Germany’s Lithuanian base complicates grand US-Russia deal – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, World

Germany &nbsp, just opened&nbsp, its first permanent military base abroad since World War II&nbsp, amidst the competition &nbsp, for leadership of&nbsp, post-conflict Europe&nbsp, between itself, France and Poland.

Located in southern Lithuania near the Belarusian borders and in contact to Russia’s Kaliningrad Region, it’s strategically positioned to provide Germany enormous effect in shaping Europe’s potential security architecture. That’s because Germany is now a direct stakeholder in Central &amp, Eastern Europe’s ( CEE ) security.

This development improvements many related strategic objectives. For instance, it poses a problem to Poland’s work to present as the Baltic States ‘ most dependable European alliance, given that Germany now has a bottom in one of those countries, exactly the one that connects Poland to the other two.

On that subject, Germany and Poland agreed to create a “military Schengen” in early 2024 to facilitate the movements of soldiers and products, which makes it easier for Germany to supply its Ukrainian center.

This alliance may consequently be expanded to encompass Latvia and Estonia, especially after the German Parliament&nbsp, confirmed the centrality&nbsp, of the” Baltic Defense Line” to the republic’s eastern protection plan.

Germany’s Lithuanian base could, therefore, pair with its&nbsp, envisaged military buildup&nbsp, and an expanded “military Schengen” to compete more robustly with Poland for influence in the Baltics. That might, in turn, result in Germany subordinating Poland to become the dominant military player in CEE.

Germany’s new base in Lithuania doesn’t just pose a challenge to Polish interests, even if Warsaw won’t openly admit as much. Some Polish officials might even support a more important regional security role for Berlin.

Any hypothetical Russian military action against Lithuania, including if Moscow tries to carve out a so-called” Suwalki Corridor” from Belarus to Kaliningrad, could serve as a tripwire for the EU’s de facto leader to become militarily involved in the crisis.

To be sure, Russia hasn’t signaled any intent to blitzkrieg through Poland or much weaker Lithuania en route to its Baltic exclave. Nor has anyone cogently suggested why it would do so, considering this scenario would almost certainly lead to a continental conflict and perhaps even World War III if the US becomes involved.

Nevertheless, it still worries many Europeans and thus influences how they formulate policy, with Germany now poised to play a greater role in such discussions, given its direct stakes in deterring or responding to this scenario.

And, finally, the two preceding objectives of Germany competing more robustly with Poland for influence in the Baltics and having a greater say in” Suwalki Corridor” contingency planning are meant to ensure that it’s included in any Russian-US deal over Europe’s future security architecture.

Putin’s late 2021 request for the US to return to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act by withdrawing Western troops and military infrastructure from the former Warsaw Pact countries can’t now be achieved without Germany’s participation.

Every other NATO member’s eastern deployments&nbsp, are rotational, &nbsp, even though they function as permanent. Yet the US and Germany’s are officially permanent, which is a different legal status that’s considered more serious by Russia.

This doesn’t automatically mean that Germany will be included in the Russian-US talks, not even in the capacity of representing the EU, but just that Berlin can now serve as more of an obstacle than anyone else to them possibly clinching a grand deal over European security without any European nations ‘ input.

This&nbsp, article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

Continue Reading

Trump’s step back abroad has triggered an atomic race in East Asia – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, World

US friends in Asia fear losing their radioactive umbrella because US President Donald Trump suggested some international withdrawal. Without the awning, as seen with Ukraine, a government’s liberation is in danger. It starts a new spread.

Washington is tempted to retreat from some foreign pledges and is willing to do its plan without much discussion or consensus with the allies. There are different objectives in the partnerships.

Facing the Northern Korean nuclear danger, the majority of South Koreans apparently want the weapon. Japan, threatened by North Korea and scared by China, may quickly acquire a nuclear security. At that point, actually Vietnam or Indonesia may comprehend plutonium features. And why not the Philippines or Thailand? India and Pakistan now possess a magnificent stockpile.

The big question is Taiwan: did the area produce to Beijing or create its weapons?

China would be in a minefield. It’d be the goal of this army and in a violent circle – the more weapons it companies, the more explosives its neighbors will store. It’d be extraordinary with unimaginable consequences.

The atmosphere in Asia is more difficult than in Europe, where two powerful US-backed systems, NATO and the Union, have held the peninsula along for years. Asia has thinner international organizations and intergovernmental agreements with the US.

Countries in the region usually don’t believe China or each other. If America steps up, everything will fall apart. China is not willing to offer free safety offers to anyone, replacing American people, and its assures could not be welcomed.

Eastern options

A plan could be for Korea and Japan to question France and the UK to expand their radioactive umbrella to Asia. A similar arrangement is under concern in Europe, where France and the UK may extend their national safety across the peninsula. This may enhance the transatlantic split, as the UK plus EU may produce greater room for maneuvering out of Wahington’s programs.

Besides, a Franco-British reach over Eurasia’s east side could spark fresh, not necessarily positive, global political and military dynamics. Alternatively, there could be greater political and military coordination among America’s allies, even with the US taking a step back.

The UK ( with Keir Starmer ), France ( with Emmanuel Macron ), Germany ( with Friedrich Merz ), and Japan ( with Fumio Kishida ), are possibly weaving the fabric of something new that other countries could join. In World War II, the US wanted to stay out of the fight, but then Churchill, with words and actions, helped to convince Roosevelt to change his mind.

China, America’s primary concern and preoccupation, could turn the situation by tackling it head-on. Beijing should force Pyongyang to forfeit its nuclear arsenal. It should press Russia to disarm partially, and it should shelve its rearmament plans. It would defuse the arms race.

It’d be challenging, but it’d be essential to start working on it.

It could also dissuade the US from leaving the region and persuade it to engage in a genuine negotiation on the RMB’s full convertibility, the complete opening of China’s internal market, and Beijing’s territorial claims.

US world

Underpinning this scenario is perhaps a reality that’s perceived vaguely in Beijing and taken for granted ( thus similarly unclear ) in Washington. America is not a country but a world order, just as Rome ceased to be a city when it cemented its empire around the Mediterranean.

This empire is not based solely on military might as was that of the Mongols. It has a sophisticated architecture comprising many elements besides strength: culture, rule of law, history, economic and financial prestige. If the US tries to withdraw, not only will the world order collapse but the United States will crumble, too. There’s no way back from “imperial America” other than suicide.

Naturally, the US feels immense strain after decades of vast responsibilities. Thus, many political and economic aspects must be renegotiated, but invading Greenland destroys the world order and the American nation.

It might superficially look like an opportunity for China to take up the US slack. However, Beijing could have far more problems than it currently faces, or it could face negotiating a broad deal with the US.

In all this, too many elements are up in the air, and the role of the Vatican as a disarmed yet knowledgeable and disenchanted mediator could be invaluable.

Many players would need to leave their present trajectory and comfort zone to turn the present undercurrents around. The US should rethink its direction and renegotiate its commitments. It’d be safer and less expensive than to gamble a global security overhaul. Perhaps Trump is pursuing this, but the public hears a different message.

Therefore, Asian and, thus, global nuclear proliferation is the likely scenario. The old Cold War set the terms of the previous arms race– it was run between two blocs. Now, alliances are unraveling, and every country could be basically on its own. This race would be different, more challenging, and full of unexpected incidents.

Everyone needs to step back and keep a cool head to avert a military tsunami.

Continue Reading

Turkey holds the key to solving multiple global crises – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, World

Turkey’s state is struggling to deal with widespread protests at home ( after Istanbul’s president Ekrem Imamoglu was imprisoned ), but it is extremely successful as a major power broker in negotiations with Russia, the US, and Europe.

Turkey, which is effectively significant to almost everyone and is emerging as a smart communicator, is strategically important to almost everyone at the intersection between Asia and Europe.

Turkey has relied on a international policy that placed a premium on cooperation rather than competitors since the early 2000s. Turkey continuously improved its associations with Russia, Iran, and Syria because financial relationships were a top priority.

Turkey maintains its membership in NATO and is a big trading mate with the European Union, but it also holds important ties to Russia, Ukraine, China, and Middle Eastern nations. Turkey has demonstrated that it will function with any state that serves its interests, and it has used local conflicts to act as a quick ally when necessary.

Recep Tayyip Erdoan, the president of Turkey, has no reservations about confronting both friends and foes similarly, giving it proper flexibility at the same time.

Russian-Russian marriage is rough

Russia’s second-largest buying lover is Turkey. With over US$ 60 billion in annual deal with Moscow, Armenia continues to concentrate on Soviet banking and gas networks. When Turkey stopped supporting Chechen rebels and Russia stopped supporting the Kurdish Workers Party ( PKK), the relationship between Turkey and Russia dramatically improved in 1995.

Turkey has never been compliant with Moscow, but it has kept a working relationship with Russia ever since.

Turkey criticized Russia’s plans to establish military installations in Syria, Tartus and Khmeimim, and because it controls the airport in northern Syria, it also has the authority to obstruct Russian access. In addition, Ankara has used its military presence to thwart previous Soviet control in Idlib, in northern Syria.

Turkey’s helicopter offensive in Idlib in 2020 supported the Arab opposition and resisted Russian-backed activity in the west.

The significance of the Black Sea

Turkey has a strong advantage in the Black Sea as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. Russia aimed to have complete control over the Black Sea, yet seizing some Ukrainian ships, which would have a negative impact on global grain supply in 2022.

However, Turkey negotiated the release of millions of tonnes of corn and complied with the Montreux Convention to ensure the safety of shipping roads through the Black Sea. This arrangement from 1936 gave Turkey complete control over the delivery route between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea ( through the Bosporus Strait, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, through which hundreds of millions of tons of cargo transit each year ) through the Bosporus Strait.

Turkey also limited Russian troops into the Black Sea, which has severely limited Russian maritime power, according to the agreement.

A map of the Black Sea region.
Map provided by Shutterstock via The Talk

Turkey does not support the Russian annexation of Crimea, even though it has certainly imposed sanctions on Russia and has kept its revenue sources available. Turkey values Crimea for both corporate and historical reasons, with more than 5 million Turks claiming to be of Crimean Tatar descent.

Turkey does, however, maintain communication with Moscow ( and Erdogan and Putin are “dear friends” ). Turkey likewise supports Ukraine, providing it with Bayraktar TB2 robots, heavy machine guns, laser-guided rockets, electronic warfare techniques, armored vehicles, and safe products, complicating this “friendship.”

In the end, Turkey wants Ukraine to keep separate to prevent Russian naval presence in the Black Sea. As a result, Turkey is likely to collaborate with NATO to ensure that Ukraine is never defeated.

In order to achieve this, Turkey is willing to send troops to a post-ceasefire arrangement, provided the necessary conditions are met.

Turkey has also reduced its dependence on Russia by diversifying its power supply routes ( relying more on manufacturers from the Caucasus region and central Asia ) in the wake of the conflict in Ukraine. Turkey is in a strong position, particularly with the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean discovering oil reserves.

Through the Trans-Anatolian natural gas pipeline, Ankara aims to become an energy gateway that facilitates the transport of oil from the Caucasus, central Asia, and Russia to Europe.

Syria and Turkey

Turkey’s connection with Syria’s neighbor has also been wise and logical. In 2005, Bashar al-Assad became the first Arab leader to visit Turkey since Syria gained its independence in 1946, allowing Turkey to seek reconciliation with Syria.

However, Erdoan continued to work with him to stop Syria from entangling with Iran when it was no more appropriate for him. He occasionally hosted anti-Assad characters in Turkey, and he established a safe haven for Syrian refugees and armed fighters along its borders. He gave separatists the ultimatum to overthrow Assad in 2024.

Just as the conflict in Syria gave Turkey prospects, so too has the fight in Ukraine. The United States has strengthened its bargaining status and pressed for more concessions from Western friends. Turkey is leveraging the US’s withdrawal from NATO to encourage closer assistance with Europe.

Turkey is likewise leveraging Donald Trump’s more diplomatic stances toward Russia to strengthen its connection with the US. This is mainly due to a desire to enhance protection cooperation. Turkey relied on the US for supplies of arms, revenue, and equipment during the Cold War, but it was unable to use them without US permission.

After 1989, Turkey carved out new areas for its exports of arms and was subject to US sanctions for purchasing S-400 surface-to-air weapons from Russia in 2020. Turkey wants to purchase F-35 sonic fighter planes from the US and is hoping that the US will stop imposing sanctions on second nations that have engaged with Russia.

Whose important ally?

Turkey has made certain that the US does not view it as a young companion in the Middle East. For instance, the US offered no military support when Turkey launched activities in north Syria in 2019 and constantly fired close to US troops.

Despite having a number of different tactical objectives, the US views Turkey as a crucial alliance. Turkey also has US and NATO military bases at several of its bases, as well as US nuclear weapons ( B61 nuclear bombs ) stationed at its Incirlik Air Force Base.

Turkey wants to make an even bigger diplomatic and military presence. It has a lot of power as a G20 part, having one of the world’s 20 largest markets and having the second-largest and most effective military power in NATO after the US.

And in terms of geopolitical spinning, Turkey is now in the elite position of wanting to support them.

Natasha Lindstaedt is a professor at the University of Essex’s Department of Government.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

Continue Reading

Great Game On: Shining light on the contest for Central Asia – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, World

The Founding Fathers advised Americans to steer clear of ensnaring relationships if they wished to keep their recently acquired Republic. This may be news to some of our legislators but not to President Donald Trump. No US senator has been leerier of the authoritarian foreign policy bequeathed to us by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt than Trump. &nbsp,

Immune to the crony passion for “democracy tower” and “forever wars”, Trump lives in the realm of reality– no intellectual pseudo-reality. &nbsp, Trump has had enough of the “values-based” international plan that, in the matter of Ukraine, perhaps have brought us closer to thermonuclear war than at any moment since the Cuban missile crisis. &nbsp,

Unlike so many of his political opponents, Trump is not oblivious to the negative effects a misrepresented foreign policy could have on ordinary citizens, people, the nation at large and, for that matter, the earth. &nbsp, &nbsp,

With that in mind, and in view of the rising necessity of Asia, Geoff Raby’s fresh book –” Great Game On: The Battle for Central Asia and Global Supremacy” – is worth reading to get a better control on the history and current state of great power dynamics in Eurasia and Central Asia. Raby served as American Ambassador to China from 2007 to 2011.

He has done a company by focusing on Central Asia in view of its significant and growing value. The region encompasses Afghanistan, Inner Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Xinjiang ( China ), and is more than 300, 000 square miles larger than the continental United States. That’s a major part of real property which the US ignores at its risk. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Raby – a largely non-ideological international policy specialist – deftly describes not only the 19th centuries Anglo-Russian” Great Game” but the evolving 21st century” New Great Game”, i. e., the great power competition for influence over Central Asia between China, Russia and, to a lesser extent, the United States. As such, he delves into the respective geopolitical ambitions of China and Russia in Eurasia over the past 100 years with a spotlight on Central Asia. &nbsp,

” The Principal Theater of Contest”

Raby argues that” Core Eurasia” – in other words, Central Asia – is” the principal theater of contest” between the great powers and that” the key pivots on the chess board are Afghanistan and Xinjiang” .&nbsp,

He has a point, but it’s also the case that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with their massive reserves of natural resources, extensive trade routes – east-west and north-south – and welcoming attitude toward the outside world represent a stable setting in which the US can expand its economic ties. ( See: Time for a US pivot to Central Asia )

To his credit, Raby eschews the moralism of so many foreign policy gurus ( who rarely get around to considering morality ). Raby, from all indications, is a proponent of the realist school of politics.

He is concerned about national self-interest, security and power relationships rather than presumed ideological imperatives as the principal drivers of inter-state relations.

Raby’s treatment of the United States ‘ presence in Central Asia is skimpy – but that is telling in itself: Washington pays Central Asia scant attention, so there’s not much to write about. That should change under Trump.

Raby provides much-needed historical context without which it is impossible to understand the competition for influence in the region. He makes insightful, thought-provoking comments on the geostrategic thinking of the great powers in light of history– for example, Mackinder’s” Heartland” theory, i. e., “whoever controlled Central Asia would be the dominant world power”.

Helpfully, the author provides the reader with maps to navigate a vast region that could easily thwart even adepts at world geography. Thus, the reader can easily find Türkmenbaşy, Kashgar and the Wakhan Corridor as well as inner Mongolia, various mountain ranges and rivers and myriad other places unknown to most people. &nbsp,

And having traveled extensively in Central Asia, Raby provides a store of anecdotes that helps demystify the inscrutability and romance of these far-off lands and peoples. &nbsp, The book is extensively researched and footnoted – a sign of the author’s sober-mindedness.

Raby claims that China has emerged” as the primary Eurasian power” in the new age of multipolarity that is upon us, an increasingly recognized reality. &nbsp,

The US, though, should take this state of affairs in stride and deal with it not through any form or degree of belligerence or aggressiveness and ditch its usual moral preachments that historically have been the stock and trade of USAID, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and other mouthpieces and instruments of liberal internationalist and globalist orthodoxy.

What Vice President JD Vance told the Munich Security Conference ( see his speech ) is also good advice for US policymakers: a little introspection is advisable. &nbsp,

Raby believes that” Great Powers can find a strategic accommodation without going to war … Options for finding strategic stability … are still worth pursuing” .&nbsp,

Nicely put – a vision that Trump’s State Department and the various Central Asian states share ( see this author’s &nbsp, Central Asian School of Diplomacy ) i. e., diplomacy is the smartest, most cost-effective way to resolve conflicts, defend national interests and avoid armed conflict. &nbsp,

Raby has recently suggested that China, for the first time in its history, feels secure along its Eurasian land frontiers and is now free to project power globally, a matter of some concern for those in the neighborhood.

Having said that, one way to address China’s resurgence, Raby suggests, might be for the West to engineer a so-called “reverse Kissinger”, i. e., entice Russia to “look West” and distance itself from China. &nbsp,

Only time will tell whether that is a real possibility, meanwhile, the West would be well-advised to understand Beijing’s geopolitical mindset and history as it confronts its growing ambitions.

Platitudes vs reality

Raby reminds the reader that the West should stop framing the Great Game as a contest between “democracy” and “autocracy” or” good guys vs bad guys” .&nbsp, Stated differently, the use of preachy, moralistic, diplomatic lingo is a non-starter. Certainly, it is a money-loser when dealing with China, Central Asia or most anyone else. Trump understands that.

Raby correctly states that” Russia’s trade with Central Asia is dwarfed by China’s” and” China has replaced Russia as Central Asia’s major source of foreign direct investment”. He sheds light on contested matters such as the “debt trap”, “debt sustainability” and the Belt &amp, Road Initiative.

But he might have pointed out that Central Asian governments are selective in their partnerships. They will not accept one-way investment deals that are perceived to have few long-term benefits for the country or, worse, inadvertently lead to geoeconomic subjugation.

To be sure, Central Asia wants win-win deals as well as free and fair trade – a mindset more in tune with Trump’s than with that of much of the American foreign policy establishment.

In case anyone missed it, Central Asian governments – whether you like them or not – want investors – whether Chinese, Indian or American – to make sensible, non-ideological cross-border long-term economic commitments to develop smart infrastructure connectivity and integration and create jobs and decent wages for families and the region’s growing populations. &nbsp, This vision is in line with Trumpian economic policy at home.

Sinostan

Without explicitly saying so, Raby does not appear to be optimistic about the US’s long-term prospects in Central Asia since China’s aim to absorb Central Asia – transform it into a veritable” Sinostan” – &nbsp, “is an advanced work in progress. But Russia and China will continue to look to each other for support in their contests with the United States and this will remain a strong point of convergence in their relationship” .&nbsp,

If true, all the more reason for the US government and business community to get in on the action in Central Asia, namely, expand trade relations and, more importantly, set up joint ventures that give US companies skin in the game. Toward this end, Trump’s State Department should grease the wheels.

If Washington doesn’t deliver soon on substance, Central Asians will continue to get the best infrastructure, logistics and mining deals ( critical metals and oil &amp, gas ) that China, Russia and others have to offer. This would be only logical if the US were to remove itself de facto from the equation.

For those eager to understand the historical and present-day ins and outs of great power competition in Central Asia, they would be well advised to read” Great Game On: The Contest for Central Asia and Global Supremacy”. This would include policymakers. &nbsp,

If American ingenuity and creativity were to be introduced into the arena shorn of hidden political and/or woke agendas and offered Central Asia attractive win-win economic arrangements, the US would stand a good chance of not only staying in the ( great ) game but prevailing.

Javier M Piedra has 40 years of international banking and finance experience and was former acting assistant administrator, Bureau for Asia, USAID ( 2018 – 21 )

Alexander B Gray is former deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff, White House National Security Council ( 2019-21 )

Continue Reading

Trump’s Sino-Russia split bid likely to backfire – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, World

Is the US hoping that the Sino-Russian broken will occur again?

President Donald Trump claimed in an interview on October 31, 2024, that Joe Biden’s administration had falsely pushed China and Russia up.

He claimed that his administration would prioritize separating the two power. Trump said,” I’m going to have to un-unite them, and I think I can do that as well.”

Trump has been willing to deal with Russia since returning to the White House, aiming to put an end to the conflict in Ukraine as quickly as possible. This Ukraine plan, in one way, serves the purpose of what Trump was trying to say in his remarks to Carlson.

Even if it means throwing Ukraine under the vehicle, pulling the US out of the German conflict and repairing ties with Russia can be seen in the context of a change in America’s focus on containing Chinese strength.

However, Trump said to Fox News after a new phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin that” the first thing you learn is you don’t like Russia and China to get together.”

Trump makes reference to history as the Nixon administration’s strategy for countering the Soviet Union by attempting to coincide with China, which ultimately led to the division of the two communist organizations.

However, if creating a cleft between Moscow and Beijing is indeed the best goal, Trump’s eyesight is, in my opinion, both stupid and foolish. Russia’s partnership with China is unlikely to end, and many in Beijing view Trump’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine war in general as a reflection of failure rather than strength.

a growing problem

Although Russia and China have previously engaged in conflict when it suited their passions, the political landscape of today is distinct from that of the Sino-Soviet broken during the Cold War.

The two nations have significantly shared key strategic objectives, with the US leading the charge against the Western liberal order, among which their relationship has steadily grown since the Soviet Union’s fall.

Men in helmet look across an expanse with mountains on the other side.
During a months-long fight in 1969, Russian military keep an eye on the Chinese-Soviet borders. Keystone/Getty Images via The Talk

China and Russia both have recently taken an increasingly assertive approach when presenting their military might: Russia is based in former Soviet satellite says, including Ukraine, and China is located in Taiwan and the South China Sea.

A unified approach taken by American administrations to counter China and Russia’s threat has only brought the two nations closer together in response.

Besties long, please?

President Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping declared a “friendship without limits” in a display of unwavering support for the West in February 2022, only as Russia was preparing to invade Ukraine.

Since then, China has become Russia’s leading trading lover for both imports and exports. Russia today relies heavily on China as a major buyer of its oil and gas, and bilateral trade between China and Russia reached a record deep of US$ 237 billion in 2024.

Due to China’s growing economic dependence, any US effort to pull Moscow out of Beijing is impossible due to its significant leverage over Russia. That doesn’t imply that there are still areas of disagreement and different legislation, or that the Russian-Chinese marriage is unassailable.

In fact, if Trump were to draw a wedge between the two nations, there are some places that he could utilize. For instance, it might help Russia’s hobbies to help US attempts to encircle China and deter any interventionist tendencies in Beijing, such as through Moscow’s proper ties to India, which China finds alarming, especially given that there are still disputed territories along the Chinese-Russian borders.

Screenshot

Putin is aware of who are his true companions.

Putin is not arrogant. He is aware that the deep-rooted American consensus against Russia, including a powerful, if leaky, financial sanctions regime, won’t disappear anytime soon with Trump in office.

The US leader appeared to be warming up to Putin in his first term, but there is a reason why he was yet more harsh with Russia than Barack Obama or Joe Biden’s services in terms of punishment.

Putin may be willing to accept a Trump-brokered peace agreement that sacrifices Ukraine’s passions in favor of Russia, but that doesn’t mean he should remain hurriedly rejecting a broader call to unite against China.

Putin will be aware of how dependent Russia is now physically dependent on China economically and physically. Moscow is now a “vassal” or at best a young partner to Beijing, according to one Russian scientist.

Transactional stumbling block

Trump’s peace deals with Russia and Ukraine are seen by China as a sign of weakness that might undermine US hawkishness toward China, for the most part.

While some US officials are truly aggressive about China ( Secretary of State Marco Rubio calls China the “most effective and dangerous” threat to American success ), Trump himself has been more indifferent.

He does have reportedly considered holding a meeting with President Xi Jinping as part of a renewed business battle. Beijing acknowledges Trump’s interpersonal mindset, which prioritizes short-term, visible advantages over more foreseeable, long-term strategic interests requiring continued investment.

This alters the assumption that the US might not be willing to pay for Taiwan’s higher prices. In contrast to his father, Trump has failed to undertake the nation to protecting Taiwan, the self-governing area that Beijing claims.

Trump had somewhat stated that he would opt for economic measures like taxes and sanctions if the Chinese authorities were to establish a military strategy to “reunify” Taiwan. His ostensible willingness to deal Ukrainian territory for peace has now sparked concern among Taiwanes over Washington’s devotion to long-established global standards.

insulating the market

The US-led financial sanctions government has severe limitations, according to China’s takeaway from Russia’s practice in Ukraine. Russia was able to survive despite heavy American sanctions thanks to deceit and support from friends like China and North Korea.

China has significant leverage to fight any US-led efforts to isolate the nation economically because it remains significantly more financially connected to the West than Russia, and due to its relatively powerful international financial position.

In fact, Beijing has adapted to the resulting economic decline by prioritizing local consumption and increasing the self-reliance of the economy in vital sectors as political tensions have slowly eroded the West’s relationship with China in recent years.

The image of two men in suits is shown on objects on a glass table.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump are depicted in Matryoshka dolls in a memory shop. Misha Friedman/Getty Images

That, in portion, reflects China’s important economic and cultural power globally. A private drive to get places in the Global South around to China’s position has been a contributing factor to this. Taiwan has received endorsements from 70 nations that give it the status of a member of China.

China’s strategy for severing a gap

Trump’s strategy of ending the Russia-Ukraine war by favoring Russia in the hopes of bringing it into an anti-China coalition is likely to have a negative impact.

Russia may harbor concerns about China’s growing power, but any US effort to pull Moscow away from Beijing is unrealized given the two countries ‘ shared strategic goal of challenging the Western-led international order and Russia’s deep economic dependence.

Additionally, Trump’s strategy exposes China’s potential vulnerabilities. His transactional and isolationist foreign policy and his support for right-wing parties in Europe may strain ties with European Union allies and cause a deterioration in trust in American security commitments.

Beijing may interpret this as a sign that China is letting go of US influence, which, in turn, gives it more room to maneuver, notably in terms of Taiwan. A change like this could instead divide a Western coalition, which is already fragile, rather than causing a Sino-Russian split.

Linggong Kong is a PhD candidate at Auburn University in political science.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Losing the war of wedges – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, World

Donald Trump is speaking with Xi Jinping, the president of China, while Vladimir Putin, the leader of the US, is speaking with him.

The National plan is to polarize the two officials and pit them against one another. The intention could be to include Russia rebel against China and compel Beijing to renounce its position in response.

Although it’s not known whether this strategy will work, it’s now eliciting reverberations from US friends east and west of Russia. Some are urging Americans to unite and demand a more confrontational approach from Moscow. Without that, some people are considering forming an alliance of US companions even without the US.

Some EU leaders, including Angela Merkel, once hoped to change the world through business or “wandel by bach” to deal with Putin. According to Bill Emmott, the legislation infamously failed.

But right now, US rulers simply want to accept Russian as one of his own, giving in to his behavior without even considering whether to change him. The following questions are asked: Why? And what will occur?

But first, let’s take a moment again. The three countries, the US, China, and Russia, were playing a game 17 years ago, and the relationships between them were starkly different.

Chinese President Hu Jintao and US President George W. Bush were standing in front of the Beijing Olympics on August 8, 2008. Puntin was parking on a chair behind. Russia had other ideas, but the Chinese wanted to show the world their novel G2 connection with the US.

Russian troops also attacked Georgia and carved out the Ossetia place there at the same time. On August 12th, a quick peace was reached. Despite the initial shock, the event was immediately put on hold. The war was viewed as a modest trespass, an indiscretion, and a peccadillo by the West and the US. The Olympics were just three weeks long.

The Soviet annexation of Crimea in 2014 lasted a few weeks, if not more. Soviet troops crossed the border on February 27 and quickly seized the area, which was annexed on March 18 through a vote.

Additionally, it was quick, perhaps before the US had enough time to process and respond. By that time, Putin and the US had a long-term strategy. Obama’s” Pivot to Asia” wanted to entice Russia to surround Beijing despite having strained ties with China since 2010. Russia was eager to raise its value with the US.

It might have stoked the Belarusian intervention in Syria, which would support the Assad government in Damascus. Russia also supported Iran, which had already positioned its troops and weapons in Damascus to combat the native Daesh Sunni rebels.

Russia intervened on September 30th, sending bombs to Syria to launch considerable attacks against cities targeted by anti-Assad forces. De facto, Russia’s appearance in Damascus lasted until last year when Turkish-backed soldiers finally swept through the state deserted by both Russian and Persian forces.

We don’t notice a significant change in the current US harmony choices when we consider these ten to seventeen years of history. The single notable change was that the US and Europe decided to draw a line in the sand and turn Kyiv against Moscow in 2022, before the disastrous Russian disappointment in Ukraine.

Contrary to popular belief, the aid was flimsy and constrained. Ukraine received more time and money from American weapons, but larger social factors limited the scope of insurgencies and strikes.

Most importantly, the US and Europe didn’t following through despite it being obvious that Russia was rebuilding its defense industry at least since 2023.

Just now, in 2025, is Europe really boosting its military industries, following Trump’s warnings. Many European nations are dropping their prudence and may promote Kyiv to build real serious problems into the Russian heartland now that there is the possibility of an infamous bargain between the US and Russia.

In other words, Russia may now have less incentive to comply with US demands than it did ten years ago. It’s unclear why they should have one now because they didn’t reach an agreement ten years ago.

China hasn’t shown some indications that it intends to make any agreements at the same time. Beijing is prepared for significant additional surprises, according to Premier Li Qiang, who made the announcement on March 23 that Beijing will open up more space for foreign funding.

Maybe he suggests that Xi is prepared to reject US demands and that no miracle is anticipated with Trump’s mountain. Or perhaps Beijing is negotiating before making a bargain.

The reality is that the US’s alliances in Europe and Asia are breaking down, despite its best efforts to reach a swift resolution. In spite of the fissures it has opened in its intercontinental and transatlantic relations, any agreement the US does approach with Russia may drop short.

With about half of China’s community, the EU, UK, and Norway have economies that are more advanced than China’s. With almost the same people, Japan’s sector is three times the size of Russia’s. The number of countries that are close to the UK and farther away from the US is increasing.

Here’s the dramatic reality: a deal with America is less appealing to Russia or China because of the fissures between the US and its supporters. The activity appears to have reverted.

The US is correct in looking at both China and Russia while also promoting peace, but if it breaks or even strains its friendship with its allies, it may lose on both fronts.

Without a deal, Russia and China may lose their most important asset, its network of friends. They will want to emulate America while crossing paths with the ( ancient ) US. ally.

The US allegedly underestimated the friends ‘ responses to its Russian requests and created a space for China or Russia to scuttle tensions between the US and its supporters.

Also if US allies won’t rebel openly against America, the distance opens up new ground for maneuvering for Russia. America needs to think different now.

America needs a more important long-term strategy where talking to opponents is certainly important, but this didn’t be accomplished by allying with supporters. The US might have a more comprehensive perspective to consider the future.

This content was originally published on Appia Institute, and it is now licensed for resale.

Continue Reading

East-West divide over plan to replace US in NATO – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, World

Four unnamed European officials were cited by The Financial Times (FT ) in a report claiming that” European military powers work on a 5- to 10-year plan to replace US in NATO.”

The Scandinavian countries, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are all cited in the document as wanting to provide this request to the US at the upcoming NATO Summit in June.

Several nations have also declined to participate in these discussions, according to FT, either out of fear that this will prompt the US to move more quickly or because they believe it won’t leave Europe.

The most significant nations on NATO’s southeast side, which all prefer to remain under the US protection umbrella, are likely the ones whose FT is referring to.

If the ruling liberal-globalists win May’s presidential election, Poland ‘s&nbsp and recent flirtations with France&nbsp could signal a full-fledged pivot, but for the time being, it serves as an attempt to rebalance ties with the US in the face of uncertainty over its future plans. It can also be seen as a&nbsp, a mistaken negotiation tactic, to maintain and grow the US military appearance.

The Baltic States have a devoted pro-American aristocracy, and they’ll simply revert to the EU if Trump unilaterally or completely removes US soldiers from their territory as part of a royal agreement with Russia.

Romania&nbsp, somewhat rebuffed&nbsp, France’s plan to expand its nuclear umbrella to the rest of the globe, which can be interpreted as placing more trust in the US than in Europe in the situation of a crisis&nbsp, with Russia&nbsp, over Moldova.

If these five nations continue to view their national interests in these methods, which would involve Poland’s ruling liberal-globalists to avoid moving to France if they are elected president ( their opponents are relatively more pro-US), then a split within NATO Europe would form.

France and Germany, who are competing with Poland and France for the title of post-conflict Europe, may find that the US will undermine their plans for influencing Central and Eastern Europe ( CEE ).

The final of which voted against the US’s Russophilic population’s wishes while the last needed the US to maintain Turkey’s sea claims at bay, NATO’s eastern flank may drop under US influence. From Estonia to Romania and potentially as far as Bulgaria and perhaps Greece.

This alleged” cordon sanitaire” could then serve the dual purposes of preserving US influence in this geostrategic region of Europe by “pivoting ( back ) to Asia” and dividing Western Europe and Russia.

Poland’s liberals might be able to fend off that scenario, but it depends on: 1 ) the CEE countries still see Russia as a threat; 2 ) they believe the US to be a more trustworthy security partner than the EU; and 3 ) the US not voluntarily ceds all of its influence in Europe.

If these factors stay the same, Western Europe might physically reshape mostly independent of CEE, which CEE nations might still appreciate because it would aid in their “deterrence” strategies.

In the unlikely event that a popular NATO-Russian conflict persists below the nuclear threshold, the CEE countries may depend on a military merged Western Europe to come to their rescue if they&nbsp doesn’t stop Russia on their own.

Russia has no intention of joining NATO, but the US’ continued military presence in the CEE may deter those anti-Russian nations from acting provocatively, and the US’ status would be ruined if it abandoned them in a heated conflict.

If FT’s statement about the first’s plans to replace the US in NATO is accurate, Europe may physically split into a effectively automatic northern half and an American-aligned eastern one with this understanding in mind.

The goal of Poland’s upcoming presidential election, which would draw attention to its overwhelming influence on shaping Europe’s potential security architecture, the subject of which is at the heart of NATO-Russian tensions, could be the only realistic way to offset that scenario.

This article was originally published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack, and it has since been republished. Subscribe to the Andrew Korybko Newsletter here.

Continue Reading

​Is Europe rearming? The jury is still out – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, World

Germany recently passed legislation that purports to commit €1 trillion ($ 1.08 trillion ) to the defense sector, while the EU has suggested a Rearm Europe  Plan to raise more than € 800 billion ($ 866 billion ) for defense.

On the surface, it appears as though Europe is getting ready for the next battle, but the reality is that it is actually trying to cover up its severe economic issues by investing money into its economy and building weapons. But will this approach job?

At various degrees, problems exist.

The first is financial. The idea that human factories may be converted into weapons production facilities, mainly tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, is at the center of the planning. For instance, the German company, Rheinmetall, is considering purchasing a Volkswagen factory in Osnabrück, north Germany, a facility that then faces an uncertain future.

The government of Italy has promoted a similar concept, urging Stellantis to begin producing protection equipment in its auto factories.

Stellantishttps: //www next month. reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/stellantis-italy-output-falls-475090-vehicles-2024-cars-lowest-level-since-1956-2025-01-03/ produced fewer than 500, 000 vehicles in Italy ( Fiat plus Alfa Romeo, Maserati, Lancia ) compared with 751, 000 in 2023. The bank’s lowest number in Italy since 1956 was 2024.

Chairman of Stellantis, John Elkann.

The president of Stellantis, John Elkann, objected to the government’s request to change some factories to protection production, claiming that his company was unsure that the “dead industry” would be the future of the car.

At the opening of the White Paper for European Defense, Kaja Kallas, the vice president of the European Commission, names journalists. European Commission, in pictures.

The main issue is that the economic justification for switching from high-volume creation to low-volume defense equipment makes little sense in the business world. Although it is true that some vehicles companies that produce trucks and other large equipment have cranes and lifts that could be used to build armoured vehicles, also tanks, these plants are designed for mass production rather than primarily for hand-built result.

Chrysler factory during World War II.

The US stopped most car production during World War II ( aside from the necessary vehicles for the battle ) and switched to defense manufacturing. The US production was remarkable: 297, 000 plane, 193, 000 ordnance guns, 86, 000 tank and 2 million vehicles. The US merely produces 250 fighter jets annually today. That would equal a total production of 1,250 planes in a five-year issue like World War II, which would not compare to World War II’s.

Europe currently produces no more than 50 war tanks per year. Even though that figure is pretty low, it may take years to change an car factory to tank production, so the tank production in Europe doesn’t significantly increase over the next five years. Additionally, converting a manufacturer to military hardware requires a significant redesign of an automobile factory. Although Germany’s labor unions would have a lot to say about job rates, settlement, and social advantages, less people would also be required.

In the US, Europe, Russia, or China, it is obvious that the World War II design, which called for a federal participation to fight the war, is not feasible.

It is also important to point out that the security industry in Europe is divided, its supply chains are uncertain, and, in many cases, severely cheap, and that participating companies are not known for reliability or cost usefulness. Many of these businesses have grown as a result of wings transfers to Ukraine, where they receive the highest compensation. Where will the extra projected production get, if the conflict ends, if at all?

More military equipment does require more troops and support as a result. How this will become accounted for is currently unknown. Without enlistment, the force structure of Europe won’t be easy to grow. According to some, Europe is currently experiencing a crisis in defense selection.

Both the German and Italian cases are intended to solve financial and employment issues and in some way resurrect the German and Italian economy. However, in reality, the concept looks more like a rebate program to keep plants running, but with significantly lower output.

Both nations will have to determine whether or not they can manage the grants, whether or not they will contribute to resolving the country’s economic crisis in Italy or Germany, which is currently in decline. The solution to car selling is not to manufacture weapons, as the Stellantis CEO suggested.

One wonders if a major study has examined whether it makes sense to convert existing companies to war-making in the middle of the night or even if massive grants are going to help alleviate Germany’s and other countries ‘ economic woes.

The social issue is of course.

There isn’t a discussion on the strategic objective of the investing, despite the proposed ramp-up in defense spending in Germany and by the EU’s proposed plans to benefit defense companies that can use the new funding. In reality, there is a different political divide between some EU member states. This is a significant factor in Italy’s opposition to the EU Rearm Europe program, which was opposed to the European Commission’s president, Ursula von der Leyen.

Guido Crosetto, the minister of defense of Italy,

Guido Crosetto, Italy’s defence secretary, sent an&nbsp, open text that was published in Corriere la Sera, Italy’s most read newspapers.

Crosetto argued that Western defense” cannot change NATO nor provide the same level of protection.”

He explained that without the consent of all EU members, the EU may impose a popular defense strategy for Europe.

The EU Treaty itself gives the option of a typical defense scheme, but only after a unanimous vote of the German Council, which has never occurred or is currently being discussed in any state or member state.

The EU command has been pushing for a security function outside of NATO and has long intended to take its place. The EU’s Rearm Europe strategy has been put on hold due to Italy’s resistance to these interests, at least for the moment.

Uncertainties

The overall strategy to increase protection spending lacks any resolerable strategic justification. What kinds of forces are required for Western protection? Which industries demand the most capital? Additionally, even though everyone is talking about doing so ( as they have for the past 50 years ), there is no real strategy to consolidate German defense production in any significant way.

Additionally, it’s uncertain whether the promised funds will be provided by the Bundestag or any other European legislature.

The main strength of German law is that it makes it simpler to lift defence costs without subjecting them to a constitutional ban on budget deficits greater than 0. 35 % of the GDP. According to reports, the recently passed policy includes a constitutional amendment that removes the defence spending cap.

That is a likely significant step, but with an already depressed economy and little real growth in job from new investing, it will be difficult to maintain social support for large defense budgets in Germany or elsewhere.

Germany may also try to recoup its lost business in Russia if the conflict in Ukraine is resolved. Additionally, there is the spectacular probability that Germany will once more attempt to purchase less expensive gas from Russia, even renovating existing natural gas pipes, such as Nordstream. A shift in the way European industrialists view things might be able to halt the effort to boost defence output.

State aid programs, yet those costing €1 Trillion, must become based on a clear security plan, which Europe does not have, and on an understanding of the financial consequences, which may not produce anything like what appears to be promised. The verdict on Rearm Europe is still out.

Former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent for Asia Times. This Substack newsletter, Weapons and Strategy, originally published as an original article in his Substack, is republished with permission.

Continue Reading

You know the Big Bang. Now enter the Big Wheel – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, World

An exceptionally large galaxy in the early universe has been revealed by deep observations from the James Webb Space Telescope ( JWST ). It is a galactic giant that has travelled to Earth over 12 billion times. We’ve given it the name” The Big Wheel,” and our results have been published in Nature Science.

This gigantic drive galaxy was present within the first two billion years following the Big Bang, which indicates that it was created when the world was only 15 % of its present time. It challenges what we currently know about the formation of stars.

Imagine a cosmos with the stars, gas, and dust that is similar to the Milky Way, which rotates level, rotating, frequently surrounded by an unidentified halo of dark matter.

Disk galaxies usually have clear spiral arms that protrude upwards from a sizable central region. Our Milky Way is a device cosmos with wonderful circular arms that cover around its center.

YouTube video

embedded content ]

An artist’s impression of the Milky Way reveals the filthy circular structures that resemble The Major Wheel.

Studying drive stars, such as the Milky Way and the recently discovered Big Wheel, aids in understanding how galaxies form, grow, and develop over billions of years.

These studies are particularly important because understanding galaxies like our own may reveal more about the celestial history of our interstellar home.

A major wonder

We previously believed that star plates formed slowly over a long period of time either by merging with smaller galaxies or by gas flowing naturally into them naturally from the outside.

The gentle circular structures are typically weakened by quick galaxie mergers, which cause them to change into more chaotic shapes.

Nevertheless, the Big Wheel was able to quickly increase to a surprisingly large dimension without losing its unique circular shape. This challenges conventional theories regarding the development of gigantic galaxies.

According to our in-depth JWST observations, the Big Wheel’s dimensions and rotary speed are similar to those of the universe’s largest” super-spiral” galaxies. It is one of the most enormous galaxies observed in the early universe and is three times as large in size as superior galaxies at that time.

In fact, due to its high rotational speed, it is ranked among galaxies at the top end of what is known as the Tully-Fisher relationship, a well-known connection between a galaxy’s brilliant mass and how quickly it spins.

Amazingly, despite being exceedingly large, the Big Wheel is still expanding at a rate comparable to that of other stars at the same celestial scale.

The center of the image is the Great Wheel cosmos. The Big Wheel is approximately 50 times higher apart, whereas the brilliant blue cosmos (upper right ) is only 1.5 billion light years away. Although both appear comparable in size, the Big Wheel’s enormous distance reveals its utterly massive natural size. JWST picture

Exceedingly crowded portion of storage

The atmosphere in which the Big Wheel was created makes this even more amazing.

It’s situated in a strangely dense area of space, where galaxies are clustered close up, making the world ten times more dense. The thick atmosphere possible provided best problems for the galaxy’s rapid growth. It presumably experienced mergers that were delicate enough to allow the galaxy to maintain its circular disk shape.

Moreover, the galaxy’s rotation must have been properly aligned with the gas so that the disk can grow quickly without being hampered. Thus, the ideal mixture.

YouTube video

embedded content ]

An instance of how a large circular galaxy develops over the course of a billion years. Similar to how our closest circular galaxy, Andromeda, developed specific circular hands similar to the Big Wheel, is in the real world.

A good fortune to have

It was very unlikely to find a cosmos similar to the Big Wheel. According to current galaxy formation models, we had less than a 2 % chance to discover this in our survey.

We were fortunate to find it, most likely because it was observed in a very deep region, which is very different from standard cosmic environments.

The Big Wheel’s final fate is another interesting question, aside from its strange formation. Potential mergers could have a significant impact on its structure given the dense environment, possibly leading to the formation of a galaxy that is similar in mass to the largest ones found in nearby clusters like Virgo.

The discovery of The Big Wheel has revealed but another ancient unknown, demonstrating how needless our current theories of galaxy evolution are.

Astronomers will be able to learn more about how the universe constructed the constructions we see today thanks to more observations and revelations of large, first galaxies like the Big Wheel.

The James Webb Australian Data Centre, Swinburne University of Technology, is led by Themiya Nanayakkara.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

Continue Reading

A Cold Truce – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, World

Two months ago, a ceasefire was reached in Gaza, and some Jewish victims captured during the October 7 murder have been exchanged for Hamas prisoners. Two days away, a plan for the long-awaited stalemate in Ukraine has been made. Donald Trump does travel to China in April to attend a conference with Xi Jinping. We may say that flower has arrived, and after three years of war and rising conflicts, we should be anticipating harmony.

Little could possibly be more false. An extraordinary €1 trillion-worth mobilisation plan has been launched by Europe. It is anticipated to enhance the German military into a true war machine. It is planned to work more closely with Turkey, the UK, and the Union within NATO. More than 10 % of Russia’s GDP is used for the defense. Police officers have demanded a resources increase. Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and India are investing more in their military troops in Asia. The state in America is cutting every single dollar, with the exception of the Pentagon.

The important issues of the RMB’s complete convertibility and the Chinese market’s full liberalization would not likely be resolved by a potential agreement between the US and China. Border conflicts may persist. It would be a peace, no a peaceful one. A peace is preferable to combat and can endure, but it requires more focus and concern from both parties.

We are not just witnessing the start of a peaceful period, but the start of a long-awaited war in the hopes that it will be cool. This time could be very much if past can teach us anything. Nearly half a century passed during the past Cold War.

Warm wars are certainly preferable to popular ones, but the past Cold War has taught us that chilly can turn hot in the blink of an eye. So, every nation must get ready for an extended period of border living.

Similar to the Second World War, which involved guns and trenches, was different from the next one, which involved air raids and container battles. However, we use the older people because we don’t use any new terms.

The describe of the stabilization may be a little vague, but the situation in Gaza may be stabilized, and Iran is far from calm. Syria is also dangerous. One might be more enthusiastic about the peace agreement in Ukraine. It might last more than it might in the Middle East. After all, there has been a stalemate on the Vietnamese Peninsula for more than 70 years.

A settlement might be reached between China, the United States, and its neighbors. However, it is likely that we may endure a rapid onset of hostilities that will increase.

Italy or the Euro can’t handle the world only because it is so difficult. A decade after the first US action in World War I, American assistance for Europe and its allies continues to be crucial. Europe may be able to make its obligations and speak out in front of all of its allies, such as Japan.

There is only one option for Europe beyond simple deals: the Jewish one.

It implies that the German way of life had alter, and that the benefits of peace must be redistributed. A more efficient and competitive financial system, in addition to privileges of all kinds, must be replaced. Just that can help the ongoing mobilisation work.

It poses a significant challenge for Western nations. We have gotten used to distrusting war, believing it didn’t bother us. A social revolution as well as an economical revolution are on the horizon. If our purpose is to prevent the next battle from occurring and reduce the risks of a fight, we may get seriously about considering the possibility of a war.

War cannot be an accident for which we are ready in the future, as it was with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Hamas ‘ attack on Israel. However, it may turn out to be something we are prepared to face.

Conclusion of a time

It marks the conclusion of a special chapter in Western history. The peninsula has historically been one of the most hostile in the world. However, the next 80 years of peace have made us forget that we are created by conflict rather than harmony.

The future war/peace fluid will be different from what has been experienced in any other time. The new battle will be cross, with infiltrations, economic disruptions, influence operations, espionage, influence operations, disinformation, technical theft, infiltrations, and potential criminal attacks.

Italy was already the site of what we might then refer to as composite warfare, with terrorists using their support or funding to destabilize European democracy during the Cold War.

Italy may be more vulnerable to cross hazards this time than it was 30 or 40 years before. The collapse of Italy could lead to a collapse of NATO, a defeat for the US alliance system, and a setback for the entire system. Italy needs to take its weakness really. Italy has become a benefit rather than a liability for the US and its allies. Apparently a new sense of national unification is required for this.

Do Italians really want to live the life they have always wanted to be in Italy or do they want to live the life of the Mediterranean? The decision might resolve some of Italy’s political ambiguities.

Francesco Sisci is the chairman of the Appia Institute, which published this article in its original form. With agreement, it is republished in a somewhat condensed form.

Continue Reading