World (Page 3)

Beware of exponential articles. But in this case, I’m frightened, as Ulrike Herrmann’s highly readable book The End of Socialism makes clear, the choice between neoliberalism and culture really does seem to be either/or – and the end will likely come a lot sooner than we thought.

Anyone who isn’t alarmed about the rapid and well-documented decline in the global environment, upon which we and our atypically comfortable lifestyles depend, really hasn’t been paying attention. You may not enjoy reading a book like this, but you really should read it – if only for your children’s sake.

The End of Capitalism appeared in Germany a couple of years ago, but it has lost none of its relevance or urgency. On the contrary, with Donald Trump in the White House promising to “drill, baby drill“, it could hardly be more timely.

The majority of potential readers are likely to disagree with Herrmann’s central claim that” climate protection will only be possible if we abolish capitalism”.

This is unsurprising. We have known nothing other than capitalism in the West for several hundred years. Attempts to do things differently in other parts of the world, such as the Soviet Union, generally did not go well socially or, more importantly, environmentally.

One of the reasons it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism, as philosopher Fredric Jameson famously claimed, is that people everywhere like the abundance of stuff that capitalism has been instrumental in producing.

Living standards, especially in the West, but also in China, India and elsewhere, have risen unimaginably in a remarkably short space of time. It is not surprising that the beneficiaries have generally been pleased about this unprecedented change in their material circumstances.

True, contemporary capitalism is characterised by a growing gulf between the richest and the poorest, both within and between countries. This is an awkward problem for” communist” China, but one that Australians and especially Americans seem relatively unconcerned about. Herrmann, too, is surprisingly relaxed about it. She argues that” capitalism made democracy possible – and it can be democratically controlled”.

This idea is currently being subjected to a searching real-time examination, as the Trump administration systematically eviscerates and transforms America’s system of governance to a point where sober and serious analysts consider it to be headed toward authoritarianism.

Herrmann does not consider such a possibility, but she does provide a clear explanation of the rise of capitalism and the social and technological forces that have made it the most transformative force in human history.

More hyperbole? Lots of people have given up on organised religion, but not many have renounced consumerism. Unlikely as such a renunciation might seem, Herrmann argues that endless consumption is something we will have to give up if the environment is to remain habitable.

The argument is simple and has been around since the Club of Rome published The Limits to Growth, half a century ago: a system that is predicated on ever expanding growth is incompatible with a world of finite resources, especially if one of those resources is a functioning natural environment.

Lots of people have spent the intervening 50 years pointing out why the authors of that book were wrong. It is likely they will be queuing up to tell Herrmann she is wrong, too – especially when she argues that” ‘ green growth’ does not exist”.

The unpalatable options

We have been repeatedly assured that technology will come to the rescue. But Herrmann contends that” we no longer have the time to wait for possible technological breakthroughs. We must act immediately if we are to avert climate collapse”.

The seemingly irreconcilable problems, she argues, are highlighted in the cost of removing carbon from the atmosphere and storing it somewhere. Despite all the hype, such technology has yet to be viably demonstrated at scale. This means “humanity will be forced to move away from fossil fuels and towards green energy”.

Unfortunately for the likes of Peter Dutton, Herrmann is scathing about the prospects for nuclear power. There is some debate about precise figures, but the German experience, which is central to the book’s main arguments, suggests that even when Germany had 19 commercially run reactors, they could only provide around 13 % of total energy consumed.

Herrmann points out that” the nuclear energy sector is the only branch of industry in which costs consistently rise”. Reactors are, consequently, not viable without government subsidies.

Before admirers of green energy and especially “green growth” start feeling smug, it is important to note that Herrmann is equally sceptical about wind and solar. She claims that, between them, they provide less than 10 % of Germany’s energy needs and won’t be of much use in periods of dunkelflaute: the “dark doldrums” when the sun doesn’t shine ( much ) and the wind doesn’t blow.

In 2024, however, after the publication of the German edition of Herrmann’s book, Germany generated 59 % of its electricity from renewables, including 31.9 % from wind and 14.7 % from solar.

Nevertheless, energy storage is expensive and difficult, and the transition to green solutions is fraught. One example: it takes 35 kilograms of scarce minerals to make a traditional petrol driven car and 210 kilograms to make an electric one. Manufacturing the batteries for them generates a further 15–20 tonnes of carbon dioxide.

As a result, “our planet is being ransacked ]… ] Around one-third of all raw material consumption since 1900 took place in the short time between 2002 and 2015”.

This is why Herrmann argues that simply moving to green energy sources will not be sufficient, either to guarantee current needs or to adequately reduce our collective impact on the environment.

It is not only the automotive sector that will have to shrink. One of the industries that will be difficult to reform, much less shrink, is aviation. Over a single year, 90 % of the world’s population will not fly at all and 1 % will account for half of the global aviation emissions.

This mirrors the grotesque levels of inequality in global wealth distribution. It means the rich will have to join the poor in” saying goodbye to flying”.

Other examples of politically unpalatable sacrifices are given throughout the book. And the message is clear:

The challenges will grow, and the funds ]to address them ] will shrink. Consumption must fall, which immediately begs the question of who should cut back and by how much. Distribution conflicts will be inevitable.

Given that “technology will not enable us to produce enough green energy sufficiently cheaply to fuel ‘ green growth ‘ ] … ] the only remaining option is green shrinkage: fewer new buildings, fewer cars, fewer chemical products”.

This is a message that no policymaker anywhere in the world, democrat or autocrat, will want to hear. It is not just the rich industrialised countries that are wedded to the idea of economic expansion.

Many developing countries would like nothing better than to join their wealthy counterparts. So would the people of the Global South, which is why so many of them risk their lives to flee hopeless poverty.

Improbable precedents

Unlikely as the necessary reforms are to be realized, Herrmann suggests that wartime Britain offers a model of what can be achieved if the dangers are sufficiently immediate and existential.

She points out that “rationing was so popular in Britain because everyone had exactly the same entitlement”– though no doubt the legendary” spirit of the Blitz” also had something to do with spending nights cowering in underground stations with hundreds of strangers while people dropped bombs on you.

This is not a flippant point. Without a dramatic change of consciousness on the part of “ordinary” people generally, and policymakers in particular, it is impossible to imagine the sorts of sacrifices that seem necessary to achieve the” shrinkage” being considered, much less enacted as “necessary prohibitions”.

Given that any actions would also need to have a global, rather than just a national rationale, a radical change of collective direction also seems improbable, to put it delicately, especially if it involves something resembling central planning.

And yet Herrmann argues that there is no choice other than radical and seemingly unimaginable change if we are to survive in anything like a civilized condition:

There is no alternative for the industrialised countries. Either they end growth voluntarily, or the era of growth will end violently, when everything that forms the basis of our way of life has been destroyed.

For what it’s worth, I agree. I am not a climate scientist, but I recognize that there is an intellectual division of labor that is a central component of modernity. None of us is capable of knowing everything about the increasingly complex world in which we live.

But if something like 99 % of climate scientists agree on the causes and likely consequences of climate change, I am happy to take their word for it. What possible basis could I have to disagree?

Herrmann may not be right about everything, but she is right about enough to cause any open-minded reader to think seriously about what the future looks like, especially for younger generations who will have to deal with the decisions we make – or don’t make – today.

This is hardly a novel insight. But it is striking that, for all our real understanding about the nature of the unprecedented challenge we collectively face, there is still an equally remarkable unwillingness or inability to act.

Like many before her, Herrmann thinks that salvation could come from “below”, because “parties do not lead their voters, they follow them”. But given what is currently happening in the United States and elsewhere, the durability of democracy itself is uncertain.

In a world where democracy is already in retreat, the environmental emergencies that will inevitably increase without meaningful action could make authoritarian responses even more likely.

Still, what do I care? I’m a baby boomer with no kids. I live in one of the wealthiest, safest places on Earth. In Western Australia, we don’t even care about the rest of the country, let alone the rest of the world.

Local politicians are planning to make an even bigger contribution to destroying the planet than we already do, because Woodside Energy wants to speed up the approval process for the controversial North West Shelf project. Good to know who’s running the state, at least.

It might have been useful if Herrmann had given a bit more attention to the politics of self-absorption or the slightly optimism-inducing literature on “degrowth“.

These are minor criticisms of what is a significant contribution to the literature on the climate crisis, though I fear The End of Capitalism may only be read by an already sympathetic audience.

This remains a seemingly insurmountable obstacle faced by would-be reformers. I know it is considered de rigueur to strike an optimistic note when concluding discussions of this sort, but it is not easy, and may be dishonest.

There is no doubt that unmitigated climate change and environmental degradation will transform our lives and the political systems that circumscribe them. By the time they do, it may be too late to do anything useful, other than keep a lid on social breakdown.

It won’t necessarily be the end of the world, but it may be the end of any human civilization worthy of the name.

Mark Beeson is adjunct professor, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

In recent months, some Western media critics have suggested the Soviet economy is in such severe problems that President Vladimir Putin may soon have little option but to end the war in Ukraine.

In December, the Washington Post reported concerns among Russian companies that interest rate hikes to fight inflation could provide the business to a block in 2025. More recently, an essay in Politico suggested the explanation Putin now seems ready to negotiate an end to the war is because he wants to “avoid a degrading bankruptcy”.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago and the following implementation of strong economic sanctions, the Russian market has undoubtedly been under stress. Issues have been accumulating and Russia does appear to be experiencing steady economic decline– but not at all to the amount that has been claimed.

Russia’s financial performance over the last four times may be summarized by a look at the key metrics. While there are doubts as to the accuracy of some established Russian statistics, they also provide a good picture of the entire situation.

How Russia’s economy has changed throughout the war:

In spite of the war and sanctions, the Russian economy has proved to be robust. Growth has been driven to a large extent by sharply increased budget spending, not only on the military but on infrastructure projects.

These projects include investment to improve transport links with China, secure greater economic self-reliance by producing goods previously imported from the west, and tackle some of Russia’s social problems – above all, its low birth rate.

In 2025, the government is increasing its maternity payments, with first-time mothers to receive 677, 000 rubles – up from 630, 400 rubles in 2024. Making sure Russians have” as many children as possible”, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov told the Washington Post in 2024, is” the underlying goal of our state policy”.

However, the 2.5 % growth in GDP forecast for 2025 is probably overoptimistic. Problems have mounted in recent months. The Russian economy became overheated, fuelled by budget funding and generous credit, leading to inflation of at least 10 %.

Increased military production, the mobilization of personnel to the armed forces, and significant outward migration gave rise to an acute labour shortage. The end-of-year unemployment rate was only 2.3 %, compared with 4.5 % before the war. To attract labor and recruits, wages and payments to people signing military contracts have increased rapidly.

Russia’s central bank increased its interest rate from 16 % in December 2023 to 21 % in October 2024, where it remains. It is these developments that have prompted claims that Russia’s economy is heading for disaster.

But Russia has had high interest rates before: 19 % in 1998 and 13.1 % in 2009, and inflation fell quickly on both occasions. There are signs the economy is now beginning to cool down – it is under pressure, yes, but by no means in crisis.

The business sector has started to feel the impact of the high interest rates, the government is selectively reducing the volume of loans provided on generous terms, and firms are taking measures to raise productivity.

The Russian rouble has been appreciating, and the rate of inflation and interest rates should start to fall later in the year. In January 2025, the unemployment rate began to increase, if only a little, to 2.4 %.

The federal budget can be expected to remain in near-balance this year, possibly with scope to increase military spending above the current planned level.

Dwindling growth

While there is no threat of imminent economic collapse, there is no real prospect for development either. The Russian economy is facing a period of stagnation, with ageing infrastructure and equipment and little technological innovation.

Spending on research and development has been little more than 1 % of GDP over many years. And Russia is becoming increasingly dependent economically on China, which is now by far its largest trade partner – accounting for 39 % of imports in 2024. China is Russia’s main source of many ( not always high-quality ) industrial and consumer goods.

Russia’s civil aviation fleet is shrinking steadily and degrading under the impact of sanctions, which have made it difficult to obtain spares. It is striving to keep its many Boeings and Airbuses flying, while the promised new fully Russian airliners fail to appear, with few likely until 2027-28.

Russia’s stock of cars is also ageing. Customers are having to choose between far-from-modern domestic Ladas, Chinese cars unsuited to Russia’s roads and climate, and imported second-hand vehicles of dubious quality. In 2024, 69 % of all cars purchased in Moscow were Chinese – a total of 139, 000, compared with 13, 000 Ladas.

The mounting problems show that Russia has a regressing economic order. In time, these pressures could force a Russian president to seek better relations with the west. But that time has not yet arrived.

If Putin does end the war in Ukraine, it will not be because of economic imperatives. It is far more likely to be because doing so may bring recognition by the US that he is the president of a great power who deserves respect. This is something that every leader of the Soviet Union and Russia has always craved.

Julian Cooper is emeritus professor at the Centre for Russian, Eurasian and European Studies, University of Birmingham

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Donald Trump revisited his desire to “get” Greenland “one means or the other during a wide-ranging&nbsp, 90-minute speech” to the US Congress on March 4. According to Trump,” for regional safety” his nation needed Greenland.

While he claimed that” we strongly support your right to decide your own future,” he continued, “if you choose, we welcome you into the United States of America.”

In the first six months of his next term, Trump’s interests regarding Greenland and its enormous mineral wealth have strewn among other issues that have disorganized international politics in Europe.

The US leader is even discussing” cutting a offer” with Russian president Vladimir Putin as the White House presses Ukraine’s leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, to help the US to own the country’s material success.

That agreement would result in regional costs for Kyiv, as well as setting the stage for a potentially profound economic relationship between the White House and the Kremlin.

Trump and Putin’s current agenda is largely centered on the country’s mineral resources and its territory. However, conversations have even begun regarding possible locations for “deals,” including in the Arctic.

Given how significant both officials believe the Arctic should be in terms of the rich material resources they possess, a carve-up of it is a good idea for the two nations. Such a strategy would reveal Trump’s preference for interpersonal politics at the expense of international approaches, as in the case of Ukraine.

Any agreement in the Arctic would effectively put an end to the idea of” circumpolar cooperation.” Since the end of the cold war, this has upheld the regional supremacy of the eight Arctic states ( A8 ) that have cooperated to address common problems.

The A8 has been working on issues of environmental protection, green creation, human security, and technological collaboration since the Arctic Council was founded in 1996. In a time when Arctic snow is rapidly melting due to climate change, cooperation has been important.

Importantly, the Arctic Council was instrumental in the negotiation of a number of legally binding agreements. These include agreements on scientific cooperation ( 2017 ), marine oil pollution preparedness ( 2013 ), and search and rescue ( 2011 ). Additionally, it backed the Central Arctic Ocean fisheries agreement ( CAO ) that the Arctic Ocean states signed in 2018 with South Korea, China, Iceland, and the EU.

The Arctic Council and, more widely, latitudinal assistance, remained resilient to the political shocks caused by Russia’s 2014 and 2015 seizure of Crimea and sections of eastern Ukraine. However, faith was teetering on the edge as a result of Russia’s massive invasion of Ukraine.

Members of the Arctic Council and its clinical working groups, which were isolated in Moscow, had pressed pause on ordinary meetings a month earlier from Europe and North America.

Although some activities were gradually resumed in online formats at the working group level, Russia’s full withdrawal from Ukraine has remained a conditional one. In addition, the US and Europe imposed severe restrictions, including those aimed at Russian Arctic energy initiatives.

Russia’s comment was to strengthen its interactions with others. Russia and Russia are currently working together in the Arctic on commercial and scientific tasks. Nations like Brazil, India, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are examples of this.

NATO allies expressed concern about a stronger and more difficult Russia-China existence across the Arctic following this tilt. However, the math has changed as a result of the following Trump presidency. A fresh Arctic attempt is now threatened by the risk of a reset of US-Russian relationships based on the predominance of the A8 rather than the A8.

Change of perspective

Trump’s filing of an executive attempt on February 4 to decide whether to remove support from international organizations might lead the White House to assume that the Arctic Council has no place in the world.

The Trump administration, which has already withdrawn from the Paris Agreement and is destroying local climate-related research programs, is anathema to its historic rely on climate change and economic security.

The White House, which favors the embracing of great power politics, is likely to reject the A8’s longstanding commitment to circumpolar cooperation or even a narrow A5 ( Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the US) view of the Arctic Ocean coastal states ‘ supremacy. While many have argued that Russia cannot support the Arctic Council, losing US support and interest would undoubtedly be its death knell.

The possibility of Washington and Moscow dividing the Arctic and its resources seems more and more plausible in this” America first” environment.

The international agreements signed by the A8 and the CAO may also be in danger in this circumstance. If Trump gets his way over Greenland, Denmark may find itself completely cut off from Arctic affairs. In any case, all the Nordic Arctic states are likely to struggle to make their voices heard in the area.

If Trump brought US-Russia economic cooperation to extract the region’s wealth, what is the key question for European NATO and EU members to ask: Would they worry about Russian dominance in the European Arctic?

If doing so meant collaborating to unlock Svalbard’s mineral resources, let alone the wealth of the Arctic seabed, then might Trump even be supportive of Russian attempts to rewrite the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, which ultimately gave Norway control over the Arctic archipelago ( albeit with some limitations )?

What room, if any, would a deal allow for international scientific collaboration on pressing issues relating to climate and biodiversity?

If there has been anything to be learned from the recent tumult, it is that European nations, individually and collectively, struggle to exert strategic influence over contemporary geopolitical events. Europe might have to accept the end of the Arctic Council and circumpolar cooperation if Trump and Putin do start to talk about the Arctic.

The ability of indigenous people to choose their future would suffer as well as climate science, environmental protection, sustainable development, and other factors. Meanwhile, it will be up to the UK and Europe to decide what can be done to defend Arctic interests if anything.

Caroline Kennedy-Pipe is professor of war studies at Loughborough University, and Duncan Depledge is senior lecturer in geopolitics and security.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

In the December third, Australia’s economy expanded at the fastest rate in two years thanks to stronger exports and consumer spending.

According to today’s national addresses report from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the market increased by 0.6 % in the third. It attributed this to “modest growth ]… broadly across the economy [… supported by an increase in exports ]”.

For the year to December 2024, annual gross domestic product ( GDP ) growth was 1.3 %. That’s no particularly high in traditional terms, but it’s still as good as we’ve seen since late 2022. The Australian economy’s long-term average growth rate is closer to 2.7 %.

It will give some ease to the Labor government because it is one of the final significant financial information before the upcoming national election.

The per person crisis has ended

The fact that GDP per head of community is not declining is another enabling mark. It only increased by 0.1 %, but at least it is positive.

The per capita rate has decreased seven straight apartments. What some refer to as a “per head recession” is the conclusion of today’s report, which means that when the economy expands more slowly than population, we really reverse in terms of production per person.

More money was spent by families on equipment, tools, clothing, hotels, cafes and restaurants, wellness care, and power. Use increased by 0.4 %, which increased economic development.

Households also saved more, with the ratio of saving to income rising from 3.6 % to 3.8 %, which is the highest level in nine quarters. How did homes manage to save money even when they made more purchases? The answer is that pay are rising even more quickly.

In both the public and private sectors, overall employee compensation increased by 2 %. Additionally, the settlement figure shows a 0.7 % increase in the number of hours worked.

Government spending and exports of goods and service were other factors that contributed to the quarter’s good economic growth. Agriculture saw a strong performance (up 7.3 % ) as a result of increased grain production in response to favorable weather conditions and meat exports to the United States.

However, GDP does not adequately account for crucial aspects of well-being.

It omits points like the atmosphere and paid work, which we value. GDP is increased by investing in recovery from a crisis, but GDP is unchanged if disaster rarely occurs.

While he was still working for the Treasury, American mathematician David Gruen outlined the GDP restrictions in a conversation in 2010. Both researchers and academics are aware of those restrictions.

Crisis is the only way to increase GDP, but it results in job losses and financial collapse. Ultimately, this most recent release is a good set of numbers for Australia.

improving prospect

The financial growth trend appears favorable.

The December quarter improved by 0.3 % and 0.2 % from the June quarter, respectively. As anticipated, the September fourth resulted in a turning point.

We presently appear to be heading in the right direction for expansion. Remember, the December fourth occurred before the Reserve Bank cut interest rates in February. Not just lease recipients but also business borrowers will benefit from falling interest rates.

The low in prices has given rise to the possibility of further interest price reductions.

However, while the rate of inflation is dropping, this does not imply that rates are dropping. They simply are rising more quietly than they were. An example of prices is included in the inflation figure.

Some goods or services have higher than average value increases, while others have lower. Individuals tend to focus on price increases rather than price increases that remain constant or drop. In summary, these figures might not significantly affect the president’s chances of winning. Individuals will still be concerned about the cost of living.

Trump issue

If electors pay attention to global politics, they are aware that the current economic gloom might not last.

Donald Trump, the president of the United States, has imposed 25 % tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico and doubled the 10 % to 20 % tariff on Chinese imports. The damaged nations are enthused about retribution.

There is a negative impact from the US taxes on China, even if the US doesn’t impose tariffs on American goods ( which is still a chance, but American officials are working hard to stop it ).

We rely on China to be our main trading partner. If its market declines, but will ours. Currently, China has responded to the risk of taxes with a new stimulus package.

If trade war spread to different nations, that would be even more alarming. Insularity and protectionism hurt economies. spread frequently, it may cause a global recession.

Even though the December third national accounts provide encouraging signs of economic recovery and for the future, international events beyond Australia’s power may but undermine our optimistic outlooks.

Stephen Bartos is an economics professor at the University of Canberra.

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

Continue Reading

In a statement made over the weekend by his and his, decades-long close friend, Matthias Warnig, the Financial Times (FT),” Putinally pushes a deal to resume Nord Stream 2 with US support.”

The idea is that Nord Stream’s potential ownership by the United States may prompt the return of Russian fuel exports to Germany via this megaproject’s one intact pipeline as part of a great deal. This was first marketed in soon November&nbsp with regard to US investment Stephen Lynch’s related plan.

This time, it’s apparently being advanced by Warnig through a unique US-led collaboration involving Lynch. In any case, the fact that it’s back in the news highlights how critical the conversations between the Russian–US and British governments have been since a few weeks ago in Riyadh.

Despite those two’s tariff tensions, the argument is also valid because the EU’s European leader requires less expensive gas to fend off a possible recession that could lower the price of US exports and make the bloc much less significant.

Trump vehemently opposed Nord Stream during his first term, using the pretext that it would increase Germany’s dependence on Russia and that it would also increase the odds that those two managed Central & Eastern Europe ( CEE ) independently to stifle US influence.

However, in reality, he only wanted American LNG to smuggle Russia’s vast oil industry as part of an economic authority play. These concerns persist, but they may change as they are advanced in light of the new world situation.

The” impact therapy” that the US pressured Europe to implement following the “decoupling” from Russian pipeline gas, which nevertheless remains insufficient due to its  increased purchase  of more expensive Russian LNG out of necessity due to an absence of different suppliers, had serious consequences.

When there could have been a gradual transition, as Trump imagined, had he remained in power and prevented the war, the real economy suffered as a result of the sudden spike in prices across the board.

Therefore, allowing the resumption of some Russian pipeline gas to Germany via the undamaged Nord Stream pipeline under US supervision upon acquiring ownership of it would be in the US’ long-term interests.

Similar to how the German-led EU would compromise its so-called “values” by adhering to this pragmatic arrangement, while Russia’s compromise would be to surrender control of the country in exchange for faster sanctions relief.

What’s being presented right now is similar to what was suggested in this early January briefing on creative energy diplomacy.

This includes the US’s approval of the EU’s partial resumption of Russian gas pipeline imports, returning some of Russia’s seized assets as compensation for the US’s control of Nord Stream, and lifting some sanctions like its SWIFT ban for facilitating the resumption of the Russian-EU energy trade.

It’s possible that none of this will actually occur, at least with regard to Nord Stream, to be sure. There are still some factors that could help to counteract this scenario, not the least of which being Trump’s unwillingness to temporarily cede some of the US’s “poached European gas market share back to Russia or the new German leader’s goal of “achieving independence” from the US.

However, the most recent reports suggest that it’s premature to rule out Nord Stream’s partial revival, which could occur sooner or later.

This article was originally published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Subscribe to the Andrew Korybko Newsletter here.

Continue Reading

Observers were shocked on Wednesday ( February 26 ) after former Romanian presidential front-runner Calin Georgescu was &nbsp, temporarily detained and charged on six counts&nbsp, amidst police raids against some of his closest supporters as he was &nbsp, preparing to file for his candidacy&nbsp, in May’s election redux.

The first round of voting in December 2012 was canceled on the grounds that an unnamed state actor had promoted him on TikTok prior to the election, but it eventually became clear that this was just another side’s marketing campaign gone wrong.

Georgescu’s vote may had ruined the US “deep country’s” increase plans against Russia. After the divorce, this examination provided more framework.

The instant run-up to the latest innovations saw US Vice President JD Vance&nbsp, lambast&nbsp, the Italian government as anti-democratic for what it did last December.

Wednesday’s activities were subsequently followed by Elon Musk&nbsp, retweeting a video&nbsp, of State Department journalist Mike Benz describing the “deep country’s” involvement in Romania.

Benz drew consideration to how Romania agreed to host NATO’s largest airport in Europe and has played a vital role in&nbsp, clandestinely&nbsp, transferring&nbsp, Muslim defense equipment to Ukraine.

These are significant items, as is the” Moldova Highway,” which is mentioned in the two earlier assessments because it completes the last leg of the hall running from Greece’s Mediterranean ships to Western Ukraine.

But there’s more to what’s happening than merely politics. Worldview is probably just as important.

After these forces abused Romania’s political dysfunction and widespread corruption to continue installing their chosen candidates into energy, liberal-globalist rule has existed there for decades.

Georgescu offers the most appealing prospect for a populist-nationalist revolution that may successfully address the systemic difficulties outlined above and restore Romania’s independence. His pertains to record, religion and national interests really resonate with many of his countrymen.

Georgescu can thus be referred to as a” Romanian Trump,” but both men are actually just stoking the populist-nationalist mood, which has been rifling the West as a result of liberal-globalist evils in terms of socio-political and economic abuses.

He’s his own person, as is Trump, and both just embody the pattern of the days. Like all revolutionaries ( or counter-revolutionaries from the perspective of regaining the power that was seized from the people ), however, they’re also facing lots of resistance.

It’s no wonder that Georgescu, who only recently began his political job, is struggling because it took him more than eight years to destroy the “deep country’s” revolutionary plots.

It’s probable that Trump could help Georgescu significantly shorten the amount of time it takes for him to mitigate his own “deep state’s” revolutionary plots because he was a trailblazer while Georgescu is following in his footsteps. The US-EU conflict is still important in this area.

Putin’s June 2022 projection about social shift in Europe was confirmed by Vance’s talk in Munich, which demonstrated that the US supports all populist-nationalist movements on the continent.

The Italian “deep country’s” most recent attempt to overthrow Georgescu is basically a labyrinth launched at the Trump presidency by its liberal-globalist foes in Brussels, who firmly support Bucharest. They want to see if the US will act in response to Romania’s rolling revolt by the EU.

What’s unfolding in this Balkan state is nothing less than the beginning of another&nbsp, New Cold War&nbsp, entrance, albeit this time an intellectual one between liberal-globalists and populist-nationalists, which likewise incidentally pits minimum NATO allies against one another as the EU and the US take opposing sides.

The Trump presidency has the power to take the necessary steps to ensure that Georgescu is eligible to run for president in May’s react and that the ballot is absolutely free and fair rather than irrationally flawed.

To address this issue, the authorities may be forced to reconsider the wisdom of doing Brussels ‘ selling by imposing targeted sanctions on Italian figures, credible threats to withdraw its troops from Romania, suspension of arms contracts, and extending whole political aid to populist-nationalist protesters.

A complete pressure campaign may also backfire if the German-led EU takes advantage of it as a pretext to bolster Romania’s now vast control, though that could also backfire.

The probable future European leader’s commitment to “achieve freedom” from the US that military, economic and strength components make that a lot easier said than done.

Trump could use each of them in his own for strategy against the EU and Germany that has a good chance of winning on both fronts if the German-led Union rebels against the US’ likely impending pressure campaign against Romania.

Overall, Romania is at the middle of the New Cold War’s intra-Western philosophical dimension, which will determine the direction of Europe.

Liberal-globalists will sometimes fully resuscitate Trump, probably at great cost to their countries, or they will be deposed by populist-nationalists who have the same worldview as his team.

This battle is historical, and the effects of its outcome may resonate for decades.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind agreement. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, around.

Continue Reading

There has been a lot of discussion about the ramifications of a potential agreement between US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and the increasingly damaging effects it will have on Ukraine and Europe.

There is much more at play than just the potential borders of Ukraine and US relations if Trump and Putin reach a deal.

As we are nearing the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale war, Ukraine’s prospect is more in question than it has ever been since February 2022. For once, comparisons to Munich in 1938 are unfortunately correct.

This is not due to a false idea that Putin may be appeased, but rather because wonderful powers once more decide the fate of weaker states without their presence.

Ukraine is now under stress from Russia on the ground and the US, both socially and economically, in the same way that Czechoslovakia was subjected to in 1938 by Germany and its alleged allies France and Britain.

Trump and his team are working fervently to get Ukraine to concede geographical rights to Russia and declare that about 20 % of the Ukrainian territories that Russia has occupied are lost. Trump also demands that Ukraine give back half of its metal and rare earth resources in exchange for its previous military support.

If allied NATO forces were deployed to Ukraine as part of a peace or peace agreement, the United States ‘ refusal to deliver substantial security guarantees sounds like the Munich comparison. No only did France and Britain at the time pressure Czechoslovakia to renounce Sudetenland, which had an ethnic German majority, to Nazi Germany.

When Poland and Hungary seized large portions of the nation, they likewise did nothing. And they failed to act when Hitler, just six months after the Munich deal, created a Czech marionette state and occupied the last of the Czech Republic.

Every evidence suggests that Putin is doubtful to step down from his position in or toward Ukraine. And it is important to keep in mind that the second world war began 11 months after Neville Chamberlain believed he had secured “peace in our day.”

The Munich comparison does not carry that much, however. Trump isn’t trying to appease Putin because he believes he has weaker tickets than Putin, as Chamberlain and Daladier did in 1938.

A more simplistic view of the world, where tremendous power carved out spheres of influence without interfering, seems to drive Trump.

The issue with Ukraine and Europe in a world order is that no one in Trump’s team views Ukraine as a member of an American impact area, and that Europe is at best a foreground.

Trump-eye glass on the planet

Trump’s concern isn’t really about Ukraine or Europe, but rather about re-ordering the global program in a way that fits his 19th-century perspective of the world in which the US life in splendid isolation and is almost unquestioned in the Northern hemisphere.

In this view, Ukraine is the image of what was wrong with the ancient purchase. Trump believes that the US has engaged itself in too many different international activities where none of its essential interests were at play, echoing Henry Cabot’s protectionism.

Echoing Putin’s talking items, the war against Ukraine little more is an unfair anger but was, as Trump has then declared, Kyiv’s problem. The most important test the democratic global order has to move has been Ukraine.

The conflict with Ukraine is undoubtedly a sign of the decline of the progressive global order, but it is hardly its single cause. It has become the tool that Trump and Putin use to offer it a devastating blast. But while the US and Russia, in their present political combinations, may have found it easy to destroy the existing order, they may find it substantially harder to create a new one.

Even though Ukraine and other important Western nations may appear trivial at this point, the EU and NATO have robust institutional foundations and deep pockets even without the US.

Despite the justified criticism of Europe’s largely ambitious responses thus far, the continent is built on much stronger politically and economically than Russia, and the vast majority of its citizens have no desire to live in the conditions that Putin’s want-to-be empire has.

Without China, neither Trump nor Putin will be able to rule the world. Trump does use a package to scuttle a wedge between them and drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, but this is unlikely to work given China’s growing ties to China and Russia’s growing conflict with the US.

All Trump would accomplish is a more US-to-West continent resurgence if he reached a deal with Xi as well, for instance regarding Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, allow alone over Taiwan. This may leave Putin and Xi to do their own, existing package of a no-limits relationship unimpeded by an American-led counterpoint.

From the standpoint of what remains of the progressive global order and its adherents, a Putin-Xi deal, also, has an strange parallel in past – the short-lived Hitler-Stalin alliance of 1939. Only this time, there is little to recommend that the Putin-Xi ally will break down as quickly.

Stefan Wolff is professor of global surveillance, University of Birmingham

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

Continue Reading