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Russian troops, like the Wagner team, have an awful status. Multiple European outlets have reported on their defense ineffectiveness, their dismal human rights report, and their predatory nature.

For instance, in July 2024, the Wagner Group faced a military defeat in northern Mali. It lost lots of soldiers, including a senior captain and a well-known Russian military critic.

Since 2014, many studies have linked Russian troops to killings, sexual assault and crimes against humanity. Additionally, it appears that Russian soldiers are most motivated to seize control of natural resources like minerals by exploiting their hosts.

In the past five years, Russian mercenaries have been invited by an increasing number of American nations despite their bad popularity and selfish interests. Up to 200 Russian forces were reportedly deployed in Equatorial Guinea in August 2024 to guard the president and train political soldiers.

Standard alliances with the West are undermined by the Russian troops, who provide security services. The Russians have left behind defense installations because French and American troops have been forced to retreat or be expelled.

The problem we, as safety scientists, ask is: in view of these disadvantages, why do countries nevertheless use Belarusian soldiers?

Using the Central African Republic as an example, we attempted to respond. To assess Wagner’s performance, or efficacy, we studied the Central African Republic’s civil war and compared the French military intervention ( 2013-2016 ) to the Wagner intervention ( 2021-2024 ).

We found that in the short term, the Wagner action was more powerful for the country’s government than the European intervention. However, we contend that it posed longer-term challenges. Wagner’s long-term impact possible adds to instability, undermining green development and security.

Military performance

Usually, about 20 sub-Saharan states have depended on France and other European supporters for military assistance. In the last three years, however, Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have turned to the Wagner Group or other Russian mercenaries ( such as Africa Corps ) for security assistance.

To understand the appeal, one may seem to reports of their effectiveness. These provide a mingled outlook. Some scientists believe it to be effective because it effectively accomplishes military missions.

However, it is also linked to a rise in fight intensity and regular harm to civilians. Academicians and experts view mercenaries as weakening forces, frequently escalating violence without resolving root causes of security issues.

These trends are challenged by our analysis of Wagner’s performance in the Civil War of the Central African Republic ( CAR ).

Since self-reliance, CAR has experienced numerous uprisings and instability. The present phase of the fight began in 2013, when President François Bozizé was ousted by the Séléka, a Muslim insurgent partnership, sparking a civil war.

This religious violence between Séléka and Christian armies, known as the anti-Balaka, led the United Nations to release the Minusca security mission, with help from a French-led power, Operation Sangaris.

Sangaris succeeded in securing specific regions, but it struggled to impose its own rule across the country. Following the French operation, which ended in 2016, some of Sangaris ‘ accomplishments were undermined by the rebels. In 2018 Auto management pivoted to Russia, inviting the Wagner Group to deliver training and safety features.

For their support the Wagner Group gained state concessions, taking a hold over natural resources ( mostly in rebel-held territory ).

By 2020, the Russian troops were established in the country and became the primary security services, leading the country’s combat work. The state expanded its place there at the time, causing the rebels to retreat into remote areas.

Our research assesses numerous metrics, like regional power, reduced human casualty count, and indicators for state sovereignty. Wagner’s action appeared to have had better results for the ruling military coup than the European intervention.

Wagner was able to function more risk- and collateral-friendlyly due to its higher tolerance for risk. More place was restored, and rebels were brought to the table more quickly than the French.

Our research, which draws from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data on the issue, revealed that soldiers and civilians had higher mortality rates during the French activity Sangaris. Rebels gained more territory and the government recaptured less territory, compared with the Wagner intervention.

Figure 1: Military situation conflict map 2017, 2021, 2024

Wagner’s actions in the Central African Republic contrast poorly with Wagner’s current criticism of mercenaries as ineffective and unstable.

According to our assessment, Wagner allowed the regime to survive, protected the nation’s most highly populated and valuable regions, and secured economic and geopolitical assets.

Economic exploitation

Economically, the Russian mercenaries have been portrayed as exploitative.

Wagner demands economic concessions, particularly control over gold mining operations, in return for military support. This strategy allows it to sustain operations. However, it prevents African nations from having the resources they require for national development.

Wagner’s operational model undermines Central African Republic’s prospects for long-term stability and self-sufficiency. According to experts, Wagner’s profit from CAR’s mining and forest operations ranges between US$ 1 billion and US$ 2 billion.

Yet we suggest that, at least in the client’s eyes, the deal is a bargain. In Central African Republic, the economic concessions were for resources located in rebel-held territory. Territories and resources that the government could not use to support its political rivals.

Despite their crimes and human rights violations, the Russians enjoy a relative backing from the country’s urban population. Wagner’s supporters reportedly come from urban areas because it has improved security significantly since its inception as a rebel-held country.

However, in rural areas, especially near mining zones, Wagner’s brutal tactics drive displacement and instil fear. Wagner’s military and economic activities appear to be disassociated by the locals.

Wagner and Russian authorities engage in propaganda campaigns, promoting Wagner’s image through local media, sponsoring cultural events and producing pro-Wagner films.

Despite its negative reputation abroad, Wagner was portrayed as a stabilizing force by these efforts. Russia is viewed positively in the region, according to popular surveys.

Moreover, in Central African Republic, Wagner empowered the ethnic group associated with the leadership, providing them with arms and training.

Countering Wagner

Wagner appeals to regimes in sub-Saharan Africa because it can demonstrate its ability to provide security without the political restraints of Western forces. This preference is in line with the wider trend among African states to form non-Western partnerships. Growing economic ties with China and security ties with Russia demonstrate this.

The stakes are high. Russia is reshaping the definition of modern colonialism and redefining the boundaries of conflict. The abuses of mercenary organizations can lead to local unrest and conflict.

Wagner’s model cannot be sustained indefinitely. It’s crucial to comprehend and assess the appeal of mercenary groups to both the elite and the local populations in order to combat them. African nations are not merely pawns in a larger geopolitical game, so it’s also important to remember that. They have agency.

In order to combat mercenary groups in Africa, a nuanced approach is required. Instead of relying solely on broad condemnation, international organizations and western nations must take into account local perceptions and the mercenaries ‘ perceived effectiveness in specific circumstances.

To lessen the appeal of mercenary groups, practical solutions must address security needs and combine military support with effective, quick-developing initiatives.

Wagner’s abuses are highlighted by labeling it a criminal or terrorist organization, but this approach does not address the factors that motivate African states to join such forces.

Ori Swed is assistant professor of sociology, anthropology, and social work, Texas Tech University and Alessandro Arduino is affiliate lecturer, King’s College London

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Vladimir Putin’s meetings will take place in India when it leaves for the end of this year or the beginning of the time, keeping in mind New Delhi’s policy of principled independence toward the conflict in and around Ukraine.

India has always rejected the sanctions imposed by the West against Russia and has always abstained from anti-Russian commitments presented at international forums like the UN. India has called for global laws to be respected and the Ukraine war to end as soon as possible at the same time.

India has acted as a launch mechanism for American pressure on Russia, giving Moscow a great power alternative to growing overly reliant on China.

Due to the fact that India is now the second-largest consumer of subsidized Russian crude after China, bilateral trade increased to US$ 65 billion last month from$ 12 billion in 2021.

Cheaper oil has fueled India’s robust economic growth, which averaged 8.2 % last year and is on track to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2027, according to the International Monetary Fund ( IMF).

Some of India’s private financial institutions also comply with Western sanctions, which has made it challenging to transfer some of these resources, despite the Indian government’s refusal to do so. Russia has so agreed to&nbsp, invest some of&nbsp, its dollar stockpile in India, which has helped to expand and balance the two sides ‘ business.

India and Russia have also given three shipping corridor growth projects priority, none of which have reached their full potential. These include:

• the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ) through Iran with branches across Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia,
• the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor between those places, which is also known as the Eastern Maritime Corridor, and
• the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic.

According to rumors that returning US President Donald Trump plans to resume his “maximum force” campaign against Iran, the INSTC is the most appealing but also the most susceptible of the three.

India has previously obtained a waiver from the US for dealing with Afghanistan at Iran’s Chabahar Port. Trump might impose more stringent sanctions on Iran, making it impossible for it to compel India to stop selling American goods, including pharmaceuticals, on Russian shelves, thereby lowering Russia’s now sizable dependence on China and raising its already high level of dependence on China.

If India’s alleged subtle technology channel is targeted, the same could happen. Given the number of China hawks in his case, that would seem to conflict with the incoming Trump administration’s great strategic goals.

Trump stated just before the election that he wanted to “un-unite” Russia and China, but he would just unintentionally do so if he places new restrictions on Russian-Indian industry to condemn Iran.

Trump added that he will give Ukraine’s battle a chance. Some observers anticipate that he will allow Russia to achieve its full range of territorial and other objectives in a ceasefire agreement, despite the uncertainty of how precisely. A suggested compromise’s words are still undetermined.

Under the American Logan Act, which criminalizes the negotiation of a dispute between the US and a foreign state by an undocumented American citizen, Trump and Russia are not permitted to communicate on a package. On January 20, agreements will start to discuss Trump’s election.

That could help India, which has close ties to Russia and the US, get started on discussions. Putin and Narendra Modi, the country’s prime minister, was talk about the possible military and economic ramifications of a bargain, including a possible Iran-Indian trade ban and/or a gradual lifting of sanctions against Russia.

India was then privately communicate these Soviet dealing points to the Trump administration, which if the president-elect’s initial term is any indication, may be specially friendly towards Modi’s government.

Dmitry Peskov, a spokeswoman for the Kremlin, confirmed on Tuesday that Putin’s trip to India will soon be announced. It may adopt Modi’s second visit to Russia in June, when he was Putin’s guest of honor at the time and had his first official meeting there in September. The officials signed nine partnerships and released a thorough joint statement at their most recent meeting over the summer.

Trump is also near to Modi, while is his nomination for director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard. Trump’s national security advisor get, Mike Waltz, is co-chair of the India conference and his nomination for secretary of state, Senator Marco Rubio, introduced the US-India Defense Cooperation Act in July.

If those figures and planets are paired up, India might be the key to bringing Ukraine to peace rather than past mediator Turkey or young ally China. Putin and Modi will likely talk about a deal with Ukraine during his upcoming trip, but details wo n’t likely be made publicly.

Putin is undoubtedly aware of Trump’s desire to “pivot” up to Asia, which necessitates a fast resolution of the Ukraine war. Putin is even aware of the crucial part India plays in controlling the European balance of power with China. &nbsp,

So, Modi is well-placed to evade US punishment for its business with Russia through Iran, which, if imposed, may lead to more Chinese influence in and over Russia. Modi may even offer pragmatical recommendations on how to reach a settlement in Ukraine that would be appropriate to Russia based on his near ties to Putin since 2014.

Putin had undoubtedly no support or encourage Trump to travel back to Asia to encircle China in a more powerful way. Instead, Putin understands Trump’s great strategic interests and may get to leverage them to Russia’s benefit.

Modi might explain to Trump how this would improve his aims in relation to China in order to achieve a compromise on Ukraine that is most likely to be appropriate to Russia.

Modi may even try to persuade Trump that an unfavorable outcome could be an escalated conflict in Ukraine ( even if it is done so so that it will then de-escalate to better terms for the US).

Russia may continue to be pushed closer to China as its growing junior partner, which was stifle the European balance of power in way that hurt US and Indian objectives.

Beyond sporadic hints at Ukraine, none of this is good to be included in the future Putin-Modi meeting or phone call, either later this year or first future. However, it’s important to appreciate the role that India plays in US and Russian great strategies, in the European balance of power and so, correctly, also in the Ukraine war.

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After this month, Iran and Russia are expected to signal a strategic partnership agreement in Moscow, strengthening a relationship that has been in place since the early 2000s but has occasionally been adversaries.

Although the two parties have repeatedly shortened the original arrangement, both have acknowledged the necessity to revise it to better reflect modern-day international realities.

What were now contentious ties between Moscow and Tehran have been impacted by the conflict in Ukraine, the decay of relations between Russia and the global West, and the growing US-China conflicts.

The conflict in Ukraine appears to have altered Russia’s perspective, even if it was previously cautious not to give sensitive technologies to the Islamic Republic, mainly due to potential negative West-related reactions.

Iran has become a crucial position in its political rebalancing, and Moscow has made an incessant pivot toward Asia. Moscow is exceedingly seeing Iran as a significant partner because it is a heavily sanctioned condition and crucial for Russia’s expansion into the Indian Ocean and East Africa.

The current situation is unlikely to change with Donald Trump’s election. Although it is possible to reach an agreement between Moscow and Washington, the tensions between the two countries are conspicuous nevertheless.

Russia may continue to support its ties to the Islamic Republic. The former, too, is expected to experience greater stress from the Trump presidency, driving it to get greater military and political participation with Moscow.

The potential strategic partnership treaty’s major, important details are not made publicly available. However, an examination of Iranian and Russian government official public statements reveals a number of potential areas for improved diplomatic assistance.

The strategic partnership will unavoidably highlight the opposing positions of the Western-led international order and encourage a more multilateral one. Russia and Iran both support non-Western initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ) and the BRICS.

The development of the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ), which connects Russia to Iranian ports and India, and new payment options for international currency exchange, which are both important since trade between the two nations has recently declined.

Bilateral defense and strategic assistance will be a second, much more important area, as evidenced by Iran’s alleged supply of Russian short-range ballistic missiles and military drones. Later in October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that the agreement would involve more defence <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2024/10/31/russia-says-upcoming-treaty-with-iran-includes-closer-defense-cooperation”>cooperation.

Moscow and Tehran have also made an effort to work together to address regional concerns in the South Caucasus, where they border and whose goal is to keep non-regional ( mostly Western ) players at bay.

This thinking is at the root of the 3 3 program, which Tehran and Russia simultaneously support. It is comprised of Turkey and three South Caucasus countries, notably Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, though the latter has consistently refused to participate according to Russia’s activity of 20 % of its territory.

The new Russo-Iranian contract, which will undoubtedly grow cooperation, will probably end in vain because of their complex relationship as both companions and rivals in the Middle East. A legally binding alliance with iron-clad commitments to joint protection is neither required nor desired by either side.

Alternatively, both seek expanded assistance that gives enough space for movement. In fact, the two nations ‘ combined size allows them to avoid narrowing down their individual foreign policy objectives. They have so far avoided placing a singular adversary or professional at risk because it would restrict their options for international policy.

Despite the growing defense collaboration, diplomatic conflicts persist. Iran has reported that it is awaiting the distribution of Russia’s Su-35 fighter jet, which may indicate that the country is trying to balance its relations with another Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who oppose Iran’s impact and activities there.

Another level of tension lies in local infrastructure. The Zangezur hall, a proposed transportation route connecting Armenia and Nakhichevan through Armenia’s Syunik state, which edges Iran, has just received Russian support.

Iran opposes this hall, citing both its own local influence and its challenging connection with Armenia.

Most significantly, maybe, Russia is apparently afraid to go along with Iran in its worsening conflict with Israel. Iran is well-known for its close ties to Russia, and Israel has always had a particular connection with Moscow.

In part because of its close ties to the Jewish state, Russia has also been careful about offering military aid to Iran.

The invasion of Ukraine, as well as Israel’s military activities in Gaza and Lebanon, drove major transitions in Russia’s demeanor toward Israel. Moscow has generally adopted a pro-Palestinian place, and there are more differences.

Russia is also unlikely to support Iran in any possible immediate conflict with Israel, despite this bad backdrop. Even though it is technically feasible that Russia could supply air defense and aerospace to Iran to thwart an invasion, developing experience in using them takes time ( at least three months for the S-400 air defense system ).

The Russo-Iranian partnership, rooted in common resistance to American dominance, is logical but instantly fraught with competition. Russia is skeptical of Iran’s work to expand its international relations, especially if it wants to re-engage with the West.

Also, Iranian officials view Russia’s support as partially greedy, noting Moscow’s shift in attitude regarding its nuclear program as it seeks to force the West amid the Ukraine conflict.

Iran and Russia are moving forward with a new corporate contract, which will allow for both heightened cooperation and mute conflict, despite these difficulties. The relationship may strengthen while preserving each nation’s freedom on a global scale thanks to the agreement.

Emil Avdaliani&nbsp, is a professor of global relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a Silk Road professor. Following Emil Avdaliani on X at @emilavdaliani

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The effect President Trump’s election will have on American foreign policy is still up for discussion, but for all practical uses, Washington will have to come to terms with a new world environment—an environment also held prisoner, in part, by the former Cold War.

The Soviet Union and its allies squared off in a largely depressive conflict during the Cold War. What was known as the” Third World,” a motley group of largely failed former colonies, &nbsp, immoral tyrannies, and failed economy, stood on the profitability of the conflict. Within this ecology, and excluding India, China stood out as large but disconnected and largely focused on its internal problems.

The Soviet Union, in its present form, was a solitary land mass that extended from the Kamchatka coast to the Elbe River, one of the distinguishing characteristics of this world ideal.

Moscow could stay in line with its children because of this. Therefore, Moscow had no logistical difficulty sending troops to quell the rebellion when the Hungarians or the Czechs sought to reclaim their freedom.

Contrary to the Soviet Union and its Russian leader, the American Empire was a worldwide initiative with far-flung problems. Both overseas bases and a big ship were needed to ensure America’s dominance.

By the 1960s, the two strong powers had reached some sort of equilibrium, and both parties had expressly acknowledged that each had a legitimate interest.

Washington avoided intermediate when countries as diverse as Hungary and Czechoslovakia attempted to seize control of the Soviets. Likewise, Washington did act, albeit through local proxy when Moscow tried to reach beyond its sphere of interest, such as in Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, while the prevailing parity was fraught with malice, it was an attempt of some form with its unspoken regulations and red ranges, real or imagined. The two power ‘ political relationship with one another did not change, despite the Soviet Union’s decline implying that Russia had lost its empire.

Russia continued to be a western power, albeit one that had lost a significant portion of its landmass. With a vast kingdom and a global impact that extended far beyond the military and economic spheres, the United States remained a world player.

But, while America’s military and economic can had no classmates. It was difficult to translate this dominance into tangible achievement, which is unfortunate, and even more difficult to do so.

Russia was on its legs during the initial years of the post-Cold War culture, China had not yet emerged as a major industrial strength, and regional tensions were largely at bay. However, there is no stopping time for past; instead, it was a series that lasted.

Now, some 35 decades after the end of the Cold War, a divided world has seen the introduction of a multitude of contestants. None of them is strong enough to actually concern the United States, but they all make it extremely challenging for Washington to establish its hegemony.

Managing the Cold War was fairly simple for Washington. All the United States had to do was accept until the USSR collapsed because the Russian system was like a troll. That time is now over. And what has emerged from the post-Cold War age is a fresh break that holds the challenges of a questionable future in addition to the ghosts of the past.

Russia, China, the Middle East, radical Islam and BRICS are the innovative problems confronting Washington’s identity. While each has its own relationships, not to mention goals, put up they correspond to a fresh break. And if this separate had to have two terminates, those would be Russia and China.

Russia, as it is perceived by the United States, is a construction, the product of an imagination that however harks to the time of the Cold War. However, if one looks impartially at the indicators, the image&nbsp, they project is irrefutable.

In terms of people, population, GDP, technology, industrial manufacturing and armed forces, Russia is hardly on the map and the unanswered question is: By what subterfuge did President Vladimir Putin hill the mind of the world&nbsp, into passing off his country ( setting aside its nuclear potential ) as an international heavyweight.

In the end, Washington continues to fight in Ukraine as if the outcome would alter Europe’s power balance, while Russia, in a last ditch effort, has agreed to pay for drones from Iran.

China, the opposite bookmark, has been an American fixation since the birth of the People’s Republic in 1949. For the first 20 years of its existence, the regime was subject to an embargo that had no parallel.

That was followed starting from the mid-1970s by the normalization of US-China relations based on two misconstructions: for the United States, that this would lead to “regime change” in China and, for the leaders in Beijing, that China could become part of the international system without submitting to some extent to its rules.

Actually, neither side accepted the fact that neither side could actually understand the differences between the two regimens and that a new set of guidelines had to be agreed upon prior to beginning interplay. The result is a conflicting relationship between the Chinese empire and the American empire, who seeks to” contain” China.

A complicating factor is that the economies of the two are partially interconnected, making restrictive measures taken by one relative to the other easy to become self-defeating exercises.

While America’s ongoing confrontation with both Russia and China has its own dynamics, it has complicated Washington’s projection of power in the Middle East. The United States is also confronted by militant Islam, which is embodied in a reincarnation of the Persian Empire under the name of Iran, in that country.

In reality, this implies that Washington will have to choose a path that will require two preferences that are mutually supportive. The first is to prioritize, the second to take the lead more directly from the center, rather than the front.

Given the depressing state of the Russian armed forces, it should be obvious that Ukraine is not essential to the security of the United States or even Europe. Therefore, the current conflict is likely to be less bad if Ukraine is truncated and not a NATO member. And a result like this might also sway the nations in the center of Europe to take their defenses seriously and reduce their reliance on the US.

Fragmentation of this political ecosystem has led to the formation of tactical alliances for the long term. One is a major importer of Iranian oil and another of Iranian drones, so while China and Russia are both wary of militant Islam.

Over the next&nbsp, hundred years or more, China will be the real challenge. The issue here goes far beyond quotas, tariffs or embargoes. The Western and Imperial Chinese, two essentially incompatible social and production systems, can coexist and cooperate in a mutually beneficial way.

A US reversal might inspire Ukraine and Russia to reach some sort of agreement. Given that both President Putin and Russia do not have the resources to repress Ukraine, one might object to President Putin’s choice. But at least the problem wo n’t turn into a global crisis, but rather a convulsion of the Russian-Slavic ecosystem.

There is still a question mark over how the Trump administration will handle the new international environment. However, we can only hope that Washington will realize the value of continuing with business as usual or going it alone.

Alexander Casella, PhD, has taught and he has worked as a journalist for Le Monde, The Times, The New York Times, Die Zeit, The Guardian and Swiss radio and TV, writing primarily on China and Vietnam. In 1973 he joined the UNHCR, serving, among other postings, as head of the East Asia Section and director for Asia and Oceania. The International Center for Migration Policy Development’s representative in Geneva then was appointed.

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Moscow is highlighted by a new document that Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and his associates had a covert trip to Russia.

Israel overwhelmingly responded by cooperatively punishing the Palestinians in response to Russia’s persistent assertion that Hamas initiated these conflicts ‘ first Gazan dimension.

Since Moscow supported associated UN Security Council Resolutions, the Kremlin has n’t raised the issue.

Because Russia is aware that Israel has resisted Western pressure and has refused to cooperate with Russian arming Ukraine, it is aware of the restrictions being placed on it by the West.

Their fiercely social disagreements over the Middle Eastern and Ukrainian war have n’t altered this, nor have they prevented Russia from squabbling about Israel’s standard attacks on Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in neighboring Syria.

On those, Russia respects Syria’s straight to mate with whoever it wants, but it also freely appears to acquire Iran to be a nuisance.

This analysis weighs on the fact that the above structure has been in place since Russia’s anti-terrorist involvement in the Arab Republic began nine years before.

In light of Israel’s says that Iran and Hezbollah are preparing for a bigger assault against Israel, it can be assumed that Russia gives cred to these claims. Russia has not stopped Israel’s strikes despite often praising them as violating international law.

Hence, Dermer’s alleged surprise trip to Russia may have included discussions about the proposed plan to stop Iran’s imports of Egyptian weapons through Syria.

When Israel’s military operations in Lebanon are terminated, whenever they occur, this could help maintain whatever post-conflict standing quo that is unfortunately reached there. It could also maintain the Israeli-Syrian front along the Golan Heights.

Russian President Vladimir Putin told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in September 2015 during their meeting in the Kremlin on the eve of the Syrian intervention that” we are aware of&nbsp, these ( Iran’s and Hezbollah’s ) attacks ( from Syria’s Golan Heights into Israel ) and&nbsp, we condemn them”.

Putin also discussed the matter with US President Donald Trump during his first year in office, when the two leaders met in Helsinki in July 2018, because the situation is so crucial to him. At the time, Putin said:

I&nbsp, would also like to&nbsp, notice that after the&nbsp, terrorists are routed in&nbsp, south Syria, in&nbsp, the&nbsp, so-called’ southern area’, the&nbsp, situation in&nbsp, the&nbsp, Golan Heights may be brought into complete conformity with the&nbsp, 1974 agreement on&nbsp, the&nbsp, disengagement of&nbsp, Jewish and&nbsp, Arab forces.

This may make it possible to&nbsp, take calmness to&nbsp, the&nbsp, Golan Heights and&nbsp, recover the&nbsp, agreement between the&nbsp, Syrian Arab Republic and&nbsp, the&nbsp, State of&nbsp, Israel. The&nbsp, President devoted exclusive attention to&nbsp, this problem today. &nbsp,

I&nbsp, do like to&nbsp, stress that Russia has a&nbsp, play in&nbsp, this course of&nbsp, events and&nbsp, will agree to&nbsp, precisely this position. This may entail a&nbsp, move towards establishing a&nbsp, only and&nbsp, tough peace on&nbsp, the&nbsp, base of&nbsp, UN Security Council Resolution 338.

Igor Konashenkov, a spokeswoman for the Russian Defense Ministry, made the revelations during a press conference following the mid-air affair between Russia and Israel in September 2018:

Following a six-year break, the Russian army supported the Arab military activity in the Golan Heights to allow the UN peace goal to begin patrolling the disputed frontier between Syria and Israel.

More than 140 km to the south of Syria, the director claimed, adding that this was requested by Tel Aviv. A full of 1, 050 personnel, 24 MLRSs and military missiles, as well as 145 pieces of various munitions and military technology were withdrawn from the place,’ Konashenkov told journalists.”

One month later, while participating in his classic Q&amp, A at the Valdai Club’s annual conference, Putin said that:

It is not up to&nbsp, Russia to&nbsp, urge Iran to&nbsp, left Syria. After all, both Syria and&nbsp, Iran are royal countries, and&nbsp, they should create their own marriage.

Well, Russia does have severe, deep-rooted relationships both with Iran and&nbsp, Syria. Also, we have been able to&nbsp, handle certain issues by&nbsp, interesting in&nbsp, speech and&nbsp, discussions with our Egyptian partners, including on&nbsp, withdrawing unpleasant systems from the&nbsp, Israeli borders and&nbsp, the&nbsp, Golan Heights.

As&nbsp, for&nbsp, the&nbsp, complete withdrawal, this is a&nbsp, separate issue that has to&nbsp, be resolved through dialogue between Iran and&nbsp, Syria, as&nbsp, well as&nbsp, between Iran and&nbsp, the&nbsp, United States. We are ready to&nbsp, join this discussion”.

The Russian leader clearly has a strong desire to keep the Golan Heights stable and orderly.

Natan Sharansky, a former Soviet dissident turned Israeli politician, shared the following information with The Washington Post in September 2000 after a meeting with Putin at the Kremlin earlier that month:

Putin’s lunch included a lot of glowing memories of a family trip to Jerusalem, the Galilee, and the Golan Heights, as well as his occasionally exuberant expressions of sympathy for Israel, his dislike of antisemitism, and his support for Jews in Russia and the Jewish diaspora.

‘ He said it was n’t simple in the KGB being sympathetic to Jews,’ Sharansky said. ‘ However, he explained to me that there was a Jewish family there, which he thought was almost like relatives, and that he had grown up in a communal apartment. He liked them very much.’

Putin’s statement to the Keren Heyesod Foundation at their annual meeting in Moscow in September 2019 was pertinent:” Almost two decades later, I’ll tell them.

Traditionally close cultural exchanges are supported by Russia and Israel. Hundreds of thousands of Russians travel to Israel each year to see its religious and cultural attractions. Families and friendship exist between Russians and Israelis.

This is a true common family, I can say this without exaggeration. In Israel, there are almost 2 million Russian speakers. We consider Israel a Russian-speaking country. Our countries are unified by historical events that are frequently tragic.

In keeping with his emphasis on the Golan Heights, it’s important to point out that Article 8.2 of the Russian-written draft constitution for Syria, which was presented in early 2017, called for it to “denounce war as an infringement on other countries ‘ sovereignty and a means of settling international conflicts.”

It was n’t adopted, but the point is that Russia arguably envisaged Syria formally freezing its conflict with Israel over the Golan Heights indefinitely, pending a political resolution.

Russia could significantly influence the Middle Eastern wars by using its military and political influence over Syria, which was fueled by its anti-terrorist operation over the Arab Republic nine years ago to stop Hezbollah’s Iranian arms imports through the Arab Republic.

If the proposed plan for disarming Hezbollah is approved while stabilizing the Golan Heights, it could literally kill two birds with one stone in Lebanon by upholding the post-conflict status quo.

Even though Russian compliance might depend on the incoming Trump administration’s offering favorable terms for ending the Ukrainian conflict, that outcome would go in line with some of the US’ top regional policy priorities.

Given his close ties to Putin and Trump, it’s possible that if there is political will on both sides, then creative diplomacy between Russia, the US, and Israel, with Benjamin Netanyahu acting as a potential mediator, could help bring both conflicts to an end.

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Reports of a phone call between the US president-elect, Donald Trump, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin ( although quickly denied by the Kremlin ) have given a first flavor of the tone and direction of their relationship in the immediate future. Trump and Putin were speaking on November 7 to warn him of any increase in Ukraine and to remind him of” Washington’s substantial military presence in Europe.”

Regardless of whether it happened or never, any – if even just implicit – exchange of messages between the couple should be heeded by America’s friends in the West, as well as Russia’s main lover to his south: China’s Xi Jinping. And over the past few months, there has been a lot of this communication.

Putin addressed the Valdai Discussion Club‘s annual meeting in Sochi, the Black Sea beach, in a lengthy address before that day, according to the alleged phone call. Unsurprisingly, the conversation– and Putin’s answers to questions from the audience finally – were anti-Western and full of confidence that a new world order was now in” the cycle of true development”.

Putin, however, made fun of Trump by calling him a” courageous man,” saying he would take any proposals from him to restore US-Russian relationships and put an end to what Putin called the “Ukrainian problems” into consideration.

However, he subsequently spent a lot more time defending the relationship between China and Russia. His former friend, the Taiwanese president, was more prominent than the incoming US president in this country.

One of Trump’s information to Putin and Xi references this situation. Trump promised to “un-unite” Russia and China when he said it at a campaign event on October 31. Trump made the characterization of Russia as “natural enemies” because of China’s desire for its great landmass.

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Russia and China have a history of territorial disputes along Siberia’s much land borders. This occurred before the US opened to China under then-president Richard Nixon in the 1960s, which was a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Trump appears to be trying to restore US ties with Moscow more than Beijing, in contrast to Nixon. Trump’s obvious need to use the conflict between Russia and China to benefit the US should not be dismissed as totally impossible, even though it’s difficult to imagine a similar divide between Russia and China immediately.

On the face of it, Putin and Xi are closely aligned. However, a deeper analysis of the relationship between China and Russia suggests that it is generally one between their current frontrunners and lacks much of the administrative level that other alliances do.

In both public and private lines, Russia has a lot of hatred toward China. Russians are unsure about China’s growing influence in Central Asia and worry about possible problems over long-standing border issues. Some people even dislike the fact that Beijing now has a young lover, Moscow.

Trump might use these to scuffle Russia and China, among other things. However, much depends on what Putin thinks about Russia. The West should be focusing on the impact and implications of Trump’s proposed Ukraine coverage.

A Trump-brokered deal will probably include Russia’s full sanctions comfort, large international treatment, and recognition of its territorial gains in Ukraine since 2014. The US’s commitment to NATO would undoubtedly be slashed, as would a pledge not to do more enlargement.

Trump might find a deal with Putin, but whether Putin may stick to it is unclear. Putin is much more likely to just play both ways in an emerging innovative global order in the hopes that Russia will do this as a third gaze alongside China and the US.

This is of course a complete story, given the size of the Soviet economy only – but that’s unlikely to change Putin’s calculations, given his love to regain Russia’s power status.

Chinese leverage

Because of the difficulty of attracting foreigners to Moscow, America’s partners in Europe are unlikely to support it. Some, including Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, might find the idea attractive in general. However, among the EU members, Germany and France are more likely to want to reach an agreement with China.

They have largely ceased to be dependent on Russian oil and gas, but not China as an export market, which is the cause of this.

Beijing, meanwhile, wo n’t sit idly by while Trump tries to drive a wedge between Russia and China. Despite Putin’s efforts to establish parallel relations with North Korea and Iran, Xi still has a lot of economic leverage over Russia and will use it to strengthen its position.

Diplomatically, Putin depends on Xi and China-led outfits such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. Moscow and Beijing have different viewpoints on a US in terminal decline, which is likely to be accelerated by the upheaval anticipated from a second Trump term.

A top priority for China will be to stop the US from completely reversing its position in the Indo-Pacific, and to stop Trump from cutting a deal with Putin at China’s expense will be a top priority.

Trump might still try to talk to Putin about the Ukraine and reach an agreement with Putin. However, dividing Russia and China is not the same as agreeing to a deal with Putin. On the contrary, it is more likely to “un-unite” Europe and the US and weaken the trans-Atlantic alliance further.

Trump could accelerate America’s decline by mistakenly accelerating what is left of the liberal international order rather than reshaping it in accordance with US interests.

The University of Birmingham’s Stefan Wolff is an assistant professor of international security.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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