World – Sure A Not

Pacific island nations still lose out despite superpower rivalry – Asia Times

On: December 18, 2024

A 140 million aid agreement signed on December 9 between Australia and Nauru is a primary example of the Pacific nations ‘ walking on a geopolitical wire in the twenty-first era.

The package provides Darwin with strong fiscal support, stable banking services, and policing and security resources. In exchange, Australia will have the right to object to any agreement Nauru may reach with various nations, particularly China.

The filibuster terms are comparable to the late last year” Falepili Union,” which gave Tuvaluans access to American citizenship and help for climate change in exchange for security guarantees.

Additionally, more details about a security agreement between the United States and Papua New Guinea were revealed just last week. It is now known to be fair US$ 864 million. In exchange for funding in military facilities development, training and equipment, the US increases unlimited access to six ships and terminals.

Even last year, PNG signed a ten-year, A$ 600 million offer to finance its own group in Australia’s National Rugby League competitors. In exchange,” PNG won’t mark a security agreement that would permit the presence of Chinese police or military forces in the Pacific.”

These preparations represent the political conflict that exists between the US and its allies in the Pacific, on the one hand.

This tactical conflict is frequently depicted in political commentary and mainstream media as an extension of” the great game” waged by rival countries. Pacific countries can be seen as attempting to profit from their own growth priorities, from a standard protection perspective.

However, this presumption that Pacific governments are “diplomatic value setters” who can pit China and the US against one another ignores the very actual power disparities that exist.

The danger, as the authors of one new research argued, is that the” China risk” tale becomes the explanation for “greater Western militarisation and financial dominance”. In other words, Pacific countries become political value takers.

Defense politics

The countries in the Pacific are vulnerable on a number of fronts: the majority have weak monetary foundations, and many are in debt. They are also at the forefront of rising sea levels and climate shift.

More bill and greater risk are the result of the costs associated with recovering from more numerous extreme weather events. Weather funding in the Pacific typically takes the form of concessional funding, as was reported at the UN COP29 summit this year.

The Pacific is already one of the country’s most aid-reliant areas. However, when victim nations continue to struggle to achieve their development goals, there is still much uncertainty about the effectiveness of that help.

Governments frequently lack the capacity to handle growing help packages at the national level. And they fight with the political responsibilities that the new political conditions demand.

In August, Kiribati also closed its borders to officials until 2025 to let the new state “breathing space” to attend to domestic politics.

In the past, Australia’s economic aid included institutional support and management. However, a significant portion of development aid is then geared more toward defense and policing.

Australia just committed A$ 400 million to the Pacific Policing Initiative, on top of a host of different security-related activities. This is all a part of a general increase in the so-called “defense diplomacy,” which has caused some observers to condemn the democratization of help at the cost of the Pacific’s most vulnerable people.

Lack of great belief

In addition, some political parties in the Pacific region operate largely unofficially and without complete plan manifestos. Most institutions lack political departments for examining foreign policy.

The end result is that small scrutiny can be given to international policy and security arrangements because they can get driven by personalities rather than by policy priorities. Pacific regions are even susceptible to corruption, as outlined in Transparency International’s 2024 Annual Corruption Report.

Executive Director of Transparency Solomon Islands, Ruth Liloqula, wrote about the effects of the Solomon Islands ‘ political conflict:

Since 2019, my country has become a center for political tensions and unusual disturbance, and undue effect.

Also, Pacific affairs specialist Steven Ratuva has argued the Australia–Tuvalu arrangement was one-sided and showed a “lack of great faith”.

Behind these developments, of course, lies the evolving AUKUS security pact tying together Australia, the US and the United Kingdom, a response to growing Chinese presence and influence in the” Indo-Pacific” region.

The responses from the Pacific countries have been political, perhaps because they cannot “rock the submarine” very much given their relationships to the major powers at play. But past Pacific Islands Forum secretary-general Meg Taylor has warned:

Pacific leaders needed to start raising their voices for the sake of their fellow citizens because they were being sidelined by significant political decisions affecting their place.

While there are clear benefits associated with strategic alliances, the substantial effects for Pacific countries are still incomprehensible. Not a second target is on record to be accomplished by 2030, according to the UN’s Asia and the Pacific progress report on sustainable development goals.

Unless these alliances are grounded in great faith and real sustainable development, the grass effects of geopolitics-as-usual may never change.

Sione Tekiteki is a senior teacher at Auckland University of Technology’s Faculty of Law.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

What Assad’s fall says about Putin’s great-power ambitions – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: December 13, 2024

In: Asia, World

The Middle East has been shocked by the Assad regime’s swift overthrow. The region’s energy balance has changed dramatically since the dictator’s family’s dispossession of him for more than 50 years.

Beyond Syria and its neighbors, significant ramifications exist, with Russia one of the more severely affected countries.

Back in 2015, Assad’s plan had been on the brink of collapse. A Russian treatment, supported by Iran and Hezbollah, saved it. Russia, which was established in response to the growing risk from Islamic State, gave Assad’s regime the ability to repress another rebel groups as well.

Over the years that followed, it gave Assad the ability to retake control of the city’s money, another important towns, and in particular the coastal area, where Russia had two military installations.

The future of these foundations is now questionable. Russians needed important resources to establish military power in the Mediterranean Sea and support the Kremlin’s say to Russian great-power standing, including an air basic at Khmeimim established south of Latakia in 2015, as well as the Russian naval base in Tartus, which dates back to the Soviet era.

Given how substantial investments have been made over the years to support the program and how important are the bases for Russia, Assad’s fall has a negative impact on Russia’s ability to assert reliable influence on the global stage.

Yet if Russia manages to reach an agreement with Syria’s fresh leaders regarding the future of its military installations, Moscow’s failure to save an important ally like Assad exposes crucial shortcomings in Russia’s capacity to act like a great strength rather than just talk.

There are distinct knowledge gaps that either overlooked or misinterpreted Qatar’s continued support for anti-Assad forces and Turkey’s covert support for this. These losses were then made worse by the Russian military’s ineffectiveness and ability to increase them on short notice. This is, of course, according to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

Iran and Hezbollah, two different Kremlin allies in the region, have been given more military support, which has more complicated Assad’s situation, and this has also made the effects of Russia’s overwhelm worse. This even raises the question of whether Russia had a strategic error in interpreting the position and undervalued Syria’s risk.

Even more disturbing is the fact that Russia relies on friends who positively support a young wonderful power that lacks the means to proclaim its claim to power, as Iran and Hezbollah did in 2015, as Assad did when he provided Russia with its military foundations.

Where’s China?

China is missing from this equation. Beijing had backed Assad after the start of the Syrian civil war, but most of it was rhetorical. It was primarily intended to stop a Western-backed, UN-backed intervention similar to the one in Libya that caused the country’s chaos and the fall of Gaddafi since.

A high-profile visit of Assad to China in September 2023 resulted in a strategic partnership agreement. In Beijing’s eyes at least, this appeared to be another step in the direction of the Syrian regime. However, China did nothing to save him when the situation suddenly appeared and Assad’s rule was in serious danger.

Xi Jinping and Bashar al-Assad: friends – with limited benefits. &nbsp, Photo: Yao Dawei / Xinhua / Alamy Live News

This raises a significant question about how well-versed in China is the Syrian government and the evolving crisis. But there is also a broader point here regarding Russian great-power ambitions.

Despite all the talk of a never-ending partnership between Moscow and Beijing, China ultimately failed to save Russia from humiliating defeat in Syria.

China’s interests in the Middle East are primarily about economic opportunity and the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, unlike Russia, where it needed a military presence to back up its claims to great-power status.

This has clearly limited Beijing’s appetite to become more involved, let alone to bail out Assad.

Putin diminished

Russia’s position in the Middle East now is in peril. Moscow lost a significant allies to Assad. Its other main allies, Iran and Hezbollah, are significantly weakened. Israel and Turkey, with whom the Kremlin has not had easy relations over the past few years, have been strengthened.

This exposes the hollowness of Russian claims to great-power status. Russia’s reputation and standing in the eyes of other partners is likely to be further diminished, whether they are from China or North Korea, from BRICS members or from countries in the Global South that Russia has recently tried to woo.

The consequences of that are likely to be ambiguous for Ukraine, which is arguably Russia’s biggest contributor to the overstretch.

On the one hand, the ease with which Assad was removed shows that Russia has limitations and is not invincible. On the other hand, nothing but Russian resumption should be anticipated in Ukraine.

Putin requires a swift recovery to help him win both domestic and international trust. After all, Donald Trump does not like losers.

Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

All bow before the almighty US dollar – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: December 2, 2024

In: Asia, World

The earth was suffering from a massive abundance of dollars in 1971. The world was being flooded with money by British international investment and assistance, as well as US government policies that were inflationary.

The earth had too little golden at the same time, especially the United States. That was a problem because, unlike today, exchange rates did n’t float freely on markets. Money were to be exchanged for gold for$ 35 an ounce. ( The currencies of other countries were fixed-rate pegged to the dollar. )

Europeans were frantically attempting to exchange money for metal or exchange them for other currencies. With the US progressively unable to fulfill its responsibility, traders expected devaluation.

President Richard Nixon halted the economy’s conversionibility into gold in August of that year in response to the money crisis.

Despite a later established devaluation, speculators continued to attack the money. By 1973, the gold standard and resolved exchange rates were past.

Nixon’s Treasury Secretary John Connally made a wonderfully cynical post that is frequently quoted yet now during the devaluation negotiations in 1971. Connally stated to foreigners,” The money is your problem, but ours.”

In an unexpected way, the money was likewise my problem. In 1971, I was the 24-year-old minesweeping and offer agent on the USS Pivot. The Nixon administration decided to pay for basic rights that by granting Pivot and several other US Navy minesweepers as pay for the money problems.

In preparation, the Pivot’s captain tasked me with teaching our crew Spanish – a language that I did n’t know and that the crew turned out to be uninterested in learning. I called the Pentagon in a desperate attempt to find someone there who could help me compile a lengthy list of minesweeper conditions in Spanish. By pointing at their mimeographed files of the list, the crew successfully overcame the language barrier.

These weeks a strong money is, in many ways, everybody’s issue. It’s particularly difficult for international places.

International Monetary Fund research last year concluded that for emerging-market economies,” a 10 % U. S. dollar appreciation, linked to global financial market forces, decreases economic output by 1.9 % after one year, and this drag lingers for two and a half years”. Development-developed nations are worst hit by their ballooning local currency principal and interest duty.

Higher interest rates are a possible issue for the Federal Reserve Board and Fed Chair Jerome Powell, if that’s one of the reasons for a stronger money. Donald Trump, the president-elect, wants more authority over the Federal Reserve, weaker currencies, and lower interest rates. However, the Fed will keep rates higher, which will tend to keep the buck powerful, if his policies are as many economists and investors predicted. In such a case, Powell may find himself in Trump’s sights again.

A stronger money would be no joy for US exporting companies, pretty little including agriculture. Without the money dwindling more, it’s difficult enough to engage with Brazil and other ag-exporting nations.

The money appears to be strengthening further. Since April 2022, the US Dollar Index has been in solid country, rising above 100, and rising since soon September. Despite the mayor’s choices, Wall Street is betting that it will expand under a Trump presidency.

Trump has significantly reassured markets by appointing hedge-fund director Scott Bessent as treasurer. In recent days, the money and long-term interest rates have both increased slightly. Wall Street’s fears about prices have been fueled by the promise of enormous tariffs. Bessent has criticized taxes less heavily, claiming that they can serve as a bargaining chip and that coordination should be done with US friends.

Bessent furthermore, however, has promised to keep the economy’s position as the nation’s reserve currency. That’s a good thing for any government minister to perform, reserve-currency position affords the US many advantages. Keep in mind, though, that it is one of the factors the money is therefore often strong. With so much of the world’s business and assets denominated in dollars, there’s nearly always require for the divine buck.

Connally was half-right, the money is really our money. But it’s not just their difficulty. It’s about everybody’s.

Past lifelong Wall Street Journal Asia journalist and editor&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, is writer professor of DTN/The Progressive Farmer.

This&nbsp, content, &nbsp, initially published on December 2 by the latter news business and then republished by Asia Times with authority, is © Copyright 2024 DTN/The Progressive Farmer. All rights reserved. Follow&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, on&nbsp, X @urbanize&nbsp,

Germany closing factories at home, opening them in China – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: November 27, 2024

In: Asia, World

Germany’s biggest technological people are moving away from home to more positive circumstances in China as a result of its domestic energy guidelines and economic environment. Germany’s environment is increasingly hostile to business growth due to rising energy costs, high green energy subsidies, and strict regulations.

As a result, some of Germany’s most established companies are downsizing at house, shedding tens of work, while investing heavily in China. This change underlines the tremendous impact of existing policies on Germany’s professional scenery, with long-term implications for the local market and employment.

Here, Asia Times examines the main aspects and the businesses that are changing their business models worldwide.

Higher energy costs in Germany: The result of ideological laws

Germany’s energy policies have caused business energy prices to rise to amounts that are among the highest in the world, behind only the UK and the UK. Actually this high cost level, which has already reached unparalleled levels, cannot be sustained because the average cost for industrial users may have reached about US$ 250 per MWh by 2023.

Germany’s rely on renewable energy sources such as wind and solar, combined with the pulling out of nuclear energy, has increased the government’s reliance on imports and caused significant price fluctuation, eventually putting stress on both business and citizens. Due to rising costs, some businesses are considering reducing their businesses in Germany and starting new ones, especially in China.

Consumption of industrial strength has decreased by more than 16 % in the last two decades.

In 2023, power consumption in Germany’s business sector fell to 3, 282 petajoules, a decrease of 7.8 % compared to 2022. This drop followed an already significant reduction in 2022, when industrial energy use fell by 9.1 % year-on-year to 3, 558 petajoules. Taken together, these cuts represent an overall increases in industrial energy usage of about 16.3 % over the two-year time.

Energy source in Germany: Increased trade dependence

German domestic energy production has also changed, with renewable energy sources generating a record 61 % of the country’s energy mix in the first half of 2024. In the first quarter of 2024, Germany’s reliance on foreign energy sources to complement its varying renewable production has increased by 23 % in this period.

Businesses that require steady, affordable electricity are at risk because of the variability of the supply of renewable energy, combined with rising home prices. Germany’s continued emphasis on solar is also expected to increase buy dependency, more discouraging companies from expanding internally.

Large subsidies for solar

In 2024 only, Germany will deliver 20 billion dollars in subsidies to alternative energy producers. Despite quickly falling market prices, these payments guarantee that solar energy suppliers receive set-assigned minimum prices.

The state budget has been burdened greatly by this centrally planned program, which allows the government to pay clean energy suppliers when wholesale prices drop.

In fact, the original budget for subsidies in 2024 was 10.6 billion euros ( US$ 21 billion ), but as energy prices have fallen, the projected need has doubled. Given the government’s commitment to follow the debt brake, these increasing subsidies are putting more pressure on the budget and making negotiations more difficult.

The Nord Stream pipelines and lost Russian gas played a significant role in Germany’s professional decrease.

Germany’s power landscape has been severely affected by the withdrawal of Russian gas imports, which has severely impacted its industrial base and increased energy costs. Russian natural gas was a core of Germany’s power source, providing reliable and affordable energy for years. However, this crucial strength link was cut short by the political effects of the Ukraine war and the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage in September 2022.

The problems rendered Nord Stream 1 entirely useless, and one of the two pipes of Nord Stream 2 was even damaged. Just one part of Nord Stream 2 is still in use and functional. If Germany was willing to engage with Russia politically and economically, President Vladimir Putin just reaffirmed that this operational pipeline was resume sales right away.

Putin and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently spoke in conversation, emphasizing that restarting oil travels through Nord Stream 2 was” a matter of pressing a box,” indicating that Russia was willing to provide fuel if Germany cooperated.

German gas had to be replaced by much more expensive liquefied natural gas ( LNG ) imports, primarily from the United States, after Russia’s abrupt loss of oil. These raised prices have undermined Germany’s international business competitiveness.

Putin’s suggestion to restart the last Nord Stream 2 pipeline highlights the corporate sway Russia also has over Europe’s energy source. By offering a possible crutch to Germany’s ailing business, Putin aims to control Germany’s social position on the Ukraine conflict. Germany has abstained from responding to the proposal despite the potential economic benefits of a resumed gas imports.

Falling domestic investment in Germany

Domestic investment has decreased significantly as a result of rising energy costs and regulatory challenges. Private gross fixed capital formation is about 10 % below pre-covid levels.

The situation is even worse for industrial production: Since 2021, Germany’s production level has fallen by more than 9 %. The decline has been even sharper in energy-intensive industries. In those areas, production levels have fallen by more than 18 % in less than two years, which indicates serious issues in industries that are heavily reliant on affordable energy.

This decline may have had an impact on the cost structure of these industries because of rising energy costs and the ongoing shift toward renewable energy sources. The trend suggests potential deindustrialization pressures, particularly in sectors that are unable to adjust to rising operating costs.

Many businesses are cutting jobs at home while expanding in China as a result of Germany’s unsustainable cost environment.

The biggest German businesses are investing in China instead of reducing their workforce there.

Volkswagen: Facing potential job cuts of up to 30, 000 in Germany, Volkswagen has made significant investments in China, including 2.5 billion euros ($ 2.6 billion ) to expand EV production in Hefei and a further 700 million euros in EV technology partnership with Xpeng.

Bosch: Announced plans to cut 7, 000 jobs in Germany as it increases investment in China’s e-mobility and automated driving sectors.

SAP: &nbsp, Plans to cut 9, 000 to 10, 000 jobs in Germany while reallocating resources to high-growth markets abroad.

As German businesses are putting more and more money under the belt, these cuts are a part of a wider trend. The Association of the Bavarian Economy (vbw ) estimates that the automotive sector in Bavaria alone could lose 106, 000 jobs by 2040, highlighting the far-reaching consequences of Germany’s industrial challenges.

Hildegard Müller, president of the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA ), warns that up to 190, 000 jobs across the sector could be at risk by 2035, reflecting the risks associated with Germany’s deindustrialization.

In response to these developments, Scholz’s government has initiated urgent talks with industry leaders. Industry experts contend that these discussions lack the long-term strategic vision required to address fundamental issues like high costs, regulatory pressures, and labor costs. Without significant structural reforms, the German automotive sector risks a further decline in global competitiveness.

Soaring German investment in China: Record levels

German companies continue to place record levels of investment in the nation despite pressure from German government officials and the EU to reduce their dependence on China. In recent years, German investment in China has increased to unheard levels, primarily in the chemicals and automotive industries.

In the first half of 2024 alone, German foreign direct investment ( FDI) in China reached 7.3 billion euros, surpassing the 6.5 billion euro total for the whole of 2023. German automakers and Germany are increasingly influencing Chinese foreign direct investment, accounting for 57 % of total EU investment in China in the first half of 2024, 62 % in 2023, and a record 71 % in 2022.

Key investment projects:

Volkswagen: In addition to its 2.5 billion euro investment in Hefei, Volkswagen has increased its joint venture stake in JAC Motor from 50 % to 75 %. This move underlines Volkswagen’s long-term commitment to local vehicle production in China, a market crucial to its growth in electric vehicles.

BMW: BMW’s investment in Shenyang not only expands its production, but also its research and development capabilities, aligning with local demand and avoiding the high energy costs in Germany.

BASF: The chemical company’s 10 billion euro plant in Guangdong is another example of large-scale localization. By operating in China, BASF lowers German regulations and energy costs while satisfying China’s growing demand for advanced chemical products, particularly in the automotive industry.

These initiatives are based on a localized production approach that helps businesses avoid the difficulties and costs of exporting from Germany and meet Chinese market demands.

Germany’s lead in expanding greenfield investments in the EU

The second quarter of 2024 saw the highest quarterly level to date for greenfield investment by the EU reach a record 3. 6 billion euros. German automakers have been a significant contributor to this growth, accounting for roughly half of all EU investments in China since 2022.

While average quarterly M&amp, A activity declines by 30 % between 2022 and the first half of 2024, greenfield investments by EU firms have steadily increased, with Germany’s automotive and chemicals sectors leading this trend.

Between 2022 and the first half of 2024, 65 % of all EU FDI in China will come from Germany, up from 48 % between 2019 and 2021. The top five European investors in China in 2023 were German companies, underlining Germany’s key role in EU-China investment.

Countries like France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, for example, will contribute only 7-8 % of EU FDI during this time, while the remaining 23 EU Member States will contribute only 12 % of that percentage.

Localizing supply chains and reducing geopolitical risks

German businesses are also restructuring their supply chains to reduce risk as a result of rising energy prices and regulatory uncertainty. Companies have been prompted to localize their operations in key markets as a result of events like the Covid-19 pandemic and the Suez Canal disruption, which have highlighted the fragility of global supply chains. German businesses are responding by increasing direct production in China, which reduces both the cost and the risk of global supply chain disruptions.

According to Friedolin Strack of the Federation of German Industries ( BDI), businesses in China are increasingly “reorganizing their supply chains regionally.” In a world where Chinese EV manufacturers are gaining market share, German automakers like Volkswagen and BMW are focusing on localizing their EV supply chains to stay competitive. German businesses are reducing costs by investing in localized production as well as protecting themselves from global uncertainties.

reducing German exports to China through local production

In the first seven months of 2024, Germany and China’s bilateral trade decreased by 5.7 % as a result of the transition to localized production. German exports to China fell by 11.7 % year-on-year, as companies increasingly serve Chinese consumers directly through local production.

German automakers, which are producing cars directly in China rather than exporting them, are especially attracted to this decline in exports. As less of German-made goods are exported abroad while localized production in China is growing, this could have an impact on Germany’s trade balance.

China’s unique advantages for German companies

While the German government and the European Commission advocate diversification away from China, alternative markets lack China’s infrastructure, market scale and cost efficiency. Countries such as Vietnam and Thailand, while considered as diversification options, cannot match China’s industrial networks, skilled workforce and market size.

Since 2022, more than 50 % of all EU investment in China has come from German companies, mainly in the automotive and chemical sectors. Major projects, such as Volkswagen’s partnership with Xpeng and BASF’s production facility, underline Germany’s strategic focus on China as a key market for long-term growth and competitiveness.

Domestic policy and global competition fueled a strategic reorientation

German companies ‘ decision to restrict domestic investment and expand in China is a stark reflection of Germany’s current energy policy and regulatory pressures. High costs, variable energy supply and regulatory challenges have made Germany a difficult environment for large-scale industrial investment, while China offers stability, cost-efficiency and market growth potential.

These trends suggest that domestic structural issues must be addressed as Germany attempts to maintain its industrial base. Without reforms to lower energy costs and reduce regulatory burdens, the shift of German investment to China is likely to continue, with long-term implications for Germany’s trade balance, industrial output and economic resilience. Even the EU tariffs wo n’t play a significant role.

Russia’s grand geo-economic plan a step closer in Afghanistan – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: November 27, 2024

In: Asia, World

Sergei Shoigu, a director of the Russian Security Council, traveled to Afghanistan this week to promote Moscow’s” Greater Eurasian Partnership,” a great strategic plan to create new trade routes and administrative alliances in Asia.

Russia has prioritized GRP because of the US’s and the West’s unprecedented sanctions against Russia in 2022 following its invasion of Ukraine, which some people view as Russia’s “pivot to Asia” scheme.

Since then, Russia has revived the previously stalled International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ) between itself and India via Iran, with branch corridors through Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ), an Eurasian political, economic, and security and defense organization established by Russia and China in 2001, has also been pushed for a larger regional role.

These are pertinent to Afghanistan both through its trade with India via the INSTC and as a SCO spectator. Central, South, and West Asia are at their intersections, and Afghanistan is effectively located there.

Shoigu’s top goal is to increase military-technical assistance with the ruling Taliban so that it can defeat ISIS-K, a militant group that has a presence in Afghanistan and has previously attacked Russia.

In order to better coordinate their efforts to contain local security risks like ISIS-K, Shoigu has pledged that Russia will replace the Taliban from its record of terrorist organizations.

In reverse, Russia is expected to stimulate the SCO to integrate more carefully with Afghanistan, including probably through more intelligence-sharing and future anti-terrorist activities.

Afghanistan’s strategic location also facilitates South Asian power and trade. The Taliban must stabilize private security, strengthen ties with Pakistan, and hope that Pakistan and India’s frequently strained relations will improve in order for that strategy to be viable.

Recent years have seen significant improvement in Russian-Pakistani ties, with considerable progress also being made in recent months. Later in September, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk visited Pakistan for two days, and Moscow hosted the first-ever Russian-Pakistani Trade and Investment Forum.

On the SCO Summit in Tashkent in September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif,” The goal is to provide pipeline gas from Russia to Pakistan. This is achievable as&nbsp, also, in&nbsp, see of&nbsp, the&nbsp, truth that some equipment is already in&nbsp, location in&nbsp, Russia, Kazakhstan and&nbsp, Uzbekistan”.

This potential Russian network may potentially even extend to India if Afghan-Pakistani relationships improve in tandem with Afghan-Pakistani relations.

Even without headway on Putin’s proposed network, Russia could possibly turn Afghanistan into a local oil gateway, as the Taliban envisages, according to a Reuters statement.

Nooruddin Azizi, the acting Afghan secretary of industry and trade, made the report based on what Nooruddin Azizi, the country’s oil-producing nation, said to Sputnik in August 2022 about Kabul’s want to trade its vast mineral reserves.

( In 2010, the US assessed that Afghanistan has nearly US$ 1 trillion worth of untapped minerals, including lithium. )

So, it appears as though the pieces are all in place for Russia to exchange oil for minerals from Afghanistan, transform the country into a local fuel hub, and then assist in mediating an Afghan-Pakistani dispute to facilitate its oil exports to Pakistan and lay the democratic foundation for the construction of a pipeline.

On the business before, a memorandum of understanding ( MoU) to create a travel corridor between Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan was signed in August 2023.

This corridor, which is tentatively referred to as the Central Eurasian Corridor ( CEC ) or the SCO Corridor due to its geographic location and institutional association, was referenced in the MoU signed between Pakistan and Russia during Overchuk’s visit in late September.

These legal grounds can expedite plans to build a Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan ( PAKAFUZ) railway. The CEC/SCO Corridor, with PAKAFUZ as its base, can even eventually grow to India dependent on increased ties with Pakistan.

Shoigu traveled to Afghanistan to learn more about closer military-technical cooperation in battling ISIS-K in response to Russia’s pending end of the Taliban’s designation as a terrorist organization.

Russia’s ambitious plans for integrating Afghanistan into its GEP through the construction of a transregional transport corridor with complementary energy infrastructure require this cooperation.

Russia may provide mediation for Pakistan and India’s long-running Kashmir dispute if requested, and this new corridor might encourage them to do so.

In turn, Pakistan could profit from facilitating trade between India and Russia in Central Asia and Afghanistan, while Pakistani trade with all three countries could be facilitated through Pakistan.

By enhancing the role that South Asia, particularly Pakistan and India, play in its balancing act, it will help Russia avoid becoming too dependent on China.

From the incoming Trump administration’s perspective, this would advance the returning president’s stated goal of “un-uniting” Russia and China, though some US officials might seek to obstruct this gambit.

With these possibilities in mind, Shoigu’s trip to Kabul can, therefore, be seen as part of a major power play designed to further Russia’s grand strategic goal of becoming a leading Asian nation.

These plans could be hampered, of course, if ISIS-K is not quickly defeated, and even that could take some time. But improved Russian-Afghan ties could shift the region’s geopolitical and geo-economic balance if even just part of Moscow’s plans come to fruition.

Why Africa keeps employing Russia’s bad boy mercenaries – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: November 27, 2024

In: Asia, World

Russian troops, like the Wagner team, have an awful status. Multiple European outlets have reported on their defense ineffectiveness, their dismal human rights report, and their predatory nature.

For instance, in July 2024, the Wagner Group faced a military defeat in northern Mali. It lost lots of soldiers, including a senior captain and a well-known Russian military critic.

Since 2014, many studies have linked Russian troops to killings, sexual assault and crimes against humanity. Additionally, it appears that Russian soldiers are most motivated to seize control of natural resources like minerals by exploiting their hosts.

In the past five years, Russian mercenaries have been invited by an increasing number of American nations despite their bad popularity and selfish interests. Up to 200 Russian forces were reportedly deployed in Equatorial Guinea in August 2024 to guard the president and train political soldiers.

Standard alliances with the West are undermined by the Russian troops, who provide security services. The Russians have left behind defense installations because French and American troops have been forced to retreat or be expelled.

The problem we, as safety scientists, ask is: in view of these disadvantages, why do countries nevertheless use Belarusian soldiers?

Using the Central African Republic as an example, we attempted to respond. To assess Wagner’s performance, or efficacy, we studied the Central African Republic’s civil war and compared the French military intervention ( 2013-2016 ) to the Wagner intervention ( 2021-2024 ).

We found that in the short term, the Wagner action was more powerful for the country’s government than the European intervention. However, we contend that it posed longer-term challenges. Wagner’s long-term impact possible adds to instability, undermining green development and security.

Military performance

Usually, about 20 sub-Saharan states have depended on France and other European supporters for military assistance. In the last three years, however, Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have turned to the Wagner Group or other Russian mercenaries ( such as Africa Corps ) for security assistance.

To understand the appeal, one may seem to reports of their effectiveness. These provide a mingled outlook. Some scientists believe it to be effective because it effectively accomplishes military missions.

However, it is also linked to a rise in fight intensity and regular harm to civilians. Academicians and experts view mercenaries as weakening forces, frequently escalating violence without resolving root causes of security issues.

These trends are challenged by our analysis of Wagner’s performance in the Civil War of the Central African Republic ( CAR ).

Since self-reliance, CAR has experienced numerous uprisings and instability. The present phase of the fight began in 2013, when President François Bozizé was ousted by the Séléka, a Muslim insurgent partnership, sparking a civil war.

This religious violence between Séléka and Christian armies, known as the anti-Balaka, led the United Nations to release the Minusca security mission, with help from a French-led power, Operation Sangaris.

Sangaris succeeded in securing specific regions, but it struggled to impose its own rule across the country. Following the French operation, which ended in 2016, some of Sangaris ‘ accomplishments were undermined by the rebels. In 2018 Auto management pivoted to Russia, inviting the Wagner Group to deliver training and safety features.

For their support the Wagner Group gained state concessions, taking a hold over natural resources ( mostly in rebel-held territory ).

By 2020, the Russian troops were established in the country and became the primary security services, leading the country’s combat work. The state expanded its place there at the time, causing the rebels to retreat into remote areas.

Our research assesses numerous metrics, like regional power, reduced human casualty count, and indicators for state sovereignty. Wagner’s action appeared to have had better results for the ruling military coup than the European intervention.

Wagner was able to function more risk- and collateral-friendlyly due to its higher tolerance for risk. More place was restored, and rebels were brought to the table more quickly than the French.

Our research, which draws from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data on the issue, revealed that soldiers and civilians had higher mortality rates during the French activity Sangaris. Rebels gained more territory and the government recaptured less territory, compared with the Wagner intervention.

Figure 1: Military situation conflict map 2017, 2021, 2024

Wagner’s actions in the Central African Republic contrast poorly with Wagner’s current criticism of mercenaries as ineffective and unstable.

According to our assessment, Wagner allowed the regime to survive, protected the nation’s most highly populated and valuable regions, and secured economic and geopolitical assets.

Economic exploitation

Economically, the Russian mercenaries have been portrayed as exploitative.

Wagner demands economic concessions, particularly control over gold mining operations, in return for military support. This strategy allows it to sustain operations. However, it prevents African nations from having the resources they require for national development.

Wagner’s operational model undermines Central African Republic’s prospects for long-term stability and self-sufficiency. According to experts, Wagner’s profit from CAR’s mining and forest operations ranges between US$ 1 billion and US$ 2 billion.

Yet we suggest that, at least in the client’s eyes, the deal is a bargain. In Central African Republic, the economic concessions were for resources located in rebel-held territory. Territories and resources that the government could not use to support its political rivals.

Despite their crimes and human rights violations, the Russians enjoy a relative backing from the country’s urban population. Wagner’s supporters reportedly come from urban areas because it has improved security significantly since its inception as a rebel-held country.

However, in rural areas, especially near mining zones, Wagner’s brutal tactics drive displacement and instil fear. Wagner’s military and economic activities appear to be disassociated by the locals.

Wagner and Russian authorities engage in propaganda campaigns, promoting Wagner’s image through local media, sponsoring cultural events and producing pro-Wagner films.

Despite its negative reputation abroad, Wagner was portrayed as a stabilizing force by these efforts. Russia is viewed positively in the region, according to popular surveys.

Moreover, in Central African Republic, Wagner empowered the ethnic group associated with the leadership, providing them with arms and training.

Countering Wagner

Wagner appeals to regimes in sub-Saharan Africa because it can demonstrate its ability to provide security without the political restraints of Western forces. This preference is in line with the wider trend among African states to form non-Western partnerships. Growing economic ties with China and security ties with Russia demonstrate this.

The stakes are high. Russia is reshaping the definition of modern colonialism and redefining the boundaries of conflict. The abuses of mercenary organizations can lead to local unrest and conflict.

Wagner’s model cannot be sustained indefinitely. It’s crucial to comprehend and assess the appeal of mercenary groups to both the elite and the local populations in order to combat them. African nations are not merely pawns in a larger geopolitical game, so it’s also important to remember that. They have agency.

In order to combat mercenary groups in Africa, a nuanced approach is required. Instead of relying solely on broad condemnation, international organizations and western nations must take into account local perceptions and the mercenaries ‘ perceived effectiveness in specific circumstances.

To lessen the appeal of mercenary groups, practical solutions must address security needs and combine military support with effective, quick-developing initiatives.

Wagner’s abuses are highlighted by labeling it a criminal or terrorist organization, but this approach does not address the factors that motivate African states to join such forces.

Ori Swed is assistant professor of sociology, anthropology, and social work, Texas Tech University and Alessandro Arduino is affiliate lecturer, King’s College London

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

‘Climate finance’ saddles Pacific island nations with more debt – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: November 21, 2024

In: Asia, World

Pacific scholars are urging world leaders to enhance the climate finance spread system to support people living in small island nations as the UN climate summit approaches its last stage of negotiations.

The most extensive study on climate change in the Pacific was presented to the Conference of the Parties ( COP29 ) last week. People with lived experience are amplified by the Pacific Ocean Climate Crisis Assessment ( POCCA ). It compiles case studies and data on the climate impacts isle nations are now addressing and how to apply regional adaptation strategies.

According to the report, climate finance has been integrated into global economic models that adhere to growth aid’s designs.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as other major international financial institutions, will now serve as “accepted” entities for dispersing funds, adding product components, and making clear entry difficult for Pacific countries.

Loading the receiving nations with the highest bill

By the time money gets to people on the ground, about 72 % of it is in the form of loans. Personal contractors hired by developed nations to create climate-resilient facilities are the true beneficiaries.

What might have started out as a kind of donation ended up inflating the debts of the recipient nations in the Global South, particularly those in the Pacific.

Recent studies indicate that vulnerable island nations are currently losing US$ 141 billion annually due to extreme weather. By 2030, it is predicted that this will reach$ 1 trillion annually.

At COP29, climate finance is a crucial dialogue place, with the aim of boosting the contributions of the rich.

The Dubai climate conference last year agreed to establish a fresh fund to pay damages and costs incurred by natural disasters brought on by climate change. A group of small, developing nations spearheaded this political work, and it is crucial that this fund fills the latest climate finance gap.

However, there is only one factor that can close the gap between the resources already available and the required funds. To ensure that money is distributed in a way that people who already experience routine climate impacts are benefitted, we may also change the distribution method.

A traditional elevated house in the Solomon Islands, with an elder and a child in the foreground. — Homes are protected from flooding thanks to classic building methods. Photo: Kike Calvo / Universal Images Group

Indigenous information and regional adaptation

Additionally, our report makes use of a variety of climate-adapted methods, including relocating homes and settlements that are already in use by Pacific peoples.

Pacific peoples have much developed sophisticated adaptive abilities as the ancestors of the great navigators and coastal settlers who ruled the nation’s largest ocean for millennia. They have been adapting to change in the most environmentally friendly and compact techniques for centuries despite having roots in some of the world’s smallest and most difficult locations.

This includes southern protections from sea level rise and shore erosion as well as standard building methods that make more accommodating homes that are easier to restore.

The majority of Pacific Island version techniques are based on indigenous knowledge and skills that have been passed down through generations. For instance, the government in France has started funding the country’s version of risk prevention by constructing raised homes with floors 1.5 meters above ground level.

The Pacific Islands have also made an increasing effort to use ecosystem-based strategies that advance both populations and communities. Indigenous knowledge in Fiji has enabled the identification of indigenous vegetation that is suitable for reducing coastal erosion and flooding.

Relocating is a last-minute solution for adaptation. Two Fiji group transfer case studies are included in the report, which highlight the value of including all social groups in preparing to promote positive outcomes.

Changing the tale

Pacific peoples have developed social and ecological resilience systems that allow them to recover fast from disturbance because they are intrinsically linked to the ocean.

However, climate change has a significant impact on many Pacific residents. But the regular tale of vulnerability is difficult. It contradicts the very notion of native and aboriginal firm and resilience in the Pacific.

We must consider what is happening on the ground because climate impacts are complex, especially when using science-based models and the natural uncertainties to guide regional adaptation decisions.

To maintain a balance between top-down and ground-up methods to adaptation and endurance, the report recommends enabling channels that combine traditional knowledge with modern scientific methods and state decision-making tools.

On islands prone to drought, wave, and tropical cyclones have Pacific Island communities usually resided. With limited tools, they had to live on islands.

Over millennia, Pacific individuals developed native information, including social concepts and social structures, to live in these circumstances. Given existential threats and challenges, especially those facing reef island communities, we need to bring on climate-related aboriginal knowledge and practices.

In contrast to narratives of risk, legacy of endurance are key to successful weather version.

Steven Ratuva is chairman of the Macmillan Brown Center for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury.

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Time for world to pivot away from the US economy – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: November 21, 2024

In: Asia, World

Donald Trump’s win in the 2024 vote and his danger to impose taxes on all American imports highlight a significant issue for the worldwide market.

The US has won more Nobel rewards in the last five years than any other nation combined and has spent more on research and development than any other nation combined. The world is envious of its innovations and economical accomplishments. However, the rest of the world must exert every effort to avoid becoming very dependant on it.

And if Harris had prevailed, there would n’t have been much of a change.

Donald Trump’s” America first” strategy has actually been republican. The US has been largely inward-looking ever since the power independence policy of past president Barack Obama, putting an end to industrial job outsourcing.

Trump’s first policy was to take higher prices for US consumers, which would have meant imposing high tariffs on nearly every investing partner, to protect regional producers.

For example, Trump’s 2018 levies on washing machines from all over the world mean US consumers have been paying 12 % more for these items.

President Joe Biden– in certainly a more polite way– then increased some of the Trump tariffs: up to 100 % on electric vehicles, 50 % on solar cells and 25 % on batteries from China. This was a clear decision to slow down the energy move in a climate disaster to safeguard US production.

Biden launched a payment competition while agreeing to a tariff truce with Europe, which may have sparked a potentially yet worse conflict.

For example, the US Inflation Reduction Act provides$ 369 billion in incentives for sectors like renewable energy and electric cars. Additionally, the Chips Act authorized$ 52 billion to support the production of computer and semiconductor chips.

China, Europe and the rest of the world

Although this US commercial plan may have been biased toward the outside, there are still serious implications for the rest of the world. China, after years of largely export-based growth, may now deal with huge problems of business overcapacity.

The nation is now attempting to expand its trading partners and encourage more private usage.

Europe, despite a very small budget requirement, spends a lot of money in the rebate competition. Germany, a country facing sluggish growth and big doubts about its&nbsp, industrial model, is committed to matching US subsidies, offering, for instance, &nbsp, €900 million &nbsp, ($ 950 million ) to Swedish battery makers Northvolt to continue producing in the country.

All those grants are causing a negative impact to the global business and could have easily funded urgent needs like solar panel and battery-powered electricity across the entire African continent. Meanwhile, China has replaced the US and Europe as the largest buyer in Africa, following its own interest for organic sources.

Ideas may be fixed by the approaching Trump mission.

One may say that if the Biden administration had known more about the effects of an invasion and had given Kyiv modern arms before the war, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, along with the thousands of deaths that ensuing, and the energy crisis that ensued, could have been avoided.

But the responsible is mostly on Europe. Trump had a right to credit where it’s expected for his first-term warning about Germany’s proper issue of becoming too dependent on Russian gas.

By putting an end to China’s personal tax battle on Chinese technology like solar panels and electric cars, there is a clear path ahead.

Alternatively of importing record quantities of wet oil from the US, Europe would reestablish some of its original power by producing more of its own fresh energy. China could use its considerable liquidity on Russia to put an end to Ukraine’s war, and it could also learn a few things from working with Chinese companies.

The European Union may put more effort into achieving its goals, which is to sign trade agreements and use them to decrease global carbon emissions. Never just China and Europe are the subjects. After years of&nbsp, ongoing improvement&nbsp, in all main dimensions of human existence, the world is moving downward.

The number of people facing starvation is increasing, taking us back to the rates of 2008-9. War is raging in Gaza, Sudan, Myanmar, Syria, and presently Lebanon. Since 2010, there have n’t been as many civilian casualties in the world.

For better or worse, it is doubtful that a Trump administration may change the way of lower US meddling. Additionally, it is unlikely to be a major force in the fight against climate change, trade liberalization, or tranquility.

America wo n’t help the world because it is alone.

What will happen to the US is unknown. Trump’s transfer may be largely a continuation of his previous ten years. The US economy will become less important as a result of expensive tariffs or the destruction of the organizations that contributed to its economic powerhouse status.

Americans have chosen this option, and the rest of the world must accept it. The only thing the universe can do in the interim is to learn how to collaborate more effectively without becoming overly dependent on one another.

Renaud Foucart is mature teacher in finance, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

Path to peace in Ukraine likely to run through India – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: November 20, 2024

In: Asia, World

Vladimir Putin’s meetings will take place in India when it leaves for the end of this year or the beginning of the time, keeping in mind New Delhi’s policy of principled independence toward the conflict in and around Ukraine.

India has always rejected the sanctions imposed by the West against Russia and has always abstained from anti-Russian commitments presented at international forums like the UN. India has called for global laws to be respected and the Ukraine war to end as soon as possible at the same time.

India has acted as a launch mechanism for American pressure on Russia, giving Moscow a great power alternative to growing overly reliant on China.

Due to the fact that India is now the second-largest consumer of subsidized Russian crude after China, bilateral trade increased to US$ 65 billion last month from$ 12 billion in 2021.

Cheaper oil has fueled India’s robust economic growth, which averaged 8.2 % last year and is on track to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2027, according to the International Monetary Fund ( IMF).

Some of India’s private financial institutions also comply with Western sanctions, which has made it challenging to transfer some of these resources, despite the Indian government’s refusal to do so. Russia has so agreed to&nbsp, invest some of&nbsp, its dollar stockpile in India, which has helped to expand and balance the two sides ‘ business.

India and Russia have also given three shipping corridor growth projects priority, none of which have reached their full potential. These include:

the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ) through Iran with branches across Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia,
the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor between those places, which is also known as the Eastern Maritime Corridor, and
the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic.

According to rumors that returning US President Donald Trump plans to resume his “maximum force” campaign against Iran, the INSTC is the most appealing but also the most susceptible of the three.

India has previously obtained a waiver from the US for dealing with Afghanistan at Iran’s Chabahar Port. Trump might impose more stringent sanctions on Iran, making it impossible for it to compel India to stop selling American goods, including pharmaceuticals, on Russian shelves, thereby lowering Russia’s now sizable dependence on China and raising its already high level of dependence on China.

If India’s alleged subtle technology channel is targeted, the same could happen. Given the number of China hawks in his case, that would seem to conflict with the incoming Trump administration’s great strategic goals.

Trump stated just before the election that he wanted to “un-unite” Russia and China, but he would just unintentionally do so if he places new restrictions on Russian-Indian industry to condemn Iran.

Trump added that he will give Ukraine’s battle a chance. Some observers anticipate that he will allow Russia to achieve its full range of territorial and other objectives in a ceasefire agreement, despite the uncertainty of how precisely. A suggested compromise’s words are still undetermined.

Under the American Logan Act, which criminalizes the negotiation of a dispute between the US and a foreign state by an undocumented American citizen, Trump and Russia are not permitted to communicate on a package. On January 20, agreements will start to discuss Trump’s election.

That could help India, which has close ties to Russia and the US, get started on discussions. Putin and Narendra Modi, the country’s prime minister, was talk about the possible military and economic ramifications of a bargain, including a possible Iran-Indian trade ban and/or a gradual lifting of sanctions against Russia.

India was then privately communicate these Soviet dealing points to the Trump administration, which if the president-elect’s initial term is any indication, may be specially friendly towards Modi’s government.

Dmitry Peskov, a spokeswoman for the Kremlin, confirmed on Tuesday that Putin’s trip to India will soon be announced. It may adopt Modi’s second visit to Russia in June, when he was Putin’s guest of honor at the time and had his first official meeting there in September. The officials signed nine partnerships and released a thorough joint statement at their most recent meeting over the summer.

Trump is also near to Modi, while is his nomination for director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard. Trump’s national security advisor get, Mike Waltz, is co-chair of the India conference and his nomination for secretary of state, Senator Marco Rubio, introduced the US-India Defense Cooperation Act in July.

If those figures and planets are paired up, India might be the key to bringing Ukraine to peace rather than past mediator Turkey or young ally China. Putin and Modi will likely talk about a deal with Ukraine during his upcoming trip, but details wo n’t likely be made publicly.

Putin is undoubtedly aware of Trump’s desire to “pivot” up to Asia, which necessitates a fast resolution of the Ukraine war. Putin is even aware of the crucial part India plays in controlling the European balance of power with China. &nbsp,

So, Modi is well-placed to evade US punishment for its business with Russia through Iran, which, if imposed, may lead to more Chinese influence in and over Russia. Modi may even offer pragmatical recommendations on how to reach a settlement in Ukraine that would be appropriate to Russia based on his near ties to Putin since 2014.

Putin had undoubtedly no support or encourage Trump to travel back to Asia to encircle China in a more powerful way. Instead, Putin understands Trump’s great strategic interests and may get to leverage them to Russia’s benefit.

Modi might explain to Trump how this would improve his aims in relation to China in order to achieve a compromise on Ukraine that is most likely to be appropriate to Russia.

Modi may even try to persuade Trump that an unfavorable outcome could be an escalated conflict in Ukraine ( even if it is done so so that it will then de-escalate to better terms for the US).

Russia may continue to be pushed closer to China as its growing junior partner, which was stifle the European balance of power in way that hurt US and Indian objectives.

Beyond sporadic hints at Ukraine, none of this is good to be included in the future Putin-Modi meeting or phone call, either later this year or first future. However, it’s important to appreciate the role that India plays in US and Russian great strategies, in the European balance of power and so, correctly, also in the Ukraine war.

How allied are Iran and Russia really? – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: November 19, 2024

In: Asia, World

After this month, Iran and Russia are expected to signal a strategic partnership agreement in Moscow, strengthening a relationship that has been in place since the early 2000s but has occasionally been adversaries.

Although the two parties have repeatedly shortened the original arrangement, both have acknowledged the necessity to revise it to better reflect modern-day international realities.

What were now contentious ties between Moscow and Tehran have been impacted by the conflict in Ukraine, the decay of relations between Russia and the global West, and the growing US-China conflicts.

The conflict in Ukraine appears to have altered Russia’s perspective, even if it was previously cautious not to give sensitive technologies to the Islamic Republic, mainly due to potential negative West-related reactions.

Iran has become a crucial position in its political rebalancing, and Moscow has made an incessant pivot toward Asia. Moscow is exceedingly seeing Iran as a significant partner because it is a heavily sanctioned condition and crucial for Russia’s expansion into the Indian Ocean and East Africa.

The current situation is unlikely to change with Donald Trump’s election. Although it is possible to reach an agreement between Moscow and Washington, the tensions between the two countries are conspicuous nevertheless.

Russia may continue to support its ties to the Islamic Republic. The former, too, is expected to experience greater stress from the Trump presidency, driving it to get greater military and political participation with Moscow.

The potential strategic partnership treaty’s major, important details are not made publicly available. However, an examination of Iranian and Russian government official public statements reveals a number of potential areas for improved diplomatic assistance.

The strategic partnership will unavoidably highlight the opposing positions of the Western-led international order and encourage a more multilateral one. Russia and Iran both support non-Western initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ) and the BRICS.

The development of the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ), which connects Russia to Iranian ports and India, and new payment options for international currency exchange, which are both important since trade between the two nations has recently declined.

Bilateral defense and strategic assistance will be a second, much more important area, as evidenced by Iran’s alleged supply of Russian short-range ballistic missiles and military drones. Later in October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that the agreement would involve more defence <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2024/10/31/russia-says-upcoming-treaty-with-iran-includes-closer-defense-cooperation”>cooperation.

Moscow and Tehran have also made an effort to work together to address regional concerns in the South Caucasus, where they border and whose goal is to keep non-regional ( mostly Western ) players at bay.

This thinking is at the root of the 3 3 program, which Tehran and Russia simultaneously support. It is comprised of Turkey and three South Caucasus countries, notably Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, though the latter has consistently refused to participate according to Russia’s activity of 20 % of its territory.

The new Russo-Iranian contract, which will undoubtedly grow cooperation, will probably end in vain because of their complex relationship as both companions and rivals in the Middle East. A legally binding alliance with iron-clad commitments to joint protection is neither required nor desired by either side.

Alternatively, both seek expanded assistance that gives enough space for movement. In fact, the two nations ‘ combined size allows them to avoid narrowing down their individual foreign policy objectives. They have so far avoided placing a singular adversary or professional at risk because it would restrict their options for international policy.

Despite the growing defense collaboration, diplomatic conflicts persist. Iran has reported that it is awaiting the distribution of Russia’s Su-35 fighter jet, which may indicate that the country is trying to balance its relations with another Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who oppose Iran’s impact and activities there.

Another level of tension lies in local infrastructure. The Zangezur hall, a proposed transportation route connecting Armenia and Nakhichevan through Armenia’s Syunik state, which edges Iran, has just received Russian support.

Iran opposes this hall, citing both its own local influence and its challenging connection with Armenia.

Most significantly, maybe, Russia is apparently afraid to go along with Iran in its worsening conflict with Israel. Iran is well-known for its close ties to Russia, and Israel has always had a particular connection with Moscow.

In part because of its close ties to the Jewish state, Russia has also been careful about offering military aid to Iran.

The invasion of Ukraine, as well as Israel’s military activities in Gaza and Lebanon, drove major transitions in Russia’s demeanor toward Israel. Moscow has generally adopted a pro-Palestinian place, and there are more differences.

Russia is also unlikely to support Iran in any possible immediate conflict with Israel, despite this bad backdrop. Even though it is technically feasible that Russia could supply air defense and aerospace to Iran to thwart an invasion, developing experience in using them takes time ( at least three months for the S-400 air defense system ).

The Russo-Iranian partnership, rooted in common resistance to American dominance, is logical but instantly fraught with competition. Russia is skeptical of Iran’s work to expand its international relations, especially if it wants to re-engage with the West.

Also, Iranian officials view Russia’s support as partially greedy, noting Moscow’s shift in attitude regarding its nuclear program as it seeks to force the West amid the Ukraine conflict.

Iran and Russia are moving forward with a new corporate contract, which will allow for both heightened cooperation and mute conflict, despite these difficulties. The relationship may strengthen while preserving each nation’s freedom on a global scale thanks to the agreement.

Emil Avdaliani&nbsp, is a professor of global relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a Silk Road professor. Following Emil Avdaliani on X at @emilavdaliani