What Assad’s fall says about Putin’s great-power ambitions – Asia Times

The Middle East has been shocked by the Assad regime’s swift overthrow. The region’s energy balance has changed dramatically since the dictator’s family’s dispossession of him for more than 50 years.

Beyond Syria and its neighbors, significant ramifications exist, with Russia one of the more severely affected countries.

Back in 2015, Assad’s plan had been on the brink of collapse. A Russian treatment, supported by Iran and Hezbollah, saved it. Russia, which was established in response to the growing risk from Islamic State, gave Assad’s regime the ability to repress another rebel groups as well.

Over the years that followed, it gave Assad the ability to retake control of the city’s money, another important towns, and in particular the coastal area, where Russia had two military installations.

The future of these foundations is now questionable. Russians needed important resources to establish military power in the Mediterranean Sea and support the Kremlin’s say to Russian great-power standing, including an air basic at Khmeimim established south of Latakia in 2015, as well as the Russian naval base in Tartus, which dates back to the Soviet era.

Given how substantial investments have been made over the years to support the program and how important are the bases for Russia, Assad’s fall has a negative impact on Russia’s ability to assert reliable influence on the global stage.

Yet if Russia manages to reach an agreement with Syria’s fresh leaders regarding the future of its military installations, Moscow’s failure to save an important ally like Assad exposes crucial shortcomings in Russia’s capacity to act like a great strength rather than just talk.

There are distinct knowledge gaps that either overlooked or misinterpreted Qatar’s continued support for anti-Assad forces and Turkey’s covert support for this. These losses were then made worse by the Russian military’s ineffectiveness and ability to increase them on short notice. This is, of course, according to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

Iran and Hezbollah, two different Kremlin allies in the region, have been given more military support, which has more complicated Assad’s situation, and this has also made the effects of Russia’s overwhelm worse. This even raises the question of whether Russia had a strategic error in interpreting the position and undervalued Syria’s risk.

Even more disturbing is the fact that Russia relies on friends who positively support a young wonderful power that lacks the means to proclaim its claim to power, as Iran and Hezbollah did in 2015, as Assad did when he provided Russia with its military foundations.

Where’s China?

China is missing from this equation. Beijing had backed Assad after the start of the Syrian civil war, but most of it was rhetorical. It was primarily intended to stop a Western-backed, UN-backed intervention similar to the one in Libya that caused the country’s chaos and the fall of Gaddafi since.

A high-profile visit of Assad to China in September 2023 resulted in a strategic partnership agreement. In Beijing’s eyes at least, this appeared to be another step in the direction of the Syrian regime. However, China did nothing to save him when the situation suddenly appeared and Assad’s rule was in serious danger.

Xi Jinping and Bashar al-Assad: friends – with limited benefits. &nbsp, Photo: Yao Dawei / Xinhua / Alamy Live News

This raises a significant question about how well-versed in China is the Syrian government and the evolving crisis. But there is also a broader point here regarding Russian great-power ambitions.

Despite all the talk of a never-ending partnership between Moscow and Beijing, China ultimately failed to save Russia from humiliating defeat in Syria.

China’s interests in the Middle East are primarily about economic opportunity and the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, unlike Russia, where it needed a military presence to back up its claims to great-power status.

This has clearly limited Beijing’s appetite to become more involved, let alone to bail out Assad.

Putin diminished

Russia’s position in the Middle East now is in peril. Moscow lost a significant allies to Assad. Its other main allies, Iran and Hezbollah, are significantly weakened. Israel and Turkey, with whom the Kremlin has not had easy relations over the past few years, have been strengthened.

This exposes the hollowness of Russian claims to great-power status. Russia’s reputation and standing in the eyes of other partners is likely to be further diminished, whether they are from China or North Korea, from BRICS members or from countries in the Global South that Russia has recently tried to woo.

The consequences of that are likely to be ambiguous for Ukraine, which is arguably Russia’s biggest contributor to the overstretch.

On the one hand, the ease with which Assad was removed shows that Russia has limitations and is not invincible. On the other hand, nothing but Russian resumption should be anticipated in Ukraine.

Putin requires a swift recovery to help him win both domestic and international trust. After all, Donald Trump does not like losers.

Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham

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How to know if Trump intends to sell out to China – Asia Times

Trump is not yet in office, and some people are beginning to understand that they didn’t receive the results they hoped. During his campaign, &nbsp, Trump promised unhappy consumers&nbsp, that his policies may “rapidly travel costs down” and “bring your food expenses means down”.

Understandably, Trump has now&nbsp, equivocated on that assurance, declaring that “it’s hard to bring things down when they’re up”. Conservatives hoped that Trump would upend the transgender movement and advocate for a traditional view of identity, but he now claims he doesn’t “want to get into the bath problem” and that he wants” to have all individuals treated pretty.”

Some technologists anticipated that Trump would be a friend of engineering and a foe of inadequate unions, but now Trump denies automation and supports the longshoremen’s union:

And so on. This doesn’t come as a surprise to everyone, of program— we’ve had nearly a decade to observe Trump&nbsp, make promises and split them.

Everyone is aware that Trump adheres to his own preferences, feelings, and personal objectives, and that what constitutes his philosophy is merely a set of instincts and hazy ideas that he independently compiled after watching too many CNN on television in the 1990s. If you projected your hopes and dreams onto Trump when you pulled the lever, also, I guess that’s on you.

All in all, I’m not&nbsp, too&nbsp, worried about the status of the United States right then. Our business is strong, even if Trump re-accelerates prices by running huge deficits and toying with the Fed, it probably didn’t get severe.

Our world is slowly settling back after a decade of upheaval. Climate change is a risk, but it ‘s&nbsp, typically being caused by different countries, so even if Trump cancels clean electricity subsidies it’ll had only a marginal effect on the planet.

A lot of long-term persistent problems, like injustice, are definitely worth addressing but not as instantly essential as we made them out to be in the 2010s. Trump may put Ukraine under the bus, but doing so would be a terribly wrong and repugnant thing to do. It also won’t pose a direct threat to the US.

And yet there’s one big exception, which is the threat posed to the US by the People’s Republic of China. China has the capacity to defeat the US in any extended conventional war, thanks to its domination of global manufacturing, soon, it may have the capacity to&nbsp, defeat the US and all of its allies combined. What China will then only be able to do to the US in accordance with its current policy.

And I think it’s clear that&nbsp, what China’s current leaders want&nbsp, is to reduce the US to a second-rate power so that there’s no chance it will threaten their hegemony or their freedom of action in the future. This is what some claim the US did to Russia following the Cold War. And communist China is not&nbsp, nearly&nbsp, as nice a country as the US was in the 1990s.

The economic and political consequences for the American people would be, to put it mildly, pretty negative.

The only way I can think of preventing this happening is to close the manufacturing gap between the US-led alliance and China, rather than simply praying that China somehow collapses or that the Chinese are some sort of uniquely passive and mild people who won’t actually do anything as their leaders say they will.

Biden&nbsp, made some strides toward this&nbsp, during his term in office, reviving US manufacturing somewhat with his industrial policies, and implementing stringent and wide-ranging export controls on the Chinese chip industry.

The big question is whether Trump will continue the effort to ( partially ) catch up to China in manufacturing, or whether he will scrap it. Given that Trump frequently talks about how his tariffs on China are going to restore American manufacturing, this may seem like a stupid question. But you shouldn’t believe this story, for several reasons.

The first is that Trump’s tariff threats, like his promise to bring down grocery prices, may be mostly bluster. During his campaign, he promised 60 % tariffs on China, now, he has apparently&nbsp, reduced the number to 10 %. That is a pretty small amount, and exchange rate appreciation will&nbsp, easily cancel it out.

The second is that Trump’s tariffs on US allies will significantly hinder China’s effort to become a manufacturing partner. Currently, Trump is threatening only 10 % tariffs on China, but&nbsp, 25 % tariffs on Mexico and Canada. This is likely just bluster and theater ( in which case we should inquire as to how an economic strategy that heavily relies on bluster and theater will help the US catch up to China in terms of manufacturing ).

But if it’s for real, it will hurt US manufacturing, by making imported components more expensive. Remember that while US tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and other allies directly affect the Chinese manufacturing juggernaut, creating a large common market outside of China is one of the most important strategies.

Trump’s tariffs, in my opinion, could give him the most political and rhetorical cover to basically abandon his fight against China’s influence. Tariffs, along with aggressive rhetoric, give Trump the appearance and reputation of a China hawk.

Without suffering much of a political blow, he could effectively gut America’s nascent resistance to China thanks to his stellar reputation. In the 2020s, we might discover that only Trump could sell us out to China, much like Nixon did in the 1970s.

Why do you think Trump did that in his first term when he was largely very hawkish toward China? Several reasons.

First of all, he is already discussing a number of ways to accommodate Chinese power. Trump initially requested a TikTok divestment, but he later reversed his opposition to the bipartisan TikTok divestment bill earlier this year.

The Information has reported&nbsp, that TikTok altered its algorithm to favor Trump and the GOP. Trump may have been helped by billionaire Jeff Yass ‘ financial contributions to TikTok, which he also owns.

The bipartisan CHIPS Act, the most significant and ( so far ) successful single policy that America has implemented to shore up its industrial base in more than 50 years, was denounced by Trump during his campaign.

In other words, Trump’s main reason to believe he might sell American interests to the CCP is that he is already openly discussing doing so.

Additionally, it’s possible that some of Trump’s advisors favor a complacent view of Chinese power. Although Trump has appointed some hawks like Marco Rubio to his administration, his most important advisor and confidant — at least, for now— is Elon Musk. &nbsp, A recent story in the Financial Times&nbsp, detailed Musk’s deep business connections with China — connections that he would be loath to lose in a conflict:

The richest man in the world has close ties to powerful Chinese Communist Party leaders, and is reportedly urging Beijing to make important decisions regarding Tesla, his$ 1 billion electric vehicle business. The carmaker relies heavily on its largest factory in Shanghai, which is the largest in its global network, to sell to the nation’s 1.4 billion people and export its China-made vehicles to other parts of the world. Musk’s Chinese suppliers, especially in batteries, are also crucial to the company’s global manufacturing operations, including in the US…

According to Yuqiu Wang of Freedom House,” Musk is not only vulnerable to Beijing’s pressure, but he also appears to genuinely enjoy close relationships with China’s authoritarian leaders,” he says. The CCP has plenty of opportunities to influence Trump’s China policy thanks to this dynamic.

Vivek Ramaswamy&nbsp, and&nbsp, Tulsi Gabbard&nbsp, have also both called for the US to accommodate Chinese power in Asia, with Tulsi even going so far as to&nbsp, denounce Japan’s rearmament&nbsp, in the face of Chinese aggression. So although it doesn’t seem&nbsp, certain&nbsp, that Trump will roll over for the Chinese Communist Party, it certainly seems like a real possibility.

So how will we know? With Trump, there’s always a lot of bluster and theater. On top of that, it’s hard to tell whether Trump really believes that tariffs will be effective in restoring American manufacturing, or if they’re just a smoke screen. Meanwhile, Congress will probably&nbsp, fight hard to keep the CHIPS Act&nbsp, and the TikTok divestment bill.

However, Trump has the power to sabotage America’s efforts to compete with Chinese influence. He could cancel&nbsp, the export controls&nbsp, that the Biden administration placed on the Chinese semiconductor industry. Trump could simply do it whenever he wanted, without requiring executive action to remove export controls.

And because the policy is not really in the limelight, there probably wouldn’t be a popular backlash to its cancellation. So export controls are pretty much a pure test of Trump’s China policy — if he keeps them, it’s because he&nbsp, wants&nbsp, to stand up to China, and if he cancels them, it means he doesn’t.

And make no mistake — China&nbsp, really, really&nbsp, wants those export controls gone. Despite early&nbsp, wailing and gnashing of teeth&nbsp, over Huawei’s creation of a 7nm chip, the US export controls have almost certainly been very effective in slowing down China’s chip industry. Just a few examples of evidence point to the effectiveness of the controls:

    SMIC, the Chinese foundry company that developed the 7nm chip, was rumored to be rapidly advancing to 5nm. But the company has reportedly&nbsp, delayed its 5nm release until at least 2026. This has &nbsp, left SMIC’s customer Huawei in the lurch, relying on technology that’s fast becoming obsolete.

  • Even SMIC’s 7nm process, hailed as a catastrophic failure for export controls, is actually&nbsp, not achieving good yields, and is reportedly having reliability issues. This is probably&nbsp, hurting Huawei’s production&nbsp, of leading-edge phones.
  • In the last five years, &nbsp, over 22, 000 Chinese semiconductor companies have reportedly shut down. This is almost certainly due to some of it being exported.
  • Huawei’s own chip production is&nbsp, probably suffering as well, with&nbsp, very low yields. The low yields are probably a result of having to rely on older, outdated equipment, due to export controls.
  • Meanwhile, &nbsp, Chinese companies are pessimistic&nbsp, about their ability to keep up with leading-edge chipmakers without access to the latest chipmaking tools from the Netherlands, the US, and Japan. This is expected to have &nbsp, deep ramifications for the AI race&nbsp, between the US and China.

In other words, export controls are doing what they’re designed to do. They’re not killing China’s chip industry, but they’re slowing it down in important ways, and letting the U. S. retain its technological edge.

What’s more, the Biden administration constantly strengthened the controls, plugging loopholes even as China fought to come up with new workarounds. In fact, the outgoing administration &nbsp, released one more very strong update&nbsp, to the export controls on December 2, denying China many of the best cutting-edge AI chips.

If the US wants to maintain any sort of military-technological advantage over China, export controls are effective and absolutely necessary. Chips are &nbsp, the foundation of&nbsp, all&nbsp, modern weaponry, from missiles to drones to satellites to advanced fighter jets.

And AI itself, which relies on advanced chips for inference and training, is quickly emerging as a vital tool of conflict. AI will become even more important to the military balance when autonomous drone swarms strike the front line.

Even with all the world’s industrial and tariff laws, the US is unlikely to be able to compete with China. America needs to maintain a technological edge to counteract its productive weakness, which should be balanced out by its quality deficiencies. Those semiconductors are the edge. If Trump cancels the export controls, it will mean he’s destroying America’s best chance to keep its weapons ahead of China’s weapons.

Now, Trump&nbsp, might&nbsp, not do this. After all, Trump was the one to start the practice of imposing export controls on China during his first term ( which targeted a select few Chinese businesses ). But recall that Trump dropped the export controls against China’s ZTE, reportedly as&nbsp, a personal favor to Xi Jinping. Congress&nbsp, scrambled to keep the controls in place, but they failed.

Trump’s second term could see a repeat of that episode. Trump might cancel America’s semiconductor export controls, possibly as some kind of deal for China dropping its own far less formidable export controls on&nbsp, drone batteries&nbsp, and&nbsp, various metals&nbsp, — or maybe just for no reason at all. Trump might not even need any justifications for his actions.

In any case, Trump’s decision to revoke export controls will send the strongest message that his administration wants to stop trying to compete with Chinese influence. Don’t let tariff theater fool you; this is the real test.

This&nbsp, article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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What next for US in post-Assad Syria? – Asia Times

The United States ‘ response to the social upheaval appears uncertain because a new state is expected to emerge in Syria following a sudden revolution earlier this year. Rebel groups quickly overthrew Syria’s lifelong head, Bashar al-Assad, on December 8, 2024, sending the tyrant into exile in Russia.

President Joe Biden has stated that the US will be monitoring the rebel groups ‘ behavior and that they have a “grim history of extremism.” However, Donald Trump, the president-elect, has stated that the US may not engage in the immediate acquisition and its aftermath.

Jordan Tama, a professor of US international policy at American University, spoke with The Conversation US to better understand the role the US has played in Syria and what Assad’s abrupt demise may think for this connection.

A framed porter of a white man with dark hair and a dark suit is seen with the glass cracked.
A damaged portrait of previous Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a federal building on Dec. 7, 2024, in Hama, Syria. Photo: Omar Haj Kadour / AFP via Getty Images via The Talk

What aspect of US military relationship with Syria is most crucial to be aware of?

US presence in Syria dates back to at least 2011, when the Arab Spring, a pro-democracy Middle East opposition movements, broke out and spread to Syria.

This prompted a brutal assault by the Arab government, led by Arab chief al-Assad. Some of the activists later joined rebel groups in Syria and fought the Assad state, leading to a civil war. The US instantly imposed severe economic sanctions on Syria’s government.

Some of the insurgent parties that were restraining the Assad government began receiving weapons from the US in 2013. By using biochemical weaponry against civilians, the Syrian army even crossed a “red range” that was established by then-President Barack Obama that season. Obama opted never to act despite being under pressure to maintain the dark line once Assad agreed to end Syria’s chemical weapons, a duty Assad did not fully live up to.

In 2014, the Islamic State group, often known as ISIS or IS, took over pieces of Syria. In 2015, the US immediately sent its troops to combat IS. By 2019, the US had seriously weakened IS, and the US scaled back its appearance. The US not accepted the Assad administration’s legitimacy, but it did become largely resigned to Assad’s law.

What does US presence look like at the moment?

In a number of methods, the US has continued to be involved in Syria. Second, it has about 900 soldiers deployed in some distant elements of Syria to stop ISIS from regrouping.

Next, the US has provided more than US$ 1 billion in military support to more modest armed organizations that the Assad authorities had fought against. The Syrian Democratic Forces, a military force led by the Kurds, a minority ethnic group in northeast Syria, has collaborated tightly with the US to combat ISIS while preserving its antagonism to Assad.

Third, the US has continued to impose stringent economic sanctions against the Arab state since 2011. And third, the US has been providing humanitarian aid for Syria suffering from the country’s 13-year legal conflict.

The US did not directly participate in the new uprising against the Arab government. Turkey, which seeks to undermine the Arab branch of another Kurdish organization known as the Kurdistan Workers ‘ Party, is primarily behind the Syrian rebel organizations that overthrew Assad. Turkey sights this organization as a threat to power its own Shiite population.

What does the US’s support for the Assad government think?

The US is still unsure as to whether this change will benefit the country. Nevertheless, Assad’s fall opens the possibility of increased relationships between the US and Syria, but that will hinge, in large part, on the new management in Syria.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or Units, the team that led the destroy of Assad, has ruled in an authentic sense in the area of Syria it has already been controlling.

The US is likewise concerned about ISIS, which is still ongoing. In recent days, the US has launched a number of attacks against ISIS targets in an effort to stop the organization from gaining floor following the fall of the Assad government.

A girl stands and holds a black and green and white flag with three red stars and stands next to several men, including one in camouflage holding a gun.
Folks gather with insurgent fighters on Umayyad Square in Damascus, Syria, on Dec. 10, 2024. Nael Chahine, Middle Eastern Images, AFP, via Getty Images, The Talk

What does Trump’s election suggest for the US relationship in Syria?

Trump has stated that Syria is a disaster and that it is not the fault of the United States. Trump’s experts persuaded him to maintain a small number of troops in Syria after they persuaded him to withdraw all of the remaining US troops from his first word. Trump likely didn’t care whether Syria’s new frontrunners act in an authoritarian sense or not.

Trump, however, is a staunch supporter of Israel, and it’s possible that he won’t be too upset if Israel launches attacks in Syria.

Under Trump, the US will likely not become a significant factor in shaping activities in Syria, but I believe it is in the country’s best interest to continue cooperating because what happens in Syria has an impact on the rest of the Middle East and, consequently, the US.

American University School of International Service provost associate teacher Jordan Tama

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The Syrian powder-keg and geopolitical risk – Asia Times

Subscribe right away and get the first year for only$ 99. With a one-month trial for only$ 1, you can sign up for the exclusive rate of$ 99.

The Palestinian powder-keg and political risk

David Goldman argues that there is a disconnect between escalating geopolitical tensions, especially in Ukraine and Syria, and subdued industry threat assessments. As the fall of the Assad regime raises the risk of jihadist threats against Russia and China, confusion persists.

Merz fails to notice Germany’s main concern

Diego Faßnacht shows Germany’s financial struggles, driven by higher energy costs stemming from its shutdown of nuclear power plants, rely on costly US gasoline imports, and the loss of cheap Russian energy. These elements have accelerated de-industrialization.

Russia has benefits in the forefront before Trump 2.0.

James Davis reports that Russian troops continue to dominate in Ukraine, achieving significant regional increases in November 2024, with improvements in the Kursk obvious, Donbass, and southern sides. However, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria complicates Russia’s place.

Japan’s grips with a modern trade deficit

&nbsp, Scott Foster examines Japan’s growing “digital imbalance”, a major industry disparity in online services like software registration, sky storage, and online platforms, which surpassed ¥5.35 trillion in 2023 and is projected to reach ¥6.5 trillion this year. &nbsp,

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Syria’s fallen regime linked to black market drug trade – Asia Times

Big stocks of the illegal drug captagon have apparently been discovered following the fall of the al-Assad government in Syria.

The supplies, found by Arab rebels, are believed to be linked to al-Assad defense office, implicating the fallen program in the product’s manufacture and distribution.

Captagon was previously a medical drug, similar to some of the legal substances we still use today for conditions like attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder ( ADHD), as we’ll observe.

Captagon was again a medicinal

Captagon is the original name for a vintage chemical pharmaceutical drug that was created in Germany in the 1960s. It was an option to drug and drugs, which were both used as treatments at the time.

The original substance, which was developed to treat conditions like ADHD and insomnia, contained the active component fenethylline. It had a similar apply to some of the officially available substances we also use now, such as dexamphetamine.

Captagon has identical results to stimulants. It increases serotonin in the mind, leading to emotions of well-being, satisfaction and joy. It also improves target, attention and strength. But it has a lot of unwanted side effects, like as low-level illness.

The medicine was first mainly sold in the Middle East and some parts of Europe. It was available over the counter ( without a prescription ) in Europe for a short time before it became prescription-only.

Prior to becoming a managed substance in the 1980s, it only dimly received US approval, but it was still permitted to treat insomnia in some European nations until recently.

Captagon’s production, according to the International Narcotics Control Board, had stopped by 2009.

The illegal business seized control of the situation.

The illegally produced type is typically referred to as captagon ( with a small c ). Because it is thought that men in Middle Eastern war-torn locations use it to aid in their concentration and energy, it is sometimes called” chemical courage.”

For example, it’s been reported to have been discovered on the body of Hamas soldiers during the Israeli-Hamas issue. Its production is fairly easy and cheap, making it an obvious goal for the black-market medication trade.

Nearly all of the black market captagon is then produced in Syria and neighboring Lebanon. It’s most frequently used in the Middle East, and some Gulf state have it for recreational purposes.

It is one of the most prevalent illegal medicines in Syria.

Captagon generated more than US$ 7.3 billion in Syria and Lebanon between 2020 and 2022, according to a new record ( roughly$ 2.4 billion a year ).

What we usually know about illegal drugs is that any seizures or restrictions on the sale of drugs only have a small impact on the market because another producer or distributor opens up to meet demand.

Given the size of the Middle East captagon business, these most recent pharmaceutical insights and spasms are likely to only temporarily decrease production.

Nicole Lee is an adjunct professor at Curtin University’s Curtin University’s National Drug Research Institute ( Melbourne ).

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US, China, Russia gearing up for space wars to come – Asia Times

As China’s subtle maneuvers, Russia’s hunter-killer satellites, and the US’s press for efficient orbital fight capabilities converge toward future space battles, the conflict is escalating.

According to Air & Space Forces Magazine, US Space Force leaders have been looking for more maneuvering abilities as a result of China’s extreme orbital maneuvers in geostationary orbit.

Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine mentions that since 2010, China has launched roughly 1, 000 satellites, with new activities involving large activity rates, planetary war techniques and evasion tactics.

The document highlights the dangers posed by China’s powerful telescope tactics, which include inspecting, moving or damaging another observatories. According to the record, these tactics are uncommon for a geostationary circle and aim to avoid detection and disruption.

According to the statement, US Space Force Commander General Stephen Whiting cited China’s use of novel orbit and on-orbit fuel as evidence that the need for sustained place movement abilities.

Additionally, it mentions Brigadier General Anthony Mastalir’s warning about a paradigm change that required the US to adjust. Additionally, the report mentions Lieutenant General Douglas Scheiss ‘ suggestion that because both countries have maneuvering skills, there might be a “dogfight in space.”

According to Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine, the US aims to create systems similar to the X-37B spaceplane to lessen operating surprises and bridge planetary governments.

Defense Scoop reported in October 2024 that the US Space Force gave California-based business Impulse Space a$ 34.5 million commitment to show on-orbit flexibility for its strategically flexible storage system in addition to the X-37B spaceplane.

The contract includes the delivery of two orbital maneuver vehicles ( OMV) for the Victus Salo and Surgo missions, according to Defense Scoop. The report notes that these missions are intended to evaluate the ability of pre-positioned space assets to respond to on-orbit threats quickly.

Defense Scoop mentions that the US Space Force is working to improve its response to space threats and aims to have operational, tactical space capability by 2026. It also says the upcoming Victus Haze mission, slated for 2025, aims to test maneuverable space vehicles.

In February 2022, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ( DARPA ) announced that General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, and Blue Origin had been awarded contracts to develop nuclear propulsion systems for Low Earth Orbit ( LEO ) demonstrations by 2025.

This technology, which uses nuclear fission to accelerate propellants, offers significant advantages over traditional chemical propulsion, including longer endurance, heavier payload capacity and double fuel efficiency.

These advancements may shift space combat from passive “detection and response” to active “positioning and maneuver” strategies. They enable the application of traditional war principles—flexibility, concentration, and maneuverability—to space operations.

Maneuverability may also address satellites ‘ inherent vulnerability. Most of them follow predetermined paths, making them susceptible to tracking and targeting by anti-satellite weapons. With greater precision, adversaries can plan and execute attacks with greater predictability.

Adversary satellites employing” chase and disable” tactics —actively seeking, inspecting, or damaging critical space assets—pose significant threats to space security.

These tactics involve satellites moving to close proximity to and possibly involving other satellites, raising concerns about unintentional interruptions or hostile behavior.

For instance, NPR reported in May 2024 that the US had accused Russia of launching a satellite, Cosmos 2576, that is likely a counter-space weapon. NPR says the satellite, launched from the Plesetsk site in northern Russia, is in the same orbital plane as a US spy satellite, USA 314, which is part of the Keyhole 11 series.

According to NPR, the US claims that Cosmos 2576’s proximity to USA 314, approximately 48 kilometers at its closest point, suggests it could be used to inspect, move or damage other satellites.

The report notes that this maneuver has raised international tensions, with the US looking out for any threatening behavior on the satellite. NPR says Russia has denied the allegations, calling them “fake news” and asserting its opposition to placing weapons in space.

Previously, Asia Times reported in August 2022 that Russia’s Kosmos-2558 satellite is suspected to be an “inspector satellite” with potential hunter-killer capabilities. Analysts believe it has the ability to track and possibly destroy US spy satellites, which raises questions about the use of space as a weapon.

That month, Kosmos-2558 approached within 75 kilometers of the USA-326 satellite, which carries a classified payload for space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ) missions.

Concerns about the satellite’s location and potential threat have been raised by the US National Reconnaissance Office ( NRO ). Russia has a history of deploying satellites with similar capabilities, including Kosmos-2491, Kosmos-2499, and Kosmos-2504, which have conducted proximity maneuvers since 2013.

The US Space Force should look into plans to deploy “hunter-killer” satellites, using SmallSats ‘ flexibility and affordability, in a July 2024 article for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, to increase space superiority.

Galbreath says these hunter-killer satellites are designed to operate as co-orbital weapons capable of disabling adversary satellites through kinetic strikes, electronic warfare, laser targeting, spoofing and jamming.

He points out that the US Space Force is more apt to carry out offensive counter-space operations on short notice by patrolling close to adversary assets, hiding in less-monitored orbits, or remaining dormant aboard larger spacecraft until they are activated.

Additionally, Galbreath says these satellites can be “bodyguards” for high-value space assets, similar to fighter escorts for aircraft, thereby shielding critical systems like missile warning satellites from attack.

He notes that the adoption of SmallSats for this role is driven by their low cost, rapid development cycles, and potential for mass deployment, which enables the US to counter China’s and Russia’s growing space warfare capabilities.

Galbreath claims that SmallSats have the potential to transform US military space operations because of their combination of precise targeting, operational agility, and the ability to achieve effects without creating orbital debris.

However, the rules of war regarding attacks against satellites aren’t crystal clear. Michael Byers and Aaron Boley discuss the legality of an attack on a satellite as a result of their book” Who Owns Outer Space” in 2023, which deals with the interpretations of the jus ad bellum ( right to war ) and jus in bello ( conduct in war ) principles.

According to Byers and Boley, opponents of satellite attacks may argue that they fall under the UN Charter’s Article 2( 4 ), primarily if they cause significant damage to state assets or interfere with essential services like navigation or communications.

They argue that using satellites for military, economic, and civilian purposes may be justification for using them in self-defense under Article 51.

Conversely, they mention that opponents note that not all satellite attacks meet the threshold of an “armed attack”, especially if effects are non-destructive, like signal jamming or hacking.

Moreover, Byers and Boley point out that satellites ‘ dual-use nature complicates attribution and intent assessment, making classifying such actions as acts of war challenging.

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China has cause to be terrified of rebel-run Syria – Asia Times

A coalition of Syrian rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ( HTS ) has seized control of Damascus, putting President Bashar al-Assad in exile, and evoking a new uncertain future for the war-torn country. Despite China’s range from the war core, the rebel acquisition may be setting off warnings in Beijing.

China’s concern comes from credible reports of the Turkestan Islamic Party ( TIP ) fighting alongside HTS. A Uyghur separatist group with strong ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, the TIP, also known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement ( ETIM), has roots in China’s troubled western province of Xinjiang.

It is attempting to establish an independent Muslim status in East Turkestan in Xinjiang. China, the UN, and the US designated TIP as a terrorist organization off until 2020, respectively. The terrorist organization was established in Pakistan but has since gained traction in Afghanistan’s neighbor. In recent years, the team’s control in Afghanistan and Pakistan waned under Foreign stress.

In a strange turn of events, many of the insurgents and their people found refuge in Idlib, a rebel-held region of Syria. Imad Moustapha, the then-Syrian ambassador to China, claimed that Syria had 5,000 or 5,000 Rohingya militants by 2017.

Turkey supported the Hole’s relocation to Syria, a move that successfully killed two birds with one punch. Turkey was able to support the oppressed Slavic brethren in areas under its control in northern Syria. It is friendly to the situation there.

Additionally, Turkey wants to create a pro-Turkey bulwark against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF) in eastern Syria. Turkey thinks that Kurdish separatists on both sides of the border may join forces to undermine its regional dignity and national security if the SDF takes control of the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian borders.

The TIP therefore armed itself in Syria when it arrived along with other Arab insurgent parties against the Assad government and its SDF allies. The Emir of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, has &nbsp, said,” The TIP has been in Syria for seven years and has never posed a threat to the outside world.

Because they face persecution in China, which we highly oppose, and have nowhere to go, they are determined to defend Idlib from the Assad administration’s aggression. However, our battle against China is not ours. They are welcome to stay as long as they follow our guidelines, which they do.

Units does not appear to have any interest in engaging with China beyond expressing support for the Uyghur reason. In that regard, HTS‘ success in the Syrian civil war does not create a direct threat to China.

But, TIP insurgents gaining fight experience does. The TIP is fighting in Syria, according to Chinese Major General Jin Yinan, to draw notice to the Uyghur reason and get fight knowledge so they can use those fighting abilities against Beijing one day.

The state was confirmed when Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the TIP’s Emir, demanded that Uyghurs from all over the planet” come together to combat China and the Assad regime.” Now, we are helping our boys pay jihad in Greater Syria. The Islamist troops must be prepared to rescue Xinjiang from its communist occupiers by tomorrow.

Beijing claims that the TIP carried out terrorist problems in China in 2008, 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2015. Attacks included driving cars into pedestrians, violence with knives in common areas, auto bombs, and suicide bombings.

If the group is responsible for all of the claimed problems, it is difficult to establish. Some were most likely carried out by wayward wolf upset with Xinjiang’s social-economic disparity.

However, Beijing blames the party for all of the attacks and has implemented limiting measures, epitomized by massive incarceration facilities, in the Uyghur’s house state in response. There are obvious indications that the unrest is still bubbling just beneath the surface despite these rigorous measures.

However, China’s Permanent Consultant to the UN claimed in 2022 that TIP-related violence had resurrected recently, claiming that the organization is using Syria as a base to recruit and train insurgents to attack China and Central Asia.

Beijing pledged to” coordinate with Syria and other related parties to conflict TIP violence” in order to combat the reemergent risk. The statement was made in response to rumors that TIP had been involved in an attack last year that left 112 people dead at a military academy in Palmyra. What the speech meant in real practice, but, remains unclear.

Rumors of Taiwanese regiment operations to Syria surfaced in 2017 and 2018, but in the end, nothing were deployed. Additionally, while weapons made in China were delivered to the government, they were both redistributed by next parties or long-agolysed to Syria. After the civil war broke out, no immediate revenue of weapons were made.

Despite TIP’s supposed rising risk to China’s regional security, Beijing has remained staunch to its decade-long modus operandi of non-intervention. It has been happy to fly on another nations ‘ surface in Syria with boots on the ground.

Beijing’s just significant step was to carry high-level discussions with Damascus to exchange information on the TIP’s actions starting in 2016. With Assad’s demise, this knowledge supply will stop.

China’s apparent lack of action sends a message that while Beijing is concerned by the fact that if battle-trained Edge insurgents – known for fighting like “lions” in Syria – make their way back to China in sufficient amounts, it will experience an insurrection several times stronger than the previous one because it is uncertain whether the Edge can and will return to China.

On the one hand, the TIP do not shy away from this objective in their propaganda. In Syria, they have notably failed to integrate into local communities, with language being the primary barrier. TIP militants forbid Arabs from entering Uyghur villages because they are not” Chinese,” which suggests that they continue to be ensconced in their Chinese homeland.

On the other hand, TIP militants who sold their homes in China before relocating to Syria with their families sent a message that they are still there. In addition, China’s security has significantly improved in recent years, making it difficult for militants to enter the country undiscovered in large numbers.

However, the Syrian civil war’s apparent end could shift the TIP’s calculus. The TIP no longer has to struggle to make ends meet in a small sliver of land in northern Syria for the first time in a decade. As such, the TIP could quickly set its militant sights elsewhere.

Beijing is concerned that TIP militants will re-establish themselves in neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan while China itself is out of reach. That’s a high risk as the two countries have become safe havens in recent years for various terrorist organizations, including ISIS-K, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP ) and the Balochistan Liberation Army ( BLA ).

Indeed, there has been an uptick in attacks on Chinese citizens and assets abroad in recent years, especially in Pakistan. Despite the lack of available evidence, Beijing believes these attacks stem from the TIP’s collusion with ISIS, al-Qaeda and the BLA to undermine China’s overseas interests and investments.

Therefore, should battle-hardened TIP militants return to Pakistan and join forces with the TTP, BLA and others, as Beijing claims is already happening, it would pose a serious threat to China’s strategic interests as its flagship project – the Belt and Road Initiative – runs through the country.

The likelihood of this scenario has increased exponentially as Assad’s ouster has diminished, and Russia and Iran’s ability to control and contain Syrian rebel groups and their allies has decreased.

” A&nbsp, butterfly&nbsp, flapping its wings in&nbsp, China&nbsp, can cause a&nbsp, hurricane&nbsp, in the Caribbean,” the old saying goes. Conversely, a frozen conflict thawing in Syria can erect roadblocks to China’s global ambitions. China needs to reevaluate its foreign policy toward Syria and other countries.

Yang Xiaotong is an assistant researcher at a Beijing-based independent&nbsp, think tank.

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Not quite peaceful protests in democratically enraged South Korea – Asia Times

International media outlets have covered the alleged peaceful and orderly public protests calling for the resignation of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s attempted military law tragedy.

Stephanie Choi, a scholar, was quoted by Reuters as saying that the rally’s use of mild sticks” speaks the power of solidarity while upholding the original principle of non-violence.”

Nihon Keizai Newspaper described the demonstrations before the National Assembly on December 7 as “orderly, with the vibrant ambience of a festivity, incorporating elements of leisure”.

It’s true—South Korea’s presentations are usually more composed than, state, those in the United States. No significant conflict erupts into public places, no rioters burning down structures, no rioters storming the National Assembly, and no extremists storming the building.

However, despite the compliment for peaceful protests, demonstrations in South Korea are messier than they may seem.

Protestors enraged against ruling People Power Party ( PPP ) lawmakers who en masse boycotted the vote on December 7 immediately following the unsuccessful impeachment motion against Yoon on December 7.

A field blade and a banner demanding Yoon’s senate were discovered a day later atop Kim Jae-sup’s residence. His district department was stricken by an egg-filled wreath of flowers with important messages and targeted with a crown of flowers in protest. Kim has since requested authorities security.

At the office of another ruling party lawmaker, Shin Dong-wook, a university student, pasted a flyer stating,” What you did in the National Assembly on the 7th … is a declaration of war against the people”. Many other PPP politicians have experienced similar intimidation, with many of their offices being strewn with fresh eggs.

On the other hand, Kim Yea-ji, one of the three PPP lawmakers who voted in next week’s prosecution movement, has received a lot of phone calls and messages requesting her departure.

However, street protests are likewise intensifying. In mid-November, 11 trade union individuals were detained in Gwanghwamun during a protest demanding Yoon’s departure.

One protester was injured and transported to a local hospital as a result of the confrontation that turned into a real confrontation between the police and activists. On Thursday, the same union party unjustly blocked several bridges and attempted to misconduct the presidential mansion, calling for Yoon’s prosecution.

Last month, a rebel claiming to “oppose inequity” attempted self-immolation by dousing himself with ink thinner on the day of Yoon’s impeachment vote. Also, on Wednesday in Chuncheon, another person poured thinner over his plain neck while demanding Yoon’s accusation and senate.

In the traditional enclave of Gyeongbuk state, banners calling for Yoon’s impeachment were frequently vandalized. A PPP senator volunteer reportedly contacted a local emblem company, heightening the situation, and threatened the graffiti of their signs.

A 20-year-old gentleman was detained earlier this month after posting an Instagram photo of himself carrying a knife and a ominous information to harm protesters at the Gwanghwamun march. The risk was obviously aimed at “anti-Yoon” protesters.

Similar incidents of pro- and anti-Yoon partisan conflict led to more egregious acts of despair in January, including the beating of PPP senator Bae Hyun-jin with a stone in Busan and the teen’s beating of opposition leader Lee Jae-myung in the neck.

In South Korea, hostilities have a record during prosecution trials. During previous President Park Geun-hye’s prosecution, real face-offs were widespread, resulting in tens of injuries among officers and protesters, the deaths of four pro-Park crusaders and many arrests.

Also, cruel, half-baked stories about Park and her allies, together with personal insults directed at the then-president, circulated widely yet through established media.

With the upcoming days and weeks of a new prosecution movement being introduced this Saturday ( December 14), one can only hope that these unnecessary and unfortunate activities do not occur again.

However, the citizens of democratic democracies have important liberties, including the right to gather and protest. And in the midst of significant unrest this month, the North Korean people have shown largely remarkable resilience and ordered leadership in response to the government’s alleged injustice.

But engagement that defies common sense also poses a threat to the integrity of democratic operations, especially when maintaining constitutional order is important.

In the end, the elected officials will decide whether to remove President Yoon from office or not, while the leader will ultimately have to make that choice. The Constitutional Court will decide whether Yoon should be removed from office if the parliament passes the impeachment articles.

The public must also have faith that Yoon’s two institutions will conduct a thorough investigation, and it will be the president’s responsibility to decide whether or not he should be punished.

If South Koreans are dissatisfied with any of the outcomes, democratic channels—such as elections, petitions, and legal recourse—provide legitimate ways to seek redress. Intimidation and coercion, however, should have no role in the nation’s democratic political process in the days and weeks ahead.

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Assad’s hard fall decapitates region’s ‘Iranization’ – Asia Times

The 24 million Syria who lived and suffered mostly under his terrible concept will also be affected by President Bashar Assad’s fall. Over the frontier in Lebanon, the effect will be felt, too.

Hezbollah, Assad’s ally, was previously suffering from an Israel issue that had already weakened its capabilities and decimated its management, and the collapse of Assad’s authorities is yet another blow to its Syrian allies. However, some people in Lebanon did remain cheering, not the least of the 1.5 million Syrian refugees who fled Syria to avoid Assad and a 13-year civil war.

As a specialist on Lebanon’s history and culture, I anticipate that Syria’s impact will have an impact. The two places ‘ present histories are intertwined, and throughout its 54-year law, the Assad community has intervened in Lebanon several times – mostly to the expense of its people, its business and its security.

Hezbollah and Assad: A bilateral relationship

Hezbollah has benefited greatly from the Arab regime’s solid support since its creation in the early 1980s. There were definitely times of tension between the two, most prominently in the midst of the Syrian civil conflict. However, Hezbollah has been able to rely on Syria for weapons, education, and quick area access to Iran overall.

And this design was mutual. Hezbollah fighters entered Syria to boost the authorities when Assad’s law was challenged in 2011 and the nation erupted into civil war.

However, Hezbollah has seen its fortunes suffer recently as it has grown to become the most effective military force in Lebanon. The team was forced to accept a ceasefire agreement that includes a path toward disarmament as a result of the current conflict with Israel.

However, Syrian support for Hezbollah has shifted significantly, with empty calls for the group to stop its military activities.

The team’s battle with Israel cost the life of about 3, 700 people in Lebanon, and about 1.2 million Syrian – about one-fifth of the population – were internally displaced from their homes. However, the financial loss for Lebanon is estimated in the billions of dollars.

Iran, Assad and Hezbollah square

It is no accident that the new rebel progress that led to Assad’s ouster happened the day after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was signed. Hezbollah troops were depleted, and many of their soldiers were pulled out of Syria to strengthen Lebanon’s southwestern border.

Arab separatists chose this opportunity because they were aware that Iran was also strained by the Israel-Hezbollah conflict to support Assad. The ripple effect has resulted in the unfolding of Iran’s” shaft of weight”. Surely, Tehran has lost its strong hold over Syria and Lebanon.

It is fitting that Assad’s drop coincides with the possible end of both Syria’s civil war and the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah ally because it was the initial stage of the civil war that established the three-way marriage.

Syria was the site of the Arab Spring, a string of pro-democracy and individual rights demonstrations that started in Tunisia in 2011. Anti-Assad demonstrations broke out in Daraa and quickly spread to big cities such as Syria, Hama and the capital, Damascus.

The Arab state reacted brutally, ordering soldiers to fire at the demonstrators, detaining and torturing thousands of men and boys, and did so with cruelty.

International uproar followed. However, with the assistance of Iran and Hezbollah, the Arab state remained in place. In reality, in addition to Hezbollah’s soldiers, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps was likewise advising Assad and fighting alongside his defense against the Arab people.

For Tehran and its proxies, including Hezbollah, this contributed to the” Iranization” of the region, which included the spread of the Iranian Revolution ideology and the transformation of Syria and Lebanon into Shia states.

Syria is largely Sunni Muslim. It was ruled by an Syrian majority, a party that practiced a tree of Shia Islam, under the Assad home. Hezbollah, as a Shia extremist group, swore allegiance to Iran’s high leader in its 1985 statement.

Another unified force between the three was the Arab reason. The post-1979 innovative Iran philosophy of “death to Israel” is a sentiment shared by the Assad government and Hezbollah soldiers. Assad may have been less vocal about it, particularly as he attempted to negotiate with Israel over the occupied Golan Heights.

Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah under the leadership of Assad were not just united by militancy and their desire to rule the area. They even shared financial goals, and they have benefited from the trafficking of illegal drugs, particularly Captagon, an amphetamine-type drug that is widely produced in Syria under the guise of Assad and Iran. At a time when global sanctions were ensnapping, the drug offered a viable and significant source of income.

Hezbollah and its power of Lebanon’s airports and seaports have helped the drug became extensively available in the Gulf state. The Arab world was actually a threat from its very addictive nature, and Assad used it to strain Saudi Arabia into calling for Syria’s inclusion in the Arab League in 2023. In return, the Syrian government agreed to transfer its drug trafficking abroad.

Assad’s tradition

With Hezbollah’s fight in Lebanon and the fall of the Syrian regime, the” Iranization” of the area is, at the very least, stalled. However, 54 years of Assad home law in Syria has left a long road of death in neighboring Lebanon.

More than 25, 000 soldiers were sent by Syria over the border in June 1976 to put an end to the Syrian civil conflict. Its existence was supposed to be momentary, but it was extended for over four years.

By the time the Syrian civil war ended in 1991, Syria was in complete control of both Lebanon’s domestic and international politics. Serious human rights breaches were reported, including kidnappings, improper punishments, abuse and the killings of political figures and editors.

Rafik Hariri, the leader of Lebanon’s political elite, was killed in a deadly attack in February 2005 that involved Assad and top Palestinian officials in large numbers.

Protesters carrying red, white and green flags march. One holds a picture of a man.
Numerous tens of thousands of Palestinian people show up to lament Rafik Hariri’s death. Photo: Ghaith Abdul-Ahad / Getty Images via The Talk

The shooting sparked the Cedar Revolution, in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinian residents gathered in the streets to demand the Syrian causes ‘ immediate withdrawal.

Although Syrian troops left Lebanon, the Palestinian government continued to interfere in the country’s elections through Hezbollah, which evolved into a political-military firm and entered the authorities in 2008.

From that point onward, Hezbollah would block any decision that did not serve Syria’s and Iran’s interests. For instance, Hezbollah and its allies vetoed any candidate for president who opposed the Syrian regime, a move that caused Lebanon to experience a protracted presidential lull.

An uncertain future

While Hezbollah may continue to operate within Lebanon and under Iran’s umbrella, Assad’s fall means it is deprived of its supply route.

Without Syria, Hezbollah has no quick access to Iran’s fighters and weapons – and the newly signed ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel reaffirms Lebanon’s commitment to a UN resolution calling for Hezbollah’s disarmament.

And while it’s not yet clear what the new Syria will look like, at least the populations of Lebanon and Syria, both of whom have endured decades of brutal rule and Hezbollah’s abuse, can rejoice at the removal of the man who caused so much of the suffering.

At Dickinson College, Mireille Rebeiz is chair of Middle East Studies and associate professor of Francophone and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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India must atone for Bangladesh’s lost decade – Asia Times

In the annals of South Asia’s social background, India’s role in sustaining Sheikh Hasina’s government in Bangladesh stands as a striking training in the dangers of evaluating short-term corporate interests over long-term regional security.

India may deal with its guilt in preserving a program that had hampered a nation’s democratic aspirations as Bangladesh emerges from Hasina’s authoritarian rule.

The seeds of Bangladesh’s lost generation were first put in 2013 during a key visit by Sujata Singh, therefore India’s Foreign Secretary. Her visit included a meeting with General Hossain Mohammad Ershad to urge him to join in an election that all major opposition parties had abandoned only weeks before Bangladesh’s contentious general elections.

Bangladesh’s lost decade was initiated by this direct action to turn its brittle yet effective politics into fascism with American support.

It marked a pivotal moment for some Bangladeshis, highlighting the fact that India had chosen to support a routine rather than the people’s political aspirations.

In 2018 and again in 2024, much of the global society distanced itself from the Awami League’s controlled elections. However, India stood solid as Hasina’s only backer, providing her government with the worldwide legitimacy it sorely needed.

This unwavering support, combined with New Delhi’s silence on human rights abuses and political fraud, reinforced India’s picture as the innovator of a dictator. Without India’s approval, Hasina’s grip on power could not have endured.

Decade of oppression

India’s aid for Hasina was no moral. Throughout her career, essential agreements favored American interests, from transport routes to energy exports, usually at Bangladesh’s expense.

These offers were perceived by many as Hasina’s “return of favour” for India’s social support, reinforcing the storyline that she served American interests rather than her own individuals. Further eroded trust as a result of the fear that Hasina was turning Bangladesh into an Indian customer condition, similar to the death of Sikkim.

This view is key to Bangladesh’s federal consciousness. While Hasina’s state leaned heavily on India, regular Bangladeshis saw this marriage as manipulative. The Awami League’s law became associated with both local persecution and additional persecution.

Yet, India, remarkably, seems oblivious to the deep resentment this has fostered. Indian policymakers have historically seen their relationship with Bangladesh through the lens of Hasina, failing to meaningfully engage with the Bangladeshis.

India’s missteps were compounded by its media establishment, which played a significant role in distorting the narrative around Bangladesh’s political student-led revolution that ousted Hasina, as she shamefully fled to India by helicopter.

Rumor Scanner discovered that 49 Indian media outlets had spread 13 false stories about Bangladesh, many of which depicted the country’s democratic uprising as an Islamist insurgency.

One of the most glaring examples was Indian media’s coverage of the post-Hasina uprising. Newspapers like Firstpost and The Economic Times made illogical claims that China and Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency orchestrated the protests to install an anti-India government.

Such propaganda did not only include opulent media outlets. Mamata Banerjee, the chief minister of West Bengal, joined the chorus and demanded an UN mission to help in Bangladesh. This action heightened tensions even further.

India framed the post-revolution backlash against the Awami League’s oppressive apparatus as targeted Hindu oppression, ignoring its roots in widespread political grievances.

India further alienated Bangladesh’s people by reducing the uprising to a communal narrative, presenting it as an attempt to shield a discredited regime under the pretext of protecting minorities.

The Agartala attacks and the communal framing of events in the Indian media have only heightened anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh.

Indeed, these narratives ignored the democratic essence of the uprising, portraying it instead as a threat to regional stability. By perpetuating such disinformation, Indian media and politicians alienated the Bangladeshi populace further.

Rebuilding trust

As Bangladesh transitions from Hasina’s authoritarianism, India faces a critical choice: continue the policies of the past or recalibrate its approach to reflect the aspirations of a democratic Bangladesh. In order to achieve this, New Delhi must fundamentally alter its engagement strategy.

    Engage without any plans to bring Sheikh Hasina back: India must give up its obsession with bringing the Awami League back to power. Any efforts to stifle Hasina’s return or sway domestic politics in Bangladesh will face opposition, which will unfavor bilateral ties irreparably. India should instead concentrate on interacting with Bangladesh’s new leaders and fostering relationships that promote reciprocity and democratic values.

  1. Recognize its contribution to the decade of oppression: Indian policymakers must acknowledge their contribution to enabling Hasina’s oppressive regime. This is a necessary step in the rebuilding of trust, not just an introspection exercise. By putting pressure on Hasina, India suffocated a country that had valiantly fought for the 1990s ‘ restoration of democracy. Without India’s active effort to make amends for its mistakes, this betrayal of democratic ideals will not be forgotten.
  2. Promote equity in partnerships: Bangladeshis widely perceive India’s deals with Hasina’s government as exploitative, benefiting India at Bangladesh’s expense. Moving forward, New Delhi must prioritize equitable agreements that serve both nations ‘ interests. This includes open negotiations on trade, energy, and transit that show a genuine partnership rather than power imbalance.
  3. Combat misinformation and fabricated stories: The Indian media needs to stop spreading false information about Bangladesh. Recognizing the democratic essence of Bangladesh’s struggles, rather than framing them as communal or Islamist threats, is crucial. This also extends to Indian political discourse, which must shed its communal lens when analyzing Bangladesh’s internal affairs.

Burying the Hasina past

India’s relationship with Bangladesh cannot continue to be boundless by the Hasina era.

India must make amends for the country’s role in maintaining a system that stifled democracy and alienated its citizens in order to find a new course. From political interference to exploitative deals and divisive media narratives, it must first acknowledge the harm that its actions have caused.

Bangladesh’s fight for democracy has been long and arduous. Having emerged from the shadows of dictatorship, the nation now seeks a partner, not a patron. For India, this is an opportunity to build a relationship rooted in equality, respect and shared aspirations.

However, if New Delhi fails to adapt and continues to provoke during Bangladesh’s transition toward a new national identity, it runs the risk of causing the country to go down a similar path as Pakistan, which is defined by resistance to Indian influence.

India’s choice is clear: rebuild trust and embrace a democratic Bangladesh, or remain haunted by the legacy of a lost decade.

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