Bolen C (Page 66)

Think Donald Trump can’t become president after his second word is up in January 2029? Consider afterwards.

When President-elect Donald Trump met with congressional Republicans shortly after his November 2024 election victory, he floated the idea of another term: “ I suspect I won’t be running again unless you say, ‘ He’s so good we’ve got to figure something else out. ’ ”

At first glance, this seems like an apparent prank. The 22nd Amendment to the Constitution is evident that Trump can’t been elected again. The words of the article states:

“No man shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no man who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two decades of a name to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. ”

That amendment was passed in response to Franklin Roosevelt’s four elections to the president. Since George Washington had stepped down at the end of his next word, no leader had sought a second word, much less a third. The act was evidently meant to prevent leaders from serving more than two terms in office.

Because Trump has been elected leader twice now, the ordinary language of the article bars him from being elected a second time. Some have argued that since Trump’s words were nonconsecutive, the article does n’t use to him. But the article makes no distinction between subsequent and nonconsecutive terms in office.

Though the 22nd Amendment prohibits Trump from being elected chairman again, it does not prevent him from serving as president beyond Jan. 20, 2029. The reason for this is that the 22nd Amendment only prohibits someone from being “elected ” more than twice. It says nothing about one becoming president in some other means than being elected to the office.

Skirting the laws

There are a few possible alternative situations. Under typical circumstances, they would be next to impossible. But Donald Trump has never been a regular leader.

On topic after matter, Trump has pushed the outer parameters of political power. Most important, he has already shown his eagerness to stretch or actually break the law to stay in business. And while Trump claims he’s only joking when he floats the idea of a third term, he has a long history of using “jokes ” as a way of floating trial balloons.

However, once he leaves business, Trump could once again face the possibility of criminal prosecution and perhaps prison time, further motivating him to stay in power. As Trump’s next word advances, don’t be surprised if American hear more about how he may try to stay in business. Here is what the Constitution says about that possibility.

Nine citizens have served as president without first being elected to that business. John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, Chester Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford were all vice president who stepped into the office when their forebears either died or resigned.

The 22nd Amendment does no bar a term-limited senator from being elected vice president. On the other hand, the 12th Amendment does position that “no people lawfully unsuitable to the office of the President shall be eligible to that of the Vice-President of the United States. ”

It’s not clear whether this limitation applies to a two-term leader who is unsuitable for a second term because of the 22nd Amendment – or whether it only imposes on the vice president the Constitution’s different criteria for political eligibility, namely that they be a natural-born citizen of the United States, at least 35 years of age and have lived in the US for at least 14 years.

That issue would have to be decided by the US Supreme Court. If the justices decide in Trump’s prefer – as they have just on questions regarding the 14th Amendment’s rebellion section and political immunity – then the 2024 ticket of Trump-Vance could become the 2028 Vance-Trump ticket. If elected, Vance was therefore retire, making Trump leader afterwards.

But Vance would not even have to retire in order for a Vice President Trump to exercise the power of the administration. The 25th Amendment to the Constitution declares that if a leader declares that “he is unable to transfer the rights and responsibilities of the company … such rights and obligations may be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. ”

In fact, the US has had three such acting presidents – George H W Bush, Dick Cheney and Kamala Harris. All of them held presidential power for a brief period when the sitting president underwent anesthesia during medical procedures; Cheney did it twice.

In this scenario, shortly after taking office on January 20, 2029, President Vance could invoke the 25th Amendment by notifying the speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate that he is unable to discharge the duties of president. He would not need to give any reason or proof of this incapacity.

Vice President Trump would then become acting president and assume the powers of the presidency until such time as President Vance issued a new notification indicating that he was able to resume his duties as president.

‘Tandemocracy’

But exercising the power of the presidency does n’t even necessarily require being president or acting president.

Trump has repeatedly expressed his admiration for autocratic Russian President Vladimir Putin, so he might want to follow the example of the Medvedev-Putin “tandemocracy. ”

In 2008, term limits in the Russian constitution prevented Putin from running for president after two consecutive terms. Instead, he selected a loyal subordinate, Dmitry Medvedev, to run for president.

When elected, Medvedev appointed Putin as his prime minister. By most accounts, Putin remained firmly in power and made most of the important decisions. Following this example, a future Republican president could appoint Trump to an executive branch position from which he could still exercise power.

In 2012, Putin was able to run for president again, and he and Medvedev once again swapped roles. Since then, Putin has succeeded in amending the Russian Constitution to effectively allow him to remain president for the rest of his life.

Using a figurehead

Then again, Trump might just want to avoid all of these legal subterfuges by following the example of George and Lurleen Wallace. In 1966, the Alabama Constitution prevented Wallace from running for a third consecutive term as governor.

Still immensely popular and unwilling to give up power, Wallace chose to have his wife, Lurleen, run for governor. It was clear from the beginning that Lurleen was just a figurehead for George, who promised to be an adviser to his wife, at a salary of US$ 1 a year.

The campaign’s slogan of “Two Governors, One Cause, ” made it clear that a vote for Lurleen was really a vote for George. Lurleen won in a landslide.

According to one account of her time in office, the Wallaces had “something of a Queen-Prime Minister relationship: Mrs. Wallace handles the ceremonial and formal duties of state. Mr. Wallace draws the grand outlines of state policy and sees that it is carried out. ”

Trump’s wife was not born a US citizen and therefore is n’t eligible to be president. But as the head of the Republican Party, Trump could ensure that the next GOP presidential candidate was a member of his family or some other person who would be absolutely loyal and obedient to him.

If that person went on to win the White House in 2028, Trump could serve as an unofficial adviser, allowing him to continue to wield the power of the presidency without the actual title.

Philip Klinkner is James S Sherman professor of government, Hamilton College

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

China ’s fast air-to-air weapons, designed especially to shoot down US stealth bombers, indicate a potential seismic shift in the future of heat battle, one that could drastically alter the Indo-Pacific’s balance of power.

Chinese scientists have confirmed the existence of a new hypersonic air-to-air weapon, which has reportedly suffered serious heat-resistance tests to join the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s strict performance requirements, according to a new South China Morning Post (SCMP ) report.

Developed by the China Airborne Missile Academy ( CAMA ) in Luoyang, Henan province, the new missile poses a significant threat to US military aircraft, including the B-21 stealth bomber.

According to SCMP, the last assessments of full-scale weapon designs were conducted in an arc-heated weather hole capable of generating warm air flows reaching tens of thousands of degree Fahrenheit.

This approach ensures the missile may endure prolonged exposure to temperatures exceeding 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit, equal to flying at Mach 9 for an extended period. The wind tunnel, primarily used for challenging space missions, operates continuously for an hour or more, though its enormous power consumption makes it costly.

The missile’s high speed and heat endurance make it a formidable weapon capable of outmaneuvering current US military aircraft. Highlighting its capabilities, SCMP noted that, in a simulated war game, China ’s hypersonic air-to-air missiles capable of reaching Mach 6 shot down a target resembling a US B-21 bomber and its companion drone.

The missiles used a solid fuel “pulse engine ” for adjustable power output, enabling them to ascend to near space and descend unpredictably along a “Qian Xuesen trajectory. ” This capability surpasses the capabilities of current hypersonic weapons, which struggle to maintain control at high speeds.

The B-21 is critical for countering a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, leveraging its stealth, range, and payload capabilities to operate in highly contested areas.

A March 2023 report by Mark Gunzinger for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies notes that the B-21 would target essential objectives in the initial phases of a conflict, such as People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) amphibious assault ships, missile launchers and airbases.

These targets, crucial for China ’s offensive actions, likely fall under the PLA’s anti-access/area-denial ( A2/AD ) framework, underscoring the importance of the B-21’s stealth for its effectiveness.

Gunzinger also highlights the B-21’s ability to carry various munitions, including small precision-guided bombs, to strike mobile and well-defended targets effectively. Its long-range capability allows operation from distant bases like Guam and Australia, reducing dependence on forward-deployed forces vulnerable to PLA attacks.

Given the B-21’s critical role, China ’s stealth fighters, equipped with hypersonic air-to-air missiles, could significantly threaten its operations. The J-20’s large internal capacity, long range, and supercruise capability suggest it is designed as a long-range interceptor and air-to-surface attack platform.

Similarly, the new-generation J-36, a tailless delta-shaped stealth aircraft, combines high speed, long range, heavy payload capabilities and advanced sensors. These features enable it to deploy long-range air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles against enemy bases, ships and critical support units while maintaining stealth, according to Bill Sweetman for The Strategist.

While the US F-22 and F-35 may rival China ’s J-20 and J-36, their performance comparison remains speculative due to limited information. Kris Osborn, writing for 1945 in November 2024, suggests that any contest between these aircraft would likely hinge on the quality of their mission systems, sensor fidelity, computing power, weapon range and fire control capabilities.

China ’s apparent successful development of hypersonic air-to-air missiles and advanced fighters contrasts sharply with the troubled progress of the US Next Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD ) fighter program. The NGAD’s future remains uncertain as the US Air Force paused its contract award due to escalating costs, now estimated at US$ 300 million per aircraft.

Additional challenges include budgetary competition with the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) and B-21 programs, debates over prioritizing manned fighters or distributed platforms with unmanned assets, and whether to produce lower-cost, upgradeable aircraft instead of singular expensive fighters.

China ’s simulation of hypersonic air-to-air missile capabilities, including a simulated B-21 shootdown, also underscores the impact of beyond-visual-range ( BVR ) capabilities.

These advancements shift air-to-air engagements from close-range dogfights to long-distance precision strikes. Stealth, advanced radars and long-range missiles allow aircraft to detect and engage opponents without being detected themselves.

The China Aerospace Studies Institute ( CASI) emphasized in a July 2024 report that China ’s development of long-range air-to-air missiles aligns with its focus on countering US and allied air dominance in the Indo-Pacific.

Missiles such as the PL-15 and PL-17 are designed to outrange US counterparts like the AIM-120, targeting critical enablers such as tankers and airborne early warning and control systems ( AWACS) to degrade adversary power projection.

According to CASI, the PLAAF integrates these advanced weapons with aircraft like the J-16 and J-20, enhancing their reach and effectiveness. This capability supports China ’s broader A2/AD strategy to neutralize aerial threats and establish local air superiority over contested regions, including the Taiwan Strait and the First Island Chain.

Continue Reading

When South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol issued his now-infamous military law order in the early days of December 3, 2024, it seemed to some spectators that his fate was sealed. With no obvious cause for the order beyond reining in some stubborn lawmakers in the legislature, Yoon’s military legislation move looked like a large overreaction.

While reserving assessment on whether the senator ’s steps were unconstitutional, without having exhausted various social options, we argued at the time that Yoon’s martial law was a social misstep.

Also if Yoon survived the following impeachment trials, we wrote, he had consigned his administration to everlasting lame-duck status—a much fade-out into obscurity. And thus, it seemed to us then, the post-martial-law Yoon administration had limp along in humiliation.

But one factor stays regular then and now. A military law charter is a social problem, one made at the choice of the chief executive. Recall that when Yoon declared martial law on December 3, he was doing so as the sitting president. Martial laws is something he had every right to declare. But, there was never any large legal question at play in that regard.

Whether declaring martial law without an apparent reasonable reason amounts to an egregious illegal act–that is, an indictable offense–is a problem for the Constitutional Court to handle. Also, whether Yoon’s martial law order constitutes an act of rebellion, as opposition parties but claim, is a question for the same court and judicial authorities to handle.

To that end, the issue surrounding Yoon’s December 3 charter is fully liquid under the local law and regulation. It should have begun and ended as a simple problem of what is allowed under the Constitution.

But Yoon’s opponents–namely the opposition Democratic Party and the analytical company probing Yoon–have changed the margins. If something, their decision to aggressively rise tensions in response to Yoon’s military law strategy has inadvertently bolstered the explanation for its necessity.

Let’s begin with the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials ’ ( CIO ) fixation on arresting a sitting president on allegations of inciting an insurrection. After one failed effort, the CIO on January 15 apprehended Yoon from his house under a controversial permit issued by the Seoul Western District Court.

Four days later, determine Cha Eun-kyung from the same judge granted a proper imprisonment of the leader, extending the incarceration for another 20 times, including the original 48 hours allowed under local law.  

Besides the exceptional nature of for warrants in North Korean story, they are almost certainly unlawful. The CIO, first and foremost, does not have authority to investigate the leader on rebellion costs.

This analytical agency was created in 2020 under the communist Moon Jae-in management, which sought to grip in the trial, an entity the left had usually viewed as overwhelmed. By its own rules, the CIO’s power is confined to investigating high-ranking officials, notably courts, public prosecution and police officers, for fraud and the like.

But to gain an upper hand in a turf war among other investigative agencies over this “case of the century, ” the CIO pressed forward with absurd reasoning that it had the right to probe the president for abuse of power, with insurrection charges being a natural extension of that crime.

In other words, the CIO decided that Yoon was guilty of insurrection–even before the CIO arrested him for it–and then used that presumption of guilt to justify an expansion of its scope of power to include a sitting president.

Even more astounding, the courts actually bought their argument. Two judges issued arrest warrants and one recently granted a formal arrest warrant against Yoon by ignoring the Criminal Procedure Act and never addressing exactly how the CIO has jurisdiction over the case.

More egregiously, during the execution of the second arrest warrant on January 15, the CIO and its authorities reportedly coerced the military commander at the presidential residence into authorizing their entrance.

According to news reports, this was done using falsified documents. The paperwork lacked the required seal of the Presidential Security Service’s chief, and instead, an unrelated scrap of paper bearing the stamp of a military commander was affixed to the official document, rendering the entire arrest procedurally invalid.

As if detaining Yoon weren’t enough, the CIO has lately escalated matters by preventing the president from meeting anyone other than his attorneys—not even his wife, the First Lady. And all this is taking place as Yoon’s trial at the Constitutional Court, determining whether he will be reinstated or formally removed from office, is pending decision.

For his part, Yoon is rightly pushing back. This is a classic example of the fruit of the poisonous tree: if the source ( CIO’s jurisdictional overreach and illegal warrants ) is tainted, everything derived from it is inherently compromised.

The chaos unleashed by the CIO is only half the story, however. Let us now turn our attention to the madcap maneuvers of the main opposition Democratic Party and their run-amok impeachment obsession.

Since the December 3 martial law declaration, the party has impeached President Yoon and the first acting president Prime Minister Han Duk-soo, the latter under an arbitrary rule set by the speaker of the parliament from the Democratic Party.

They have even gone so far as to threaten impeachment against the current acting president Choi Sang-mok and everyone in the line of succession if their demands are not met. This is on top of some two dozen impeachment motions against state officials and prosecutors filed by the Democratic Party since Yoon’s inauguration in May 2022. Several prosecutors involved in the ongoing probes into opposition leader Lee were also impeached.

For the past six weeks, moreover, the Democratic Party has relentlessly promoted the notion that Yoon incited insurrection on December 3, aggressively shaping the narrative for public consumption. But perhaps realizing the uphill battle of proving insurrection—a charge with a high burden of proof and in Yoon’s case very little proof—they are now pivoting away from it.

Rather, they have amended articles of impeachment to claim that Yoon failed to follow proper procedures when declaring martial law. This is quite the about-face for a party that, just a while ago, was steadfast in accusing Yoon of spearheading an insurrection, deploying the term as if it were a mantra and repeating it 29 times in their impeachment article.

What, then, is driving the Democratic Party’s perilous behavior? Beyond their clear intent to end a conservative presidency, they are seizing this moment to pave an unobstructed path for their leader, Lee, to ascend to the helm.

With two of Lee’s liberal rivals, Cho Kuk and Song Young-gil, recently imprisoned, and no viable contender emerging from the ruling party, Yoon’s fall would all but ensure Lee’s rise. For this reason, the party is intent on crushing any attempts to sabotage their plan, even if it means further elevating the tension already paralyzing South Korean society and politics.

Earlier this month, the Democratic Party unveiled the Minju Police Box, an online platform inviting citizens to report individuals for allegedly spreading false information about the December 3 martial law declaration. Unsurprisingly, what qualifies as false information remains entirely subjective.

Despite mounting criticism over censorship, the opposition has doubled down, pledging to track and pursue legal action against those accused of conspiring in an insurrection by spreading “false claims. ”

One opposition lawmaker has even floated the idea of monitoring Kakaotalk, South Korea’s most widely used messaging app. Already, the party has filed police complaints against ten conservative Youtubers and several ruling party lawmakers.

But perhaps what the opposition party and the CIO have overlooked in their calculations is the very real possibility that their hotheaded pursuits could spectacularly backfire–which they clearly have.

Yoon’s supporters, who initially seemed to have been taken aback by Yoon’s declaration of martial law and resigned to the political consequences of that seemingly rash decision, are rallying decisively to his defense.

The South Korean electorate appears to have seen through the opposition’s facade. The president ’s ratings have now surpassed 50 % and the ruling People Power Party’s ratings have overtaken that of the opposition Democratic Party.

By escalating the martial law issue by means of injudicious use of judicial authority, the South Korean oppositionists have, ironically, sidelined the martial law issue and energized Yoon’s base like never before.

The tables have turned. The left is caught in a political whirlpool over the martial law debacle, while the right is taking the moral high ground, fighting for the survival of the country.

Because the calculus is different now, most South Korean conservatives are no longer concerned with the fate of Yoon alone but also with that of the constitutional order. South Korea, it would seem, is undergoing a coup d’etat by the left seeking to overwhelm executive power with judicial power applied in entirely dubious ways.

Many are in South Korea are thus asking the question: who are the real insurrectionists?

Continue Reading

Taiwanese leader Xi Jinping has been evident that he intends to acquire Taiwan – one way or another. He has great causes. It may create Xi as one of the gods by accomplishing anything Mao Tse Tung was n’t.

By taking Taiwan, China breaks through the first island chain – the island countries stretching from Japan to Taiwan and on to the Philippines and Malaysia – that inhibit China ’s freedom of entry to the Pacific and beyond. Break the chain and the Army finally gets quick access to the Pacific and potentially can encompass Japan, cut off Australia and proceed forward. These are functional rewards.

As essential are the social and psychological benefits. Consider Taiwan and Beijing has demonstrated the US government had n’t save the 23 million free citizens of Taiwan. Neither had American economic and financial stress. And US nuclear weapons did n’t stop China both.

In assets all over Asia, the calculus will shift and many will reduce the best offers they can and change “red ” immediately rather than attempt to resist Chinese pressure on their own. The United States may be finished as a Western power. And worldwide nobody will believe a US guarantee of protection – explicit or implicit.

Is China taking Taiwan?

The late released 2024 US Department of Defense  China Military Power Report  presents a bleak portrait of a rapidly developing Chinese government. But the report  assesses  that while Taiwan is a primary goal, the Chinese government really is n’t ready for procedures against the beach.  

No matter how many progress the Army makes, it seems it ’s not quite ready to attack Taiwan. China specialists can rattling off the reasons why a Taiwanese assault on Taiwan won’t be coming in the near future.

Here’s the lotto cards of reasons. And why, probably, the claims may not be all they seem.

1.     There are only two little windows during the year ( April and October ) when the weather is good enough for an invasion force to get across the Taiwan Strait.

When asked about this, a Chinese works noted: “Look at the bridge schedule. They run all time. ”  And someone should include told Dwight Eisenhower about the climate in June 1944. He just needed 72 hrs of good wind to get across the English Channel.

2.   Only a small quantity of small beaches on Taiwan’s western coast are suitable for an aquatic landing.

Marine forces sometimes don’t have much of a beach…or one at all…if you ’ve struck the keeper tight enough or deceived him. The U. S. Marines pushed a division across a beach about 200 yards wide in one day at Tinian in 1944. And amphibious operations include troops delivered by helicopter, airborne, and infiltrated in advance along with fifth columnists.

3.   PLA needs to seize a port – and that’ll never happen because 1 ) it ’s a port and Taiwan is presumably defending it; 2 ) The Chinese are not smart enough to have their fifth column, including organized crime, already in place to up up, say, Kaosiung.

The “barges ” China is  building  can, in combination with redundant ships, be used to build breakwaters and other components of an artificial port.

4.   PLA has n’t got the “lift ” – enough ships – to take troops and equipment across the strait.

A Marine Corps University professor in the late 2010’s had a PowerPoint presentation making this case. He was counting the wrong ships. Add in “old ” amphibious ships and civilian ships and boats that were integrated under the “military-civil fusion ” doctrine and the PLA had plenty of lift. It’s got even more now. And the world’s second-largest merchant marine has more than enough shipping to deliver up to six brigades and 60 days of supplies ( particularly if they build an artificial harbor ).

5.     Amphibious operations are the hardest, most complex military operation known to man.

This argument boils down to “the Chinese just aren’t as smart as us. ”  That’s mistaken, and when it comes to amphibious operations, read Toshi Yoshihara’s  book  on how they performed in the Chinese Civil War.

6. PLA can’t do joint operations.

Look at recent exercises and ongoing training. They’re getting better. In fact, they’ve been doing joint training for going on two decades and intensely since Xi came to power 12 years ago. And you don’t have to be perfect. Just good enough to do a specific task in a specific place.

7.     PLA can’t do “joint logistics over-the-shore. “

Once again, the Chinese aren’t smart enough and can’t possibly be our equals.

8.     The PLAN has aircraft carriers but they’re nowhere near our level.

Do you see a pattern? The Chinese aren’t intelligent or capable enough. Just as was said about the Japanese in 1941. Remember, the PLA’s carriers will be operating within and along the edge of the First Island Chain and with the support of the PLAAF and PLA Rocket Force.

9.   PLA has n’t got combat experience.

Neither does the US Navy, except against the Houthi Navy. And the rest of the US military has n’t fought a high-end opponent in decades.

10.   The PLA is corrupt.

Andrew Erickson at the Naval War College gets it  right: “If Xi and the PLA were in the disarray that some myopically focused on their system’s chronic corruption imagine, there’s no way China ’s military could be developing, deploying, exercising and otherwise preparing in the ways that the CMPR chronicles. ”

11.   Xi Jinping can’t trust his generals and admirals.

Neither could Hitler or Stalin. One almost got to Moscow. The other took Berlin.

12.   The PLA is “restive” and pushing back at Xi’s efforts to give himself total power.

Have we ever seen any real evidence that any PLA officer has “pushed back”? And on our side, how many US Navy admirals pushed back against the systematic degrading of their service’s capabilities over the last 30 years? It was also said before 1939 that the Wehrmacht Generals – the elite of the elite – would never actually let “that Corporal” run things.

13.   The Chinese can’t innovate. They can only copy.

There’s “Chinese ingenuity ” just as there was “Yankee ingenuity. ” It works well enough, no matter who invented the thing improved upon. the PLA Strategic Rocket Force has been very innovative…anyone heard of the DF-21D, DF-26, and DF-17? Or the new Type 076 amphibious assault carrier that is going to carry and launch drones, fixed wing and helicopters and put amphibious vehicles on the beach?

14.   PLA officers and NCOs  won’t take the initiative  – like ours will.

Maybe. But have you ever heard a Korean War vet say he wanted to fight the Chinese again?

15.   China won’t attack Taiwan until 2027, 2035, 2049.

It’s always some years off. Xi is said to have told his military to be ready to go against Taiwan by 2027. In fact, Hu Jintao in 2008 and Xi in 2013 ordered the PLA to be ready to take Taiwan in 2020.

The shoe could drop at any time. Would Xi really tell us his attack date in advance? Remember that the British assessed in the 1930s that Germany would not be ready to fight a war until 1943.

16.   China has so many one-child families that Xi would n’t dare attack.

The popular anger over families losing their only child would be too hard for Xi and CCP leaders to handle, it is argued. But make them “heroes of the revolution ” and provide a house and a handsome pension – and complaints about it disappear.

17.   Economic costs would be too high.

Tough, yes, but Xi is sanctions-proofing the country. And he’s telling his people to toughen up and get ready for what’s coming. What is never discussed is the economic benefits that taking Taiwan and establishing the PRC’s global domination over the global trading system would mean for the PRC. It is always viewed in the negative…but they don’t consider that Xi and the CCP see it as a step towards economic supremacy.

18.     The blow to China ’s reputation will be too high.

As if the CCP cares about its reputation. If the CCP does n’t mind the flack that comes from taking organs out of live prisoners and selling them, the criticism from taking Taiwan won’t move the needle much. Nor is there likely to be much. Who is still talking about the subjugation of Tibet or the strangling of Hong Kong?

19.   Taiwan has a million reservists.

999,000 of whom get about four days of training a year.

20. Taiwan’s military and civilians will fight like tigers.

Maybe. But the Taiwanese may not be the Ukrainians or the Finns, especially if outside support does n’t come quickly.

21.   Taiwan has mountains. Mountain combat is tough.

Just too hard for the Chinese, it seems. However, selected PLA brigades train in the mountains annually and unless there is a war with India, they might be deployed to Taiwan after the beaches are secure.

22.   Taiwan has cities. Urban combat is tough.

The Americans, the Russians and many others have figured out urban combat. But it ’s too hard for the Chinese?

23. The US military has a qualitative superiority with its hardware, training and experience.

The French thought ‘elan’ would overcome the German Maxim guns in 1914. It did n’t. They also had faith in the fact their tanks were superior in 1940. And these days, America’s technological superiority is eroding almost daily.

24.     The U. S. military calculated that taking Formosa from the Japanese in 1944/1945 would have been a herculean effort.

True. But perhaps Xi thinks it ’s worth it for him. And what he thinks matters. And it probably is worth more to the PRC and Xi these days than Formosa was to the US in 1944/1945.

Also, let’s not forget that our invasion force had to travel 1,200 nautical miles to the invasion beaches on Taiwan versus 120nm for the PLA. We only had carriers for air support for the first week. Again, the PLA has the full strength of the Eastern and Southern Theater Command Air Forces as well as the PLARF ( PLA Rocket Force ). We had nothing to compare to the PLARF in 1944-45.

25.     The American invasion of Sicily in 1943 was really hard…so the PLA can’t possibly do an invasion of Taiwan.

Really. One fellow  wrote  a piece about this a few years ago.

26.     The Japanese will step in.

With what? And not if Japan’s business community and the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs ” “China club” and the “political class ” China sympathizers have anything to say about it.

These are all practical articles of faith for a sizeable chunk of the US China analyst community. And they create  “threat deflation ” – as retired US Navy Captain James Fanell and Dr Bradley Thayer call it – that justifies complacency.

It is, of course, possible that some combination of these reasons may dissuade Xi Jinping from attacking Taiwan. And nothing in war is easy– not least an assault across the Taiwan Strait.

But one imagines a similar “bingo card ” could have been created to demonstrate why the Chinese would n’t or could n’t attack across the Yalu River into Korea in 1950. It’s equally dangerous to underestimate the PRC in 2025.

So, the United States has a choice: start acting like the threat to Taiwan ( and to us ) is immediate and not a couple of years or more into the future – and move a lot faster.

Or, if that ’s too hard, just read and re-read reasons 1-26 until you are lulled into a comfortable stupor. No points for guessing which one Xi would prefer.

---

Grant Newsham  is a retired US Marine officer and senior fellow at The Center for Security Policy, The Japan Forum for Strategic Studies and The Yorktown Institute. He is the author of  When China Attacks: A Warning to America. This article first appeared on RealClear Defense and is republished with the author’s kind permission.

Continue Reading