Tracking the leakage of German assault rifles in Philippines – Asia Times

In recent months, authorities have seized some uncommon European assault rifles in the Philippines ‘ Bangsamoro.

The region’s efforts to end decades of insurrection, problem, and violence highlight a prolonged protection challenge as it looks to conquer a decades of insurgency, corruption, and violence. Additionally, they mention a remarkable Spanish authorities practice.

In the violence-hitting municipality of Datu Saudi Ampatuan, in the heart of the conflict-affected Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao ( BARMM), on November 9, a local official handed over four weapons to the police.

Two assault rifles with Armed Forces of the Philippines ( AFP ) markings and two Heckler &amp, Koch HK416 assault rifles, which local residents allegedly gave to the official, were included in the weapons.

In one of Southeast Asia’s most arms-saturated regions, a 2014 peace agreement between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front ( MILF ) gave people the opportunity to bring in illicit weapons.

The government just launched an amnesty program that works with regional community leaders to obtain arms in exchange for state funding. Since its release in soon 2023, the plan has produced hundreds of firearms.

But the HK-416 firearms are distinct. They are only used by a limited number of police and military models, and they are not available for purchase on the human market.

According to German information on hands transfers, they could have only been exported to the Philippines between 2006 and 2012. In close proximity to each another, the authorities seized these firearms on at least three more times in 2024.

The initial arrest took place in February when a regional arms trafficker was being detained by police during a bite procedure in nearby Cotabato City. In May, authorities seized another HK-416 from an outlaw Girl chief in Sultan Kudarat, just northwest of Cotabato City. After spotting military men in a car at a local South Cotabato Province traffic checkpoint in July, police took another car.

Since HK-416s have not been seen in illegal flow in any other part of the Philippines, these situations are extremely tight in terms of time and place. Additionally, there is no evidence that they have been seized before 2024. The fact that several of these firearms have been collected by government forces in various circumstances suggests that there are more out there and that they were detainned in a systematic manner.

This raises a crucial issue: how did these ultra-modern rifles, which were only recently purchased by elite units ( Germany’s data suggests only 800 rifles were exported to the Philippines ) end up circulating in illicit possession throughout southwest Mindanao?

In a nutshell, government-held weapons may be diverted into illegal hands in a fairly limited number of ways: through field captures, loss, unexpected or planned fraud, looting, desertion, purposeful state-sanctioned diversion, or corruption. While it’s impossible to know the precise history of these rifles, some of these channels may be discounted. &nbsp,

Numerous military actors who may attempt to seize weapons through fight remain active in the BARMM. This includes the socialist New People’s Army, rogue parts of the MILF, or extreme Islamist parties like Dawlah Islamiyah.

The area is also replete with clan militias, usually overlapping with pro- and anti-government trained parties, that usually engage in violent rivalries. Any of these actors may reasonably seize these rifles by ambushing government forces or pillaging a federal arsenal.

But battle describes have become uncommon in Bangsamoro. Although often, government forces engage in attacks, they do not occur at the same rate or scale as they did in the past.

Armed organizations are typically willing to release pictures of captured weapons, but a constant check of NPA and Islamist resources does not reveal any HK-416-related claims. Several government forces have been launched recently that are powerful enough to feasibly seize several of these rare rifles in one incident.

Also, looting activities are unique and often take place within a larger security problems. When they surrounded the Marawi city ( today a part of the BARMM) in 2017, IS-aligned gunmen may have looted government outposts.

The HK-416s would have appeared in convulsions and loses properly before 2024, so there is little to suggest that they were leaked in this way. However, a spontaneous theft or loss would also be unlikely to divert some HK-416s without drawing major outside attention.

This suggests the weaponry would have been diverted through some method that involved inside support – either through state-backed escape, betrayal, planned fraud, or problem.

A well-known but largely illegal method in Bangsamoro, a hazy integration of state security forces and secret militias affiliated with powerful clans, families, and politicians, would probably take place if any of these diversion pathways were to happen.

The government has relied on security initiatives and organizations that are susceptible to political interference at the local and provincial levels in its effort to stabilize the region. This includes the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units ( CAFGUs ), which are armed volunteers hired to provide extra manpower to military and police units.

Local and regional elected officials have the authority to choose such volunteers and can use their authority to appoint their own cronies or buy off employees, typically giving them access to surplus state weapons.

Additionally, local police units answer local elected officials and the national police force. In this way, powerful clans and politicians can install loyalists in their neighborhood police departments, giving them some access to police armories, licensing procedures, and procurement channels. The 2009 Ampatuan Massacre is still relevant for demonstrating this dynamic, despite being 15 years old.

In a municipality named after the clan itself, gunmen affiliated with the powerful Ampatuan clan massacred dozens of people on November 23rd, that year. The victims were a political rival on his way to register for a local election, his entourage, and journalists documenting the process.

Security forces seized an incredible arsenal from the clan’s militia following the massacre, including machine guns and mortars that could only have been obtained from government armories as well as ammunition that had been purchased by police officers only a year prior.

The ammunition demonstrates how police can serve as a conduit for powerful clans and warlords to obtain weapons from illegal sources. Four officers purchased one million ammunition rounds from a Philippine arms manufacturer in 2008 ostensibly to conduct operations in a province close to the Ampatuans ‘ positions of power. Contrary to government guidelines, the officers reportedly paid$ 400, 000 in cash for the ammunition, despite the fact that they had no official purchase permits.

The ammunition was shipped from Manila to the enumerated province by the manufacturer, and it was taken four months later. Only a quarter of the 1,200 weapons taken from the Ampatuans were registered and legally owned; the rest could have been obtained through police or similar means.

In the BARMM, clan feuds and electoral violence are persistent sources of insecurity. Given the extent of the region’s still-present arms access and violence, the interconnected trends are so severe that they threaten the validity of the peace agreement from 2014. The HK-416s strongly suggest that arms traffickers, prominent clans, and armed actors can still source even modern government weapons through subtle forms of collusive diversion.

Although it may seem oppressing to the government, this highlights two positive aspects that merit praise. Only because the Philippine government actively and creatively seeks to return illicit weapons to state control and because military and police departments publicly disclose each seizure and surrender on their social media pages for the public to see if these HK-416s are identified and tracked can we identify and track them.

Such transparency is invaluable, it illuminates high-level trends that local or provincial units may not be able to detect. This information can help government agencies plan better interventions, such as targeted amnesties for particular high-value weapons or targeted police audits in areas where it is suspected that such weapons are expanding.

It also benefits international stakeholders. Armes exporters can use these reports to identify potential sources of revenue or to discover opportunities to support the Philippine government. Additionally, these disclosures provide a clearer picture of how security conditions in Bangsamoro are changing as they allow interested parties to track the flow of illicit weapons back into state control.

Other countries would be wise to use this information to make a public report.

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Trump’s BRICS salvo an exercise in dollar destruction – Asia Times

NEW DELHI – A week after US President-elect Donald Trump threatened 100 % tariffs against any backers of a” BRICS currency”, key emerging powers such as India have quickly distanced themselves from any BRICS-led de-dollarization initiative.

” Right then, there is no plan to have a BRICS money. So I’m not quite sure what is the foundation for]Trump’s note ]”, India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said during the Doha Forum held in New Delhi this year.

The top minister of India made it clear that “each state doesn’t have an identical placement on this,” despite the fact that there are ongoing discussions about streamlining and advancing “financial transactions” among Six countries.

” ]W] these India’s involved, the United States is our largest business partner and we have no interest in weakening the dollar at all”, he added, emphasizing India’s selection of relations with the West.

Days earlier, Reserve Bank of India Governor Shaktikanta Das also clarified that” ]t ] here is no step which we have taken that specifically wants to de-dollarize]which ] certainly ]is ] not our objective” despite ongoing attempts to diversify the country’s pool of foreign currency reserves.

India’s northern banker even questioned the validity of a BRICS money given the “geographical spread of the countries…unlike]common money devices like ] the eu which has geographical contiguity”.

In his sly attempt to reestablish National supremacy, the second Trump administration may end up boosting the chances of a BRICS currency.

A ham-fisted approach to diplomatic relations with key rising powers, however, will likely just strengthen their resolve to group together and&nbsp, cooperatively undermine any US-led international order.

Not only India but another non-Western forces for Indonesia, Turkey, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia will also likely not simply join the BRICS but also more positively lead to new “de-dollarization” initiatives.

In recent years, America has attempted to win foreign support and has been slowly forming a new alliance to “de-risk” China, mainly in high-tech goods like expensive electronics and the tools used to create them.

But Trump’s good unilateralist policies, including higher blanket tariffs, could inspire rising powers, particularly those in BRICS, to double down on efforts to “de-risk” from the US, paving the way for a new world order immediately.

To be sure, de-dollarization is complicated and mostly also aspirational. For example, India has struggled to enact its more narrow, diplomatic non-dollar-denominated deal with important lovers such as Russia.

Moscow is accumulating US$ 1 billion every month that it struggles to use because of both American sanctions and India’s funds control measures, in the midst of a historically increase in India’s trade of greatly discounted Russian oil.

” This is a problem”, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters during last year’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ) meeting. ” We need to use this money. However, these rupees must be transferred to a different currency for this, and this is being discussed right now,” he continued.

Leading Russian experts, like Alexander Knobel, have warned that India’s mass of “frozen funds” will likely “reach tens of billions of dollars,” and that the” situation is aggravated by India’s historically high aggregate trade deficit, which reduces the chances of clearing settlements with third countries.”

Similar issues have previously developed as a result of a boom in non-dollar-denominated trade between major oil customers like India and China, one of the BRICS members, and Iran, another country that is also heavily sanctioned by the West.

Nevertheless, the world’s most populous nation continues to maintain robust ties with Russia, a major source of armaments and hydrocarbon goods throughout the past decades.

This week, Indian private refiner Reliance&nbsp, ( RELI. NS ) &nbsp, secured a massive deal with Russia’s state oil firm Rosneft&nbsp, ( ROSN. MM). The 10-year agreement, amounting to a whopping 0.5 % of the entire global supply, is worth roughly$ 13 billion &nbsp, a year.

The new deal notably accounts for roughly half of Rosneft’s seaborne oil exports, making Indian markets a leading customer.

As the two BRICS countries strengthen trade and energy ties, Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely to travel to New Delhi soon. India imports a third of its energy from the Eurasian nation, but the South Asian nation has replaced the European Union as Russia’s top energy client.

Trump, who is determined to keep American dominance, warned on his social media platform ( Truth Social ) that partner countries could” face 100 per cent tariffs, and should expect to say goodbye to selling into the wonderful US economy” unless they agree to “neither create a new BRICS currency, nor back any other currency to replace the mighty US Dollar.”

Harkening back to his” Make America Great Again” foreign policy mantra, the incoming US president warned any backers of a BRICS currency:” They can go find another’ sucker.’ There is no chance that the BRICS will take the place of the US dollar in global trade, and any nation trying should wave goodbye to the United States.

Some in India hope for lessening the criticism of its long-standing relations with Russia in light of Trump’s support for a peace agreement in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the South Asian powerhouse has remained staunchly non-aligned in its foreign policy, eager to exploit great power rivalries for its own national interest.

A knowledgeable New Delhi resident said,” Whenever the West bashes us, we gain credibility in Moscow,” underscoring India’s preference to play the superpowers off one another while maintaining strong ties with both Washington and Moscow.

If anything, India’s Narendra Modi-led administration is relatively bullish on relations with a second Trump administration.

” We had a strong and solid relationship with the first Trump administration…Yes, there were some issues mostly trade-related, but there were a whole lot of issues on which President Trump was actually forward-leaning”, Jaishankar said during the Doha Forum this week. &nbsp,

According to our analysis, Prime Minister Modi and President Trump have a close relationship, “in my opinion.” In terms of politics, we really don’t have divisive issues”, he added, underscoring New Delhi hopes to leverage personal diplomacy with the incoming US leader.

Given India’s economic momentum and its emerging centrality in global growth, any global de-dollarization push will benefit from its foreign policy leanings.

Currently, the US dollar accounts for more than half of the world’s trade invoices and more than 80 % of all international currency transactions. Trump’s policies, however, could unintentionally affect how much the US dollar is used in the upcoming years.

On the one hand, it is still to be seen how the upcoming US administration will deal with pending bilateral disputes with benevolent BRICS members like India.

” A major source of concern is the fate of large number of Indians illegally residing in America”, a source in India with deep ties to Washington, DC, told this writer. If Trump implements the draconian immigration policies he vowed on the campaign trail, up to 18, 000 Indians could face deportation in the coming months.

Moreover, Trump’s fiscal policies, including massive tax cuts, could add as much as$ 15 trillion to America’s already sky-high$ 36 trillion national debt. Trump’s plan to impose unprecedented tariffs across the board may, in addition, totter global trade and lower the value of foreign currency reserves held by its major trading partners.

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has &nbsp, welcomed&nbsp, the end&nbsp, of an American-led unipolar world and, accordingly, has pivoted to the BRICS and China, which he has described as a springboard for the creation of a more multipolar order.

For his part, Indonesia’s new president, Prabowo Subianto, has reversed his predecessor Joko Widodo’s policy by actively seeking membership in the BRICS. These new rising powers join the bloc to strengthen ties with Beijing, a major investor and trade partner, as well as express some unease with the US-led order.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @Rich Heydarian

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Dark Eagle: US bears hypersonic claws at China, Russia – Asia Times

The US Army’s Black Eagle hypersonic missile has only blazed earlier years of delays with a deafening launch, indicating a bold new wave in the country’s fight for long-range accuracy firepower against China and Russia.

This month, The War Zone reported that the US Army properly test-fired its Black Eagle fast missile from a trailer-based app at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida. After years of delays brought on by launcher issues, the test represents a major milestone.

The test, conducted by the US Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO ) and the US Navy Strategic Systems Programs, involved the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon ( LRHW), also known as the common All Up Round ( AUR) missile.

The statement notes that the weapon, which the US Navy plans to deploy on Zumwalt-class ships and Block V Virginia-class boats, achieved rapid frequencies exceeding Mach 5.

The War Zone says that various aircraft, including NASA’s WB-57F and the Missile Defense Agency’s ( MDA ) HALO jets, observed the test, demonstrating the missile’s capability to reach target distances at hypersonic speeds.

Additionally, the report mentions that US Army Secretary Christine Wormuth and US Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro both stressed the importance of the test in furthering the US government’s fast features.

According to the report, this powerful launch signals progress toward developing the Black Eagle system, with the first fully functional LRHW battery anticipated by fiscal year 2025. It further explains that the development of hypersonic arms is essential for maintaining US defense superiority, especially in potential problems in the Pacific.

As the US Army shifts from lengthy combat operations in the Middle East to battling China in the Pacific and Russia in Europe, it must face the daunting process of reinventing itself in response to the near-peer challenges. Capabilities providing long-range precision fires ( LRPF), such as LRHW, are critical to this transformation.

The US Army’s push for LRPF capabilities, notably hypersonic weapons, is driven by the need to counter adversaries like China and Russia, who have developed advanced anti-access/area-denial ( A2/AD ) systems. These features make it possible to launch conflict cuts that are beyond the capabilities of these techniques.

According to Asia Times, the US is building a missile walls across the Pacific to counteract China’s military expansion, with an emphasis on LRPF from land-based weapon devices like the Typhon.

Capable of launching Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles with ranges from 500 to 1, 800 kilometers, the Typhon bridges a gap between the shorter-range Precision Strike Missile ( 482 kilometers ) and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (2, 776 kilometers ).

The program seeks to establish a system of missile launch locations in the First Island Chain, encompassing Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, to strengthen counter-A2/AD features vis-à-vis China.

But, the plan faces major barriers, especially alliance opposition to hosting US weapon systems. While Japan appears most willing, different countries, including the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea, are wary of possible social backlash and economic retaliation from China.

Despite these challenges, the US has begun stationing Typhon missiles in the Philippines, albeit under the pretext of training exercises, to prevent triggering local escalations. This strategy shifts to a circular, flexible force deployment strategy rather than a fixed base deployment.

The initiative, according to critics, could lead to a missile-armed conflict with China, whose impressive weapon army, including the DF-26″ Guam Killer,” highlights the growing intensity of the US-China geopolitical rivalry.

Apart from building a Pacific weapon walls, Asia Times mentioned this month that the US Navy is transforming the USS Zumwalt, a US$ 4 billion guided-missile warship, into a fast weapons software to counter China’s growing maritime skills.

In order to replace its inactive gun system, the ship is being retrofitted with missile tubes, which will enable it to launch hypersonic glide vehicles ( HGV ) at seven to eight times the speed of sound.

This development work, part of the US Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike ( CPS) program developed with the US Army, aims to enhance the Zumwalt’s operational power by allowing quickly, efficiency cuts from greater distance.

The program reflects the urgent want to tackle rising risks from China’s Model 055 cruisers and Russia’s military nuclear-armed vessels. Despite Zumwalt’s sophisticated systems, including electric propulsion and cunning design, the group has faced criticism for its higher costs and potential risks.

By 2027 or 2028, the US Navy intends to examine the fast program aboard the Zumwalt. The action is a part of a wider plan to keep the navy safe despite disruptions and overcash costs in other initiatives.

However, a US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report this month mentions several critical challenges for the US in developing, producing, testing and deploying hypersonic weapons.

Technological difficulty, according to the report, poses a substantial challenge because fast systems require cutting-edge components that can endure extreme temperatures and pressures. Production bottlenecks are caused by manufacturing these innovative materials at a scale.

According to the CRS record, additional difficulties are presented by the precision needed for transforming guidance, navigation, and control systems with aerodynamic shaping.

Also, it mentions that screening constraints have hindered development. Fast flight tests are expensive, logistically complex, and limited by the presence of particular exam ranges and facilities. This bottleneck slows down development and allows for iterative design.

Further, the CRS report says these weapons must be integrated into existing military infrastructure, requiring storage, handling, and launch system modifications. It makes note of the fact that deployment timelines have been further hampered by delays in these areas.

Additionally, the report mentions that slow decision-making has been exacerbated by bureaucratic and budgetary constraints, which have contributed to the technical and logistical difficulties. Collectively, these factors create a protracted timeline for the operational deployment of US hypersonic capabilities.

In a July 2024 article for National Defense Magazine, Josh Luckenbaugh mentions that China has invested heavily in developing and testing these systems over the past 20 years as a leader in the development of hypersonic weapons.

Luckenbaugh highlights China’s extensive research and development infrastructure, including numerous wind tunnels dedicated to hypersonic systems. He contrasts this by pointing out that since the Cold War, US facilities and expertise have declined, with the majority of testing capabilities now being held by academic institutions.

Although Luckenbaugh mentions efforts are being made to rehabilitate this expertise through collaborations between academia and the US Department of Defense ( DOD ), the US has so far not deployed a single hypersonic weapon.

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What Assad’s fall says about Putin’s great-power ambitions – Asia Times

The Middle East has been shocked by the Assad regime’s swift overthrow. The region’s energy balance has changed dramatically since the dictator’s family’s dispossession of him for more than 50 years.

Beyond Syria and its neighbors, significant ramifications exist, with Russia one of the more severely affected countries.

Back in 2015, Assad’s plan had been on the brink of collapse. A Russian treatment, supported by Iran and Hezbollah, saved it. Russia, which was established in response to the growing risk from Islamic State, gave Assad’s regime the ability to repress another rebel groups as well.

Over the years that followed, it gave Assad the ability to retake control of the city’s money, another important towns, and in particular the coastal area, where Russia had two military installations.

The future of these foundations is now questionable. Russians needed important resources to establish military power in the Mediterranean Sea and support the Kremlin’s say to Russian great-power standing, including an air basic at Khmeimim established south of Latakia in 2015, as well as the Russian naval base in Tartus, which dates back to the Soviet era.

Given how substantial investments have been made over the years to support the program and how important are the bases for Russia, Assad’s fall has a negative impact on Russia’s ability to assert reliable influence on the global stage.

Yet if Russia manages to reach an agreement with Syria’s fresh leaders regarding the future of its military installations, Moscow’s failure to save an important ally like Assad exposes crucial shortcomings in Russia’s capacity to act like a great strength rather than just talk.

There are distinct knowledge gaps that either overlooked or misinterpreted Qatar’s continued support for anti-Assad forces and Turkey’s covert support for this. These losses were then made worse by the Russian military’s ineffectiveness and ability to increase them on short notice. This is, of course, according to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

Iran and Hezbollah, two different Kremlin allies in the region, have been given more military support, which has more complicated Assad’s situation, and this has also made the effects of Russia’s overwhelm worse. This even raises the question of whether Russia had a strategic error in interpreting the position and undervalued Syria’s risk.

Even more disturbing is the fact that Russia relies on friends who positively support a young wonderful power that lacks the means to proclaim its claim to power, as Iran and Hezbollah did in 2015, as Assad did when he provided Russia with its military foundations.

Where’s China?

China is missing from this equation. Beijing had backed Assad after the start of the Syrian civil war, but most of it was rhetorical. It was primarily intended to stop a Western-backed, UN-backed intervention similar to the one in Libya that caused the country’s chaos and the fall of Gaddafi since.

A high-profile visit of Assad to China in September 2023 resulted in a strategic partnership agreement. In Beijing’s eyes at least, this appeared to be another step in the direction of the Syrian regime. However, China did nothing to save him when the situation suddenly appeared and Assad’s rule was in serious danger.

Xi Jinping and Bashar al-Assad: friends – with limited benefits. &nbsp, Photo: Yao Dawei / Xinhua / Alamy Live News

This raises a significant question about how well-versed in China is the Syrian government and the evolving crisis. But there is also a broader point here regarding Russian great-power ambitions.

Despite all the talk of a never-ending partnership between Moscow and Beijing, China ultimately failed to save Russia from humiliating defeat in Syria.

China’s interests in the Middle East are primarily about economic opportunity and the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, unlike Russia, where it needed a military presence to back up its claims to great-power status.

This has clearly limited Beijing’s appetite to become more involved, let alone to bail out Assad.

Putin diminished

Russia’s position in the Middle East now is in peril. Moscow lost a significant allies to Assad. Its other main allies, Iran and Hezbollah, are significantly weakened. Israel and Turkey, with whom the Kremlin has not had easy relations over the past few years, have been strengthened.

This exposes the hollowness of Russian claims to great-power status. Russia’s reputation and standing in the eyes of other partners is likely to be further diminished, whether they are from China or North Korea, from BRICS members or from countries in the Global South that Russia has recently tried to woo.

The consequences of that are likely to be ambiguous for Ukraine, which is arguably Russia’s biggest contributor to the overstretch.

On the one hand, the ease with which Assad was removed shows that Russia has limitations and is not invincible. On the other hand, nothing but Russian resumption should be anticipated in Ukraine.

Putin requires a swift recovery to help him win both domestic and international trust. After all, Donald Trump does not like losers.

Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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How to know if Trump intends to sell out to China – Asia Times

Trump is not yet in office, and some people are beginning to understand that they didn’t receive the results they hoped. During his campaign, &nbsp, Trump promised unhappy consumers&nbsp, that his policies may “rapidly travel costs down” and “bring your food expenses means down”.

Understandably, Trump has now&nbsp, equivocated on that assurance, declaring that “it’s hard to bring things down when they’re up”. Conservatives hoped that Trump would upend the transgender movement and advocate for a traditional view of identity, but he now claims he doesn’t “want to get into the bath problem” and that he wants” to have all individuals treated pretty.”

Some technologists anticipated that Trump would be a friend of engineering and a foe of inadequate unions, but now Trump denies automation and supports the longshoremen’s union:

And so on. This doesn’t come as a surprise to everyone, of program— we’ve had nearly a decade to observe Trump&nbsp, make promises and split them.

Everyone is aware that Trump adheres to his own preferences, feelings, and personal objectives, and that what constitutes his philosophy is merely a set of instincts and hazy ideas that he independently compiled after watching too many CNN on television in the 1990s. If you projected your hopes and dreams onto Trump when you pulled the lever, also, I guess that’s on you.

All in all, I’m not&nbsp, too&nbsp, worried about the status of the United States right then. Our business is strong, even if Trump re-accelerates prices by running huge deficits and toying with the Fed, it probably didn’t get severe.

Our world is slowly settling back after a decade of upheaval. Climate change is a risk, but it ‘s&nbsp, typically being caused by different countries, so even if Trump cancels clean electricity subsidies it’ll had only a marginal effect on the planet.

A lot of long-term persistent problems, like injustice, are definitely worth addressing but not as instantly essential as we made them out to be in the 2010s. Trump may put Ukraine under the bus, but doing so would be a terribly wrong and repugnant thing to do. It also won’t pose a direct threat to the US.

And yet there’s one big exception, which is the threat posed to the US by the People’s Republic of China. China has the capacity to defeat the US in any extended conventional war, thanks to its domination of global manufacturing, soon, it may have the capacity to&nbsp, defeat the US and all of its allies combined. What China will then only be able to do to the US in accordance with its current policy.

And I think it’s clear that&nbsp, what China’s current leaders want&nbsp, is to reduce the US to a second-rate power so that there’s no chance it will threaten their hegemony or their freedom of action in the future. This is what some claim the US did to Russia following the Cold War. And communist China is not&nbsp, nearly&nbsp, as nice a country as the US was in the 1990s.

The economic and political consequences for the American people would be, to put it mildly, pretty negative.

The only way I can think of preventing this happening is to close the manufacturing gap between the US-led alliance and China, rather than simply praying that China somehow collapses or that the Chinese are some sort of uniquely passive and mild people who won’t actually do anything as their leaders say they will.

Biden&nbsp, made some strides toward this&nbsp, during his term in office, reviving US manufacturing somewhat with his industrial policies, and implementing stringent and wide-ranging export controls on the Chinese chip industry.

The big question is whether Trump will continue the effort to ( partially ) catch up to China in manufacturing, or whether he will scrap it. Given that Trump frequently talks about how his tariffs on China are going to restore American manufacturing, this may seem like a stupid question. But you shouldn’t believe this story, for several reasons.

The first is that Trump’s tariff threats, like his promise to bring down grocery prices, may be mostly bluster. During his campaign, he promised 60 % tariffs on China, now, he has apparently&nbsp, reduced the number to 10 %. That is a pretty small amount, and exchange rate appreciation will&nbsp, easily cancel it out.

The second is that Trump’s tariffs on US allies will significantly hinder China’s effort to become a manufacturing partner. Currently, Trump is threatening only 10 % tariffs on China, but&nbsp, 25 % tariffs on Mexico and Canada. This is likely just bluster and theater ( in which case we should inquire as to how an economic strategy that heavily relies on bluster and theater will help the US catch up to China in terms of manufacturing ).

But if it’s for real, it will hurt US manufacturing, by making imported components more expensive. Remember that while US tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and other allies directly affect the Chinese manufacturing juggernaut, creating a large common market outside of China is one of the most important strategies.

Trump’s tariffs, in my opinion, could give him the most political and rhetorical cover to basically abandon his fight against China’s influence. Tariffs, along with aggressive rhetoric, give Trump the appearance and reputation of a China hawk.

Without suffering much of a political blow, he could effectively gut America’s nascent resistance to China thanks to his stellar reputation. In the 2020s, we might discover that only Trump could sell us out to China, much like Nixon did in the 1970s.

Why do you think Trump did that in his first term when he was largely very hawkish toward China? Several reasons.

First of all, he is already discussing a number of ways to accommodate Chinese power. Trump initially requested a TikTok divestment, but he later reversed his opposition to the bipartisan TikTok divestment bill earlier this year.

The Information has reported&nbsp, that TikTok altered its algorithm to favor Trump and the GOP. Trump may have been helped by billionaire Jeff Yass ‘ financial contributions to TikTok, which he also owns.

The bipartisan CHIPS Act, the most significant and ( so far ) successful single policy that America has implemented to shore up its industrial base in more than 50 years, was denounced by Trump during his campaign.

In other words, Trump’s main reason to believe he might sell American interests to the CCP is that he is already openly discussing doing so.

Additionally, it’s possible that some of Trump’s advisors favor a complacent view of Chinese power. Although Trump has appointed some hawks like Marco Rubio to his administration, his most important advisor and confidant — at least, for now— is Elon Musk. &nbsp, A recent story in the Financial Times&nbsp, detailed Musk’s deep business connections with China — connections that he would be loath to lose in a conflict:

The richest man in the world has close ties to powerful Chinese Communist Party leaders, and is reportedly urging Beijing to make important decisions regarding Tesla, his$ 1 billion electric vehicle business. The carmaker relies heavily on its largest factory in Shanghai, which is the largest in its global network, to sell to the nation’s 1.4 billion people and export its China-made vehicles to other parts of the world. Musk’s Chinese suppliers, especially in batteries, are also crucial to the company’s global manufacturing operations, including in the US…

According to Yuqiu Wang of Freedom House,” Musk is not only vulnerable to Beijing’s pressure, but he also appears to genuinely enjoy close relationships with China’s authoritarian leaders,” he says. The CCP has plenty of opportunities to influence Trump’s China policy thanks to this dynamic.

Vivek Ramaswamy&nbsp, and&nbsp, Tulsi Gabbard&nbsp, have also both called for the US to accommodate Chinese power in Asia, with Tulsi even going so far as to&nbsp, denounce Japan’s rearmament&nbsp, in the face of Chinese aggression. So although it doesn’t seem&nbsp, certain&nbsp, that Trump will roll over for the Chinese Communist Party, it certainly seems like a real possibility.

So how will we know? With Trump, there’s always a lot of bluster and theater. On top of that, it’s hard to tell whether Trump really believes that tariffs will be effective in restoring American manufacturing, or if they’re just a smoke screen. Meanwhile, Congress will probably&nbsp, fight hard to keep the CHIPS Act&nbsp, and the TikTok divestment bill.

However, Trump has the power to sabotage America’s efforts to compete with Chinese influence. He could cancel&nbsp, the export controls&nbsp, that the Biden administration placed on the Chinese semiconductor industry. Trump could simply do it whenever he wanted, without requiring executive action to remove export controls.

And because the policy is not really in the limelight, there probably wouldn’t be a popular backlash to its cancellation. So export controls are pretty much a pure test of Trump’s China policy — if he keeps them, it’s because he&nbsp, wants&nbsp, to stand up to China, and if he cancels them, it means he doesn’t.

And make no mistake — China&nbsp, really, really&nbsp, wants those export controls gone. Despite early&nbsp, wailing and gnashing of teeth&nbsp, over Huawei’s creation of a 7nm chip, the US export controls have almost certainly been very effective in slowing down China’s chip industry. Just a few examples of evidence point to the effectiveness of the controls:

    SMIC, the Chinese foundry company that developed the 7nm chip, was rumored to be rapidly advancing to 5nm. But the company has reportedly&nbsp, delayed its 5nm release until at least 2026. This has &nbsp, left SMIC’s customer Huawei in the lurch, relying on technology that’s fast becoming obsolete.

  • Even SMIC’s 7nm process, hailed as a catastrophic failure for export controls, is actually&nbsp, not achieving good yields, and is reportedly having reliability issues. This is probably&nbsp, hurting Huawei’s production&nbsp, of leading-edge phones.
  • In the last five years, &nbsp, over 22, 000 Chinese semiconductor companies have reportedly shut down. This is almost certainly due to some of it being exported.
  • Huawei’s own chip production is&nbsp, probably suffering as well, with&nbsp, very low yields. The low yields are probably a result of having to rely on older, outdated equipment, due to export controls.
  • Meanwhile, &nbsp, Chinese companies are pessimistic&nbsp, about their ability to keep up with leading-edge chipmakers without access to the latest chipmaking tools from the Netherlands, the US, and Japan. This is expected to have &nbsp, deep ramifications for the AI race&nbsp, between the US and China.

In other words, export controls are doing what they’re designed to do. They’re not killing China’s chip industry, but they’re slowing it down in important ways, and letting the U. S. retain its technological edge.

What’s more, the Biden administration constantly strengthened the controls, plugging loopholes even as China fought to come up with new workarounds. In fact, the outgoing administration &nbsp, released one more very strong update&nbsp, to the export controls on December 2, denying China many of the best cutting-edge AI chips.

If the US wants to maintain any sort of military-technological advantage over China, export controls are effective and absolutely necessary. Chips are &nbsp, the foundation of&nbsp, all&nbsp, modern weaponry, from missiles to drones to satellites to advanced fighter jets.

And AI itself, which relies on advanced chips for inference and training, is quickly emerging as a vital tool of conflict. AI will become even more important to the military balance when autonomous drone swarms strike the front line.

Even with all the world’s industrial and tariff laws, the US is unlikely to be able to compete with China. America needs to maintain a technological edge to counteract its productive weakness, which should be balanced out by its quality deficiencies. Those semiconductors are the edge. If Trump cancels the export controls, it will mean he’s destroying America’s best chance to keep its weapons ahead of China’s weapons.

Now, Trump&nbsp, might&nbsp, not do this. After all, Trump was the one to start the practice of imposing export controls on China during his first term ( which targeted a select few Chinese businesses ). But recall that Trump dropped the export controls against China’s ZTE, reportedly as&nbsp, a personal favor to Xi Jinping. Congress&nbsp, scrambled to keep the controls in place, but they failed.

Trump’s second term could see a repeat of that episode. Trump might cancel America’s semiconductor export controls, possibly as some kind of deal for China dropping its own far less formidable export controls on&nbsp, drone batteries&nbsp, and&nbsp, various metals&nbsp, — or maybe just for no reason at all. Trump might not even need any justifications for his actions.

In any case, Trump’s decision to revoke export controls will send the strongest message that his administration wants to stop trying to compete with Chinese influence. Don’t let tariff theater fool you; this is the real test.

This&nbsp, article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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What next for US in post-Assad Syria? – Asia Times

The United States ‘ response to the social upheaval appears uncertain because a new state is expected to emerge in Syria following a sudden revolution earlier this year. Rebel groups quickly overthrew Syria’s lifelong head, Bashar al-Assad, on December 8, 2024, sending the tyrant into exile in Russia.

President Joe Biden has stated that the US will be monitoring the rebel groups ‘ behavior and that they have a “grim history of extremism.” However, Donald Trump, the president-elect, has stated that the US may not engage in the immediate acquisition and its aftermath.

Jordan Tama, a professor of US international policy at American University, spoke with The Conversation US to better understand the role the US has played in Syria and what Assad’s abrupt demise may think for this connection.

A framed porter of a white man with dark hair and a dark suit is seen with the glass cracked.
A damaged portrait of previous Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a federal building on Dec. 7, 2024, in Hama, Syria. Photo: Omar Haj Kadour / AFP via Getty Images via The Talk

What aspect of US military relationship with Syria is most crucial to be aware of?

US presence in Syria dates back to at least 2011, when the Arab Spring, a pro-democracy Middle East opposition movements, broke out and spread to Syria.

This prompted a brutal assault by the Arab government, led by Arab chief al-Assad. Some of the activists later joined rebel groups in Syria and fought the Assad state, leading to a civil war. The US instantly imposed severe economic sanctions on Syria’s government.

Some of the insurgent parties that were restraining the Assad government began receiving weapons from the US in 2013. By using biochemical weaponry against civilians, the Syrian army even crossed a “red range” that was established by then-President Barack Obama that season. Obama opted never to act despite being under pressure to maintain the dark line once Assad agreed to end Syria’s chemical weapons, a duty Assad did not fully live up to.

In 2014, the Islamic State group, often known as ISIS or IS, took over pieces of Syria. In 2015, the US immediately sent its troops to combat IS. By 2019, the US had seriously weakened IS, and the US scaled back its appearance. The US not accepted the Assad administration’s legitimacy, but it did become largely resigned to Assad’s law.

What does US presence look like at the moment?

In a number of methods, the US has continued to be involved in Syria. Second, it has about 900 soldiers deployed in some distant elements of Syria to stop ISIS from regrouping.

Next, the US has provided more than US$ 1 billion in military support to more modest armed organizations that the Assad authorities had fought against. The Syrian Democratic Forces, a military force led by the Kurds, a minority ethnic group in northeast Syria, has collaborated tightly with the US to combat ISIS while preserving its antagonism to Assad.

Third, the US has continued to impose stringent economic sanctions against the Arab state since 2011. And third, the US has been providing humanitarian aid for Syria suffering from the country’s 13-year legal conflict.

The US did not directly participate in the new uprising against the Arab government. Turkey, which seeks to undermine the Arab branch of another Kurdish organization known as the Kurdistan Workers ‘ Party, is primarily behind the Syrian rebel organizations that overthrew Assad. Turkey sights this organization as a threat to power its own Shiite population.

What does the US’s support for the Assad government think?

The US is still unsure as to whether this change will benefit the country. Nevertheless, Assad’s fall opens the possibility of increased relationships between the US and Syria, but that will hinge, in large part, on the new management in Syria.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or Units, the team that led the destroy of Assad, has ruled in an authentic sense in the area of Syria it has already been controlling.

The US is likewise concerned about ISIS, which is still ongoing. In recent days, the US has launched a number of attacks against ISIS targets in an effort to stop the organization from gaining floor following the fall of the Assad government.

A girl stands and holds a black and green and white flag with three red stars and stands next to several men, including one in camouflage holding a gun.
Folks gather with insurgent fighters on Umayyad Square in Damascus, Syria, on Dec. 10, 2024. Nael Chahine, Middle Eastern Images, AFP, via Getty Images, The Talk

What does Trump’s election suggest for the US relationship in Syria?

Trump has stated that Syria is a disaster and that it is not the fault of the United States. Trump’s experts persuaded him to maintain a small number of troops in Syria after they persuaded him to withdraw all of the remaining US troops from his first word. Trump likely didn’t care whether Syria’s new frontrunners act in an authoritarian sense or not.

Trump, however, is a staunch supporter of Israel, and it’s possible that he won’t be too upset if Israel launches attacks in Syria.

Under Trump, the US will likely not become a significant factor in shaping activities in Syria, but I believe it is in the country’s best interest to continue cooperating because what happens in Syria has an impact on the rest of the Middle East and, consequently, the US.

American University School of International Service provost associate teacher Jordan Tama

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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The Syrian powder-keg and geopolitical risk – Asia Times

Subscribe right away and get the first year for only$ 99. With a one-month trial for only$ 1, you can sign up for the exclusive rate of$ 99.

The Palestinian powder-keg and political risk

David Goldman argues that there is a disconnect between escalating geopolitical tensions, especially in Ukraine and Syria, and subdued industry threat assessments. As the fall of the Assad regime raises the risk of jihadist threats against Russia and China, confusion persists.

Merz fails to notice Germany’s main concern

Diego Faßnacht shows Germany’s financial struggles, driven by higher energy costs stemming from its shutdown of nuclear power plants, rely on costly US gasoline imports, and the loss of cheap Russian energy. These elements have accelerated de-industrialization.

Russia has benefits in the forefront before Trump 2.0.

James Davis reports that Russian troops continue to dominate in Ukraine, achieving significant regional increases in November 2024, with improvements in the Kursk obvious, Donbass, and southern sides. However, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria complicates Russia’s place.

Japan’s grips with a modern trade deficit

&nbsp, Scott Foster examines Japan’s growing “digital imbalance”, a major industry disparity in online services like software registration, sky storage, and online platforms, which surpassed ¥5.35 trillion in 2023 and is projected to reach ¥6.5 trillion this year. &nbsp,

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Syria’s fallen regime linked to black market drug trade – Asia Times

Big stocks of the illegal drug captagon have apparently been discovered following the fall of the al-Assad government in Syria.

The supplies, found by Arab rebels, are believed to be linked to al-Assad defense office, implicating the fallen program in the product’s manufacture and distribution.

Captagon was previously a medical drug, similar to some of the legal substances we still use today for conditions like attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder ( ADHD), as we’ll observe.

Captagon was again a medicinal

Captagon is the original name for a vintage chemical pharmaceutical drug that was created in Germany in the 1960s. It was an option to drug and drugs, which were both used as treatments at the time.

The original substance, which was developed to treat conditions like ADHD and insomnia, contained the active component fenethylline. It had a similar apply to some of the officially available substances we also use now, such as dexamphetamine.

Captagon has identical results to stimulants. It increases serotonin in the mind, leading to emotions of well-being, satisfaction and joy. It also improves target, attention and strength. But it has a lot of unwanted side effects, like as low-level illness.

The medicine was first mainly sold in the Middle East and some parts of Europe. It was available over the counter ( without a prescription ) in Europe for a short time before it became prescription-only.

Prior to becoming a managed substance in the 1980s, it only dimly received US approval, but it was still permitted to treat insomnia in some European nations until recently.

Captagon’s production, according to the International Narcotics Control Board, had stopped by 2009.

The illegal business seized control of the situation.

The illegally produced type is typically referred to as captagon ( with a small c ). Because it is thought that men in Middle Eastern war-torn locations use it to aid in their concentration and energy, it is sometimes called” chemical courage.”

For example, it’s been reported to have been discovered on the body of Hamas soldiers during the Israeli-Hamas issue. Its production is fairly easy and cheap, making it an obvious goal for the black-market medication trade.

Nearly all of the black market captagon is then produced in Syria and neighboring Lebanon. It’s most frequently used in the Middle East, and some Gulf state have it for recreational purposes.

It is one of the most prevalent illegal medicines in Syria.

Captagon generated more than US$ 7.3 billion in Syria and Lebanon between 2020 and 2022, according to a new record ( roughly$ 2.4 billion a year ).

What we usually know about illegal drugs is that any seizures or restrictions on the sale of drugs only have a small impact on the market because another producer or distributor opens up to meet demand.

Given the size of the Middle East captagon business, these most recent pharmaceutical insights and spasms are likely to only temporarily decrease production.

Nicole Lee is an adjunct professor at Curtin University’s Curtin University’s National Drug Research Institute ( Melbourne ).

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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US, China, Russia gearing up for space wars to come – Asia Times

As China’s subtle maneuvers, Russia’s hunter-killer satellites, and the US’s press for efficient orbital fight capabilities converge toward future space battles, the conflict is escalating.

According to Air & Space Forces Magazine, US Space Force leaders have been looking for more maneuvering abilities as a result of China’s extreme orbital maneuvers in geostationary orbit.

Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine mentions that since 2010, China has launched roughly 1, 000 satellites, with new activities involving large activity rates, planetary war techniques and evasion tactics.

The document highlights the dangers posed by China’s powerful telescope tactics, which include inspecting, moving or damaging another observatories. According to the record, these tactics are uncommon for a geostationary circle and aim to avoid detection and disruption.

According to the statement, US Space Force Commander General Stephen Whiting cited China’s use of novel orbit and on-orbit fuel as evidence that the need for sustained place movement abilities.

Additionally, it mentions Brigadier General Anthony Mastalir’s warning about a paradigm change that required the US to adjust. Additionally, the report mentions Lieutenant General Douglas Scheiss ‘ suggestion that because both countries have maneuvering skills, there might be a “dogfight in space.”

According to Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine, the US aims to create systems similar to the X-37B spaceplane to lessen operating surprises and bridge planetary governments.

Defense Scoop reported in October 2024 that the US Space Force gave California-based business Impulse Space a$ 34.5 million commitment to show on-orbit flexibility for its strategically flexible storage system in addition to the X-37B spaceplane.

The contract includes the delivery of two orbital maneuver vehicles ( OMV) for the Victus Salo and Surgo missions, according to Defense Scoop. The report notes that these missions are intended to evaluate the ability of pre-positioned space assets to respond to on-orbit threats quickly.

Defense Scoop mentions that the US Space Force is working to improve its response to space threats and aims to have operational, tactical space capability by 2026. It also says the upcoming Victus Haze mission, slated for 2025, aims to test maneuverable space vehicles.

In February 2022, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ( DARPA ) announced that General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, and Blue Origin had been awarded contracts to develop nuclear propulsion systems for Low Earth Orbit ( LEO ) demonstrations by 2025.

This technology, which uses nuclear fission to accelerate propellants, offers significant advantages over traditional chemical propulsion, including longer endurance, heavier payload capacity and double fuel efficiency.

These advancements may shift space combat from passive “detection and response” to active “positioning and maneuver” strategies. They enable the application of traditional war principles—flexibility, concentration, and maneuverability—to space operations.

Maneuverability may also address satellites ‘ inherent vulnerability. Most of them follow predetermined paths, making them susceptible to tracking and targeting by anti-satellite weapons. With greater precision, adversaries can plan and execute attacks with greater predictability.

Adversary satellites employing” chase and disable” tactics —actively seeking, inspecting, or damaging critical space assets—pose significant threats to space security.

These tactics involve satellites moving to close proximity to and possibly involving other satellites, raising concerns about unintentional interruptions or hostile behavior.

For instance, NPR reported in May 2024 that the US had accused Russia of launching a satellite, Cosmos 2576, that is likely a counter-space weapon. NPR says the satellite, launched from the Plesetsk site in northern Russia, is in the same orbital plane as a US spy satellite, USA 314, which is part of the Keyhole 11 series.

According to NPR, the US claims that Cosmos 2576’s proximity to USA 314, approximately 48 kilometers at its closest point, suggests it could be used to inspect, move or damage other satellites.

The report notes that this maneuver has raised international tensions, with the US looking out for any threatening behavior on the satellite. NPR says Russia has denied the allegations, calling them “fake news” and asserting its opposition to placing weapons in space.

Previously, Asia Times reported in August 2022 that Russia’s Kosmos-2558 satellite is suspected to be an “inspector satellite” with potential hunter-killer capabilities. Analysts believe it has the ability to track and possibly destroy US spy satellites, which raises questions about the use of space as a weapon.

That month, Kosmos-2558 approached within 75 kilometers of the USA-326 satellite, which carries a classified payload for space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ) missions.

Concerns about the satellite’s location and potential threat have been raised by the US National Reconnaissance Office ( NRO ). Russia has a history of deploying satellites with similar capabilities, including Kosmos-2491, Kosmos-2499, and Kosmos-2504, which have conducted proximity maneuvers since 2013.

The US Space Force should look into plans to deploy “hunter-killer” satellites, using SmallSats ‘ flexibility and affordability, in a July 2024 article for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, to increase space superiority.

Galbreath says these hunter-killer satellites are designed to operate as co-orbital weapons capable of disabling adversary satellites through kinetic strikes, electronic warfare, laser targeting, spoofing and jamming.

He points out that the US Space Force is more apt to carry out offensive counter-space operations on short notice by patrolling close to adversary assets, hiding in less-monitored orbits, or remaining dormant aboard larger spacecraft until they are activated.

Additionally, Galbreath says these satellites can be “bodyguards” for high-value space assets, similar to fighter escorts for aircraft, thereby shielding critical systems like missile warning satellites from attack.

He notes that the adoption of SmallSats for this role is driven by their low cost, rapid development cycles, and potential for mass deployment, which enables the US to counter China’s and Russia’s growing space warfare capabilities.

Galbreath claims that SmallSats have the potential to transform US military space operations because of their combination of precise targeting, operational agility, and the ability to achieve effects without creating orbital debris.

However, the rules of war regarding attacks against satellites aren’t crystal clear. Michael Byers and Aaron Boley discuss the legality of an attack on a satellite as a result of their book” Who Owns Outer Space” in 2023, which deals with the interpretations of the jus ad bellum ( right to war ) and jus in bello ( conduct in war ) principles.

According to Byers and Boley, opponents of satellite attacks may argue that they fall under the UN Charter’s Article 2( 4 ), primarily if they cause significant damage to state assets or interfere with essential services like navigation or communications.

They argue that using satellites for military, economic, and civilian purposes may be justification for using them in self-defense under Article 51.

Conversely, they mention that opponents note that not all satellite attacks meet the threshold of an “armed attack”, especially if effects are non-destructive, like signal jamming or hacking.

Moreover, Byers and Boley point out that satellites ‘ dual-use nature complicates attribution and intent assessment, making classifying such actions as acts of war challenging.

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China has cause to be terrified of rebel-run Syria – Asia Times

A coalition of Syrian rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ( HTS ) has seized control of Damascus, putting President Bashar al-Assad in exile, and evoking a new uncertain future for the war-torn country. Despite China’s range from the war core, the rebel acquisition may be setting off warnings in Beijing.

China’s concern comes from credible reports of the Turkestan Islamic Party ( TIP ) fighting alongside HTS. A Uyghur separatist group with strong ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, the TIP, also known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement ( ETIM), has roots in China’s troubled western province of Xinjiang.

It is attempting to establish an independent Muslim status in East Turkestan in Xinjiang. China, the UN, and the US designated TIP as a terrorist organization off until 2020, respectively. The terrorist organization was established in Pakistan but has since gained traction in Afghanistan’s neighbor. In recent years, the team’s control in Afghanistan and Pakistan waned under Foreign stress.

In a strange turn of events, many of the insurgents and their people found refuge in Idlib, a rebel-held region of Syria. Imad Moustapha, the then-Syrian ambassador to China, claimed that Syria had 5,000 or 5,000 Rohingya militants by 2017.

Turkey supported the Hole’s relocation to Syria, a move that successfully killed two birds with one punch. Turkey was able to support the oppressed Slavic brethren in areas under its control in northern Syria. It is friendly to the situation there.

Additionally, Turkey wants to create a pro-Turkey bulwark against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF) in eastern Syria. Turkey thinks that Kurdish separatists on both sides of the border may join forces to undermine its regional dignity and national security if the SDF takes control of the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian borders.

The TIP therefore armed itself in Syria when it arrived along with other Arab insurgent parties against the Assad government and its SDF allies. The Emir of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, has &nbsp, said,” The TIP has been in Syria for seven years and has never posed a threat to the outside world.

Because they face persecution in China, which we highly oppose, and have nowhere to go, they are determined to defend Idlib from the Assad administration’s aggression. However, our battle against China is not ours. They are welcome to stay as long as they follow our guidelines, which they do.

Units does not appear to have any interest in engaging with China beyond expressing support for the Uyghur reason. In that regard, HTS‘ success in the Syrian civil war does not create a direct threat to China.

But, TIP insurgents gaining fight experience does. The TIP is fighting in Syria, according to Chinese Major General Jin Yinan, to draw notice to the Uyghur reason and get fight knowledge so they can use those fighting abilities against Beijing one day.

The state was confirmed when Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the TIP’s Emir, demanded that Uyghurs from all over the planet” come together to combat China and the Assad regime.” Now, we are helping our boys pay jihad in Greater Syria. The Islamist troops must be prepared to rescue Xinjiang from its communist occupiers by tomorrow.

Beijing claims that the TIP carried out terrorist problems in China in 2008, 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2015. Attacks included driving cars into pedestrians, violence with knives in common areas, auto bombs, and suicide bombings.

If the group is responsible for all of the claimed problems, it is difficult to establish. Some were most likely carried out by wayward wolf upset with Xinjiang’s social-economic disparity.

However, Beijing blames the party for all of the attacks and has implemented limiting measures, epitomized by massive incarceration facilities, in the Uyghur’s house state in response. There are obvious indications that the unrest is still bubbling just beneath the surface despite these rigorous measures.

However, China’s Permanent Consultant to the UN claimed in 2022 that TIP-related violence had resurrected recently, claiming that the organization is using Syria as a base to recruit and train insurgents to attack China and Central Asia.

Beijing pledged to” coordinate with Syria and other related parties to conflict TIP violence” in order to combat the reemergent risk. The statement was made in response to rumors that TIP had been involved in an attack last year that left 112 people dead at a military academy in Palmyra. What the speech meant in real practice, but, remains unclear.

Rumors of Taiwanese regiment operations to Syria surfaced in 2017 and 2018, but in the end, nothing were deployed. Additionally, while weapons made in China were delivered to the government, they were both redistributed by next parties or long-agolysed to Syria. After the civil war broke out, no immediate revenue of weapons were made.

Despite TIP’s supposed rising risk to China’s regional security, Beijing has remained staunch to its decade-long modus operandi of non-intervention. It has been happy to fly on another nations ‘ surface in Syria with boots on the ground.

Beijing’s just significant step was to carry high-level discussions with Damascus to exchange information on the TIP’s actions starting in 2016. With Assad’s demise, this knowledge supply will stop.

China’s apparent lack of action sends a message that while Beijing is concerned by the fact that if battle-trained Edge insurgents – known for fighting like “lions” in Syria – make their way back to China in sufficient amounts, it will experience an insurrection several times stronger than the previous one because it is uncertain whether the Edge can and will return to China.

On the one hand, the TIP do not shy away from this objective in their propaganda. In Syria, they have notably failed to integrate into local communities, with language being the primary barrier. TIP militants forbid Arabs from entering Uyghur villages because they are not” Chinese,” which suggests that they continue to be ensconced in their Chinese homeland.

On the other hand, TIP militants who sold their homes in China before relocating to Syria with their families sent a message that they are still there. In addition, China’s security has significantly improved in recent years, making it difficult for militants to enter the country undiscovered in large numbers.

However, the Syrian civil war’s apparent end could shift the TIP’s calculus. The TIP no longer has to struggle to make ends meet in a small sliver of land in northern Syria for the first time in a decade. As such, the TIP could quickly set its militant sights elsewhere.

Beijing is concerned that TIP militants will re-establish themselves in neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan while China itself is out of reach. That’s a high risk as the two countries have become safe havens in recent years for various terrorist organizations, including ISIS-K, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP ) and the Balochistan Liberation Army ( BLA ).

Indeed, there has been an uptick in attacks on Chinese citizens and assets abroad in recent years, especially in Pakistan. Despite the lack of available evidence, Beijing believes these attacks stem from the TIP’s collusion with ISIS, al-Qaeda and the BLA to undermine China’s overseas interests and investments.

Therefore, should battle-hardened TIP militants return to Pakistan and join forces with the TTP, BLA and others, as Beijing claims is already happening, it would pose a serious threat to China’s strategic interests as its flagship project – the Belt and Road Initiative – runs through the country.

The likelihood of this scenario has increased exponentially as Assad’s ouster has diminished, and Russia and Iran’s ability to control and contain Syrian rebel groups and their allies has decreased.

” A&nbsp, butterfly&nbsp, flapping its wings in&nbsp, China&nbsp, can cause a&nbsp, hurricane&nbsp, in the Caribbean,” the old saying goes. Conversely, a frozen conflict thawing in Syria can erect roadblocks to China’s global ambitions. China needs to reevaluate its foreign policy toward Syria and other countries.

Yang Xiaotong is an assistant researcher at a Beijing-based independent&nbsp, think tank.

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