Syria’s fallen regime linked to black market drug trade – Asia Times

Big stocks of the illegal drug captagon have apparently been discovered following the fall of the al-Assad government in Syria.

The supplies, found by Arab rebels, are believed to be linked to al-Assad defense office, implicating the fallen program in the product’s manufacture and distribution.

Captagon was previously a medical drug, similar to some of the legal substances we still use today for conditions like attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder ( ADHD), as we’ll observe.

Captagon was again a medicinal

Captagon is the original name for a vintage chemical pharmaceutical drug that was created in Germany in the 1960s. It was an option to drug and drugs, which were both used as treatments at the time.

The original substance, which was developed to treat conditions like ADHD and insomnia, contained the active component fenethylline. It had a similar apply to some of the officially available substances we also use now, such as dexamphetamine.

Captagon has identical results to stimulants. It increases serotonin in the mind, leading to emotions of well-being, satisfaction and joy. It also improves target, attention and strength. But it has a lot of unwanted side effects, like as low-level illness.

The medicine was first mainly sold in the Middle East and some parts of Europe. It was available over the counter ( without a prescription ) in Europe for a short time before it became prescription-only.

Prior to becoming a managed substance in the 1980s, it only dimly received US approval, but it was still permitted to treat insomnia in some European nations until recently.

Captagon’s production, according to the International Narcotics Control Board, had stopped by 2009.

The illegal business seized control of the situation.

The illegally produced type is typically referred to as captagon ( with a small c ). Because it is thought that men in Middle Eastern war-torn locations use it to aid in their concentration and energy, it is sometimes called” chemical courage.”

For example, it’s been reported to have been discovered on the body of Hamas soldiers during the Israeli-Hamas issue. Its production is fairly easy and cheap, making it an obvious goal for the black-market medication trade.

Nearly all of the black market captagon is then produced in Syria and neighboring Lebanon. It’s most frequently used in the Middle East, and some Gulf state have it for recreational purposes.

It is one of the most prevalent illegal medicines in Syria.

Captagon generated more than US$ 7.3 billion in Syria and Lebanon between 2020 and 2022, according to a new record ( roughly$ 2.4 billion a year ).

What we usually know about illegal drugs is that any seizures or restrictions on the sale of drugs only have a small impact on the market because another producer or distributor opens up to meet demand.

Given the size of the Middle East captagon business, these most recent pharmaceutical insights and spasms are likely to only temporarily decrease production.

Nicole Lee is an adjunct professor at Curtin University’s Curtin University’s National Drug Research Institute ( Melbourne ).

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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US, China, Russia gearing up for space wars to come – Asia Times

As China’s subtle maneuvers, Russia’s hunter-killer satellites, and the US’s press for efficient orbital fight capabilities converge toward future space battles, the conflict is escalating.

According to Air & Space Forces Magazine, US Space Force leaders have been looking for more maneuvering abilities as a result of China’s extreme orbital maneuvers in geostationary orbit.

Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine mentions that since 2010, China has launched roughly 1, 000 satellites, with new activities involving large activity rates, planetary war techniques and evasion tactics.

The document highlights the dangers posed by China’s powerful telescope tactics, which include inspecting, moving or damaging another observatories. According to the record, these tactics are uncommon for a geostationary circle and aim to avoid detection and disruption.

According to the statement, US Space Force Commander General Stephen Whiting cited China’s use of novel orbit and on-orbit fuel as evidence that the need for sustained place movement abilities.

Additionally, it mentions Brigadier General Anthony Mastalir’s warning about a paradigm change that required the US to adjust. Additionally, the report mentions Lieutenant General Douglas Scheiss ‘ suggestion that because both countries have maneuvering skills, there might be a “dogfight in space.”

According to Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine, the US aims to create systems similar to the X-37B spaceplane to lessen operating surprises and bridge planetary governments.

Defense Scoop reported in October 2024 that the US Space Force gave California-based business Impulse Space a$ 34.5 million commitment to show on-orbit flexibility for its strategically flexible storage system in addition to the X-37B spaceplane.

The contract includes the delivery of two orbital maneuver vehicles ( OMV) for the Victus Salo and Surgo missions, according to Defense Scoop. The report notes that these missions are intended to evaluate the ability of pre-positioned space assets to respond to on-orbit threats quickly.

Defense Scoop mentions that the US Space Force is working to improve its response to space threats and aims to have operational, tactical space capability by 2026. It also says the upcoming Victus Haze mission, slated for 2025, aims to test maneuverable space vehicles.

In February 2022, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ( DARPA ) announced that General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, and Blue Origin had been awarded contracts to develop nuclear propulsion systems for Low Earth Orbit ( LEO ) demonstrations by 2025.

This technology, which uses nuclear fission to accelerate propellants, offers significant advantages over traditional chemical propulsion, including longer endurance, heavier payload capacity and double fuel efficiency.

These advancements may shift space combat from passive “detection and response” to active “positioning and maneuver” strategies. They enable the application of traditional war principles—flexibility, concentration, and maneuverability—to space operations.

Maneuverability may also address satellites ‘ inherent vulnerability. Most of them follow predetermined paths, making them susceptible to tracking and targeting by anti-satellite weapons. With greater precision, adversaries can plan and execute attacks with greater predictability.

Adversary satellites employing” chase and disable” tactics —actively seeking, inspecting, or damaging critical space assets—pose significant threats to space security.

These tactics involve satellites moving to close proximity to and possibly involving other satellites, raising concerns about unintentional interruptions or hostile behavior.

For instance, NPR reported in May 2024 that the US had accused Russia of launching a satellite, Cosmos 2576, that is likely a counter-space weapon. NPR says the satellite, launched from the Plesetsk site in northern Russia, is in the same orbital plane as a US spy satellite, USA 314, which is part of the Keyhole 11 series.

According to NPR, the US claims that Cosmos 2576’s proximity to USA 314, approximately 48 kilometers at its closest point, suggests it could be used to inspect, move or damage other satellites.

The report notes that this maneuver has raised international tensions, with the US looking out for any threatening behavior on the satellite. NPR says Russia has denied the allegations, calling them “fake news” and asserting its opposition to placing weapons in space.

Previously, Asia Times reported in August 2022 that Russia’s Kosmos-2558 satellite is suspected to be an “inspector satellite” with potential hunter-killer capabilities. Analysts believe it has the ability to track and possibly destroy US spy satellites, which raises questions about the use of space as a weapon.

That month, Kosmos-2558 approached within 75 kilometers of the USA-326 satellite, which carries a classified payload for space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ) missions.

Concerns about the satellite’s location and potential threat have been raised by the US National Reconnaissance Office ( NRO ). Russia has a history of deploying satellites with similar capabilities, including Kosmos-2491, Kosmos-2499, and Kosmos-2504, which have conducted proximity maneuvers since 2013.

The US Space Force should look into plans to deploy “hunter-killer” satellites, using SmallSats ‘ flexibility and affordability, in a July 2024 article for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, to increase space superiority.

Galbreath says these hunter-killer satellites are designed to operate as co-orbital weapons capable of disabling adversary satellites through kinetic strikes, electronic warfare, laser targeting, spoofing and jamming.

He points out that the US Space Force is more apt to carry out offensive counter-space operations on short notice by patrolling close to adversary assets, hiding in less-monitored orbits, or remaining dormant aboard larger spacecraft until they are activated.

Additionally, Galbreath says these satellites can be “bodyguards” for high-value space assets, similar to fighter escorts for aircraft, thereby shielding critical systems like missile warning satellites from attack.

He notes that the adoption of SmallSats for this role is driven by their low cost, rapid development cycles, and potential for mass deployment, which enables the US to counter China’s and Russia’s growing space warfare capabilities.

Galbreath claims that SmallSats have the potential to transform US military space operations because of their combination of precise targeting, operational agility, and the ability to achieve effects without creating orbital debris.

However, the rules of war regarding attacks against satellites aren’t crystal clear. Michael Byers and Aaron Boley discuss the legality of an attack on a satellite as a result of their book” Who Owns Outer Space” in 2023, which deals with the interpretations of the jus ad bellum ( right to war ) and jus in bello ( conduct in war ) principles.

According to Byers and Boley, opponents of satellite attacks may argue that they fall under the UN Charter’s Article 2( 4 ), primarily if they cause significant damage to state assets or interfere with essential services like navigation or communications.

They argue that using satellites for military, economic, and civilian purposes may be justification for using them in self-defense under Article 51.

Conversely, they mention that opponents note that not all satellite attacks meet the threshold of an “armed attack”, especially if effects are non-destructive, like signal jamming or hacking.

Moreover, Byers and Boley point out that satellites ‘ dual-use nature complicates attribution and intent assessment, making classifying such actions as acts of war challenging.

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China has cause to be terrified of rebel-run Syria – Asia Times

A coalition of Syrian rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ( HTS ) has seized control of Damascus, putting President Bashar al-Assad in exile, and evoking a new uncertain future for the war-torn country. Despite China’s range from the war core, the rebel acquisition may be setting off warnings in Beijing.

China’s concern comes from credible reports of the Turkestan Islamic Party ( TIP ) fighting alongside HTS. A Uyghur separatist group with strong ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, the TIP, also known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement ( ETIM), has roots in China’s troubled western province of Xinjiang.

It is attempting to establish an independent Muslim status in East Turkestan in Xinjiang. China, the UN, and the US designated TIP as a terrorist organization off until 2020, respectively. The terrorist organization was established in Pakistan but has since gained traction in Afghanistan’s neighbor. In recent years, the team’s control in Afghanistan and Pakistan waned under Foreign stress.

In a strange turn of events, many of the insurgents and their people found refuge in Idlib, a rebel-held region of Syria. Imad Moustapha, the then-Syrian ambassador to China, claimed that Syria had 5,000 or 5,000 Rohingya militants by 2017.

Turkey supported the Hole’s relocation to Syria, a move that successfully killed two birds with one punch. Turkey was able to support the oppressed Slavic brethren in areas under its control in northern Syria. It is friendly to the situation there.

Additionally, Turkey wants to create a pro-Turkey bulwark against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF) in eastern Syria. Turkey thinks that Kurdish separatists on both sides of the border may join forces to undermine its regional dignity and national security if the SDF takes control of the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian borders.

The TIP therefore armed itself in Syria when it arrived along with other Arab insurgent parties against the Assad government and its SDF allies. The Emir of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, has &nbsp, said,” The TIP has been in Syria for seven years and has never posed a threat to the outside world.

Because they face persecution in China, which we highly oppose, and have nowhere to go, they are determined to defend Idlib from the Assad administration’s aggression. However, our battle against China is not ours. They are welcome to stay as long as they follow our guidelines, which they do.

Units does not appear to have any interest in engaging with China beyond expressing support for the Uyghur reason. In that regard, HTS‘ success in the Syrian civil war does not create a direct threat to China.

But, TIP insurgents gaining fight experience does. The TIP is fighting in Syria, according to Chinese Major General Jin Yinan, to draw notice to the Uyghur reason and get fight knowledge so they can use those fighting abilities against Beijing one day.

The state was confirmed when Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the TIP’s Emir, demanded that Uyghurs from all over the planet” come together to combat China and the Assad regime.” Now, we are helping our boys pay jihad in Greater Syria. The Islamist troops must be prepared to rescue Xinjiang from its communist occupiers by tomorrow.

Beijing claims that the TIP carried out terrorist problems in China in 2008, 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2015. Attacks included driving cars into pedestrians, violence with knives in common areas, auto bombs, and suicide bombings.

If the group is responsible for all of the claimed problems, it is difficult to establish. Some were most likely carried out by wayward wolf upset with Xinjiang’s social-economic disparity.

However, Beijing blames the party for all of the attacks and has implemented limiting measures, epitomized by massive incarceration facilities, in the Uyghur’s house state in response. There are obvious indications that the unrest is still bubbling just beneath the surface despite these rigorous measures.

However, China’s Permanent Consultant to the UN claimed in 2022 that TIP-related violence had resurrected recently, claiming that the organization is using Syria as a base to recruit and train insurgents to attack China and Central Asia.

Beijing pledged to” coordinate with Syria and other related parties to conflict TIP violence” in order to combat the reemergent risk. The statement was made in response to rumors that TIP had been involved in an attack last year that left 112 people dead at a military academy in Palmyra. What the speech meant in real practice, but, remains unclear.

Rumors of Taiwanese regiment operations to Syria surfaced in 2017 and 2018, but in the end, nothing were deployed. Additionally, while weapons made in China were delivered to the government, they were both redistributed by next parties or long-agolysed to Syria. After the civil war broke out, no immediate revenue of weapons were made.

Despite TIP’s supposed rising risk to China’s regional security, Beijing has remained staunch to its decade-long modus operandi of non-intervention. It has been happy to fly on another nations ‘ surface in Syria with boots on the ground.

Beijing’s just significant step was to carry high-level discussions with Damascus to exchange information on the TIP’s actions starting in 2016. With Assad’s demise, this knowledge supply will stop.

China’s apparent lack of action sends a message that while Beijing is concerned by the fact that if battle-trained Edge insurgents – known for fighting like “lions” in Syria – make their way back to China in sufficient amounts, it will experience an insurrection several times stronger than the previous one because it is uncertain whether the Edge can and will return to China.

On the one hand, the TIP do not shy away from this objective in their propaganda. In Syria, they have notably failed to integrate into local communities, with language being the primary barrier. TIP militants forbid Arabs from entering Uyghur villages because they are not” Chinese,” which suggests that they continue to be ensconced in their Chinese homeland.

On the other hand, TIP militants who sold their homes in China before relocating to Syria with their families sent a message that they are still there. In addition, China’s security has significantly improved in recent years, making it difficult for militants to enter the country undiscovered in large numbers.

However, the Syrian civil war’s apparent end could shift the TIP’s calculus. The TIP no longer has to struggle to make ends meet in a small sliver of land in northern Syria for the first time in a decade. As such, the TIP could quickly set its militant sights elsewhere.

Beijing is concerned that TIP militants will re-establish themselves in neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan while China itself is out of reach. That’s a high risk as the two countries have become safe havens in recent years for various terrorist organizations, including ISIS-K, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP ) and the Balochistan Liberation Army ( BLA ).

Indeed, there has been an uptick in attacks on Chinese citizens and assets abroad in recent years, especially in Pakistan. Despite the lack of available evidence, Beijing believes these attacks stem from the TIP’s collusion with ISIS, al-Qaeda and the BLA to undermine China’s overseas interests and investments.

Therefore, should battle-hardened TIP militants return to Pakistan and join forces with the TTP, BLA and others, as Beijing claims is already happening, it would pose a serious threat to China’s strategic interests as its flagship project – the Belt and Road Initiative – runs through the country.

The likelihood of this scenario has increased exponentially as Assad’s ouster has diminished, and Russia and Iran’s ability to control and contain Syrian rebel groups and their allies has decreased.

” A&nbsp, butterfly&nbsp, flapping its wings in&nbsp, China&nbsp, can cause a&nbsp, hurricane&nbsp, in the Caribbean,” the old saying goes. Conversely, a frozen conflict thawing in Syria can erect roadblocks to China’s global ambitions. China needs to reevaluate its foreign policy toward Syria and other countries.

Yang Xiaotong is an assistant researcher at a Beijing-based independent&nbsp, think tank.

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Not quite peaceful protests in democratically enraged South Korea – Asia Times

International media outlets have covered the alleged peaceful and orderly public protests calling for the resignation of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s attempted military law tragedy.

Stephanie Choi, a scholar, was quoted by Reuters as saying that the rally’s use of mild sticks” speaks the power of solidarity while upholding the original principle of non-violence.”

Nihon Keizai Newspaper described the demonstrations before the National Assembly on December 7 as “orderly, with the vibrant ambience of a festivity, incorporating elements of leisure”.

It’s true—South Korea’s presentations are usually more composed than, state, those in the United States. No significant conflict erupts into public places, no rioters burning down structures, no rioters storming the National Assembly, and no extremists storming the building.

However, despite the compliment for peaceful protests, demonstrations in South Korea are messier than they may seem.

Protestors enraged against ruling People Power Party ( PPP ) lawmakers who en masse boycotted the vote on December 7 immediately following the unsuccessful impeachment motion against Yoon on December 7.

A field blade and a banner demanding Yoon’s senate were discovered a day later atop Kim Jae-sup’s residence. His district department was stricken by an egg-filled wreath of flowers with important messages and targeted with a crown of flowers in protest. Kim has since requested authorities security.

At the office of another ruling party lawmaker, Shin Dong-wook, a university student, pasted a flyer stating,” What you did in the National Assembly on the 7th … is a declaration of war against the people”. Many other PPP politicians have experienced similar intimidation, with many of their offices being strewn with fresh eggs.

On the other hand, Kim Yea-ji, one of the three PPP lawmakers who voted in next week’s prosecution movement, has received a lot of phone calls and messages requesting her departure.

However, street protests are likewise intensifying. In mid-November, 11 trade union individuals were detained in Gwanghwamun during a protest demanding Yoon’s departure.

One protester was injured and transported to a local hospital as a result of the confrontation that turned into a real confrontation between the police and activists. On Thursday, the same union party unjustly blocked several bridges and attempted to misconduct the presidential mansion, calling for Yoon’s prosecution.

Last month, a rebel claiming to “oppose inequity” attempted self-immolation by dousing himself with ink thinner on the day of Yoon’s impeachment vote. Also, on Wednesday in Chuncheon, another person poured thinner over his plain neck while demanding Yoon’s accusation and senate.

In the traditional enclave of Gyeongbuk state, banners calling for Yoon’s impeachment were frequently vandalized. A PPP senator volunteer reportedly contacted a local emblem company, heightening the situation, and threatened the graffiti of their signs.

A 20-year-old gentleman was detained earlier this month after posting an Instagram photo of himself carrying a knife and a ominous information to harm protesters at the Gwanghwamun march. The risk was obviously aimed at “anti-Yoon” protesters.

Similar incidents of pro- and anti-Yoon partisan conflict led to more egregious acts of despair in January, including the beating of PPP senator Bae Hyun-jin with a stone in Busan and the teen’s beating of opposition leader Lee Jae-myung in the neck.

In South Korea, hostilities have a record during prosecution trials. During previous President Park Geun-hye’s prosecution, real face-offs were widespread, resulting in tens of injuries among officers and protesters, the deaths of four pro-Park crusaders and many arrests.

Also, cruel, half-baked stories about Park and her allies, together with personal insults directed at the then-president, circulated widely yet through established media.

With the upcoming days and weeks of a new prosecution movement being introduced this Saturday ( December 14), one can only hope that these unnecessary and unfortunate activities do not occur again.

However, the citizens of democratic democracies have important liberties, including the right to gather and protest. And in the midst of significant unrest this month, the North Korean people have shown largely remarkable resilience and ordered leadership in response to the government’s alleged injustice.

But engagement that defies common sense also poses a threat to the integrity of democratic operations, especially when maintaining constitutional order is important.

In the end, the elected officials will decide whether to remove President Yoon from office or not, while the leader will ultimately have to make that choice. The Constitutional Court will decide whether Yoon should be removed from office if the parliament passes the impeachment articles.

The public must also have faith that Yoon’s two institutions will conduct a thorough investigation, and it will be the president’s responsibility to decide whether or not he should be punished.

If South Koreans are dissatisfied with any of the outcomes, democratic channels—such as elections, petitions, and legal recourse—provide legitimate ways to seek redress. Intimidation and coercion, however, should have no role in the nation’s democratic political process in the days and weeks ahead.

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Assad’s hard fall decapitates region’s ‘Iranization’ – Asia Times

The 24 million Syria who lived and suffered mostly under his terrible concept will also be affected by President Bashar Assad’s fall. Over the frontier in Lebanon, the effect will be felt, too.

Hezbollah, Assad’s ally, was previously suffering from an Israel issue that had already weakened its capabilities and decimated its management, and the collapse of Assad’s authorities is yet another blow to its Syrian allies. However, some people in Lebanon did remain cheering, not the least of the 1.5 million Syrian refugees who fled Syria to avoid Assad and a 13-year civil war.

As a specialist on Lebanon’s history and culture, I anticipate that Syria’s impact will have an impact. The two places ‘ present histories are intertwined, and throughout its 54-year law, the Assad community has intervened in Lebanon several times – mostly to the expense of its people, its business and its security.

Hezbollah and Assad: A bilateral relationship

Hezbollah has benefited greatly from the Arab regime’s solid support since its creation in the early 1980s. There were definitely times of tension between the two, most prominently in the midst of the Syrian civil conflict. However, Hezbollah has been able to rely on Syria for weapons, education, and quick area access to Iran overall.

And this design was mutual. Hezbollah fighters entered Syria to boost the authorities when Assad’s law was challenged in 2011 and the nation erupted into civil war.

However, Hezbollah has seen its fortunes suffer recently as it has grown to become the most effective military force in Lebanon. The team was forced to accept a ceasefire agreement that includes a path toward disarmament as a result of the current conflict with Israel.

However, Syrian support for Hezbollah has shifted significantly, with empty calls for the group to stop its military activities.

The team’s battle with Israel cost the life of about 3, 700 people in Lebanon, and about 1.2 million Syrian – about one-fifth of the population – were internally displaced from their homes. However, the financial loss for Lebanon is estimated in the billions of dollars.

Iran, Assad and Hezbollah square

It is no accident that the new rebel progress that led to Assad’s ouster happened the day after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was signed. Hezbollah troops were depleted, and many of their soldiers were pulled out of Syria to strengthen Lebanon’s southwestern border.

Arab separatists chose this opportunity because they were aware that Iran was also strained by the Israel-Hezbollah conflict to support Assad. The ripple effect has resulted in the unfolding of Iran’s” shaft of weight”. Surely, Tehran has lost its strong hold over Syria and Lebanon.

It is fitting that Assad’s drop coincides with the possible end of both Syria’s civil war and the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah ally because it was the initial stage of the civil war that established the three-way marriage.

Syria was the site of the Arab Spring, a string of pro-democracy and individual rights demonstrations that started in Tunisia in 2011. Anti-Assad demonstrations broke out in Daraa and quickly spread to big cities such as Syria, Hama and the capital, Damascus.

The Arab state reacted brutally, ordering soldiers to fire at the demonstrators, detaining and torturing thousands of men and boys, and did so with cruelty.

International uproar followed. However, with the assistance of Iran and Hezbollah, the Arab state remained in place. In reality, in addition to Hezbollah’s soldiers, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps was likewise advising Assad and fighting alongside his defense against the Arab people.

For Tehran and its proxies, including Hezbollah, this contributed to the” Iranization” of the region, which included the spread of the Iranian Revolution ideology and the transformation of Syria and Lebanon into Shia states.

Syria is largely Sunni Muslim. It was ruled by an Syrian majority, a party that practiced a tree of Shia Islam, under the Assad home. Hezbollah, as a Shia extremist group, swore allegiance to Iran’s high leader in its 1985 statement.

Another unified force between the three was the Arab reason. The post-1979 innovative Iran philosophy of “death to Israel” is a sentiment shared by the Assad government and Hezbollah soldiers. Assad may have been less vocal about it, particularly as he attempted to negotiate with Israel over the occupied Golan Heights.

Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah under the leadership of Assad were not just united by militancy and their desire to rule the area. They even shared financial goals, and they have benefited from the trafficking of illegal drugs, particularly Captagon, an amphetamine-type drug that is widely produced in Syria under the guise of Assad and Iran. At a time when global sanctions were ensnapping, the drug offered a viable and significant source of income.

Hezbollah and its power of Lebanon’s airports and seaports have helped the drug became extensively available in the Gulf state. The Arab world was actually a threat from its very addictive nature, and Assad used it to strain Saudi Arabia into calling for Syria’s inclusion in the Arab League in 2023. In return, the Syrian government agreed to transfer its drug trafficking abroad.

Assad’s tradition

With Hezbollah’s fight in Lebanon and the fall of the Syrian regime, the” Iranization” of the area is, at the very least, stalled. However, 54 years of Assad home law in Syria has left a long road of death in neighboring Lebanon.

More than 25, 000 soldiers were sent by Syria over the border in June 1976 to put an end to the Syrian civil conflict. Its existence was supposed to be momentary, but it was extended for over four years.

By the time the Syrian civil war ended in 1991, Syria was in complete control of both Lebanon’s domestic and international politics. Serious human rights breaches were reported, including kidnappings, improper punishments, abuse and the killings of political figures and editors.

Rafik Hariri, the leader of Lebanon’s political elite, was killed in a deadly attack in February 2005 that involved Assad and top Palestinian officials in large numbers.

Protesters carrying red, white and green flags march. One holds a picture of a man.
Numerous tens of thousands of Palestinian people show up to lament Rafik Hariri’s death. Photo: Ghaith Abdul-Ahad / Getty Images via The Talk

The shooting sparked the Cedar Revolution, in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinian residents gathered in the streets to demand the Syrian causes ‘ immediate withdrawal.

Although Syrian troops left Lebanon, the Palestinian government continued to interfere in the country’s elections through Hezbollah, which evolved into a political-military firm and entered the authorities in 2008.

From that point onward, Hezbollah would block any decision that did not serve Syria’s and Iran’s interests. For instance, Hezbollah and its allies vetoed any candidate for president who opposed the Syrian regime, a move that caused Lebanon to experience a protracted presidential lull.

An uncertain future

While Hezbollah may continue to operate within Lebanon and under Iran’s umbrella, Assad’s fall means it is deprived of its supply route.

Without Syria, Hezbollah has no quick access to Iran’s fighters and weapons – and the newly signed ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel reaffirms Lebanon’s commitment to a UN resolution calling for Hezbollah’s disarmament.

And while it’s not yet clear what the new Syria will look like, at least the populations of Lebanon and Syria, both of whom have endured decades of brutal rule and Hezbollah’s abuse, can rejoice at the removal of the man who caused so much of the suffering.

At Dickinson College, Mireille Rebeiz is chair of Middle East Studies and associate professor of Francophone and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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India must atone for Bangladesh’s lost decade – Asia Times

In the annals of South Asia’s social background, India’s role in sustaining Sheikh Hasina’s government in Bangladesh stands as a striking training in the dangers of evaluating short-term corporate interests over long-term regional security.

India may deal with its guilt in preserving a program that had hampered a nation’s democratic aspirations as Bangladesh emerges from Hasina’s authoritarian rule.

The seeds of Bangladesh’s lost generation were first put in 2013 during a key visit by Sujata Singh, therefore India’s Foreign Secretary. Her visit included a meeting with General Hossain Mohammad Ershad to urge him to join in an election that all major opposition parties had abandoned only weeks before Bangladesh’s contentious general elections.

Bangladesh’s lost decade was initiated by this direct action to turn its brittle yet effective politics into fascism with American support.

It marked a pivotal moment for some Bangladeshis, highlighting the fact that India had chosen to support a routine rather than the people’s political aspirations.

In 2018 and again in 2024, much of the global society distanced itself from the Awami League’s controlled elections. However, India stood solid as Hasina’s only backer, providing her government with the worldwide legitimacy it sorely needed.

This unwavering support, combined with New Delhi’s silence on human rights abuses and political fraud, reinforced India’s picture as the innovator of a dictator. Without India’s approval, Hasina’s grip on power could not have endured.

Decade of oppression

India’s aid for Hasina was no moral. Throughout her career, essential agreements favored American interests, from transport routes to energy exports, usually at Bangladesh’s expense.

These offers were perceived by many as Hasina’s “return of favour” for India’s social support, reinforcing the storyline that she served American interests rather than her own individuals. Further eroded trust as a result of the fear that Hasina was turning Bangladesh into an Indian customer condition, similar to the death of Sikkim.

This view is key to Bangladesh’s federal consciousness. While Hasina’s state leaned heavily on India, regular Bangladeshis saw this marriage as manipulative. The Awami League’s law became associated with both local persecution and additional persecution.

Yet, India, remarkably, seems oblivious to the deep resentment this has fostered. Indian policymakers have historically seen their relationship with Bangladesh through the lens of Hasina, failing to meaningfully engage with the Bangladeshis.

India’s missteps were compounded by its media establishment, which played a significant role in distorting the narrative around Bangladesh’s political student-led revolution that ousted Hasina, as she shamefully fled to India by helicopter.

Rumor Scanner discovered that 49 Indian media outlets had spread 13 false stories about Bangladesh, many of which depicted the country’s democratic uprising as an Islamist insurgency.

One of the most glaring examples was Indian media’s coverage of the post-Hasina uprising. Newspapers like Firstpost and The Economic Times made illogical claims that China and Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency orchestrated the protests to install an anti-India government.

Such propaganda did not only include opulent media outlets. Mamata Banerjee, the chief minister of West Bengal, joined the chorus and demanded an UN mission to help in Bangladesh. This action heightened tensions even further.

India framed the post-revolution backlash against the Awami League’s oppressive apparatus as targeted Hindu oppression, ignoring its roots in widespread political grievances.

India further alienated Bangladesh’s people by reducing the uprising to a communal narrative, presenting it as an attempt to shield a discredited regime under the pretext of protecting minorities.

The Agartala attacks and the communal framing of events in the Indian media have only heightened anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh.

Indeed, these narratives ignored the democratic essence of the uprising, portraying it instead as a threat to regional stability. By perpetuating such disinformation, Indian media and politicians alienated the Bangladeshi populace further.

Rebuilding trust

As Bangladesh transitions from Hasina’s authoritarianism, India faces a critical choice: continue the policies of the past or recalibrate its approach to reflect the aspirations of a democratic Bangladesh. In order to achieve this, New Delhi must fundamentally alter its engagement strategy.

    Engage without any plans to bring Sheikh Hasina back: India must give up its obsession with bringing the Awami League back to power. Any efforts to stifle Hasina’s return or sway domestic politics in Bangladesh will face opposition, which will unfavor bilateral ties irreparably. India should instead concentrate on interacting with Bangladesh’s new leaders and fostering relationships that promote reciprocity and democratic values.

  1. Recognize its contribution to the decade of oppression: Indian policymakers must acknowledge their contribution to enabling Hasina’s oppressive regime. This is a necessary step in the rebuilding of trust, not just an introspection exercise. By putting pressure on Hasina, India suffocated a country that had valiantly fought for the 1990s ‘ restoration of democracy. Without India’s active effort to make amends for its mistakes, this betrayal of democratic ideals will not be forgotten.
  2. Promote equity in partnerships: Bangladeshis widely perceive India’s deals with Hasina’s government as exploitative, benefiting India at Bangladesh’s expense. Moving forward, New Delhi must prioritize equitable agreements that serve both nations ‘ interests. This includes open negotiations on trade, energy, and transit that show a genuine partnership rather than power imbalance.
  3. Combat misinformation and fabricated stories: The Indian media needs to stop spreading false information about Bangladesh. Recognizing the democratic essence of Bangladesh’s struggles, rather than framing them as communal or Islamist threats, is crucial. This also extends to Indian political discourse, which must shed its communal lens when analyzing Bangladesh’s internal affairs.

Burying the Hasina past

India’s relationship with Bangladesh cannot continue to be boundless by the Hasina era.

India must make amends for the country’s role in maintaining a system that stifled democracy and alienated its citizens in order to find a new course. From political interference to exploitative deals and divisive media narratives, it must first acknowledge the harm that its actions have caused.

Bangladesh’s fight for democracy has been long and arduous. Having emerged from the shadows of dictatorship, the nation now seeks a partner, not a patron. For India, this is an opportunity to build a relationship rooted in equality, respect and shared aspirations.

However, if New Delhi fails to adapt and continues to provoke during Bangladesh’s transition toward a new national identity, it runs the risk of causing the country to go down a similar path as Pakistan, which is defined by resistance to Indian influence.

India’s choice is clear: rebuild trust and embrace a democratic Bangladesh, or remain haunted by the legacy of a lost decade.

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Historic US missile hit sends a warning to China from Guam – Asia Times

As tensions rise over a possible Taiwan war, the US only demonstrated its ability to shoot down nuclear missiles from Guam. This sends a strong message to China.

The US Missile Defense Agency ( MDA ) conducted its first live intercept of a ballistic missile from Guam on Tuesday ( December 10 ), according to The War Zone, marking a significant milestone in the development of the Aegis Guam System.

The War Zone mentions that the test, known as Flight Experiment Mission-02 ( FEM-02 ), successfully saw a Standard Missile-3 Block IIA intercept a mock medium-range ballistic missile over 200 nautical miles northeast of the island. It notes that the test is an important step in ensuring Guam, a geopolitical island in the Indo-Pacific region, receives 360-degree protection.

According to the report, Aegis Guam’s method, which has a leaning Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), offers more freedom for missile launch points than another Aegis Ashore systems. It makes note of the AN/TPY-6 sensor, which demonstrates the Guam’s incorporated air and missile defence capabilities.

The program is a part of a wider effort to strengthen Guam’s threats against potential risks from China, which has been swiftly expanding its nuclear weapon army. In the event of a discord, it makes note of the MDA’s continuous expansion of the Guam Defense System, which aims to establish a strong, multi-layered defense network involving regional allies and members of the US military.

Aegis Ashore, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ( THAAD), Typhon, and Patriot systems are integrated into Guam’s wider Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense ( EIAMD) system for 360-degree protection, according to Asia Times.

Guam will also make use of the Integrated Battle Command System ( IBCS) to unite various radar and missile assets into a single network, addressing flaws in US missile defense kill chains.

Yet, significant barriers remain. The complexity of integrating various systems and the limited land area of Guam cause risks of clumsy responses when combined with nuclear, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, while the country’s limited land space and hilly terrain complicate the development of infrastructure.

Additionally, over-reliance on set sensor-to-shooter links does limit adaptability against next-generation risks. China’s possible use of multi-domain attacks—combining cyber, electrical, and dynamic strikes—threatens the dignity of US destroy chains.

Apart from these challenges, a finite number of interceptors per system ( Aegis, THAAD and Patriot ) means that if a large-scale, multi-axis attack occurs, the inventory of available interceptors could be depleted quickly.

In line with that, Megan Eckstein mentions in a February 2024 Defense News content that the US Navy faces significant challenges as a result of supply chain bottlenecks and antiquated manufacturing capabilities.

Eckstein claims that despite dramatically increasing weapons costs, the US Navy struggles with insufficient stockpiles of crucial weapons, including the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile ( LRASM), MK 48 torpedoes and Standard Missile varieties.

She mentions that vital suppliers of elements like jet motors and electronics are unable to meet the growing demand while big defense contractors have expanded their facilities and modified processes. She notes that while the US Navy’s FY24 funds includes US$ 380 million to address these obstacles, business professionals warn that it will take time to discover changes.

Eckstein points out that efforts to increase productivity are further hampered by the US Navy’s reliance on a select few eligible rocket engine manufacturers.

Further, Mackenzie Eaglen mentions in a July 2024 article for The National Interest ( TNI ) that the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) decision to terminate SM-3 Block IB production in favor of the newer SM-3 Block IIA has not been matched with adequate increases in the latter’s procurement, leading to a shortfall in interceptor stockpiles.

Eaglen notes the FY 2025 defence budget reduces planned purchasing of SM-3 Block IB from 153 to zero over the next five years, saving US$ 1.9 billion but no reinvesting these benefits into SM-3 Block IIA output, which remains stagnated at 12 weapons annually.

He points out that despite a projected increase in SM-6 purchasing, total missile production is still insufficient to meet the US Navy’s requirements.

Eaglen says that efforts to increase output are further hampered by the persistent preference for smaller purchasing quantities and the reliance on a small number of skilled rocket motor manufacturers.

To address those challenges, the US Navy released an industry Request for Information ( RFI ) in July 2024 to assess the production capabilities for SM-6 rocket motors, specifically the MK72 booster and MK104 dual thrust rocket motor, to enhance fleet defense.

In its July 2024 RFI, the US Navy seeks details on these creation efforts ‘ value and professional preparation, aiming for merger in the FY26-FY27 timeframe or faster.

Additionally, the supplies of missiles, energy and extra parts for interceptors, sensor systems and communications technology is logistically difficult. Guam may experience resupply delays as a result of a protracted conflict due to the disruption of seafaring supply lines.

China has been constantly expanding its appearance in the South Pacific in an effort to do so. Some experts suggest that threatens to minimize entry between Guam, Australia, New Zealand and the US.

In Asia Times, Grant Newsham mentions how China is encroaching on the South Pacific through a comprehensive plan of social, economic, and military invasion.

According to Newsham, China is using political conflict to undermine US presence while the US is focused on reestablishing airfields and dispersing forces under the Agile Combat Employment (ACE ) strategy.

He mentions that China is funding Kiribati aircraft repairs and has built dual-use infrastructure, including games and ships, in US states like the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.

He says that in the Federated States of Micronesia, China is constructing airports that mirror US work, while China aims to influence Palau’s political authority in its pursuit through purchases.

Newsham points out that Huawei’s buildings and harbor restoration in the Solomon Islands support the latter’s China-friendly program. He claims that an East Timor airport constructed with US cash might ultimately be a “gift” for China.

Newsham says China’s approach to these South Pacific says includes corruption, political offers and misinformation, usually outmatching US attempts.

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Trump heralds the end of dollar dominance – Asia Times

Donald Trump’s win in November’s US presidential poll saw the US dollars improve. In less than two weeks, it reached a one-year large and has since maintained its power in comparison to its main competitors. His vote has also raised the possibility of US tariffs on goods, and notice has also been drawn to the potential disruption to international trade.

As part of this, Trump made a not-so-veiled threat of rough taxes on the&nbsp, BRICS&nbsp, team of leading emerging industry really they&nbsp, create a rival&nbsp, to the US dollar, which has been the country’s “dominant money” since the Second World War.

Dollarization refers to the use and positioning of the US dollar by different nations. It has various degrees of meaning, from places like Panama using the US dollar as their reserve and as their car money. This latter position enhances international trade.

Get Chile and Malaysia as an example. There will be a big and active marketplace for the exchange of Chilean pesos for the Indonesian rupiah, for which any industry between these two nations will be required. Pesos are rather exchanged for US money and US dollars for dinars, making business easier and less expensive.

However, the US dollar is used in more than 50 % of international business invoices, and over 80 % of all international trade deals worldwide. But, it is possible that Trump’s” America First” foreign policy may provide to hasten the end of the US currency’s dominance.

Pros and cons

Dollarization is advantageous for international business. However, it has distinct advantages for the US, as other nations require US currency to help trade and pay for a lot of commodities. This implies that the US dollar’s demand is still high, and that it does not experience depreciation force.

Perhaps the most crucial aspect is that nations don’t hang US dollars in cash when they do so. Instead, they buy US Treasury bills and thus, in effect, lend money to the US authorities. Due to the US government’s great need for US Treasury, borrowing at a lower interest rate than would otherwise be feasible.

But, there are also disadvantages. A robust US buck increases the price of dollar-denominated goods and, therefore, the cost of international trade. And for the US itself, a robust US dollars may damage its local trade organization.

These shortcomings have frequently prompted the idea of a multi-currency worldwide program, but this has never gained any traction or been a significant factor. But that could change with a following Trump administration.

When Trump takes office in January, he has threatened to impose large trade sanctions. Photo: Phil Mistry / Shutterstock via The Talk

During his first name, for enquiries grew louder. Additionally, there have been some changes to US dollars holdings since that point, causing a decline in global US dollars reserves.

Therefore, which Trump plans may hasten the end of US dollars dominance? The incoming president is viewed as pro-business, which will likely translate into laws designed to lower taxes and regulations. At a time when worldwide productivity is less than respectable, engaging private growth will result in an even stronger US dollar.

A stronger US dollars, as mentioned above, even increases the price of petrol and related supplies. Countries will certainly be asking themselves why, as crude from Saudi Arabia, for instance, may be purchased in US bucks as those dollars increase in value.

Trump’s financial plans are likely to raise US bill, which could lower the value of the significant US dollar deposits held around the world. According to one research, Trump’s plans may include as much as US$ 15 trillion to the world’s loan over a decade. Some nations may be less willing to hold US bill as a result of a decline in the value of US dollars resources.

The result of these policies may be considered unexpected. But other procedures, like as Trump’s program for higher taxes, are more consciously designed.

A robust US dollar hurts US exports because they become more expensive locally and import prices are less expensive. Taxes are a way to shield domestic producers from this global rivals.

However, raising tariffs will only serve to strengthen the US dollars if no other nation reacts, as fewer exports will result in fewer US dollars being sold on the global trade market. This does, at least in part, erase the impact of the price policy while imposing trade costs worldwide.

Countries may agree to use choices as a reserve money and a payment method for global commodities in order to prevent this. A distinct money, such as the Euro or Yuan, has been suggested by the Brics countries. Trump’s challenges may merely speed up this hunt for an option.

What would this imply for the United States?

Countries would then need to carry less US money, but may sell off their US Treasuries. The outcome will be a surge in the US’s loan and a decline in the value of the US dollar. Unfortunately, this would increase the price of goods ( the goal of Trump’s tax policy ), but it could also lead to inflation.

A work on the US dollar did have significant effects on the US and the world in the worst-case situation, if nations coordinated their offering of US dollars and Bonds. This may require the US to reduce its trade deficit and raise its loan costs.

Globally, it may disrupt industry, increase purchase costs and there would be a loss of benefit for any dollar-denominated property and resources. A major world recession would probably follow from this.

For the immediate future, the US dollar will be a world money. But Trump’s” America First” plan, as well as the greater weaponisation of the US dollars, could lead to its fall from being the only world currency.

David McMillan is doctor in finance, University of Stirling

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Trump’s BRICS threat adds fuel to de-dollarization drive – Asia Times

Donald Trump’s resumption of electricity is regaining his trademark bluntness to the international stage of economic activity. &nbsp,

The BRICS, an economic alliance led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which has information members like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, is one of his earliest targets. They are considering the development of a coin to challenge the US currency’s status as the dominant dollar. &nbsp,

Trump’s threats of 200 % taxes and a complete ban from US areas for any Multilateral member state attempting to de-dollarize have rekindled debates about the economy’s supremacy’s future.

Trump’s conservative money protection appears to strengthen its status as the world supply money, a position it has held since World War II. &nbsp,

However, a closer examination suggests that these strategies may have a negative impact, leading to efforts by nations like China to lower their emphasis on and holdings of the dollar.

China has spent the past century laying the groundwork for an alternative economic future, now wary of Washington’s commitment to use the money as a political tool. &nbsp,

Through bilateral trade treaties and expanded collaborations under its Belt and Road Initiative, it has aggressively promoted the use of its yuan abroad. &nbsp,

Also, China’s central banks has been diversifying its international resources, shifting away from dollar-denominated resources to gold and other assets. &nbsp,

For Beijing, Trump’s language is hardly a deterrent—it’s a call to action. Unexpected effects have already been a result of Trump’s preference for taxes and sanctions as financial diplomacy tools.

The extreme application of these steps has grown in distrust between the United States ‘ trade partners and enemies. &nbsp, By turning the money into a crossbow, the US mistakenly pushes regions to seek alternatives. &nbsp,

China and Russia, often targets of American sanctions, have been at the frontline of this change. They have signed deals to exchange regional economies and increased participation within organizations like the BRICS. These moves does not depose the dollar immediately, but they’re chipping away at its supremacy.

While still a distant and economically difficult proposition, the development of a BRICS currency is a sign of a general desire to create economic systems that are less vulnerable to American influence.

Trump’s risks does stifle or impede these efforts in the near future, but they also confirm the fears that the US uses its economic power without considering the security of the global financial system for the long run.

For China, this isn’t just about dollars and cents, it’s about securing its status as a worldwide power. A unipolar monetary system would lessen Beijing’s risk to the US economy, giving Beijing more freedom to pursue its strategic goals. &nbsp,

China’s digital yuan experiment—the world’s most advanced central bank digital money project—is portion of this broader motivation. If successful, it may offer an alternative to dollar-dominated cross-border pay systems, particularly in emerging markets.

Trump’s method, ironically, accelerates the styles he claims to be trying to combat. By doubling down on taxes and punishment, he amplifies the belief that the US is a liar and untrustworthy manager of the global financial system.

This view has implications for allies in Europe and Asia, many of whom have expressed concerns about over-reliance on the dollar. It also has an impact on adversaries like China and Russia. &nbsp,

This growing uneasiness is reflected in work like the European Union’s press for greater use of the euro in power industry.

In the end, the supremacy of the dollar depends on faith: confidence in the US’s ability to lead the world economy responsibly and confidence in the stability and accessibility of dollar-denominated assets. &nbsp,

By weaponizing the money, Trump risks eroding that faith, not just among America’s enemies but also its allies. And as that faith diminishes, so too will the dollar’s carry on its prized supply currency status.

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Trump-made Ukraine ceasefire could undercut OSCE’s relevance – Asia Times

Next year, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ( OSCE ) will celebrate its 50th anniversary. Last year, after months of wrangling, its 57 people meeting in Malta managed to agree on a fresh management team.

This is a significant milestone because the OSCE has been without permanent command since the end of the previous secretary general and senior officers ‘ terms in early September. Then again, given that this involved obtaining the consent of Russia and Ukraine, as well as their particular allies and partners,

The OSCE’s new leadership team includes former Turkish envoy Feridun Sinirlioğlu as its secretary standard, and Maria Telalian, mind of the legal section in the Grecian foreign ministry, as director of the individual rights office.

Christophe Kamp, the present French ambassador to the OSCE, may serve as the organization’s high commissioner for minorities, while Jan Braathu, a Norway who has led the organization’s Serbian vision since January 2021, will be its head of press freedom.

This means the OSCE command, for the next three centuries, will be made up entirely from NATO people. Both Russia’s support for this list of candidates and Malta’s decision to renounce an alternate plan that held the OSCE’s rotating seat in 2024 are amazing.

Its recommendation included Kamp and Braathu, but also named the original Macedonian foreign secretary, Igli Hasani, as a possible secretary general, and Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, current Greek ambassador to the OSCE, as nominee for great commissioner.

Both were eventually dropped, largely due to the conviction by Greece and Turkey on their two simultaneously chosen individuals, Sinirlioglu and Telalian.

This indicates that the participating claims are generally more pragmatist, but it doesn’t cover up the organization’s severe flaws. These became clear during the harrowing claims made by foreign officials at the annual supervisory committee meeting in Malta on December 5 and 6 during the period.

Most of these disputes were, of course, about the Russian anger against Ukraine. Russia’s foreign secretary, Sergey Lavrov, accused the West of ignoring what he called the fact that the” Nazi government in Kyiv has, since 2017, adopted a series of rules that exterminate the Russian language in all realms”.

His US equivalent, Antony Blinken, responded by calling out Lavrov’s “tsunami of propaganda”. Blinken thoroughly quotes from Vladimir Putin’s lengthy list of statements that refute the existence of a Russian condition and population.

As was visible from a range of different claims during the ministerial council proceedings, there is no empty support for Russia’s place – except from Belarus. However, an east-west split remains.

The Russian anger was condemned without a doubt by the European Union and all of its member state. But others – Armenia, for example – just frequently referred to the importance of OSCE concepts, without mentioning Russia’s infraction of them.

Russia has made a significant investment in different global conferences over the past few years as part of its effort to alter the existing world order because of its relative isolation in the OSCE. Lavrov, so, used the opportunity to notice the “mutually valuable cooperation” within the framework of several other global bodies.

However, their entire success in advancing Russian passions is in question. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS are probably the most cutting-edge initiatives. However, China dominates these groups. They serve Beijing’s interests initially and Moscow’s a distant following, at best.

By virtue of its 57 participating says, the OSCE is the largest local security institution, and it is also the only one in which Russia and the West frequently communicate.

Lavrov might have remarked that” the OSCE only exists when there is consensus and as long as each state has guarantees that its interests are taken into account.”

However, this should not be seen as a threat to Russia leaving the organization as much as an acknowledgment that the Kremlin has few, if any, viable options to play a significant role in the reform of the European security order.

Part of the solution

Meanwhile, there are high hopes that the incoming Trump administration will prioritize pursuing a resolution of the Ukraine conflict. The OSCE ministerial council erupted in a discussion about the organization’s future role in Ukraine.

The OSCE has a long history in Ukraine and faces a number of opportunities and challenges in supporting the country’s post-war recovery, reintegration and EU accession.

Ukraine’s foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha, specifically acknowledged that” the OSCE should play a role in the implementation of the peace formula” advocated by Ukraine. Among the ten points of this plan, the unconditional withdrawal of all Russian forces from territory illegally occupied since 2014 remains Kyiv’s most important, and so far non-negotiable, demand.

Consequently, Sybiha was also unequivocal that there should be no return to the division of Europe into spheres of influence – as there was after the February 1945&nbsp, Yalta conference, which ushered in the Cold War, or the&nbsp, Minsk Accords&nbsp, of September 2014 and February 2015. In February 2022, Minsk established a flimsy ceasefire that was repeatedly broken before it finally fell apart.

Despite its inherent risks, a deal that rewards the Kremlin for its aggression is increasingly likely given the incoming Trump administration’s strong push for it.

For the time being, a US-mandated ceasefire in Ukraine could bring about a new era of cold war and stability on the continent. However, it also emphasizes that the OSCE and its participating states may have ensured the organization’s operational and administrative survival, but the same cannot be said about the European security order that it is supposed to protect.

Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko, professor of international relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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