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A” New Great Game” is emerging from Trump’s Greenland strategy, in which the ultimate strategic prize is command of this Arctic large.

This power struggle extends beyond land and ice to include essential raw materials, military supremacy, and shipping lanes in an exceedingly available polar region.

This automatic Danish province, which is not a member of the EU, has evolved from a distant island to the epicenter of contemporary geopolitical power as barriers fall. &nbsp,

Greenland is the world’s largest area, carefully located in the Arctic between America and Europe. Despite its small community of 57, 000, mostly Inuit, it holds huge political prominence due to its undiscovered energy potential, including oil, healthy gas, and essential minerals. Its close proximity to the developing transport routes in the Arctic and its position as a gateway for military operations and Arctic surveillance adds to its proper worth. &nbsp,

In 2019, former US President Donald Trump’s request to buy Greenland drew international interest, framing it as “essentially a huge real property deal”. Trump canceled a state visit to Copenhagen when Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen criticized it as “absurd.”

His&nbsp, comment, including a post featuring a golden Trump Tower superimposed on a Greenlandic settlement with the message,” I promise not to do this to Greenland”! were broadly mocked.

However, these remarks highlighted deeper US proper emotions. Greenland has become a political prize thanks to its Pituffik Space Base remaining a key component of America’s ballistic missile early-warning program and area surveillance. &nbsp,

Trump’s renewed force highlights growing US concerns about Russian and Chinese Arctic effect. The automatic Greenlandic state ‘s&nbsp, interest&nbsp, in assistance with China, particularly in mine jobs, coupled with Russia’s military build-up in the region, has intensified US necessity to strengthen its relationship.

However, the Swedish authorities seemed caught off guard by Trump’s claims, leading Frederiksen to rush for a good framing of the disagreement. &nbsp,

Additionally, he has repeatedly stated his interventionist goals within a month, including the restoration of the Panama Canal and the acquisition of Greenland in the current Trump 2.0 period, under the banner of MAGA. These claims are strengthened by his near-absolute power in this next term. &nbsp,

In a January 7th hit conference—a several days before his inauguration—he did not rule out the use of military or economic force to achieve his goal, &nbsp, claiming&nbsp, it as important:” People don’t even know if Denmark has any lawful right to it. But if they do, they may give it up … We need it for national safety”. On his social media platform, he&nbsp, insisted: &nbsp,

” the Free World, have safety, security, durability, and PEACE! This is a package that has happen” .&nbsp,

For China, a US appearance in Greenland threatens its Polar Silk Road initiative and supremacy in essential raw materials, necessary for advanced technology. Moreover, the Arctic’s warming climate could reduce transit times for Asian trade with Europe, making control over the region increasingly valuable. &nbsp,

Accordingly, three potential scenarios emerge. &nbsp,

First, the US could take a diplomatic approach offering Greenland financial incentives, development packages and autonomy guarantees. The difficulty would be persuading Greenlanders that integrating with Washington would result in long-term advantages while overcoming Denmark’s resistance, which is rooted in history, national pride, and strategic concerns.

This would stifle China’s access to vital minerals and halt its polar expansion, leading to Beijing’s desire to develop stronger ties with other Arctic countries, particularly Russia. &nbsp,

Second, the US might use increased investment and direct aid to counteract political pressure, potentially isolating Greenland from Denmark. Washington might also put political pressure on Copenhagen, implying that Nuuk’s support for NATO and the Arctic Council is essential, and that this would undermine Denmark’s ability to maintain control.

This ostensibly reflects China’s strategy of growing influence, but it also raises the possibility of alienating European allies. It may also lead Beijing to increase economic ties with local authorities and mobilize diplomatic opposition, thereby destabilizing Washington. &nbsp,

The US asserting de facto control over Greenland’s strategic resources or military infrastructure without formal acquisition, bypassing Denmark entirely, and even threatening economic repercussions if Copenhagen rejects an American diktat is the most aggressive scenario. &nbsp,

This is not unusual because the US has historically justified interventionist measures under the pretext of preserving regional stability. While the foundational&nbsp, Monroe Doctrine&nbsp, aimed to prevent European interference in the Americas, the Roosevelt Corollary expanded its scope, legitimizing US intervention in the Western Hemisphere to uphold stability or defend its interests.

Due to this history, US pressure on Greenland is seen as a comprehensive strategic plan to safeguard its sphere of influence as well as a territorial ambition. &nbsp,

However, this could trigger an international backlash, particularly from the EU, which would be legally obliged to respond to any sort of hostility or sanctions against Denmark, giving the EU anti-coercion instrument, therefore, unexpected importance.

Yet, based on recent developments in January 2025, the European Commission’s response to such threats—while it constantly criticizes China over matters that don’t directly affect Europe—exposes both weakness and a lack of clear strategy. &nbsp,

Another issue is China. It might interpret US pressure on Greenland in three ways: as a part of a larger geopolitical containment plan, as a claim of dominance that challenges Beijing’s growing global influence, and as a case study for limiting its ambitions in areas like the South China Sea.

Consequently, while adhering to its non-interference principle, China might weigh the strategic implications of US actions, treating them as part of a broader struggle for global primacy. &nbsp,

In response, China could pursue two approaches, having ruled out inaction. First, it might consider taking bold countermeasures, such as strengthening military and economic ties with Russia and bolstering local opposition in Greenland with financial aid and investments. This development is very uncomfortable and precarious for Denmark, a significant US ally. &nbsp,

A more assertive position, even though less probable, warrants consideration. While China might formally designate Greenland as a Danish internal issue in accordance with its non-interference policy, it may struggle to ignore US pressure on the country. If Beijing responded with a better economic offer, it would stoke a serious geopolitical conflict.

Denmark would likely decline an offer to preserve Western alliances, but Greenland’s response might be less nuanced if China promised substantial infrastructure development and respect for their sovereignty. &nbsp,

Any attempt by China to find alternative solutions to Greenland as a direct threat to its national security and Arctic dominance in the US would seem to be. Sanctions and an increase in military presence would be among the best means of stopping it, according to Washington.

China would be at risk for reputation because such a proposal could be viewed as neo-colonialialism, especially if it rejects the indigenous people’s wishes or undermines Danish sovereignty. Furthermore, Beijing would struggle to defend its position on sensitive issues like Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, where it monitors any movements for independence. &nbsp,

Nevertheless, the temptation is hard to resist: strong Chinese involvement would mark a historic shift reaching beyond Arctic geopolitics, challenging Western dominance and potentially altering the Arctic Council’s power dynamics. Russia might initially be appreciative of this development, but it will become more wary of Beijing’s growing presence. &nbsp,

Regardless of the outcome, these scenarios underscore Greenland’s emergence as a pivotal flashpoint in the broader US-China rivalry. The Arctic is a center for strategic resources, shipping routes, and military positioning, which pushes superpowers against international law and creates a more contentious geopolitical debate. &nbsp,

Trump’s push for Greenland could mark his” Polar Pivot”, a counterpart to Obama’s Pivot to Asia, yet focused on Arctic ambitions. For those who doubted Trump’s foreign policy vision, his attempt to redefine the Roosevelt Corollary—draped in protectionism, isolationism, and nationalism—offers a clear rebuttal.

If successful, it might even earn the title of the” Trump Corollary”. His approach is far from foolish, revealing a deliberate geopolitical plan hidden beneath the surface of his real estate rhetoric.

Republished with the kind permission of China-US Focus, 2025 ( www. chinausfocus.com ). Read the orignal here.

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The experiences we had with Syrian migrant families in New Zealand were nothing short of devastating. These were not philosophical studies from distant but deeply personal accounts of torture, prison, and illegal killings—testimonies that laid bare the unbelievable suffering inflicted by Bashar al-Assad’s program.

Any lingering misperceptions about the government’s ability for cruelty within the supposed standards of the liberal world purchase were dissipated by the repression’s large savagery. The idea of Syria’s release from such oppression felt less like a chance and more like an unattainable desire at those times.

However, after nearly 14 years, that moment arrived when Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ( HTS), led by Abu Mohammad al-Golani, seized control of major Syrian cities, including Damascus. Refugees worldwide, including in Europe, celebrated this rotating stage, taking to the streets with their flags of unity and full of hope for their country.

For the thousands of Palestinian refugees in EU countries, this moment of triumph brings confusion. While some may experience a sense of happiness, they also face a pressing fresh query: What comes next for them as immigrants?

However, EU nations have responded by halting new hospital programs, signaling a change that has raised worries among some Syrians. Some people may want to rush and see how HTS operates before making a decision to return to their country.

Legislators in the Union are now in a significant predicament. If they encourage Palestinian refugees to bring their own families back home with aid packages, or if they permit volunteer resettlement on an individual basis?

For migrants in Turkey and Lebanon, where they face conflicts and limited options, the decision to return may be more clear. Yet, for those in EU countries, the condition is more difficult.

Immigrants in the EU have access to social services and processes to membership. Some have visited Europe for almost ten years and have benefited from welcoming people and welcoming policies. The decision between staying in the EU and returning to Syria is challenging and deeply personal for these migrants.

The EU’s determination to end asylum applications appears to indicate that Western governments are getting ready for a lot of mass repatriation. In a post-conflict earth, their recovery and the profit of its residents might be seen as priorities from their viewpoint.

The end of Assad’s government is truly good news, and temporary safety procedures for Syrians in Europe may now be viewed as successful.

Yet, the safety of returning migrants remains a major concern. Units, while now in power, has past links to groupings like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. It’s unclear whether HTS will support minority-friendly government or build a one based on political principles.

For organizations such as the Yazidis, Christians, Shias and Kurdish Syrians, the position remains precarious. While Assad’s demise offers hope for a more egalitarian and political coming, this perspective may be balanced against fresh conflicts and power challenges.

Subsequent clashes between Kurdish and Turkish-backed forces have heightened worries of more unrest and violence, particularly in areas that have already been devastated by war.

In a quickly evolving political environment with much guarantee of safety or justice, these minority areas, which have long been marginalized and caught in the crossfire of opposing factions, are now at risk of dislocation and harassment. Hopes and aspirations for a freed Syria are tempered by the terrible reality of a scattered and dangerous state.

In response to various conflicts, such as the Afghan problems, where many refugees were forced to return, the EU has recently halted refugee applications. But as we know, Afghanistan remains illegal, specifically for minority and ladies, who continue to face serious restrictions on education and employment. This law raises questions about whether Syria is really prepared to welcome its citizens back safely.

Another complication is that the European Union is now deeply burdened with the task of assisting thousands of Ukrainian refugees who are fleeing Russia’s continuing anger. This has put a lot of strain on Western institutions, straining resources, and putting the limits of public and political compassion for large-scale movement to the test.

The possible relocation of Syrian refugees could lessen this strain by lowering the social and economic strains posed by hosting displaced communities.

The main problem is to decide whether Syria, especially the sections governed by Units, will uphold the rights, surveillance and livelihoods of returning Syrians, particularly those from minority communities.

Considerable doubts exist about the organization’s ability to promote a truly diverse and democratic society due to its historical ties to fundamentalist ideologies and its current hold on parts of northwest Syria.

Discussions between EU foreign secretaries and the Jolani group in charge of HTS are continuing, indicating an effort to find common ground or build frameworks for assistance.

These discussions are fragile because they must strike a balance between political concerns, political concerns, and the wider implications of speaking with a group that is still viewed with suspicion by many in the worldwide community.

Despite these attempts, the prospect remains ambiguous, as the way Units may consider in shaping its management, enforcing the rule of law, and ensuring the safety of returnees is yet to be seen. The idea of extensive repatriation is currently both a social gamble and a humanitarian necessity.

The Union must reconsider its method of relocation if Units adopts a restrictive position equivalent to that of the Taliban. Until HTS allows democracy to grow and ensures the safety of all citizens, irrespective of their religion, nationality, or history, Syrian refugees should not be pressured to profit.

Ultimately, the EU must uphold its commitment to voluntary repatriation. Syrian refugees deserve the freedom to choose this potentially fatal course of action at their own pace. EU leaders should be aware that refugees are subject to forced displacement and that repatriation is a gradual process.

Syrian refugees should be given temporary protection and should work with other countries to ensure their safe return when necessary. The EU must continue to support those rights as an institution that was founded on human rights.

A crucial conundrum is at the center of this situation: while the EU can encourage repatriation and lay the groundwork through diplomacy, returning must always be voluntary, especially for those Syrian refugees who are currently residing in EU member states.

Dr Sheraz Akhtar lectures at Thailand’s Chiang Mai University. His research examines the social, economic, and educational development of refugee communities in host nations.

Canadian author and editor Patrick Keeney. His areas of interest are at the intersection of philosophy, politics, and the study of ideas. &nbsp,

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From trade dominance to provide chain power: China’s Globalization 2.0

David Goldman makes a point about China’s shifting business plan, known as” Globalization 2.0,” which focuses on establishing supply stores throughout the Global South. In consequence, China’s direct part in US imports has increased, with Chinese goods passing through next countries.

Germany’s lock vote: AfD benefits, CDU/CSU weakens and financial uncertainty persists

Germany’s preparations for the February 23 lock national elections are highlighted by Diego Faßnacht. Amid business collapse, higher energy costs, and economic slowdown, elections show rising separation, with the far-right AfD and smaller events gaining ground.

As China and India adjust, the effects of oil sanctions may be temporary.

James Davis information the Biden administration’s extraordinary eleventh-hour sanctions on Russia’s dark fuel tanker fleet. Although significant buyers are observing the sanctions, both countries are considering subtle strategies to support Russian oil imports.

Japan’s Ishiba: Political success and private problems

Scott Foster discusses Shigeru Ishiba, the prime minister of Japan ,’s new political accomplishments in Malaysia and Indonesia, where he bolstered economic and security relationships. Domestically, while, Japan grapples with higher prices, rising real estate prices, and the dollar’s loss.

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On January 19, 2025, the much-anticipated Gaza peace and prisoner agreement is expected to become effective, subject to a postponed Jewish government’s decision to vote on the package, which had originally been scheduled for the morning of January 16.

The discovery comes 15 months into the terrible conflict that was sparked by a Hamas gunmen attack on October 7, 2023, which resulted in the deaths of about 1,200 Israelis and the taking of 251 hostages. In the following bomb and battle of the Gaza Strip, some 45, 000 Palestinians have been killed.

What does the present discovery mean for the chances of a more lasting peace, however, and why? Asher Kaufman, a teacher of peace studies at the University of Notre Dame and an expert on Jewish story, was contacted by The Conversation for clarifications.

What is the deal’s major thrust?

Not all of the information have been clarified or made public. However, we do know this:

The package is divided into three levels. In the first step, 33 people, children and men who are ill or over the age of 55 may be released in stages over 42 weeks. Two Americans have been among the victims taken by Hamas, according to reports that they have been there since October 7.

In full, 94 victims remain in prison, including 34 thought to be dead.

Palestinians who were forced to leave north Gaza will also be permitted to return, even though the majority of the neighborhood and their homes are completely destroyed.

Negotiations will start on the 16th day of the agreement’s application, which will include the transfer of Hamas’s remaining captives. Israel will move its troops to a protective buckle to provide a cushion between Israel and the Gaza Strip at this point.

Israel may release Arab prisoners in exchange for releasing the hostages in accordance with a predetermined ratio for each Jewish dead or living human or soldier. Hunderte of Arab women and children are expected to be released in the first wave, already housed in Israeli prisons. Israel did also permit more humanitarian aid to enter Gaza.

The launch of the remaining hostages will be a part of the next phase of the agreement, and Egypt, Qatar, and the UN will be assisting with the rebuilding of Gaza. Israel’s complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip is anticipated at this point.

How important is the miracle?

Gaza has been ravaged by the war’s fifteen times. This agreement could lead to the end of the conflict that and set the stage for the first steps toward stabilization and reconstruction.

It might also allow the incoming Trump presidency to concentrate on other pressing issues that are more important to its foreign policy strategy, such as a possible new agreement with Iran and the resumed standardization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia in relation to the establishment of a new security alliance with the US.

For Israel, it means the possibility of the end of its longest conflict, which has cost a fortune, eroded its reputation internationally, and severly divided its culture between supporters and opponents of the state. It might put an end to the disaster that has been in place since October 7, 2023, allowing Jewish society to start its own recuperation.

What concerns remain excellent?

Over the early phases of the agreement, there are significant questions. Critical users of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s alliance, including Ministers of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, have been accused of being more engaged in a permanent job of the Gaza Strip than in the transfer of the victims.

They will be reluctant to accept any procedures that would result in the area becoming a Palestinians ‘ administrative and security force.

The Israeli government has made it abundantly clear that it does not believe Hamas will play a role in a post-conflict Gaza throughout the issue. But Hamas ‘ main competitor, the Palestinian Authority, has small trust among Gaza’s people. Who may rule in Gaza remains to be seen.

Additionally, it raises the possibility that, if Israel had been really interested in putting the deal into action, it might have agreed to a deal that would require Israel to completely leave Gaza in exchange for the release of all hostages rather than have one that would have been put into action incrementally.

Why did speaks achieve today, but earlier efforts fail?

This package has been discussed at least since May 2024. However, Netanyahu and his administration have opposed it in part because they want Israel to keep control of Gaza.

Some of his government’s officials have expressly discussed creating the circumstances for reducing the number of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and some of them have also stated that they want to build Israeli settlements there.

Netanyahu’s critics also suggested that the prime minister wanted to keep the battle going as long as possible because it benefited him socially.

However, Donald Trump’s election as president of the US changed the relationships between Israel, Hamas, and the US.

Trump wants to be recognized as a deal-maker on a global scale, and Netanyahu, a Democratic ally, feels inclined to lend his support to Trump on this front. Trump can take on a part thanks to the schedule of the agreement, and Joe Biden can keep with a “win” in terms of foreign policy.

There are also hopes that forging a package, which was started under Trump’s second administration, will then open the door for the continuation of normalization discussions between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Netanyahu’s reputation as the country’s leader in charge of the October 7 slaughter may become balancing out with a deal with Saudi Arabia.

How will the bargain play out in Israel’s turbulent politics?

The major problem that may affect the deal’s death in the long run is this.

Its provisions are in direct opposition to the aspirations of some members of Netanyahu’s ruling coalition, and they may do everything in their power to damage it.

If these right-wing holdouts leave the government or remain in the alliance because they think the latter stages of the offer won’t be put into action, it is still unclear.

What does it suggest for Hamas’s part in Gaza and its future?

Conditions that could change Hamas ‘ rule in Gaza are not included in the contract.

Netanyahu has so far opposed any attempts to elicit the Palestinian Authority’s profit or permit any other Arab or international organizations to run human affairs in the remove.

Hamas, on the other hand, has no desire to facilitate its substitute by various governing bodies and transferring control of Gaza. The militant group is now in a less powerful place than it was before Oct. 7, because it has lost key users of its authority over the course of the battle.

A sarcastic opinion might be that Netanyahu’s efforts to manage the Israeli-Palestinian issue does actually benefit from having a weakened Hamas remain in power rather than trying to resolve it.

Before October 7, he had this strategy in place, and there are no signs that it has changed.

University of Notre Dame professor of history and harmony research Asher Kaufman

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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The UK’s anti-corruption secretary, Tulip Siddiq, has resigned from the state after being named in many bribery investigations in Bangladesh. The claims extend to some close family members, including Siddiq’s uncle, the deposed Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina, and her family, Sheikh Rehana. Hasina faces significant criminal charges after the ouster of her state in the midst of common political upheaval.

Hasina fled Bangladesh on August 5 last year in the midst of widespread demonstrations and social unrest that resulted in the end of her 15-year law. Her state is accused of a number of autocratic methods, including extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances.

There are also claims of significant economic mismanagement. Injuries and other serious injuries were reported during violent clashes involving her demise in July and August 2024, which included more than 1,500 fatalities and hundreds of injuries.

An international court to look into crimes committed during Hasina’s rule has been established by the newly established Bangladeshi state. Legal proceedings are pending to challenge permits for the incarceration of Hasina and her home. Siddiq, for example, could be asked to answer for her reported role in corruption cases.

Tulip Siddiq’s name has officially been mentioned in two important corruption investigations, but she has consistently refuted both the allegations made against her and addressed the minister’s adviser on ministerial interests, who is responsible for finding out whether ministers follow government conduct laws. It’s acceptable behaviour for ministries and doesn’t in any way indicate grief.

In her letter to Sir Laurie Magnus, she wrote,” I am clear that I have done nothing wrong.” ” But, for the avoidance of doubt, I would like you to freely create the information about these things”. According to Magnus, Siddiq had “inadvertently misled” the people about an room that an alliance of her uncle had given her. It should not be taken as a violation of the ministerial code.

Sheikh Hasina’s father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was known as the “founding parents of Bangladesh”. He led the country, formerly known as East Pakistan, to independence from Pakistan in 1971. This occurred following a brutal and bloody conflict known as the” Bangladeshi murder,” in which 10 million Bangladeshis were killed and 10 million were internally internally. ( Some 200, 000 Bangladeshi women are alleged to have been raped by Pakistani military personnel. )

In 1973, Rahman was elected president of Bangladesh’s second interim government by a majority vote. In a military coup on August 15, 1975, he, his wife, three children, and other community members were killed amid allegations of corruption and political oppression. Sheikh Hasina and her girl Sheikh Rehana were both present at the time, but they managed to survive the murder.

When she returned to Bangladesh in 1981, Sheikh Hasina took charge of the social organization, the Awami League. She finally took over in 1996. Hasina’s reputation quickly changed as a result of accusations that she was using her position to benefit herself and her family, despite her initial reputation as a political leader. Hasina’s government passed a number of contentious regulations, including those that are now widely regarded as energy abuses, to protect all of her family members from state surveillance and cover.

In 2001, under the Father of the Nation’s Family Security Act, she was properly given the Ganabhaban, the standard prime minister’s residence in the capital Dhaka, apparently for a key value. Additionally, her girl Sheikh Rehana was given a home in the wealthy Dhanmondi neighborhood.

Her government supposedly approved sizable financial aid, provided a monthly allowance for each child until they were 25 years old, covered all education expenses both at home and abroad, and provided a monthly allowance for each child. This accumulation of assets and protections apparently continued until Hasina fled to India in 2024 amid widespread protests.

Allegations of corruption

Sheikh Hasina’s substantial economic growth is credited with occurring between 2009 and 2024. However, latest information from a Bangladeshi authorities white paper published in December suggests that this progress was largely made up. The report claims that Hasina’s coworkers and friends manipulated key economic indicators and funneled billions of dollars to foreign accounts.

Muhammad Yunus, the time president of Bangladesh, has demanded the profit of what he has referred to as stolen goods and called for the release of Sheikh Hasina and people. Hasina has denied making any accusations in relation to Yunus ‘ says.

Human Rights Watch, a New York-based NGO, has documented considerable human rights abuses during Hasina’s program, adding to the claims against her home. Hasina has denied the NGO’s claims.

Apparently, Hasina’s official residence in Dhaka, which was seized following her ouster, was the site of social flyers and expensive items relating to Siddiq. Additional concerns are raised by Siddiq’s alleged role in the Ruppur nuclear deal, which is currently being investigated for cash fraud. She reportedly worked with Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, to negotiate the US$ 1.2 billion offer.

According to Bangladesh News 24, the nuclear deal, a three-way task involving funding from Bangladesh, India and Russia, resulted in the reported misappropriation of millions of dollars of public money. Siddiq’s function is thought to be being looked into by researchers, among other things. According to reports, she claimed to have told a representative for the British state that she had been a victim of a “political hit job.”

Siddiq is accused of being involved in fraud and embezzlement by the Bangladeshi government. Her departure may turn out to be the least of her worries given the seriousness of the allegations against other family members, which range from death to forced kidnappings to financial scam.

Tulip Siddiq’s withdrawal marks a significant turning point for her as Bangladesh seeks justice through the newly established global court. However, Bangladeshi studies continue to suggest that this is only the start of a protracted and challenging legal fight.

The University of Essex’s Center for Accountability and Global Development is led by Shahzad Uddin.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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