China building monster barges to overrun Taiwan’s shores – Asia Times

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China’s latest ships of special-purpose marine boats is rewriting the rulebook for a possible Taiwan war, raising the stakes in the cross-strait stalemate with striking new tactics and high-stakes challenges for the self-governing planet’s defenders.

This quarter, Naval News reported that China is fast constructing a ship of special-purpose boats, possible for marine attack on Taiwan. At Guangzhou Shipyard, according to the review, five of these vessels were observed with unusually long path bridges that propelled tanks and other large equipment straight onto Chinese roads.

These boats are intended to travel along coastal highways or hard surfaces beyond beaches, potentially making recently inadequate landing sites practical, according to Naval News. They are reminiscent of the Mulberry Harbors used during the Allied invasion of Normandy in World War II. Building of the boats, which began with a design in 2022, has accelerated late, raising issues about China’s purposes.

Given their size and design, which considerably exceed human needs, Naval News suggests that these vessels were specifically designed for military use. The report says the barges ‘ ability to dock with China’s large fleet of roll-on/roll-off ( RoRo ) ferries, built to carry military vehicles, further underscores their potential role in a Taiwan invasion.

This growth, according to the report, makes Taiwan’s defense strategy more difficult, allowing China to choose new landing locations and bypass beaches and ports that are sparsely defended.

In October 2023, Asia Times mentioned that China’s marine sealift features face important restrictions, complicating a possible invasion of Taiwan. As of December 2024, China had four Type 075 landing helicopter assault ( LHA ) ships and nine landing platform docks ( LPD), with more Type 76 LHAs on the horizon.

While the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s ( PLAN ) amphibious assault ships could carry 21, 000 troops – the equivalent of one heavy brigade during its initial landing, where Taiwan may have as many as 1, 200 tanks waiting – the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) has the capacity to put only half that number ashore.

But, using RoRo boats to assist an amphibious assault could boost China’s sealift power.

Following death strikes on Taiwan’s management, China may have to place 300, 000-400, 000 soldiers ashore to capture the island immediately. But, if those decapitation strikes fail, China may have to take 2 million soldiers, including police and military forces, across the Taiwan Strait to assure a three-to-one or five-to-one quantitative superiority against defending Chinese troops.

In the 2024 book” Foreign Marine Warfare: Hopes for a Cross-Strait Invasion”, Ian Easton highlights the importance of Taiwan’s ships in China’s plans for a potential war.

According to Easton, the PLA believes that Taiwan’s ports must be in place to support large-scale operations because they can support heavy equipment, reinforcements, and logistics that beachheads and airports cannot. Without capturing and utilizing these facilities, he claims PLA forces run the risk of being attacked and overwhelmed by Taiwanese counterattacks.

Conversely, Easton says Taiwan’s defense strategy prioritizes transforming its ports into fortified strongholds, incorporating interlocking firing networks, underground bunkers and coastal artillery.

He mentions Taiwan’s defensive strategies, including using anti-airborne and anti-tank missiles, mining waterways, and possibly sabotaging infrastructure to prevent access. He points out that PLA strategies recommend integrated port-seizure operations that include commando raids, air assaults, and amphibious landings to reduce the risk of damage to port facilities and ensure their use.

Additionally, Easton claims that Taichung is the most likely port target in a July 2021 Project 2049 report because of its extensive modern amenities, relatively light urban settings, and easy access to nearby beaches and river deltas.

However, he says Taichung would likely be well-defended. He also mentions that Kaohsiung, Zuoying, Taipei and Anping are likely targets because of their strategic importance, although their dense urban environments and surrounding defensive positions present challenges.

Easton mentions that Keelung, Suao, Hualien and Makung could be targeted but are lesser-priority targets due to unfavorable terrain and strong defenses.

While Easton lists 14 suitable landing spots for a Chinese invasion, including five in the south and nine in the north, according to a report from Newsweek in December 2023 that cautious Taiwanese defense planners had identified more than two dozen sites.

In such a case, Taiwan and the US face a defensive quandary. In a March 2022 article for the Global Taiwan Institute ( GTI), Charlemagne McHaffie stresses the need for Taiwan to develop a comprehensive, multi-layered strategy to repel a potential Chinese invasion, emphasizing mobile defense as an indispensable component. McHaffie emphasizes unified command, air, naval and ground forces coordination, and a robust doctrine tailored to resist amphibious operations.

However, he points out that naval and coastal defenses, while effective in delaying and attriting enemy forces, have historically failed to prevent landfall when the attacker holds naval superiority, as China does against Taiwan. He contends that shoreline defenses must be supported by mobile mechanized forces in order to prevent initial beachhead.

According to McHaffie, calls for Taiwan to adopt an asymmetric strategy that relies on guerrilla warfare and prolongs conflict to secure US intervention are based precariously on an ambiguous US commitment.

He claims that the current policy of strategic ambiguity raises significant risks because of this strategy’s reliance on external aid. Consequently, he says Taiwan’s defense strategy will likely prioritize capabilities for independent victory, including mechanized counterattacks to destroy Chinese beachheads.

Taiwan has the option to launch sporadic strikes on the Chinese mainland. Asia Times mentioned that Taiwan’s long-range missiles, including the Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile, significantly advance the island’s defense strategy. They make precise long-range assaults on crucial Chinese military and infrastructure, such as as staging areas for an amphibious assault.

With ranges extending beyond 2, 000 kilometers, these missiles can target key sites such as liquid natural gas terminals, oil ports and nuclear power plants, potentially inflicting substantial damage.

In the midst of escalating tensions with China, Taiwan’s development of these advanced weapons highlights its strategic move toward more mobile and resilient defense systems.

However, the use of these missiles could have serious effects, including the possibility of more frequent conflicts and potential nuclear retaliation from China. International standards and alienating allies could be compromised by striking a nuclear-armed state’s home, which would impede international support.

Additionally, such strikes might be used by China’s leadership to rally domestic support for an invasion of Taiwan, potentially leading to a protracted conflict.

According to McHaffie, with this circumstance, the US has two options: funding Taiwan’s robust conventional defenses and securing the necessary time for US intervention.

He warns that if Taiwan is ignored, it could become vulnerable, and US counteroffensives against a China with nuclear weapons might be necessary, or Taiwan might completely abandon it.

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How Trump can break China’s tightening grip on Central Asia – Asia Times

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The royal release of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan rail on December 27 was the latest evidence of China’s growing effect in Central Asia.

China’s growing deal with a crucial area that the US has de facto abandoned since its military withdrawal from neighboring Afghanistan in 2021 will be supported by construction, which is anticipated to take six decades.

China’s deal with Central Asia, comprised of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, hit US$ 89 billion in 2023, making it by far the state’s largest business partner.

China’s trade was followed by the EU with$ 53.9 billion, Russia’s$ 44 billion and Turkey’s nearly$ 13 billion. Russia’s sphere of influence has long been viewed as having a broader scope, but China’s affect is now clearly shifting, at least in part as a result of the Ukraine conflict. &nbsp,

The Office of the United States Trade Representative has released data for the last year, but America’s combined deal with Central Asia in 2022 was a modest$ 4.4 billion.

This is in spite of the” United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity“, published in February 2020 under the preceding Trump presidency.

India trailed behind at$ 2 billion in 2023 followed by Iran at$ 1.5 billion in 2022 and Pakistan at just$ 309 million that same year.

Given their involvement in the International North-South Transport Corridor and the US’s waiver to conduct business with Afghanistan from Iran’s Chabahar port ( and apparently throughout the rest of the place ), India and Iran’s lower level of business is relatively unexpected.

In that regard, next spring, India and Iran signed a 10-year deal with the Chabahar port, but the Biden administration unexpectedly threatened to impose sanctions despite the waiver for India’s use of the city’s facilities.

Pakistan’s sluggish trade with Central Asia is due to its worsening hostilities with Taliban-run Afghanistan, which scuppered plans to join with the area after the US government left in 2021.

There are still programs to reconstruct and upgrade the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan rail, but rising security-related conflicts and money problems have impeded development.

Even so, the Minister of Maritime Affairs of Pakistan asserted in early January that all of the nations in Central Asia still want to deal through Muslim ships.

Now, Central Asia’s most trusted business associates are neighboring China and Russia. Although EU business is higher than that of Russia, there are reasons to believe that a sizable portion of it is transshipments to Russia to avoid American sanctions, as Brookings Institute older brother Robin Brooks has suggested.

Their business must also pass through the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and Anatolia or the Baltic Sea. Similar to Turkey’s deal with Central Asia, which is also bidirectional and results in significantly higher costs and longer travel times.

Georgia is a crucial factor in facilitating trade between the EU and Turkey along the so-called” Middle Corridor,” but a potential resolution of Baku’s Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute was ease this process in the future.

A flowing issue over that debate, but, risks disrupting their trade.

Last year, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated to reporters that” Armenia does not have in our manner.” They shouldn’t serve as a boundary between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The Zangezur hall may remain and will be opened. The sooner they understand this, the better”.

He also called for demilitarizing Armenia and “eradicating” what he described as its “fascist philosophy” in vocabulary related to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s in the run-up to what the Kremlin has referred to as its” specific function” in Ukraine.

Even if a local conflict doesn’t start, the EU’s relationship with Georgia could be hampered by Tbilisi’s latest parliamentary elections and Tbilisi’s deteriorating unusual agents laws, which could complicate trade between the bloc and Central Asia.

Regardless of whether the Zangezur Corridor actually comes into being or not, China may end up being the biggest winner, which would cause the place to deteriorate further into its sphere of influence.

It is most likely that the US would be able to avoid that situation by facilitating Central Asia’s business with all of its partners, with the exception of China. That, in turn, would allow them to function as a social counterpoint to China.

For that to occur, the US will have to make some hard, if not controversial, decisions. For example, the incoming Trump presidency would need to evaluate some of its Russian punishment, many of which haven’t worked as punitively intended.

According to Maximilian Hess of the Foreign Policy Research Institute,” It may seem counterintuitive, given one of the key goals of the restrictions imposed on Russia has been to restrain deal with Russia, but deal with Russia has increased for Central Asia and the Caucasus since 2022,” according to Hess. Much of this has been caused by trade rerouting, whereby Western exports to Russia have fallen and were instead routed through the area.

Hess noted that sanctions have caused some difficulties in their trade, notably because Russia is no longer a member of SWIFT, but their only real impact on the area has been the de post forwarding of some pre-war Western business to Russia via Central Asia.

While specific information is hard to find, it’s obvious that a major share of the EU’s deal with the location is transshipments. That implies that true trade between the EU and Central Asia is likely to be lower than what is currently known, implying that China has more influence than the data suggest.

Greater financial clarity about Central Asia’s real existing business could be gained by reversing some sanctions, extending waivers to Western companies, or threatening secondary sanctions in response to violations, some of which might be included in a package deal with Russia on Ukraine.

That’s imperative to better understand the EU’s competitive advantages there vis-a-vis China, which could then be more effectively leveraged.

The second difficult choice is whether or not Iran will continue to impose sanctions on India for trade with Afghanistan ( and presumably also Central Asia ) via Iran’s Chabahar port.

Significantly, Trump’s Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellog, revealed over the weekend that the incoming administration &nbsp, plans to revive&nbsp, its “maximum pressure” policy against Iran.

India’s trade with Central Asia lags far behind its potential, and if the US wants to keep China’s influence in check in the strategic region, then it must rely in part on India as a counterbalance.

If India and Central Asia are confident that their businesses won’t face secondary sanctions for trading with Iran and other countries, this only can occur.

Pakistan’s best course of action would be to reconcile with Afghanistan and India, allowing India to establish a pioneering overland route to Central Asia, but that’s currently politically unrealistic. That’s why Iran must be relied upon as a transit state, which requires the US to be flexible with sanctions.

Finally, Trump ought to think about changing Biden’s pressure policy toward Georgia and urging the EU to do the same. Such a rapprochement would ensure the EU can continue trading with Central Asia across Georgia’s territory, thereby lifting present uncertainties.

In parallel, Trump’s incoming government could also consider taking the lead in resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over the so-called” Zangezur Corridor” in order to avert another war.

Trump and his advisors are known for their business-minded worldview and thus may agree that compromises toward Russia, Iran-India and the South Caucasus ( Georgia and Armenia-Azerbaijan ) are acceptable to counter China’s rising influence in Central Asia.

If the US doesn’t take action, China will undoubtedly grow to be a dominant economic force in the strategic region, giving it more access to its resources and minerals and acting as a ready hub for more trade with Iran.

Because China already relies on imported energy by sea to give the US Navy leverage in any potential conflict with China, including through a blockade of the Malacca Strait chokepoint, those outcomes would conflict with US interests.

Meanwhile, greater overland trade between China and Iran via Central Asia would serve to neutralize Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran.

Thus, it would be wise for the incoming Trump administration to emphasize Central Asia more prominently in its foreign policy strategy; otherwise, its planned pressure tactics against China and Iran will be less likely to succeed.

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The passing of a Japanese automaking icon – Asia Times

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Osamu Suzuki, mind of Japan’s Suzuki Motor Corporation since 1978 and the driving force behind India’s Maruti Suzuki, died on December 25, 2024. Overshadowed by Toyota, the Nissan-Renault play and the increase of China’s BYD, Suzuki was yet one of the great companies of the global auto industry.

Suzuki’s business, which was founded by his parents, has grown to become the tenth-largest manufacturer in the world and the largest in India, where Maruti Suzuki’s company holds more than 40 % of the business. Akio Toyoda, president of Toyota Motor, called him the parents of mini-vehicles – the “people’s vehicle” of Japan.

In 1930, Suzuki was born in Gifu Prefecture as Osamu Matsuda. After graduating from university and working at a local bank, he married Shoko Suzuki, the princess of Michio Suzuki, the leader of Suzuki Motor Corporation. He was adopted into the community in accordance with Chinese customs, changed his name to Osamu Suzuki, and started working for the company in 1958.

Osamu Suzuki rose up the corporate ladder, becoming president in 2000, president and CEO in 1978, and top managing chairman in 1972. In 2021, he retired to become a senior consultant to the business. His brother, Toshihiro, is now president and CEO of Suzuki Motor.

Michio Suzuki founded the Suzuki Loom Works in the Pacific beach town of Hamamatsu, Shizuoka Prefecture, in 1909. He began working on small gasoline-powered passenger vehicles in 1937, a job that was halted by World War II, as he sought to diversify alongside Japan’s commercial economy.

After the battle, he turned to motorized bike and riders, changing the name of his business to Suzuki Motor Co, Ltd in 1954. The business introduced its first rider car the following month.

This story is comparable to Toyota Motor, which was founded in 1926 as Toyoda Automatic Loom Works. Toyota Motor, a 1933-founded car department, was founded in 1937.

Suzuki Motor had a lot of success creating the ultra-compact light cars known as the” Kei jidosha” ( Kei cars ) in Japanese. The Suzuki Fronte sedan, its leader, the Alto, and another passenger vehicles types have proved to be strong dealers in Japan and elsewhere.

Since its debut in 1979, The Alto has gone through nine publications. Suzuki Carry cabs, first introduced in 1961, are also common with farmers and people driving Japan’s small remote roads.

To meet laws, Kei vehicles, which include passenger cars, lighting vans and modest pickup trucks, may be no more than 3.4 meters long, 1.48 meters wide and 2.0 meters higher, and have an engine displacement of less than 660 cubic centimeters.

Suzuki Motor expanded into small cars with up to 1.8 liter of engine displacement for the highest-performance versions over the years, but Kei cars also make up the majority of its engine production and sales.

Into India

Suzuki, who was prepared to transfer Suzuki Motor elsewhere in the 1980s, was concerned that the US market might not stand up to direct competition from Toyota, Nissan, and Honda.

He jumped at the chance when an Indian group arrived in Japan looking for a business that would provide money and expertise to the country’s infant auto industry. No one else did.

In 1981, Suzuki Motor entered into a joint venture with Maruti Udyog, buying 26 % of the company from the American government. Beginning in December 1983, Suzuki began manufacturing light vehicles, and as the company expanded, it became a merged subsidiary.

Listed on the Indian stock market in 2003, Maruti Suzuki is then 54.27%-owned by Suzuki Motor.

Maruti Suzuki dominates India’s fast-growing car industry. Image: X Screengrab

Ravindra Chandra Bhargava, president of Maruti Suzuki, said in his remarks regarding his encounter with Osamu Suzuki that “without his vision and vision, his willingness to take a chance that no one else was willing to take, his deep and abiding passion for India, and his huge abilities as a teacher, the American automotive industry could not have become the powerhouse that it has become. Osamu San has improved the lives of millions of people in this nation.

Osamu Suzuki was a hands-on, penny-pinching manager who frequently visited his factories to monitor how things were going and eliminate inefficiency, even eliminating the need for unnecessary lighting and switching to less expensive paint. He made several trips to India each year, documenting the introduction of Japanese factory practices.

The severe discipline, to which many local workers were unaccustomed, eventually sparked violent worker unrest in the summer of 2012. More than 500 employees were fired, and the business persevered. Suzuki told India’s Business Today,” I don’t consider this a union-management labor issue, I term it a criminal act”.

But he also said,” From 1945, when Japan lost in World War II, until 1960, we also had labor troubles. In Japan, I also had labor issues. Each nation experiences labor difficulties in its own time, which may vary in timing.

Incidentally, while Maruti Suzuki gets all the attention, the much smaller Pak Suzuki Motors is also the largest auto company in Pakistan. It started assembling cars in Pakistan in 1982 as a joint venture with the Pakistani government.

Suzuki attempted to enter the US market through a partnership with GM, which made its first investment in the Japanese company in 1981 and increased its stake in the business to more than 20 % in 2001. However, the partnership fell apart as GM’s finances deteriorated.

In 2006, GM sold most of its stake back to Suzuki, in 2008 it sold the rest and, in 2009, it filed for bankruptcy. Suzuki stopped selling passenger cars in the US in 2012. Suzuki then turned to Volkswagen, which bought 19.9 % of the company in 2010. However, the two sides broke out, and Suzuki repurchased VW shares in 2015.

Suzuki started providing Toyota with compact cars that were rebranded and offered through Toyota dealerships the following year, leading to significant increases in unit sales. In 2-19, Toyota took a 4.9 % stake in Suzuki for 96 billion yen ( about US$ 910 million at the time ) and Suzuki buying 0.2 % of Toyota for half that amount.

The partnership continues to evolve, with coordinated marketing in Japan, India, Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The two businesses made a deal in October 2024 that Suzuki would start making battery-powered electric SUVs for Toyota in Gujarat. Suzuki also makes hybrid vehicles.

Maruti Suzuki and the State of Gujarat reached an agreement last year to establish a new auto factory that will eventually produce one million vehicles annually. The fiscal year that runs until March 2029 is when operations are expected to begin.

In order to expand the production of electric vehicles, a fourth production line is planned at the company’s current factory in Gujarat. Scheduled to start operations in the year to March 2027, it will raise the facility’s annual production capacity from 750, 000 to one million vehicles. Gujarat’s total vehicle production should eventually reach two million vehicles.

In addition to the State of Haryana, construction on a new factory is underway. Work is anticipated to begin by the end of 2025 and by the 2028 annualized capacity will reach one million vehicles. In addition, the business is looking for a location in Haryana where it can set up a new factory that will have a one million vehicle annual capacity.

Maruti Suzuki’s total production capacity should increase from the current 2.35 million vehicles per year to 4 million, almost as many as the 4.3 million passenger cars sold by all automakers in India in 2024 if all of these plans are realized and older facilities retired.

Suzuki Motor also produces passenger cars in Asia in Indonesia and Thailand, but it intends to close its factory there because the country’s sales have been hampered by intensifying Chinese competition. The business has not yet provided specifics about plans to increase its investment in Indonesia this year. Suzuki withdrew from China’s auto market in 2018 but still makes motorcycles there.

In Europe, Suzuki makes passenger cars in Hungary, where it has almost 13 % of the market. Since 1991, Suzuki has invested more than$ 2 billion in Hungary. The Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency presented Magyar Suzuki with the Investors Lifetime Achievement Award in February 2024.

Suzuki makes open all-terrain vehicles ( dune buggies ) in the US state of Georgia. Because of their small size and light weight, it’s Kei cars are fatal traps in collisions with large American passenger cars and SUVs, and they have been restricted to farms or completely prohibited in a growing number of US states.

Suzuki is almost immune to Donald Trump’s planned tariffs and fierce competition in the world’s largest auto market, thanks to its low US and China sales, and its almost zero Chinese automakers ‘ presence in India, where they are almost entirely unaffected.

For the fiscal year ending March 31, 2025, Suzuki Motor forecasts a 4.5 % increase in consolidated sales to 5.6 trillion yen ($ 35.3 billion ) and an 11.4 % increase in operating profit to 550 billion yen ($ 3.5 billion ).

In comparison, Toyota is forecasting 2 % sales growth, a 19.7 % decline in operating profit and an operating margin of 9.8 %. Suzuki is also doing better than Honda, Nissan, Mitsubishi Motors and Subaru.

In terms of sales, Suzuki Motor was the 10th-largest automaker in the world at the start of 2024, according to market research firm Focus2Move. Company data show Suzuki selling 3.0 million passenger cars, compared with 3.7 million for 9th-ranked BYD and 9.7 million for top-ranked Toyota ( including its wholly-owned subsidiary Daihatsu Motor ). Suzuki is also the world’s eighth largest maker of motorcycles.

From January to November 2024, Suzuki Motor ( including its subsidiary Maruti Suzuki ) sold 670, 000 vehicles in Japan and 2.33 million elsewhere in the world, including 1.66 million in India.

In the financial year that ended in March 2024, Maruti Suzuki held the top spot in the Indian auto market, followed by Hyundai Motor and its affiliate Kia with nearly 20 %, Tata Motors with 14 %, and Mahindra &amp, Mahindra with 11 %, according to Statista data. MG ( owned by China’s SAIC ) had 1.3 %. Volvo ( owned by China’s Geely ) and BYD had less than 0.1 % combined.

India accounts for about 6 % of global passenger car sales that year, surpassing Japan in the former category in 2023. It is the third-largest national market for motor vehicles and fourth-largest in terms of passenger car sales worldwide. It will serve as Suzuki’s primary export market for the next ten years and be its largest market.

Sources: Statista data, Asia Times chart

Road ahead

The headquarters of Suzuki Motor is still headquartered in Hamamatsu, a city with a population of nearly 800,000 and where other well-known Japanese companies reside, including Yamaha Corporation, a manufacturer of musical instruments, and Hamamatsu Photonics, an optical device manufacturer. In the nearby city of Iwata, Yamaha Motor has its head office, which includes motorcycle, outboard, and jet-propelled water scooter manufacturers.

A memorandum of understanding between Hamamatsu City and the Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad ( IIT-Hyderabad ) &nbsp ) was signed on December 26. It included arrangements for Indians to live and work in Hamamatsu, as well as for personnel exchange in science and engineering. It is the first such agreement between an IIT and a foreign government, according to IIT-Hyderabad Director Budaraju Srinivasa Murty.

The agreement comes after Suzuki Motor’s establishment of a 100%-owned subsidiary called Next Bharat Ventures IFSC Private Limited and a$ 40 million Next Bharat Venture Fund-1 in India in 2022 and the opening of the Suzuki Innovation Center at IIT Hyderabad in 2022. Bharat, deriving from Sanskrit, is another name for India.

Next Bharat Ventures invests in start-ups in the fields of agriculture, finance, supply chains and mobility through the Fund, and supports them with professional advice, networking and feasibility studies. The goal is to solve social issues and contribute to India’s economic growth. Next Bharat and Hamamatsu City have a parallel MOU signed.

President and CEO Toshihiro Suzuki says,” There are about 1.4 billion people in India, but we have only reached about 0.4 billion people … Through this]Next Bharat Ventures], we will connect with the’ Next Billion ‘ people of India, extending beyond mobility and becoming a part of India’s future story”. Responsible for his father’s legacy, he is driving it forward with gusto.

Follow this writer on&nbsp, X: @ScottFo83517667

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Why China’s Ice Silk Road has Trump up in Arctic arms – Asia Times

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While American media called Republican President-elect Donald Trump a “madman” for suggesting he may purchase or “invade” Greenland, China is slowly building up a fresh maritime Silk Road in the Arctic Ocean with Russia’s support. &nbsp,

The United States of America believes that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity for purposes of regional security and freedom throughout the world, according to Trump in an X article on December 22, 2024.

He stated to the media on January 7 that he would not act out using military or economic force to occupy the automatic Norwegian territory.

Trump stated in August 2019 that, for proper reasons, he was considering purchasing Greenland. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen at the time stated that Greenland was not for sales and that Trump’s request was “absurd.” Trump called Frederiksen’s responses “nasty”.

At that time, the 2022 Ukrainian-Russian battle had not yet broken out and China-European Union connections were however relatively stable.

The Chinese state released” China’s Arctic Policy” in January 2018, outlining its strategy for “using Arctic sources in a lawful and moral manner.”

Those laws include:

  1. China’s involvement in the creation of Arctic shipping roads
  2. Participating in the investigation for and oppression of oil, gas, material and other non-living sources
  3. assisting in the restoration and use of fishing and different living things
  4. Participating in developing hospitality resources

” China is a significant player in Arctic interests. Geographically, China is a’ Near-Arctic State’, one of the western States that are closest to the Arctic Circle”, the Taiwanese authorities said in the policy statement. &nbsp,

” China has long been involved in Arctic matters. In 1925, China joined the Spitsbergen ( Svalbard ) Treaty and started to participate in addressing the Arctic affairs”, it added.

” Since therefore, China has exerted more work in the investigation of the Arctic, expanding the scope of actions, gaining more experience and deepening cooperation with other members”.

An opener in the Arctic Ocean Photo: Baidu.com

China has made significant progress over the past seven times in putting its Arctic plans into practice.

For instance, NewNew Shipping Line, a Chinese business that has collaborated with Russia, completed seven containership excursions between Asia and Europe via the Arctic Ocean in the second quarter of 2023. Last July, it launched a fresh Arctic way supporting Shanghai to St Petersburg.

A Shanxi-based journalist says the US suddenly recognized that China and Russia have joined forces to release the Northern Sea Route, or Ice Silk Road, which among other things, may lessen China’s Malacca Strait issue, but it’s too late now.

The Northern Sea Route has been overlooked by many people, but it is now catching China’s interest thanks to its distinctive geographical benefits, the author claims. &nbsp,

This route follows East Asia to Europe along the Russian Arctic coastline, which is cut by a third the way through the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal, he adds. A shorter tour results in lower costs, according to the author.” This is undoubtedly a wonderful advantage for China.”

China’s fuel supply will immediately experience a significant problem if one morning the US attempts to block the Strait of Malacca through defense methods. Thus, developing the Northern Sea Route is not only to save time and costs, but more importantly, to open up another backbone for China’s electricity protection”.

North America, Russia and Europe surround the North Pole. Photo: Google Earth

Foreign explorer Gao Dengyi read about the Svalbard Treaty in a guide while visiting Norway in 1991, according to a writer from Shandong who claims China had failed to conduct any scientific research at both the North and South Poles for many years. &nbsp,

The author claims that in the past, American capitalist countries led by the US had used various excuses to obstruct our study at the North and South Poles. We had asked for assistance from international companies and requested to use land from our neighbors. However, Gao’s Norway journey would only be able to solve this issue.

He claims that the Svalbard Treaty authorized China to conduct clinical studies at the North Pole, which led to the establishment of China’s second Arctic research facility, Yellow River Station, in Svalbard, Norway, in 2004. &nbsp,

14 nations formally ratified the Svalbard Treaty in 1920. Svalbard is a part of Norway, whereas other nations have the right to conduct clinical studies on the North Pole.

In 1925, Duan Qirui, mind of the Beiyang state, dominated by rulers in northwestern China, was forced by the West to sign the treaty. Due to the fact that China was at the time of its civil war, he allegedly did not take the time to thoroughly comprehend what he had signed.

Like Trump, China has an eye on Greenland’s proper importance in the Arctic. In 2018, Chinese state-owned contractor China Communications Construction Company (CCCC ) bid to build airports in Greenland, but it withdrew the bid in 2019.

Some Chinese clients had even marketed personal property in Svalbard, but the Norwegian government stopped the sale last July on national security grounds. &nbsp,

The first meeting of the subcommittee on Arctic shipping routes in Saint Petersburg was held on November 25, 2012, by China’s Minister of Transport Liu Wei and Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation ( Rosatom ) General Manager Alexey Likhachev.

Both sides agreed to further explore shipping development, transportation security and polar deliver technology and building. &nbsp,

The US Congress ‘ Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP ) expressed concerns about China’s expanding presence in the Arctic in a letter sent to the US Pentagon in October. &nbsp,

As a result of an arms race that may increase shipping insurance rates in the region, Elizabeth Buchanan, a top fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and expert on polar politics, told Nikkei Asia.

Yong Jian contributes to the Asia Times. He is a Chinese blogger who specializes in Chinese technologies, economy and politics. &nbsp,

Read: Blacklisting of Tencent, CATL energy US-China hostilities

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US Pacific airfields highly vulnerable to China’s preemptive attack – Asia Times

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US airfields in the Pacific are incredibly susceptible to China’s developed long-range aircraft and missile capabilities, which could lead to catastrophic losses before a possible issue even starts.

According to a report released by the Hudson Institute think tank, US airfields in the Western Pacific are in grave danger because China’s People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) has far outperformed US efforts to protect airfield infrastructure.

According to a report from the Hudson Institute, the US government has added two more aircraft shelters since the early 2010s compared to China’s, which has doubled its solidified aircraft homes to over 3, 000 and extended runways. According to the document, this gap leaves US airbases risky of being hit by precision missiles, with the majority of aircraft losses anticipated on the ground.

According to the report, China’s fortress efforts provide for prolonged heat attacks that are under attack, which presents a strategic advantage. In comparison, it points out that US rely on Warm War-era strategies and little investment in improving airfield resilience raises operating risks and encourages Chinese aggression.

It recommends a multi-year strategy to dry US airbases, install active and passive defenses, and remodel force structures to run from remote or separated locations. Without these steps, the Hudson Institute record warns that the US faces a destabilizing proper disparity that could lead to preemptive Chinese military activities and that it risks losing air supremacy in the Indo-Pacific.

Additionally, The War Zone reported in December 2024 that the US Air Force’s new Installation Infrastructure Action Plan ( I2AP ) notably disregards plans for new, hardened aircraft shelters despite acknowledging that bases can no longer be regarded as sanctuary and must operate under attack.

The War Zone information that this absence comes as a result of China’s growing drone and missile risks. It says that while the I2AP emphasizes modernizing and right-sizing center system, improving resiliency against attacks and natural disasters, and enhancing energy grid stability, it leans towards versatility and rapid recovery more than real hardening.

According to the report, US Air Force officials claim diversifying and expanding assets is more successful than strongly investing in dried structures. It mentions the higher cost and restricted utility of precision-guided arms against dried homes.

Nevertheless, The War Zone points out that this strategy contrasts with concerns raised by US Congress, which were highlighted by a letter from 13 Democratic lawmakers warning that the majority of US plane losses in simulated issues with China occurred on-site.

In response to the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) slow response to the growing threat, US lawmakers raised concerns over the vulnerability of US airbase infrastructure in the Pacific in March 2024.

Representatives John Moolenaar and Marco Rubio urged the US Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall and the US Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro to make urgent security improvements in a text dated May 2024. They noted that Anderson Air Force Base in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands are now in danger of being attacked by China’s sophisticated weapon features, including those of all US foundations in the area.

The lawmakers also made a point about the US DOD’s slow adoption of quiet defenses, quite as cooled aircraft shelters, because they are necessary for surviving and recovering from possible attacks. China has built over 400 of these homes in the past ten years, but only 22 have been added in the US.

Additionally, the text criticized sluggish rules for handling weapons from World War II, which cause costly delays to crucial development projects. The legislators warned that if something isn’t done, the US government’s operational capabilities may suffer significantly if a Chinese invasion of Taiwan occurs.

In a December 2024 Stimson Center think tank statement, Kelly Grieco and various writers discuss the effects of underinvestment in dried airbase infrastructure, mentioning that Chinese missile strikes may ruin US air operations in the Indo-Pacific, involving destroying key runways and taxiways that would cause fleet generation and flying refueling at the start of a conflict.

According to Grieco and others, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force ( PLRF ) has the capability to launch ballistic and cruise missiles to close runways in Japan, Guam, and other Pacific locations, potentially halting tanker and fighter operations for more than a month.

Without operational tankers, US fighters would struggle to reach or leave crucial combat areas like the Taiwan Strait, and bombers could experience significant delays as a result of relying on distant bases. They claim that these disruptions could give China a strategic window into achieving its military goals, such as capturing Taiwan, before US forces can recover.

In light of the growing threat of Chinese long-range strikes on US airspace in the Pacific, &nbsp, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported in December 2024 that China is significantly expanding the range of its missiles and warplanes, which poses a growing threat to US interests in the region.

According to the report, the PLA is enhancing its anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD ) strategy by increasing ballistic missiles and advanced aircraft. The PLA Navy ( PLAN ) and Air Force ( PLAAF ) are now operating more frequently and farther away from China’s shores, making use of new air refueling capabilities to extend their operational range, according to the report.

According to the US DOD’s 2024 China Military Power report, China’s long-range aviation and missile forces made significant progress through the previous year, which shows how much more emphasis is being placed on strengthening strategic deterrence and power projection.

According to the report, the PLAAF integrated the Y-20U aerial tanker, making it more able to support long-range air operations by enabling international deployments and over-the-top missions into the Philippine Sea.

Concurrently, it says the PLAAF pursued the development of the H-20 stealth bomber, which is projected to achieve a global strike capability, marking a critical step in evolving China’s airborne leg of its nuclear triad.

In addition, it points out that the PLARF has expanded its inventory by using modern intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBMs) like the DF-27, which can carry nuclear and conventional payloads at altitudes up to 8, 000 kilometers. It says the DF-17 missile, equipped with HGVs, bolstered precision strike capabilities across the Western Pacific.

The report mentions these developments are supported by improvements in command and control, missile defense countermeasures, and space-based targeting technologies, underscoring China’s strategic focus on achieving military parity with global powers and deterring adversaries across multiple domains​.

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Myanmar’s NUG cooks the books on resistance success – Asia Times

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Myanmar’s third year of post-coup civil war is currently rife with rumors of an imminent insurgency victory.

The Arakan Army ( AA ) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA ) have made historic battlefield gains in Rakhine and Kachin states, respectively. These came after the Three Brotherhood Alliance ( 3BA ) seized the Northern Shan state capital of Lashio in August. In various ethnic hinterlands, the junta’s State Administration Council’s ( SAC ) forces are clearly in retreat.

Now, into the convoluted conflict reporting field comes the one-year” Military Progress Report” from the exiled, anti-junta National Unity Government’s ( NUG) Ministry of Defense ( MoD ). At first glance, the January 4 record is a clean record of a long fight, one possibly being won against the coup-installed program.

The NUG’s counting of 2024 military gains requires careful analysis of how these numbers are produced, what they mean for armed resistance in the future, and what the SAC might lose if it is overused in different ways.

The NUG claims their three major achievements since forming in 2021 are: 1 ) the creation of multiple People’s Defense Forces ( PDF), 2 ) “establishment of controlled and liberated territories”, and 3 ) the overturning of the military regime’s administrative structure and “formation of people’s governance systems”.

Despite confusing the distinct difference between” control” and “governance”, there is truth to all of these claims. The report claims that the NUG derive legitimacy from two sources:” ( 1 ) De Jure: Authority granted by the people’s mandate, ( 2 ) De Facto: Authority stemming from territorial control and popular support”.

Although it’s unclear whether the MoD completely comprehends both those terms, it assumes more widespread assistance on the ground than it probably does.

The report’s debatable information centers on the remarkable territorial gains achieved. “( T ) he PDF and EROs (ethnic revolutionary organizations ) control a total of 144 townships ( out of 330 in all of Myanmar ). Among these, 95 towns ( 48 townships ) are fully” liberated” and under revolutionary governance. Innovative fights continue in an extra 79 settlements, according to the report.

” The regime’s power has diminished to just 107 districts. In proportion, revolutionary forces and cultural revolutionary pushes control 44 % of the country’s settlements. 24 % of all conflicts are effective. According to the report from the NUG MOD, the junta only has power over 32 % of Myanmar, which reveals its inability to maintain rule over the majority of the country.

However, this global break suggests the MoD may become cooking the books. The main problem is the fusion of innovative actors into a single top. The report frequently confuses the “EROs” and” PDFs,” a rebranding of the more conventional ethnic armed organizations ( EAOs ) as “revolutionary forces.”

These are never mentioned by name in the report, but they include the AA, KIA, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army ( MNDAA ), theTa’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ) and many others. Many of these seasoned ethnic rebels have a weak, at best, relationship with the NUG and don’t actually obey the NUG’s MoD.

More down in the document, the MoD clarifies that the NUG/PDF controls only eight of those 95 freed towns, breaking down the work divisions. Eleven borders buying settlements” were freed from coup power “along the edges with China, Bangladesh, India and Thailand: the NUG PDFs took none of them. A claimed 741 SAC foundations were overrun during 2024, with PDF’s taking 162 of them in Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay, Bago and Tanintharyi parts.

173″ Central bases “were captured, including two Regional Military Commands in Rakhine and north Shan position. The vast majority of these martial profits were made by EAOs and their friends. The NUG so engages in a form of” stolen courage” by claiming military benefits it had had no or very little to do with.

The study’s dying depend section is also dangerous. It claims 14, 093 SAC troops were killed and 7, 363 injured in 2024. The document fails to provide a detailed account of how these figures were compiled and what resources were used, aside from the doubtful character of these numbers in comparison to the typical 3: 1 victim ratio in most conflicts. Some EAOs are typically cautious about such conflict information and won’t release enemy combatant kill statistics.

How were these precise figures compiled by the NUG? However, revolutionary-side victim listings are a glaring mistake.

The number of SAC sympathizers to the NUG is a contestable area. Under its” People’s Embrace “program, the NUG claims that 14, 760 SAC personnel have switched sides, but of these, the majority are Myanmar Police Force ( MPF). 3, 872 military officers have defected since 2021, with 567 joining the” Embrace “program in 2024.

This suggests a collapse, even as several thousand soldiers have been captured, mainly by EAOs, during heavy battle in many wars. Despite the unquestionable demise of the military in so many areas, the SAC continues to exist.

The NUG report claims that” ( t ) he junta’s conscription campaigns have also largely failed”, after the Military Service Law was enacted in February. Yet many rounds of instruction have already been completed, with some 20, 000 volunteers.

However, the report reflects some early triumphalism that persisted over the previous year and slammed predictions that the main area of Mandalay was being “encircled and poised to get” liberated.

The notable accomplishments include the successful penetration of Mandalay through the Shan-Mann offensive and the defense of Pinlebu town by the nearly 1, 000 SAC troops ( sic ). Now, the frontline has reached the outskirts of Mandalay, the next largest city, while essential protective zones such as Naypyidaw, Yangon, Taungoo and Meiktila are under normal attacks.”

It is accurate to say that the resumption of Operation 1027 in June of 2024 was an important advancement that resulted from deploying NUG-aligned troops into higher Mandalay. However, many of these gains, particularly in Madaya town, had been reversed in the final months of 2024 as a result of SAC strikes and the rollout of ground forces.

Pyin U Lwin, a big defense area close to Mandalay, did not experience the magnitude that was predicted in the middle of the year as a result of a combined power of PDFs and EAOs.

Pinlebu‘s arrest is mentioned in detail, too. The city in the northern Sagaing area is 400 kilometers away from Mandalay, making it almost a “frontline” target ( though the nature of” frontlines” in Myanmar’s conflicts differs from region to region ). Following the coup, the area was one of the first to start an armed uprising against the Myanmar military.

Numerous PDFs have made numerous attempts to take total control, and the KIA has made numerous efforts. This was finally achieved in October, after 53 days of heavy battle, which the NUG claimed at the time included 670 heat attacks and some 5, 000 weapons dropped. Most of the town’s people of more than 7, 000 had much fled.

Kawlin, which was captured by the PDFs in soon 2023 and retaken by the SAC after three times, is only 50 meters away. The city was almost totally destroyed in the back-and-forth battle.

The NUG record likewise fails to mention how much of Region, and most of northern Myanmar, has become an horrific environment. There are an estimated 1, 258, 000 internally displaced persons ( IDPs ) in Sagaing alone, out of 3.5 million nationwide, according to the United Nations. The Myanmar monitoring group Data for Myanmar documents that 106, 000 homes have been destroyed in ( mostly ) SAC arson attacks since the coup, 74, 000 just in Sagaing.

The report asserts that of the nine key transit routes, some of which are highways teetered by armed groups with an indeterminate chain of command, “dominate” ( which is a bold claim ).

It’s questionable whether they are motivated by surveillance or removal of fees and straight-up stealing. Despite the establishment of NUG managerial structures and the success of their efforts, violent disorder frequently prevails.

By any measure, the NUG MoD’s achievement has been remarkable, from its roots in 2021 to then being a regional military business. Yet information such as this” Defense Development “privileges data braggadocio over humanitarian considerations.

For instance, the section on “liberating” towns” fails to mention the risky and laborious realities of landmine and booby trap clearance, unexploded ammunition ( UXO ), collecting of the dead, both civilians and combatants, rebuilding community relations, and accommodating to what in many ways might be an” alien “new authority, such as the MNDAA in Lashio.

The document does include a snappy slogan, as the MoD’s strategic program is” All Highways Guide to Naypyidaw. However, these paths may vary as the EAOs’ and the expelled NUG’s goals start to vary.

The NUG needs to prepare for this truth. It could do this by recognizing the tremendous suffering of the people in their functional areas and giving its fellow revolutionary organizations the due credit for their military victories.

Independent scientist David Scott Mathieson is engaged in fight, charitable, and human rights issues in Myanmar.

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Recalibrations in the preset India-US-China triangular equation – Asia Times

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Pacific Forum published this article at its original publication. It is republished with authority.

Over the past few years, the rectangular calculation between China, the United States, and India has undergone significant changes. In light of recent rapid changes, such as Donald Trump’s returning to the global stage and the melting of tensions between Delhi and Beijing, taking into account such long-term trends helps to understand the emerging sure of the triangle interactions.

During the Cold War, the preliminary euphoria over Eastern cooperation, bringing India and China up, gave way to regional conflict, resulting in a continuous freeze in their relationships.

While India’s connection with the US remained weak during this period according to intellectual, development, and political differences, China’s volte-face in its relationship trajectory with the US — from enmity to partnership — aimed to store their common adversary in the Soviet Union.

Basically, Indo-US and the Sino-US relationships during the Cold War were very dependant on the three countries ‘ individual formulas with the Soviet Union.

Thus, there arose a cycle of integration between the three following the fall of the Soviet Union, with the rapidly globalizing world order bringing the trio closer together through financial interdependence.

In the end, China’s growing confidence and revisionist rhetoric ultimately led to a growing mistrust of its connections with both India and the US. This played a significant role in bringing India and the US up, resulting in an increasing degree of alignment in their plans toward China.

Since the US and China have diplomatic relations, the two nations have been trying to link their economy in a close embrace based on their complement strengths. In exchange for China absorbing technological advancements and monetary assets from the world’s remaining power, the US gained the cost benefit and massive business hopes offered by China.

Washington began to reconsider its position on Beijing as a result of the growing awareness of the structural challenges that China faces in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis ( 2007-2009 ) and China’s expansionist tendencies in Asia. China truly weighed strongly on the United States ‘ “rebalance to Asia” plan, and the subsequent expression of a” Free and Open Indo-Pacific” plan. A key component of this shift might get putting pressure on China by strengthening the US presence in the latter’s local environment.

The United States ‘ first major diplomatic engagement with China occurred during Trump’s first term as president. Though the energy to “decouple” the American market from China was recrafted as a more subtle “derisking” under the Biden administration, the momentum to eliminate any deadly dependency on China has no slowed.

Trump’s return with a hawkish cabinet already signals a ratcheting up of America’s pressure on China.

To be sure, Trump’s tariff threats are not limited to China. India, too, is a target, as his tariff strategy is known to be rather indiscriminate.

On a similar note, India and China’s relations have undergone strain during the same period, nosediving in the past half decade. Despite intensifying border disputes and geopolitical conflict in Asia, the two nations maintained a positive trend in their bilateral and multilateral relations.

New Delhi and Beijing stepped up their engagement through economic cooperation and saw eye-to-eye on many issues concerning the Global South in the 21st&nbsp, century, even though they slipped from the path of border “resolution” to that of border “management”.

With the 2020 conflict in Galwan, this delicate balance abruptly came to an end, halting the two nations ‘ growing economic and development partnership.

India severely curbed Chinese mobile applications in the country by keeping China’s communication equipment out of its troubled sectors. &nbsp, India insisted that China cannot conduct “business-as-usual” with India while unilaterally violating its territorial status-quo, as well as established agreements in the border areas.

India’s economic and security ties with the US and the other Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (” Quad” ) nations increased during this period.

However, after four years of negotiations, India and China have recently reached a point where they no longer ally themselves at the friction points in their borders. This phase will then be followed by a de-induction of forces. This opens the door to a resumption of the relationship after the 2020s, though it will most likely be a gradual transition that will depend on the recovery of the trust.

Indo-US relations, on the other hand, have now gone past irreversible milestones of progress in ties.

The two key international policy issues for which there is a bipartisan consensus are the two important issues that the US is concerned about: investing in a strengthened strategic partnership with India and fighting China’s strategic challenge to American primacy and the rules-based international order.

These imperatives of the US align with India’s outlook, moreover, India’s civilizational perspective on strategic thinking points toward an adversarial neighbor being encircled by distant partners. India continues to be a crucial link between the US and the expanding Global South.

China, with its revanchist-revisionist vision rooted in Confucian hierarchy and the” Century of Humiliation” narrative, undoubtedly will remain a systemic rival to America’s vision of a liberal world order.

Despite the ensuing thaw in relations, India’s approach to China will continue to have a sense of trepidation that has been reinforced in its strategic calculus. India’s strategic positioning, its demographic dividend and its enduring democratic ethos ensure an organic deepening of Indo-US ties.

India will have to navigate the short-term turbulences in its relations with both the US and China, keeping this larger picture in mind. India needs to exercise extreme caution as it charts the return to normalcy in bilateral ties given China’s track record. India must strengthen its relationship with the US in order to improve and maintain its relationship with China.

The US’s incoming administration should rebalance its priorities for foreign policy so that the Indo-Pacific regains dominance in the country’s geography. Given Trump’s efforts to revive the Quad during his first term and his assurances to put an end to the ongoing conflicts in Europe and West Asia, this shouldn’t be so difficult. The triangular equation can be adjusted to achieve strategic equilibrium in the looming uncertainty using these techniques.

Dr. Anand V. &nbsp, ( anand. v@manipal .edu&nbsp, ) &nbsp, is an assistant professor ( senior scale ) and coordinator of the China Study Center at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education.

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Blacklisting of Tencent, CATL fuels US-China tensions – Asia Times

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Chinese commentators have criticized the US Department of Defense for pushing unilateralism after including Tencent Holdings and Contemporary Amperex Technology Co ( CATL ) on its” Chinese military companies” list.

The Department updated the Section 1260H record of Taiwanese military organizations that are active in the US on January 7. The updated CMC record today includes 134 Chinese firms. &nbsp,

From HK$ 408.6 on January 6, stock of Tencent, the largest Hong Kong-listed firm by market cap, have declined 9.5 % to HK$ 369.6 as of January 10. Shares of the Shenzhen-listed CATL have dropped 4.2 % to 246 yuan ( US$ 33.5 ) during the period. &nbsp,

Apart from Tencent and CATL, Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Limited ( Comac ), which produces China’s self-developed C919 airliners, was added to the CMC List for the second time. The organization had been on the checklist in January 2021, but it was later dropped in June of that year after winning an appeal. &nbsp,

Big manufacturers to Comac’s C919 plane include the United States ‘ GE Aviation, Collins Aerospace and Honeywell Aerospace and France’s Safran Aircraft Engines. &nbsp,

A dozen additional subsidiaries of the previously blacklisted Aviation Industry Corporation of China Ltd ( AVIC ), China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Limited ( CASIC ), and China Communications Construction Group (CCCG) were included on the CMC List. &nbsp,

CXMT, a company based in Hefei and that produces DRAM for use in bright cars and computer servers, is even currently listed on the list. &nbsp,

Last March, media reports said CXMT would be blacklisted because it planned to make high-bandwidth memory ( HBM ) chips, which can be used as artificial intelligence ( AI ) accelerators. &nbsp, &nbsp,

The defense department said updating the Section 1260H list is an important continuing effort in highlighting and countering the People’s Republic of China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy, which aims to help the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) acquire advanced technologies and expertise from local companies, universities and research programs.

According to the statement, the US government has the right to acquire additional actions against these individuals under laws other than Section 1260H. &nbsp,

China” strongly opposes the United States ‘ exercise of overstretching the concept of regional security, making biased names in different brands, and going after Chinese firms to include China’s high-quality enhancement,” Guo Jiakun, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said in a press briefing on January 7. &nbsp,

He urged the US to quickly correct its transgressions and stop its unlawful unilateral sanctions and long-arm legality against Chinese businesses. He stated that China would take all necessary steps to protect its legitimate right to growth and the legal rights and interests of Chinese firms.

Harsh competition

Zhou Xinping, a journalist for the Beijing Review, writes in an article published on January 9 that” some of the 134 companies on the Foreign Military Companies listing are defence contractors, but many others are related to the security industry sector.” They are “blacklisted because they are technologies companies.” Why Tencent is included in the list this time is certainly difficult to understand.

” This kind of destruction has nothing to do with national protection, but with cruel competitors”, Zhou says. The US government “is engaging in unethical actions against Chinese tech firms to maintain US companies ‘ advantages.”

Zhou claims that Tencent’s participation on the CMC List bestexes the growing unilateralism of the United States. He claims that the international community needs to unite to protect the world’s business regulations and buy.

” The United States ‘ inclusion of Chinese firms on different lists has become a methods of suppressing China’s scientific and technological growth”, says Huang Haifeng, a Shaanxi-based journalist. These actions may cause problems for some top-tier businesses in the near future, but they will help improve Chinese firms ‘ ability to innovate and be more globally competitive.

Huang points out that some firms, such as Xiaomi Corp and Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment, had won their appeals in the past and been removed from the list. He suggests that businesses that are on the verge of US restrictions shouldn’t become concerned because they can still grow their businesses by working with companies outside the US. &nbsp,

In a stock exchange processing on January 7, Tencent’s Chairman Ma Huateng claimed that Tencent’s participation on the CMC List was incorrect because it is “neither a Taiwanese military organization nor a military-civil integration contribution to the Chinese security commercial base.”

He said that Tencent intends to start a review method to correct this error. ” During the process, it will engage in discussions with the DOD to resolve any misunderstanding, and if necessary, will undertake legal proceedings to remove the company from the CMC List” .&nbsp,

Ma emphasized that inclusion on the CMC List will not forbid anyone from conducting business with Tencent because it is different from the Non-Specially Designated Nationals Chinese Military-Industrial Complex ( NS-CMIC ) list maintained by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control ( OFAC ). &nbsp,

Qui Mengyun, a companion at AllBright Law Offices, a Shanghai-based law company, said although firms on the CMC List are not subject to economic sanctions and US export controls, they will encounter obstacles when buying for some US state contracts. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

She claimed that the NS-CMIC List and the CMC List have some similarities.

Numerous businesses on the CMC List were previously sanctioned by the US Treasury and Commerce Department. &nbsp,

Those sanctioned by the US Treasury, such as Huawei Technologies, find it difficult to export their products to countries that settle trade in US dollars. &nbsp,

Those who have been approved by the Commerce Department, such as Dawning Information Industry Co ( Sugon ) and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp ( SMIC ), are unable to purchase expensive machinery and parts from the US. They must either sell their units or obtain US parts and supplies from third parties or from foreign nations.

Yong Jian contributes to the Asia Times. He is a Chinese journalist who specializes in Chinese technology, economy and politics. &nbsp,

Read: US sanctions China-based hackers ‘ cybersecurity service provider

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US-China race for AI’s next frontier is already on – Asia Times

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DeepSeek, a Chinese AI company, unveiled their v3 design on December 26.

DeepSeek achieved performance that was in line with OpenAI’s GPT-4, a model that reportedly cost over$ 100 million to train, using underpowered chips that were designed to comply with US-imposed restrictions and only US$ 5.6 million in training costs.

Like most Taiwanese laboratories, DeepSeek open-sourced their new concept, allowing everyone to operate their own version of the now state-of-the-art program.

The news came as a result of Silicon Valley’s growing concern that the significant advancement in AI capabilities has now come to an end. It would have appeared that the future of AI lay in marketing and price reduction rather than ability advancements had DeepSeek released their design four times earlier.

Otherwise, the news came a week after OpenAI demonstrated o3, a new model that would position in the 99th percentile of all competing programmers and was properly address the world’s most challenging mathematics problems at 10 times the rate of its predecessor.

Together, the two events point to a new era for the development of AI and a fiercer battle for place dominance between the US and China. China is considerably behind the US in terms of export restrictions tohips, which also fail to handle the next frontier of AI development.

That is the value of reasoning, which teaches AI to believe in the same way as humans do. While earlier models excelled at discussion, o3 demonstrates real problem-solving abilities, excelling not only at tasks that humans find plain, which frequently confounded AI, but also on tests that some Artificial leaders believed were years away from being cracked.

The reasoning method, which is described by Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella as “another scaling law,” could result in improvements like those seen over the past few years thanks to more data and computational power.

Improvements that go along this route are less likely to strain chip capacity limits. Rather, talent, energy efficiency and cheap power will be key.

In Virginia, a major US data center hub, new facilities can wait years just to secure power connections. US utilities and regulators are frantically adapting to the enormous power requirements of advanced AI after 20 years of stagnant demand.

Meanwhile, China is rapidly expanding its power infrastructure, with new integrated computing networks being built across regions like Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei. China’s electricity generation has increased 64 % in the past decade, while the United States ‘ has stalled.

However, just looking at the race from the perspective of a country can be misleading. Instead of releasing the nation’s best model through an established tech company with strong government ties like Tencent, Alibaba, or ByteDance, it was a lab of perhaps 200 people behind DeepSeek and a culture that made the most of that talent.

Although the United States is still a hub for international talent, a recent PNAS article claims that Chinese researchers are leaving the country in greater numbers than ever to study there.

In an interview with the Wall Street Journal late last month, incoming US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo described attempts to halt China as “fool’s errand.”

Ten days later, researchers at China’s Fudan University released a paper claiming to have replicated o1’s method for reasoning, setting the stage for Chinese labs to follow OpenAI’s path.

” The only way to beat China is to stay ahead of them”, Raimondo continued. ” We have to run faster, out innovate them. That’s the way to win”. In the race to lead AI’s next level, that’s never been more clearly the case.

Ben Dubow is the Chief Technology Officer at the AI and intelligence firm Omelas and a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

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Singapore-Malaysia SEZ promises a production powerhouse – Asia Times

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Sixty years ago, Singapore’s parting from Malaysia marked the terrible collapse of a strong social experiment.

What started out as a coalition with the promise of a shared future and a typical business sank under the mass of conflicting social goals and growing regional conflicts. For Singapore, the 1965 cut was a disturbing moment of judgment, propelling the budding state onto the route of independence as a little city-state.

This year, as Singapore celebrates its SG60 diamond jubilee, the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone ( JS-SEZ ) offers an opportunity to rekindle that partnership at a time when political-level bilateral ties are on notably solid footing.

Formalized at this year’s 2025 diplomatic leaders ‘ retreat, the JS-SEZ represents a landmark engagement, combining Singapore’s technological and financial skills with Johor’s vast territory, work and natural resources.

Spanning 3, 571 square meters, or over four times the size of Singapore, the corridor aims to reshape Southeast Asia’s financial environment. Singapore may make use of its expertise in government and innovation, while Johor, Malaysia’s state, will make the most of its production and resource advantages.

The JS-SEZ arrives at a key time. Between January and November 2024, bilateral trade between the two countries increased by 6.7 % to US$ 78.59 billion, up from the same time in 2023. The JS-SEZ is expected to develop on this speed.

Malaysia has set ambitious JS-SEZ goals, projecting that by 2030 the zone will contribute$ 35.5 billion annually to its GDP – nearly 5 % of its current economic output.

Singapore’s GDP growth is reasonable, hovering around 0.2 % over the next five years, but its wider benefits come from strengthening relationships with its closest neighbor, aligning its corporate goals, and enhancing its relevance in worldwide trade and development.

Taiwanese firms, especially mid-sized businesses, are now exploring Johor as a cost-competitive center for operations and production that complements existing high-value activities such as R&amp, D and local headquarters within Singapore.

Opening substitutability

The JS-SEZ stands out for its ability to unlock complementarities that possibly neither nation could accomplish on its own. These synergies fall into four large areas, particularly supply chain communication, transportation, movement of people and convenience of doing cross-border company.

Firstly, Singapore’s semiconductor industry, which accounts for around 7 % of its gross domestic product ( GDP ) and contributes more than 10 % of global semiconductor output and about 20 % of global semiconductor equipment production, will benefit from Johor’s budding assembly and testing capacity.

This collaboration could lead to a regional supply chain that is as resilient and close to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) markets as opposed to China’s Shenzhen.

Meanwhile, Johor’s renewable energy resources, such as solar and biomass, can power energy-intensive data centers, enabling firms in Singapore to expand digital infrastructure while advancing a global green energy agenda.

Second, Johor is a prime location for the expansion of Singapore-based green technology and food manufacturing companies due to its abundant land and affordable prices.

ASEAN’s booming e-commerce market, projected to exceed$ 300 billion by 2025, underscores the importance of efficient logistics. With its proximity and infrastructure, the JS-SEZ is well-positioned to become a regional logistics hub, enabling both nations to outpace regional competitors.

Thirdly, unlike previous initiatives such as Iskandar Malaysia, the JS-SEZ prioritizes connectivity. The Rapid Transit System (RTS ) Link, set to open in 2026, will reduce travel time between Johor Bahru and Singapore, easing congestion and enhancing labor mobility. The goal of streamlined cross-border flows, which includes a passport-free QR code system for employees and digitized customs procedures, is to significantly lower business transaction costs.

Finally, governance reforms underpin the SEZ’s design. Addressing previous grievances about bureaucratic delays, a one-stop business center in Johor will handle investment approvals.

Special tax incentives, including lower corporate rates and personal income tax relief for skilled professionals, are designed to attract high-value industries and top global talent. If successfully implemented, these measures will make the JS-SEZ a magnet for investors.

‘ Merger’ reimagined

The JS-SEZ represents a reimagining of the Singapore-Malaysia relationship as a partnership grounded in mutual interest and economic foresight, moving beyond the potential the short-lived 1963 Malaysia-Singapore” Merger” had envisaged.

It enables both sides to transcend national limitations. In a world where protectionism, economic nationalism, and tighter trade restrictions are all at their height, it is a bold statement of confidence in economic collaboration to promote growth.

For Singapore, the zone offers a strategic opportunity to break through physical and structural limitations, charting the course for its upcoming growth, strengthening ties with its closest neighbor, and under the leadership of Prime Minister Lawrence Wong.

For Malaysia, it has the potential to make Johor a global hub for production, spurring regional development, and form part of a partnership that was established while ASEAN’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was in charge.

The JS-SEZ offers both countries a chance to enhance their respective value propositions where the sum proves more than its parts, as well as a fresh perspective to rewrite their shared story as complementary partners united by shared goals for themselves and the region in an increasingly complex global landscape.

The greater competition we face is not between ourselves within ASEAN, but rather with other countries in the region, according to Singapore Prime Minister Wong. ASEAN has to come together, look at ways to enhance our value proposition, and be competitive together”.

History may not repeat itself, but it often rhymes. The JS-SEZ could finally bring Singapore and Malaysia the shared prosperity their people have long desired.

Marcus Loh serves as the director of Temus, a Singapore-based company that offers digital transformation services, and oversees Step IT Up, its award-winning career conversion program.

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