grown to become something beyond Beijing’s control.
In the run-up to Pelosi’s visit, nationalists called for strong action against both the United States and Taiwan, with Hu Xijin, the former editor-in-chief of Global Times, calling for the PLA to “forcibly dispel” – and, if that proved ineffective, shoot down – Pelosi’s plane.
After Pelosi’s visit, censors hurried to delete posts calling Beijing’s response too weak, as some appeared to demand “reunification by force” – an invasion of Taiwan.
The attempt to dispel nationalist fervor constitutes self-recognition that the People’s Republic of China is not yet ready to unify Taiwan by force, reinforcing the Pentagon’s assessment that an invasion is unlikely for another two years. To some extent, this involves military capabilities.
While China does not have the necessary lift capacity to sustain an invasion, recent exercises have shown that an air and sea blockade of the island is possible.
However, the CPC leadership recognizes that the military, economic, and diplomatic costs of such an offensive are too high given such factors as the current self-inflicted damage to the domestic economy from the zero-Covid policy, a collapsing housing market as developers including Evergrande default on their debts, and a foreign debt challenge as partners are forced to default on Chinese loans.
US needs to prepare
As Beijing continues its naval modernization and escalation around Taiwan, the United States needs to prepare – striking a balance between support for Taiwan that increases the potential costs of offensive military action and the sort of overzealous support that Zhongnanhai could point to as a pretext for further escalation.
Some aspects of the Taiwan Policy Act currently in the US Senate may stray to the latter side of this balance. On the other hand, after US President Joe Biden’s statements of intent to defend Taiwan, Washington should clarify that it would consider a military blockade an act of war, as one participant stated at a US-Taiwan dialogue on deterrence and defense in August.
Although Manila, fearing retribution, may be hesitant, stationing a small, mobile naval force in the Philippines would decrease the response time for cross-Strait disturbances, forcing further Chinese recalculations. If stationing such a force should prove infeasible, the US should increase its military engagement with the Philippines beyond the occasional freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea.
Finally, the United States must at long last answer the call of US Representative Elaine Luria, a frequent critic of the deterioration of American naval forces, who noted in 2021 that the US Navy wanted to retire 15 ships while procuring only four. This trend must reverse. Chinese calculations already expect US intervention in a Taiwan contingency. Empowering the US Navy would help to prevent the contingency from happening.
Jake Steiner ([email protected]) is a resident WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum. This article was first published by Pacific Forum and is republished here with permission.