On a train from Pakistan to Russia via US-sanctioned Iran – Asia Times

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Pakistan Railways Freight CEO Sufiyan Sarfaraz Dogar&nbsp, announced&nbsp, last week that the second Russian-Pakistani transport coach service will release on March 15, transiting across Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

According to reports, the line will help Russian exports of industrial and agricultural products to Pakistan and Pakistan’s exports of agrarian and textile goods to Russia.

This is the most recent breakthrough in their relationship and has been in the doing for a long time. These are three major restaurants.

Iran’s unique position

Next month’s ideas show that Russia and Pakistan are prioritizing Iran over&nbsp, Afghanistan&nbsp, as the unique travel state for expanding their diplomatic deal. That’s reasonable considering continued Pakistani-Taliban hostilities, but it also carries risks.

Trump has &nbsp, already revived&nbsp, his first government’s “maximum pressure” legislation against Iran and is therefore expected to establish secondary restrictions against all companies that also deal with it without a cancellation.

Trump’s but serious about this that he&nbsp, threatened to change or rescind&nbsp, the exemption that his first leadership extended to India, which has invested heavily in Iran’s Chahabar Port, but he’ll consistently come down cruelly against Pakistan, too.

Therein lies the problem since Pakistan has proven in the past that it will comply with American sanctions against Iran, most infamously the one that’s obstructing their&nbsp, over-decade-long pipeline plans.

So, it will likely do the same with the US ‘ latest sanctions crackdown and, therefore, abandon this route for trade with Russia.

Pakistani-Taliban tensions

By relying on Afghanistan as their transit state, Russian-Pakistani trade could be conducted more cost-effectively and economically, but that won’t be possible as long as Pakistani-Taliban tensions continue.

In a nutshell, those tensions boil&nbsp, down&nbsp, to the Taliban suspecting that&nbsp, Pakistan’s de facto military junta&nbsp, is&nbsp, secretly allied with the US&nbsp, against it.

Pakistan, in contrast, accuses the Taliban of supporting terrorist organizations like Pashtun and Baloch ( perhaps as a counterbalance to restoring the fractious balance of power ).

Although Russia is&nbsp, better positioned than anyone else&nbsp, to mediate between them, it hasn’t yet formally done so, nor might it ultimately succeed in resolving the security dilemma at the core of their disputes.

That’s regrettable because relying on Iran increases the likelihood that Pakistan will fall victim to US pressure to impose secondary sanctions.

The self-evident solution is to patch up their problems for the greater good of Eurasian connectivity, but that’s a lot easier said than done.

Will to expand

Laudably, the will exists on both sides to expand bilateral trade in spite of the described obstacles. Quite clearly, there is still a&nbsp, faction/school of the Pakistani establishment&nbsp, that is serious about diversifying their country’s economic dependence on China and testing the limits of its traditional political dependence on the US, each by means of Russia. This suggests that senior citizens are placing a little weight between the two.

No one should be mistaken about India ever developing relations with non-traditional partners like Pakistan at this historic stage of the&nbsp, global systemic transition to multipolarity, despite the fact that everyone agrees that this needs to be done at India’s expense.

The combined effect of the above mentioned imperatives is that the parties are sincerely attempting to make good on their&nbsp, economic&nbsp, agreements&nbsp, from last year in pursuit of their complementary interests.

The imminent launch of the first Russian-Pakistani freight train service through Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan is a big deal, but the challenges Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy and persistent Pakistani-Taliban tensions could pose could limit bilateral trade.

The best-case scenario would therefore be for Pakistan to defy the US over Iran, address its issues with the Taliban, and rely instead on two trade routes to Russia, but that might be too much for its de facto military junta.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Kann die AfD die NATO retten? – Asia Times

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Ein existenzieller Wendepunkt für Europa

” Wir stehen an einem entscheidenden Wendepunkt für unsere Freiheit und Sicherheit”, erklärte Deutschlands&nbsp, Außenministerin&nbsp, Annalena&nbsp, Baerbock, der sie eine stärkere europäische Beteiligung an den Ukraine-Friedensverhandlungen forderte. Dieser Woche wurden Gespräche zwischen dem Präsidenten Donald Trump und Wladimir Putin initiiert.

Dieser Moment ist nicht nur eine Herausforderung für Europa, sondern auch für&nbsp, Baerbocks &nbsp, Partei, die Grünen, die sich als eine der lautstärksten Befürworter einer konfrontativen Haltung in der Ukraine-Frage positioniert haben. Trotz der Kriegstreiberei der Grünen gaben jedoch lediglich 9 % ihrer Mitglieder in Umfragen an, bereit zu sein, ihr Land aktiv zu verteidigen.

Europas Kriegsfalken do not want to pay or engage in combat. Ihr’s request to attend Friedensgespräche primarily stems from their excellent service to the international and sicherheitspolitical formation in Washington. Milliarden von Dollar sind von dort Jahr für Jahr&nbsp, durch USAID, das National Endowment&nbsp, for&nbsp, Democracy ( NED ) und prominente private Stiftungen an willfährige Europäer gezahlt worden.

” Brutal&nbsp, harte&nbsp, Amerikaner&nbsp, schockieren&nbsp, Europa”, &nbsp, titelte&nbsp, das&nbsp, Politico-Magazin&nbsp, des&nbsp, deutschen&nbsp, Springer- Konzerns in seiner aktuellen Ausgabe. Ein Sprecher des Weißen Hauses erklärte, zu Politico jährlich rund 8 Millionen Money an US-Subventionen erhalten habe.

Europa im Abseits

Der Schock über die geopolitischen Entwicklungen reicht weit über die Friedensgespräche zur Ukraine hinaus. Jacques Schuster, leitender Redakteur der” Welt”, bemängelte am 13. Februar, dass die Europäer&nbsp, und Ukrainer&nbsp, in diesen Verhandlungen „an den Katzentisch” &nbsp, verbannt wurden.

US-Präsident Donald Trump macht indes Ernst zu seiner jahrelangen Warnung: Die Vereinigten Staaten können und zu night länger für die europäische Verteidigung aufkommen. Am 13. Februar stellte Trump einen neuen globalen Sicherheitspakt zu Russland und China zur&nbsp, Diskussion, de es den USA&nbsp, ermöglichen würde, ihre Militärausgaben drastisch zu reduzieren.

” Sobald such die Lage beruhigt helmet, werde ich mich mit China und Russland zusammensetzen und vorschlagen, nicht wir unsere Militärausgaben senken. Wir könnten dieses Geld für andere wichtige Projekte nutzen”, but Trump.

Dies bedeutet, dass Europa zukünftig für river eigene Sicherheit sorgen time. Die einzige deutsche Partei, die eine klare Verteidigungsstrategie verfolgt, ist die&nbsp, Alternative für Deutschland ( AfD ). Sie füllt auf konservative Vakuum, &nbsp, das&nbsp, nach&nbsp, der&nbsp, politischen&nbsp, Neuausrichtung&nbsp, der&nbsp, Christdemokraten&nbsp, under Angela Merkel entstanden sind.

Die&nbsp, AfD und die&nbsp, Wehrpflicht

Merkel setzte 2011 die Wehrpflicht der, verbündete such später zu den Sozialdemokraten and forcierte eine grüne Energiepolitik, die den Atomausstieg vorantrieb. In einer Analyse von 22. März. Dezember 2024 stellten zu carnival, dass die AfD die einzige deutsche Partei ist, die eine umfassende Wiedereinführung der Wehrpflicht fordert.

Das Parteiprogramm der AfD erklärt dazu:

„Der Militärdienst ist ein ehrenvoller Dienst. Er sollte nicht primär und Eingriff in death Grundrechte verstanden sind, sondern und staatsbürgerliche Pflicht zur Wahrung von Frieden und Sicherheit.

Eine&nbsp, nationale&nbsp, Armee&nbsp, muss&nbsp, fest&nbsp, in&nbsp, der&nbsp, Gesellschaft&nbsp, verankert&nbsp, sein. &nbsp, Die&nbsp, Abschaffung&nbsp, der&nbsp, Wehrpflicht helmet diesem Verhältnis in nur wenigen Jahren erheblichen Schaden zugefügt”.

Auf&nbsp, dem&nbsp, AfD-Parteitag&nbsp, am&nbsp, 12. &nbsp, Januar&nbsp, in&nbsp, Riesa&nbsp, wollte&nbsp, Parteichef&nbsp, Tino&nbsp, Chrupalla&nbsp, die&nbsp, Wehrpflicht&nbsp, der republican Wahlprogramm streichen. Doch eine große Mehrheit von über 70 % de Delegierten stimmte dafür, zu und zentrales Wahlkampfthema zu behalten.

Der AfD-Bundestagsabgeordnete Jan-Wenzel Schmidt betonte gegenüber der “Asia Times”:

„Die AfD befürwortet die vollständige Wiedereinführung der Wehrpflicht. Sie bietet jungen Menschen eine Möglichkeit das persönlichen Entwicklung und leistet einen entscheidenden Beitrag das Verteidigungsfähigkeit Deutschlands.”

„Deutschland time unabhängiger von seinen Bündnispartnern zu. Die Bundeswehr sollte am Notfall in der Lage sein, das Land eigenständig zu verteidigen. Dafür braucht algorithm modern Waffensysteme und eine Stärkung der der Rüstungsindustrie”, fügte Schmidt hinzu.

„Dazu bedarf es der Anschaffung moderner Rüstungsgüter&nbsp, und des Ausbaus der eigenen Rüstungsproduktion, zu der die deutsche Industrie in hervorragender Lage ist”, fuhr ooh camp. „Die AfD bekennt such festival das NATO-Mitgliedschaft, sofern zu Bündnis an seiner Rolle der Verteidigungsbündnis festhält der nicht und globaler&nbsp, Aggressor auftritt”.

Niemand&nbsp, wird&nbsp, für&nbsp,” Europa” &nbsp, kämpfen&nbsp, und&nbsp, sterben, &nbsp, die&nbsp, amorphe&nbsp, supranationale&nbsp, Bürokratie, &nbsp, die&nbsp, in Brüssel sitzt. Aber Patrioten sind für ihr Land kämpfen, die Quelle ihrer Identität und das Vehikel für ihre Weitergabe an zukünftige Generationen.

Eine Rückkehr zur Wehrhaftigkeit?

Das Bekenntnis der AfD zu einer großen Bürgerarmee&nbsp, helmet tiefgreifende strategische Implikationen. Die Bundeswehr wurde durch Angela Merkel und ihren Nachfolger, mah sozialdemokratischen Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz, but sehr durch sie, dass sie keine einzige kampfbereite Division mehr aufstellen kann.

Deutschlands Verteidigungshaltung besteht darin, dass nichts zu keg, während zu sich unter dem amerikanischen Schutzschirm duckt befindet. Das ist eine unsichere der gefährliche Natur. Das Fehlen konventioneller Streitkräfte lenkt jede Krise on die nukleare Eskalationsleiter.

Helmut Schmidt. Foto: Wikimedia Commons

Helmut Schmidt erkannte diese Gefahr, dass ( West-) Deutschland zu einem nuklearen Schlachtfeld (und Friedhof ) werden würde, deutlich, als er als Verteidigungsminister ( 1969-1972 ) unter Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt diente und 1974 selbst Kanzler wurde ( in diesem&nbsp, Amt bis 1982 ).

Von&nbsp, seinen&nbsp, Landsleuten&nbsp, ‘Schmidt-Schnauze ‘&nbsp, genannt, &nbsp, definierte&nbsp, er&nbsp, taktische&nbsp, ( oder&nbsp, Theater-) Atomwaffen als ‘ Atomwaffen, die in Deutschland explodieren’. Er machte sich daran, ein glaubwürdiges strategisches Gleichgewicht in Europa wiederherzustellen, insbesondere for de sowjetischen Stationierung des mobilen IRBM&nbsp, MIRVed&nbsp, SS-20 in Jahr 1976.

Unter Schmidts Führung wuchs die Bundeswehr bi Ende 1982 auf ihre maximale Personalstärke von 495.875 Mann an. Die&nbsp, Armee stellte 38 Brigaden auf, setzte über 7.000 Panzer ein und wurde ( selbst von amerikanischen Beobachtern ) als die beste stehende Kampftruppe der Welt eingestuft. Die von Schmidt veranlasste Entscheidung der NATO von 1979, 108 Pershing II IRBM-Raketenwerfer in Europa zu stationieren, führte&nbsp, zu&nbsp, einer&nbsp, Angleichung&nbsp, des&nbsp, nuklearen&nbsp, Gleichgewichts in Einsatzgebiet.

Und doch so die Welt 1983 während von NATO-Übungen&nbsp ,’Able Archer ‘ einem Atomkrieg gefährlich&nbsp, nahe. The NATO’s exercise attempt, which involved the arrival of the British Premierministerin Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, was aimed at demonstrating that it was necessary to prepare for a first-round defeat of the Warschauer Pakt. &nbsp, Als&nbsp, Reaktion&nbsp, darauf setzten&nbsp, die Sowjets ihre Streitkräfte, &nbsp, einschließlich&nbsp, ihrer Atomstreitkräfte, &nbsp, on die höchste Alarmstufe. &nbsp, Eine mögliche Katastrophe wurde erst vermieden, und das NATO- Hauptquartier erkannte, dass die sowjetische Gegenmobilisierung true war, und die gesamte Übung&nbsp, absagte.

NATO-Soldaten bei der Übung “Able Archer”. Foto: History Skills

Nach der Beinahe-Katastrophe setzte&nbsp, ( West ) &nbsp, Deutschland den Aufbau und die Modernisierung seiner konventionellen Streitkräfte fort, ein Prozess, der erst nach dem Fall der Berliner Mauer 1989 und dem anschließenden Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion zum Stillstand kam.

Die Ansicht&nbsp, eine&nbsp, gewisse&nbsp, Friedensdividende&nbsp, ken woman möglich war&nbsp, vernünftig and eine&nbsp, angemessene Verkleinerung&nbsp, de Streitkräfte&nbsp, des vereinten Deutschlands wäre sinnvoll gewesen.

Was keinen Sinn ergab und Deutschland in der aktuellen Sicherheitslage in Europa zur Ohnmacht verdammt, war eine Reihe von&nbsp, undurchdachten&nbsp, Regierungsentscheidungen, die von engen Haushaltsüberlegungen der rot-grünen Regierungskoalitionen unter Gerhard Schröder ( 1998 –2005 ) und der christdemokratisch-sozialdemokratischen und christdemokratisch-liberalen Koalitionen unter Angela Merkel angetrieben wurden.

Die&nbsp, aufeinanderfolgenden&nbsp, Regierungen&nbsp, ließen&nbsp, die&nbsp, Bundeswehr&nbsp, völlig&nbsp, verfallen, &nbsp, ihr&nbsp, Personal&nbsp, ist&nbsp, auf nur noch 180.000 Mann geschrumpft ( Tendenz fallend ).

Zukunft Deutschlands in de NATO

Donald Trump fordert eine alte Sicherheitsarchitektur, die nicht allein auf nukleare&nbsp, Abschreckung setzt.

Der&nbsp, Schlüssel&nbsp, zu&nbsp, diesem&nbsp, Ziel&nbsp, ist&nbsp, eine&nbsp, starke&nbsp, deutsche&nbsp, konventionelle&nbsp, Streitkraft. &nbsp, Dies&nbsp, erfordert&nbsp, nicht sind höhere Verteidigungsausgaben, sondern zu allem ein nationales Bekenntnis zur eigenen&nbsp, Wehrfähigkeit. Das Wehr- und Dienstpflichtprogramm der AfD ermöglicht die Bildung einer von allen Bürgern mitgetragenen Armee, die dazu dienen soll, dass Deutschland verteidigt und cave erforderlichen Beitrag zur NATO leisten kann.

&nbsp, Das englische Original dieses Artikels finden Sie ham: &nbsp,

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How China-Russia can seize the climate action lead – Asia Times

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China and Russia have developed a more significant relationship that goes beyond their conventional military and economic ties as Moscow’s loneliness from the West grows and Beijing’s great power rivalry with Washington intensifies.

While both powers maintain that they are not formal allies, their proclamation of a” no limits” partnership with” no forbidden areas” has crystallized into what Western observers view as a de facto alliance, particularly in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The evolving China-Russia relationship encompasses wide-ranging collaboration that encompasses many cross-cutting areas. Climate change is cited as the defining issue of the 21st century among which both nations have pledged to address it up.

Russia adopted a National Security Strategy in 2021 that directly addresses climate change and incorporates the idea of natural protection. This commitment to climate change has been strengthened by following diplomatic announcements, with particular emphasis on plans to improve cooperation in renewables and weather action.

In a joint statement signed by China and Russia in 2024, it was committed to intensify bilateral investment in low-carbon areas, including solar power and carbon markets.

Some critics point out that meaningful collaboration is somewhat excluded from their bilateral agenda despite their linguistic commitments to weather collaborations. The 2024 China-Russia Joint Statement tellingly emphasizes “deepening” participation in conventional power areas, such as natural gas, petroleum, and oil refining, while simply suggesting the possibility of “developing” cooperation in emerging areas like carbon markets and solar power.

This gap is more evidenced in the 2024 book on diplomatic opportunities, published by the Russia-China Investment Collaboration Committee. While references to regular “power generation” appear sixteen times, specifically in the framework of natural gas projects, terms like “green” and “low carbon” collect only brief mention.

Beyond reasonable proposals for gas and acid development, the handbook’s power and miners section is generally devoted to fossil fuel projects. However, 2024 customs statistics shows that Russia has become China’s top crude oil and natural gas provider, with fossil fuel surpassing climate-related merchandise exports.

The slow progress in China and Russia’s bilateral climate cooperation is alarming. As the world’s largest and fourth largest carbon emitters, both nations have pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2060.

However, they continue to invest in infrastructure that uses fossil fuels, which could undermine global confidence. It detracts economic resources from incentives for renewable energy and sustainable infrastructure, and it prevents the transition to net zero from other developed nations.

Other significant emitters are required to uphold their commitments, as evidenced by the US’ stunning withdrawal from multilateral climate agreements under the second Trump administration. China and Russia have a chance to take a bigger part in shaping the global climate transition in this leadership vacuum.

Both nations must, however, turn diplomatic rhetoric into concrete action, set forth precise deadlines for climate projects, and reduce their extensive fossil fuel collaboration in order to gain credibility as leaders of the world.

Several sectors offer promising pathways for meaningful climate cooperation between the two nations, including hydrogen development, carbon market integration, and critical minerals partnerships.

Hydrogen infrastructure development

In a wide range of applications, from transportation fuel sources and energy storage medium to feedstock in industrial processes like steelmaking, hydrogen has enormous potential as a clean alternative to fossil fuels.

In contrast to fossil fuels, hydrogen does not release carbon dioxide when burned. However, its climate benefits are reliant on low-emission production techniques. Hydrogen produced with water electrolysis using renewable power can be completely emission-free, but its exorbitant costs remain a significant hurdle for large-scale commercialization.

Blue hydrogen refers to hydrogen that has been produced from natural gas and has carbon capture and storage facilities. Although blue hydrogen is currently receiving criticism, it has been viewed as a less expensive, more acceptable compromise before the costs of green hydrogen start tolerable.

Enhancing joint investment in the hydrogen industry aligns with China’s and Russia’s strategic advantages. Russia is well-suited for producing and transporting blue hydrogen due to its abundant natural gas reserves and extensive pipeline infrastructure.

Gazprom’s current pipelines already have up to 20 % hydrogen in them, with upgraded infrastructure capable of up to 70 %. This potential is essential to Russia’s ambitious strategy of capturing 20 % of the global hydrogen market by 2035. Europe is undoubtedly a major source of Russian hydrogen, but European sanctions against Russian exports following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have made this adversity unlikely.

Along with its position as the world’s top producer of renewable energy, China adds its technological expertise in hydrogen production and storage to these assets. The two nations should make joint R&amp, D and investment in CCS technologies in their national hydrogen industry strategies in order to increase the benefits of blue hydrogen’s emission reduction.

Beyond the contentious blue hydrogen, the partnership could use China’s renewable capacity to produce green hydrogen for transportation via Russia’s extensive pipeline network, potentially lowering production costs significantly.

Hydrogen is notoriously challenging to transport and store. Russia needs to develop its energy infrastructure along their shared border to attract China’s hydrogen exports. New dedicated pipelines for hydrogen and ammonia would be necessary in addition to the already existing natural gas pipelines.

The expansive, underdeveloped regions along the Sino-Russian border offer ideal testing grounds for innovative hydrogen infrastructure. These areas could host integrated hydrogen hubs combining production, storage, and diverse end-use applications, establishing replicable models for hydrogen ecosystem development.

The partnership might have the power to influence global standards beyond just physical infrastructure. Joint research into pipeline materials that are best suited for hydrogen transport and advanced liquefaction techniques could establish new standards for safety and effectiveness.

Such technical cooperation would advance both nations ‘ positions in the developing global hydrogen market while accelerating the development of technology.

Carbon market integration

Another area with strong potential for collaboration is the carbon market. Sinopec and SIBUR’s involvement in China’s Carbon Trading Market is a recent illustration of potential collaboration. Sinopec, the largest integrated petrochemicals company in Russia, is a shareholder of Sinopec, which also has the second-largest carbon emissions reduction projects in the nation.

SIBUR will become the first Russian company to issue carbon units in an international system since the creation of Russia’s carbon trading system as a result of the project’s registration with the Global Carbon Council system. Five climate projects have been added to the Russian carbon emissions registry system thanks to SIBUR.

On top of that, these projects are anticipated to reduce total CO2 emissions by 7.5 million tons over the course of ten years. As long as appropriate validation systems and high standards are established, SIBUR’s relationship to Sinopec opens up opportunities for entry into the Chinese carbon trading market.

The potential for further collaboration in carbon markets is still largely untapped despite these initial efforts to promote cross-border carbon trading. China and Russia could develop novel methodologies for carbon valuation that better reflect their national idiosyncrasies rather than simply linking existing systems.

For instance, they could jointly develop new methodologies for valuing natural carbon sequestration, such as Russia’s vast Siberian forest. It is a significant carbon sink hub, and the Russian government is expressing its growing support for monetization through carbon offset. The two countries could also develop novel financial instruments that combine clean technology transfer and carbon credits, making them more appealing investment vehicles for foreign investors.

A second untapped opportunity is the creation of joint carbon accounting standards specifically for international industrial projects. This might include establishing specialized carbon credit categories for emissions reductions achieved through Sino-Russian technological collaboration, particularly in difficult-abating industries like steel and cement production.

These standards could later serve as a model for other developing nations trying to strike a balance between industrial growth and emissions reduction.

Critical minerals

China is rapidly ascending as a global hub for clean technology R&amp, D and manufacturing, particularly in the “new big three” sectors: solar, electric vehicles ( EVs ), and batteries. These important minerals are strategically important because Russia has these key points of China’s clean energy initiative.

Russia is one of the largest copper and nickel reserves in the world, ranking among the top ten for both metals globally. These resources are fundamental to the clean energy transition, especially in transportation.

Copper serves multiple functions in EVs, from battery components and motor windings to charging infrastructure, while nickel is essential for high-energy-density batteries and corrosion-resistant components in wind turbines and solar cells.

As an example of Russia-China collaboration in critical minerals, Nornickel, Russia’s leading metals and mining company, produces 15 % of the world’s best high-grade nickel and is also a global leader in copper production.

The company is pivoting toward the Chinese market to reduce the sanction’s impacts. The company made plans to significantly increase the supply of metals to China and establish joint ventures in copper refinery and battery materials processing in 2024.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US and UK introduced a ban on imports of Russian aluminum, copper, and nickel. Russian metals can no longer be exchanged on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and London Metals Exchange.

Russian minerals are increasingly important to China’s supply chains, which is partly fueled by growing pressure from the West. Cooperation with Russian producers allows Beijing to diversify its supply chain while allowing Moscow to gain capital and technical expertise for production expansion as the United States pressures allies like Indonesia to impose restrictions on mineral exports to China.

The Shanghai Futures Exchange could become famous as a result of this partnership, which could reshape global metals markets: Western exchanges are currently closed to Russian metals, and it will gain more visibility for setting international benchmarks and encouraging yuan-denominated trading.

Copper and nickel are prominent in current bilateral agreements, but the deepening global climate transition implies that demand for these metals will increase exponentially. Both nations have the potential to quickly increase their mining and refining capacities, potentially outpacing the industry’s traditionally slow-moving one.

The partnership could extend to other strategic minerals, notably palladium, where Russia dominates global production. It is used to connect chips to circuit boards using metal connections. Russia is the world’s largest palladium producer. Through just two projects, Russia controls 40 % of world palladium output, a metal crucial for semiconductor manufacturing.

Climate cooperation leadership

Climate cooperation remains underdeveloped in the ever-growing China-Russia partnership. Some areas, including hydrogen development, carbon market integration, and critical mineral collaboration, offer transformative potential.

The success of their climate collaboration will depend on a number of crucial elements. First, both nations must implement their diplomatic agreements through actionable plans, established procedures, and measurable outcomes.

Second, their cooperation in important minerals and hydrogen infrastructure must go beyond bilateral benefits to contribute to global climate change. Third, their efforts to integrate the carbon market must shift from sporadic initiatives to coordinated efforts that can inspire other developing nations.

Strong Sino-Russian leadership in climate policy could significantly affect the trajectory of global emissions reduction efforts, but only if both countries place long-term climate gains preceding short-term fossil fuel interests.

Chris Zou works for the World Resources Institute ( wri ) as a climate policy researcher. org ) based in Washington DC.

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Reasons for hope Trump won’t sink world’s critical minerals supply – Asia Times

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There is a possibility that Donald Trump’s second term as president of the United States will have a long-term negative impact on the supply and demand of what are referred to as essential nutrients. These include metal, lithium, copper, cobalt and the “rare world parts”, such as lanthanum and yttrium.

They are essential for the alternative energy move, being used in electric car batteries, solar panels and wind turbines. Trump’s decision to withdraw from the UN’s Paris agreement to stop global warming has stoked some negative opinions regarding the effects of this policy.

The price opportunity for new mine projects for important minerals may decrease, along with long-term source, if Trump’s shift toward oil and gas is interpreted by the markets as permanent. This has the potential to impair the shift to clean energy.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to fear this negative situation. Contrary to this, we think the new US administration’s approach to energy change is merely a temporary impact without profound altering the world’s trajectory. In consequence, volatile material industry will continue to be positive over the long and medium term. This place is based on three major claims.

1. In crucial material areas, the US is in a unique position to compete.

The US is viewed as dependent on the import of crucial nutrients from other nations, such as China, in general. Although a select few have this trait, America is one of the most aggressive nations in terms of producing the minerals needed for natural technology overall.

However, exporting a wide range of materials, including the most crucial ones, has been demonstrated by the US as having a comparative advantage.

Germanium processed ore
China has a tight control over its supply of tungsten. RHJPhtotos

Therefore, maintaining the beneficial and vital nutrient industry will be in the interests of the United States. Even if the US reduces its sustainability interests, slowing its demand for new fresh technology, it is likely to do it properly so as not to hurt its own business.

In fact, we anticipate that the US will show more interest in developing processing companies to recover some materials from some manufacturing techniques ‘ intermediate stages or electronic waste. These include germanium and chromium, which are tightly controlled by China ( their biggest maker ) but which are vital for computer cards and renewable energy technology, as well as night-vision sunglasses.

2. Just a small percentage of fresh systems are produced and used in the US.

China and Europe drive these businesses. No fresh clean technologies are produced by the US, neither by the desire nor by the source. On the demand side, the US represents only 10 % of world electric car sales, while China and Europe account for 66 % and 20 % of the market respectively.

Similarly, for the world installed solar energy capacity China represents over 43 % of the market, Europe 20 % and the US only 10 %. On the supply side, the US produces around 15 % of the country’s electric vehicles, while China represents more than 50 % of the business.

Similar statistics exist for another fresh technologies, including China’s remarkable leadership in solar panel and wind turbine production.

Therefore, the laws adopted by China and Europe are likely to have a much bigger impact on the energy shift than those adopted by the US. The cost of slowing the natural transition’s modern capture up for the US will be too high in the event that these nations continue to push forward the natural transition.

Additionally, Middle Eastern oil-producing nations are intensely betting on fresh clean technologies, which could help US oil producers ‘ lower appetite for natural assets. But, regardless of what Trump’s administration decides, it will have a minimal impact on the market for clear technologies.

3. New tariffs may further enhance some minerals’ singularity

Buy tariffs imposed by Trump’s second management to promote local production damaged US imports of those sectors using imported middle, or partially finished, goods. In other words, global commerce along global value chains has modified the text relationships of protectionism, and imports are hindered – and no promoted – by trade security.

Trump has stated that he intends to establish 25 % more stringent import tariffs on goods coming from Mexico and Canada. This may make some nutrients more difficult for the US. For example, copper and aluminium may become even more crucial to the US market because Canada supplies nearly 40 % of the copper employed by US business, and 70 % of the metal.

As a consequence, fresh tariffs could really increase the importance of some minerals. In fact, this was likely the reason behind the decision to defer the price increases and to only implement them on a limited number of products.

The new administration’s energy policies may include a repercussions. These are likely to be transitory, and it is unlikely that the market for important nutrients will suffer in the long run. For the moment, the transition to clean electricity seems healthy.

Carlo Pietrobelli is a professor of economics at the Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology ( UNU-MERIT ), United Nations University, and Jorge Valverde is a PhD fellow there.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Donald Trump’s multipolar diplomacy – Asia Times

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A new multipolar world can be reached by Donald Trump by achieving harmony in Ukraine, stabilizing the Taiwan dispute, and then cutting protection investing in half, preventing a potential US debt crisis.

More than any of his successors, Trump has &nbsp, explained to&nbsp, the people exactly what he means to do and why. &nbsp, The bewilderment with which Western officials and media have responded to Trump and his vital aides&nbsp, does not stem from lack of clarity in Trump’s communication, &nbsp, but from neglect. &nbsp, America’s former clients have &nbsp, little&nbsp, to&nbsp, do &nbsp, in the new order.

The US-Russian agreements that brokered on February 18 in Saudi Arabia are expected to lead to a deal that extends beyond the Ukraine War.

” One of the first meetings I want to have ]is ] with President Xi]of] China and with President Putin of Russia and I want to say,’ let’s cut our military budget in half. &nbsp, We’re going to have them spend a lot less money and we’re going to spend a lot less&nbsp, income, &nbsp, and I know they are going to accomplish it,'” Trump told investigators February 13.

Trump may enter the May 9 Moscow&nbsp, 80th&nbsp, celebration party of success in Europe, which Xi&nbsp, Jinping may go. The Chinese website” Observer” ( guancha.cn ) &nbsp, on February 19 speculates that Trump may convene a “new Yalta conference”, referring to the 1945&nbsp, meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin&nbsp, that sketched the postwar order. Russian state leaders have also made an appearance in Moscow regarding Trump. &nbsp,

The government’s notes to writers February 18 at Mar-al-Lago provoked outraged&nbsp, remark in conventional media. &nbsp,” Today I heard&nbsp, ]from Ukraine ] &nbsp,, &nbsp,’ Oh, we weren’t invited ‘]to Tuesday’s U. S. Russia talks ]. Well, you’ve been there for three years, you should have ended it ]in ] three years. You should have always started&nbsp, it, &nbsp, you could have made a deal”.

Russia, to be sure, &nbsp, started the military conflict, Trump apparently referred to Zelensky’s abandonment of the Minsk II framework ( Russophone autonomy in a neutral, sovereign Ukraine ). &nbsp, Politico, the victim of tens of millions of dollars of grants from USAID, denounced Trump for “echoing the Kremlin”.

But Trump is unfazed. &nbsp,” They were quite good”, he&nbsp, said&nbsp, at Mar-al-Lago&nbsp, of&nbsp, the debate with&nbsp, Russia&nbsp, in Saudi Arabia. &nbsp,” Russia wants to do something. They want to quit the violent barbarianism”.

The historical allusion to the original Yalta is timely because it marked a catastrophe for the Central Europeans and East Germans who fell under Soviet rule. However, Germany’s Die Welt stated that the Great Powers may end war while the small people are relegated to the children’s board. &nbsp,

The Cheshire cat&nbsp, of&nbsp, Alice in Wonderland&nbsp, vanished&nbsp, except&nbsp, for its smile, and the British—whose then Prime Minister Boris Johnson&nbsp, helped thwart peace negotiations in early 2022 – have disappeared except for their catty sense of humor.

The&nbsp, Economist&nbsp, pundit&nbsp,” Talleyrand” &nbsp, on February 19 deplores&nbsp,” the readiness with which much of the world has accepted the humiliation of Ukraine and its European friends. Where were the South Vietnamese present during the Paris peace negotiations? This pattern was established a long time ago. When the US finally started speaking with the Taliban, where were the Afghan puppet rulers? And now, what about the stalwart&nbsp, Mr&nbsp, Zelenskyy? Proxies are almost always treated&nbsp, thus…. If&nbsp, the Ukrainians are clever, they’ll quietly ask about applying for entry to the BRICS. Join the queue”.

A&nbsp, three-way&nbsp, summit&nbsp, in Moscow&nbsp, is far from certain. If it occurs, the agenda&nbsp, will&nbsp, look something like this:

1 ) A ceasefire in Ukraine with Russia in complete control of the territory it has already taken, including the majority of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as new elections in Ukraine that almost certainly would eliminate Zelensky. Given that the Europeans have too few deployable forces to cause trouble, and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has already stated that peacekeepers would not be protected by the mutual defense provisions of NATO treaties, some European or UK peacekeepers might be permitted.

2 ) &nbsp, A rapid end to economic sanctions on Russia. Given that Trump prefers to sell US natural gas to Russia for roughly twice the price than to restore Russian supplies, whether gas supplies will be restored is a matter of negotiation.

3 ) &nbsp, An agreement with China to stabilize the status of Taiwan. Although this would likely fall short of a new Shanghai Agreement&nbsp ( the 1972 treaty restored diplomatic relations between the US and China ), it would still be strong enough to win over both parties.

4 ) &nbsp, The beginning of a nuclear arms negotiation on the scale of the Reagan-Gorbachev&nbsp, agreement at Reykjavik in 1986.

” Observer” columnist Yan Mo on February 19 argues that Trump’s main objective in Taiwan is to bring onshore the knowhow of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, &nbsp, which fabricates 90 % of the world’s advanced chips ( 4 nanometers and below ).

Noting Trump’s mention of a 100 % tariff on Taiwanese chip exports to the US, Yan writes: &nbsp,” Trump&nbsp, knows that it is meaningless to impose&nbsp, tariffs&nbsp, on&nbsp, TSMC. After all, TSMC is in an absolute monopoly position…. &nbsp, No matter&nbsp, what tariff&nbsp, is imposed, it will only be shared by customers. &nbsp, At present, the main buyers of TSMC’s advanced process chips are mostly American customers”.

What Trump intends, the Chinese columnist adds, is to force TSMC to set up several plants in the United States ( after years of delays, it is about to open one plant in Arizona ), or to merge TMSC with the struggling US chipmaker Intel, in effect acquiring TSMC’s technology.

From a national security standpoint, that is quite logical: The United States&nbsp, does not want to depend on the People’s Republic of China for advanced chips in the event that Taiwan&nbsp, were&nbsp, absorbed into the mainland. &nbsp,

The State Department last week deleted a phrase from its&nbsp, Taiwan fact sheet&nbsp, stating that the US does not support Taiwan’s independence. That is a bargaining move, the” Observer” columnist argues. ” The US State Department’s deletion of the statement&nbsp, about’ not supporting Taiwan independence ‘&nbsp, is a negotiating posture&nbsp, with respect&nbsp, to&nbsp, mainland&nbsp, China”. If so, it is a clever negotiating move.

Vladimir Putin was forced out of the Kremlin in March 2022, when President Biden declared that the Russian economy would shrink by half&nbsp and that the unipolar world order would end. &nbsp, In October 2022, the United States imposed tech controls&nbsp, that a&nbsp, prominent&nbsp, US analyst&nbsp, dubbed” a new US policy of actively strangling large segments of the Chinese technology industry– strangling with an intent to kill”.

At the conclusion of the first Godfather film, Biden’s attempts to imitate Michael Corleone woefully failed. Russia ‘s&nbsp, economy expanded rather than collapsed, and&nbsp, out-produced&nbsp, the combined NATO countries in arms, while China found workarounds to US controls, producing its own high-end chips and innovative AI systems.

On January 30th, Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivered the eulogy&nbsp for unipolarity, saying,” It’s not normal for the world to simply have a unipolar power.” Unipolarity, he told&nbsp, interviewer Megyn Kelly, “was an anomaly. You eventually would have a multipolar world, multi-great powers operating in various regions of the planet, despite the fact that it was a result of the Cold War’s end.

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Apparent Trump vision: Divvy up the world into demarcated empires – Asia Times

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Technically, America– whether led by Joe Biden, Kamala Harris or Donald Trump– may be trying to remain the country’s pre-eminent corporate power.

The realist perspective holds that the global system of states compels specific states to seek as much power as possible in foreign relations theory. &nbsp, This is the only means to effectively make themselves more stable.

From these, there is a cut between defensive and offensive realists.

Protective realists think that as a condition improves its standing over potential rival states, it stops at the accelerator and concentrates more on upholding the status quo than leading.

According to insulting realists, a state can never have too much security, and states will not give up trying to bolster their relative power over other nations, who could also be adversaries. &nbsp, Any condition that has the capability may try to dominate its relatives.

John J. Mearsheimer portrayed as” Mearchiavelli”, by Marwane Pallas, the Philomathean Society. Image: mearsheimer.com

One of the most popular American proponents of authenticity, University of Chicago doctor John Mearsheimer, is in the unpleasant station. &nbsp, His outlook&nbsp, predicts:” The United States is going to come to great lengths to make certain that China does not occupy Asia”.

Wonderful measures include declaring war on Taiwan. Americans “would fight and die to support Taiwan”, he&nbsp, believes.

He dissects questions about whether US citizens would be in favor of a war by stating that the US government had “manipulate the discourse on what is happening in ways that manifest China as a corporeal threat.”

Mearsheimer&nbsp, gives&nbsp, two causes why Washington had try so hard to have PRC expansionism.

Second, the United States has worldwide economic passions to defend. A possible adversary, such as China, do threaten American prosperity if it gained control of a significant region with its wealth, commercial potential, and economic power. &nbsp,” It is evident from the traditional record”, he&nbsp, writes, that” the US does not tolerate friend competition”.

Second, Mearsheimer argues that a strong country that establishes domination over its region is “free to roam” .&nbsp, Not threatened by any of its own neighbors, it will make aggressive probes into some other major power’s neighborhood. &nbsp, So if the US wasn’t blocking Beijing’s power over areas of China’s close overseas such as Taiwan, the East China Sea and the South China Sea, China may be challenging US protection in the Northern Hemisphere.

Mearsheimer’s unpleasant realism, nonetheless, has a built-in weakness. He acknowledges that governments, including those of the US, do not always work as his theory suggests, despite the reasoning that seems to suggest that America should hang onto proper hegemony at all costs and ensure China does no achieve hegemony over Asia.

For example, he&nbsp, says, &nbsp, it was “foolish” and a” proper blunder” for the US to energy China’s rapid economic growth and technical progress starting in the 1980s in the mistaken belief&nbsp, that this would preclude potential security conflicts with China– an opinion that many other analysts then share.

Mearsheimer claims that his theory accurately predicts how major powers will act in response to external circumstances, but that some nations, including the most important nation on earth, reject to act in accordance with his theory.

Despite the pressures of the international system, it seems as though this makes room for the possibility that a government in the US that is no longer interested in preventing Chinese hegemony in East Asia might emerge.

This may in fact be happening. &nbsp,

Trump’s strategy appears to involve dividing the world into clearly defined empires, rather than an activist America that favors liberal rules and institutions and seeks to shape regions around the world to stop the rise of powerful adversaries. His continued rant about annexing Canada and Greenland seems more like a joke to his domestic political rivals.

Trump may have accepted the Russian and Chinese empires, according to some sources. &nbsp, His government has signaled acceptance of Russia&nbsp, keeping&nbsp, its recent territorial gains in Ukraine.

Recent statements by Trump’s controversial Defense Secretary&nbsp, Pete Hegseth&nbsp, and Vice President&nbsp, J. D. Vance&nbsp, have deepened European&nbsp, fears&nbsp, that Trump II intends to scuttle US security commitments to Western Europe.

Trump has frequently said the US alliances with Japan and South Korea are worthwhile only if America&nbsp, makes a profit&nbsp, from them. He has said little about the strategic significance of these alliances, which suggests he is not in favor of strategically containing China, even though some of his senior officials are.

Trump reportedly&nbsp, wants&nbsp, to withdraw US troops from South Korea. &nbsp, He has also&nbsp, said&nbsp, he has” no problem” with North Korea testing short-range missiles that cannot reach the US, even though such missiles threaten South Korea. If Trump were to remove America from Pyongyang’s target list, it seems as though he would be willing to let go of South Korea’s defense.

As for the possibility of US intervention in a Taiwan Strait war, Trump has said Taiwan is&nbsp, indefensible and is&nbsp, unimportant&nbsp, compared with China – and that he resents Taiwan for allegedly” stealing” the semiconductor manufacturing business from the US.

After taking part in annual drills at the Tsoying naval base in Kaohsiung, Taiwanese sailors in this file photo, taken on January 31, 2018, salute the island’s flag on the deck of the Panshih supply ship. Photo: AFP / Mandy Cheng

Trump sees China as a threat as an economic threat, which he would address primarily through economic policy rather than military strategy.

He has always preferred tariffs as a tool. Trump argues that tariffs can help to balance the US trade deficit and encourage manufacturing to relocate there. &nbsp, In late 2024 Trump&nbsp, said&nbsp, in an interview with the&nbsp, Wall Street Journal&nbsp, that he would respond to a PRC attack on Taiwan by imposing high tariffs on China, not by sending US forces to help.

Contrary to Mearsheimer’s expectation, Trump seems not to fear that a Chinese hegemony over Asia would seriously jeopardize US prosperity.

Despite China’s impressive economic development, accumulation of wealth and military buildup, America is still the world’s leading economic, military and innovation power. &nbsp, Washington also has a network of strong allies, unlike China.

The US has not abandoned its efforts to support global arrangements made up of liberal principles that serve US interests, or to oppose Chinese expansionism in East Asia. &nbsp, Rather, the Trump II administration may be choosing to let&nbsp, Pax Americana&nbsp, die in a case of domestic politics triumphing over international imperatives that are clearly not irresistible.

Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu.

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Time for Europe to get up, stand up – Asia Times

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America is certainly attempting to conserve Europe at this time.

That is the clear communication of two location statements from the previous year — one by U. S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, the other by Vice President JD Vance. Hegseth stated at a conference in Brussels on February 12 that Europe is no longer America’s top priority for safety:

We’re here presently to declare unequivocally that the United States of America is primarily focused on the security of Europe. The United States is in danger of facing serious threats to our country. We must – and we are – focusing on protection of our own borders… We furthermore face a peer competition in the Communist Chinese with the ability and intention to harm our country and core national hobbies in the Indo-Pacific.

For the sake of all of us, punishment never fail. As the US favors deterring war with China in the Pacific, the US must make the resource compromises that reflect this. [ I put emphasis on mine ]

Hegseth also warned that the US will eventually&nbsp, take its troops out of Europe, and said that Europe may provide the vast majority of aid for Ukraine going forward.

Vance argued two days later at the Munich Security Conference that what he saw as a fallout from the anti-democratic principles was Europe’s biggest risk rather than Russia or China.

The danger from within, the surrender of Europe from some of its most basic values, ideals shared with the United States of America, is the one that worries me the most about. It is not China, it is not any other additional actor.

As evidence of Europe’s retreat from democracy, he cited Romania ‘s&nbsp, cancellation&nbsp, of an election result due to supposed election interference, Sweden ‘s&nbsp, jailing&nbsp, of a rightist activist for burning a Koran, and Britain ‘s&nbsp, arrest&nbsp, of an anti-abortion activist for silently praying near an abortion clinic. He even urged Western governments to spend more on defense and to listen to their members who are upset about current wave after wave of emigration.

Although these statements may be interpreted in two entirely different ways, they both lead to the same fundamental conclusion.

The initial understanding is that Hegseth and Vance are telling Europe hard beliefs that it needs to hear. Even if America wants and needs to be the surety of Western security as it did in the Cold War and World Wars, it can’t, at least not if it wants to be the surety of surveillance in Asia, where its most fearsome foe looms. In terms of manufacturing capacity, China is significantly ahead of America in terms of community and technologies, and it has four instances that of America. Yet with Japan, India, Korea, Australia, and other friends entirely on board, America may be sorely hard-pressed to endure a concerted Chinese attempt to take over Asia.

America is not the democracy’s army anymore, it once was, smothered by decades of underdevelopment and smothered in levels of claims and regulations. There is no choice but to promote because it has. Asia is more economically crucial to the US, and China is a&nbsp, much&nbsp, bigger long-term danger to the US than Russia is. Therefore, it’s just inevitable that America will have to turn away from Europe and the Middle East and instead focus more on Asia.

Vance does make a point about Western values. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights&nbsp, claims to safeguard freedom of expression, as does the UK’s&nbsp, Human Rights Act of 1998. The laws that prohibit burning the Koran and praying near an abortion office certainly seem to violate the right to free speech. And even though Russia allegedly influenced Romania’s vote, canceling it risks creating a dangerous precedent because it’s always relatively simple to claim or manipulate foreign interference if you’re an immoral autocrat.

So it’s probable that Hegseth and Vance are not only being honest, but are giving Europe a needed wake-up visit.

Hegseth and Vance are portrayed as being dishonest in the following sense. According to this tale, the MAGA action respects and has a close relationship with Russia. Trump draws a false social equality between Russia and Ukraine, unfairly&nbsp, laying some of the blame on Ukraine&nbsp, for the battle.

Regardless of whether or not their help has been significantly significant, Trump has a strong preference for those who support him. Russia has always, favored Trump over his rivals. And unlike the Europeans, who they perceive as wicked deracinated socialists, many on the British right mistakenly view Russia as a follower of traditional Christian and muscular values. But perhaps Trump and his folks just want Russia to prevail over Ukraine.

Hegseth is obviously blowing the whistle when he claims that America needs to divert resources to secure its own borders. Even the$ 7.3 billion that America spends on border security ( just$ 7.3 billion in 2024, despite years of significant increases ), would leave it much less than Ukraine aid. And it’s a little pricey for JD Vance to condemn Romania for allowing an vote when he backs Trump’s plan to do something incredibly related in 2020.

In this view, all Trump’s people are saying is simply an extension of right-wing culture-war politics — their problem for free conversation is a fig leaf, they like European far-right parties because they’re anti-immigration, and they want to change America’s foreign policy up to isolationism and the Northern Hemisphere.

Which of these interpretations is correct, in my opinion, is a little agnostic. I believe that Hegseth is being sincere, while Vance is likely exploiting his domestic political base in the US. In addition, the Trump administration likely includes a number of both right-wing isolationists who want America to leave the world and concentrate all of its efforts on internal ideological conflicts, and conservative internationalists who acknowledge the magnitude of the threat from China.

But more importantly, I think that from Europe’s vantage point, &nbsp, it mostly doesn’t matter&nbsp, which interpretation of America’s recent words and actions is more accurate.

Whether America really wants to concentrate on deterring China in Asia or whether it wants to focus on bullying Canada, Panama, and its own minorities is another question that ignores the cold hard reality that America is stepping down as the protector of European security.

Whether or not Trump’s supporters actually believe Russia to be a threat to Europe doesn’t change the fact that Russia is a threat to Europe. And whether Trump’s people truly care about free speech, that doesn’t change the fact that&nbsp, Europe’s people are angry&nbsp, about recent immigration waves, and if that anger isn’t accommodated through the democratic process, Europe’s stability could be in danger.

In other words, both the challenges that Europe faces and the fact that the US is unwilling to assist in those challenges are obvious and obvious. Europe must either retaliate against the threats that confront it or abandon its position.

Fortunately, some of the Europeans may finally be realizing this. Hegseth is essentially correct in his argument that Europe needs to step up and fill the void the US is leaving, which Benjamin Tallis has in an excellent thread. Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, has been&nbsp saying similar things. And France’s President Macron has &nbsp, called an emergency EU summit&nbsp, to discuss America’s withdrawal from the region.

And fortunately, even without America’s assistance, Europe has the fundamental strength it needs to withstand the threats it faces.

Russia can be handled alone by Europe if it so chooses to.

Just as the US is overmatched by China, Russia is overmatched by Europe. I wrote out the fundamental case two years ago along with some pertinent numbers.

Russia and Europe both have significantly more people and industries. The EU and UK together have half a billion people — more than three times as many as Putin’s empire:

UN source

The ratio is even more lopsided when Turkey is included in the mix.

As for industrial output, even after Russia’s big wartime mobilization, Europe still makes far more stuff. Russia would only be the region’s fifth-largest manufacturing nation if it were included in Europe:

Source: World Bank via Wikipedia and Wikipedia

Even the UK manufactures more than Russia!

This is just a rough measure because not all types of manufacturing are equally useful for war. For example, Russia typically produces a lot of tanks and artillery shells, while Europe produces a lot of pharmaceuticals and medical devices.

However, the comparison is so unfair that it is obvious that a united, determined Europe would prevail over Russia in any protracted conventional conflict, even without the iota of American assistance. And Europe has its own nuclear deterrent as well, mostly in the hands of France and the UK.

It’s also fanciful to think that Europe might band together to combat Russia. NATO command can act as a single military force for any and all European efforts against Russia, even if the United States officially withdraws from NATO or simply refuses to come to its aid.

Crucially, NATO also includes Turkey and the UK, who aren’t in the EU, but both of which are rivals of Russia. Without a Trump-led US weighing the alliance down, it might be free to become the pan-European military force that the region requires.

Politically speaking, Europe is more united than it has ever been throughout its history, as evidenced by how the entire region banded together to impose sanctions on Russia in 2022, and how even traditionally neutral nations like Sweden have been a part of NATO.

But even with unity, Europe will still need the will to fight. None of Europe’s largest countries are currently achieving the level of what it would take to contain Russia without American assistance, despite the many bold rhetoric from officials in Germany, France, and the UK.

This is typically expressed in terms of the share of GDP that European nations invest in their militaries. And yes, Russia spends far more of its GDP on its military than the major European countries do:

Changes to this number can also reveal details about a nation’s priorities. Germany, France, and the UK are showing that they aren’t yet taking the Russian threat as seriously as they should, despite the fact that military spending hasn’t increased significantly in those countries. Poland, in contrast, is clearly taking the threat seriously, which is why Hegseth consistently praises Poland.

Of course, because Europe has a much higher GDP than Russia does, even a smaller share of GDP could result in a higher total military spending amount. However, it’s important to keep in mind that the real purchasing power of the military also depends on prices, such as soldiers ‘ salaries and medical expenses, weapons, vehicles, transportation, etc. are cheaper in Russia than in Europe, that means$ 1 of Russian defense spending counts for more than$ 1 of European defense spending.

In reality, Russia sells its military equipment for a a lot  less. Taking this into account, it probably spends about as much money on its military as all of Europe combined:

Russia’s military expenditure is rising so fast that it is outperforming all European countries combined despite their effort to boost budgets and rearm, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies ‘ latest&nbsp, Military Balance report…The think tank said that Russia’s military expenditure last year was forecast at 13.1 trillion rubles ($ 145.9 billion ) …Meanwhile, Europe’s combined 2024 defense spending was$ 457 billion …11.7 percent higher in real terms than the previous year…

The Kremlin’s military expenditure would reach$ 461.6 billion, the IISS said, if its spending is calculated in purchasing power parity terms, which are used in nations like Russia where domestic inputs are significantly less expensive than on the global market.

Russia has about 1.1 million active military personnel, whereas NATO does not have nearly as many, despite having about a quarter of that number. But it’s not clear how many of those troops NATO could actually bring to bear in a fight.

Germany, France, and the UK need to immediately and significantly increase their defense spending. Hegseth is correct in saying that Poland’s goal of 5 % of GDP by 2025 is appropriate and roughly equivalent to what the US spent on its military spending during the 1980s during the peace process.

Furthermore, European countries need to make sure their troops are well-trained and their militaries are well-integrated. And Europe needs to strengthen its nuclear deterrent in order to be less dependent on the ( now likely nonexistent ) US nuclear umbrella. France and the UK need to build more nukes, while Germany and Poland need to obtain their own.

There are essentially two dangers for Europe: a lack of cooperation between nations and a lack of popular will within each nation.

It’s possible that European publics simply don’t worry enough about the Russian threat, or that they’ve become so rich and complacent — or perhaps so infused with leftist ideology — that they hate the very idea of spending money on the military. Elites in Europe, particularly those in Germany, France, and the UK, simply need to persuade the public that a strong, integrated defense is necessary.

If they are unable to do that, the European nations will demonstrate that democracies are inherently weak and incapable of standing up for themselves. In the 20th century, democracies passed the toughness test, sacrificing blood and treasure to crush fascism and contain communism. Perhaps America is failing that test in the twenty-first century. If so, it becomes even more crucial that Europe succeed in the examination.

The other danger is that each European country will look after its own narrow interests, throwing the other countries to the wolves. There is a tendency for each nation to view the countries east of it as buffer states, which is a defense-in-depth way to fend off the Russians. This is a dangerous fantasy.

The more Russia conquers, the more powerful it growth, since it basically enslaves each conquered group into its army to conquer the next group. When the USSR attacked Poland in 1919, it did so with a large number of Ukrainian troops, and when it faced West Europe’s Cold War, Polish troops were used to defend it. And so forth. Europe has to make a stand and put up a hard wall, instead of letting Russia continue to absorb and enslave its people bit by bit.

It might make sense for Europe to actively participate in the conflict, helping the Ukrainians stop Russia from grabbing any more territory, if the US abandons Ukraine entirely to Russia, as it appears to be now.

Europe could send troops to strengthen Ukraine’s defenses and learn how modern warfare operates while they are lacking in manpower and grit. But even if direct intervention doesn’t happen, Europe will need to fortify its borders in the east against continued Russian encroachment.

There is actually a historical precedent for this. The UK and France formed a partnership in 1865-1946 to defend the weakening Ottoman Empire from Russian territorial grabs. The result was the Crimean War, in which the alliance of Britain, France, and Turkey — depicted at the top of this post — defeated the Russians and halted their westward expansion. Over the next 20 years, Europe will be able to defeat the new Russian empire, even if it doesn’t actually fight in Ukraine. If Europe increases defense spending and deploys its forces to its eastern borders.

Europe needs to reform its immigration and economy.

It should also go without saying that Europe needs to fix its economy. Over the past ten and a half, the region has stagnated. Even when comparing purchasing power parity, which is unaffected by exchange rate movements, it is obvious that Europe has been trailing the US:

It’s not just that the U. S. has more immigration, either — Europe ‘s&nbsp, per capita GDP has lagged&nbsp, as well.

Particularly poorly has Germany done in recent years. Before the Ukraine war broke out, Russian gas was cut off, and its industrial production has been declining since long before:

Source: &nbsp, Marginal Revolution

When confronted with these facts, Europeans typically comfort themselves ( or attack their American critics ) by highlighting Europe’s lower levels of inequality, life expectancy, and crime. However, those benefits don’t really help the hundreds of thousands of Russian drones, which make Europe a nice place to live. To build up military-industrial strength, you need higher GDP and you need higher industrial production.

How Europe can obtain those things is a challenging question to answer. There are some obvious policy choices, such as removing internal trade barriers between European nations, general deregulation, and reversing the Danish “flexicurity” system to promote labor mobility. Europe also needs as much cheap energy as it can get, since factories are especially power-hungry.

There is a requirement to restart all mothballed nuclear reactors, and many more should be constructed. Europe should also be generating as much solar power as possible, particularly in Spain, where it’s sunny and sparsely populated, before using high-voltage transmission lines to supply the country’s industrial heartland.

On top of that, Europe needs to build a better software industry. AI and especially software will play an increasingly significant role in manufacturing, and exporting software can also help to boost the economy. Europe already has a lot of talented coders, especially in East Europe, and it also has a lot of capital to invest.

However, the region has been having a really difficult time creating a software ecosystem a la the US. Deregulation should be the first step in this regard, making sure that there are no real obstacles to innovation until laws like GDPR are changed. After that, tweak financial laws to encourage venture capital, and work to harmonize standards and regulations across EU member states so the market isn’t fragmented.

Age is one of Europe’s biggest challenges, and every nation in the world is either dealing with it or will have to deal with it quickly. Unfortunately, effective pro-natalist policies still don’t exist ( mostly because France only experiences passing results with them ) Until recently, robust immigration partially filled Europe’s gap, but there is a huge backlash against the types of immigrants Europe has been absorbing in a flurry of mass for the past ten and a half. Even if you doubt JD Vance’s motives, he’s right that European countries need to accede to the will of their increasingly immigration-skeptical populaces, to do otherwise would risk political instability.

The most obvious move in this situation is to simply restrict the set of source countries, in addition to deporting immigrant criminals so that the populace feels more positively about the entire thing. It would probably be a good idea to take fewer refugees from violent war-torn areas and more skilled or semi-skilled immigrants from stable low-crime nations.

Anyway, I have &nbsp, much&nbsp, more to say about the European economy, but for right now, I just want to point out that although Europe desperately needs a stronger military, countries that pump up their militaries without concomitant increases in their economic output typically don’t fare well.

Instead of waiting for America to intervene and save the day like it did in the 20th century, the Europeans need to think about economics and military power as one big interconnected effort.

This article was originally published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack, and it is now republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Can the Alternative for Germany save NATO? – Asia Times

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” We are at an existential milestone for our freedom and security” ,&nbsp, declared German Foreign Minister&nbsp, Annalena&nbsp, Baerbock, who demanded European involvement in the Ukraine peace talks initiated this week by Presidents Trump and Putin.

Better said, it is an existential time for Baerbock’s Green Party, the most intense conflict hawks on the German political range. Despite the Greens ‘ enthusiasm for the Ukraine War, only&nbsp, 9 % of its members&nbsp, told German pollsters that they would fight to defend their country. &nbsp,

Europe’s war eagles don’t want to spend and don’t want to struggle. Their sense of entitlement derives from their status as customers of the Washington foreign&nbsp, and security&nbsp, policy establishment, which paid billions of dollars a year through USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy&nbsp, ( NED), and prominent private foundations to keep complaisant Germans on the payroll. &nbsp,

” Brutally hard Americans shock Europe”, reads the headline in today’s” Berlin Playbook” newsletter by&nbsp, the German Springer Verlag-owned&nbsp, Politico, &nbsp, the recipient of$ 8 million a year in US government subsidies, according to a&nbsp, White House spokesperson.

Die Welt’s Jacques Schuster, writer, reported February 13 that the shock extends far beyond the peace negotiations in Ukraine, which left the Europeans “relegated to the family’s table.” &nbsp,

President Donald Trump pulled that lock after years of warning that the United States could not and would not be able to defend Europe continuously. &nbsp, Trump&nbsp, on&nbsp, February 13 proposed a new global security alliance with Russia and China that may help the United States to reduce its military expenditure in half.

” At some point, when things settle down, I’m going to meet with China and I’m going to meet with Russia, in particular those two, and I’m going to say there’s no reason for us to be spending almost$ 1 trillion on the military … and I’m going to say we can spend this on other things”, Trump said.

Europe will have to see to its own defence. &nbsp, The only major political party with a clear defense strategy is Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland&nbsp, ( AfD ), the scrappy populist&nbsp, contender that filled the vacuum&nbsp, on the conservative spectrum after Angela Merkel&nbsp, moved her Christian Democrats toward the left.

Merkel suspended&nbsp, compulsory&nbsp, military support for all men 18 years or older in 2011&nbsp, and&nbsp, later&nbsp, allied her gathering with the&nbsp, Social Democrats&nbsp, and adopted green&nbsp, anti-nuclear&nbsp, strength guidelines.

In a&nbsp, December 22, 2024, research, &nbsp, we&nbsp, noted that the&nbsp, AfD&nbsp, is the only European party proposing a&nbsp, comprehensive&nbsp, restoration of&nbsp, military recruitment. The&nbsp, AfD’s&nbsp, gathering system states:

Military support is virtuous services. It should not be understood as a violation of a citizen’s fundamental right initially, but as a civic duty to defend peace and security and ensure the stability of our nation’s politics. The federal troops should be established within society, and the end of conscription has significantly damaged this relationship in recent months.

At the&nbsp, AfD’s&nbsp, group agreement January 12 in the city of Riesa in the state of Saxony, its co-chair Tino&nbsp, Chrupalla&nbsp, proposed to eliminate recruitment from the group’s electoral&nbsp, campaign&nbsp, system. More than 70 % of the 600 members voted to keep recruitment at the vanguard of the battle, outvoting&nbsp, the&nbsp, AfD’s&nbsp, second-highest standard.

AfD&nbsp, Bundestag part Jan-Wenzel Schmidt, a head of the group in the European state of Saxony-Anhalt, told Asia Times,” The&nbsp, AfD&nbsp, advocates the&nbsp, full&nbsp, resumption of recruitment. National support for&nbsp, Germany offers younger people the opportunity for private development while making a&nbsp, valuable&nbsp, commitment to their country. Most importantly, it&nbsp, is essential for rebuilding Germany ‘s&nbsp, defense capabilities” .&nbsp,

He added,” It is&nbsp, critical&nbsp, for Germany to become more independent from its alliance partners. The Bundeswehr]German armed forces ] must be&nbsp, ready, &nbsp, if&nbsp, required, &nbsp, of defending Germany freely.

” This requires the acquisition of present defence equipment and the expansion of our own defense production&nbsp, of which European industry is highly competent, “he continued”. The&nbsp, AfD&nbsp, is strongly committed to NATO account, provided that the empire pieces &nbsp, to its&nbsp, function as a defensive alliance and does not work as a global&nbsp, offender.”

No one will fight and die for” Europe,” the abstract global government sitting in Brussels. &nbsp, But revolutionaries may fight for their country, the source of their personality and the&nbsp, vehicle for its distribution to future generations. &nbsp,

The&nbsp, AfD’s&nbsp, devotion to a large&nbsp, citizen&nbsp, army&nbsp, has profound strategic implications. Under Angela Merkel and&nbsp, her son, Social Democratic Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the Bundeswehr atrophied to the point that it cannot area a second combat-ready section.

Germany’s defence strategy is one of clinging to the American radioactive overcoat while doing nothing. &nbsp, That is an essentially unstable and unsafe state of affairs. Every crisis is sanitized by the lack of regular forces, which propels it further up the nuclear escalation ladder. &nbsp,

Helmut Schmidt clearly recognized this danger that&nbsp, ( West ) &nbsp, Germany would become a nuclear battleground ( and cemetery, as German soldiers&nbsp, darkly&nbsp, put it in the 1970s ) &nbsp, when he served as defense minister ( 1969-1972 ) under Chancellor Willy Brandt&nbsp, and acted on when he became chancellor himself in 1974 ( serving in that position until 1982 ).

Helmut Schmidt. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

Called Schmidt-the-Lip (” Schmidt-Schnauze” ) by his countrymen, &nbsp, he defined military (or&nbsp, theater ) nuclear arms as” nuclear arms that go off in Germany.”

He set out to regain reliable proper equilibrium in Europe, in particular, after&nbsp, the Russian deployment of the MIRVed SS-20 smart IRBM in 1976.

Under Schmidt ‘s&nbsp, leadership, the Bundeswehr grew to its maximum personnel strength of 495, 875 by the end of 1982. The army fielded 38 brigades, deployed over 7, 000 tanks and was judged ( even by American observers ) the world’s best standing fighting force. NATO’s 1979 decision, prompted by Schmidt, to deploy 108 Pershing&nbsp, II IRBM launchers in Europe led to equalization of the in-theatre&nbsp, nuclear balance.

And yet, &nbsp, in 1983, the world came perilously close to nuclear war during the NATO” Able Archer “exercises. By involving UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, NATO tried to make the exercises hyper-realistic, convincing the Russians that the exercise showed a NATO first strike against the Warsaw Pact.

NATO personnel participating in the training session called” Able Archer.” Photo: History Skills

In response, &nbsp, the Soviets readied their forces, including their nuclear forces, and potential disaster was only avoided when NATO headquarters realized the Soviet countermobilization was real&nbsp, and called the whole exercise off.

MiG-27s at Laerz Air Base in former East Germany. These nuclear-capable fighter-bombers were put on heightened alert by the Soviets during Able Archer. Photo: Wikiimedia Commons

After the near-disaster, Germany &nbsp, continued to&nbsp, build&nbsp, up&nbsp, and modernize its&nbsp, conventional forces, &nbsp, a process that only came to a halt after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. &nbsp,

Talk of a peace dividend was reasonable, and it would have made sense to downsize the unified Germany.

What made no sense, &nbsp, and now condemns&nbsp, Germany &nbsp, to impotence in the current security situation in Europe, &nbsp, was a series of mindless government decisions driven by narrow budget considerations&nbsp, of&nbsp, the&nbsp, Social Democrat-Green&nbsp, ruling&nbsp, coalitions under Gerhard Schroeder ( 1998 – 2005 ) and the&nbsp, Christian Democratic-Social Democratic and Christian Democratic-Liberal&nbsp, coalitions headed by Angela Markel.

Those successive governments&nbsp, let the&nbsp, Bundeswehr&nbsp, fall into utter disrepair, its personnel reduced to just 180, 000 ( and falling ) at present.

Trump wants a less militarized security system. The key to achieving this goal&nbsp, is a robust German conventional force. That isn’t merely a matter of budget allocation, but of a national commitment to defense. The&nbsp, AfD’s&nbsp, proposal to revive the citizen army that Germany had in the closing years of the Cold War dovetails with Trump’s strategic vision.

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Why EU may seize Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ in the Baltic – Asia Times

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Last month, Polititico&nbsp reported that some EU nations might capture Russia’s” shadow ship” in the Baltic Sea under the pretext of adhering to global climate and piracy laws.

They might even pass novel national laws to validate this, too. The arrest of one of these ships in Finland last December under the excuse that it was engaged in cutting an underground cable reportedly prompted them to do so frequently. The goal would be to reduce the Kremlin’s international revenue flow from Asia-based sales of reduced oil.

Stopping them from operating in the Baltic Sea may have a significant financial impact on the Kremlin because roughly 40 % of its” dark ship” transits through the Baltic Sea, or a little less than 350 warships, whose entire business was roughly comparable to one-third of Russia’s monthly defense budget.

However, these plans have a lot more difficulties in them than policymakers may suppose, issues that were raised in Politico’s statement.

First of all, the seizure of even a solitary ship could result in big political and legal costs due to international law and the ownership of some” shadow fleet” vessels, something that Finland is only just starting to learn after the dramatic incident in December.

If they can’t rely on the EU as a whole to support them, let alone NATO’s head, they may decide to reconsider the intelligence of seizing any more boats, particularly if they need to reconsider this.

In the event that Russia sends naval tankers to escort its” shadow submarine” through the Baltics, the last-mentioned problem leads to the second level about the potential for anescalation.

The deputy chairman of Russia’s political security committee&nbsp, warned&nbsp, that “any assault on our ships may be regarded as an assault on our place, even if the ship is under a foreign flag”. Trump doesn’t favor escalation against Russia, at least at this time, so he might not extend Article 5 guarantees to allies that seize such vessels.

And finally, all of this might simply be too little, too late. Russia and the US have already started backchannel discussions with Ukraine, putting an end to their proxy war when the stereotypically slow EU decides to support the US’s” shadow fleet “‘s capture of the Baltic Sea.

Moreover, this wasn’t hitherto seriously considered due to the two aforesaid reasons, which remain relevant. It’s, therefore, unlikely that the bloc will suddenly change its calculations.

The questions that are being addressed by the previous points are as simple as those in which some EU nations, like the hawkish Baltic States, want to appear as though they haven’t yet exhausted their policy options against Russia.

The realization that there isn’t anything they can do to stop Russia’s on-the-ground advance or collapse its economy as they anticipated could lead to a lot of demoralization because everything they’ve already done hasn’t stopped its on-the-ground advance.

The other two reasons might be even simpler because they could have already persuaded themselves that discussing this alone might deter Russia’s” shadow fleet” from operating in the Baltic and/or spur Trump’s aggression in Ukraine.

No matter how unlikely either outcome is, it doesn’t mean they still sincerely believe they’re possible. These political fantasies could quickly become dangerous, however, if any of the associated states try to unilaterally bring them to fruition.

A major incident at sea could instantly spark a&nbsp, New Cold War&nbsp, crisis that brings the&nbsp, Baltic front&nbsp, of this competition to the center of global attention.

It’s highly unlikely that Trump will turn his back on Russia if this occurs while Trump is still in talks with Putin because it is clear that this is a “deep state” provocation meant to sabotage a peace deal. However, if those discussions go wrong and he decides to “escalate to de-escalate” on better terms for the US, his strategy might change.

That could backfire though if Putin authorizes the navy to defend his” shadow fleet” as a reciprocal escalation&nbsp, following the precedent&nbsp, that he established last November.

Back then, he authorized the first-ever use of the hypersonic Oreshniks in response to Ukraine using long-range Western missiles against targets within Russia’s pre-2014 borders, which signaled that the days of his backing down were over. He used to be self-assured to avoid World War III, but that only unintentionally led to more hostility.

Putin is, therefore, expected to strongly respond to the scenario of European countries seizing his” shadow fleet” in the Baltic, which could lead to a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that might easily spiral out of control.

Trump would likely either decline to support such a provocation or would abandon whichever ally unilaterally engages in defiance of his warnings because he doesn’t appear to be willing to risk World War III by cutting off the Kremlin’s foreign revenue flow.

Russia’s” shadow fleet” shouldn’t have anything to worry about because the odds of European nations seizing its vessels are low, even though some of them might still attempt to capture a few ships under false pretenses like last December’s.

Russia might not escalate as it did less than two months ago as long as this is extraordinarily rare. However, any expansion of that policy almost certainly would result in a strong response from Russia.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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US makes clear Europe’s security isn’t a Trump priority – Asia Times

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Western defence ministers left their conference in Brussels on February 12 in horror after the new US secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, &nbsp, told them&nbsp, they may no longer depend on the US to ensure their security.

Hegseth stated that he was there” to express explicitly and unequivocally that the United States of America is not mainly focused on the protection of Europe.”

He even insisted that Western states provide the “overwhelming” share of money for Ukraine in the future. The US has been the largest recipient of Ukrainian military assistance, with US assistance, weapons, and financial aid essential in assisting Kyiv in thwarting the Russian war.

Hegseth’s responses are in keeping with the position of the US senator, Donald Trump, on the NATO intercontinental military empire. Trump has repeatedly urged its members to improve their defence spending because he believes NATO is a burden on the US financially.

But Hegseth’s notes may also be seen as a mark of America’s waning devotion to the conditions of Nato’s founding treaty. Article 5 of the 1949 agreement, signed by the US, Canada, and a number of western European countries, mandates that member states stand up for one another in the event of an military assault.

The US has the biggest army in NATO and the biggest hoard of nuclear weapons. But, on the face of it, attempts to resurrect the alliance appear to have caused a significant change in Europe’s security landscape following the cold war.

However, those who are familiar with the political climate surrounding NATO and the US’s role in protecting Europe may soon learn that this action follows in the footsteps of others who have fought hard to achieve since the Cold War.

Changing over time

NATO was put under enormous pressure to adapt to the new world attempt in 1991 as a result of the Soviet Union’s decline. Some in Washington were yet to be thinking about a rising China, but they were concerned that the US’s financial commitments to Western Europe during the Cold War would not remain.

Almost all Allied states were able to reduce their military spending at this time thanks to the so-called “peace income,” a popularized by former US president George H. W. Bush and past UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher.

The alliance actively participated in maintaining a no-fly area over Yugoslavia in 1992, almost as soon as Western Nato countries were reducing their forces and deploying specialist soldiers.

A novel Nato was becoming evident. It was changing from a social protection group to one of social security, where conflicts were fought within NATO’s borders.

A US fighter jet at an air base in Italy.
A US fighter aircraft at Aviano air center, Italy, after a goal over Bosnia to maintain the no-fly territory in 1993 Photo: Sgt. Janel Schroeder / Wikimedia Commons

This cooperative security agreement was effective up until 2001 when George W. Bush’s management entered the White House and engaged the US in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the US, NATO resorted to Article 5 and went back to the process of social defense.

Some Western countries, including the new, smaller NATO says like Estonia and Latvia, sent soldiers to Iraq and Afghanistan. We need to be there when the US needs us so that they will be that when we need them, according to the consistent explanation I heard in the European state.

However, Barack Obama’s administration introduced a “pivot to Asia” in 2011 before the war in Iraq and Afghanistan were through. The US’s intention was to shift its focus away from China’s Western hemisphere mostly.

By this stage, China had become the second-largest economy in the world and was quickly developing its defense. Incredibly, the US changed its mind in German cities as a result of this policy change. They thought it was the US’s decision to decide that its own stability did not reside in Europe as it has since 1945.

Therefore, in 2014, Russia invaded Crimea and the Donbas in eastern Ukraine. The expansion to Asia appeared to have stopped. However, as US military installations were closed across Europe, US involvement and investment in Western defense remained stagnant. The second Trump presidency followed the pattern established by Obama.

President Joe Biden, who became president in 2021, used the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to demonstrate to European officials that the US also saw its own stability in Europe and that it would support Ukraine.

However, the US remained persistent in urging Western nations to invest in their own defense. Over the past few years, the UK, Poland, and France have all pledged to raise their defence spending, but overall, the total cost of European NATO states has remained stagnant.

There has been a long-held conviction in the US that Europe is “freeriding” on British strength. This freeriding was permitted to continue while the US saw its personal safety in Europe.

However, as the US’s perspective has changed and the focus is now being put on thwarting China, it has been eager to suggest that European defense should significantly fall under the purview of Europe itself.

Nato won’t leave without a hitch. It is much more probable to vanish slowly with a whimper. After all, who did Trump match on his next morning in business? Never NATO but the Quad: an alliance between Australia, India, Japan and the US in the Indo-Pacific.

Professor of International Security at the University of Bath, David J. Galbreath

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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