The United States dodged a bullet this month when Turkey failed to assassinate one of Washington’s key allies in its fight against Islamic State (ISIS). Had the Turkish drone hit its mark – Mazloum Abdi, head of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – three US military members escorting Abdi would likely have died alongside him, sparking one of the most dangerous crises in Turkish-US relations of modern times.
The Turks missed, perhaps intentionally. But even if Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s goal was to send a message by deliberately firing wide, the damage has been done. Such a brazen attack could turn already frayed US-Turkish relations into a full-blown diplomatic tangle with incalculable consequences for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
This isn’t the first time Americans were in the line of Turkish fire. In November 2022, Turks’ bombs aimed at SDF positions fell just 130 meters from co-located Americans. Again, the US soldiers were unharmed.
It’s not difficult to imagine the US Congress’ reaction had Americans been killed in either attack.
Turkey is already out of favor on Capitol Hill for several reasons, including the government’s growing authoritarianism, its behavior in Syria and the Aegean, its vetoing of Sweden’s NATO membership, and its purchase of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems (which could endanger the US military’s F-35s).
Congress has condemned the Joe Biden administration’s reluctance to criticize Turkey. Dead soldiers would have forced the administration’s hand.
So why would Erdogan engage in such a risky maneuver?
The obvious answer is politics. Erdogan is running for re-election next month, and as a populist authoritarian who has transformed the country into his own private fiefdom – most state and public institutions have been neutered and brought under his control – he cannot afford to lose.
The attack on Abdi and American personnel demonstrates how desperate Erdogan is. Had he succeeded, he would have parlayed it as a victory and used it to propel him over the finish line.
Anti-Kurd obsession
Erdogan has been a virulent critic of Washington’s partnership with the Kurds in northern Syria, whom he accuses of being terrorists. Turkey has a serious domestic Kurdish problem and has faced an insurrection led by the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, as well as peaceful domestic Kurdish political opposition.
The Syrian Kurds owe much of their military training to the PKK, but there’s no evidence they have ever engaged in any activity inside Turkey or against the Turkish regime. Nevertheless, Erdogan has sent his army into northern Syria, displacing and occupying parts of Kurdish territory, and carried out a relentless drone campaign against Washington’s ally.
For now, the US has mostly chosen to play down Turkish actions rather than push back.
Yet a constant drumbeat of Turkish government disinformation has convinced the Turkish public that it faces an imminent threat – not only from the Kurds but also from the US.
While Turkey does have a genuine fear that Kurds in Syria could end up with an autonomous region – after all, the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq emerged after Washington intervened in that conflict – repressing Kurdish demands at home nonetheless serves Erdogan’s interests.
As US Secretary of State Antony Blinken conceded last month, Turkey has proved to be “a challenging ally,” as the timing of Erdogan’s risky behavior demonstrates.
The recent dust-up follows two events that presented Turkey with opportunities to lower the heat.
The first was Washington’s public calls for Ankara not to intervene in Syria in the run-up to the May 14 Turkish elections. High-ranking US military officials, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, have visited northern Syria, sending a clear message to Turkey.
The second was the devastating February 6 earthquake that killed more than 50,000 people in Turkey alone. The Turkish economy, already reeling from high inflation and balance-of-payments difficulties, desperately needs external financing and support to manage the reconstruction effort. The US is well positioned to help, but killing Americans is not the way to get it.
The failed attack on Abdi doesn’t obviate the fact that Erdogan may have already jeopardized American earthquake assistance. President Joe Biden has intentionally avoided confronting Erdogan over the drone strike; keeping him at arm’s length, Biden has pointedly refused to invite him to the White House, limiting exchanges to sidebar meetings at international summits.
In a clear rebuke to Erdogan’s strongman tactics, Turkey (along with Hungary) wasn’t invited to the recent Summit for Democracy at the White House. Yet Erdogan doesn’t seem deterred.
Congress may be inclined to push Biden to take a tougher stand. However, it would be wise to wait until after the elections. There’s no point in giving Erdogan ammunition to score points at home.
Still, Erdogan must be made to understand – privately and subtly in public – that he needs to avoid dangerous gambits. To that end, Washington should develop a coherent policy for the day after the elections, especially if Erdogan wins.
For too long, America’s policy toward Turkey has indulged Erdogan. Faced with an economic crisis at home, a victorious Erdogan will quickly become a needy ally. It’s best to start preparing him now for what he’ll need to do to garner that support.
This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.