China’s secretive miniature spaceplane, a unique asset that could play a key role in supporting future military operations in space, has reportedly cleared a key test hurdle, according to state media and other reports.
This month, The Warzone reported that China’s mini spaceplane touched down on an unspecified runway located in the Gobi Desert after 276 days in orbit after being launched on August 4, 2022.
The report mentions several possible landing sites for the spaceplane, possibly near the Lop Nur nuclear test site, which has been used for spaceplane recovery in the past, or the Dingxin Test and Training Base, which regularly hosts large-scale People’s Liberation Army-Air Force (PLA-AF) exercises.
The Warzone report notes that China provided no details about the spaceplane’s design or the particular technologies it was carrying. Nor did it provide any photographs of the plane.
Yet China’s state media showcased the event as a significant milestone in the country’s space program. State media reports noted that its spaceplane’s journey was much shorter than the comparable US X-37B, which spent a record 908 days in orbit.
In a separate article this month, The Warzone reported that LeoLabs, a private space services company, claims that its data shows China’s mini spaceplane docked with or captured a separate smaller object on multiple occasions during its 276-day space mission.
Since its launch in August 2022, China’s mini spaceplane has conducted multiple large maneuvers raising its altitude, demonstrated formation flying and self-propelled in what appeared to be two or three docking or capture missions.
The Warzone notes that while it is unclear what China’s mini spaceplane was doing if LeoLab’s data is accurate, it shows that China’s mini spaceplane has significant close-in maneuvering capabilities.
In an August 2022 article for The Debrief, Tim McMillan notes that although China’s mini spaceplane program is shrouded in secrecy, it has striking physical similarities to the US X-37B clandestine spacecraft.
McMillan notes that China’s spaceplane program borrows from US designs, such as the Space Shuttle, X-37B and SpaceX rockets, rather than creating innovative new designs. He also notes that the extreme secrecy around both China’s and the U’S spaceplane programs makes ascertaining their intended missions and capabilities difficult.
Kyle Mizokami speculates in a July 2021 article for Popular Mechanics that since the PLA has similar mission requirements as the US Air Force, the PLA could use China’s spaceplane to launch satellites into orbit, conduct reconnaissance missions and perform other tasks.
Mizokami notes that the US X-37B is built to spend months in orbit performing classified missions for the US military. He says that it uses atmospheric physics for self-defense and eluding enemies. Its payload bay is its chief advantage that enables them to launch and recover payloads, then land at any suitable runway in its path.
However, a 2019 paper by the Union of Concerned Scientists points out that the US X-37B is a poor platform for potential missions and as a space weapon.
The paper mentions several X-37B design flaws that make it too large and non-maneuverable to be a spy platform while it is not cost-efficient enough for retrieving space equipment. It also says it has too small of a payload to launch multiple satellites and lacks the technology to rendezvous and dock with other satellites.
The paper says that X-37B is also impractical as a space weapon as it lacks close-in maneuverability and the ability to interface with other satellites. It notes that space-based weapons intended to attack ground targets are more costly, less secure and unreliable compared to ground-based systems.
China’s mini spaceplane may have design features that rectify the shortcomings of the US X-37B, capitalizing on the “latecomers advantage” that improves and builds on existing designs rather than developing new designs from the bottom up and undergoing a costly and time-consuming trial-and-error test process.
In a November 2021 report by the China Aerospace Studies Institute, Daniel Shats and Peter Wood note that China’s spaceplane program, in tandem with recent developments, has several military and civilian implications.
Shats and Wood note that China’s spaceplane program shows it wants to compete with the US and other countries in the emerging space tourism sector, seeks to reduce costs for launching satellites and other space-based assets, and aims to utilize spaceplanes to service satellites and as an anti-satellite weapon.
Apart from developing spaceplane technology, China is also developing next-generation space launch technologies. Mark Stokes and other writers note in a March 2020 report for Project 2049 that China is planning to produce a two-stage-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle by 2030. The report says that a trans-atmospheric vehicle appears to be in the early stages of R&D via ground tests of advanced propulsion systems such as scramjets or combined-cycle engines.
These developments have sparked concerns in US security circles. Mandy Mayfield notes in a February 2021 article for National Defense Magazine that US defense officials have expressed concern about the vulnerability of US space assets to China’s anti-satellite weapons, noting that China has placed its space and counter-space weapons into the new PLA–Strategic Support Force (PLA-SSF), which focuses on electronic and cyberwarfare capabilities.
Mayfield also mentions that as China works to match or exceed US space capabilities, counter-space operations will feature prominently in future PLA campaigns.
These projects tie in with China’s larger space strategy. Namrata Goswami notes in a 2018 article for Strategic Studies Quarterly that China aims to occupy strategically important locations such as the moon to secure energy and strategic resources, enhance its national prestige and international status, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on power and conduct research that positions China as a world leader in space technology.