US-Germany alliance may not matter so much to Trump – Asia Times

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The European state-owned news agency Deutsche Welle published an article with the article” Trump’s election defeat is a problem for Germany” less than 24 hours after Donald Trump was elected president of the United States in November 2024.

A few hours afterwards, Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, announced that his three-party social alliance had collapsed. A major factor in disagreements regarding how to help improve Germany’s fragile market was the US election resulted in the coalition breaking up, according to Scholz.

One month later, Scholz lost a trust vote, ending the state he has led since 2021. Federal votes will take place in Germany on February 23, 2025.

Germany is regarded as one of the United States ‘ most enmity partners in Western Europe, working on everything from financial industry to military protection.

However, this may change if Trump retakes company. As Angela Merkel, the lifelong former chancellor of Germany, said in November 2024, the looming following Trump administration “is a problem to the world, particularly for multilateralism”.

However, Trump’s US-centric approach to international politics runs counter to diplomacy, which is the notion that various countries working together helps people involved.

European officials worry that the incoming Trump presidency poses a major threat to the relation as someone who studies German-American connections in the 20th century.

Trump’s potential launch of a tariff-induced industry war, as well as the likelihood that the president-elect would withdraw his financial and military support for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia, are among the European problems.

Given that, in addition to the US and the EU, Germany is the third-largest donation to Ukraine and would be required to make even more of this financial assistance if the US stopped giving Ukraine wealth, both scenarios may hurt the German economy even more.

Despite the fact that he has previously served as president, German officials continue to be perplexed by Trump’s unique political bent.

Merkel wrote in her 2024 autobiography” Freedom: Memoirs 1954-2021″ that when she first met Trump in 2017, she acted as though she were having a conversation with” people totally normal”.

Merkel immediately realized, nevertheless, that Trump was not like other British officials. She noted that Trump seemed to believe that all nations competed, and that one victory could mean another disappointment.

A woman wearing a light blue jacket stands around a table with men wearing dark suits. She faces toward a man seated with his arms crossed.
Angela Merkel, German’s then-chancellor, speaks with Donald Trump on the outside of a G7 conference in June 2018 in Charlevoix, Canada. Photo: Tesco Denzel / Bundesregierung via Getty Images/ The Talk

A long-lasting empire

Merkel and another Germans were not used to doing that, which was not the American leader.

Merkel was born in 1954, when Germany was split into two countries: socialist, Soviet-aligned East Germany, where Merkel grew away, and bourgeois West Germany, which was formed out of the three northern areas controlled by France, the US and the United Kingdom at the end of World War II and was aligned with the US.

Shortly after the war, the US accepted West Germany as an essential alliance. This alliance made certain that Germany, who was once a US foe during World War II, would never again pose a danger to international peace.

West Germany even served as a crucial front line for Europe as the US fought the Soviet Union in the Cold War starting in 1947.

Despite the fact that West Germany enjoyed having an American overpartner during the Cold War, West Germany benefited most financially from the issue. East Germany’s market, on the other hand, was somewhat poor throughout the Cold War.

Perhaps the most obvious sign of Germany’s section was the Berlin Wall, a 96-mile split that cut through Berlin. In 1961, East German authorities constructed the roof to avert East Germans ‘ frights.

Merkel entered politics only after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which represented the looming end of the Cold War that year and opened the door to German unity.

United States and Germany combined

In the 1990s, Merkel served as a politician and witnessed how former British Prime Minister George H. W. Bush persuaded France and the United Kingdom to put their worries about a fresh German rule over Europe to allow their original adversary from World War II to unite and reclaim their former country’s independence.

The United Kingdom, US, Soviet Union, and France were the four main Allied allies in Europe at the start of World War II, but they had originally denied Germany the right to self-determination.

However, the four Friends signed the Two Plus Four Treaty in 1990, an international arrangement that made it possible for Germany to consolidate as a completely independent state in October 1990.

Soon afterwards, Bush praised the transatlantic alliance between the US and Germany. The British leader praised the two nations ‘ shared “love of liberty” and expressed his desire for them to “partner in leadership.”

Bush’s terms signaled a significant change in how well-known internationally and how necessary it is for Germany to exercise its political and military dominance in international politics.

It was a turn, however, that some Germans did not necessarily allowed. Germans were hesitant to assume the powerful leadership position that the US desired for the nation.

Following two bloody war, it was widely believed in Germany that defense restraint had suddenly brought stability and prosperity.

In fact, in almost all the global crises since 1990 – from the conflict in Bosnia in 1992 to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 – Germany has shown a reluctance to take the result. Germany prefers to play a secondary role in navigating global issues, largely through its participation in the NATO and UN military alliance.

A group of men wearing black jackets stand at the edge of a platform and look toward gray buildings over a wall.
George H W Bush, then-vice chairman of the US, surveys East Germany over the Berlin Wall in 1983. Photo: Sahm Doherty / Getty Images via The Talk

Germany’s foreign location nowadays

Germany’s approach to international issues drastically changed after Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and it suddenly assumed the leadership position that Bush had envisioned in 1990.

In a traditional speech on February 27, 2022, Scholz called the strike a” Zeitenwende”, meaning” a boundary time” in German, and announced a major boost in military spending.

This change has been welcomed by the US and other Eastern allies. NATO members had now agreed to dedicate a minimum of 2 % of their GDP to defense spending in 2006, but Germany– like additional European nations– did not follow through on this promise for many years.

In the wake of the ongoing Russian-Ukraine conflict, it was only in February 2024 that Germany finally met its 2 % spending goal for the first time. That it did that wasn’t just a side effect of the issue itself.

Stress by American president, above all Trump, even played a key role. Trump’s repeated threat to “pay your expenses or we leave NATO” throughout his second term as president had apparently paid off.

The new German government may be required to keep Trump informed of the intercontinental alliance’s several benefits and the history of German-American relationships.

Sylvia Taschka is professor of training of story, Wayne State University

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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How Trump could in fact make Canada a US territory – Asia Times

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” We take everything by conquest…Thank God”, wrote the National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser, an important Washington magazine, in February 1847.

In accordance with the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty, the US recently purchased 55 % of Mexico for US$ 15 million. The alliance concluded the terrible Mexican-American War, which claimed thousands of lives.

Despite the loss of existence, and British interests to get all of Mexico, the treaty painted the whole experience as a legitimate “cession” of area rather than a invasion.

Every Canadian should be paying attention to this historical context of the United States. In one agreement, the US annexed the present-day states of California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Oklahoma, Kansas and Wyoming. In the wake of this, it fraudulently invaded indigenous place in the west.

Canada might be the next state to join the United States, probably not right away as the 51st status, but rather as a US place that would impose some restrictions on freedom and make citizenship questions confusing. The US has the legal infrastructure to make it happen.

Difficult? Unfathomable? Some critics dismiss Trump’s belligerent rhetoric as hot-headed negotiations. It’s really hard speak, they say. Some claim that his rhetoric is merely a result of his preferred” art of the deal” negotiation strategy.

That’s the wrong checking. The US Constitution explains how Trump may fulfill the risk. For the US to get territory through surrender or subjugation, there is both probable and precedent.

Invading Canada

The US Department of War even came up with the War Plan Red of 1930 to show how to attack Canada if necessary.

It contained egregious details about the attack’s origins in Halifax, how it started with poison oil, how it rapidly retreated to New Brunswick, how it occupied Québec City and Montréal before claiming Niagara Falls, and more.

Previously, America has made many American leaders anxious. Queen Victoria felt that Ottawa, as a capital, may become sheltered from US attacks. As US Confederacy spies and pirates were permitted to hunk up in Montréal during the civil war, John A. Macdonald was concerned about Union troops ‘ attacks on Canada.

In the 1911 vote, when the Democratic party pushed for free deal with the US, they were shown the door by a flood of anti-American attitude that backed Robert Borden’s Republicans.

Treaties and legislative authorizations

Putting off hypothetical fear, the US Constitution firmly teaches that the country has the right to acquiesce to territory. It is easy. First, begin with Article II, Part 2 of the Constitution:

” He] The President ] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur…”.

Agreements are the means by which the US adopts “nothing by invasion” once the Senate ratifies them with a two-thirds majority.

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which was proposed to Congress in 1848, would conquer Mexican land. Congress ratified the convention despite some wanting to take the entire of Mexico.

In 1898, Congress passed House Joint Resolution 259. It ratified President William McKinley’s convention of the conquest of Hawaii. According to protest, petition and protest, it took 60 times for Hawaii to become an established position in 1957.

Just a small portion of the country is covered by the American nature tale of a nation born during a revolution. The remainder of the area became a result of invasion. The US expanded to 50 state and 14 abroad lands through a mix of surrender, activity and order.

Dwight Eisenhower, the president of the United States, signs a declaration making Hawaii the 50th state of the union in August 1959 to help unfold the novel 50-star symbol in Washington. &nbsp, Photo: AP via The Conversation / Byron Rollins

The position of opposition

The belief that the US rise throughout the Americas was both justified and unavoidable is embedded in the US Constitution from the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, which saw 827, 987 flat miles of travel from France to the US from France to the US.

But so, also, is protest. Content IV, Part 2 of the Constitution provides Congress the authority to control or dispose of lands once the US officially acquires them:

The Congress may be able to adopt and adopt all necessary laws and regulations governing the United States ‘ country and other property.

A country can be disposed of if it was unfairly acquired through a convention, by immoral means, or by a conflict of interest. A prime example of this is the Marshall Islands.

The nation ratified a law in 1979 and is currently in a free association agreement with the US after serving as a US nuclear tests surface.

In 1870, President Ulysses S. Grant proposed the annexation of Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic in order to prevent the country from being attacked by Haiti. He believed that this would be a great place for the freed Black prisoners to identify themselves there. Congress did not possess it, and the convention was not ratified.

Cuba’s isolation — over glucose

In 1898, the US declared war on Spain by invading Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam. Spain gave up within six weeks, and agreements of conquest by cession were drawn for each country. Although the Philippines won up its democracy in 1946, the US regained control over all but Cuba.

Senator Henry Teller of Colorado, who was concerned about Caribbean sugar flooding the American marketplace, was in charge of Cuba’s rejection. He emphasized the value of freedom, self-government, and the rights of man in beautiful rhetoric.

Teller, in fact, intended to keep Cuba out to support local honey beet growers. The act, which excluded Cuba, was passed by the Senate. However, another article by Connecticut Sen. Orville Platt gave the US the right to enter Cuba whenever it saw suit and established Guantanamo Bay as a continuous US military center on the island.

Colors fly in front of Camp Justice’s houses at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, in April 2019. &nbsp, Photo: AP via The Conversation / Alex Brandon

Opening lines of communication

It seems impossible to comprehend how debate about US annexation work against Canada actually start. It would be a mistake to ignore past, overlook the US Constitution, and attempt to overthrow the art of the offer, but it would be wrong to ignore it.

Trump’s demands for Canada’s integration into the US could only be supported by creating a treaty that establishes the legality of the surrender, order, or occupation process. Just then, and only with a two-thirds bulk of the Senate, was Congress review it. Trump does not have two-thirds of the Senate.

The best course of action is to bring American tones to Congress. Through personal interactions in a complex web of parental and business relations, Canada-US relations have always been strong.

Trump doesn’t see the benefit in that. Congress, but, does, particularly if annexing Canada proves costly. This is why American politicians need to open communication with Congress at the federal, provincial, and yet provincial levels, especially in economically proper state.

Instead of treating conquering Canada as a victory, Congressional representatives should see it as a crazy burden, both politically and financially.

Robert Huish is associate professor in International Development Studies, Dalhousie University

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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The great steepening – Asia Times

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Subscribe right away and get the first year for only$ 99. With a one-month trial for only$ 1, you can sign up for the exclusive rate of$ 99.

The wonderful steepening

David Goldman explores the steepening of the US offer curve following Donald Trump’s vote, driven by the Treasury’s expanding saving requirements. The use of gold as a fence is likely to increase as key global economies rely heavily on loan financing.

Competent goals stifle hope for peace in Ukraine.

According to James Davis, the conflict between President-elect Donald Trump, which is being exacerbated by reported threats from the incoming Biden administration, could escalate before Trump takes office.

Completely business between Asia and. US isolationism

Scott Foster examines the growing problems in Asia over President-elect Donald Trump’s possible taxes, which threaten to destroy deal with important US lovers. Local activities like the RCEP free trade agreement and the Multilateral development are also gaining traction.

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Taiwan hypersonics aim for deep strikes on the mainland – Asia Times

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Taiwan’s latest hypersonic weapons allow for precise long-range attacks on China’s critical infrastructure and military installations, a significant improvement in the self-governing region’s defence strategy amid rising tensions with Beijing.

Many media outlets reported last month that Taiwan is developing hypersonic missiles with ranges greater than 2, 000 km that can strike targets strong into northern China.

The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST ) has previously mass-produced the Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile, with a 1, 200–2, 000 mile range, and is working to improve it into the Ching Tien fast cruise missile.

Taiwan officially began producing the Ching Tien supersonic cruise missile in late 2024 and then apparently sent small quantities to Taiwan’s Air Force and Missile Command. In the future, Taiwan aims to build 10 sets of wireless devices with 20 weapons at Pingtung County, south of the island, according to reports.

The Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile’s move from bunker-style launch platforms, according to reports, may improve strike and survival abilities. The Chinese government considers 12×12 vehicle trucks from Bohemian company Tatra as key start vehicles, while US-made Oshkosh M983 trucks are an alternative.

The Ching Tien weapon line, first deployed last month, represents Taiwan’s annual strategic tool capable of reaching target as far as Hohhot, Inner Mongolia. The project, reportedly part of an NT$ 13.5 billion ( US$ 411 million ) budget under the codename” Feiji No 2″, underscores Taiwan’s push to bolster deep-strike capabilities amid escalating regional tensions.

Additionally, the NCSIST makes use of local expertise to achieve fast speeds by developing sophisticated materials and rocket engines to further refine the missiles. This program is in line with Taiwan’s strategic move toward more portable and repeatable defense systems.

Asia Times has recently reported on Taiwan’s long-range weapon jobs. Taiwan has unveiled the Hsiung Feng IIE ( HF-2E ) long-range cruise missile, targeting critical Chinese installations and cities like Beijing and Shanghai.

This weapon, with a documented range of up to 1, 200 meters, demonstrates Taiwan’s intent to store probable marine barricades and preemptive attacks by China.

Developed by the NCSIST, the HF-2E employs advanced navigation and propulsion systems to achieve high accuracy, comparable to the US Tomahawk missile. Despite US opposition, Taiwan has reportedly tested the Ba Dan ballistic missile and advanced with the Yung Feng supersonic cruise missile.

Additionally, Taiwan aims to increase annual missile production to nearly 500 units, focusing on indigenously manufactured systems to ensure strategic autonomy.

In a 1945 article this month, Christian Martin mentions that the missile’s range gives Taiwan the ability to strike deep into mainland China, potentially targeting key energy infrastructure such as liquid natural gas terminals, oil ports, petroleum refineries, gas power plants and nuclear power plants.

Martin says that these sites, located primarily on or near China’s west coast, are within the Ching Tien’s reach, making them potential targets in the event of a conflict.

He points out that Ching Tien’s deployment sends a powerful message to China, highlighting Taiwan’s ability to seriously damage critical infrastructure and avert a potential invasion or crippling blockade.

Further, Ian Easton mentions in a decade-old report for Project 2049 Institute that Taiwan’s military has built a robust counterstrike doctrine targeting vulnerabilities in the People’s Liberation Army’s ( PLA ) reconnaissance-strike network.

Easton points out that Taiwan maintains precision strike capability to disrupt PLA command centers, communication hubs, and infrastructure while focusing on interdiction of critical nodes.

According to Easton, Taiwan’s doctrine prioritizes intelligence-driven, politically calibrated strikes focusing on PLA assets such as command centers, airbases and naval facilities.

He points out that Taiwan is testing advanced unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV ) to combat PLA radar and missile sites while integrating unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAV ) systems for surveillance, electronic warfare, and targeting support.

Easton mentions that the Taiwanese Navy fires subsonic and supersonic missiles against maritime and coastal targets while ground forces use heavy guns and rocket artillery that can overfly the area.

He says these systems collectively enhance Taiwan’s ability to deter and counter PLA operations, highlighting a strategic shift towards resilient, precision-guided and technologically advanced deterrence measures.

The Ching Tien, alongside Taiwan’s other missiles, may form the backbone of a proposed “pit viper” strategy, emphasizing counterstrike capabilities to deter aggression by threatening China’s key cities and infrastructure.

Such strikes may also be used as psychological warfare. By bringing the war to Russia through long-range strikes deep in Russian territory, Taiwan may be a ladle from Ukraine’s playbook in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Ukraine has hoped that these strikes will end the” social contract” between the Russian leadership and its citizens, particularly in cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg. According to a social contract, the Russian leadership may continue to support the war as long as it keeps the conflict out of the lives of the people.

Taiwan may take note of the fact that Taiwan may be aware that the wider war effort and the apparent impact of these Ukrainian strikes have been limited by Russian public opinion. Despite the high casualties of Russian soldiers, these strikes may have provided a compelling argument for the country’s leaders to continue supporting the war.

In the same way, the Chinese government might use Taiwanese strikes to argue its support for a Chinese invasion and annexation of Taiwan. In the event that a potential decapitation operation against Taipei’s leadership fails, leading to a drawn-out conflict with the US and its allies who support Taiwan, China may need this support.

In February 2024, Asia Times reported that the PLA might need a minimum of 300, 000 to 400, 000 soldiers to seize Taiwan following swift air and missile strikes aimed at eliminating Taiwan’s leadership.

However, in the event that these decapitation strikes fail, the PLA may need to enlist as many as 2 million troops to take control of Taiwan, which will ensure numerical superiority to Taiwan’s defending forces.

The possibility of retaliation strikes against mainland China has sparked debates against and against an invasion.

In a December 2019 RAND dissertation, John Meyers asserts that advocates are right to target high-value Chinese assets, including missile sites and command centers, to deter US losses in a potential conflict.

On the other hand, Meyers claims that critics point out that China’s nuclear arsenal poses a significant escalation threat because even brief strikes could be misinterpreted as the start of a larger campaign, increasing the possibility of nuclear retaliation.

Moreover, he mentions that critics argue that striking the homeland of a nuclear-armed state could severely damage US credibility, violate international norms and alienate allies, complicating global support. He adds that critics warn of the dangers of a lingering conflict because China might retaliate in a conflict it views as existential.

Detractors highlight their escalatory nature and strategic risks, according to Meyers, while supporters argue that these strikes are necessary to restore operational balance. He points out that the discussion raises a crucial issue for US military planners: balancing the risks of geopolitical fallout and nuclear escalation.

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Trump power deflating Asian currencies – Asia Times

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The US currency’s strong respect after President-elect Donald Trump’s election gain is hitting Eastern currencies, with the Foreign renminbi, Japanese yen, Indian rupee and Asian won then all plumbing multi-year lows. &nbsp,

That raises important questions about imported prices and the challenges local governments and central banks will face in implementing economic and financial policymaking.

For Asian markets, where the US is a key business partner and some commodities—notably oil—are priced in dollars, a weaker regional money inflates the cost of goods. Consumer prices are affected by this imported prices, which causes an increase in living costs and a decline in purchasing power. &nbsp,

A depreciating yuan in China makes important goods like electronics and agricultural items, which are essential to the country’s production and food supply chain, more difficult to come by. &nbsp,

Similar to South Korea, the did n’s loss raises the cost of imported energy and raw materials, as well as threatens to weaken the success of export-oriented sectors as higher manufacturing costs offset the advantage of a weaker dollar.

A key issue for politicians is how currency-induced prices is spiral. &nbsp,

Businesses and consumers frequently make adjustments to their behavior when they anticipate that prices will rise as well. For instance, companies may temporarily raise prices, while households may make purchases as they anticipate higher prices will rise.

This can lead to a feedback loop where inflation expectations turn out to be unrealistic, putting strain on central banks ‘ efforts to maintain value security.

In India, inflationary anticipation are particularly difficult because the rupee’s loss has already increased costs for essentials like gas and edible oils.

The Reserve Bank of India ( RBI ) has attempted to stabilize inflation expectations through interest rate management, but a persistent decline in the rupee could undermine these efforts.

So, central bankers across Asia experience a dramatic policy dilemma. To fight imported prices, raising interest rates is the text response. &nbsp, But, higher interest rates may soften economic progress by making borrowing more costly for businesses and consumers.

Monetary concerns

For economy already grappling with severe problems, such as China’s slowing economic development and Japan’s persistent negative forces, tightening monetary policy carries substantial risks.

Consider Japan, for instance. The Bank of Japan ( BOJ) has maintained an ultra-loose monetary policy for years to combat deflation. However, the currency’s sharp decline in value relative to the money has pushed import prices higher, making it necessary for the BOJ to deal with inflationary pressures without compromising a delicate financial recovery. &nbsp,

The question is whether Japan can afford to resume its economic policy without starting a recession, a danger that even looms over various Asian nations.

The currency’s loss trend is not occurring in confinement. It reflects broader international developments, including the Federal Reserve’s financial tightening, which has made the money more attractive to buyers seeking higher yields. &nbsp,

This cash flow from emerging businesses has increased the strain on their assets. At the same time, geopolitical conflicts and trade policy difficulties, both exacerbated by Trump’s affected tariffs and ‘ America First ‘ plan, have heightened uncertainty in money markets.

Eastern central banks must deal with both domestic inflationary pressures and external forces that are beyond their control, so. &nbsp,

Involvement in foreign exchange markets, like as selling dollar reserves to support local currencies, has its own hazards, including reducing resources and lowering investor confidence.

Many Asian markets may benefit from combining short-term monetary policy with long-term structural changes.

Central bankers could work with governments to resolve supply-side concerns while implementing targeted interventions to maintain currencies. For example, reducing power dependence on imported energy through investments in renewable energy might lessen the impact of upcoming money swings.

In India, measures to boost domestic production of important items —a basis of the” Make in India” initiative—could minimize reliance on increasingly expensive goods.

Also, China’s efforts to boost self-sufficiency in electronics and other high-tech companies may protect it from the worst results of currency-driven prices over the long term. &nbsp,

The problem for Asian economies is to increase endurance against unforeseen surprises in addition to the current inflationary strains. This necessitates a delicate balancing act of managing economic plan to stop inflation while preventing progress while also addressing structural issues.

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China’s appetite for salmon could reshape global seafood markets – Asia Times

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The need for planted salmon in China is growing at a rate never before seen. Imports of fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon increased by 46 % year over year in 2023, up 63 %.

The world seafood trade is being transformed by this amazing growth. Manufacturers from Scotland, Norway, Chile, Australia, Faroe Islands, Canada and Iceland are racing to offer the wants of this large and rapidly evolving industry.

China’s efforts to produce its own Atlantic salmon have also encountered major difficulties, which indicate that competitors like rainbow fish are required to meet the nation’s growing appetite for seafood specialties.

When the Taiwanese government approved labeling and selling rainbow trout as mackerel, a significant change took place in 2018. This choice made a more affordable option for customers who are concerned about costs by blurring the difference between directly farmed rainbow trout and imported Atlantic salmon.

Trout has strong, oily meat that has an orange-pink color and is comparable in look and size to salmon. Physiologically also, the varieties are alike, as are the way in which they can be cooked and prepared.

In our recent study, which included style tests, we discovered that some Chinese consumers were unable to tell the difference between private rainbow fish and imported Atlantic salmon in deaf testing. However, when asked about the origin, the testers ‘ preferences for imported Atlantic salmon significantly changed, highlighting the influence of history on customer preferences.

Although person’s willingness to pay did not initially differ in our deaf tests, it quickly changed into a crucial element once the origin of the fish was known.

However, we realized that the only thing missing was source. Our testers needed to like the look, smell, and taste of the product more in order to be willing to pay higher prices, or they had to be persuaded by its ecolabel ( indicating environmental standards ).

Economic costs

Transporting Atlantic salmon from Scottish glens, Norway fjords, or Chilean waters involves complicated logistics and substantial environmental costs. The carbon footprint of this industry, combined with the resource-intensive character of mackerel aquaculture, raises important concerns about conservation.

These difficulties are especially acute in China, where customers have a strong desire for beauty. Despite its negative effects on the environment, buyers are increasingly turning to online retailers to purchase their shrimp because of this.

E-commerce has transformed shrimp store in China, allowing fast delivery and products that meet consumer demands for quality and freshness. In this industry, Salmon is renowned for its perceived high price, superior quality, and affordable price. Salmon retains its appeal when frozen or cooled, unlike other costly seafood that frequently needs to be sold exist to maintain its worth.

Salmon is ideally suited for contemporary retail environments, where complex cold-chain logistics guarantee its freshness without the challenges of live transportation. But, these advances come at a cost.

Transported salmon has a significant impact on the environment due to its labor-intensive storage and quick transportation. Addressing the conservation issues relating to the Chinese seafood market will be crucial in achieving a balance between climate responsibility and consumer demand as the market grows. In China, the latest global certification programs that aim to improve the sector’s sustainability have had a minimal impact.

China has made significant efforts to establish a local Atlantic salmon business, but these attempts have mostly failed because of technical difficulties and economic boundaries. This has created a space that internally raised rainbow trout is ready to pack.

In 2022, China produced 37, 000 lots of rainbow trout. Although this is a small amount in comparison to global output levels, it is still noteworthy given that rainbow trout is a fairly new planted species in China, in contrast to other traditional species like carp.

However, rainbow trout farming in China is geographically constrained, as the species thrives in cooler freshwater temperatures found in higher-lying lakes and pools, as well as in “raceways” ( programs supplied continuously with fresh water diverted from river ).

Advances in fishing techniques offer a possible pathway to develop China’s production. The use of fish gardening reduces the carbon footprint associated with goods and provides healthier alternatives for Chinese customers. It is a more sustainable, locally manufactured alternative to Atlantic herring. Growing a strong domestic salmon industry would improve food security, lessen import dependence, and foster economic growth in rural areas.

The expanding seafood market in China offers important teachings for the worldwide market. The extremely advanced Chinese consumer may find it important to emphasize quality, beauty, and sustainability.

At the same time, expense in eco-friendly aquaculture practices, both domestically and internationally, may be necessary to stabilize the growing demand for premium shellfish with economic responsibility. These might include reducing feed waste and using recirculating aquaculture systems ( which reuse and filter water ) to reduce water usage. The key is also recycling leftover nutrition from food generation.

The connection between consumer interests, environmental issues, and economic opportunities could have an impact on the global salmon industry as rainbow trout gains popularity in China’s seafood industry.

Salmon manufacturers in Europe, Canada, and various distributing regions does face significant challenges if local fish are able to occupy a larger share of the Chinese business. In the end, this could push them to reevaluate their strategies in order to change business relationships.

Although China’s attempt to establish a local Atlantic salmon business has proved difficult, trout farming offers a sensible and sustainable solution for its premium seafood market.

Mausam Budhathoki is a doctorate researcher at the University of Copenhagen and the University of Stirling, while Dave Little is a professor of underwater solutions development at the University of Stirling.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Trump’s Greenland bid is about race with China for Arctic control – Asia Times

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With the exception of a canceled state visit to Denmark, Donald Trump faced a lot of ridicule when he first made an offer to purchase Greenland in 2019. Fast forward six times and Trump’s renewed “bid” for the nation’s largest beach is back on the table.

And that too with renewed strength. In an interview on January 7, the approaching US leader refused to rule out the use of force to take ownership of Greenland and he dispatched his brother, Don Jr,” and several associates” there on January 8, 2025, to emphasize his sincerity. Money may not be a hindrance to any offer that Trump envisages, especially with Elon Musk taking over the plan.

Trump is not the first US politician to attempt to get Greenland. The island’s first acquisition test dates again to 1868, the first time it has been documented.

The next significant efforts since Trump was made by the 1946 administration’s president, Harry S. Truman. Trump’s renewed interest in Greenland hence continues a long line of geographical expansion efforts by the United States.

Trump’s most recent bet is less absurd today than it may have appeared again in 2019 even without this historical background. On the one hand, Greenland is extremely rich in so-called” important materials”. According to a 2024 record in the Scholar, the area has known reserves of 43 out of 50 of these nutrients. According to the US Department of Energy, these minerals are necessary for “technologies that create, transmit, store and preserve power” and have” a higher risk of supply chain disruption”.

Given that China, a major distributor of a number of crucial nutrients to international markets, has been putting more restrictions on its imports as part of an ongoing business dispute with the US, this is undoubtedly a valid concern. Washington would have more control over the supply chain and lessen any utilize that China might have to exert. Having access to Greenland’s solutions.

Strategic price

Greenland’s corporate location also makes it valuable to the US. Pituffik Space Base, a well-established US center, is crucial to US weapon protection and early warning and is important for space surveillance. The base’s future growth may also improve US ability to track Russian naval activities in the Arctic Ocean and the northern Atlantic.

US autonomy over Greenland, if Trump’s deal comes to pass, do likewise properly buckle any goes by rivals, especially China, to get a grip on the island. If Greenland is still a member of NATO, which has provided the island with an quarterly grant of about US$ 500 million, this may be less of a issue.

Greenland’s freedom – assistance for which has been gradually growing – may open the door to more, and less controlled, foreign purchase. In this situation, China is perceived as especially eager to step in if the chance arises.

Add to that the growing security assistance between Russia and China and the fact that Russia has typically become more physically violent, and Trump’s case appears to be even more reliable. He is not the only one to raise the alarm: Canada, Denmark, and Norway have all recently reacted to the growing Russian and Chinese presence in the Arctic.

The issue with Trump’s proposal is not that it is based on a flawed assessment of the underlying issue it attempts to address. In a time when geopolitical rivalry is waning, Russia’s and China’s influence in the Arctic region is generally a security issue. In this context, Greenland unquestionably poses a particular and significant security risk to the United States.

The flaws in Trump’s plan

The problem is Trump’s” America first” tunnel vision of looking for a solution. insisting that he wants Greenland and that he will receive it, even if that means imposing high tariffs on Danish exports ( think Novo Nordisk’s weight-loss drugs ) or imposing force.

Predictably, Greenland and Denmark rejected the new “offer”. And key allies, including France and Germany, rushed to their ally’s defense – figuratively for now.

Rather than strengthening US security, Trump is arguably effectively weakening it by, yet again, undermining the western alliance. The irony of doing so in the north Atlantic does not only seem to be lost on Trump, This kind of territorial expansionism, which is representative of Trump’s isolationist tendencies, also seems to be a more fundamental issue at play here.

” Incorporating” Greenland into the US would likely shield Washington from the collapse of crucial mineral supply chains and keep Russia and China at bay. Beyond the kind of bluster and bombast that are typically associated with Trump, and signaling that he will do it whatever the cost, is an indication that his approach to foreign policy will quickly wear off with any gloves.

Trump and his team may believe that the US can get away with this by strengthening security cooperation with Denmark and the rest of its NATO and European allies in the Arctic and beyond. Given that what is at stake here are relations with the United States ‘ hitherto closest allies, this is an enormous, and unwarranted, gamble.

No great power in history has ever been able to go it alone forever, and even taking control of Greenland by hook or by crook is unlikely to reverse this.

Stefan Wolff is a University of Birmingham professor of international security.

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China and Latin America, facing Trump, may seek even stronger ties – Asia Times

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Xi Jinping, the president of China, was present at a meeting marking the beginning of a “diplomatic battle” through Latin America at the time of Donald Trump’s victory in November 2024.

Xi’s appearance was a symbol of China’s rising influence in the region. The Chinese-funded ($ 3.4 billion ) Chancay port represents an expansion of the relationship between China and Peru. Additionally, the two nations signed a treaty expanding free business. Xi said this was the beginning of a coastal version of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, to grow its international trade and control.

Peru was one of the first Trump administration’s countries to adopt a confrontational attitude against several other nations in the area. In the end, this led Peru to reaffirm its relationship with China. Beijing saw the chance, through positive business deals and investments, to place itself as a more reliable and useful companion than Washington.

China has significantly increased its position as Latin America’s leading trading partner in the past 20 years. In 2002, trade between China and the region was worth$ 18 billion. hat amount increased to$ 500 billion by 2023. In the first two weeks of 2024, China’s exports to Latin America increased by 20.6 %.

Trump’s second term was widely believed to be a move toward China as Latin American nations turned away from US principles and alliances. Brazil, for instance, saw deal with the US fall to its lowest level for 11 times, while commerce with China grew considerably. Joe Biden did much to improve relationships.

Trump’s campaign speech suggests that the approaching management will continue to do so. And if and when options arise, China is undoubtedly ready to expand its collaborations in the area.

The Trump presidency is likely to concentrate on business, emigration, and drug trafficking. For instance, Mexico is more likely to become a scheme objective, because of improper immigration, than Brazil.

Trump might look for local friends whose plans seem more in line with his own. Argentina’s leader Javier Milei and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele seem good candidates, with their kind of democracy echoing some of Trump’s.

Despite attempts by Brazil’s leader Jair Bolsanaro to work with Trump when they were both in authority, and to sound Trump’s buzzwords, trade between the two countries fell. Significantly, during Trump’s term of office three countries – the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama – withdrew recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign nation, officially shifting allegiance to Beijing and apart from US-backed Taipei.

What future?

In 2025, countries with nearby ties with China may be targets for the Trump administration. Trump has threatened to impose tariffs on Chinese goods, and he has outlined his strict China plans as part of his” America second” plan. China might interpret the Chancay dock as a way to avoid rising US tariffs and as a backdoor to the US marketplace. So Peru may be a trade-relations fight.

However, Trump’s America First plan, prioritizing US interests, could even result in the reduction of local aid.

Reduced US assistance might prompt Latin American nations to find yet stronger ties with China. Over the past ten years, the latter has previously been constantly offering economic investments and funding infrastructure projects through Belt and Road Initiative programs. Argentina has also served as a Foreign space station’s base.

Belt-and-Road-related initiatives are frequently viewed as more appealing than assistance and investments from eastern nations, including the US, because they have lower costs for the nation receiving the investment.

Trump’s possible disengagement from international organizations, quite as NATO and the World Bank, may also improve China’s influence internationally. Latin American nations would have fewer reasons to support Washington because of this US place, which may lessen its ability to influence foreign norms and policies.

Latin American nations could switch to China for increased funding, which frequently relies on international organizations for economic and political support like the Inter-American Development Bank. China’s diplomatic work, including high-level appointments and involvement in local forums, continue to rise, signalling its intention to improve ties with Latin America.

Latin American nations will likely continue to find powerful economic ties with China, especially for those who have experienced financial instability in the post-pandemic time and are looking for innovative avenues of growth and development.

Interestingly, China’s investments in the country’s facilities and energy sectors have already been considerable in the last century. They have provided much-needed funds and tech exchanges. These opportunities have not only strengthened regional economies but also strengthened political ties, making China a crucial partner in the development of the region.

China v US

Another benefit of China’s overseas scheme is its non-interventionist policy, which may appeal to Latin American nations. This approach emphasizes the independence and the freedom of nations to choose their own growth lines.

China presents itself as an alternative to the standard western power. This enables China to present itself as a brother emerging sector, which suggests a sense of cohesion with Latin American nations. This contrasts with the US’s complicated story of interfering with the regional economy ‘ domestic politics.

Countries in Latin America may discover China’s technique more compatible with their own guidelines as Trump continues to illustrate a more isolationist and mercantilist approach.

Many Latin American nations are expecting something related this time due to the hostile rhetoric used against them during the first Trump term, mainly over immigration. China appears poised to create even more of those options.

The International Institute for Management Development ( IMD)’s ( IMD) World Competitiveness Center’s ) Jose Caballero is a senior economist.

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How the US sanctioned itself in Ukraine – Asia Times

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The US Treasury yields, which are the key drivers of international markets, lower property prices, increase the US dollar exchange rate, and pose a threat to US homebuilding and another rate-dependent economic activity. As rates rise, moreover, the US Treasury deficit – already above 6 % of GDP – will increase. The federal debt’s interest rate increased from$ 400 billion to$ 1 trillion in 2021, putting an additional$ 1.8 trillion requirement on top of the previous year’s$ 1.8 trillion.

Despite my calculations, foreign central banks have decreased their holdings of US government debt, putting pressure on yields by painfully 0.8 %, based on my analysis. Central bankers shifted out of money assets as a result of the arrest of Russian foreign exchange reserves in 2022. The US business was perhaps more harmed by the reserve arrest than Russia’s.

The Federal Reserve, to be sure, increased the rate at which banks are charged for overnight cash, which contributed to the majority of the price rise. However, a significant increase in the so-called real offer of Treasury bonds ( in this case, the interest rate on inflation-indexed Treasuries ( TIPS) is attributable to less foreign central banks purchasing of US loan. Reduced foreign central bank holdings of US government debt account for roughly 80 basis points ( 8/10ths of a percentage point ).

Foreign central banks, including those of China, India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, began shifting their foreign exchange reserves into gold and out of Treasuries after the US and its allies seized half of Russia’s$ 600 billion in foreign exchange reserves in early 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The influence of foreign central banks ‘ sales of US federal debt is illustrated in the table below.

The Fed’s report on the change in international central banks holdings of Treasuries for six weeks is shown in the red line. The offer of 10-year TIPS is depicted in the blue line, which is the nighttime rate that the Fed charges bankers. 10-year Ideas provides increased by 80 basis points as of January 1 ( the shift in the TIPS supply that is not explained by the federal funds rate is depicted in the blue line, once more ). At the 95 % trust level, statistical tests demonstrate that the relationship between the two elements is important.

While the US Treasury’s saving necessity has risen quickly, foreign central banks holdings of US Treasuries have declined. This contrasts starkly with the time period 2007-2012 ( including the World Financial Crisis ), when the Treasury intervened with an ( then ) unprecedented$ 800 billion bailout to support the banking system. Foreign central banks, notably including China, stepped in to support the Treasury, doubling their holdings of US government debt to$ 4 trillion from$ 2 trillion in 2007. During the Covid crisis of 2020, by contrast, foreign central banks ( notably including China ) reduced their holdings of Treasuries.

This has had a significant and palpable effect on US Treasury provides.

We are comparing leads and falls, which clearly demonstrate that adjustments in foreign central banks holdings of Treasuries are related to changes in the TIPS offer (once more, the changes are not those that the federal funds rate has predicted ). Each table in the table below displays the relationship between the two factors ‘ current and past lagged values at regular intervals. For instance, the lagged benefit of changes in international central banks holdings of Treasuries shows a -0.6 relationship with that weekend’s TIPS yield when compared to a 5-week slowdown. Changes in international central banks investments are consistent with the cross-correlogram, which is contrary to what the cross-correlogram suggests.

Additionally, it explains how the real yield on US Treasuries is decoupled from the golden value. For the 15 years 2007 to 2022, golden and TIPS provides were traded simultaneously. They provide a form of protection against unanticipated prices and dollar depreciation, and they both play a similar investment role. The difference is that Treasury assets may be seized by the US government, as in the case of Russia, while metal in a central bank’s tomb can’t.

After March 2022, metal rose sharply despite the surge in TIPS provides. The balance of the government’s debt is in question, and the value of golden as a wall against currency depreciation is rising as a result of all the major American economies’ running huge deficits.

Like additional sanctions against Russian business, Washington’s arrest of the Russian supply backfired. It destroyed confidence in the basic property of the US dollar supply system, particularly the debt of the US Treasury, and raised America’s borrowing cost just as the Treasury’s borrowing requirements exploded.

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China’s zero-inflation troubles getting harder to ignore – Asia Times

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With the announcement that manufacturer prices dropped for a 27th consecutive month in December and that customer price changes are essentially zero perhaps before Donald Trump’s trade war kicks off, China’s deflation issues became more difficult to rewrite.

The 2.3 % decline in wholesale prices year over year and the small 0.1 % rise in consumer prices only add to the growing fad. That’s nothing more true than in China’s bond business. Offer relationships suggest investors have never been so skeptical on Beijing’s ability to avoid so-called” Japanification”.

The yield gap between 10-year US securities and similar 10-year royal Chinese debt increased to an unprecedented 300 basis points this week. Despite Team Xi’s storm of signal efforts, that’s despite. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, investors are concerned that China will soon surpass its record-breaking negative work in the late 1990s.

Trump’s returning to the US presidency in 11 days is the financial undertone. The US dollar is currently in a strong upward trend due to anticipation that Trump did implement tariff and revenue cuts. Team Xi and the People’s Bank of China are now trying to stop the yuan from falling below the$ 7.2 per dollar mark as a result.

There’s some good news moving in, also. Stock exercise, for instance, seems to be holding upward, expanding for three straight weeks now. However, good socioeconomic factors remain constrained as a 2025 begins to look incredibly uncertain.

According to Zhiwei Zhang, chief economist at Pinpoint Asset Management,” Recent economic data has stabilized, but the speed is not strong enough to put downward pressure on consumer prices already.”

Also before Trump’s profit, weak domestic demand has Taiwanese firms cutting output, freezing hiring and laying off employees. Nevertheless, says Macquarie Group general China analyst Larry Hu,” 2024 may be remembered as a time of muddle-through”.

Although this was much better at least than the -0.6 % and -0.3 % changes in November and October, economist Michael Pettis at the Carnegie Endowment notes that “despite this being much better at least than the -0.6 % and -0.3 % changes in December, it represents the fourth month of zero to negative price changes. CPI inflation overall for 2024 was at a very low 0.2 %, the same as it was last year, and the lowest level since 2009. For all the signal and the boom in bill during the year, in other words, China has been unable to resurrect inflation”.

Brian Tycangco, researcher at Stansberry Research, adds that” the recession threat is real and growing in China. Beijing should use this most recent information as a sign to act more quickly on stimulus.

As the new year begins, Xi’s internal group appears to be doing just that, stepping up efforts to shock need. Beijing is rolling out 15 % incentives for buying fresh smartphones, tablets, devices and other devices. In coastal towns of Shanghai, card programs are popping up to increase demand for goods like furniture, cars, and electronics, as well as interior metropolises like Hubei and Sichuan.

However, 25 years later, Japan continues to demonstrate that a comprehensive response to depreciation requires a disproportionate use of both monetary and fiscal resources, and the sooner the better. Looked at through this lens, all gaze are on how the current annual Central Economic Work Conference&nbsp, held in Beijing affects Xi’s policy objectives.

That mid-December session ended with pledges for macro policies aimed at” stabilizing growth” and “reviving household consumption” and achieving a “reasonable rebound” of inflation via “more proactive” fiscal and monetary maneuvers. Yet it’s rubber-hitting-the-road time as global investors fun about depreciation getting worse in Asia’s biggest market.

Problem is that economics have more questions than answers regarding Xi’s plan proposals. What are you going to do with all this generation, asks Natixis scholar Alicia Garcia Herrero? Who will you import to? Protectionism is rising, and China isn’t changing its unit, making the issues likely become more serious. I think 2025 is time for change, and China needs to change quite quickly, or the year may end up very hard”.

The coming” Trump deal” is raising the stakes. To be sure, no everyone fears the worst. Bank of America planners warn that “geopolitical tensions and probable US guidelines… could lead to higher cost of capital and several de-rating once more in 2025. That said, we believe the worst of flow/position-selling for the China business should have been over”.

The 60 % tax threat, according to the optimistic viewpoint, is a negotiating ploy intended to bring Xi to the table of negotiations. The next four years might not be the business conflict hellscape traders fear, so if Trump give a significant business deal with China precedence over a business war.

However, the worst-case circumstance might occur sooner than China bulls now believe. The economy’s current uptrend is predicated on expectations that Trump’s 60 % taxes are just the start. Never mind that an “increase in customs duties may lead to an understanding of the money which would cancel out the gain in competitiveness,” according to economist Sylvain Bersinger of the business intelligence company Asterès.

The bigger problem is Trump’s 1980s-era view that taxes are “beautiful” and the fastest road to raising America’s financial activity. China’s economy will suffer as a result of a worsening house crisis, great youth unemployment, mounting debts among local governments, and poor consumer demand.

” Imports will naturally grow much less and purchase too”, alert economics at S&amp, P Global. ” The impact on investment can in part blow in even before US tax implementation, because of the increased confusion. Spill-over to job, income and trust will ponder on use”.

Ian Bremmer, chairman of Eurasia Group, notes that the “incoming US leader promises taxes that could destroy the global economy, incident relations with China, and increase the conflict in unregulated spots”. He cites the US-China conflict as “export disruption disruption to everyone else this season, shortening the global recovery and accelerating geoeconomic separation at a time when global growth is sluggish, inflation remains high, and debt levels are at traditional highs.”

What’s more, Bremmer says, Trump 2.0″ will destroy an uncontrolled decoupling in the world’s most important political marriage. That, in turn, risks a significant financial disruption and broader crisis. Trump will impose new tariffs on Chinese goods in an effort to entice Beijing to make concessions on a number of issues, and China’s leaders will do so more strongly to demonstrate to both Trump and the Chinese people that they can and will fight back.

Wildcards appear, also. Conflicts over Taiwan” may perhaps fall”, Bremmer says, even if a “full-blown problems” seems doubtful in 2025.

The renminbi is its own potential battlefield. Team Xi and currency speculators are attempting to reduce the yuan against the money as the year gets underway. At the moment, the People’s Bank of China is really publicly setting the dollar’s regular mention price stronger than 7.2 per money, signaling that Beijing isn’t favoring a weaker exchange rate.

However, the decline in Chinese bond yields and the growing spread with the US may make it even more difficult to stabilize the yuan. The trend has 10-year yields around 1.6 % – and lower at times – for the first time since the worst of the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2008 Lehman Brothers crisis

Markets aren’t always accurate, but the deflationary signals coming out of the current yield levels should stoke the alarm at Xi’s Ministry of Finance. The fallout could further lower retail spending, aggravate China’s capital outflow issue, and give the Japanification talk that irritates Xi’s reform team more.

The case study from Japan’s 1990s, according to Goldman Sachs, serves as a “valuable playbook” for economists and stock investors trying to assess the outlook for Chinese assets.

To be sure, there may be winners from falling Chinese prices, just as there was with Japan. Falling prices could act as a covert tax cut for consumers who are in a tough economy. In China, brokerage Haitong Securities believes that low prices could benefit technology companies looking to expand, high-dividend stocks, and exporters with diversified businesses.

Still, the ways in which deflation could undermine confidence in China Inc. make today’s bond markets signals a wake-up-call moment for Xi’s economy.

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