Putin’s diminishing returns and Russia’s shrinking world – Asia Times

Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, emailed Donald Trump a cautious congratulations information on the day of his inauguration, before making a protracted call with Xi Jinping, the country’s leader.

From Putin’s standpoint, this makes sense. Russia gets billions of dollars from power sales to China and engineering from Beijing, but from Washington, until recently, generally sanctions and fear.

Moscow is hoping for a more positive relation with the White House’s present owner, who has made it known that he wants a “deal” to stop the Ukrainian conflict.

However, Putin should not be faking the fact that this three-year-old issue has had one of the worst years in Russian foreign policy since the Cold War’s finish.

Transatlantic unification

Russia’s actions around the world have been stifled by the conflict in Ukraine and limited by its possibilities.

The 2022 war, in contrast to the 2014 annexation of Crimea, resulted in an extraordinary amount of intercontinental unity, including the growth of NATO and sanctions against Russian commerce and finance. Both the US and the European Union have recently expanded their sanctions measures.

The EU also forbids the re-export of Soviet liquefied natural gas and ends help for an Arctic LNG project by Russia for the first time.

EU-Russian industry, including Western imports of vitality, has dropped to a fraction of what it was before the battle.

The two Nord Stream pipes, designed to bring Russian oil to Germany without transiting East Europe, lie crippled and unoccupied. Energy profits have about one-half of what they did two years ago.

The West has also provided billions in humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine, giving Russia a degree of endurance for which Russia was ready. In addition, international businesses and professional authorities and intellectuals have flocked to Russia in droves.

China has been the nation’s major lord despite Russia’s” shadow fleet,” an aged group of ships sailing under different administrative and technical evasions.

Since the end of 2021, trade between China and Russia has increased by nearly two-thirds, and the US cites Beijing as the primary cause of Russia’s “dual apply” and other systems.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has moved from an energy-for-manufactured-goods business partnership with the West to one of protectorates with China, as one Russia researcher termed it.

Hosting an October gathering of the BRICS countries – today counting 11 people, including the five original people: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa– is unlikely to account for political costs elsewhere.

Two men in suits hold wine glasses.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping bread their companionship in March 2023. Photo: Pavel Byrkin / AFP via Getty Images/ The Talk

Problems at home …

The Russian economy is deeply distorted by increased military spending, which represents 40 % of the budget and 25 % of all spending. The government currently needs the equivalent of US$$ 20 billion annually to pay for new hires.

Russian officials may find a way to satisfy at least some of the populace, but consistent inflation and shortages of supply money directly from the conflict have made this task more difficult.

On the field, the battle itself has killed or wounded more than 600, 000 Russian men. Operations during 2024 were especially dangerous, producing more than 1, 500 Russian deaths a day.

The head who anticipated Kyiv’s acquiescence in time then discovers that Russia’s place is occupied, its naval troops are withdrawn from the Black Sea, and one of its own commanders was murdered in Moscow.

The fact that this presumptive great energy, which has a community of 144 million, has to rely on North Korean troops to help conquer its own land is probably the biggest humiliation.

… and in its yard

Moscow’s commitment to the conflict has affected its ability to influence activities abroad, even in its unique community.

For instance, Russia had much supported Armenia in its ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over borders and people in the Caucasus following the fall of the Soviet Union.

Moscow has engaged in various ceasefire negotiations. Despite the presence of about 2, 000 Soviet troops dispatched to defend the remaining Armenian population in some of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, continuous attacks and territorial benefits for Azerbaijan persisted.

In September 2023, Azerbaijan’s troops immediately took command of the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh. In the largest ethnic purging incident since the end of the Balkan Wars, over 100 000 Armenians have fled. The soldiers stayed out of the situation and afterwards withdrew. The Russian army, absorbed in the terrible efforts in Ukraine, was not rear up or reinforce them.

In recent years, the Azeris ‘ diplomatic and economic standing have improved, helped by support from NATO member Turkey and increased demand for its gas as a substitute for Russia’s.

The Iranian state, which is feeling betrayed by Russia, has for the first time emailed its sentiments to the West, which is content to accept such requests.

Losing control and associates

Russia’s losses in the Caucasus have been dwarfed by the Middle East’s negative impact and impact on its defense.

Russia backed Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian government during the Arab Spring in 2011 and directly aided it by starting defense action in 2015.

However, a mix of rebel groups quickly swept Assad out in December 2024. With the conflict in Ukraine having drained Russia’s potential for more, the protection offered to Assad by Moscow was the closest it could offer.

Russia’s potential departure from the Arab naval base at Tartus and the airport at Khmeimim would eliminate property that made it able to work with Iran, its main strategic companion in the region.

In recent years, Jewish attacks on Iran and other Iranian-backed troops in Lebanon and Syria have had an impact on Russia’s credibility as an alliance and arsenal.

The loss of the Arab foundations, which are crucial start points for expanding Russian energy, and Moscow’s apparent ability to influence the situation on the ground across the Sahel area in north-central Africa would also have a negative impact on Russia’s position in Africa.

Diminishing results

Moscow is increasingly reliant on a variety of different means to try to influence others, given the impasse in Ukraine and the Russian’s corporate losses in Syria and elsewhere.

Disinformation, election interference and various threats are not fresh and are part of Russia’s deeds in Ukraine. However, recent efforts in East Europe have not been very successful.

For instance, massive Russian funding and propaganda in Romania helped to pave the way for a flimsy victory for a candidate for president against NATO in December 2024, but the Romanian government quickly exposed these practices, and the election was voided.

Russia has long been a target of threats and propaganda in neighboring Moldova, especially during recent presidential elections and a referendum on stipulating a” European course” in the constitution.

The tiny nation made a move to lower its dependence on Russian gas, but it is still largely squat on a territorial level due to the separatist region of Transnistria, which had previously provided most of the nation’s electricity.

Despite these factors, the results were not what Moscow wanted. In both votes, a European direction was favored by the electorate. When the Transnistrian legislature in February 2024 appealed to Moscow for protection, none was forthcoming.

It’s fair to say that your power ranking has decreased when Moldova criticizes you.

Wounded but still dangerous

Not all recent events have had an impact on Moscow. The state’s economic dominance has led to the quick reconstruction of a weakened military and support for its technology sector in the near future. With Chinese assistance and evasion of sanctions, sufficient resources and energy will allow the conflict in Ukraine to continue.

Despite some ambiguous signals, Donald Trump’s election will likely favor Putin. A task force headed by Biden, which was established in the US, was threatened with tariffs and additional sanctions, as well as the US president’s threat to impose sanctions on Russian oligarchs who evaded sanctions.

Someone in the White House has publicly admired Putin, expressed doubts about US support for Ukraine, and hurriedly bullied America’s most enticing allies in Latin America, Canada, and Europe.

Most importantly, Trump’s eagerness to make good on his pledge to end the war may provide the Russian leader with a deal he can call a “victory”.

The shrinking of Russia’s world has not necessarily made Russia less dangerous, it could be quite the opposite. Some Kremlin observers contend that a more isolated Russia is less receptive to American economic pressure.

A retreating Russia and a troubled Putin might also choose to make even more careless threats and actions, such as those involving nuclear weapons, especially if reversing their policies in Ukraine would threaten his standing. It is, after all, Putin’s war.

The acrimonious dictum” Russia is never as strong as she looks… nor as weak as she looks” has been ominously rephrased by Putin himself as” Russia was never so strong as it wants to be and never so weak as it is thought to be” would be wise to all observers to take note of.

Ronald H Linden is professor emeritus of political science, University of Pittsburgh

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Trump, Putin and Xi as co-architects of brave new multipolar world – Asia Times

The Soviet Union’s decline and America’s current collapse have amazing connections. The Soviet Union was a failure because it marginalized the business community. Due to the ruling class’s marginalization of the working class, which has caused serious financial disparity and political polarization, the United States is faltering.

In his first name, Donald Trump resembled Boris Yeltsin, the destroyer of the ancient purchase. Trump may imitate Vladimir Putin’s playbook, a nationalist developer focused on home matters and rebuilding its business center, in his second term.

You Trump and Putin, along with China’s Xi Jinping, become the co-architects of a new multipolar world get?

Russia and the United States have more in popular than they would like to say. Both nations were born from revolutions against European empires and were founded on humanitarian political ideals ( freedom and social equality, respectively ), as American futurist Lawrence Taub noted in the 1980s. And both expanded by retaking control of the land by aboriginal peoples in the 19th century.

Additionally, both the US and Russia both have federated political systems and are generally European in origin. Although both have multiethnic populations, they are dominated by a single group ( WASPs in the US, Russians in Russia ) culturally, economically, and politically.

Cowboys and Russian

Alexis de Tocqueville and, more recently, Paul Dukes, in his book” The Emergence of the Super-Powers” ( 1970 ), also drew parallels between Russia and the United States.

According to Dukes, they had until recently held the view that it had a present life, a global goal, and that the other was the main impediment to its accomplishment. Also, they had the Cowboy/Cossack mystery and a connected inclination to see all political and religious issues in straightforward, black-and-white terms.

Both locations are powers with power attitudes. They are huge in size, close in people, and related in culture, temperate zone location and terrain. Both countries have substantial arms stockpiles and have decades of space exploration experience.

In the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev visited China under Deng Xiaoping. Deng successfully incorporated bourgeois concepts into the socialist system of China, promoting economic growth while preserving the Communist Party’s position of authority.

Gorbachev aimed for a similar transformation through perestroika ( economic restructuring ) and glasnost ( political openness ). He lacked the political will and administrative balance to carry out his vision, though.

His laws, in contrast to supervised reform, accelerated social fragmentation and economic decline, which led to the Soviet Union’s abolition in 1991.

In 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping pose with the Great Hall of the People. Image: Public Domain

The reforms that were carried out by Gorbachev opened the door for Yeltsin, a nationalist who capitalized on popular unpopularity with socialist rule. Alternatively of refining communism, Yeltsin dismantled it.

By scrapping Communist Party power, Yeltsin aimed to change Russia to a Western-style politics and marketplace economy. The end result was widespread corruption, common poverty, and the unregulated increase of elites, who consolidated their wealth at the expense of the Russian people.

It paved the way for a president who reimposed attempt and reclaimed Russia’s independence.

Putin’s fresh get

Clinton permitted the oligarchs to rule Russian scheme, but Vladimir Putin reined them and established state control. His method combined nationalism, financial control and, specifically, national independence, which had been under risk during the Yeltsin years.

Russia reaffirmed its position on the global stage under Putin, utilizing its military and energy resources to challenge European dominance. Although his autocratic strategies were contentious, he helped to restore Russia’s post-Soviet state’s standing as a powerful force.

Lenin speaks from atop a Russian tank in front of the pro-Trump protesters occupying Washington’s Capital on January 6, 2021, challenging the status quo. Image: Public Domain

In contrast to the Soviet Union, there is no such person as Gorbachev, a powerful leader who is valiant enough to press for structural reform.

In the midst of the 2008 financial crisis, Barack Obama had the chance to apply reform. But, rather than pushing architectural changes, Obama bailed out Wall Street. This choice exacerbated the economic inequality and fueled the nationalist uprising that precipitated Trump’s ascendancy.

Trump’s first president bore resemblance to Yeltsin’s career. Both officials disrupted the political creation, challenged entrenched leaders and thrived on nationalist rhetoric.

Trump’s second expression was marred by chaos, administrative collapse, and an emphasis on restoring the old order. His policies—such as trade war, deregulation and a target on nationalism—reflected a broader dismissal of the post-Cold War crony discussion.

Trump is now attempting to impose himself on the state machinery in his next term, much like Putin did in Russia.

Despite their similarities, but, Trump and Putin are different in their interactions with the super-rich. Putin, upon consolidating energy, curbed the effect of Russia’s elites, ensuring that the condition remained strong.

By comparison, Trump aligned himself with America’s wealthiest leaders, securing help from the super-rich who benefited from his tax laws and reform plan. The construction of the American political system—where corporate effect is greatly entrenched—makes a fundamental change doubtful.

Putin was able to organize energy in a way that Trump, constrained by British institutions and legal systems, may get difficult to replicate.

Toward a unipolar universe

A walk beyond superpower conflict and toward a unipolar world has become all but inevitable for many reasons, among them the conflict in Ukraine, the formation of BRICS, the US president’s unsustainable debt and China’s growing economic, scientific and political clout.

China is the world’s largest industrial producer and trading center. Red imports from China are more common than those from Germany or the US. Map created by&nbsp, reddit user creeper321448

When Trump and Putin solve the Ukrainian crisis, they will have an opportunity, in consultation with China, to go down in history as the co-architects of a multipolar world. The three countries could create a 21st-century-appropriate global order.

Capitalist and socialist ideologies, the two main political ideologies of the 20th century, are unique in China. The nation arguably lifted a billion people out of poverty by using 10, 20, and even 50-year plans, took the lead in most of the Industry 4.0 technologies that will shape the 21st century, and became the world’s indispensable industrial and trading nation.

With the Deng reforms of the 1970s, the Chinese rediscovered their 2, 500-year-old tradition of reconciling (yin-yang ) opposites, the basis of the Confucian Middle Way. Xi Jinping, the premier of China, will be able to serve as a mediator between Trump and Putin by presenting Confucian wisdom that has been updated for the twenty-first century.

Don’t be a capitalist or collectivist, be both

Don’t be a nationalist or globalist, be both

Don’t be a realist or idealist, be both.

Contrarian Chinese philosopher Chuang Tzu, who criticized the dangers of being firmly reliant on a fixed identity, belief, or worldview, could be quoted by Xi.

Without praises, without curses,

Now a dragon, now a snake, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

You transform with the times.

And never give in to being by one thing.

Continue Reading

Three reasons why gold’s record run is different – Asia Times

Gold opened in London January 31 at an all-time history of$ 2.845 an ounce. Platinum is a form of protection from political and financial disasters. More specifically, it has become a special insurance coverage against systemic risk, breaking apart from other resources it used to record – foreign assets and other metals, for instance, as well as inflation-linked Treasuries.

That may worry politicians in Washington.

Trump declared during his election plan,” I may end the war in Ukraine, I will stop the panic in the Middle East, and I will stop World War III from occurring,” adding,” You have no idea how near we are.” Trump vowed to put an end to the Ukraine War within a time of taking office, but peace is still not in view. The West didn’t accept Russia’s primary need for Ukrainian neutrality. Nevertheless, Russia continues to crush out regular gains.

What will the US would if Russia wins the military in a significant way over Ukraine? No single knows, and the price of end-of-the-world healthcare continues to rise.

Gold’s document work is distinctive in three ways.

First, gold stopped trading with other metals, including gold, copper and various professional metal. That partnership lasted from 2007 until the close of 2023. Gold has increased significantly over the past year, while another metal have not.

Next – as we have noted usually – gold traded in combination with the supply of inflation-protected US Treasuries, or TIPS. Both are types of protection against sudden inflation and serious dollar depreciation. However, after the US and its allies seize$ 300 billion of Russian foreign exchange reserves in March 2022, gold became decoupled from TIPS provides. A plan of insurance that the insurer may seize at will is less appealing than gold in a central bank vault.

Third: Different currencies used to indicate a wall against the dollar. The Japanese renminbi, an alternative to the penny, was almost tracked by the silver price. However, in 2022, this marriage ended. For one thing, Japan’s government debt is now 250 % of GDP ( twice the US figure of 120 % ), and the central bank owns more than half of that debt. Japan’s inflation has crept up, eroding consumer purchasing power and weakening the region’s political organizations. The japanese is no longer a haven for foreign currency investors. The Euro, which has the bag of fragile and depressed markets like France and Italy, is not.

The United States must sell more than a trillion dollars of assets to the rest of the world annually with a trade deficit of$ 1.2 trillion and a net international investment position of negative$ 25 trillion. Five years ago, foreign investors stopped purchasing US bill, and since then, the country has been selling tech companies to foreigners to help it balance its trade deficit. A stock market selloff may have negative effects on the US dollar.

During his confirmation hearings, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pointed out that the US federal deficit, which ranges between 6 % and 7 %, is unprecedented for a time without war or recession. As I wrote December 20 in Asia Times, the gap may be Trump’s rival. American businesses now have the ability to cover the majority of the US government’s gap since 2020 as a result of foreign central banks ‘ reductions in their investments of US Treasuries. However, to get interest-sensitive personal investors, it will require either lower interest rates to help banks purchases of Treasuries, which are expansionary, or higher yields on government loan.

Both the global financial picture and the geopolitical balance are becoming more dangerous. Gold’s cost run provides a disturbing measure of risk perceptions, and it has evolved into a unique hedge against both types of risk.

Continue Reading

Australia’s opposition overtly cozying up to China – Asia Times

When Peter Dutton was questioned this week about whether a Coalition authorities would continue to promote business relations with China, he unwaveringly stated that” the partnership with China will be much stronger than it is under the Albanese authorities.”

Two factors stood up: Dutton’s individual good speech, and his evident confidence about the future of Australia-China relationships.

It’s not uncommon for opposition leaders to undertake a renovation, to their people or policy, as an election approaches. Anthony Albanese gained new cups and lost pounds. Previously, he’d made Labor a little plan target.

Dutton tries to soften some aspects while maintaining the “hard guy” stereotype on others.

Mid-last time Dutton said:” I’m pro-China and the connection that we have with them. I want to strengthen our buying marriage. There are many companies in this area that rely on it, so we need to make sure we strengthen the trading marriage. However, we must be realistic about attempting to maintain peace because [ …] we live in a very uncertain time. The Prime Minister also asserts that the most difficult time has passed since the Second World War, and he is correct that we must work hard for serenity as well.

Contrast Dutton’s 2021 position as defence minister. Does the Foreign state want to hold other nations? Never in my wisdom. However, they do view us as watershed state. Our nation has fought against this retreat of independence and any disregard for the worldwide law of law since Federation.

Dutton has never altered his opinion of China. Instead, he’s camouflaged them with a softer voice, and in what he chooses to stress. Naturally, things have changed and Australia presently has a much better relationship with China. But tremendously, Dutton needs to appeal to the local Chinese-Australian citizens.

At the 2022 election, the Democrats took a big hit among citizens of Chinese heritage.

The party’s review of its election performance, undertaken by former party director Brian Loughnane and frontbencher Jane Hume, said:” In the top 15 seats by Chinese ancestry the swing against the Party ( on a 2PP basis ) was 6.6 %, compared to 3.7 % in other seats. Nowadays, there are more than 1.2 million Chinese citizens living in Australia. During this legislative session, reestablishing the Party’s partnership with the Chinese community may be top of mind.

Reid and Bennelong in NSW and Chisholm and Aston in Victoria are peripheral Work votes that the Democrats want to win because of the significance of the Chinese voting. This weekend, Dutton ( and the PM) will go a Lunar New Year festival in Box Hill in Melbourne.

It’s significant that David Coleman, named by Dutton next trip as the opponent’s new spokeswoman on international matters, has worked extensively with the Taiwanese community.

The talented James Paterson, one of the finalists for the position, was one of them. Paterson’s continued involvement in domestic politics may have had stronger justifications, but his hardline attitude toward China might have been a part of the equation.

Talking up the good side of the Coalition’s report on China, Dutton harked back to the filing of the free trade agreement under the Abbott state, and said” we want there to be common respect in the relationship”.

Over its years in government, the Coalition’s partnership with China has varied between rational compassion and suspicious anger. Things started to get worse when the Turnbull state called China out over international intervention, passed legislation, and removed Huawei from the 5G network.

The Morrison state therefore demanded an investigation into the causes and management of the Covid outbreak in Wuhan, which considerably sunk.

Despite Dutton’s optimism, it’s more than probable that, regardless of who is in charge, managing the China marriage after the vote might be more difficult than it has been during this one.

The Albanese state is cite the significantly improved diplomatic relationship as one of its most significant efforts in foreign policy. China has brought Australia out of the deep freeze, lifting the A$ 20 billion ( US$ 12.4 billion ) worth of trade barriers it had imposed. Governmental and speech markets have resumed. Albanians are favored in China.

The debate surrounding the new Taiwanese artificial intelligence system DeepSeek comes just as the latest sign of persistent security doubts regarding Chinese technology’s penetration.

( Incidentally, Dutton has an account on the Chinese-owned TikTok– despite it being banned from official government devices – in part to engage with the local Chinese community, as well as with younger people generally. )

Australia’s minerals business is likely prone to Taiwanese displeasure. The Senate, in the next month, will consider the government’s Potential Made in Australia policy, which provides a tax opportunity for processing essential nutrients.

The Chinese have a stronghold in this running and have shown a commitment to use it, such as against Japan. Producers in Australia have had a negative impact from China’s multi-billion money investment in nickel processing in Indonesia.

The change in Australian government undoubtedly contributed to the improvement in the diplomatic relationship, but it was also heavily influenced by China’s individual interests. Also, the future of the connection is more in China’s hands than in Australia’s.

China analyst Richard McGregor, from the Lowy Institute, says:” Relations with China are essentially dangerous. The day-by-day connections have returned to a degree of normal. However, all of the fundamental stresses that led to animosity are also present.

These include China’s “military confidence in the region, contest between the US and China, Australia’s worry about foreign meddling and hackers, China’s efforts to build their strength in the Pacific at the cost of Australia. None of that has gone aside”, McGregor says. The biggest change in recent years is that China has grown significantly more effective and willing to spread its wings.

Australia may find itself in the fire if there is a major deterioration in the US-China connection under Donald Trump, especially if his price policy causes a trade war. Simon Jackman, from the University of Sydney, warns that if US policy hit the ( already struggling ) Chinese economy, that would affect Australian exporters.

According to Jackman,” US tariffs or transfer bans that slowed China’s market do cause some short-medium headaches for American exporters.” If global supply chains had to re-equilibrate in response to an revolution in the US-China trade relationship, Australian export business may find themselves looking for opportunities abroad, as in Trump Mark 1 and Covid.

Surprisingly, the earlier search for diverse markets when the Chinese imposed restrictions on American producers may have helped exporters prepare for such a disaster.

Michelle Grattan is academic fellow, University of Canberra

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

Continue Reading

New START talks as a path to Ukraine peace – Asia Times

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Russian President Vladimir Putin is ready to meet with Donald Trump to discuss&nbsp, ending the Ukrainian conflict&nbsp, and&nbsp, resuming arms control talks &nbsp, after the American leader&nbsp, told the Davos elite&nbsp, last week that he’d like to do both with his Russian counterpart as soon as possible.

Since the New START will disappear in February 2026, but the negotiation process has been halted since 2023, their mention of resuming hands power discussions is important. Here, here, and here are context briefings on the subject.

To put it simply, the balance of nuclear and related forces ( like delivery systems ) between Russia and the US, the two nations with the most significant arsenals by far, is a big factor in global strategic stability.

By the time the Old Cold War was over, they realized how harmful and materially burdensome such programs were and agreed to limited cuts and checking measures.

This helped them overcome their security ambiguity, which refers to one side’s defensively intended moves ( such as building nukes for deterrence ) being perceived by their rival as offensively intended ( such as preparing for an overwhelming first strike ) and thus triggering an escalation cycle.

Their security problem returned, though, according to NATO’s east expansion. With their substitute conflict in Ukraine, it then advanced to a new risky stage, which could get worse if the New START expires without a successor.

Trump made the decision to resume the nuclear talks with Russia and China, which he claimed were on the verge of success before the 2020 election, which is why he brought this up during his video conference at Davos.

To be sure, he might have exaggerated the chances of coming to a deal had he won in the past, especially since China was reluctant to do it and Russia demanded ( as Peskov did ) British and French nuclear cuts, as well ( as Peskov did ).

The point of this explanation is to demonstrate that resuming US-Russian discussions on arms control may speed up the Russian peace process pending the outcome of the latter, which was encourage reciprocal compromises in this regard.

It can only be speculated what form that could take, but some of the proposals at the end of this analysis&nbsp, here &nbsp, and the one that was elaborated on&nbsp, here &nbsp, could be in the cards if both sides have the political will.

The need to restart arms control discussions is more serious than ever, not just because the US-Russian safety conflict recently reached a dangerous juncture and because New START has already expired, but also because new weapons systems have been developed and deployed, such as Russian hypersonic Oreshniks.

A new international arms race may soon start, and given how these munitions is be&nbsp, comparable in power to nukes but without the radiation, it’s just a matter of time before the US and others catch up.

This potential rivalry wouldn’t really be between the US and Russia like it used to be, but it would almost certainly include all additional nuclear power as well as some non-nuclear says like Iran and others as well. Due to the hyper-proliferation of systems since the end of the Old Cold War.

Another important nuclear and/or missile forces can only be brought on board through a multilateral agreement, with a US-Russian cope at its core, to agree to reduce these weapons and stop others from obtaining them.

In reality, they may agree to accept UN Security Council sanctions against any non-signatory state who is formally accused of developing or using these weapons in secret, as well as against any signatory who is formally accused of stockpiling more of these weapons than agreed upon.

What is essentially being proposed in a new global security architecture, which calls for the contribution of all key people, is essentially the non-proliferation of cutting-edge non-nuclear arms.

There is still a long way to go before anything of the type is agreed to at the suggested level, which includes the delicate nitty-gritty details of monitoring mechanisms, but it is in every responsible nuclear and missile energy’s best interests to see this happen. This includes the delicate nitty-gritty details of monitoring mechanisms.

The only way to get there is to end the Russian conflict as quickly as possible through a number of pragmatist mutually agreeable agreements in order for the US-Russian core of the world proper protection system to work on this front.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind consent. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, below.

Continue Reading

Trump doesn’t talk softly, but does he carry a big stick? – Asia Times

Donald Trump, the president of the United States, claims to be an agent of great change both domestically and internationally. However, a closer examination of the possibility that he’ll overturn previous foreign policy decisions, including those made by his predecessor Joe Biden, suggests that the extent of his adjustments might not be in line with his New Golden Age language.

It’s unusual to change a plan from president to president. According to experts, free promises of remarkable shifts can be socially dangerous when they backfire.

” Across administrations—even people as diverse as those of Biden and Trump – foreign policy is something like an iceberg”, Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security, wrote lately. The apparent portion is sharp and gleaming, and it draws a lot of the attention. Yet it also has a much bigger and underexamined base, one that tends to be largely unchanged”.

Current examples of promises that were implied or broken were also present.

Clinton situation: China MFN position

Clinton, the Democratic Party’s nominee for president in 1991, accused the first President Bush of being smooth on China, disregarding its human rights record for business benefits, while running against Republican incumbent George H. W. Bush. Clinton vowed to be more tough.

He was no.

Shortly after Clinton’s arrival in Washington, human rights came in second place, trailing only American businesspeople’s desire to capitalize on Chinese trading. Clinton offered China the&nbsp, business benefits conferred by most-favored-nation position, which guarantees non-discriminatory care between business associates. China may benefit from just making a small political movement or two at home.

The petition was rejected by Chinese officials. Clinton provided MFN anyhow.

Obama scenario: Arab chemical arms

President Barak Obama issued a stern warning to Palestinian leader Bashar al-Assad not to use chemical arms against rebels in 2012 after he had begun his second term in office. &nbsp, Doing so would mix a “red range” and result in serious US military action.

A year later, Assad bombarded pro-democracy residents with hazardous chemicals, and killed some 1, 400 people, women and children. Obama only laid the blame on the US Congress for forogling military actions.

Trump has three significant pieces of executive power left over from the previous leadership: the end of the Gaza conflict, forceful China in East Asia, and the Ukraine war. He might discover that politics benefits more from choice.

Then Ukraine

Biden vehemently supported Ukraine and decidedly detested Putin himself. In the runup to the November vote, Trump described Vladimir Putin as a “genius” and seemed ready to break with Biden plans.

Last year, however, Trump changed his tune. Acclaim for Putin morphed into mockery. ” It’s a ridiculous war”, he said of the Ukraine carnage. ” I think Russia’s going to be in big trouble”.

He said Putin is” not doing so well”, suggested that the Russian president’s leadership was” no way to run a state”. Trump said Putin had made a “big oversight” by invading Ukraine.

One important feature of his counterpart’s legislation that Trump now shared: opposiiton to sending US troops to fight the Russians.

Trump is inherited a pair of significant crises, aside from Russia, and it appears he is never considering making a reversal from current policies, including a belligerent China and a Middle Eastern conflict.

China

Washington’s reactions to the three governments have been careful because China has increased its threat to Taiwan and established marine isolation areas in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

Obama was concerned about China’s expanding economic dominance in the US market, but he frequently supported Beijing’s bourgeois stance. Nevertheless, he coined the phrase “pivot to China”, to attempt the US to bolster security in the Western Pacific.

Trump followed up during his 2017-2021 second phrase, and warned of increasing Chinese military strength. He claimed that Beijing was attempting to “displace the US in the Indo-Pacific area, expand the reach of its state-driven economic unit, and rearrange the region in its favour.” He increased US military spending by about 17 % compared to Obama’s.

In addition, Trump tried to rebalance US trade with China, an action that had little effect on China’s exports to the US ( they increased ) or American exports into China ( they decreased ).

After Biden took strength, he maintained and expanded Trump’s taxes. He even built on Trump’s and Obama’s China fears by &nbsp, beginning to revive traditional relationships along the China Seas and into the Pacific Ocean: with &nbsp, South Korea, Japan, The Philippines and Australia. Chinese leader Xi Jinping signaled his irritation with the move, accusing Biden of trying to” contain” China.

Trump has never spoken of undoing Biden’s job.

His choice of two China hawks to direct his foreign interests team, including new secretary of state Marco Rubio and former head of the country Michael Waltz, is widely regarded as strong on Beijing.

Rubio had a telephone conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and was informed in his post the week before being confirmed. The conversation centered on the” United States ‘ responsibility to our allies in the region.” According to a State Department consideration, he even expressed” critical concern over China’s aggressive behavior against Taiwan and in the South China Sea.”

Wang reacted with a dose of condescension-infused proper diplomacy. ” We will not help Taiwan to be separated from China”, Wang said. Wang finally added a term used by teachers to chastise rebellious kids,” I hope you will operate accordingly”, which roughly translates as “behave yourself”.

Waltz has praised Biden’s alliance building in Asia, a rare piece of praise in highly partisan Washington. Shortly after his nomination, he called China the “greatest adversary” of the United States.

Trump has yet to remark, or remake, one of Biden’s most surprising declarations. In a dozen statements, Biden pledged that if Beijing attacks Taiwan, which China considers its own, the US will militarily defend it. The statements violated almost a half-century of US” strategic ambiguity” intended to keep China guessing what the Americans would do if they invaded the island.

Middle East

Trump wants to put an end to the conflict between Israel and Hamas, the Islamist terror organization, in the Middle East. He supports Israel, which is one of the longest-lasting constants of US foreign policy. Nonetheless, he has expressed horror at the heavy death toll among Palestinians.

Trump and Bidden entered into a diplomatic partnership as he was getting ready to travel back to Washington. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu objected to Biden’s attempts to reach a truce despite the US administration sending naval warships to the Levantine coast to deter Iranian attacks on the Jewish state.

Trump worked to get Netanyahu to agree to a 42-day ceasefire, by adding enticements to the diplomatic pressure. Beyond anything Biden had to offer, both sweeteners went:

  • He would direct the US to levy sanctions on Netanyahu’s allies who occupy West Bank settlements and brutally assault Palestinian residents.
  • He also suggested a radical solution to the issues that Palestinians will encounter when they return to their severely damaged homes in the community. He suggested moving more than half of the two million people into Egypt and Jordan.

Trump said the exile could be for a short time or “long-term”.

The offers appealed to Netanyahu. A significant portion of the electorate supports his government, according to settlers. Moreover, Netanyahu has long favored” transfer” of Palestinians from both Gaza and the West Bank to Arab countries. He was once associated with an organization called” Jordan is Palestine, Inc”.

The neo-transfer idea died quickly. Egypt and Jordan rejected hosting expelled Palestinians.

The truce agreement, which includes an unrestricted Israeli exit from the Gaza Strip, may face problems in the future.

Ultra-nationalist members of Netanyahu’s government coalition are threatening to bring&nbsp, down the government. Hamas must be totally destroyed, they insist, and Israel forces must stay in the Gaza Strip for an open-ended period occupation, they said. They remarked that their demands were objectives that Netanyahu had set out.

If the Netanyahu government falls, it’s not clear if a new coalition can be built. The public at large wants Hamas destroyed. Elections would take time and undermine Trump’s desire to end the war immediately.

In short, it’s likely that Trump’s deal-making skill will face plenty of challenges before the Gaza war is over.

Continue Reading

Trump’s Columbia beatdown a message to China, Russia – Asia Times

Gustavo Petro, the president of Colombia, initially believed he would adjust strained relationships with his returning US rival by immediately rejecting two recently agreed military flights for the repatriation of his government’s illegal immigrants, but he was finally taught an unforgettable lesson.

Trump&nbsp, reacted with fury&nbsp, by threatening 25 % taxes that would twice in a year’s time and sanctions high-level officers on national security reasons among other disciplinary measures, which immediately prompted Petro&nbsp, to surrender.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt then&nbsp, confirmed&nbsp, her country’s triumph in its short dispute with Colombia, soon after which Petro&nbsp, rage-tweeted a complex rant&nbsp, about imperialism and racism as a parting shot against Trump that was frequently met with scorn online, particularly from Americans.

Trump’s handling of this brief-lived scandal was significant because he demonstrated how serious he is about using tariffs and sanctions to coerce Ibero-American nations into accepting the return of their repatriated citizens.

He won the 2016 election in part because of his campaign pledge to stop illegal immigration along the southern border, but after an estimated 8 million illegals flooded into the country during Biden’s term, he then promised to expulse as many as possible if voters returned him to power like they did in the end.

However, it’ll be challenging to return all of them, which is why his administration wants to coerce them into voluntarily resigning by making the most difficult conditions for those who remain.

In order to intimidate some of them into returning home on their own terms, ergo the importance of making sure these flights aren’t rejected by sending them back to their homelands on military flights, including what just happened to some illegal immigrants from Brazil.

In parallel with this, the Trump Administration is&nbsp, exploring an agreement&nbsp, to deport asylum seekers to El Salvador, which is now globally known for its zero-tolerance of gang members.

On the topic, US-sanctioned Venezuela&nbsp, halted&nbsp, repatriation flights last February after&nbsp, briefly allowing&nbsp, their resumption in October 2023, so suspected Venezuelan gang members might be sent straight from the US to Salvadoran prisons if a deal is reached.

People who remain in the US illegally will always have to look over their shoulders and be afraid of being deported back to their homelands or sent to El Salvador, depending on who they are, with an unprecedented ramping up of ICE raids across the country.

Trump’s harsh response to Petro’s rejection of those two previously agreed military flights is due to the fact that the Trump administration recognizes illegal immigration as a threat to national security.

If he didn’t inspire others to follow him, the majority of Ibero-American nations would, as one might expect, defy the US on this front as well, ruining his ambitious repatriation plans. Trump, therefore, had to remind Colombia and every other country in the hemisphere that they’re the US ‘ junior partner.

Failure to comply with its reasonable demands for repatriated citizens who illegally immigrated to the US will result in severe tariff and sanctions that will threaten their economies and severely inconvenience their political elite.

In what Trump called the nascent” Golden Age of America,” disrespecting Trump and the US personally as Petro did is completely unacceptable, and those who do so will be forced to pay the price, both politically and personally.

Regarding the assertion that every nation is supposed to be equal and must adhere to the same rules, the Biden administration falsely claimed that the so-called “rules-based order” was never what it was.

It was always about upholding the US’s declining unipolar hegemony in the emerging Multipolar World Order by strengthening the post-Old Cold War international hierarchy that dominated where it is now. To coax countries into meeting goals with varying success, a carrot-and-stick strategy pairs explicit double standards with.

Like most Ibero-American nations, those that are dependent on the US market and/or military equipment are more reliant on it, while those who are more autarkic and strategically independent are more receptive.

Trump is more direct than the Obama and Biden administrations, trying to hide this reality with lofty rhetoric and occasionally blinding its partners in ways like those Ibero-American nations that have previously refused to accept their repatriated citizens.

He doesn’t feel guilty about disclosing their junior status in the US because, per Machiavelli, he prefers his country to be feared over loved.

Additionally, Trump is preparing for&nbsp, negotiations with Putin&nbsp, over Ukraine as well as with Xi over trade and likely also Taiwan, so he’d appear weak in their eyes if he let middling leader like Petro publicly defy and even insult him without consequence. He became more aggressive with Colombia because of these demands.

The example that Trump just made out of Petro will, therefore, reverberate across the world. The” Golden Age of America,” as he affectionately describes it, is the US’s most extreme form of hyper-realism in foreign affairs, which explicitly declares its goals and aggressively pursues them without considering the opinions of other countries.

Thus, it might be better for Russia and China to&nbsp, compromise with the US&nbsp, instead of challenge it if they won’t replicate this policy, or if they lack the same power or will to use it.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

Continue Reading

Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ stirring expanded war fears in the Baltic – Asia Times

Tensions between local nations and an increased NATO appearance have been the result of numerous instances of suspected Russian-linked damage of underwater wires in the Baltic Sea.

The Scandinavian coast protect boarded a ship in the Baltic Sea on January 26 on suspicion of outlet drag and alleged damage of vital undersea cables that run through the area.

Additionally, Latvia conducted a ship search of the incident to discover fiber-optic wires ‘ injuries. The Russian vessel is now under inspection. The ship’s user has denied any involvement in damage.

The countries along the Baltic Sea coastline have started stationing military ships at sea every day and have started to worry about suspected destroy of their underwater facilities in recent months due to ships deliberately drag their anchors along the seabed.

Anchor drag can quickly damage important underwater system. Russia has denied involvement in these situations. However, there are also reliable information that Russia has been conducting undersea system mapping.

NATO increased its local naval presence in response to rising concerns about network protection by launching the Baltic Sentry vision on January 14 and adding maritime patrol vessels to its list of local marine bases.

What’s the perspective?

As vessels pass through the Baltic Sea, there have been numerous studies in recent months of harm being done to subterranean cables. Attacks on underwater cords are comparable to conventional operations in espionage and knowledge.

This activity is conducted at a level that is comparable to warfare, intended to send specific signals to hostile powers. The intention could be to convey that the ability to effectively cut off and isolate people from the outside world is present.

These cords are extremely important. They are used to move online traffic, gas, and power between nations. Additionally, recent events have resulted in a decrease in the amount of light that can be transported, despite the fact that this has not already resulted in widespread power outages.

Another issue is that destruction to digital wires could thwart the flow of financial market data. Due to its sensitive nature, this is especially prone.

Map of the Baltic Sea.
Map: PorcupenWorks / Shutterstock

How does cables get protected?

Protecting the connectors is a difficult endeavor. Due to the idea of high seas freedom of navigation, there is little that can be actually done to stop another warships from crossing the seas and oceans. And Russia has a right of passage for its ships, for instance, from St Petersburg to the North Sea.

Without really seizing the vehicle or preventing its advancement in any way, investigations into apparent threats may be conducted. This can be accomplished by combining GPS tracking data with other data, such as witness testimony, and using GPS tracking data.

Targeting these cables may help a country fight its adversaries in a more subtle way and without the threat of armed conflict, despite the possibility of natural causes.

YouTube video

]embedded material]

A fleet suspected of being involved in damage was taken by the Scandinavian army.

Unintentional engagement is most likely to blame for the large volume of traffic on these oceanic cables. However, Russian military ships ‘ increased activity in mapping the Baltic Sea ground has raised questions.

To better understand where these cables are located, the most possible justification for the enhanced Russian ocean mapping activity. However, it might be a concept that this crucial infrastructure is difficult to defend and vulnerable to attack and damage.

Some merchant vessels are registered in international provinces, and equity can be hard to monitor. This gives a degree of believable denial over who may have directed or managed the businesses that might have damaged wires.

It makes taking action harder, but it also leads to charges that these boats are posing as part of Russia’s” shadow fleet.”

However, this more naval presence in the Baltic might serve as a barrier and give the wires greater safety. Sweden has then boarded a vehicle. Another drawback is that the country where the vehicle is registered is in no way required to cooperate with any research.

Various factors are even involved. The Baltic states and Finland have thoughts of the social control&nbsp, imposed upon them by the Russian government&nbsp, due to, and, in some cases, after, the Second World War, and this will add to the stress.

Russia’s war of Ukraine has heightened local concerns about what might transpire future. Moscow may be attempting to put more pressure on the European countries to stop them from continuing to support Ukraine by mounting tension along the coast.

However, increasing worry about Russia’s position of authority in the Baltic Sea may have the same result by escalating the tide of suspicion. It might also indicate that the Baltic and Nordic countries are more eager to spend more money on security and make plans for potential military action.

Matthew Powell is a training fellow in corporate and heat energy research, University of Portsmouth

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

Continue Reading

Snakebit UN: What happens after the US leaves the WHO? – Asia Times

Donald Trump’s plan to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization ( WHO ) has been met with dismay in the public health field. Some have called one of the US president ’s first executive orders “a grave error ” and “absolutely bad news. ”

The WHO is a United Nations agency that aims to expand universal health coverage, coordinates actions to health emergencies such as epidemics, and has a large emphasis on healthy life. It does not have the power to enforce heath plan but influences plan worldwide, especially in low-income places.

The WHO plays an important coordinating position in surveillance, reaction and policy for communicable and non-infectious illnesses. In reality, infectious diseases have the most pressing need for international cooperation.

Unlike non-communicable illnesses, diseases can spread quickly from one state to another, just as Covid spread to trigger a crisis.

T. Schneider/Shutterstock

We have much to thank the WHO for, including the eradication of smallpox, a miracle which could not have been achieved without international cooperation and authority. It has also played a major role in control of influenza and HIV.

Why does the US want to remove?

The causes for receiving include:

mishandling of the Covid-19 epidemic … and other global wellbeing crises, its failing to follow urgently needed reforms, and its ability to show independence from the improper political influence of WHO member states.

The professional buy also cites the wealthier higher bills the US makes to the WHO compared to China. In 2024-25, the US contributed 22 % of the organization’s mandatory funding from member states compared to approximately 15 % for China.

President Trump initiated departure from the WHO over related problems in 2020. But this was reversed by President Biden in 2021.

What happens future?

The departure may take a year to come into effect, and may require approval by the US Congress. How this will play out is vague, but it seems plausible the WHO will reduce US money.

The US removal may also be the final nail in the coffin for the WHO Pandemic Agreement, which faltered in 2024 when member state may not agree on the final document.

Trump’s professional order states all conversations around the epidemic agreement will continue. However, the buy clues that the US will look at working with global partners to address global health.

The US Centers for Disease and Control ( CDC ) already has such international partners and could feasibly do this. It now convenes a global system of teaching in pandemic response, which could provide a model. But to move in this direction needs finessing, as another target of the fresh US state is to reduce or stop foreign aid.

The WHO likewise convenes a range of professional commissions and network of research facilities. One among many sites of lab is for virus, comprising more than 50 laboratories in 41 member says. This includes five “super labs”, one of which is at the CDC. It’s questionable what may happen to like networks, many of which have significant US components.

With the threat of bird flu mutating to become a people crisis these international systems are critical for monitoring of pandemic risks.

Flock of chicks
Global networks are needed to keep an eye on pandemic threats, including the spread of bird flu. Photo: riza korhan oztunc / Shutterstock via The Conversation

WHO expert committees also drive global health policy on a range of issues. It is possible for the WHO to accredit labs in non-member countries, or for experts from non-member countries to be on WHO expert committees. But how this will unfold, especially for US government-funded labs or experts who are US government employees, is unclear.

Another potential impact of a US withdrawal is the opportunity for other powerful member nations to become more influential once the US leaves. This may lead to restrictions on US experts sitting on WHO committees or working with the organization in other ways.

While the US withdrawal will see the WHO lose funding, member states contribute about 20 % of the WHO budget. The organization relies on donations from other organizations ( including private companies and philanthropic organizations ), which make up the remaining  80 %.

So the US withdrawal may increase the influence of these other organizations.

A chance for reform

The Trump administration is not alone in its criticism of how the WHO handled COVID and other infectious disease outbreaks.

For example, the WHO agreed with Chinese authorities in early January 2020 there was no evidence the “mystery pneumonia” in Wuhan was contagious, while in reality, it was likely already spreading for months. This was a costly mistake.

There was criticism over WHO’s delay in declaring the pandemic, stating Covid was not airborne ( despite evidence otherwise ). There was also criticism about its investigation into the origins of Covid, including conflicts of interest in the investigating team.

The WHO was also criticized for its handling of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa a decade ago. Eventually, this led to a series of reforms, but arguably not enough.

Old sign in French warning about Ebola
Reforms followed the Ebola epidemic in West Africa a decade ago. But were they enough? Photo: Sergey Uryadnikov / Shutterstock

More changes needed

US public health expert Ashish Jha argues for reform at WHO. Jha, who is the dean of the Brown University School of Public Health and former White House COVID response coordinator, argues the organization has an unclear mission, too broad a remit, poor governance and often prioritizes political sensitivities of member states.

He proposes the WHO should narrow its focus to fewer areas, with outbreak response key. This would allow reduced funding to be used more efficiently.

Rather than the US withdrawing from the WHO, he argues the US would be better to remain a member and leverage such reform.

Without reform, there is a possibility other countries may follow the US, especially if governments are pressured by their electorates to increase spending on domestic needs.

The WHO has asked the US to reconsider withdrawing. But the organization may need to look at further reforms for any possibility of future negotiations. This is the best path toward a solution.

C Raina MacIntyre is professor of global biosecurity, NHMRC L3 research fellow, head, biosecurity program, Kirby Institute, UNSW Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

US and Spain careening toward a strategic breakdown – Asia Times

Under the Trump presidency, the future of US-Spain relationships appears to be moving along a way to fix a proper conundrum. On the one hand, the American and Spanish security and intelligence communities communicate a genuine desire to enhance and deepen their bilateral safety agreement.

For Madrid, that stems from the strategic calculus that it is better to hedge with the United States to avoid overdependence, misalignment, and uncertainty in Spain-European Union ( EU) relations. For Washington, that stems from the social essential for greater corporate independence in Europe and increased burden-sharing in North Africa and the Sahel.

On the other hand, the Americans and Spanish find themselves on opposite sides of the political debates over the spending targets for North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NATO ) member states, ongoing military operations by the Israeli Defense Forces in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and the impact of Silicon Valley on democracy.

The concern for both countries is that it is clear that there are significant events on the horizon, quite as NATO Summit 2025 and South Africa ’s massacre circumstance against Israel trials, that will provide huge policy windows for the Trump administration and the 119th United States Congress to work on their problems.  

The US National Security Council may, therefore, try to take some stress out of the program by engaging in strategic partnership control in a way that strikes the right stability between political grievances and geopolitical interests on both sides.  

One option that they should consider is to immediately relocate select military units from Naval Station Rota ( Spain ) to Ksar Saghir Naval Base ( Morocco ). That includes the Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team ( FAST ) Company Europe. That move do have distinct advantages.

Second, it may solve a communications magnification concern for the White House. Next, it would take an earlier message to the Government of Spain that the strategic relationship is in danger of a break. Third, it would provide a mechanism for broadening and deepening security cooperation between Morocco and the United States, which will be necessary if the Trump administration chooses to abandon the strategic partnership with Spain.

Since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, there has generally been a strong bilateral security relationship between Spain and the United States. In terms of security cooperation, the Government of Spain has regularly deployed its armed forces to fight alongside the United States and other NATO member states.

Examples include Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. The Government of Spain has also deployed its armed forces to conduct large-scale non-traditional security operations with the United States and other NATO member states. Examples include Libya, Somalia, and Yemen.

In terms of global posture, Spain hosts an important node in the American overseas basing network. Naval Station Rota ( NS Rota ) is a critical node for logistical support and strategic presence in Europe and Africa. Among other things, NS Rota hosts Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team ( FAST ) Company Europe.

FAST Company Europe is responsible for providing security forces for strategic weapons and rapid response and forward-deployed expeditionary anti-terrorism security forces in large parts of Europe and Africa. This includes evacuations of US diplomatic posts in times of crisis.

That said, there have been some major hiccups in the strategic partnership along the way. One occurred during the first Trump administration. That was over the extension of NS Rota. At the time, the Government of Spain sought to use that extension as leverage in bilateral trade negotiations. That did not go over well with The White House.

Strategic autonomy

Although the prime minister of Spain, Pedro Sanchez, once declared that he is “a militant pro-European, ” the Government of Spain has found it difficult to pursue its national interests and adopt a foreign policy of its preference solely through the European Union ( EU) and NATO.

His problem is that Spain’s national security and foreign policy interests are not fully aligned with the national security and foreign policy interests of other major European and NATO powers ( e. g. , France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Turkey ). To compound matters, Spanish citizens tend to have extremely unrealistic preferences for their government on matters of national security and foreign policy.

Examples include a strong desire for the establishment of a common foreign policy and a “true European army. ” As a consequence, the Sanchez administration faces a multidimensional challenge that is preventing his government from being able to “claim” what it perceives to be Spain’s rightful place in the international system.

Under the Trump administration, this dilemma presents a strong incentive for the Sanchez administration to try to pursue national interests and adopt a foreign policy of its preference with much less dependence on either the EU or NATO. That begs the question of how best to achieve such strategic autonomy given the scarce resources at Sanchez’s disposal.

One option would be for his administration to pursue greater strategic autonomy through increased hedging in North Africa and the Sahel. At present, most European countries are single mindedly transfixed on events unfolding in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Spain is watching the balance of power shift radically in North Africa and the Sahel with great apprehension. On the descent are the French, who have now been effectively expelled from their former colonial possessions across the Sahel.

This has left a strategic void throughout the region that other powers have sought to exploit in different ways. Some are internal powers like Algeria and Morocco. Others are external powers such as China, Israel, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

In Italy and Spain, this power struggle is viewed as a serious risk to their national security and foreign policy interests. The Sanchez administration, therefore, needs to try to mitigate these risks. Despite Sanchez’s personal animosity toward President Trump and “ultra-Right wing American billionaires, ” the most obvious option would be to try to broaden and deepen its strategic partnership with the United States.

The problem is that the Trump administration does not respond well to world leaders who launch public attacks on his supporters. Nor does the National Security Council want to repeat the past mistakes of the Elysee Palace.

The Trump administration faces its own strategic conundrum. The White House knows that there is a clear and present strategic imperative to fill the power projection void that currently exists in North Africa and the Sahel. However, it does want to take on more financial burdens for American taxpayers in the process.

Faced with this two-way pull, the Trump administration has a strong incentive to search for allies and partners who are willing and able to assume a large part of the burden at their own expense. Finding the right allies and partners will prove difficult, though.

There might be some interest in the NATO bloc from Turkey. There might also be some interest in the Major Non-NATO Ally bloc from Israel, Morocco, and Qatar. And there might be some interest in the Gulf Cooperation Council from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

However, all of these options come with strings attached. Some also come with daggers drawn. Whatever choice is made, none would be seen as a perfect substitute for the United States in the eyes of the Spanish military and intelligence agencies.

Some will not have sufficient power to be able to stabilize the region. Others may have sufficient power but their national security and foreign policy interests will not be well-aligned with the Government of Spain and the Spanish Royal Family.

If the Trump administration offloads the alliance burden inherited from the French onto others, then it is reasonable to expect that the Sanchez administration will pursue secondary against those American burden-sharing partners.

That would interject more complexity into US-Spain relations, which would run the risk of further destabilizing the strategic partnership.

American grievances

The problem with multi-level hedging is that there is already a lot of tension in US-Spain relations without it. On the American side, this largely stems from two major grievances.

First, there is strong opposition against the failure of the Sanchez administration to act on spending targets for NATO member states. In 2024, the Government of Spain reportedly spent a meager 1. 3 % of its gross domestic product ( GDP ) on defense expenditures. Without adjustments, that puts Spain “dead last ” among NATO member states.

That reality stands in sharp contrast to the 5 % target that has been set by President Trump. Second, there is equally strong opposition against the choices made by the Sanchez administration about how to respond to Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip.

Over the last year, the Government of Spain has recognized the State of Palestine. It has intervened in the South African genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice ( ICJ). And it has reportedly blocked “American-flagged ships from using its ports because it believed the vessels were carrying military equipment to Israel. ”

These moves have infuriated both Israel and the United States. As evidence, the Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz sent the following message to the Spanish prime minister on X: “Hamas thanks you for your service. ” In the coming months, the Spanish response is likely to draw renewed criticism from the Trump administration and 119th Congress for these moves.

The Government of Israel has asked members of Congress to put as much pressure as possible on South Africa to drop the case. Now, there are efforts well underway to impose Global Magnitsky Act sanctions on South African elites who have committed corruption and human rights violations. That includes providing material support to Hamas, Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.

If the first day of the second term of the Trump administration is any indication, winter is coming hard and fast for US-Spain relations too. Speaking at a technology industry conference, Prime Minister Sanchez went on the offensive against the “Silicon Valley techno caste” that he claims threatens democratic institutions.

According to Sanchez, Elon Musk and others are “trying to exercise absolute power over social media in order to control public discourse and as a result, government action in the west. ” For that reason, Sanchez urged other world leaders to “rebel and consider alternatives. ”

On the other side of the Atlantic, President Trump appeared to take his own jabs at the Sanchez administration. During a press conference at the Oval Office, Trump referred to Spain as “a BRICS nation. ” He then issued what appeared to be a thinly veiled threat: “Spain. Do you know what a BRICS nation is? You’ll figure it out. ”

Whatever the message President Trump was trying to convey, it ’s safe to assume that coercive measures against Spain are being discussed over the NATO spending thresholds and ICJ case in The White House and 119th US Congress. One should expect that those options will include some in-kind response to Sanchez’s attacks on Trump supporters.

If so, then the Trump administration could try to take a page out of the playbook for South Africa– a BRICS member state – and use Magnitsky sanction requests to try to expose Spanish elites who have committed corruption.

Proactive relationship management

With a cold front fast approaching, time is running out for both sides to course correct before there is a severe breakdown in the strategic partnership.

On that note, the Trump administration should take the initiative and immediately start imposing graduated pressure on the Sanchez administration to more fully align with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

One way to send such a signal would be to immediately relocate a small number of Rota-based military units to Morocco. These units should include FAST Company Europe. Such a move would have the following benefits.

First, it would mitigate the following risk. If there was an attack on a US diplomatic or military footprint by Hamas or another Iranian-backed terrorist organization within the areas of responsibility of the US Africa Command or US European Command, then the US Department of Defense might have to deploy FAST Company Europe from NS Rota.

That, in turn, might spur criticism from American and Israeli foreign policy experts who believe that the Sanchez administration has frustrated their efforts to eliminate these very organizations.

Second, it would send an unambiguous signal to the Government of Spain that the strategic partnership is in jeopardy. However, that signal would be so loud that it deafens both sides. That would open the door to conflict resolution efforts that might help to salvage the future of US-Spain relations.

Third, forward-deployed crisis response operations would provide a useful mechanism for broadening and deepening security cooperation between the militaries, foreign services and intelligence agencies of Morocco and the United States. For the Trump administration, that makes sense either way. Morocco is becoming an even more important security partner for Europeans and the United States “in the crisis-ridden Sahel. ”

However, it could also prove pivotal if the Trump administration makes the decision to freeze the strategic partnership between Spain and the United States.

Michael Walsh is an Affiliated Research Fellow at the Lasky Center für Transatlantische Studien at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. He is also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views expressed here are his own.  

Continue Reading