Weakened Russia yields to China’s energy, railway desires – Asia Times

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By allowing Beijing to construct a railroad in nearby Central Asia and agreeing to China’s proposal to reroute the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline through Kazakhstan rather than Mongolia, Russia has reached two significant agreements with China.

In the past several decades, falling global energy costs have dented Russia’s trade income. In December, petrol prices fell to about US$ 70 per barrel, over 18 % from this year’s top of US$ 87 in April, due to lower need in China and OPEC’s expectations to improve production. &nbsp, &nbsp,

These lower costs come in response to the G7 member states ‘ price caps of$ 60 per barrel on seaborne Russian oil, which have led to lower foreign currency flows in Russia and a decline in the ruble, the world’s reserve currency.

The ruble has declined by 17 % to 108 per US dollar in 2024. Since the start of the Ukraine conflict, the current pricing has fallen by 34 %.

On December 27, Zheng Shanjie, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Special Envoy and director of the National Development and Reform Commission, attended the launch ceremony of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan ( CKU) railway project in Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan. &nbsp,

Sadyr Japarov, the president of Kyrgyzstan, and Xi and Shavkat Mirziyev, the president of Uzbekistan, wrote welcome letters.

China’s Communist Party-run Global Times said the resumption of the long-anticipated communication initiative, which has been under arranging for more than 20 years, may mark a new step in China-Central Asia assistance. It said that when completed, the venture may start a new European hall connecting China, Central Asia and perhaps Europe. &nbsp,

According to China Railway, the task is scheduled to actually begin building in July 2025 with a development period of six years.

The railroad may begin from Kashi in China’s Xinjiang, go through Kyrgyzstan’s Torugart Pass and Jalalabad, and ending in the southeast Afghan city of Andijan. The Kyrgyz part may be built by China and Uzbekistan, while the Kyrgyz area will be built by a joint venture between the three governments, CKU Railway Co. &nbsp,

The job was first put forth in the 1990s. In 1997, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a memorandum of understanding, but nothing has changed. &nbsp,

” Why was the CKU rail delayed for 27 years? The primary reason lied in Russia”, Li Shuyong, a Henan-based author, said in an essay. The Soviet Union ruled Central Asia for the entire duration of the Cold War. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia still controlled Central Asia” .&nbsp,

Li said Russia had disagreed with the CKU rail task for many years as it wanted to control the transport of Central Asia’s natural sources, such as Kazakhstan’s fuel and Uzbekistan’s cloth, to Europe. He said it’s not only a matter of transit fees but also Moscow’s controlling power in the region’s foreign trade.

The entire Central Asian foreign trade will no longer be monopolized by Russia once the CKU railroad is opened. China can also bypass Russia to reach Europe via Iran, Turkey and Greece”, he said. But why does Russia now approve of it?

He claimed that Russia has experienced rising fiscal deficits and inflation since the start of the Ukraine war and has attempted to increase energy exports to China as a result. &nbsp,

Why should Russia buy more oil and gas from Russia? Russia must share its advantages with China in Central Asia, Li said. A 27-year obstacle related to the CKU railway is now gone because of this.

A Jiangxi-based columnist said Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will build their railways in Russia’s standard gauge ( 1, 524 mm ), instead of China’s one ( 1, 435 mm ), as they do not have enough money to change their existing systems.

He claimed that China didn’t demand that the two Central Asian countries follow its standard because doing so might upset Russia. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Power of Siberia 2

Another Russian compromise with China, made by President Vladimir Putin, concerns the recent agreement to build the Power of Siberia 2 via Kazakhstan, instead of Mongolia, as per Beijing’s wish. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said in an interview with the Rossiya-24 TV channel on December 25 that the construction of a gas pipeline project from Russia to China is in progress. &nbsp,

” This is a project to build a gas pipeline infrastructure with capacity for 45 billion cubic meters ( bcm ) per year, 10 bcm of it for the gasification of the northeastern regions of Kazakhstan, and 35 bcm for export to China”, he said. ” The negotiations and feasibility study are now kicking off.”

In his most recent comments, Novak’s latest assertions confirmed that Mongolia has abandoned its effort to build the Power of Siberia 2 via Mongolia.

In an article, Shi Jiangyue, a Shanxi-based writer and military commentator for Asia Pacific Daily, stated that Mongolia will not only lose hundreds of millions of US dollars in transit fees as a result of the rerouting but also have a chance to attract infrastructure investment and stronger diplomatic ties with Russia. Shi said Mongolia should blame itself for adopting a” third neighbor strategy” or “multi-pillared foreign policy”.

Mongolia’s Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai announced in July 2022 that the Power of Siberia 2 feasibility study had been completed and construction would begin in 2024. &nbsp,

Beijing, however, objected to this arrangement because it did not want Mongolia’s energy supply to pass through it, which it perceives to lean politically toward. &nbsp,

In May this year, Dauren Abayev, Kazakhstan’s envoy to Russia, told Russia’s TASS news agency that Kazakhstan plans to transit about 35 bcm of Russian gas to China annually. &nbsp, &nbsp,

In fact, Russia had previously considered taking this route several years ago because the Russian portion of a hilly area would have resulted in higher construction costs. &nbsp,

Yong Jian contributes to the Asia Times. He is a Chinese journalist who specializes in Chinese technology, economy and politics. &nbsp,

Read: What UK fighter pilots did and didn’t teach China’s PLA

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Race for Arctic resources in a climate change era – Asia Times

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In November, a student-led job made a shocking discovery: Mesyatsev Island, a floating block of ice formerly observed in the Arctic, had nearly disappeared. It took around a decade and a half for the 11.8-million-square-foot island to shrink by 99.7 % and vanish from the Arctic’s map.

However, the Arctic is changing rapidly, impacting communities and markets all over the world. Over the last 50 years, the polar region has been warming up four times faster than other parts of the globe, a trend known as Arctic amplification. Conditions have risen significantly, in 2023, the territory experienced its coolest summer.

” A melting Arctic presents new obstacles and exacerbates existing ones for Arctic states and areas”, said Samuel Jardine, head of research at London Politica. Network has already been harmed by the degrading permafrost as foundations decline and pipelines deteriorate.

According to Jardine, “it is estimated that 34 % of the people in the Arctic’s ice regions will be in danger by the end of 2100, with it costing between US$ 205 and US$ 572 billion depending on who you ask to simply keep the activity of engineering and support infrastructure in the 2080s.”

This could result in substantial threats to human security and increased migrant pressure, according to the expert, who quoted the author.

Race for Arctic tools

The Arctic is home to around 13 % (90 billion barrels ) of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil resources and 30 % of its undiscovered natural gas ones, according to an&nbsp, assessment&nbsp, conducted by the US Geological Survey ( USGS )

As Arctic snow evaporates, the cost of extracting its raw materials drops. A Finnish mining firm discovered a deposit of rare earth elements, which is thought to be the largest in Europe, in 2023.

In the meantime, the Arctic’s exploration and development of healthy resources pose new climate risks. Oil spills pose a threat to fish, birds, and other food-producing species, while mine may create toxic waste and obliterate a vital salmon wildlife.

No less important, the Arctic’s increasing mobility is spurring political opposition over natural sources.

According to Jardine,” Changing conditions also have an impact on fish, which for the Arctic has always been one of the essential trigger factors for democratic conflicts.” There have been significant political disputes over hunting quotas and their commitment to them in the High North as fish species fly and politics spill over, perhaps between states that are widely political partners like the UK, EU, and Norway. Such incidents, of course, are comparatively minor, but tensions are likely to increase as fish stocks continue to change”.

According to Jardine, the majority of the security issues are ironically being caused by these new opportunities.

The melting ice and rising temperatures make resources easier to access, not the least of which are those on the seabed, which is already generating more activity, such as Norway’s attempt to mine its EEZ for seabed oil as it aims to get away from offshore oil. This not only drives securitization, as geopolitical tensions spill over, much as they are doing with fisheries, but also makes the various clashing claims to the Arctic seabed, specifically between Russia, Denmark, and Canada, an increasingly pertinent issue.

These nations currently make use of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which can make legally binding recommendations but does not enforce or establish maritime boundaries.

Given the state’s current geopolitical situation, it is unlikely these states will be able to resolve the conflict among themselves, especially given concerns that rights to the seabed may allow for “dual-use” infrastructure or the use of national seabed regulations that might limit maritime traffic, the expert said.

Geopolitics of shipping

The rise in shipping traffic in the polar region is another security risk trigger. A growing number of previously difficult-to-reach regions have been made accessible by the shrinking sea ice. And as the frontier of natural resource extraction expands, Arctic shipping increases, too.

Russia’s Yamal Gas project and Canada’s iron ore mine in the Mary River region of Baffin Island are two of the biggest regional projects. Both initiatives have made a significant contribution to the rise in Arctic bulk carriers and gas tankers.

Three new shipping routes are anticipated to be created over the course of the Arctic by the melting Arctic, all of which are significantly faster on paper than the traditional routes to East-West, according to Jardine. By 2030, according to some estimates, the Arctic will be completely ice-free in the summer, which would allow non-ice-class vessels to travel the routes safely.

” The big’flashpoint’ is most likely to be over the Northern Sea Route ( NSR ),” the expert added, but all three routes have geopolitical issues to varying degrees already,” the expert added.

This raises questions about unresolved disputes over the sovereignty of new sea routes. Russia asserts that the NSR is within its territorial waters, but the US and a number of other nations refute this claim.

Canada claims that it is within its internal waters, but the US insists that it is an international strait.

Governing the Arctic

Some four million people live in the Arctic region, distributed across Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Russia, Canada and the US. Around 10 % of them are indigenous peoples.

National governments have exclusive jurisdiction over their own territories, including territorial waters and coastlines, while the rest of the Arctic Ocean is governed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS).

International agreements include those relating to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, and the cooperation agreement on the prevention of unregulated high seas fisheries and marine oil pollution.

A special organization known as the Arctic Council was established three decades ago to bring together the representatives of the eight Arctic states and the region’s indigenous peoples. This global forum has successfully addressed issues like oil spills, sea ice loss, tundra thawing, and rescue operations.

The Arctic Council has overcome a number of obstacles, but the most significant is the recent deterioration of relations between Russia and other Arctic nations as a result of Ukraine’s ongoing military conflict.

Politics aside, the issue with a full-fledged partnership pause is that it does not aid in addressing the effects of climate change. It also doesn’t support the rights of indigenous peoples. Any limitations on collaboration are unhelpful, if not harmful, given that the Arctic is currently facing risks from climate change that threaten the entire world.

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Rethinking the decline of the eastern Roman Empire – Asia Times

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Many people are fascinated by the issue of why empires drop. But in the hunt for an answer, thoughts may run wild. Recent research has suggested that climate change and illness are to blame for the rise and drop of ancient civilizations like the Roman Empire. This has sparked debates about whether “536 was the worst time ever alive.”

A volcanic eruption that season led to a dust mask that restricted sunlight in some parts of the world. This is said to have resulted in a drop in the global heat along with a number of volcanic explosions in the ensuing ten years.

The Justinian disease, which was the first and most serious documented case of it to strike the eastern Roman Empire ( also known as the Roman Empire ), was a complication that millions of people died from between 541 and 544.

There is a lot of debate over the length and amount of the Justinian disease, and studies show that there is no literary evidence for the effects of the sand veil in the eastern Mediterranean. Despite this, many academicians also believe that the eastern Roman Empire was hampered by the weather and the outbreak of the plague.

Our study, which was published in November, shows that these statements are wrong. They were derived from the projection of smaller case studies and isolated finds onto the whole Roman Empire.

A unique situation can be used to represent the use of large data from vast regions that were once under the Roman Empire. Our results reveal that the eastern Mediterranean had a new record for community and business in the 6th century rather than a decline in it.

The eastern Roman Empire expanded most in the sixth decade. The kingdom was reputedly destroyed by climate change and the disease during the years 533 and 565, when it was portrayed as being destroyed by mild purple. &nbsp, Map: Simeon Netchev / World History Encyclopedia via The Talk

We analyzed data from various nations and regions on a microscopic and large scale. Micro-scale information included identifying little regions and identifying the location of the decline in this area or site. Case reports, such as the site of the ancient capital of Elusa in the north-western Negev desert in tomorrow’s Israel, were reexamined.

This page was said to have declined in the middle of the 6th century by earlier research. The results of a review of the coal 14 method, which measures the age of an item made of organic material, and the concrete data used to day the site, were inconclusive. The reduction simply started in the 7th era.

New databases were created using historic study, excavation, and shipwreck finds, and were used to compile large-scale data. The study and digging databases, which contained tens of thousands of sites, were used to chart the common changes in the size and number of sites for each traditional era.

The accident collection displayed the number of disasters for each half-century. This was employed to show the change in the level of marine trade.

Changes to naval commerce ( 150–750 )

Our findings showed that there was a great relationship in the historical record for several parts, covering modern-day Israel, Tunisia, Jordan, Cyprus, Turkey, Egypt and Greece. Additionally, there was a strong relationship between the various information forms.

The population and economy did not decline in the southeast Roman Empire’s 6th century, according to both the smaller case research and the larger data. In truth, there seems to have been an increase in growth and population. The drop took place in the seventh century, so it cannot be directly related to the plague or the sudden onset of climate change.

It appears that the Roman Empire was at its height in the seventh era. However, the whole region was plunged into a downward spiral as a result of Roman errors and their failure to deal with their Arabic foes. This made the two empires weakened, allowing Islam to increase.

This does not mean that the environment in some parts of the world did not change during this time. In Scandinavia, for instance, there was a pronounced change in the material culture and a general decrease and abandonment of places in the middle of the 6th century, where the shift in the weather was more severe.

And the climate problems of today is on track to cause many more drastic changes than those that have already been observed. The earth as we know it will be forever changed by the abrupt departure from traditional economic fluctuations.

Haggai Olshanetsky is an associate professor in the Department of History, University of Warsaw, and Lev Cosijns is a PhD participant in the School of Archaeology.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Pacific island nations still lose out despite superpower rivalry – Asia Times

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A 140 million aid agreement signed on December 9 between Australia and Nauru is a primary example of the Pacific nations ‘ walking on a geopolitical wire in the twenty-first era.

The package provides Darwin with strong fiscal support, stable banking services, and policing and security resources. In exchange, Australia will have the right to object to any agreement Nauru may reach with various nations, particularly China.

The filibuster terms are comparable to the late last year” Falepili Union,” which gave Tuvaluans access to American citizenship and help for climate change in exchange for security guarantees.

Additionally, more details about a security agreement between the United States and Papua New Guinea were revealed just last week. It is now known to be fair US$ 864 million. In exchange for funding in military facilities development, training and equipment, the US increases unlimited access to six ships and terminals.

Even last year, PNG signed a ten-year, A$ 600 million offer to finance its own group in Australia’s National Rugby League competitors. In exchange,” PNG won’t mark a security agreement that would permit the presence of Chinese police or military forces in the Pacific.”

These preparations represent the political conflict that exists between the US and its allies in the Pacific, on the one hand.

This tactical conflict is frequently depicted in political commentary and mainstream media as an extension of” the great game” waged by rival countries. Pacific countries can be seen as attempting to profit from their own growth priorities, from a standard protection perspective.

However, this presumption that Pacific governments are “diplomatic value setters” who can pit China and the US against one another ignores the very actual power disparities that exist.

The danger, as the authors of one new research argued, is that the” China risk” tale becomes the explanation for “greater Western militarisation and financial dominance”. In other words, Pacific countries become political value takers.

Defense politics

The countries in the Pacific are vulnerable on a number of fronts: the majority have weak monetary foundations, and many are in debt. They are also at the forefront of rising sea levels and climate shift.

More bill and greater risk are the result of the costs associated with recovering from more numerous extreme weather events. Weather funding in the Pacific typically takes the form of concessional funding, as was reported at the UN COP29 summit this year.

The Pacific is already one of the country’s most aid-reliant areas. However, when victim nations continue to struggle to achieve their development goals, there is still much uncertainty about the effectiveness of that help.

Governments frequently lack the capacity to handle growing help packages at the national level. And they fight with the political responsibilities that the new political conditions demand.

In August, Kiribati also closed its borders to officials until 2025 to let the new state “breathing space” to attend to domestic politics.

In the past, Australia’s economic aid included institutional support and management. However, a significant portion of development aid is then geared more toward defense and policing.

Australia just committed A$ 400 million to the Pacific Policing Initiative, on top of a host of different security-related activities. This is all a part of a general increase in the so-called “defense diplomacy,” which has caused some observers to condemn the democratization of help at the cost of the Pacific’s most vulnerable people.

Lack of great belief

In addition, some political parties in the Pacific region operate largely unofficially and without complete plan manifestos. Most institutions lack political departments for examining foreign policy.

The end result is that small scrutiny can be given to international policy and security arrangements because they can get driven by personalities rather than by policy priorities. Pacific regions are even susceptible to corruption, as outlined in Transparency International’s 2024 Annual Corruption Report.

Executive Director of Transparency Solomon Islands, Ruth Liloqula, wrote about the effects of the Solomon Islands ‘ political conflict:

Since 2019, my country has become a center for political tensions and unusual disturbance, and undue effect.

Also, Pacific affairs specialist Steven Ratuva has argued the Australia–Tuvalu arrangement was one-sided and showed a “lack of great faith”.

Behind these developments, of course, lies the evolving AUKUS security pact tying together Australia, the US and the United Kingdom, a response to growing Chinese presence and influence in the” Indo-Pacific” region.

The responses from the Pacific countries have been political, perhaps because they cannot “rock the submarine” very much given their relationships to the major powers at play. But past Pacific Islands Forum secretary-general Meg Taylor has warned:

Pacific leaders needed to start raising their voices for the sake of their fellow citizens because they were being sidelined by significant political decisions affecting their place.

While there are clear benefits associated with strategic alliances, the substantial effects for Pacific countries are still incomprehensible. Not a second target is on record to be accomplished by 2030, according to the UN’s Asia and the Pacific progress report on sustainable development goals.

Unless these alliances are grounded in great faith and real sustainable development, the grass effects of geopolitics-as-usual may never change.

Sione Tekiteki is a senior teacher at Auckland University of Technology’s Faculty of Law.

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What Assad’s fall says about Putin’s great-power ambitions – Asia Times

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The Middle East has been shocked by the Assad regime’s swift overthrow. The region’s energy balance has changed dramatically since the dictator’s family’s dispossession of him for more than 50 years.

Beyond Syria and its neighbors, significant ramifications exist, with Russia one of the more severely affected countries.

Back in 2015, Assad’s plan had been on the brink of collapse. A Russian treatment, supported by Iran and Hezbollah, saved it. Russia, which was established in response to the growing risk from Islamic State, gave Assad’s regime the ability to repress another rebel groups as well.

Over the years that followed, it gave Assad the ability to retake control of the city’s money, another important towns, and in particular the coastal area, where Russia had two military installations.

The future of these foundations is now questionable. Russians needed important resources to establish military power in the Mediterranean Sea and support the Kremlin’s say to Russian great-power standing, including an air basic at Khmeimim established south of Latakia in 2015, as well as the Russian naval base in Tartus, which dates back to the Soviet era.

Given how substantial investments have been made over the years to support the program and how important are the bases for Russia, Assad’s fall has a negative impact on Russia’s ability to assert reliable influence on the global stage.

Yet if Russia manages to reach an agreement with Syria’s fresh leaders regarding the future of its military installations, Moscow’s failure to save an important ally like Assad exposes crucial shortcomings in Russia’s capacity to act like a great strength rather than just talk.

There are distinct knowledge gaps that either overlooked or misinterpreted Qatar’s continued support for anti-Assad forces and Turkey’s covert support for this. These losses were then made worse by the Russian military’s ineffectiveness and ability to increase them on short notice. This is, of course, according to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

Iran and Hezbollah, two different Kremlin allies in the region, have been given more military support, which has more complicated Assad’s situation, and this has also made the effects of Russia’s overwhelm worse. This even raises the question of whether Russia had a strategic error in interpreting the position and undervalued Syria’s risk.

Even more disturbing is the fact that Russia relies on friends who positively support a young wonderful power that lacks the means to proclaim its claim to power, as Iran and Hezbollah did in 2015, as Assad did when he provided Russia with its military foundations.

Where’s China?

China is missing from this equation. Beijing had backed Assad after the start of the Syrian civil war, but most of it was rhetorical. It was primarily intended to stop a Western-backed, UN-backed intervention similar to the one in Libya that caused the country’s chaos and the fall of Gaddafi since.

A high-profile visit of Assad to China in September 2023 resulted in a strategic partnership agreement. In Beijing’s eyes at least, this appeared to be another step in the direction of the Syrian regime. However, China did nothing to save him when the situation suddenly appeared and Assad’s rule was in serious danger.

Xi Jinping and Bashar al-Assad: friends – with limited benefits. &nbsp, Photo: Yao Dawei / Xinhua / Alamy Live News

This raises a significant question about how well-versed in China is the Syrian government and the evolving crisis. But there is also a broader point here regarding Russian great-power ambitions.

Despite all the talk of a never-ending partnership between Moscow and Beijing, China ultimately failed to save Russia from humiliating defeat in Syria.

China’s interests in the Middle East are primarily about economic opportunity and the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, unlike Russia, where it needed a military presence to back up its claims to great-power status.

This has clearly limited Beijing’s appetite to become more involved, let alone to bail out Assad.

Putin diminished

Russia’s position in the Middle East now is in peril. Moscow lost a significant allies to Assad. Its other main allies, Iran and Hezbollah, are significantly weakened. Israel and Turkey, with whom the Kremlin has not had easy relations over the past few years, have been strengthened.

This exposes the hollowness of Russian claims to great-power status. Russia’s reputation and standing in the eyes of other partners is likely to be further diminished, whether they are from China or North Korea, from BRICS members or from countries in the Global South that Russia has recently tried to woo.

The consequences of that are likely to be ambiguous for Ukraine, which is arguably Russia’s biggest contributor to the overstretch.

On the one hand, the ease with which Assad was removed shows that Russia has limitations and is not invincible. On the other hand, nothing but Russian resumption should be anticipated in Ukraine.

Putin requires a swift recovery to help him win both domestic and international trust. After all, Donald Trump does not like losers.

Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham

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All bow before the almighty US dollar – Asia Times

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The earth was suffering from a massive abundance of dollars in 1971. The world was being flooded with money by British international investment and assistance, as well as US government policies that were inflationary.

The earth had too little golden at the same time, especially the United States. That was a problem because, unlike today, exchange rates did n’t float freely on markets. Money were to be exchanged for gold for$ 35 an ounce. ( The currencies of other countries were fixed-rate pegged to the dollar. )

Europeans were frantically attempting to exchange money for metal or exchange them for other currencies. With the US progressively unable to fulfill its responsibility, traders expected devaluation.

President Richard Nixon halted the economy’s conversionibility into gold in August of that year in response to the money crisis.

Despite a later established devaluation, speculators continued to attack the money. By 1973, the gold standard and resolved exchange rates were past.

Nixon’s Treasury Secretary John Connally made a wonderfully cynical post that is frequently quoted yet now during the devaluation negotiations in 1971. Connally stated to foreigners,” The money is your problem, but ours.”

In an unexpected way, the money was likewise my problem. In 1971, I was the 24-year-old minesweeping and offer agent on the USS Pivot. The Nixon administration decided to pay for basic rights that by granting Pivot and several other US Navy minesweepers as pay for the money problems.

In preparation, the Pivot’s captain tasked me with teaching our crew Spanish – a language that I did n’t know and that the crew turned out to be uninterested in learning. I called the Pentagon in a desperate attempt to find someone there who could help me compile a lengthy list of minesweeper conditions in Spanish. By pointing at their mimeographed files of the list, the crew successfully overcame the language barrier.

These weeks a strong money is, in many ways, everybody’s issue. It’s particularly difficult for international places.

International Monetary Fund research last year concluded that for emerging-market economies,” a 10 % U. S. dollar appreciation, linked to global financial market forces, decreases economic output by 1.9 % after one year, and this drag lingers for two and a half years”. Development-developed nations are worst hit by their ballooning local currency principal and interest duty.

Higher interest rates are a possible issue for the Federal Reserve Board and Fed Chair Jerome Powell, if that’s one of the reasons for a stronger money. Donald Trump, the president-elect, wants more authority over the Federal Reserve, weaker currencies, and lower interest rates. However, the Fed will keep rates higher, which will tend to keep the buck powerful, if his policies are as many economists and investors predicted. In such a case, Powell may find himself in Trump’s sights again.

A stronger money would be no joy for US exporting companies, pretty little including agriculture. Without the money dwindling more, it’s difficult enough to engage with Brazil and other ag-exporting nations.

The money appears to be strengthening further. Since April 2022, the US Dollar Index has been in solid country, rising above 100, and rising since soon September. Despite the mayor’s choices, Wall Street is betting that it will expand under a Trump presidency.

Trump has significantly reassured markets by appointing hedge-fund director Scott Bessent as treasurer. In recent days, the money and long-term interest rates have both increased slightly. Wall Street’s fears about prices have been fueled by the promise of enormous tariffs. Bessent has criticized taxes less heavily, claiming that they can serve as a bargaining chip and that coordination should be done with US friends.

Bessent furthermore, however, has promised to keep the economy’s position as the nation’s reserve currency. That’s a good thing for any government minister to perform, reserve-currency position affords the US many advantages. Keep in mind, though, that it is one of the factors the money is therefore often strong. With so much of the world’s business and assets denominated in dollars, there’s nearly always require for the divine buck.

Connally was half-right, the money is really our money. But it’s not just their difficulty. It’s about everybody’s.

Past lifelong Wall Street Journal Asia journalist and editor&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, is writer professor of DTN/The Progressive Farmer.

This&nbsp, content, &nbsp, initially published on December 2 by the latter news business and then republished by Asia Times with authority, is © Copyright 2024 DTN/The Progressive Farmer. All rights reserved. Follow&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, on&nbsp, X @urbanize&nbsp,

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Germany closing factories at home, opening them in China – Asia Times

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Germany’s biggest technological people are moving away from home to more positive circumstances in China as a result of its domestic energy guidelines and economic environment. Germany’s environment is increasingly hostile to business growth due to rising energy costs, high green energy subsidies, and strict regulations.

As a result, some of Germany’s most established companies are downsizing at house, shedding tens of work, while investing heavily in China. This change underlines the tremendous impact of existing policies on Germany’s professional scenery, with long-term implications for the local market and employment.

Here, Asia Times examines the main aspects and the businesses that are changing their business models worldwide.

Higher energy costs in Germany: The result of ideological laws

Germany’s energy policies have caused business energy prices to rise to amounts that are among the highest in the world, behind only the UK and the UK. Actually this high cost level, which has already reached unparalleled levels, cannot be sustained because the average cost for industrial users may have reached about US$ 250 per MWh by 2023.

Germany’s rely on renewable energy sources such as wind and solar, combined with the pulling out of nuclear energy, has increased the government’s reliance on imports and caused significant price fluctuation, eventually putting stress on both business and citizens. Due to rising costs, some businesses are considering reducing their businesses in Germany and starting new ones, especially in China.

Consumption of industrial strength has decreased by more than 16 % in the last two decades.

In 2023, power consumption in Germany’s business sector fell to 3, 282 petajoules, a decrease of 7.8 % compared to 2022. This drop followed an already significant reduction in 2022, when industrial energy use fell by 9.1 % year-on-year to 3, 558 petajoules. Taken together, these cuts represent an overall increases in industrial energy usage of about 16.3 % over the two-year time.

Graphic: Asia Times

Energy source in Germany: Increased trade dependence

German domestic energy production has also changed, with renewable energy sources generating a record 61 % of the country’s energy mix in the first half of 2024. In the first quarter of 2024, Germany’s reliance on foreign energy sources to complement its varying renewable production has increased by 23 % in this period.

Businesses that require steady, affordable electricity are at risk because of the variability of the supply of renewable energy, combined with rising home prices. Germany’s continued emphasis on solar is also expected to increase buy dependency, more discouraging companies from expanding internally.

Large subsidies for solar

In 2024 only, Germany will deliver 20 billion dollars in subsidies to alternative energy producers. Despite quickly falling market prices, these payments guarantee that solar energy suppliers receive set-assigned minimum prices.

The state budget has been burdened greatly by this centrally planned program, which allows the government to pay clean energy suppliers when wholesale prices drop.

In fact, the original budget for subsidies in 2024 was 10.6 billion euros ( US$ 21 billion ), but as energy prices have fallen, the projected need has doubled. Given the government’s commitment to follow the debt brake, these increasing subsidies are putting more pressure on the budget and making negotiations more difficult.

The Nord Stream pipelines and lost Russian gas played a significant role in Germany’s professional decrease.

Germany’s power landscape has been severely affected by the withdrawal of Russian gas imports, which has severely impacted its industrial base and increased energy costs. Russian natural gas was a core of Germany’s power source, providing reliable and affordable energy for years. However, this crucial strength link was cut short by the political effects of the Ukraine war and the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage in September 2022.

The problems rendered Nord Stream 1 entirely useless, and one of the two pipes of Nord Stream 2 was even damaged. Just one part of Nord Stream 2 is still in use and functional. If Germany was willing to engage with Russia politically and economically, President Vladimir Putin just reaffirmed that this operational pipeline was resume sales right away.

Putin and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently spoke in conversation, emphasizing that restarting oil travels through Nord Stream 2 was” a matter of pressing a box,” indicating that Russia was willing to provide fuel if Germany cooperated.

German gas had to be replaced by much more expensive liquefied natural gas ( LNG ) imports, primarily from the United States, after Russia’s abrupt loss of oil. These raised prices have undermined Germany’s international business competitiveness.

Putin’s suggestion to restart the last Nord Stream 2 pipeline highlights the corporate sway Russia also has over Europe’s energy source. By offering a possible crutch to Germany’s ailing business, Putin aims to control Germany’s social position on the Ukraine conflict. Germany has abstained from responding to the proposal despite the potential economic benefits of a resumed gas imports.

Falling domestic investment in Germany

Domestic investment has decreased significantly as a result of rising energy costs and regulatory challenges. Private gross fixed capital formation is about 10 % below pre-covid levels.

The situation is even worse for industrial production: Since 2021, Germany’s production level has fallen by more than 9 %. The decline has been even sharper in energy-intensive industries. In those areas, production levels have fallen by more than 18 % in less than two years, which indicates serious issues in industries that are heavily reliant on affordable energy.

Graphic: Asia Times

This decline may have had an impact on the cost structure of these industries because of rising energy costs and the ongoing shift toward renewable energy sources. The trend suggests potential deindustrialization pressures, particularly in sectors that are unable to adjust to rising operating costs.

Many businesses are cutting jobs at home while expanding in China as a result of Germany’s unsustainable cost environment.

The biggest German businesses are investing in China instead of reducing their workforce there.

    Volkswagen: Facing potential job cuts of up to 30, 000 in Germany, Volkswagen has made significant investments in China, including 2.5 billion euros ($ 2.6 billion ) to expand EV production in Hefei and a further 700 million euros in EV technology partnership with Xpeng.
  • Bosch: Announced plans to cut 7, 000 jobs in Germany as it increases investment in China’s e-mobility and automated driving sectors.
  • SAP: &nbsp, Plans to cut 9, 000 to 10, 000 jobs in Germany while reallocating resources to high-growth markets abroad.

As German businesses are putting more and more money under the belt, these cuts are a part of a wider trend. The Association of the Bavarian Economy (vbw ) estimates that the automotive sector in Bavaria alone could lose 106, 000 jobs by 2040, highlighting the far-reaching consequences of Germany’s industrial challenges.

Hildegard Müller, president of the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA ), warns that up to 190, 000 jobs across the sector could be at risk by 2035, reflecting the risks associated with Germany’s deindustrialization.

In response to these developments, Scholz’s government has initiated urgent talks with industry leaders. Industry experts contend that these discussions lack the long-term strategic vision required to address fundamental issues like high costs, regulatory pressures, and labor costs. Without significant structural reforms, the German automotive sector risks a further decline in global competitiveness.

Soaring German investment in China: Record levels

German companies continue to place record levels of investment in the nation despite pressure from German government officials and the EU to reduce their dependence on China. In recent years, German investment in China has increased to unheard levels, primarily in the chemicals and automotive industries.

In the first half of 2024 alone, German foreign direct investment ( FDI) in China reached 7.3 billion euros, surpassing the 6.5 billion euro total for the whole of 2023. German automakers and Germany are increasingly influencing Chinese foreign direct investment, accounting for 57 % of total EU investment in China in the first half of 2024, 62 % in 2023, and a record 71 % in 2022.

Key investment projects:

  • Volkswagen: In addition to its 2.5 billion euro investment in Hefei, Volkswagen has increased its joint venture stake in JAC Motor from 50 % to 75 %. This move underlines Volkswagen’s long-term commitment to local vehicle production in China, a market crucial to its growth in electric vehicles.
  • BMW: BMW’s investment in Shenyang not only expands its production, but also its research and development capabilities, aligning with local demand and avoiding the high energy costs in Germany.
  • BASF: The chemical company’s 10 billion euro plant in Guangdong is another example of large-scale localization. By operating in China, BASF lowers German regulations and energy costs while satisfying China’s growing demand for advanced chemical products, particularly in the automotive industry.

These initiatives are based on a localized production approach that helps businesses avoid the difficulties and costs of exporting from Germany and meet Chinese market demands.

Germany’s lead in expanding greenfield investments in the EU

The second quarter of 2024 saw the highest quarterly level to date for greenfield investment by the EU reach a record 3. 6 billion euros. German automakers have been a significant contributor to this growth, accounting for roughly half of all EU investments in China since 2022.

While average quarterly M&amp, A activity declines by 30 % between 2022 and the first half of 2024, greenfield investments by EU firms have steadily increased, with Germany’s automotive and chemicals sectors leading this trend.

Between 2022 and the first half of 2024, 65 % of all EU FDI in China will come from Germany, up from 48 % between 2019 and 2021. The top five European investors in China in 2023 were German companies, underlining Germany’s key role in EU-China investment.

Countries like France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, for example, will contribute only 7-8 % of EU FDI during this time, while the remaining 23 EU Member States will contribute only 12 % of that percentage.

Localizing supply chains and reducing geopolitical risks

German businesses are also restructuring their supply chains to reduce risk as a result of rising energy prices and regulatory uncertainty. Companies have been prompted to localize their operations in key markets as a result of events like the Covid-19 pandemic and the Suez Canal disruption, which have highlighted the fragility of global supply chains. German businesses are responding by increasing direct production in China, which reduces both the cost and the risk of global supply chain disruptions.

According to Friedolin Strack of the Federation of German Industries ( BDI), businesses in China are increasingly “reorganizing their supply chains regionally.” In a world where Chinese EV manufacturers are gaining market share, German automakers like Volkswagen and BMW are focusing on localizing their EV supply chains to stay competitive. German businesses are reducing costs by investing in localized production as well as protecting themselves from global uncertainties.

reducing German exports to China through local production

In the first seven months of 2024, Germany and China’s bilateral trade decreased by 5.7 % as a result of the transition to localized production. German exports to China fell by 11.7 % year-on-year, as companies increasingly serve Chinese consumers directly through local production.

German automakers, which are producing cars directly in China rather than exporting them, are especially attracted to this decline in exports. As less of German-made goods are exported abroad while localized production in China is growing, this could have an impact on Germany’s trade balance.

China’s unique advantages for German companies

While the German government and the European Commission advocate diversification away from China, alternative markets lack China’s infrastructure, market scale and cost efficiency. Countries such as Vietnam and Thailand, while considered as diversification options, cannot match China’s industrial networks, skilled workforce and market size.

Since 2022, more than 50 % of all EU investment in China has come from German companies, mainly in the automotive and chemical sectors. Major projects, such as Volkswagen’s partnership with Xpeng and BASF’s production facility, underline Germany’s strategic focus on China as a key market for long-term growth and competitiveness.

Domestic policy and global competition fueled a strategic reorientation

German companies ‘ decision to restrict domestic investment and expand in China is a stark reflection of Germany’s current energy policy and regulatory pressures. High costs, variable energy supply and regulatory challenges have made Germany a difficult environment for large-scale industrial investment, while China offers stability, cost-efficiency and market growth potential.

These trends suggest that domestic structural issues must be addressed as Germany attempts to maintain its industrial base. Without reforms to lower energy costs and reduce regulatory burdens, the shift of German investment to China is likely to continue, with long-term implications for Germany’s trade balance, industrial output and economic resilience. Even the EU tariffs wo n’t play a significant role.

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Russia’s grand geo-economic plan a step closer in Afghanistan – Asia Times

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Sergei Shoigu, a director of the Russian Security Council, traveled to Afghanistan this week to promote Moscow’s” Greater Eurasian Partnership,” a great strategic plan to create new trade routes and administrative alliances in Asia.

Russia has prioritized GRP because of the US’s and the West’s unprecedented sanctions against Russia in 2022 following its invasion of Ukraine, which some people view as Russia’s “pivot to Asia” scheme.

Since then, Russia has revived the previously stalled International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ) between itself and India via Iran, with branch corridors through Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ), an Eurasian political, economic, and security and defense organization established by Russia and China in 2001, has also been pushed for a larger regional role.

These are pertinent to Afghanistan both through its trade with India via the INSTC and as a SCO spectator. Central, South, and West Asia are at their intersections, and Afghanistan is effectively located there.

Shoigu’s top goal is to increase military-technical assistance with the ruling Taliban so that it can defeat ISIS-K, a militant group that has a presence in Afghanistan and has previously attacked Russia.

In order to better coordinate their efforts to contain local security risks like ISIS-K, Shoigu has pledged that Russia will replace the Taliban from its record of terrorist organizations.

In reverse, Russia is expected to stimulate the SCO to integrate more carefully with Afghanistan, including probably through more intelligence-sharing and future anti-terrorist activities.

Afghanistan’s strategic location also facilitates South Asian power and trade. The Taliban must stabilize private security, strengthen ties with Pakistan, and hope that Pakistan and India’s frequently strained relations will improve in order for that strategy to be viable.

Recent years have seen significant improvement in Russian-Pakistani ties, with considerable progress also being made in recent months. Later in September, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk visited Pakistan for two days, and Moscow hosted the first-ever Russian-Pakistani Trade and Investment Forum.

On the SCO Summit in Tashkent in September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif,” The goal is to provide pipeline gas from Russia to Pakistan. This is achievable as&nbsp, also, in&nbsp, see of&nbsp, the&nbsp, truth that some equipment is already in&nbsp, location in&nbsp, Russia, Kazakhstan and&nbsp, Uzbekistan”.

This potential Russian network may potentially even extend to India if Afghan-Pakistani relationships improve in tandem with Afghan-Pakistani relations.

Even without headway on Putin’s proposed network, Russia could possibly turn Afghanistan into a local oil gateway, as the Taliban envisages, according to a Reuters statement.

Nooruddin Azizi, the acting Afghan secretary of industry and trade, made the report based on what Nooruddin Azizi, the country’s oil-producing nation, said to Sputnik in August 2022 about Kabul’s want to trade its vast mineral reserves.

( In 2010, the US assessed that Afghanistan has nearly US$ 1 trillion worth of untapped minerals, including lithium. )

So, it appears as though the pieces are all in place for Russia to exchange oil for minerals from Afghanistan, transform the country into a local fuel hub, and then assist in mediating an Afghan-Pakistani dispute to facilitate its oil exports to Pakistan and lay the democratic foundation for the construction of a pipeline.

On the business before, a memorandum of understanding ( MoU) to create a travel corridor between Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan was signed in August 2023.

This corridor, which is tentatively referred to as the Central Eurasian Corridor ( CEC ) or the SCO Corridor due to its geographic location and institutional association, was referenced in the MoU signed between Pakistan and Russia during Overchuk’s visit in late September.

These legal grounds can expedite plans to build a Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan ( PAKAFUZ) railway. The CEC/SCO Corridor, with PAKAFUZ as its base, can even eventually grow to India dependent on increased ties with Pakistan.

Shoigu traveled to Afghanistan to learn more about closer military-technical cooperation in battling ISIS-K in response to Russia’s pending end of the Taliban’s designation as a terrorist organization.

Russia’s ambitious plans for integrating Afghanistan into its GEP through the construction of a transregional transport corridor with complementary energy infrastructure require this cooperation.

Russia may provide mediation for Pakistan and India’s long-running Kashmir dispute if requested, and this new corridor might encourage them to do so.

In turn, Pakistan could profit from facilitating trade between India and Russia in Central Asia and Afghanistan, while Pakistani trade with all three countries could be facilitated through Pakistan.

By enhancing the role that South Asia, particularly Pakistan and India, play in its balancing act, it will help Russia avoid becoming too dependent on China.

From the incoming Trump administration’s perspective, this would advance the returning president’s stated goal of “un-uniting” Russia and China, though some US officials might seek to obstruct this gambit.

With these possibilities in mind, Shoigu’s trip to Kabul can, therefore, be seen as part of a major power play designed to further Russia’s grand strategic goal of becoming a leading Asian nation.

These plans could be hampered, of course, if ISIS-K is not quickly defeated, and even that could take some time. But improved Russian-Afghan ties could shift the region’s geopolitical and geo-economic balance if even just part of Moscow’s plans come to fruition.

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Why Africa keeps employing Russia’s bad boy mercenaries – Asia Times

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Russian troops, like the Wagner team, have an awful status. Multiple European outlets have reported on their defense ineffectiveness, their dismal human rights report, and their predatory nature.

For instance, in July 2024, the Wagner Group faced a military defeat in northern Mali. It lost lots of soldiers, including a senior captain and a well-known Russian military critic.

Since 2014, many studies have linked Russian troops to killings, sexual assault and crimes against humanity. Additionally, it appears that Russian soldiers are most motivated to seize control of natural resources like minerals by exploiting their hosts.

In the past five years, Russian mercenaries have been invited by an increasing number of American nations despite their bad popularity and selfish interests. Up to 200 Russian forces were reportedly deployed in Equatorial Guinea in August 2024 to guard the president and train political soldiers.

Standard alliances with the West are undermined by the Russian troops, who provide security services. The Russians have left behind defense installations because French and American troops have been forced to retreat or be expelled.

The problem we, as safety scientists, ask is: in view of these disadvantages, why do countries nevertheless use Belarusian soldiers?

Using the Central African Republic as an example, we attempted to respond. To assess Wagner’s performance, or efficacy, we studied the Central African Republic’s civil war and compared the French military intervention ( 2013-2016 ) to the Wagner intervention ( 2021-2024 ).

We found that in the short term, the Wagner action was more powerful for the country’s government than the European intervention. However, we contend that it posed longer-term challenges. Wagner’s long-term impact possible adds to instability, undermining green development and security.

Military performance

Usually, about 20 sub-Saharan states have depended on France and other European supporters for military assistance. In the last three years, however, Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have turned to the Wagner Group or other Russian mercenaries ( such as Africa Corps ) for security assistance.

To understand the appeal, one may seem to reports of their effectiveness. These provide a mingled outlook. Some scientists believe it to be effective because it effectively accomplishes military missions.

However, it is also linked to a rise in fight intensity and regular harm to civilians. Academicians and experts view mercenaries as weakening forces, frequently escalating violence without resolving root causes of security issues.

These trends are challenged by our analysis of Wagner’s performance in the Civil War of the Central African Republic ( CAR ).

Since self-reliance, CAR has experienced numerous uprisings and instability. The present phase of the fight began in 2013, when President François Bozizé was ousted by the Séléka, a Muslim insurgent partnership, sparking a civil war.

This religious violence between Séléka and Christian armies, known as the anti-Balaka, led the United Nations to release the Minusca security mission, with help from a French-led power, Operation Sangaris.

Sangaris succeeded in securing specific regions, but it struggled to impose its own rule across the country. Following the French operation, which ended in 2016, some of Sangaris ‘ accomplishments were undermined by the rebels. In 2018 Auto management pivoted to Russia, inviting the Wagner Group to deliver training and safety features.

For their support the Wagner Group gained state concessions, taking a hold over natural resources ( mostly in rebel-held territory ).

By 2020, the Russian troops were established in the country and became the primary security services, leading the country’s combat work. The state expanded its place there at the time, causing the rebels to retreat into remote areas.

Our research assesses numerous metrics, like regional power, reduced human casualty count, and indicators for state sovereignty. Wagner’s action appeared to have had better results for the ruling military coup than the European intervention.

Wagner was able to function more risk- and collateral-friendlyly due to its higher tolerance for risk. More place was restored, and rebels were brought to the table more quickly than the French.

Our research, which draws from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data on the issue, revealed that soldiers and civilians had higher mortality rates during the French activity Sangaris. Rebels gained more territory and the government recaptured less territory, compared with the Wagner intervention.

Figure 1: Military situation conflict map 2017, 2021, 2024

Wagner’s actions in the Central African Republic contrast poorly with Wagner’s current criticism of mercenaries as ineffective and unstable.

According to our assessment, Wagner allowed the regime to survive, protected the nation’s most highly populated and valuable regions, and secured economic and geopolitical assets.

Economic exploitation

Economically, the Russian mercenaries have been portrayed as exploitative.

Wagner demands economic concessions, particularly control over gold mining operations, in return for military support. This strategy allows it to sustain operations. However, it prevents African nations from having the resources they require for national development.

Wagner’s operational model undermines Central African Republic’s prospects for long-term stability and self-sufficiency. According to experts, Wagner’s profit from CAR’s mining and forest operations ranges between US$ 1 billion and US$ 2 billion.

Yet we suggest that, at least in the client’s eyes, the deal is a bargain. In Central African Republic, the economic concessions were for resources located in rebel-held territory. Territories and resources that the government could not use to support its political rivals.

Despite their crimes and human rights violations, the Russians enjoy a relative backing from the country’s urban population. Wagner’s supporters reportedly come from urban areas because it has improved security significantly since its inception as a rebel-held country.

However, in rural areas, especially near mining zones, Wagner’s brutal tactics drive displacement and instil fear. Wagner’s military and economic activities appear to be disassociated by the locals.

Wagner and Russian authorities engage in propaganda campaigns, promoting Wagner’s image through local media, sponsoring cultural events and producing pro-Wagner films.

Despite its negative reputation abroad, Wagner was portrayed as a stabilizing force by these efforts. Russia is viewed positively in the region, according to popular surveys.

Moreover, in Central African Republic, Wagner empowered the ethnic group associated with the leadership, providing them with arms and training.

Countering Wagner

Wagner appeals to regimes in sub-Saharan Africa because it can demonstrate its ability to provide security without the political restraints of Western forces. This preference is in line with the wider trend among African states to form non-Western partnerships. Growing economic ties with China and security ties with Russia demonstrate this.

The stakes are high. Russia is reshaping the definition of modern colonialism and redefining the boundaries of conflict. The abuses of mercenary organizations can lead to local unrest and conflict.

Wagner’s model cannot be sustained indefinitely. It’s crucial to comprehend and assess the appeal of mercenary groups to both the elite and the local populations in order to combat them. African nations are not merely pawns in a larger geopolitical game, so it’s also important to remember that. They have agency.

In order to combat mercenary groups in Africa, a nuanced approach is required. Instead of relying solely on broad condemnation, international organizations and western nations must take into account local perceptions and the mercenaries ‘ perceived effectiveness in specific circumstances.

To lessen the appeal of mercenary groups, practical solutions must address security needs and combine military support with effective, quick-developing initiatives.

Wagner’s abuses are highlighted by labeling it a criminal or terrorist organization, but this approach does not address the factors that motivate African states to join such forces.

Ori Swed is assistant professor of sociology, anthropology, and social work, Texas Tech University and Alessandro Arduino is affiliate lecturer, King’s College London

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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‘Climate finance’ saddles Pacific island nations with more debt – Asia Times

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Pacific scholars are urging world leaders to enhance the climate finance spread system to support people living in small island nations as the UN climate summit approaches its last stage of negotiations.

The most extensive study on climate change in the Pacific was presented to the Conference of the Parties ( COP29 ) last week. People with lived experience are amplified by the Pacific Ocean Climate Crisis Assessment ( POCCA ). It compiles case studies and data on the climate impacts isle nations are now addressing and how to apply regional adaptation strategies.

According to the report, climate finance has been integrated into global economic models that adhere to growth aid’s designs.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as other major international financial institutions, will now serve as “accepted” entities for dispersing funds, adding product components, and making clear entry difficult for Pacific countries.

Loading the receiving nations with the highest bill

By the time money gets to people on the ground, about 72 % of it is in the form of loans. Personal contractors hired by developed nations to create climate-resilient facilities are the true beneficiaries.

What might have started out as a kind of donation ended up inflating the debts of the recipient nations in the Global South, particularly those in the Pacific.

Recent studies indicate that vulnerable island nations are currently losing US$ 141 billion annually due to extreme weather. By 2030, it is predicted that this will reach$ 1 trillion annually.

At COP29, climate finance is a crucial dialogue place, with the aim of boosting the contributions of the rich.

The Dubai climate conference last year agreed to establish a fresh fund to pay damages and costs incurred by natural disasters brought on by climate change. A group of small, developing nations spearheaded this political work, and it is crucial that this fund fills the latest climate finance gap.

However, there is only one factor that can close the gap between the resources already available and the required funds. To ensure that money is distributed in a way that people who already experience routine climate impacts are benefitted, we may also change the distribution method.

A traditional elevated house in the Solomon Islands, with an elder and a child in the foreground.
Homes are protected from flooding thanks to classic building methods. Photo: Kike Calvo / Universal Images Group

Indigenous information and regional adaptation

Additionally, our report makes use of a variety of climate-adapted methods, including relocating homes and settlements that are already in use by Pacific peoples.

Pacific peoples have much developed sophisticated adaptive abilities as the ancestors of the great navigators and coastal settlers who ruled the nation’s largest ocean for millennia. They have been adapting to change in the most environmentally friendly and compact techniques for centuries despite having roots in some of the world’s smallest and most difficult locations.

This includes southern protections from sea level rise and shore erosion as well as standard building methods that make more accommodating homes that are easier to restore.

The majority of Pacific Island version techniques are based on indigenous knowledge and skills that have been passed down through generations. For instance, the government in France has started funding the country’s version of risk prevention by constructing raised homes with floors 1.5 meters above ground level.

The Pacific Islands have also made an increasing effort to use ecosystem-based strategies that advance both populations and communities. Indigenous knowledge in Fiji has enabled the identification of indigenous vegetation that is suitable for reducing coastal erosion and flooding.

Relocating is a last-minute solution for adaptation. Two Fiji group transfer case studies are included in the report, which highlight the value of including all social groups in preparing to promote positive outcomes.

Changing the tale

Pacific peoples have developed social and ecological resilience systems that allow them to recover fast from disturbance because they are intrinsically linked to the ocean.

However, climate change has a significant impact on many Pacific residents. But the regular tale of vulnerability is difficult. It contradicts the very notion of native and aboriginal firm and resilience in the Pacific.

We must consider what is happening on the ground because climate impacts are complex, especially when using science-based models and the natural uncertainties to guide regional adaptation decisions.

To maintain a balance between top-down and ground-up methods to adaptation and endurance, the report recommends enabling channels that combine traditional knowledge with modern scientific methods and state decision-making tools.

On islands prone to drought, wave, and tropical cyclones have Pacific Island communities usually resided. With limited tools, they had to live on islands.

Over millennia, Pacific individuals developed native information, including social concepts and social structures, to live in these circumstances. Given existential threats and challenges, especially those facing reef island communities, we need to bring on climate-related aboriginal knowledge and practices.

In contrast to narratives of risk, legacy of endurance are key to successful weather version.

Steven Ratuva is chairman of the Macmillan Brown Center for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury.

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