Climate crisis: what Trump can (and can’t) do – Asia Times

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Donald Trump did take over as the world’s largest greenhouse gas emission in a while.

During a campaign cycle when America was plagued by climate disasters, neither Trump nor Kamala Harris made the weather issue a dominant part of their efforts. 232 people died in the southeast of the United States as a result of Hurricane Helene, which struck in late September and was overburdened by an unusually warm Atlantic Ocean.

The swing state of North Carolina, which veered sharply in the direction of Trump, was the state where almost half of those deaths occurred. Voters in the state’s also devastated western absenteed from polling places yesterday and voted in houses.

Experts claim that the Earth structure is in a knife’s length between the carbon-rich Amazon rainforest and the slowing down of ocean heat from North Atlantic currents. If either falls, it would point the environment into deeper chaos.

Drill, girl, drill?

Democrats lost in America’s past production hinterland, the western states that presently comprise the” Rust Belt” and the party’s stalwart” Blue Wall”.

The Nixon administration’s creation of the Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA ) resulted from a river that was engulfed in industrial waste that caught fire here in 1969.

The EPA regulates climate pollutants with laws that limit pollution from power plants and automobiles, two of the region’s biggest CO₂ options.

Aerial view of an open-cast coal mine with power plant chimneys in the distance
Over the past ten years, EPA rules has been successful in reducing fuel consumption. Photo: Matthew G Eddy / Shutterstock via The Talk

According to economic policy experts Barbara Haya and Stephen Lezak ( University of Oxford ) and Stephen Lezak ( University of California, Berkeley ),” the policy proposals that Donald Trump and the think tanks advising his plan would turn the tide against America’s fundamental climate laws.”

According to a rightwing manifesto attached to the Trump campaign ( though not formally endorsed by Trump himself ), that could include” a whole-of-government unwinding” in which the EPA’s” structure and mission ]are ] greatly circumscribed”.

” Trump has promised to flame experts in state, place loyalists in their area and choose a ‘ drill, child, drill ‘ mentality”, say Lezak and Haya.

If he chooses to adopt the Project 2025 statement, as it’s known, Trump may also reduce funding for disaster preparedness and thus risk lives unnecessarily during mounting disasters.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ( NOAA ), a government agency that has monitored the ocean, studied the weather, and managed the protection of endangered species since 1970, would also be “dismantled” and “privatized.”

According to David Hastings Dunn, a professor of international politics at the University of Birmingham and a Project 2025 expert, Trump’s potential plans for NOAA reflect his wider agenda on the ground.

According to him,” NOAA is one of the main drivers of the climate change alarm industry,” and the ideological response is to banish the scientific body that produces proof that climate change has an impact.

IRAte

Trump may choose to veto the Inflation Reduction Act ( IRA ) from 2022 or to renounce Paris in Paris.

Trump’s first term removed the United States from the Paris Agreement, which mandated that all countries maintain a 2°C global warming limit. A second US exit, or a complete withdrawal from the UN climate negotiations ( another round starts in Azerbaijan ): warns climate scientist Mark Maslin (UCL).

It’s a big deal to pull out one of the world’s superpowers from international negotiations to stop global greenhouse gas emissions, he writes in an email. It also makes it easier for other nations to slow down decarbonization and blame the US for their own inachievability.

At a UN climate conference in New York in September 2019, Mike Pence and Donald Trump. &nbsp, Photo: AC News / Alamy Stock via The Conversation

The IRA extended subsidies for renewable energy until 2032, which was hailed as the Biden White House’s greatest climate achievement.

Investors in wind and solar farms typically receive federal tax breaks as a result of these subsidies. The biggest beneficiary? Banks, according to a study conducted by Durham University geographer Sarah Knuth.

Renewable tax credits were never intended to be Wall Street’s shady subsidy. They now offer significant tax shelters to banks, she claims, even though they do n’t need to file any complicated partnership forms to be incorporated into the law.

Democrats may regret supporting such a subpar model of fostering green energy, according to Knuth, and this is not the only way to finance the green transition.

She says that even the largest banks can only hold so much tax money, and that the rapidly expanding renewable energy sector requires more capital than tax equity investors can provide.

” The most significant corporate tax cuts, such as the one that was proposed under President Trump, can unfortunately shrink the entire market.”

Maslin notes Trump’s vocal support for coal, the dirtiest fossil fuel, but he says he is buoyed by the strength of America’s green industries and” simple economics”.

Trump may stifle the transition away from fossil fuels and allow other nations to thwart action, he claims, but the political and economic case is still unresolved for fossil fuels.

” It is when, not if, fossil fuel ceases to be used as an energy source”.

Jack Marley is Environment Energy Editor, The Conversation

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Cambodia’s soft but sure break from big brother Vietnam – Asia Times

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The Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area ( CLV-DTA ) has long epitomized the commitment of these three Southeast Asian nations to shared growth and regional integration.

Over two centuries, the CLV-DTA has facilitated development initiatives and cross-border opportunities aimed at fostering mutual knowledge and success.

But, Cambodia’s recent decision to withdraw from the three-way initiative marks a key turning place, signaling a move toward greater strategic autonomy in Phnom Penh. In the face of difficult local dynamics and sensibilities, Cambodia’s determination as a little state to regain its authority is reflected in this decision.

The resignation serves two main purposes: strengthening Cambodia’s administration’s home legitimacy and letting the world know that it is launching a new century of independent foreign policy.

Vietnam-Cambodia relationships are colored by a complex history of colonization, conflict and action. Vietnam’s military presence in Cambodia from 1979 to 1989, which served to stop the criminal Khmer Rouge regime, engendered mingled feelings of gratitude and hatred among Cambodians.

Vietnam was seen as both a liberator and an overpowering protector after the intervention created a patriarchal powerful. Cambodia’s departure from the CLV-DTA can thus be interpreted as a critical step in reasserting its independence and recalibrating this “brotherly” but often one-sided relationship.

At the core of Cambodia’s selection lies the issue of private validity. Needs for greater freedom have grown more intense as a result of rising republican sentiments and public pressure on perceived ingrained Asian effect.

Cambodians are becoming more vocal about reclaiming their independence and challenging perceived Asian dominance as a result of social media and community engagement amplifying these tones. The withdrawal gives new prime minister Hun Manet an opportunity to improve his standing as a powerful leader who can handle public pressure.

The move also reflects the Hun Manet government’s dedication to more self-led economic growth. A common fundraising campaign for fresh border system, which has already garnered US$ 27 million in pledges, is answering rising calling for more domestic-driven purchase.

If successful, these projects promise to build Hun Manet’s picture as a worthy and flexible activist.

Beyond domestic politics, the decision to withdraw also highlights a larger issue in international relations: managing growing patriotic sentiments against Asian influence in Thai society with the financial benefits of CLV-DTA involvement.

These concerns have been highlighted by Thai community protests against the CLV-DTA as a device of Taiwanese hegemony, which have compelled the government to take action in response to requests for more autonomy. Critics claim that the CLV-DTA impairs Cambodia’s ability to prevent Taiwanese invasion of Cambodian territory.

This growing sentiment has important effects on Cambodia’s approach to provincial partnerships and assistance frameworks as well as its foreign policy strategy. In this context, Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA can be viewed as a” smart hedger”.

Cambodia strives to strike a balance between its interests and those of other countries to protect its interests while minimizing risks as a bright trader. Cambodia is actively exploring closer ties with China and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) members, thereby reducing its overreliance on any one power by distancing itself from a Vietnam-dominated framework.

This change allows the nation to have greater freedom to pursue its national passions, which is a domestic political movement intended to quell domestic opposition and strengthen the president’s position, as former prime minister Hun Sen once said.

Cambodia’s increasing funding in tasks like the China-backed Funan Techo Canal, which has important effects on Vietnam’s economy and connection, serves as an example of this strategic tilt.

The river represents a significant shift in Cambodia’s aggressiveness to pursue its own development path, even if it is done with Taiwanese support, in addition to improving trade routes and reducing Cambodia’s dependence on Asian southeastern ports for its trade.

In this environment, China’s declared “ironclad connection” can be seen as a deliberate attempt to expand its strategic autonomy as a small state and tore its economic ties with the rest of the country in a bid to achieve upper-middle-income standing by 2030 and high-income standing by 2050.

The question now is: what lies ahead after CLV-DTA withdrawal? For one, the prevailing argument that Cambodia-China relations will come at the expense of Vietnam may be overblown. Cambodia’s foreign policy emphasizes the protection of sovereignty and peaceful coexistence with neighboring nations.

Cambodia is committed to a diplomatic strategy that emphasizes reciprocal respect and cooperation rather than trying to demonize Vietnam. This is evident in Phnom Penh’s soft approach to neighborhood diplomacy, which prioritizes dialogue and understanding over confrontation.

Cambodia and Vietnam continue to cooperate within broader regional frameworks, as demonstrated by the recent Greater Mekong Subregion Summit, an active participant of both countries.

Indeed, Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA does not intend to downgrade relations with Vietnam, but rather reflects a broader diversification of its foreign policy strategy.

This diversification allows Cambodia to strengthen existing partnerships, including with Vietnam, while forging new ties—notably with China, the US, Japan, Australia, South Korea—in line with its” strengthening old friends, making new friends” approach.

Additionally, the CLV-DTA countries have agreed to meet on the heels of important multilateral events like ASEAN summits and other multilateral forums.

The three neighbors ‘ continued cooperation on common interests will be bolstered by this, keeping their partnership strong despite changing global policy trends.

In this regard, Cambodian leaders have consistently assured their Vietnamese counterparts about controversial development projects, not least the China-backed canal. Cambodia’s intention is to ease any potential tensions that might arise from mismanaged nationalist sentiments.

After all, Vietnam remains one of Cambodia’s top five foreign direct investors, with Vietnamese enterprises holding 205 active projects in the country and a total registered capital of$ 2.94 billion. Cambodia ranks second among the countries and territories where Vietnam invests, while Vietnam is Cambodia’s second-largest export destination, following the United States.

Ultimately, Cambodia’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and its legitimate development rights deserve respect and recognition. One well-known Vietnamese scholar argued that the strategic autonomy of individual states is crucial to fostering peaceful coexistence in the Indochina sub-region, particularly in a region that is rapidly evolving.

Prime Minister Hun Manet’s resolute statement of “breathing through our own nose” is heightened by Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA, which highlights his rebalanced foreign policy. Cambodia aims to reduce dependence on any single neighbor, especially one that might be perceived as a potential threat, as a smart hedger.

This action effectively strengthens domestic legitimacy while preserving Hun Sen’s legacy and Hun Manet’s aspirations.

Cambodia asserts itself as a sovereign actor, setting its own course for development and regional cooperation, by putting national interests first and responding to domestic sentiments.

The Royal University of Phnom Penh ( RUPP ) has Dr. Chandarith Neak as its Director of the Institute for International Studies and Public Policy ( IISPP ). The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Research Center, RUPP, was founded by him as well. &nbsp,

Chhay Lim is a Monbukagakusho-MEXT scholar at Ritsumeikan University in Japan. He also serves as a young leader at Pacific Forum, a think-tank based in Hawaii, United States, as well as a visiting fellow at the Royal University of Phnom Penh in Cambodia. &nbsp,

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Comparing North and South Korea’s support for two illegal wars – Asia Times

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In recent past, two world powers – first the United States in Iraq and eventually Russia in Ukraine – initiated conflicts that were commonly regarded as questionable, if not outright improper, by much of the global community. Both of these problems sparked heated debate and scrutiny, not just for the aggressors ‘ behavior but also for the international response and alliances they sparked.

Two responses, in particular, have out for their resemblance and political sarcasm: the selection by South Korea to send troops to Iraq in 2004, and North Korea’s new move to give support to Russia in Ukraine. This parallel between the Asian states ‘ respective political systems reveals complex interconnectedness, allegiances, and evolving norms governing foreign military treatments.

A tale of two attacks

The earth was distinctly divided when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. The alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction ( WMDs ) in Iraq was the US’s official justification for the invasion, which was later refuted. However, the Bush administration went forth, citing a desire to promote democracy and remove threats to global stability.

The war was not approved by the UN. The intervention was criticized as unlawful by the UN secretary general and numerous specific nations, including many European allies. Despite global demonstrations and social criticism, the war proceeded, sparking what would become one of the most controversial war of the 21st century.

Nearly two decades later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfolded in a similar surroundings of international condemnation. Russia asserted that it was responding to safety concerns and that Ukraine’s residents were being treated unfairly by NATO’s expansion and Russian-speaking groups. Supporters make a distinction between the two, claiming that Ukraine is a neighboring state allied to European powers that threaten Russia’s immediate safety while Iraq is a royal state on the other side of the planet that does not pose a threat to the US.

Regardless, the majority of the country’s nations, especially in the West, denounced Russia’s activities as unwarranted aggression and an unconstitutional violation of Ukraine’s independence. Countries all over Europe and beyond imposed sanctions on Russia while supporting Ukraine, and the UN General Assembly largely condemned the war.

South Korea’s assistance for the US in Iraq

South Korea made the decision to send troops to support the partnership 18 weeks after the US invaded Iraq. This decision was important because South Korea, as a close ally of the United States, was under significant pressure to demonstrate its help for Washington’s plans. South Korea became one of the largest forces contributors to the alliance, behind only the United Kingdom, with the implementation of the Zaytun Division, which included around 3,600 North Korean soldiers. Nevertheless, the decision was not without controversy internally.

Substantial monetary bonuses also contributed to South Korea’s decision to support the United States and dispatch forces. This included continued US military ( including technology ) support, favorable trade conditions crucial for an export-driven economy, and lucrative contracts in construction, energy and telecommunications in Iraqi reconstruction. These economic advantages at the time significantly contributed to South Korea’s growth into Middle Eastern industry.

In South Korea, common opinion on the Iraq War was greatly divided. Many South Koreans viewed the conflict as a United States ‘ “misuse of energy” and an international agreement-brokering. However, South Korea’s state argued that the empire with the US was major, especially given the ongoing defense tension with North Korea. So, South Korea saw a way to strengthen its proper ties with the US, hoping for continued security guarantees and political support for the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea’s aid for Russia in Ukraine

Today, over 30 times into the fight in Ukraine, North Korea has sent military aid to Russia. Although the precise nature of this aid is still undetermined, evidence suggests that North Korea has already deployed military forces and provided ordnance shells and other ammunition to Russian forces, although the role they may enjoy is still unclear. In light of the international sanctions and loneliness that both nations are experiencing, North Korea’s support indicates a more comprehensive alliance with Russia.

In supporting Russia, North Korea has possible secured vital power supplies, food aid and potential access to advanced military technology, which are essential for its struggling economy. Moreover, it is likely that direct funds or in-kind payments may add to the government’s capacity to maintain control within the regime.

The choice also reflects North Korea’s long-standing anti-Western attitude and want to balance US influence in East Asia. North Korea sends a powerful concept of disobedience to what it perceives as American imperialism by supporting Russia in Ukraine. Additionally, North Korea has a significant ally in a world where there are few and its economy and tools are severely restricted by international sanctions because of aligning itself with Russia. Russia, in turn, increases from North Korea’s artillery offer, easing its possess weapons shortages on the forefront in Ukraine.

Norms are dead, long live geopolitical irony! &nbsp,

The irony of these events is not lost on observers. Each of the two rival states on the Korean Peninsula found itself allied with a superpower that was accused of carrying out illegal aggression. The decisions were strategic moves that emphasized the Koreas ‘ respective geopolitical alliances, not necessarily in accordance with the aggressors ‘ justifications.

South Korea’s participation in Iraq, while controversial, demonstrated its alignment with the Western world and its dependence on the US security umbrella, a crucial factor in its security strategy against North Korea. Similarly, North Korea’s support for Russia highlights its resistance to Western influence and a desire to maintain the balance of power in East Asia by aligning itself with a powerful, albeit embattled, Russia.

Further research is also needed regarding how international law and norms affect state behavior in these parallel decisions. Both superpowers acted in ways they believed were in line with their national interests despite the widespread condemnation and the possibility of diplomatic friction. Both South Korea and North Korea gave their strategic alliances precedence over strict adherence to international legal standards, which highlights the limitations of international law when national security is perceived as being at stake.

The two cases make a strong argument that “middle power” norms are, and always were, dependent on national interest. There is no such thing as” good international citizenship”. It is wholly dependent on national interest.

In the end, these cases demonstrate that international alliances often exert a stronger influence on state behavior than adherence to global norms or concerns about the legality of military actions. South Korea’s assistance for the US in Iraq and North Korea’s aid for Russia in Ukraine both highlight how secondary states navigate complex webs of power and influence. The priorities of both Koreas remain their national interestw and the maintenance of alliances that offer them some leverage and stability in an unpredictable world.

The complex nature of international relations and the strong sway of alliances are demonstrated by South Korea and North Korea’s decisions to engage in wars that are widely regarded as illegal. The two Koreas, though ideologically opposed, responded similarly when they were pressured&nbsp, – and offered incentives – by their superpower allies. These choices, in contrast to the increasingly multipolar world where great power competition has resumed, show how small states continue to play strategic roles, frequently placing geopolitical advantage before universal principles.

Jeffrey Robertson is an academic, consultant and writer focusing on foreign affairs, diplomacy and the Korean Peninsula. &nbsp, This article was originally published&nbsp, on his Substack, Diplomatic Seoul, and is republished with permission. Read more here.

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The clock is ticking on TikTok – Asia Times

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Last April, Congress passed, and President Joe Biden signed an unusual rules that may end up banning, in the United States at least, a solution 170 million Americans use — TikTok.

The legislation gives the Chinese-owned social-media firm until next January 19 to offer to a non-Chinese user or stop operations. The Chinese authorities is against it, according to TikTok, and a sale is difficult. TikTok may have to shut down if it is unable to persuade the authorities to reverse the law.

It’s an amazing scenario, however. Congress does not regularly enact laws to put firms in business. And this is n’t just any company.

It is a business that almost half the nation runs ( and, in some cases, is attached to ) Both presidential hopefuls used it to seduce voters, according to the business. ( They both at times favored drastic action against the business, but it’s size made them feel compelled to use it. )

Needless to say, Congress took this strange step in the name of ByteDance, which owns TikTok and is owned by the Chinese business ByteDance. All of those American consumers have private information that TikTok has collected. ByteDance may have no choice but to complience if China’s state demanded that information be disclosed.

Politicians feared that China would use the data in a hostile manner. According to TikTok supporters, China’s extensive spy network now has or had simply use TikTok to obtain information. That’s contradictory, but what’s never debatable is that with TikTok under Beijing’s influence, there’s a chance its famous engine could be adjusted to market pro-China deep scams, or worse.

As the Senate passed the bill next April, Chairwoman of the Commerce Committee said,” Congress is certainly acting to condemn ByteDance, TikTok, or any other personal business.” ” Congress is acting to prevent foreign enemies from conducting spy, security, reviled activities, harming vulnerable Americans, our servicemen and women, and our U. S. authorities personnel”.

Americans do n’t seem to want the protection Congress offered. According to Pew Research, only 32 % of US adults support a TikTok ban.

It’s not that they’re soft on China. According to another surveys, this one by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Americans give China a 26 on a one-to-100 level, the lowest preference standing since the government started polling in 1978. A record 58 % of Americans believe China to be a” critical threat to the United States ‘ vital interests.”

There are, when you think about it, two stops below. One is between how unfavorably China is perceived by the general public and how uninteresting TikTok is. Sometimes that’s because, for so many of its people, TikTok is about common culture and entertainment more than politicians.

The various discrepancy is between the enormous bipartisan support for the ban in both the House and the Senate and the general public’s opposition to it. Congress and the public are n’t usually so far apart.

The Supreme Court could also make the final decision on TikTok’s coming. Do n’t assume that the business has no chance of prevailing there. The judges will have to consider national-security considerations against First Amendment freedom-of-speech right – not only TikTok’s, but the right of the bank’s 100, 000-plus “influencers”, some of whom make their living from their TikTok articles.

Facebook, X and other American social-media operations are banned in China and there’s no court they can appeal to there. If the courts permitted the continued use of TikTok, it would be ironic.

If Washington refused to accept the offer from a Japanese company, Nippon Steel, to buy US Steel, the irony would double. A sale was opposed by both presidential candidates, not the least of which is because Pennsylvania was viewed as a swing state in the election and Pennsylvania.

President Biden opposed it, too. He requested that the Cabinet-level Committee on Foreign Investment in the US, or CFIUS, investigate whether the acquisition would be harmful to national security. Following the election, a CFIUS decision was delayed.

People in Tokyo may be wondering whether the US is aware of the difference between an adversary and an ally if the final answers are “yes” to TikTok and “no” to Nippon Steel.

Urban Lehner, a former Wall Street Journal Asia correspondent and editor, is DTN/The Progressive Farmer’s editor emeritus. &nbsp, This&nbsp, article, originally published on November 11 by the latter news organization and now republished by Asia Times with permission, is © Copyright 2024 DTN, LLC. All rights reserved. &nbsp, &nbsp, Follow&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, on X @urbanize

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Dysfunctional love triangle: Trump seeks to split Moscow, Beijing – Asia Times

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Reports of a phone call between the US president-elect, Donald Trump, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin ( although quickly denied by the Kremlin ) have given a first flavor of the tone and direction of their relationship in the immediate future. Trump and Putin were speaking on November 7 to warn him of any increase in Ukraine and to remind him of” Washington’s substantial military presence in Europe.”

Regardless of whether it happened or never, any – if even just implicit – exchange of messages between the couple should be heeded by America’s friends in the West, as well as Russia’s main lover to his south: China’s Xi Jinping. And over the past few months, there has been a lot of this communication.

Putin addressed the Valdai Discussion Club‘s annual meeting in Sochi, the Black Sea beach, in a lengthy address before that day, according to the alleged phone call. Unsurprisingly, the conversation– and Putin’s answers to questions from the audience finally – were anti-Western and full of confidence that a new world order was now in” the cycle of true development”.

Putin, however, made fun of Trump by calling him a” courageous man,” saying he would take any proposals from him to restore US-Russian relationships and put an end to what Putin called the “Ukrainian problems” into consideration.

However, he subsequently spent a lot more time defending the relationship between China and Russia. His former friend, the Taiwanese president, was more prominent than the incoming US president in this country.

One of Trump’s information to Putin and Xi references this situation. Trump promised to “un-unite” Russia and China when he said it at a campaign event on October 31. Trump made the characterization of Russia as “natural enemies” because of China’s desire for its great landmass.

YouTube video

]embedded information]

Donald Trump: US likely’ un-unite’ Russia and China.

Russia and China have a history of territorial disputes along Siberia’s much land borders. This occurred before the US opened to China under then-president Richard Nixon in the 1960s, which was a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Trump appears to be trying to restore US ties with Moscow more than Beijing, in contrast to Nixon. Trump’s obvious need to use the conflict between Russia and China to benefit the US should not be dismissed as totally impossible, even though it’s difficult to imagine a similar divide between Russia and China immediately.

On the face of it, Putin and Xi are closely aligned. However, a deeper analysis of the relationship between China and Russia suggests that it is generally one between their current frontrunners and lacks much of the administrative level that other alliances do.

In both public and private lines, Russia has a lot of hatred toward China. Russians are unsure about China’s growing influence in Central Asia and worry about possible problems over long-standing border issues. Some people even dislike the fact that Beijing now has a young lover, Moscow.

Trump might use these to scuffle Russia and China, among other things. However, much depends on what Putin thinks about Russia. The West should be focusing on the impact and implications of Trump’s proposed Ukraine coverage.

A Trump-brokered deal will probably include Russia’s full sanctions comfort, large international treatment, and recognition of its territorial gains in Ukraine since 2014. The US’s commitment to NATO would undoubtedly be slashed, as would a pledge not to do more enlargement.

Trump might find a deal with Putin, but whether Putin may stick to it is unclear. Putin is much more likely to just play both ways in an emerging innovative global order in the hopes that Russia will do this as a third gaze alongside China and the US.

This is of course a complete story, given the size of the Soviet economy only – but that’s unlikely to change Putin’s calculations, given his love to regain Russia’s power status.

Chinese leverage

Because of the difficulty of attracting foreigners to Moscow, America’s partners in Europe are unlikely to support it. Some, including Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, might find the idea attractive in general. However, among the EU members, Germany and France are more likely to want to reach an agreement with China.

They have largely ceased to be dependent on Russian oil and gas, but not China as an export market, which is the cause of this.

Beijing, meanwhile, wo n’t sit idly by while Trump tries to drive a wedge between Russia and China. Despite Putin’s efforts to establish parallel relations with North Korea and Iran, Xi still has a lot of economic leverage over Russia and will use it to strengthen its position.

Diplomatically, Putin depends on Xi and China-led outfits such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. Moscow and Beijing have different viewpoints on a US in terminal decline, which is likely to be accelerated by the upheaval anticipated from a second Trump term.

A top priority for China will be to stop the US from completely reversing its position in the Indo-Pacific, and to stop Trump from cutting a deal with Putin at China’s expense will be a top priority.

Trump might still try to talk to Putin about the Ukraine and reach an agreement with Putin. However, dividing Russia and China is not the same as agreeing to a deal with Putin. On the contrary, it is more likely to “un-unite” Europe and the US and weaken the trans-Atlantic alliance further.

Trump could accelerate America’s decline by mistakenly accelerating what is left of the liberal international order rather than reshaping it in accordance with US interests.

The University of Birmingham’s Stefan Wolff is an assistant professor of international security.

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How China may react to Trump’s threat and bluster – Asia Times

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Donald Trump did make his four-year foreign policy statement when he comes back to the White House.

US citizens have chosen a president who adheres to an” America First” process, where US interests come initially, and is expected to be more separatist than the current president, Joe Biden.

While some unusual officials, including Hungarian Prime Minister&nbsp, Viktor Orban&nbsp, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, may welcome a second Trump administration, the same cannot be said about Chinese President Xi Jinping.

A Trump presidency back in the White House is unlikely to be great news for China, which has had worsening ties with the US since Trump’s first president.

China’s economic difficulties

In July 2018, Trump fought a never-before-seen trade war with the second-largest economy in the world and imposed tariffs that ranged from 25 % to 25 % on Chinese imports into the US.

But during his 2024 plan remarks, Trump suggested that US tariffs on Chinese products could go as high as 60 % or more.

China’s economy is in a slump, with slumping house prices, great local authorities debt and higher youth unemployment. More tariffs might ruin China’s economic treatment strategy, which depends greatly on exports.

However, a second Trump administration may not be the only thing Beijing worries about. China’s ambitions to lead the world Artificial market by 2030 are likely to be constrained by a Trump-led US, which would likely restrict the flow of engineering from the US or Europe to China.

The fresh US management may also use an economic decoupling approach to “derisk” itself from Chinese coverage. By shifting its supply chain somewhere, this may aim to reduce US dependence on China and stifle US investment there.

While Joe Biden’s prior high tariffs certainly strained relations between Trump and Beijing, the Russia-Ukraine war is another factor that severely damaged Sino-US relations. Beijing has threatened to sue China for aiding Russia in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and has accused it of supporting Moscow.

Luckily for Russia, a next Trump administration may turn the tide in Moscow’s pursuit. The transfer of Ukranian property that is already occupied by Russia might be included in a Trump-negotiated peace agreement. Trump may also slash or lift sanctions against Russia because the newly elected president-elect has” no passion for punishment.”

Beijing wants a strong alliance in Russia to counteract a world order led by the US and prevent Russia from focusing its attention on Ukraine in the event that Russia apparently fails to accept its conquest of Ukraine. But as the “dealmaker-in-chief” and leading proponent of an” America First” mission, what does Trump stand to gain from helping Russia?

Second, because Russia has grown increasingly dependent on China, Beijing’s effect in Russia could be undermined by helping it overcome its diplomatic and economic problems. Secondly, as a Russian-backed Iran affects US involvement in the Middle East, a new Trump administration may agent a Russian-Ukrainian peace authority that sees Russia withhold military aid from Iran and the latter’s local friends, such as Hezbollah.

As Iran’s influence in the region diminishes, Washington may open up more solutions tied up in the Middle East and refocus its resources elsewhere, such as China, if Washington so wishes. And that may destroy China’s socioeconomic recovery more.

And what future for Taiwan?

Trump has stated ambiguously whether he would support Taiwan in the event of a Taiwanese war, in contrast to Biden. There are, however, concerns that Trump might break with China and apply Taiwan as a negotiations chip, or even leave the island entirely.

Trump expressed anger over Taiwan’s” stolen” of the US semiconductor industry and claims that the island may pay more for its defence. However, his disagreement with Taiwan is not the main point.

If Beijing invaded Taiwan, Trump has indicated that he may impose tariffs on Chinese goods of up to 20 %. Given China’s financial difficulties and President Xi’s have to&nbsp, prove&nbsp, his value as a leader whose prestige and power are &nbsp, comparable&nbsp, to the creator of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong, Xi may consider this a valuable business.

Beijing is likely to form relationships outside of the Western world as China prepares for difficulties brought on by a subsequent Trump presidency. As China lessens its reliance on the West for exports and investments, it may become more involved with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( GAL ) and the Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC).

If the Middle Eastern regime’s aid declines, China may also talk to Iran. After all, more US sources in the Middle East may mean less sources to deal with the&nbsp,” Foreign risk”.

One issue that may make Trump concerned about Taiwan coming under Beijing’s manage, even if he does like the US to make more, is that the isle manufactures 60 % of all semiconductors. This product is essential for the global use of AI and electronics.

Elon Musk’s place in Trump’s second term is still a mystery. If Trump wins a second term, Musk would head a government efficiency commission.

What part does Musk play in bridging the Washington-Beijing divide, though, given that his Tesla electric cars are heavily dependent on the Chinese market and that Tesla has a factory there?

Chee Meng Tan is assistant professor of business economics, University of Nottingham

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How Trump can reverse the tide of foreign asylum seekers – Asia Times

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Donald Trump, the president-elect, can reverse the new explosive rise in international asylum applications without the assistance of Congress.

Over the past 20 years, the number of foreigners seeking hospital in the US has increased by more than one-tenth of a percentage, just like the number of European countries.

The number of applicants for both has increased dramatically from a lone fraction of the amount of non-asylum-seeking illegal immigrants, rising from a lone variety in the US to far greater than the latter number in Europe.

2. 6 million immigrants were reportedly seeking hospital in the US in 2023. The majority of them were officially existing in the US without the ability to work, but many are regarded as having engaged in illegal employment.

The 2.6 million immigrants who are already granted asylum and who have the constitutional right to work are not included in those 2.6 million. Additionally, those 2.6 million foreigners do not include past asylum seekers who were deported after remaining in the country, many of whom are alleged to be working improperly.

Asylum business advanced

Emigration lawyers and human rights activists ‘ active roles in NGOs and the federal government have contributed to this explosive growth in hospital programs.

An ever-growing number of foreigners who otherwise might not have been able to enter the US ( or Europe ) legally have been given the status of legally admitted asylum seekers thanks to the asylum industry in recent decades. &nbsp,

The professional branch’s plan administrators and asylum application adjudicators have largely contributed to the asylum industry’s efforts by influencing the definition of “persecution” to be read much wider than it was in the past.

Still-in-force provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( INA ) of 1952, codified in part at 8 U. S. C. 1101 ( a ) ( 42 ), make “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” a prerequisite of entitlement to refugee status and hence to asylum in the US.

Prior to the “persecution” of forty or more years ago, it was primarily understood as being limited to actions by or supported by a state, a religious organization, or some other organized party, such as the mass killings of Peruvian farmers by death teams affiliated with major political parties, or the widespread mass murders of Catholics by Muslims in predominantly Muslim areas of Nigeria.

The hospital industry has expanded the definition of “persecution” over the past 30 years, including discrimination against a minor for being beaten by his dad as a result of their queer behavior or for being denied access to gender-changing drugs or surgery.

An immigration lawyer can then quickly come up with a plausible asylum claim for almost any African or Muslim because almost all American and Muslim societies disapprove of both homosexual behavior and gender-changing.

In addition, this is just one of some parameters expanding the definition of what constitutes “persecution” in terms of hospital law.

A quick look at the” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” that the US Department of State has published annually over the past four decades —e. g., in 1983, 1993, 2003, 2013 and 2023—can give a sense of how far what is deemed to form “persecution” has expanded in recent years.

In programs for asylum in the US, those reports have grown exponentially, covering a wider range of activities that can be interpreted as “persecution” with each passing ten. They are frequently cited as credible information in these reports.

Reversing the stream

It almost makes no sense to lessen the flow of illegal immigrants without even reducing the flow of asylum seekers. This may increase the number of people who are not already residing as asylum seekers. &nbsp,

Without immigrant visas or permanent resident status, it wo n’t reduce the flow of foreigners entering and remaining in the US. Even so, it wo n’t even help to halt that inflow’s growth.

By issuing an executive order directing all US senior tree officials, including boundary enforcement officials, ICE’s asylum application adjudicators, and the DOJ’s immigration court judges, to use or interpret the term “persecution” in relation to refugees and asylum cases, it is much more widely used and interpreted and used in 1952. Luckily, President-elect Trump can significantly reduce the number of plausible asylum claims.

That year marks the INA’s passage year for the INA provision that uses that term to determine refugee status eligibility, a requirement for asylum.

The only legal growth of the range of the term “persecution” in that context, enacted in 1996, requires that the INA’s use of “persecution” been construed as including “persecution for resistance to aggressive population control methods”, especially forced sterilization and forced abortion. &nbsp,

But, since such people control methods are no longer practiced somewhere, that growth of the reach of “persecution” has no existing software. This might be taken into account in the professional attempt I suggest.

In a memo re-narrowing the executive branch’s use and definition of “persecution” in relation to refugees and asylum cases, it might also be wise to direct all executive branch officials to use or interpret the term “internationally recognized human rights” to include only those rights that are ( 1 ) defined by the UN Declaration of Human Rights, in favor of which the US voted in 1948, or ( 2 ) that are protected by international agreements to which the US is party.

The State Department’s” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” are frequently referenced in hospital programs in the US because it defines the scope of its “internationally recognized human privileges” as a guideline for the use of that word.

By removing the US from the UN Refugee Agency’s 1967 Protocol Pertain to the Status of Refugees, an international agreement, it can be made more justifiable in US authorities. The US is the only international arrangement that deals with asylum to which the US is a signatory.

The UN’s Global Compact on Refugees ( GCR ), adopted by the UN General Assembly ( UNGA ) in 2018, despite the US vote against it, is not an international agreement. Like all other UNGA activities, it is not conditional on UN member states, it is only hortatory.

The US is a signatory to the 1967 Protocol Corresponding to the Status of Refugees, in comparison. The US has always been a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, which only applies to refugees fleeing oppression that started before 1951.

In 1968, the US became group to the 1951 meeting’s 1967 method, which expanded the 1951 meeting’s scope to include migrants from harassment committed since 1951 and in the prospect.

Migrant removal

Withdrawal from the US’s 1967 protocol would remove: ( 1 ) grounds on which various foreign entities could otherwise file a lawsuit seeking status in US courts challenging an executive order that narrows down executive branch employees ‘ definitions of “persecution” in refugee and asylum cases; and ( 2 ) grounds for legal arguments in US courts that a re-narrowed definition of “persecution” is incompatible with US obligations under the 1967 protocol.

Any state party to the 1967 protocol may, under Article 9 of that protocol, withdraw from it at any time ( i .e., by notifying the Secretary-General of the UN) and that its denunciation will take effect a year later.

The US senator has long been deemed by the US court to have full authority, implied by Article II, section 2 of the US Constitution, to remove the US from any treaty or foreign agreement. With this authority, President Trump announced his 2020 withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty.

No limits on presidential authority to withdraw from the 1967 refugee protocol appear to have been enacted, despite the possibility that enacted legislation may limit presidential authority to do so.

To reduce the number of asylum applications, by removing an incentive to file them, by allowing people who are asylum seekers or who declare at the border that they want to seek asylum in the US and who could seek asylum in Mexico or Canada. &nbsp,

However, that has already been widely publicized and seems well-known to President-elect Trump and his advisors. &nbsp, Moreover, that alone will not suffice to reverse the recent rise in asylum applications.

Ichabod, a pseudonym, is a former US diplomat.

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Trump tariffs threaten to torpedo the yuan – Asia Times

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Since Donald Trump’s November 5 vote gain, the Chinese yuan has traded below the main company’s fixing level. As the past and future US leader prepares to start large new trade wars, the evidence suggests that the markets are anticipating a weaker yuan.

A sensible assumption? Not sure if Gongsheng, the government of the People’s Bank of China, has anything to say about it. Pan and, for the time being, President Xi Jinping, want a steady trade rate versus the dollar.

The prominent one is assurance. A significant decrease in the renminbi could indicate to global investors that Asia’s largest economy is facing a serious issue in addition to a terrible property crisis, a growing deflation, and a significant capital flight.

The string, though, is how Trump’s coming trade war may include Team Xi scrambling to make money depreciation excellent again.

” Donald Trump’s win … is ushering in a new cycle of stress on the Foreign money”, says Wei He, an scientist at Gavekal Research.

What will happen if Trump implements his threats of fresh taxes after taking office in January, the main topic is. In this situation, it is very doubtful that the yen will be at its present level”, He said.

After Trump began imposing tariffs in 2018, the PBOC allowed a 13 % loss of the yuan in get” to largely restore trade competitiveness”, He says. So, it is “very likely” that it will allow depreciation once more, especially given the recent policy shift toward supporting local demand.

Again, this is n’t the most likely scenario as yuan internationalization&nbsp, has been a top Xi priority. Xi’s strategy to expand the dollar’s world use in finance and trade may be hampered by a weaker exchange rate.

In&nbsp, 2016, China&nbsp, won a place for the renminbi in the International Monetary Fund’s” special&nbsp, drawing&nbsp, right” box joining the dollar, yen, euro and pound. In the decades since, the stock’s usage has soared. Excessive exchange-rate interference then may dent confidence in the yuan, slowing its hinge toward reserve-currency standing.

At the same time, a falling yuan may increase the odds greatly indebted Chinese firms, including giant home designers, default on their international currency-denominated off-shore debts. That may improve the chance of new problems involving the China Evergrande Group and a Chinese asset dump.

The US Federal Reserve cutting costs as well as the monetary easing needed to support the dollar’s declines may harm Beijing’s deleveraging attempts, in part because of it. Xi’s inner group has made significant strides in eradicating economic abuse over the past few years.

That clarifies why Xi and Premier Li Qiang have been afraid to actively lower prices in the face of mounting negative forces.

Not surprisingly, the” PBOC now appears to be slowly renewing its defence of the money through large state-owned business banks”, says Gavekal’s He.

But if Xi switched program, it would destroy two unexpected dynamics.

One, it may produce Trump’s head explode, artistically speaking. He might retaliate by levying even higher taxes on mainland goods than the 20 % that all products entering the United States must pay are already telegraphed and the 60 % that all other countries have already telegraphed.

” If Trump does began a major industry war, China does, however, hit again, targeting American companies with interests in China, selling US bonds, devaluing the yuan and targeting US imports of agricultural items”, says Evie Aspinalla, a director&nbsp, at the British Foreign Policy Group think tank. ” It would have a significant impact on global trade. China, if it can, would rather avoid this, but if Trump follows through on his trade rhetoric, a tit-for-tat trade war seems all but inevitable”.

Trump, Aspinalla adds, has been “incredibly forthright throughout the campaign on his views on China, not least in his threats to impose 60 % tariffs on China. China, meanwhile, &nbsp, has pledged to continue to work with the US based on the&nbsp, principles of mutual respect, peaceful co-existence and win-win cooperation, claiming there are’ no winners’ in a trade war. 60 % tariffs would cripple the Chinese economy, which would put a strain on China’s ability to compete.

That threatened 60 % maneuver alone, UBS&nbsp, Group estimates, will cut China’s annual growth by more than half – chopping 2.5 percentage points off the gross domestic product ( GDP ) of the globe’s top trading nation. Due to sluggish retail spending, property investment, and new home sales, China increased only 4.6 % in the third quarter, up from 4.6 % last year.

A weaker yuan would have a negative impact on a region that is still too dependent on exports for comfort. As UBS&nbsp, economist Wang Tao warns, there’s a “risk of other countries raising tariffs on imports from China as well”, triggering a new wave of retaliatory trade curbs. A weaker yuan may also sway Asian governments to join the bottom-skinned nations.

In the past, Beijing’s beggar-thy-neighbor proclivities put officials from Tokyo to Jakarta on the spot. The top destination for Asian goods is by far China. A weaker yuan might spur regional governments to carry out the biggest devaluations since the Asian crisis of 1997-1998.

Stephen&nbsp, Innes, strategist at SPI Asset Management, notes that” the stakes are sky-high” if Trump goes full steam ahead with tariffs. ” For China”, he says,” the regional economic heavyweight, the options are stark: either devalue the yuan to protect exports or unleash a massive fiscal stimulus to spark domestic demand. A 60 % tariff could trigger a jaw-dropping 30%-45 % yuan devaluation, pushing dollar-yen&nbsp, skyward, possibly even past the 175 mark”.

For Asia, Innes adds,” a roaring dollar could spell disaster. The lifeblood of Asia’s emerging markets is local currency debt, which has lost all gains due to previous dollar surges. Some economies may experience a chokehold as a result of their significant external debts in US dollars. The Trump effect is a high-stakes gamble that could transform the financial landscape for years to come, despite Trump’s victory setting Wall Street on fire.

Context matters, of course, and most Asian economies are n’t approaching the Trumpian storm to come from a position of strength. Due to sluggish retail sales, weak business investment, and soft industrial production, Japan’s GDP continues to decline quarter after quarter. Hence the Bank of Japan’s reluctance to hike short-term rates above 0.25 %.

Political chaos is also raging in Japan. The Liberal Democratic Party lost absolute power late last month, marking the third straight year since 1955. With the assistance of coalition partners, the LDP and Shigeru Ishiba were able to snag control and the title of premier. On Monday, the parliament voted to let Ishiba stay on as Japan’s leader. He will now lead a minority Japanese government.

In Seoul, South Korean President&nbsp, Yoon&nbsp, Suk Yeol is struggling with a 19 % approval rating. Korea struggles to cope with record household debt, which slows down growth. Notably, Korea’s economy is dominated by a handful of giant, export-driven family-owned conglomerates whose profits are uniquely vulnerable to a new trade war.

Central bank officials in Taiwan are struggling with a housing bubble. Indonesia’s economy struggles to stop growing. Artificial intelligence is putting a strain on the Philippines ‘ vital call center sector, which is rapidly expanding. Singapore is having a cost-of-living crisis. Political conflict is preventing economic reforms in Thailand.

All of this implies that many Asian economies will import tariffs from countries already in place. China, too, as a massive property crisis drags on and increases the odds of deflation.

Jeremy Zook, an analyst at Fitch Ratings, says,” the potential exacerbation of current supply and demand trends, coupled with demographic and debt overhang challenges, poses a risk of sustained price falls”.

Chinese “domestic demand is weak, and a longer-than-expected real estate downturn is a significant risk to our growth forecasts”, Zook notes. ” Capital spending is increasing faster in export-oriented sectors. External demand is robust, but a slowing global economy in 2025 will likely constrain export growth”.

There is a case for the Communist Party of Xi’s devaluing the yuan. One of his 11 years in power was one of the most consistently consistent reform initiatives to create a stable and reliable currency regime.

” This was a commonly discussed topic throughout the year, and while it’s impossible to say for sure, we do not think this is a likely outcome”, says Lynn Song, economist at ING Bank. China’s emphasis on currency stabilization is not directly related to short-term trade flows, but it is likely to lessen pressure on capital outflows in the near future and make RMB trade settlement and internationalization easier.

In consequence, Song states that” we anticipate the PBOC to continue to resist significant movements for the RMB in either direction.” This position does not appear to be significantly changing.

The” PBOC might attempt to reset the yuan at a new equilibrium after incorporating the tariffs risk,” says Mizuho Bank’s chief Asian FX strategist, Ken Cheung. By front-loading onshore yuan depreciation, it could smooth out volatility during the US tariffs announcement, if any”.

Economist Robin Xing&nbsp, at Morgan Stanley notes that” we believe PBOC’s strategy could be to tolerate some onshore yuan depreciation against the dollar, but keep it outperforming other emerging-market currencies with intervention”.

All bets are off, of course, if Trump tries to out-devalue Asia. Trump’s supporters have suggested a unilateral dollar-price strategy to benefit US exporters. Trumpworld has been debating an Argentina-like pivot at the behest of advisors like Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s former and likely future international trade representative.

Or if Trump’s next Treasury Department attempts to upend the post-World War II” Bretton Woods” system in ways Trump 1.0 did n’t. Trump’s tax proposals could also lead to an even higher national debt, which would lead to credit downgrades that would cause the dollar to drastically fall.

For now, though, the” Trump trade” is sending the dollar higher and pulling waves of capital toward US assets. That is putting downward pressure on the yuan, which is raising concerns that Beijing might choose to pursue a downward trend.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Did Prabowo just yield to China in the North Natuna Sea? – Asia Times

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With a seemingly remarkable change in Indonesia’s South China Sea plan while in Beijing, President Prabowo Subianto has dazed and perplexed some outside policy spectators.

Indonesia Foreign Ministry officials were caught off guard, if not shocked, after an official statement released on the final day of Prabowo’s trip appeared to recognize China’s expansive “nine-dash line” claim to most of the South China Sea, including part of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ).

The announcement’s speech was confusing so the practical relevance remain unclear. Any advice that Indonesia now recognizes China’s recommended map was immediately refuted by the foreign ministry’s quick release of a clarifying statement.

Some observers are left scratching their heads as a result of this and earlier indications that Indonesia may be defending its maritime country.

Was this a president’s easy haphazard pass intended to lead international plan ahead of political officials? Or does Prabowo’s stance suggest that Indonesia’s political branding is shifting toward China?

Long-running debate

A word from a joint statement by China that refers to a” common knowledge on joint growth in areas of overlapping claims” with regard to sea issues is at the center of the disagreement. This artless phrase carries probably major implications.

China has long asserted wide geographical claims over waters in the South China Sea, which are in line with those of many Southeast Asian countries. For Indonesia, the area of contention is in the North Natuna Sea, which China claims a loaf of despite being in Indonesia’s EEZ.

Since China’s claims have no legal basis, Indonesia has not only consistently rejected this assertion, but also has adopted the unwavering position that there is nothing to explain.

Based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a 2016 decision the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the United Nations supports this. Jakarta has categorically rejected Chinese attempts to engage in conversation about the topic.

Prabowo appeared to recognize that China has genuine territorial statements in the North Natuna Sea, which if true would change Indonesian policy significantly. By putting his name in a formal declaration accepting the idea of “overlapping claims,” Prabowo appeared to accept this.

Indian foreign government officials reportedly fought diligently for the change of the language, but ultimately failed, according to sources with knowledge of the situation. But, since then, the foreign government has issued a statement clarifying that the MOU on coastal participation” may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the’ 9-Dash-Lines claim ‘” and, consequently, “has no impact on Indonesia’s sovereignty, royal rights, or jurisdiction in the North Natuna Sea”.

The situation is made even more complicated by Indonesia’s recent warnings that it might be treading a more difficult path in the North Natuna Sea.

A Chinese coast guard vessel was ejected from Indonesian regional waters around Natuna on October 23. Indonesia’s Maritime Security Agency, Bakmla, released videos of the event and announced its expulsion.

Some people thought that Prabowo, a former member of the special forces, was promoting a more muscular approach. Indonesia continued to refuse China’s sea claims while maintaining a low level of tension under his father, President Joko Widodo.

rookie blunders or corporate shifts?

What should be made of the shock statement, both by spectators and experts?

” With the recently released joint statement stating that we have an overlapping state, that is very important”, said Aristyo Darmawan, a lecturer in international laws at the University&nbsp, of&nbsp, Indonesia and an analyst on coastal rules. He suggests that this statement might have two possible consequences.

The first would be that accepting overlapping claims implies that negotiations on the maritime boundary might be in Indonesia’s future. And for a claim that is not based on international law, Aristyo said,” I think it’s absurd to negotiate a maritime boundary demarcation.”

Opening the door to regional resource sharing might be the second implication. Oil and gas are mentioned in the two sides ‘ documents but not explicitly in the joint statement.

” I think that’s something stupid”, said Aristyo. ” It’s like a random person arguing that part of your house is theirs and, therefore, you should share some of the resources”.

By examining how much the statement actually means or alters the facts in the real world, other experts had a slightly more optimistic opinion. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’s director, Gregory Poling, described Indonesia as” a huge shift” by accepting an area of overlap and opening the door to joint development. However, he added, the quick clarification issued by Indonesia’s foreign ministry suggests that in practice it is a “dead letter”.

Others suggested that China’s involvement in the matter might be advantageous. ” Prabowo’s administration is laser-focused on energy self-sufficiency, and exploring oil and gas in the North Natuna Sea is a big part of that plan. Working with China on these resources may have fruitful outcomes, according to Dedi Dinarto, a senior Indonesia analyst at Global Counsel’s strategic advisory firm.

Some have chalked up the whole affair to the inexperience of Indonesia’s new Foreign Minister Sugiono, a protégé of Prabowo’s with no previous foreign policy experience.

Sugiono allegedly received advice from officials in the foreign ministry about the problematic language, but he did not, according to a source with knowledge of the situation, push his Chinese counterparts to change their minds.

The source also attributed the pressure on Prabowo’s wealthy business partners, who were eager to maintain a friendly relationship. Some 156.19 trillion rupiah ( US$ 10 billion ) worth of deals were signed at the Indonesia-China Business Forum, though details were not publicly released.

Without making any concessions on the sea issue, former leader Widodo was able to agree to many of these agreements while visiting China as president. Many people wonder if Prabowo’s statement is a sign of diplomatic incompetence or if it indicates a desire to develop even more productive economic ties with China.

Geopolitical sides

A commitment to” carry out broader and deeper security cooperation in more areas” was a final point of interest in the joint statement.

Since China’s claims and incursions in the Natuna Sea in 2016 resulted in a severe suspension of Indonesian and Chinese security cooperation.

A move like this would fit Prabowo’s preference for diplomatic defense and his alleged desire to formally appoint a new security ally to Indonesia.

Last week, Indonesia and Russia conducted their first joint maritime exercise in accordance with this statement. Though given that Prabowo also oversaw the bolstering of security ties with America as the previous administration’s defense minister, this likely should not be over-interpreted.

In public statements, Prabowo has continued to embrace Indonesia’s long-standing commitment to non-alignment. However, that position does not preclude quiet geopolitical repositioning.

Indonesia and the United States had incredibly close relations under President Suharto. Under Widodo, Indonesia arguably leaned to China for investment. Prabowo, Suharto’s son-in-law and Widodo’s successor, is now being watched closely for how he might incline.

More signs may be coming. Just 19 days after his inauguration, Prabowo embarked on an extend international tour. He has now flown to the United States, where he is scheduled to meet with both President-elect Donald Trump and President-elect Joe Biden, after three days of traveling there.

The newly elected leader will travel to Peru, Brazil, the United Kingdom, and other Middle Eastern countries that are still unnamed as part of his diplomatic tour.

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Trump’s mandate: What will he do with it? – Asia Times

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With a one-month trial now available for only$ 1, you can sign up for the exclusive$ 99.99 annual membership.

Trump’s mission: What will he do with it?

David Goldman focuses on Donald Trump’s unexpected defeat in front of the business. Trump’s proposed tax breaks and tariff-focused trade deficit decline are likely to fight because the trade deficit has previously been worsened by increased demand.

First polls ahead as Germany’s decision partnership falls

Diego Faßnacht reviews on the decline of Germany’s ‘ customers light ‘ coalition government over strong economic and financial disagreements. Although fresh elections by March seem unavoid, Chancellor Olaf Scholz will continue to be under pressure for an instant voting.

Kiev “bordering on sadness” following Trump flood

The leadership of Ukraine is in a grim state, according to James Davis, who is extremely concerned about possible reductions in American military support, especially if the incoming Trump administration is under pressure to negotiate with Moscow and negotiate territorial concessions.

Yen over, Chinese companies up on Trump victory

Following Donald Trump’s win in the presidential election, Japan quickly expressed a desire to strengthen its relationship with the United States, according to Scott Foster. For Tokyo, but, essential uncertainties remain regarding the approaching American president’s possible demands.

Chinese politics shifts to the center.

In light of the recent elections in Japan, where Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba was elected despite his Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ) losing a sizable portion of the vote, largely due to the disapproval of scandals involving rival LDP factions, Scott Foster assesses the situation.

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