How allied are Iran and Russia really? – Asia Times

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After this month, Iran and Russia are expected to signal a strategic partnership agreement in Moscow, strengthening a relationship that has been in place since the early 2000s but has occasionally been adversaries.

Although the two parties have repeatedly shortened the original arrangement, both have acknowledged the necessity to revise it to better reflect modern-day international realities.

What were now contentious ties between Moscow and Tehran have been impacted by the conflict in Ukraine, the decay of relations between Russia and the global West, and the growing US-China conflicts.

The conflict in Ukraine appears to have altered Russia’s perspective, even if it was previously cautious not to give sensitive technologies to the Islamic Republic, mainly due to potential negative West-related reactions.

Iran has become a crucial position in its political rebalancing, and Moscow has made an incessant pivot toward Asia. Moscow is exceedingly seeing Iran as a significant partner because it is a heavily sanctioned condition and crucial for Russia’s expansion into the Indian Ocean and East Africa.

The current situation is unlikely to change with Donald Trump’s election. Although it is possible to reach an agreement between Moscow and Washington, the tensions between the two countries are conspicuous nevertheless.

Russia may continue to support its ties to the Islamic Republic. The former, too, is expected to experience greater stress from the Trump presidency, driving it to get greater military and political participation with Moscow.

The potential strategic partnership treaty’s major, important details are not made publicly available. However, an examination of Iranian and Russian government official public statements reveals a number of potential areas for improved diplomatic assistance.

The strategic partnership will unavoidably highlight the opposing positions of the Western-led international order and encourage a more multilateral one. Russia and Iran both support non-Western initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ) and the BRICS.

The development of the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ), which connects Russia to Iranian ports and India, and new payment options for international currency exchange, which are both important since trade between the two nations has recently declined.

Bilateral defense and strategic assistance will be a second, much more important area, as evidenced by Iran’s alleged supply of Russian short-range ballistic missiles and military drones. Later in October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that the agreement would involve more defence <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2024/10/31/russia-says-upcoming-treaty-with-iran-includes-closer-defense-cooperation”>cooperation.

Moscow and Tehran have also made an effort to work together to address regional concerns in the South Caucasus, where they border and whose goal is to keep non-regional ( mostly Western ) players at bay.

This thinking is at the root of the 3 3 program, which Tehran and Russia simultaneously support. It is comprised of Turkey and three South Caucasus countries, notably Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, though the latter has consistently refused to participate according to Russia’s activity of 20 % of its territory.

The new Russo-Iranian contract, which will undoubtedly grow cooperation, will probably end in vain because of their complex relationship as both companions and rivals in the Middle East. A legally binding alliance with iron-clad commitments to joint protection is neither required nor desired by either side.

Alternatively, both seek expanded assistance that gives enough space for movement. In fact, the two nations ‘ combined size allows them to avoid narrowing down their individual foreign policy objectives. They have so far avoided placing a singular adversary or professional at risk because it would restrict their options for international policy.

Despite the growing defense collaboration, diplomatic conflicts persist. Iran has reported that it is awaiting the distribution of Russia’s Su-35 fighter jet, which may indicate that the country is trying to balance its relations with another Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who oppose Iran’s impact and activities there.

Another level of tension lies in local infrastructure. The Zangezur hall, a proposed transportation route connecting Armenia and Nakhichevan through Armenia’s Syunik state, which edges Iran, has just received Russian support.

Iran opposes this hall, citing both its own local influence and its challenging connection with Armenia.

Most significantly, maybe, Russia is apparently afraid to go along with Iran in its worsening conflict with Israel. Iran is well-known for its close ties to Russia, and Israel has always had a particular connection with Moscow.

In part because of its close ties to the Jewish state, Russia has also been careful about offering military aid to Iran.

The invasion of Ukraine, as well as Israel’s military activities in Gaza and Lebanon, drove major transitions in Russia’s demeanor toward Israel. Moscow has generally adopted a pro-Palestinian place, and there are more differences.

Russia is also unlikely to support Iran in any possible immediate conflict with Israel, despite this bad backdrop. Even though it is technically feasible that Russia could supply air defense and aerospace to Iran to thwart an invasion, developing experience in using them takes time ( at least three months for the S-400 air defense system ).

The Russo-Iranian partnership, rooted in common resistance to American dominance, is logical but instantly fraught with competition. Russia is skeptical of Iran’s work to expand its international relations, especially if it wants to re-engage with the West.

Also, Iranian officials view Russia’s support as partially greedy, noting Moscow’s shift in attitude regarding its nuclear program as it seeks to force the West amid the Ukraine conflict.

Iran and Russia are moving forward with a new corporate contract, which will allow for both heightened cooperation and mute conflict, despite these difficulties. The relationship may strengthen while preserving each nation’s freedom on a global scale thanks to the agreement.

Emil Avdaliani&nbsp, is a professor of global relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a Silk Road professor. Following Emil Avdaliani on X at @emilavdaliani

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Trump’s foreign policy must look beyond old Cold War – Asia Times

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The effect President Trump’s election will have on American foreign policy is still up for discussion, but for all practical uses, Washington will have to come to terms with a new world environment—an environment also held prisoner, in part, by the former Cold War.

The Soviet Union and its allies squared off in a largely depressive conflict during the Cold War. What was known as the” Third World,” a motley group of largely failed former colonies, &nbsp, immoral tyrannies, and failed economy, stood on the profitability of the conflict. Within this ecology, and excluding India, China stood out as large but disconnected and largely focused on its internal problems.

The Soviet Union, in its present form, was a solitary land mass that extended from the Kamchatka coast to the Elbe River, one of the distinguishing characteristics of this world ideal.

Moscow could stay in line with its children because of this. Therefore, Moscow had no logistical difficulty sending troops to quell the rebellion when the Hungarians or the Czechs sought to reclaim their freedom.

Contrary to the Soviet Union and its Russian leader, the American Empire was a worldwide initiative with far-flung problems. Both overseas bases and a big ship were needed to ensure America’s dominance.

By the 1960s, the two strong powers had reached some sort of equilibrium, and both parties had expressly acknowledged that each had a legitimate interest.

Washington avoided intermediate when countries as diverse as Hungary and Czechoslovakia attempted to seize control of the Soviets. Likewise, Washington did act, albeit through local proxy when Moscow tried to reach beyond its sphere of interest, such as in Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, while the prevailing parity was fraught with malice, it was an attempt of some form with its unspoken regulations and red ranges, real or imagined. The two power ‘ political relationship with one another did not change, despite the Soviet Union’s decline implying that Russia had lost its empire.

Russia continued to be a western power, albeit one that had lost a significant portion of its landmass. With a vast kingdom and a global impact that extended far beyond the military and economic spheres, the United States remained a world player.

But, while America’s military and economic can had no classmates. It was difficult to translate this dominance into tangible achievement, which is unfortunate, and even more difficult to do so.

Russia was on its legs during the initial years of the post-Cold War culture, China had not yet emerged as a major industrial strength, and regional tensions were largely at bay. However, there is no stopping time for past; instead, it was a series that lasted.

Now, some 35 decades after the end of the Cold War, a divided world has seen the introduction of a multitude of contestants. None of them is strong enough to actually concern the United States, but they all make it extremely challenging for Washington to establish its hegemony.

Managing the Cold War was fairly simple for Washington. All the United States had to do was accept until the USSR collapsed because the Russian system was like a troll. That time is now over. And what has emerged from the post-Cold War age is a fresh break that holds the challenges of a questionable future in addition to the ghosts of the past.

Russia, China, the Middle East, radical Islam and BRICS are the innovative problems confronting Washington’s identity. While each has its own relationships, not to mention goals, put up they correspond to a fresh break. And if this separate had to have two terminates, those would be Russia and China.

Russia, as it is perceived by the United States, is a construction, the product of an imagination that however harks to the time of the Cold War. However, if one looks impartially at the indicators, the image&nbsp, they project is irrefutable.

In terms of people, population, GDP, technology, industrial manufacturing and armed forces, Russia is hardly on the map and the unanswered question is: By what subterfuge did President Vladimir Putin hill the mind of the world&nbsp, into passing off his country ( setting aside its nuclear potential ) as an international heavyweight.

In the end, Washington continues to fight in Ukraine as if the outcome would alter Europe’s power balance, while Russia, in a last ditch effort, has agreed to pay for drones from Iran.

China, the opposite bookmark, has been an American fixation since the birth of the People’s Republic in 1949. For the first 20 years of its existence, the regime was subject to an embargo that had no parallel.

That was followed starting from the mid-1970s by the normalization of US-China relations based on two misconstructions: for the United States, that this would lead to “regime change” in China and, for the leaders in Beijing, that China could become part of the international system without submitting to some extent to its rules.

Actually, neither side accepted the fact that neither side could actually understand the differences between the two regimens and that a new set of guidelines had to be agreed upon prior to beginning interplay. The result is a conflicting relationship between the Chinese empire and the American empire, who seeks to” contain” China.

A complicating factor is that the economies of the two are partially interconnected, making restrictive measures taken by one relative to the other easy to become self-defeating exercises.

While America’s ongoing confrontation with both Russia and China has its own dynamics, it has complicated Washington’s projection of power in the Middle East. The United States is also confronted by militant Islam, which is embodied in a reincarnation of the Persian Empire under the name of Iran, in that country.

In reality, this implies that Washington will have to choose a path that will require two preferences that are mutually supportive. The first is to prioritize, the second to take the lead more directly from the center, rather than the front.

Given the depressing state of the Russian armed forces, it should be obvious that Ukraine is not essential to the security of the United States or even Europe. Therefore, the current conflict is likely to be less bad if Ukraine is truncated and not a NATO member. And a result like this might also sway the nations in the center of Europe to take their defenses seriously and reduce their reliance on the US.

Fragmentation of this political ecosystem has led to the formation of tactical alliances for the long term. One is a major importer of Iranian oil and another of Iranian drones, so while China and Russia are both wary of militant Islam.

Over the next&nbsp, hundred years or more, China will be the real challenge. The issue here goes far beyond quotas, tariffs or embargoes. The Western and Imperial Chinese, two essentially incompatible social and production systems, can coexist and cooperate in a mutually beneficial way.

A US reversal might inspire Ukraine and Russia to reach some sort of agreement. Given that both President Putin and Russia do not have the resources to repress Ukraine, one might object to President Putin’s choice. But at least the problem wo n’t turn into a global crisis, but rather a convulsion of the Russian-Slavic ecosystem.

There is still a question mark over how the Trump administration will handle the new international environment. However, we can only hope that Washington will realize the value of continuing with business as usual or going it alone.

Alexander Casella, PhD, has taught and he has worked as a journalist for Le Monde, The Times, The New York Times, Die Zeit, The Guardian and Swiss radio and TV, writing primarily on China and Vietnam. In 1973 he joined the UNHCR, serving, among other postings, as head of the East Asia Section and director for Asia and Oceania. The International Center for Migration Policy Development’s representative in Geneva then was appointed.

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Israel-Lebanon peace path might run through Moscow – Asia Times

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Moscow is highlighted by a new document that Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and his associates had a covert trip to Russia.

Israel overwhelmingly responded by cooperatively punishing the Palestinians in response to Russia’s persistent assertion that Hamas initiated these conflicts ‘ first Gazan dimension.

Since Moscow supported associated UN Security Council Resolutions, the Kremlin has n’t raised the issue.

Because Russia is aware that Israel has resisted Western pressure and has refused to cooperate with Russian arming Ukraine, it is aware of the restrictions being placed on it by the West.

Their fiercely social disagreements over the Middle Eastern and Ukrainian war have n’t altered this, nor have they prevented Russia from squabbling about Israel’s standard attacks on Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in neighboring Syria.

On those, Russia respects Syria’s straight to mate with whoever it wants, but it also freely appears to acquire Iran to be a nuisance.

This analysis weighs on the fact that the above structure has been in place since Russia’s anti-terrorist involvement in the Arab Republic began nine years before.

In light of Israel’s says that Iran and Hezbollah are preparing for a bigger assault against Israel, it can be assumed that Russia gives cred to these claims. Russia has not stopped Israel’s strikes despite often praising them as violating international law.

Hence, Dermer’s alleged surprise trip to Russia may have included discussions about the proposed plan to stop Iran’s imports of Egyptian weapons through Syria.

When Israel’s military operations in Lebanon are terminated, whenever they occur, this could help maintain whatever post-conflict standing quo that is unfortunately reached there. It could also maintain the Israeli-Syrian front along the Golan Heights.

Russian President Vladimir Putin told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in September 2015 during their meeting in the Kremlin on the eve of the Syrian intervention that” we are aware of&nbsp, these ( Iran’s and Hezbollah’s ) attacks ( from Syria’s Golan Heights into Israel ) and&nbsp, we condemn them”.

Putin also discussed the matter with US President Donald Trump during his first year in office, when the two leaders met in Helsinki in July 2018, because the situation is so crucial to him. At the time, Putin said:

I&nbsp, would also like to&nbsp, notice that after the&nbsp, terrorists are routed in&nbsp, south Syria, in&nbsp, the&nbsp, so-called’ southern area’, the&nbsp, situation in&nbsp, the&nbsp, Golan Heights may be brought into complete conformity with the&nbsp, 1974 agreement on&nbsp, the&nbsp, disengagement of&nbsp, Jewish and&nbsp, Arab forces.

This may make it possible to&nbsp, take calmness to&nbsp, the&nbsp, Golan Heights and&nbsp, recover the&nbsp, agreement between the&nbsp, Syrian Arab Republic and&nbsp, the&nbsp, State of&nbsp, Israel. The&nbsp, President devoted exclusive attention to&nbsp, this problem today. &nbsp,

I&nbsp, do like to&nbsp, stress that Russia has a&nbsp, play in&nbsp, this course of&nbsp, events and&nbsp, will agree to&nbsp, precisely this position. This may entail a&nbsp, move towards establishing a&nbsp, only and&nbsp, tough peace on&nbsp, the&nbsp, base of&nbsp, UN Security Council Resolution 338.

Igor Konashenkov, a spokeswoman for the Russian Defense Ministry, made the revelations during a press conference following the mid-air affair between Russia and Israel in September 2018:

Following a six-year break, the Russian army supported the Arab military activity in the Golan Heights to allow the UN peace goal to begin patrolling the disputed frontier between Syria and Israel.

More than 140 km to the south of Syria, the director claimed, adding that this was requested by Tel Aviv. A full of 1, 050 personnel, 24 MLRSs and military missiles, as well as 145 pieces of various munitions and military technology were withdrawn from the place,’ Konashenkov told journalists.”

One month later, while participating in his classic Q&amp, A at the Valdai Club’s annual conference, Putin said that:

It is not up to&nbsp, Russia to&nbsp, urge Iran to&nbsp, left Syria. After all, both Syria and&nbsp, Iran are royal countries, and&nbsp, they should create their own marriage.

Well, Russia does have severe, deep-rooted relationships both with Iran and&nbsp, Syria. Also, we have been able to&nbsp, handle certain issues by&nbsp, interesting in&nbsp, speech and&nbsp, discussions with our Egyptian partners, including on&nbsp, withdrawing unpleasant systems from the&nbsp, Israeli borders and&nbsp, the&nbsp, Golan Heights.

As&nbsp, for&nbsp, the&nbsp, complete withdrawal, this is a&nbsp, separate issue that has to&nbsp, be resolved through dialogue between Iran and&nbsp, Syria, as&nbsp, well as&nbsp, between Iran and&nbsp, the&nbsp, United States. We are ready to&nbsp, join this discussion”.

The Russian leader clearly has a strong desire to keep the Golan Heights stable and orderly.

Natan Sharansky, a former Soviet dissident turned Israeli politician, shared the following information with The Washington Post in September 2000 after a meeting with Putin at the Kremlin earlier that month:

Putin’s lunch included a lot of glowing memories of a family trip to Jerusalem, the Galilee, and the Golan Heights, as well as his occasionally exuberant expressions of sympathy for Israel, his dislike of antisemitism, and his support for Jews in Russia and the Jewish diaspora.

‘ He said it was n’t simple in the KGB being sympathetic to Jews,’ Sharansky said. ‘ However, he explained to me that there was a Jewish family there, which he thought was almost like relatives, and that he had grown up in a communal apartment. He liked them very much.’

Putin’s statement to the Keren Heyesod Foundation at their annual meeting in Moscow in September 2019 was pertinent:” Almost two decades later, I’ll tell them.

Traditionally close cultural exchanges are supported by Russia and Israel. Hundreds of thousands of Russians travel to Israel each year to see its religious and cultural attractions. Families and friendship exist between Russians and Israelis.

This is a true common family, I can say this without exaggeration. In Israel, there are almost 2 million Russian speakers. We consider Israel a Russian-speaking country. Our countries are unified by historical events that are frequently tragic.

In keeping with his emphasis on the Golan Heights, it’s important to point out that Article 8.2 of the Russian-written draft constitution for Syria, which was presented in early 2017, called for it to “denounce war as an infringement on other countries ‘ sovereignty and a means of settling international conflicts.”

It was n’t adopted, but the point is that Russia arguably envisaged Syria formally freezing its conflict with Israel over the Golan Heights indefinitely, pending a political resolution.

Russia could significantly influence the Middle Eastern wars by using its military and political influence over Syria, which was fueled by its anti-terrorist operation over the Arab Republic nine years ago to stop Hezbollah’s Iranian arms imports through the Arab Republic.

If the proposed plan for disarming Hezbollah is approved while stabilizing the Golan Heights, it could literally kill two birds with one stone in Lebanon by upholding the post-conflict status quo.

Even though Russian compliance might depend on the incoming Trump administration’s offering favorable terms for ending the Ukrainian conflict, that outcome would go in line with some of the US’ top regional policy priorities.

Given his close ties to Putin and Trump, it’s possible that if there is political will on both sides, then creative diplomacy between Russia, the US, and Israel, with Benjamin Netanyahu acting as a potential mediator, could help bring both conflicts to an end.

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Dysfunctional love triangle: Trump seeks to split Moscow, Beijing – Asia Times

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Reports of a phone call between the US president-elect, Donald Trump, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin ( although quickly denied by the Kremlin ) have given a first flavor of the tone and direction of their relationship in the immediate future. Trump and Putin were speaking on November 7 to warn him of any increase in Ukraine and to remind him of” Washington’s substantial military presence in Europe.”

Regardless of whether it happened or never, any – if even just implicit – exchange of messages between the couple should be heeded by America’s friends in the West, as well as Russia’s main lover to his south: China’s Xi Jinping. And over the past few months, there has been a lot of this communication.

Putin addressed the Valdai Discussion Club‘s annual meeting in Sochi, the Black Sea beach, in a lengthy address before that day, according to the alleged phone call. Unsurprisingly, the conversation– and Putin’s answers to questions from the audience finally – were anti-Western and full of confidence that a new world order was now in” the cycle of true development”.

Putin, however, made fun of Trump by calling him a” courageous man,” saying he would take any proposals from him to restore US-Russian relationships and put an end to what Putin called the “Ukrainian problems” into consideration.

However, he subsequently spent a lot more time defending the relationship between China and Russia. His former friend, the Taiwanese president, was more prominent than the incoming US president in this country.

One of Trump’s information to Putin and Xi references this situation. Trump promised to “un-unite” Russia and China when he said it at a campaign event on October 31. Trump made the characterization of Russia as “natural enemies” because of China’s desire for its great landmass.

YouTube video

]embedded information]

Donald Trump: US likely’ un-unite’ Russia and China.

Russia and China have a history of territorial disputes along Siberia’s much land borders. This occurred before the US opened to China under then-president Richard Nixon in the 1960s, which was a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Trump appears to be trying to restore US ties with Moscow more than Beijing, in contrast to Nixon. Trump’s obvious need to use the conflict between Russia and China to benefit the US should not be dismissed as totally impossible, even though it’s difficult to imagine a similar divide between Russia and China immediately.

On the face of it, Putin and Xi are closely aligned. However, a deeper analysis of the relationship between China and Russia suggests that it is generally one between their current frontrunners and lacks much of the administrative level that other alliances do.

In both public and private lines, Russia has a lot of hatred toward China. Russians are unsure about China’s growing influence in Central Asia and worry about possible problems over long-standing border issues. Some people even dislike the fact that Beijing now has a young lover, Moscow.

Trump might use these to scuffle Russia and China, among other things. However, much depends on what Putin thinks about Russia. The West should be focusing on the impact and implications of Trump’s proposed Ukraine coverage.

A Trump-brokered deal will probably include Russia’s full sanctions comfort, large international treatment, and recognition of its territorial gains in Ukraine since 2014. The US’s commitment to NATO would undoubtedly be slashed, as would a pledge not to do more enlargement.

Trump might find a deal with Putin, but whether Putin may stick to it is unclear. Putin is much more likely to just play both ways in an emerging innovative global order in the hopes that Russia will do this as a third gaze alongside China and the US.

This is of course a complete story, given the size of the Soviet economy only – but that’s unlikely to change Putin’s calculations, given his love to regain Russia’s power status.

Chinese leverage

Because of the difficulty of attracting foreigners to Moscow, America’s partners in Europe are unlikely to support it. Some, including Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, might find the idea attractive in general. However, among the EU members, Germany and France are more likely to want to reach an agreement with China.

They have largely ceased to be dependent on Russian oil and gas, but not China as an export market, which is the cause of this.

Beijing, meanwhile, wo n’t sit idly by while Trump tries to drive a wedge between Russia and China. Despite Putin’s efforts to establish parallel relations with North Korea and Iran, Xi still has a lot of economic leverage over Russia and will use it to strengthen its position.

Diplomatically, Putin depends on Xi and China-led outfits such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. Moscow and Beijing have different viewpoints on a US in terminal decline, which is likely to be accelerated by the upheaval anticipated from a second Trump term.

A top priority for China will be to stop the US from completely reversing its position in the Indo-Pacific, and to stop Trump from cutting a deal with Putin at China’s expense will be a top priority.

Trump might still try to talk to Putin about the Ukraine and reach an agreement with Putin. However, dividing Russia and China is not the same as agreeing to a deal with Putin. On the contrary, it is more likely to “un-unite” Europe and the US and weaken the trans-Atlantic alliance further.

Trump could accelerate America’s decline by mistakenly accelerating what is left of the liberal international order rather than reshaping it in accordance with US interests.

The University of Birmingham’s Stefan Wolff is an assistant professor of international security.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Central Asia’s ripe demographics form a key geopolitical node – Asia Times

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Western Asia is currently experiencing a geological move. The region’s leading Muslim powers of the moment, Turkey and Iran, will lose 30 % to 40 % of their working-age population during the 21st century due to plunging fertility. &nbsp,

However, the Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan—will dwarf Iran and Turkey in sheer people length.

Another Turkish state, Azerbaijan, is included with the five Central Asian nations in the table above. Except for the Tajiks, who speak a slang of Persian, the rest of Central Asia is Turkic.

Graphic: Asia Times

There has been a lot of discussion about the impact of declining birth rates on the global market, but not much has been written about the growing population in investible parts.

Africa, where the majority of the world’s population will increase this era, faces challenges in creating an educated workforce. Pakistan is also growing, but with 50 % useful poverty and political instability, its socioeconomic potential is limited.

China, which needs to import money to nations with younger communities, is of particular interest because of the growing community in Central Asia. Additionally, it provides Europe with a business with potential for long-term development.

Germany, with its 3 million native Turks, is looking East for businesses. The Organization of Turkic States ‘ annual conference meeting took place this week in Kyrgyzstan, Hungary being the only European part.

Prime Minister Viktor Orban was awarded the Supreme Order of the Turkic World, the firm’s highest respect. ” We are the northernmost people of the East”, the Hungarian prime minister commented.

The projections on the charts are straight, to be sure, and they almost certainly are because the poor Central Asian nations are likely to repeat the fertility reduction of their neighbors. The dark line in the following chart’s hill is likely to be flatter.

But the major developments are baked in the cake, so to speak.

According to my examination from August 2024, the lower reproduction rates in Turkey and Iran are the result of the cultural shock experienced by adult education. Central Asian ovulation levels will gradually decline over time.

China and Russia are also aware of the profound strategic implications of changing demographics, but the West is essentially ignorant of them.

If Afghanistan, with its reproduction rate of nearly five babies per woman, were reckoned into the Central Asian full, the amount had increase. With a fertility rate of five babies per woman, Afghanistan remains locked into pre-modern problems.

If we include the UN projections for Afghanistan’s working-age people at regular fertility, the result is impressive: The five Central Asian republics, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan up will have a people aged 20 to 64 of 280 million, dwarfing the combined total for Turkey and Afghanistan. Afghanistan stock a border with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.

Graphic: Asia Times

Safety issues after America’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 add a sense of necessity to China’s and Russia’s emphasis on Central Asia.

Except for Kazakhstan, a middle-income state with a per capita GDP of around US$ 15, 000, the Central Asian states are bad. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan boundary on China’s Xinjiang province.

In addition to more than 10 million Tamils, who speak a Turkic slang, Xinjiang is home to almost 2 million Kazakhs and 200, 000 Kyrgyz. Therefore, Xinjiang experiences any volatility in Central Asia.

The Belt and Road Initiative politics in the area has been very successful. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two largest states, voted against a 2022 decision at the United Nations Human Rights Council condemning China’s care of its Uyghur population.

” Xi visited both of these larger Central Asian nations in September during the SCO summit to receive their prefer,” Xi said. Xi, during his first overseas visit after Covid-19, signed a new&nbsp,$ 4.1 billion &nbsp, rail deal with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan”, complained the Observer Research Foundation, referring to China’s leader.

The Group of 20 proposed an” India-Middle East-Europe Corridor” at its 2022 conference in New Delhi, with road lines to the Mediterranean ending in Israel. That has been put on hold for the duration due to the war in Gaza and Lebanon.

Turkey objects to IMEC because it plays a significant part in trade between Europe and Asia. The future of the Slavic peoples is more centered in northern Asia than Anatolia, so the issue extends far beyond transportation.

Graphic: Asia Times

Writing in China’s English-language paper Global Times last June, a former prime minister of Kyrgyzstan, Djoomart Otorbaev, hailed the fresh China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway job as” a gigantic game-changer”. The railroad will be the most difficult architectural project of its kind always.

” The total length of bridges and tunnels will be 146.49 km, or 47 % of the entire Kyrgyzstani section.” The rail will move at altitudes above 3, 000 meters in some sections, showcasing the ambitious site’s enormous size and intricacy”, Otorbaev noted.

He added,” The new rail lines will cross in Central Asia with prepared and under-construction north-south rail lines from Russia and Central Asia, passing through Afghanistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran to approach the deep-sea ships of the Indian Ocean. The plan could make Central Asia a unique transportation hub for the entire Eurasian continent once it is fully implemented.

China has little to worry about Xinjiang’s unrest because it has Turkey and the Central Asian republics by its side. By constructing infrastructure throughout Central Asia, China has shaped Turkey’s future economic and demographically.

And by stabilizing what might otherwise be a belt of unrest, China has also reduced one of Russia’s greatest threats. In a region of the world where the two powers have long battled for power, this reacquaints them with China and Russia.

Follow David P Goldman on X at @davidpgoldman

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Trump’s return will change Asia’s trade game – Asia Times

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Donald Trump’s election win is creating new financial relationships for Asia, bringing both confusion and tactical opportunities. &nbsp,

Trump’s policies, generally known for prioritizing strong British benefits, are now raising concerns across Eastern markets, where trade, investment and political stability could all be significantly affected. &nbsp,

Trump’s re-election is likely to sign a return to heightened business conflicts, particularly with China. His past leadership set a precedent by imposing severe tariffs on Chinese goods, citing trade imbalances and fears about intellectual property.

The charges, which swelled into a trade war in large numbers, disrupted global supply chains and shook up industries that depend heavily on US-China business. &nbsp,

Trump is anticipated to revise or expand this strategy. On the campaign trail, the businessman-cum-politician frequently said he would impose 60 % tariffs on all Chinese goods and 20 % on all other nations ‘ imports.

If fully implemented, this threats risks China as well as other Asian countries whose supply chains are tied together.

A new trade war, in the eyes of China, would only add to the financial strains it is already experiencing due to a lingering house crisis and a weak domestic economy, which have raised doubts about whether it will be able to meet its 5 % GDP growth target.

The past Trump administration’s taxes pressured China to reassess its business methods, pushing it to get deeper regional partnerships.

China can be expected to look to expand its industry alliances in Asia further, especially within the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP ) free trade bloc, if these taxes are increased or more stringent laws are implemented.

The shift could lessen its dependence on US markets, leading to a more cohesive and dependent Asian trade bloc, and easing the impact of revived tariffs on the country’s crucial export market.

Under Trump 2.0, smaller economies in the region that serve as intermediaries between the world’s two largest markets in terms of business are also likely to experience a more difficult setting. &nbsp,

Places like Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia, which benefited from various benefits from the last trade war’s producing shifts, may experience additional risks if tariffs continue to stifle supply chains.

Additionally, they run the risk of receiving tariff-sensitive items because their products are shipped from a factory elsewhere.

In response to the business tensions, these nations may be able to produce more products, but the confusion of sustained demand may restrict capital outflows, potentially putting off long-term growth and investment.

In addition, Japan and South Korea might have to make proper choices about how to deal with China and America. Both countries are important US allies and depend heavily on imports, especially in high-tech areas like automotives and semiconductors. &nbsp,

With Trump’s renewed effort to reintroduce high-value manufacturing employment to the US, Japanese and South Korean companies that export to the US may experience additional taxes or pressure to move production to fresh American companies.

Both nations will struggle to balance their ties with China, their largest trading partner, and the US, a vital safety alliance, as competition grows to keep the US as a vital business.

Tech issues

In the software industry, Trump’s plans are expected to continue restricting Chinese exposure to US high-end systems, impacting Chinese technology firms like Huawei. &nbsp,

With the result of these limitations, Chinese companies have already been forced to look for alternatives in Asia, which could lead to an increase in modern technology in the region.

China has responded by investing a lot in its domestic semiconductor sector, but the restrictions on sharing technology may cause the differences between nations to grow and make Asian countries choose to take sides in a technical battle. &nbsp,

With more powers putting pressure on nations like Taiwan, which has a strong position in the semiconductor sector, export restrictions or expansions could become more difficult. This could create an environment in which corporate industries can become battlegrounds for power and control.

Under Trump, as traders react to changes in trade relations and international capital flows, the price of the currency areas in Asia may experience significant fluctuations. &nbsp,

On the horizon, Beijing might start implementing capital controls or other measures to maintain the yuan as a result of increased tension.

In addition, emerging Asian currencies may experience uncertainty if taxes or trade restrictions cause their exports to decline, making these nations more prone to cash outflows. Having said that, the current perhaps even present an opportunity for some Asian nations to boost exports as the money rises.

As a result of Trump’s policies, funding flows into Asia may be affected. This could lead to pressure on American businesses to relocate their operations there.

Asia may initially face challenges as a result of this money duplication, especially if Washington implements tax incentives or other measures to encourage more regional growth. &nbsp,

However, if Asia’s economies continue to shift toward consumer-driven models and digital economies, they could attract a new wave of foreign investments that are unrelated to American investments.

Even with shifting US priorities, these markets may still be appealing to international investors because of the favorable demographics and growing middle class in many Asian countries and the spread of digital infrastructure.

While Trump’s second presidency may erect new hurdles and barriers for Asia’s export-geared and investment-dependent economies, the region’s adaptability and integration should allow for resilient responses.

The region could have a foundation to successfully deal with shifting policy directions from a more protectionist administration in Washington thanks to Asia’s extensive trade networks, expanding technological capabilities, and shifting alliances.

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‘Trump trade’ wins, Asia loses as risk factors surge – Asia Times

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It’s obvious Donald Trump’s big gain is a game-changer of epic sizes, from the harsh effect in Asian economies to the frantic press speculation about what lies ahead.

The declines in Chinese securities and the yuan only demonstrate how investors are quickly rearranging their strategies for addressing global financial risks and opportunities. The money surged on the news Trump scored a&nbsp, next term. US companies jumped, as did crypto prices. Provides on US Treasury securities shot higher, also.

The” Trump trade” that Asia has in mind is to take cover. A Trump 2.0 White House may certainly be more inward-looking, putting Asia’s export-oriented economy in harm’s way.

A large fire radius is present. Though aimed at China, Trump’s designed 60 % tariffs will destroy Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam and another trade-driven markets. The aftermath on shipping flows could be unimaginable.

According to Dubravko Lakos-Bujas, a planner at JPMorgan,” a significant increase in tariffs would reflect the most significant departure in policy from the latest administration and possibly the largest source of volatility.” The current macro environment is significantly different from what it was eight years ago, when the business cycle was in its mid-cycle, when the Fed did n’t care about inflation, and when pro-growth 1.0 policies were simpler to implement and had a greater impact on the bottom line.

Trump’s win over Kamala Harris is more of a “black swans” occasion for Asia than a “gray one.” Unlike the past, the latter is a repetitive but doubtful results. A “gray swan”, though, does have its own&nbsp, serious consequences, too.

Unexpected effects might be a way to strengthen Xi Jinping’s influence in China. Trump may effectively strengthen it by attacking Beijing with such an aggressiveness that he essentially strengthens by compulsion to integrate with an Eastern economy with China at its core and not an America led by an uneven, mercantilist president who blames Asia for many of his country’s failings.

For Asia, the best-case situation is that Trump’s tax risks are more a negotiating strategy than a real accompli. In fact, Goldman Sachs economists predict that Trump may only establish 20 % tariffs on China and resist the urge to impose blanket charges on other countries.

Trump may turn the other means and impose taxes he has previously threatened to impose. Trump has already stated that there will be 100 % taxes on Mexican car exports.

How much is manufacturers in Japan and Korea hope to avoid such restrictions, especially given that Tesla’s CEO has Trump’s ear? At the very least, electronic vehicle charges will be stacked confidently against non-US manufacturers.

The&nbsp, financial challenges &nbsp, may be even greater. One is that a penny march that has already irritated Asia will take a turn. For years, the economy’s “wasteball” impulses have shook international markets. It has lured enormous waves of global capital west, disadvantaging emerging-market markets in specific.

The difficulty, explains Tom Dunleavy, a companion at MV Capital, is that emerging markets “rely strongly on assets and have debts in money”. The majority of business and debt is also based in dollars, along with fuel. And he says that” the ratio of everything is going up.”

Regardless of the dubious reasoning behind it, the more packed a continued-dollar-strength business becomes as the result of the global fallout when depressed punters flee for their exits. And Trump was serve up some such situations.

Though Trump’s tariffs get the headlines, Asia is extremely worried about what his next president may mean for the Federal Reserve, the keeper of the world’s top supply money.

Trump put the techniques on the Fed during his 2017-2021 stay in the White House. Jerome Powell sabotaged his hand-picked Fed chair, and he went after him frequently. In 2019, Powell bowed to unrelenting force from&nbsp, Trump, who also threatened to fire him.

That’s how the world’s most powerful economic authority added liquidity to a flourishing business that did n’t need new substances. Trump’s Fed meddling set the stage for the post-Covid-19 price surge to come. It also tarnished the Fed’s credibility in global markets.

For Asia, Trump’s Fed policies are especially worrisome. The region’s central banks are armed with the largest stocks of US Treasury securities. Japan alone holds$ 1.1 trillion of US debt, China$ 770 billion.

Together, Asia’s largest holders of dollars own about$ 3 trillion worth. Trump 2.0 would put at risk vast amounts of Asian state wealth if his fiscal policies push Washington’s debt far above today’s US$ 35 trillion.

Not to mention the ways China might retaliate, leading to cycle of tit-for-tat trade curbs. Or might Beijing make a move to dump sizable amounts of Treasuries to punish the Trump 2.0 gang?

Or what if Trump’s designs on altering the Fed’s mandate come to pass? A key plank of the” Project 2025″ strategy that the Heritage Foundation devised for a&nbsp, second Trump term&nbsp, is watering down Fed independence.

In a recent interview with Bloomberg, Trump took shots at Powell and his fellow policymakers. ” I think it’s the greatest job in government”, Trump said. Everybody talks about you like a god when you say,” Let’s say flip a coin,” and you show up to the office once a month.

Trump also contends that the White House has every right to compel the Fed to do its bidding.

Trump once remarked in August that the Federal Reserve had “kind of got it wrong” ( very interesting ). He went on to say that” I feel the president should have at least ]some ] say in there, yeah. I feel that strongly. I think that, in my case, I made a lot of money. I was very successful. And I believe I have a better instinct than those who, in many cases, would be chairman of the Federal Reserve.

This could put the Fed’s economic role closer to that of the People’s Bank of China.

To be sure, the concept of central bank independence has been muddied. Take the&nbsp, Bank of Japan, which has held interest rates at or near zero for 25 years. What truly self-governing central bank would do that?

Yet the Fed is a different story. The dollar serves as the foundation of global finance and trade. Trump frequently discussed using a weaker dollar to gain a competitive advantage during his first term. Any policy change that undermines confidence in the US government and the dollar makes the world system shakier.

A weaker dollar could fan inflation. That, on top of Trump’s tariffs, could put the Fed in a very tough spot as Trump looks over Powell’s shoulder. Economists are frantically debating how all of this might turn out.

” On the US dollar, Trump wants to revitalize US manufacturing and exports”, says Will Denyer, an analyst at Gavekal Research. He may try to manipulate the dollar lower because he recognizes that the strength of the US dollar is an obstacle to these goals.

However, Denyer says, “he has few good options. Given how dependent the US government and companies are on foreign capital today, it is difficult to use capital controls to deter foreign inflows. And if Fed chair Jay Powell persists until the end of his term in May 2026, leaning on the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates wo n’t be simple in the near future.

Trump might try to use the threat of tariffs as a negotiating tactic in an effort to revalue their currencies, Denyer adds. However, it is doubtful whether multilateral or even broader economic policy changes will significantly weaken the US dollar in the absence of broader economic policy shifts.

This, Denyer concludes,” will leave Trump to hope that continued disinflation allows the Fed to cut rates, weakening the US dollar. However, there is a sizable probability that loose fiscal policy and sticky inflation will keep&nbsp, monetary policy&nbsp, relatively tight, supporting the US dollar and confounding Trump’s aim of weakening the currency”.

Another irrational possibility: whether Trump will continue to flirt with defaulting on US debt. He declared to CNBC in 2016 that he would “know that you could make a deal” if the economy crashed. And if the economy was good, it was good. So, therefore, you ca n’t lose”.

Trump considered canceling Beijing’s debt while serving as president for the first time in light of trade tensions. With the US national debt twice the size of Chinese gross domestic product, it’s easy to see how that would make the 2008″ Lehman shock” seem quaint by comparison.

Asian assets are also weighed by the threat of geopolitical conflict. One example is what a Trump 2.0 foreign policy team might have for Taiwan.

Trump’s return is music to Vladimir Putin’s ears, giving the Russian leader greater scope to commandeer&nbsp, Ukraine&nbsp, once and for all. Compared with US President Joe Biden’s administration, Trump also seems less likely to come to Taipei’s defense if China moved against the island of&nbsp, 23 million people.

Asia investors will also keep their bets guessing about the direction US policies in the Middle East will take. Trump, for instance, might give Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu more freedom to fight the conflict in Gaza. He’s also likely to tighten sanctions on Iran, adding fresh uncertainty to oil supply dynamics and, by extension, energy prices.

” Conceptually, the impact of a potential second Trump term on oil prices is ambiguous”, says commodity researcher Yulia Zhestkova Grigsby at Goldman Sachs.

As Trump 2.0 assumes power, other issues will concern Asian governments. Japan and Korea are concerned that Trump’s “grand bargain” trade agreement with Xi leaves other top Asian nations staring in from the distance.

All that’s clear, though, is that there will be fewer guardrails or inhibitions as Trump seeks to “make America great again” at Asia’s expense.

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Trump 2.0 would be no easy ride for Vladimir Putin – Asia Times

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MOSCOW—Many American elites, their media allies and card-carrying Democrats are convinced that a second Trump presidency would present Vladimir Putin with only opportunities. The reality is that a Trump 2.0 administration would likely bring more problems than the Russian leader has at present.

This soft-on-Putin narrative stems from the “Russiagate” conspiracy theory alleging that Trump was either a full-blown Russian agent or easily manipulated by Putin during his first term. Check the record, though, and it’s clear that Trump imposed more sanctions on Russia than any US president before him until Joe Biden.

Trump failed to implement campaign pledges to improve ties with Russia due to the pressure applied on him by the Russiagate accusation and the way in which some permanent members of the US military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies, spelled “deep state”, subverted his policy vision.

Trump also bombed Syria early in his presidency in response to what Russia considered to be a false flag chemical weapons provocation, which Barack Obama balked at doing in 2013 and thus called Russia’s bluff from back then.  

Another irritant in bilateral ties was the sanctions that Trump imposed on the Nord Stream II pipeline, motivated by his bid to poach the European energy market from Russia for American producers.

Russia was also displeased that Trump did nothing to encourage France, Germany and Ukraine to implement their obligations under the Minsk agreements to resolve the conflict between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine.

These and other issues caused Russia to regard Trump’s first presidency as a lost opportunity to enter into a meaningful rapprochement and to be bitter about it in hindsight.

Biden’s term was much worse for bilateral relations, but it didn’t start that way. Biden and Putin met in Geneva in June 2021, shortly after the US leader waived Trump’s sanctions on Nord Stream II, following which Putin publicly defended his American counterpart’s cognitive state in response to a question about them.

But anti-Russian “deep state” hawks ultimately preferred prioritizing Russia’s containment over China’s, sustaining America’s security dilemma in Europe. Putin’s security guarantee requests from December 2021 were rejected, which set into motion the events that would lead to his decision to launch his “special military operation” in Ukraine in February 2022.

It’s beyond the scope of this analysis to rehash the run-up to that fateful decision, but it’s sufficient to say that the events that followed have completely changed the nature of Russia-US relations. If Trump returns to office, he’ll inherit a much more difficult bilateral situation than he did during his first tenure.

The precedent set by his inability to prevent anti-Russian “deep state” hawks from subverting his envisaged rapprochement bodes ill for his possible second term from Moscow’s perspective, considering the much greater power these officials now wield over policymaking on all Russia-related matters.

Russia’s fears that they could stage a major provocation for escalating the Ukraine conflict if Trump wins, whether before or after he’s reinaugurated, explain why Putin endorsed Biden and then Kamala Harris.

Contrary to his image in the Western mind, Putin is a very cautious leader who considers himself the consummate pragmatist. That explains why he only authorized conventional military interventions in Syria and Ukraine at what he thought to be the last possible minute before perceived windows of opportunity closed.

He’s even been constructively criticized by nationalistically minded Russians and their supporters abroad for waiting too long with both military interventions, arguing they might have been more successful had they had been launched earlier.

Putin’s endorsements of Biden and then Harris weren’t part of some “5D chess master plan”, like some have speculated, but rather were sincere reflections of his preference for dealing with the proverbial devils that he already knows than a return to Trump uncertainty.

Not only might Russia fear that the “deep state” could stage major provocations to subvert Trump’s stated plan for ending the Ukraine war within months of taking office, but Trump himself might flirt with “escalating to de-escalate” on his own.

These same “deep state” forces have wisely applied a “boiling the frogs” approach to the latest phase of the already over-decade-long Ukrainian conflict by gradually escalating US involvement and always signaling such in advance so that Russia could prepare and not overreact.

This managed warfare has helped Russia and the US manage their worsening security dilemma caused by American mission creep in the conflict, thus avoiding an apocalyptic World War III scenario sparked by miscalculation – at least up until now.

That could change if Trump is re-elected, at least from Russia’s perspective, since either he or the “deep state” could ignore these prior guardrails by escalating to de-escalate in very dangerous ways. The purpose would be to coerce concessions from Russia ahead of a seemingly inevitable grand peace deal.

Putin has staked his reputation on at least obtaining control over the entirety of the four former Ukrainian regions that Russia now claims so he will be very reluctant to freeze the conflict before that is secure on the battlefield.

Perhaps a series of mutually acceptable compromises between Russia and the US (which could coerce Ukraine into complying with whatever Washington agrees with Moscow) might be reached under Trump. But even if the “deep state” doesn’t subvert such a deal, other problems might quickly arise for Russia.

If the aforementioned compromises aren’t paired with sanctions relief for Russia, then Trump might revert to his preferred use of these means to pressure India, Turkey, the UAE and others into sanctions compliance to Russia’s detriment.

His well-known dislike of Iran could also see him repeat his prior “maximum pressure” policy against Tehran at the expense of Russia’s efforts to develop the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC), which runs through Iran and connects Russia with the Gulf States, India and further afield to Africa and Southeast Asia.

In that scenario, Russia would risk becoming even more disproportionately dependent on China than it arguably already is, which it has sought to hedge and avert by using India as a counterweight in various ways.

A Trump 2.0 presidency would only present opportunities for Russia if none of those three scenarios – “escalating to de-escalate”, doubling down on sanctions enforcement, and choking off the NSTC – transpires, a fair compromise ends the Ukraine war and the US “Pivots (back) to Asia” and out of Europe pronto.

Trump’s plan for NATO, as reported by Politico, could enable Russia to more effectively manage their security dilemma in Europe with a view toward negotiating a new security architecture there.

American troops could thus be freed up for redeployment to the Asia-Pacific to contain China, shifting the center of the New Cold War to the other side of Eurasia and relieving some of the pressure applied on Russia over the past two and a half years.

Moreover, encouraging the Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security could lead to a thaw of sorts in their ties with Russia, as would the lifting of some sanctions.

US prioritization of China’s (and to a lesser extent Iran’s) containment over Russia’s in a second Trump presidency would relieve pressure on Russia in Europe, though at the cost of creating new problems that might threaten its interests further afield.

The heightened risk that a hot war could break out by miscalculation between the China and the US, or at least between China and some of the US’ top regional partners like Japan, the Philippines, and/or Taiwan, would destabilize the world much more than the Ukrainian conflict has over the past two and a half years.

That’s because the Asia-Pacific is the center of global economic growth, and a major conflict there would likely disrupt key supply chains. This is especially so for the tech sector, specifically with regard to the high-end chips that power the so-called “Fourth Industrial Revolution” as well as state-of-the-art military equipment, thus limiting Russia’s supply even more than currently due to US-led sanctions and raise the risk it falls further behind peers and rivals.

Even if a hot Asia war is avoided and supply chains remain intact, Trump would be expected to apply tremendous pressure on Russia to distance itself from China, perhaps through a carrots-and-sticks approach of the sort that he implied during his live interview with Tucker Carlson on Thursday night during a fundraiser in Arizona.

At the event, Trump claimed that Biden “allowed them (China and Russia) to get together. It’s such a dangerous thing. The stupidity of what they have done… I’m going to have to un-unite them, I could do that too.”

Considering the trade war that Trump waged against China during his first term and his explicitly declared goal of ending the Ukraine war “as soon as possible” if he’s re-elected, Trump might try to meld the two initiatives to “un-unite” China and Russia as part of a new divide-and-rule strategy.

This could put Russia in a dilemma of either accepting whatever deal  Trump might propose at the expense of reversing some of the bilateral progress made in with China since 2022, or rejecting it at the cost of Trump dangerously escalating to de-escalate in Ukraine with the potential for a hot war with the US and associated miscalculation risks.

Cautious and pragmatic Putin might thus prefer to retain the presently more predictable trajectory of US-Russian ties in the New Cold War under Harris than risk a new era of global uncertainty under Trump.

Andrew Korybko is a Moscow-based American political analyst who specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity. He holds a PhD in political science from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.” Follow him on X at @AKorybko

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The nations on the brink of going nuclear – Asia Times

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Following Israel’s October 26, 2024, attack on Iranian energy facilities, Iran vowed to respond with “all available tools,” sparking fears it could soon produce a nuclear weapon to pose a more credible threat.

The country’s breakout time—the period required to develop a nuclear bomb—is now estimated in weeks and Tehran could proceed with weaponization if it believes itself or its proxies are losing ground to Israel.

Iran isn’t the only nation advancing its nuclear capabilities in recent years. In 2019, the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned intermediate-range land-based missiles, citing alleged Russian violations and China’s non-involvement. The US is also modernizing its nuclear arsenal, with plans to deploy nuclear weapons in more NATO states and proposals to extend its nuclear umbrella to Taiwan.

Russia, too, has intensified its nuclear posture, expanding nuclear military drills and updating its nuclear policies on first use. In 2023, it suspended participation in the New START missile treaty, which limited US and Russian deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and stationed nuclear weapons in Belarus in 2024.

Russia and China have also deepened their nuclear cooperation, setting China on a path to rapidly expand its arsenal, as nuclear security collaboration with the US has steadily diminished over the past decade.

The breakdown of diplomacy and rising nuclear brinkmanship among major powers are heightening nuclear insecurity among themselves, but also risk spurring a new nuclear arms race. Alongside Iran, numerous countries maintain the technological infrastructure to quickly build nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation would require significant collaboration among major powers, a prospect currently out of reach.

The US detonated the first nuclear weapon in 1945, followed by the Soviet Union (1949), the UK (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). It became evident that with access to uranium and enrichment technology, nations were increasingly capable of producing nuclear weapons. Though mass production and delivery capabilities were additional hurdles, it was widely expected in the early Cold War that many states would soon join the nuclear club.

Israel developed nuclear capabilities in the 1960s, India detonated its first bomb in 1974, and South Africa built its first by 1979. Other countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Sweden, Egypt, and Switzerland, pursued their own programs.

However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1968 to curb nuclear spread, led many countries to abandon or dismantle their programs. After the end of the Cold War and under Western pressure, Iraq ended its nuclear program in 1991.

South Africa, in a historic move, voluntarily dismantled its arsenal in 1994. Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine relinquished the nuclear weapons they inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1996, securing international security assurances in exchange.

Nuclear proliferation appeared to be a waning concern, but cracks soon appeared in the non-proliferation framework. Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test in 1998, followed by North Korea in 2006, bringing the count of nuclear-armed states to nine. Since then, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, initiated in the 1980s, has been a major target of Western non-proliferation efforts.

Iran has a strong reason to persist. Ukraine’s former nuclear arsenal might have deterred Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022, while Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, who dismantled the country’s nuclear program in 2003, was overthrown by a NATO-led coalition and local forces in 2011.

If Iran achieves a functional nuclear weapon, it will lose the ability to leverage its nuclear program as a bargaining chip to extract concessions in negotiations. While a nuclear weapon will represent a new form of leverage, it would also intensify pressure from the U.S. and Israel, both of whom have engaged in a cycle of escalating, sometimes deadly, confrontations with Iran and its proxies over the past few years.

An Iranian nuclear arsenal could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Its relations with Saudi Arabia remain delicate, despite the 2023 détente brokered by China, and Saudi officials have previously indicated they would obtain their own nuclear weapon if Iran acquired them. Saudi Arabia gave significant backing to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, with the understanding that Pakistan could extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, or even supply the latter with one upon request.

Turkey, which hosts US nuclear weapons through NATO’s sharing program, signaled a policy shift in 2019 when President Erdogan criticized foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkey’s growing partnership with Russia in nuclear energy could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so.

Middle Eastern tensions are not the only force threatening non-proliferation. Japan’s renewed friction with China, North Korea, and Russia over the past decade has intensified Tokyo’s focus on nuclear readiness.

Although Japan developed a nuclear program in the 1940s, it was dismantled after World War II. Japan’s breakout period, however, remains measured in months, but public support for nuclear weapons remains low, given the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where nuclear bombings in 1945 killed more than 200,000 people.

In contrast, around 70 percent of South Koreans support developing nuclear weapons. South Korea’s nuclear program began in the 1970s but was discontinued under US pressure. However, North Korea’s successful test in 2006 and its severance of economic, political, and physical links to the South in the past decade, coupled with the abandonment of peaceful reunification in early 2024, has again raised the issue in South Korea.

Taiwan pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, which similarly ended under US pressure. Any sign of wavering US commitment to Taiwan, together with China’s growing nuclear capabilities, could prompt Taiwan to revive its efforts. Though less likely, territorial disputes in the South China Sea could also motivate countries like Vietnam and the Philippines to consider developing nuclear capabilities.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also had significant nuclear implications. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently suggested to the European Council that a nuclear arsenal might be Ukraine’s only deterrent if NATO membership is not offered. Zelensky later walked back his comments after they ignited a firestorm of controversy. Yet if Ukraine feels betrayed by its Western partners—particularly if it is forced to concede territory to Russia—it could spur some factions within Ukraine to attempt to secure nuclear capabilities.

The war has also spurred nuclear considerations across Europe. In December 2023, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer endorsed a European nuclear deterrent. A Trump re-election could amplify European concerns over US commitments to NATO, with France having increasingly proposed an independent European nuclear force in recent years.

Established nuclear powers are unlikely to welcome more countries into their ranks. But while China and Russia don’t necessarily desire this outcome, they recognize the West’s concerns are greater, with Russia doing little in the 1990s to prevent its unemployed nuclear scientists from aiding North Korea’s program.

The US has also previously been blindsided by its allies’ nuclear aspirations. US policymakers underestimated Australia’s determination to pursue a nuclear weapons program in the 1950s and 1960s, including covert attempts to obtain a weapon from the UK. Similarly, the US was initially unaware of France’s extensive support for Israel’s nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s.

Smaller countries are also capable of aiding one another’s nuclear ambitions. Argentina offered considerable support to Israel’s program, while Israel assisted South Africa’s. Saudi Arabia financed Pakistan’s nuclear development, and Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist is suspected of having aided Iran, Libya, and North Korea with their programs in the 1980s.

Conflicts involving nuclear weapons states are not without precedent. Egypt and Syria attacked nuclear-armed Israel in 1973, and Argentina faced a nuclear-armed UK in 1982. India and China have clashed over their border on several occasions, and Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression.

But conflicts featuring nuclear countries invite dangerous escalation, and the risk grows if a nation with limited conventional military power gains nuclear capabilities; lacking other means of defense or retaliation, it may be more tempted to resort to nuclear weapons as its only viable option.

The costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals are already steep. In 2023, the world’s nine nuclear-armed states spent an estimated US$91.4 billion managing their programs. But what incentive do smaller countries have to abandon nuclear ambitions entirely, especially when they observe the protection nuclear weapons offer and witness the major powers intensifying their nuclear strategies?

Obtaining the world’s most powerful weapons may be a natural ambition of military and intelligence sectors, but it hinges on the political forces in power as well. In Iran, moderates could counterbalance hardliners, while continued support for Ukraine might prevent more nationalist forces from coming to power there.

Yet an additional country obtaining a nuclear weapon could set off a cascade of others. While larger powers are currently leading the nuclear posturing, smaller countries may see an opportunity amid the disorder. The limited support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, in effect since 2021, as well as the breaking down of other international treaties, reinforces the lingering allure of nuclear arms even among non-nuclear states.

With major powers in open contention, the barriers to nuclear ambitions are already weakening, making it ever harder to dissuade smaller nations from pursuing the ultimate deterrent.

John P Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, DC, and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He is a contributor to several foreign affairs publications, and his book,“Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’”, was published in December 2022.

This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute. It is republished here with permission

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BRICS+ wants new world order sans shared values or identity – Asia Times

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The last two summits of BRICS countries have raised questions about the coalition’s identity and purpose. This began to come into focus at the summit hosted by South Africa in 2023, and more acutely at the recent 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia.

At both events the alliance undertook to expand its membership. In 2023, the first five Brics members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – invited Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join.

All bar Saudi Arabia have now done so. The 2024 summit pledged to admit 13 more, perhaps as associates or “partner countries.”

On paper, the nine-member BRICS+ strikes a powerful pose. It has a combined population of about 3.5 billion, or 45% of the world’s people. Combined, its economies are worth more than US$28.5 trillion – about 28% of the global economy. With Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as members, BRICS+ produces about 44% of the world’s crude oil.

Based on my research and policy advice to African foreign policy decision-makers, I would argue that there are three possible interpretations of the purpose of BRICS+.

  • A club of self-interested members – a kind of Global South cooperative. What I’d label as a self-help organization.
  • A reforming bloc with a more ambitious goal of improving the workings of the current global order.
  • A disrupter, preparing to replace the Western-dominated liberal world order.

Analyzing the commitments that were made at the meeting in Russia, I would argue that BRICS+ sees itself more as a self-interested reformer. It represents the thinking among Global South leaders about the nature of the global order and the possibilities of shaping a new order.

This, as the world moves away from the financially dominant, yet declining Western order (in terms of moral influence) led by the US. The move is to a multipolar order in which the East plays a leading role.

However, the ability of BRICS+ to exploit such possibilities is constrained by its make-up and internal inconsistencies. These include a contested identity, incongruous values and lack of resources to convert political commitments into actionable plans.

Summit outcomes

The trend towards closer trade and financial cooperation and coordination stands out as a major achievement of the Kazan summit. Other achievements pertain to global governance and counterterrorism.

When it comes to trade and finance, the final communiqué said the following had been agreed:

  • adoption of local currencies in trade and financial transactions. The Kazan Declaration notes the benefits of faster, low-cost, more efficient, transparent, safe and inclusive cross-border payment instruments. The guiding principle would be minimal trade barriers and non-discriminatory access.
  • establishment of a cross-border payment system. The declaration encourages correspondent banking networks within BRICS and enables settlements in local currencies in line with the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative. This is voluntary and nonbinding and is to be discussed further.
  • creation of enhanced roles for the New Development Bank, such as promoting infrastructure and sustainable development.
  • a proposed BRICS Grain Exchange, to improve food security through enhanced trade in agricultural commodities.

All nine BRICS+ countries committed themselves to the principles of the UN Charter – peace and security, human rights, the rule of law, and development – primarily as a response to the Western unilateral sanctions.

The summit emphasised that dialogue and diplomacy should prevail over conflict in, among other places, the Middle East, Sudan, Haiti and Afghanistan.

Faultlines and tensions

Despite the positive tone of the Kazan declaration, there are serious structural fault lines and tensions inherent in the architecture and behavior of BRICS+. These might limit its ambitions to be a meaningful change agent.

The members don’t even agree on the definition of BRICS+. President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa calls it a platform. Others talk of a group (Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi) or a family (Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jianan).

So what could it be? BRICS+ is state-driven – with civil society on the margins. It reminds one of the African Union, which pays lip service to citizens’ engagement in decision-making.

One possibility is that it will evolve into an intergovernmental organization with a constitution that establishes its agencies, functions and purposes. Examples include the World Health Organization, the African Development Bank and the UN General Assembly.

But it would need to cohere around shared values. What would they be?

Critics point out that BRICS+ consists of democracies (South Africa, Brazil, India), a theocracy (Iran), monarchies (UAE, Saudi Arabia) and authoritarian dictatorships (China, Russia).

For South Africa, this creates a domestic headache. At the Kazan summit, its president declared Russia a friend and ally. At home, its coalition partner in the government of national unity, the Democratic Alliance, declared Ukraine as a friend and ally.

There are also marked differences over issues such as the reform of the United Nations. For example, at the recent UN Summit of the Future the consensus was for reform of the UN Security Council. But will China and Russia, as permanent Security Council members, agree to more seats, with veto rights, on the council?

As for violent conflict, humanitarian crises, corruption and crime, there is little from the Kazan summit that suggests agreement around action.

Unity of purpose

What about shared interests? A number of BRICS+ members and partner countries maintain close trade ties with the West, which regards Russia and Iran as enemies and China as a global threat.

Some, such as India and South Africa, use the foreign policy notions of strategic ambiguity or active non-alignment to mask the reality of trading with east, west, north and south.

The harsh truth of international relations is there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. The BRICS+ alliance will most likely cohere as a Global South co-operative, with an innovative self-help agenda but be reluctant to overturn the current global order from which it desires to benefit more equitably.

Trade-offs and compromises might be necessary to ensure “unity of purpose.” It’s not clear that this loose alliance is close to being able to achieve that.

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is professor of international and diplomacy studies, Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs, University of South Africa

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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