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As the US vote intensifies, Korea has become a key focus in the foreign legislation agendas of the two candidates, generating both excitement and concern among Koreans regarding the future of their empire with the US, their long-standing security, financial, and proper partner.

US policy toward the Asian Peninsula is a crucial part of the wider Indo-Pacific strategy because of the Northeast Asian geopolitical landscape’s changing political landscape. Regional stability and international security will be greatly impacted by the next US administration’s decisions, whether they are those of Kamala Harris or Donald Trump.

The methods each administration may adopt show significant differences, underlining the complexity of US foreign policy in the region, despite a bipartisan compromise on important objectives.

Continuity in corporate goals: a nonpartisan base

Central to US plan toward Korea is a nonpartisan acknowledgement of the peninsula’s vital strategic importance. Regardless of the presidency in power, Harris and Trump are likely to defend three fundamental pillars:

More than just a martial relationship, the US-South Korea empire serves as a basis of regional stability. It acts as a counter to North Korea’s unstable regime and China’s expanding effect in the Indo-Pacific. Maintaining a strong US military and diplomatic presence in South Korea is viewed as essential for maintaining peace and preventing regional anger, according to both Democratic and Republican viewpoints.

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are still one of the region’s most pressing safety issues despite extensive diplomatic efforts over the past few years. Both Harris and Trump both acknowledge how crucial it is to stop these interests. Nevertheless, their strategies for achieving nuclear differ drastically, reflecting broader intellectual contrasts between their respective parties.

A complex view of US foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific is required because of China’s rise as both a regional and global energy. Both possible governments acknowledge the need to maintain and, where needed, include China’s effect, particularly in areas related to security and economic relationships. This common goal allows for a level of consistency in US plan, signaling consistency to adversaries and reassurance to allies.

This nonpartisan commitment to these geopolitical goals allows for a level of consistency in US plan toward Korea, which is essential for upholding regional stability and the broader architecture of global security.

Divergence in methods: politics over assertiveness

The approaches that Harris and Trump would use to achieve these objectives are strikingly different, influenced by their distinct foreign plan philosophies and philosophical leanings, despite the tactical goals may be constant.

Harris’s international diplomacy: coalition-building and prudence

Kamala Harris, reflecting the Democratic Party’s principles, would probably do a foreign legislation characterized by multilateralism, politics and coalition-building. Her treatment of the Asian Peninsula would focus on some crucial points:

Harris ‘ plan would give more attention to the conditioning of international institutions to address local challenges and the strengthening of the US-South Korea ally. By building a large network of allies, she may aim to provide a unified before against North Korea’s provocations and China’s confidence, emphasizing the importance of social security and shared responsibility.

Trump’s direct, personal diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un would likely be tempered by Harris ‘ more prudent and measured approach. Her approach would involve putting together coordinated diplomatic pressure through a coalition of allies and attempting to negotiate with North Korea through established diplomatic channels as opposed to through high-profile summits with little substance.

Harris might look for opportunities for selective cooperation on global issues like climate change and public health, while acknowledging the strategic rivalry with China. Given the deep-rooted tensions between Washington and Beijing and the fundamental differences in their strategic objectives, this approach is likely to face significant challenges.

Trump’s assertive strategy: personal diplomacy and economic nationalism

In contrast, a potential return of Donald Trump to the White House would signal a reversion to his assertive, and often unpredictable, approach to foreign policy.

Trump’s unconventional diplomacy, exemplified by his historic meetings with Kim Jong Un, could see a resurgence. His willingness to speak directly with North Korea’s leadership may lead to significant international successes, but the long-term viability of a similar approach is uncertain, especially given the uncertainty and unpredictability of personal diplomatic relationships.

Trump’s approach to China would likely be more combative, emphasizing military strength and economic decoupling. His administration might support more military maneuvers in troubled regions like the South China Sea and put in policies to lessen the US’s dependence on China in line with his wider agenda of economic nationalism and” America First” rhetoric.

Trump’s preference for bilateral agreements over multilateral frameworks may put strain on wider regional and global efforts. His desire to secure deals that prioritize US interests may alienate key allies and partners, potentially undermining efforts to address complex regional issues that call for a multilateral approach.

The influence of external conflicts: Ukraine and the Middle East

Significant external factors that could influence US policy in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in how future administrations might approach the Korean Peninsula, are the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Harris could use the Ukraine conflict as a case study to demonstrate the value of strong allies and collective security. Harris might make the case for a more integrated strategy among US allies in Asia by drawing parallels between the Western response to Russian aggression and the need for a coordinated approach to deter threats from North Korea and China. In order to maintain regional security, this approach would emphasize the need for coherence and responsibility.

Additionally, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, particularly the complex dynamics involving Iran, Israel and other regional actors, could further shape Harris’s approach. Under the leadership of a Democratic administration under Harris, Harris might point out the value of diplomatic solutions and multilateral frameworks to address similar issues in Northeast Asia, while also presenting the Middle East as a cautionary tale of what might happen if tensions are not effectively managed diplomatically.

Trump might use the conflict in Ukraine to support a stronger US military presence in the Indo-Pacific. Trump might argue that the situation in Ukraine highlights the need for a strong deterrent against potential aggressors, and that this will increase defense spending and bolster Trump’s position in the region, which will help stop similar events from occurring in Northeast Asia.

Trump’s assertive stance may also serve as a justification for the Middle East conflict, especially by highlighting the need for decisive action and military readiness. Trump might argue that the unpredictability of Middle Eastern actors reflects the difficulties faced by North Korea, necessitating a similar strategy that prioritizes strength and direct negotiation over larger diplomatic efforts.

The potential pitfalls

Each of Harris and Trump’s two distinct approaches has risks and potential criticisms that could have an impact on how effective US policy overall is in the region.

Harris’s multilateralism: strength in numbers or paralysis by consensus?

Harris places a lot of emphasis on multilateralism and alliances because he thinks that collective action is the best way to tackle complex global issues. However, this approach could also be seen as slow-moving and less effective in situations that demand rapid decision-making. Critical actions may be delayed due to the need to achieve consensus among multiple stakeholders, especially in crisis scenarios.

Additionally, North Korea’s ability to use multilateral pressure has historically been constrained, which raises doubts about whether this tactic can produce meaningful results in the presence of a rebellious regime.

Trump’s assertiveness: strong deterrent or risk of escalation?

Trump’s assertive strategy, while potentially offering a stronger deterrent against potential aggressors, carries significant risks of escalation. His confrontational behavior toward China and reliance on personal diplomacy with North Korea may cause heightened tensions and unanticipated outcomes. The emphasis on bilateralism and economic nationalism may also alienate allies and stifle broader multilateral efforts, putting a strain on the US’s ability to respond to regional issues that call for concerted action.

shaping US policy in Northeast Asia’s future

The US faces a crucial decision in shaping its Korea policy, balancing Harris’s diplomatic multilateralism against Trump’s assertive approach. Both strategies aim to strengthen the US-South Korea alliance, pursue North Korea’s denuclearization and manage China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. However, their methods differ significantly, reflecting broader ideological and strategic priorities.

The next U. S. administration’s Korea policy will impact not just the Korean Peninsula but the entire Indo-Pacific, shaping regional stability, the balance of power, and US foreign policy. Whether through diplomacy or through assertiveness, the US strategy in Northeast Asia will be crucial to global geopolitics, with far-reaching implications.

Allies and adversaries will be closely watching the next administration’s decisions because they will shape the course of US action in one of the world’s most crucially important regions. The outcomes of these decisions will influence the future of international relations because the stakes are high.

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There seems to be little taste for major celebrities to meet in the middle now that there has been a new level of tremendous strength competition. This explosive setting makes international cooperation more and more difficult and obscure.

The abuse on the rules-based global order, a long-standing mainstay of Western foreign policy, is one of the most obvious indicators of these turbulent days.

Although the word was only coined after the Cold War, says ‘ commitments to a specific order, primarily for peace and security, can be traced back to the important efforts made to restore order after the Second World War.

Although the idea can be used to mean a lot of different items, it is typically understood as a shared responsibility by states to carry out their actions in accordance with a set of international law-based standards, regulations, and institutions.

But what particular laws is this order referring to? And who has the authority to impose them?

States and other foreign actors are subject to a variety of inconsistent, non-binding, and non-binding guidelines as well as double standards, all of which are intended to uphold general principles.

For instance, American leaders take part in the collection of evidence for the Russia-Ukraine conflict but disapprove of the Israel-Hamas conflict in the same way. Governments also criticize the International Criminal Court ( ICC ) for pursuing an arrest warrant for the Israeli prime minister while supporting the International Criminal Court ( ICC ) for prosecuting Russia’s leader for war crimes. &nbsp,

The reality remains that the rules-based global order, also largely influenced by British liberalism, is now viewed by many as incapable of properly regulating, allow only structuring, a clear system of international governance.

The two main continued wars have recently pushed the global order to its limitations and sparked a semi-constitutional time in favor of other approaches to global cooperation.

The rules-based order’s character and layout must now be revised, despite the fact that this world has already been seen and that the post-war world order was specifically a direct result of two horrifying wars and a terrible economic melancholy.

This update is required to provide the ideas of other powers regarding international purchase and to stop the law of the jungle from enraging.

The reiteration of the essential significance of the Atlantic Alliance and NATO finding a new function are delightful improvements, especially in light of Europe’s answer to the conflict in Ukraine.

However, a wholesale approach may only contribute to the emergence of different sub-orders, potentially making the world order appear less integrated and, consequently, more simple or universally weaker.

To regain the rules-based global order from the precipice and increase its usefulness, two key variables must be considered.

First, the global order should be able to fit the new geopolitical and economic challenges by allowing for a more multilateral distribution of power that includes the federal visions of emerging center powers, primarily from the Global South.

These powers are extremely linked to a fresh Non-Aligned Movement, probably more powerful ^than its 20^th-century forerunner. Engagements may become more common in connecting says ^that were previously excluded from rule-making as opposed to ^those from like-minded groups.

However, this equitable approach is necessary to reduce potential problems brought on by competing groups of like-minded says.

Second, the global order must establish a legal and administrative framework that adopts a rational approach to international cooperation and is grounded in basic principles and values.

Essentially, it should properly manage conflict between states, promote a more inclusive, equitable, adaptable, and lasting world political economy, allow for rule-setting by a varied range of state and non-state actors, and develop adequate international cooperation to address key transnational and planetary challenges.

What is the common ground of principles that could reasonably prevail for everyone and to which all parties could adhere?

This approach has a few chances of succeeding because it relies on international laws that not all states consider to be comparable to international law. Rules and norms serve as authoritative expressions of principles that define the objectives and course of collective action in international society, much like they do in domestic settings.

It is, therefore, the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and other international standards that must prevail. These include respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, and territorial integrity, as well as human rights, fundamental freedoms and an open international economic system.

These tenets serve as both a moral imperative and the legal foundation of international relations because they firmly bind the values of the majority of humanity.

Clearly, a rules-based order aligned with the UN entails privileges and hierarchy, notably within the Security Council. Nevertheless, it also represents a system where some power differentials are moderated to promote a more predictable environment, enabling diverse actors to participate in decision-making and have a voice.

At first glance, relying on the UN’s foundational principles may seem incompatible with the diversity, change and novelty of current events. How, then, can these opposing elements be reconciled into practical commitments?

These principles, in their conflicting implications, are unquestionably unable to automatically solve particular problems. They can be carefully balanced and weighed before coming up with rational solutions, though. They can be unified to function in harmony despite the conflict between principles and pressing needs.

Principles are flexible because they do n’t impose specific procedural patterns or specific action procedures. They allow for adaptation and can express opposing emotions. For instance, a principle like the observance of human rights is counterbalanced by the concept of non-intervention. In the same way, the principle of equality among states is always understood within a framework that includes the obligations of major powers.

Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold once understood this: international affairs are a forum for discussion between various actors in the international community regarding the legitimacy of state behavior. Leaders also affirm and validate these rights as states assert their rights through actions that uphold credibility.

What remains to be determined is the space for global cooperation on issues crucial to humanity’s existence: climate change and biodiversity, long-term peace and security, including responsible conduct in outer space, the cyber domain and artificial intelligence, and the commitment to human rights and other fundamental freedoms. These growth pillars require putting aside competitive advantages brought on by bilateral or regional rivalries. &nbsp,

Finding common interests as the foundation for joint action and agreed standards is a crucial component of ensuring sustainable adhesion to these principles. The Biden administration’s proposed concept of “diplomatic variable geometry” promotes a pragmatic approach where each problem is addressed through a specific combination of partners. It is crucial to involve substate actors, civil society, and states in order for these arrangements to succeed.

In addition to fostering new global standards, new transnational organizations and arrangements will be crucial for maintaining cooperation in trade, development, finance, and monetary policy.

The Financial Action Task Force ( FATF), launched by the G7, is a valuable example. It addresses global terrorist financing and money laundering, setting up international standards to stop these illegal activities.

Additionally, various ad hoc approaches in different fields, such as the Major Economies Forum on climate change, the Nuclear Suppliers Group on nuclear issues and the Proliferation Security Initiative on missile proliferation, are already tackling specific challenges.

Such practical and practical steps can be used to influence the creation and successful application of international behavioral standards. They can give a new dimension and advance a principles-based global order for all people.

Eric Alter is an adjunct professor at the Paris School of International Affairs ( PSIA ), Sciences Po, and the dean of the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi.

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The continuous atrocities are being normalized in the US media and politics as the Gaza war enters its 12th quarter with no apparent resolution. Since the war started in October, the procedure has become so regular that we might not be aware of how absence and displacement have consistently shaped views of events.

How much of the US media focused on the Gaza battle was a whole different topic, though. Simple presumptions were made that the reports made it possible for viewers to see what was actually happening.

However, the words and images that were delivered to viewers, readers, and audiences were a far cry from real-world experiences. The idea or belief that the reality of the war was being distorted by the media ultimately led to further obscuring those challenges. And journalism’s natural restrictions were compounded by press biases.

The New York Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times ‘ protection of the war’s second six days” showed a constant discrimination against Palestinians,” according to an in-depth information study conducted by the Intercept.

The highly regarded media outlets “disproportionately emphasized Jewish deaths in the issue” and “used emotive language to narrate Jewish murders, but no Palestinian ones.”

For instance,” Laws and reporters used the term” slaughter” to describe the killing of Israelis and Palestinians 60 to 1, and “massacre” was used to describe the killing of Israelis and Palestinians 125 to 2. The term “horrific” was used to identify the killing of Israelis and Palestinians 36 to 4″.

The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post covered the use of the term “brutal” or its varieties much more frequently than the word “israeli” in the first five weeks of the conflict.

According to the findings, a study by Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting ( FAIR ) found an imbalance that occurred “even though Israeli violence was responsible for more than 20 times as much loss of life.”

The uneven rate at which “brutal” was used in op-eds to describe Palestinians over Israelis was precisely the same as the ostensibly direct news stories, according to the same article and opinion piece.

Despite excellent coverage at times, what was most deeply significant about the war in Gaza—what it was like to be terrorized, murdered, wounded and traumatized—remained almost completely out of view.

Eventually, area accounts reaching the American government came to seem monotonous and regular. The Gaza war became less of a news item as death rates increased as the number of deaths increased, but most interview programs did n’t much about it.

Gaps between the media’s reporting and the human’s perceptions of the condition both grew. In the Gaza Strip, according to a report released in mid-January 2024,” Gazans now make up 80 % of all individuals facing hunger or catastrophic hunger globe, marking an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the region amid Israel’s continued assault and siege.”

According to experts who quoted in the UN statement,” Everyone in Gaza is already starving and battling to get food and potable water, and famine is inevitable.

In late February, US President Joe Biden dramatized the conflict between the Gaza war zone and the US political area while holding a vanilla ice cream cones in his right hand while speaking to reporters about the possibility of a “ceasefire” ( which did not occur ).

” My national security adviser tells me that we’re close, we’re close, we’re not done yet”, Biden said, before sauntering off.

The UN complained that “very much humanitarian assistance has entered besieged Gaza this quarter, with a 50 % decrease compared, has entered besieged Gaza, with a 50 % decrease compared.” on the same day as Biden’s photo op at an ice cream parlor near Rockefeller Center.

Israel was halting border crossing help tankers that were prepared to enter Gaza. More than 10 police officers who guarded the assistance vehicles had been purposefully killed by the Israeli government. Fatal consequences were evident.

According to UN leaders, Jewish attacks have targeted police officials who guard the convoys, exposing them to looting by criminal gangs and determined civilians, and the amount of assistance to Gaza has decreased in recent weeks.

According to data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, only 62 trucks have entered Gaza each day on average over the past two weeks, which is significantly below the 200 trucks that Israel has pledged to facilitate. This week, just four trucks crossed on two separate days. Aid groups, which have warned of a looming famine, estimate that some 500 trucks are needed each day to meet people’s basic needs”.

While these figures were frequently mentioned in news reports, numerous real-life tragedies were hidden from the public and dragged people into private agony and loss. Some commendable human-interest reporting and investigative reporting about individual tragedies in Gaza were included in major media coverage.

But even at its best, such journalism did n’t do much to convey the size, scope, and depth of the widening disaster. And the narratives of catastrophe were short on zeal for exploring causality—especially when the trail would lead to the US “national security” establishment.

Rarely did the heartrending portrayals of Palestinian victims get covered in American media coverage of their victims in Washington. Top government officials continued to distribute enormous welcome mats for the Grim Reaper while quickly expressing facile regret for the tragic loss of life.

Norman Solomon is a co-founder of RootsAction. The <a href="https://accuracy.org/”>Institute for Public Accuracy is its executive director and administrator.

This text was adapted from Norman Solomon’s paperback book War Made Invisible: How America Hides the Human Toll of its Military Machine, which was published in partnership with Economy for All ( The New Press, 2024 ). All rights reserved.

Independent Media Institute authorized republishing.

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Japan and Australia have agreed to co-develop long-range weapons, a move aimed at simultaneously checking China’s growing defense might in the Indo-Pacific, The Mainichi reported.

The deal was reached at a meeting this month in Melbourne between Richard Marles, the head of Australia, and Minoru Kihara, the Chinese defence minister.

Kihara and Marles discussed the military operations of China, including a new Chinese spy plane’s infiltration of Asian airport.

The two officials also discussed Japan’s recent acquisition of counterstrike features and Australia’s purchasing of long-range weapons. However, talks are continuing on Japan’s ask to use Australia’s great continent as a testing ground for its weapons under development.

In regards to the type of missile that Japan and Australia will develop, Janes mentions that both are focused on the US Tomahawk boat weapon, which both have pledged to purchase for their exterior soldiers.

Both nations have agreed to sell 200 missiles through Foreign Military Sales ( FMS ) with the US. The Janes statement says Japan plans to deploy the Tomahawks on its Aegis-equipped ships, while Australia intends to equip its Hobart-class ships and Hunter-class battleships with the weapons.

This expanding cooperation in long-range missile capabilities is in line with proper evaluations that emphasize the transformational role of these weapons in contemporary warfare.

Fabian Hoffman claims in a May 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Journal of Strategic Studies that long-range strike ( LRS ) weapons like the Tomahawk can have significant strategic effects in combat by directly aiming at the adversary’s national power and ability to resist.

Hoffman notes that LRS arms fulfill four different tactical features: counter-population, proper surveillance, counter-leadership and counterforce. He claims that these roles, independent of tactical or operational engagements, allow states to destroy the will and capability of adversaries at the geopolitical level.

He mentions that using LRS weapons to disrupt enemy logistics, management, and defense forces, it can produce significant outcomes without primary wedding on the battlefield.

Hoffman points out the growing use of LRS arms beyond nuclear-armed says, suggesting that smaller forces may now put larger enemies at hazard, altering punishment and increase relationships in both nuclear and conventional contexts.

This move reflects a wider trend among US supporters as Japan and Australia work to strengthen their long-range hit capabilities to store regional threats and improve deterrence.

In a February 2021 RAND event, Satoru Mori and Shinichi Kitaoka said Japan’s merger of counterstrike features, such as the Tomahawk, is portion of its evolving defense strategy.

Mori and Kitaoka argue that Japan should acquire limited offensive capabilities focused on countering threats posed by China’s military rise, notably its anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD ) strategies.

They contend that Japan’s classic, purely defensive missile defense may no longer be sufficient, necessitating the development of the capability to launch equal counterstrikes in concert with the US.

In the event of an invasion, Japan would be able to reach crucial military infrastructure, including missile launch sites and control centers, to strengthen its deterrence posture, according to them.

But, Mori and Kitaoka point out that this action is necessary to preserve regional security and counterfactual growing threats, particularly from China, which has recently spent significantly more money on defense.

In the same event, Scott Harold noted that introducing the Tomahawk would change the standard” shield-spear” relationship within the US-Japan empire, with Japan taking a more unpleasant position. He contends that a worldview shift could undermine US control over an increase of a conflict with China.

In a March 2023 essay for The Conversation, James Dwyer explains why Australia needs Tomahawks, as the state has lacked long-range hit skills since decommissioning the F-111 in 2010.

He points out that the F-111 had a range of about 6, 000 km, but its successors, especially the F/A-18F and the F-35A, have significantly shorter amounts of 2, 700 and 2, 200 km, both.

He adds that these are the straight-line flight ranges of these aircraft, which would be significantly reduced in a combat situation.

Dwyer points out that Tomahawks would make it possible for Australia’s ships and aircraft to launch missiles from a safer range and to deter adversaries by threatening specific targets, which would prompt them to reconsider their plans for hostile actions.

He claims that the Tomahawk would give Australia A2/AD capabilities, enabling it to attack a neighbor who was attempting to impose a naval blockade or close off strategic chokepoints like the Malacca Strait.

According to Dwyer, the Tomahawk would also enable interoperability with important allies like the US and Japan, enabling them to carry out joint operations if necessary.

However, Dwyer points out the hefty US$ 879 million price tag for 220 Tomahawk missiles, US$ 385 million for 20 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System ( HIMARS ) launchers and US$ 1.47 billion for 200 Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles ( LRASM).

He also suggests that Australia’s Tomahawk acquisition may spark an arms race in the Pacific. By strengthening conventional deterrence, the US, Japan, and Australia’s trilateral defense alliance demonstrates a coordinated strategy for addressing China’s regional goals.

In a report from August 2024 for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS), Mori points out that trilateral defense cooperation between the US, Japan, and Australia is essential to thwarting any potential Chinese aggression against Taiwan.

The coalition’s objectives, according to Mori, are to demonstrate that China ca n’t forcefully unify Taiwan, highlighting the importance of conventional deterrence over nuclear capabilities.

He mentions that Australia and Japan, classified as Tier 2 and Tier 3 partners, respectively, would support US-led efforts to dislodge potential Chinese invasion forces, enhance resilience and impose costs on China.

Mori claims that the most important part of this strategy is Japan’s recent decision to strengthen its defenses. He claims that this would free US forces from focusing on Taiwan’s defense and make Japan play a bigger role in both offensive and defensive operations.

Further, he identifies critical areas of trilateral cooperation, mentioning intelligence sharing, missile defense and cyber resilience.

Mori adds that the three countries must coordinate joint military development and production while establishing a consistent stance through regular diplomatic and defense gatherings.

He points out that this trilateral collaboration is essential to bolstering conventional deterrence and preventing over-reliance on US nuclear weapons, which could lead to an even worsening conflict if deterrence is unsuccessful.

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