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It has been three weeks since Donald Trump was inaugurated as America’s 47^th president, but it feels like three years.

Tariffs imposed, tariffs suspended; a Gaza ceasefire negotiated and then put in danger; Greenland, Panama and Gaza all desired as potential new US territory; America’s $40 billion overseas aid budget destroyed; American withdrawal from the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organisation, and sanctions on the International Criminal Court.

It has been dizzying and disturbing in equal measure.

During Trump’s first term in the White House it was common to describe his administration as chaotic and unpredictable. We have learned that being unpredictable is a deliberate technique to put opponents off balance. The blizzard of actions and announcements is another deliberate technique, to make it hard for critics to focus on what really matters.

Yet so far it is unclear whether chaotic is going to remain the right word to describe the Trump effect. Wild, it certainly is. But what is happening so far looks like a combination of two much more coherent efforts than before.

One is the attempted destruction of many traditional elements of the federal government and of American commitments abroad; the other is the seizure of power to the presidency from Congress and other parts of the American constitutional system.

These two coherent efforts depend partly on Trump’s own instincts but substantially on the ideology of those around him, including Elon Musk as well as many other zealots who have spent the Biden years planning for this moment. It will remain wild for some time, but several patterns are emerging.

For the outside world, the clear pattern of the Trump administration is that “America First,” his campaign slogan, is going to be insufficient to describe the change under way: “America Alone” seems more appropriate.

Collaboration in forums and institutions is being dumped, unceremoniously: Although the Paris accord and World Health Organization were predictable victims, the replacement of collaboration by imperialism was not.

So far, it is an imperialism of words, though the sudden swing of policy this week on Gaza comes close to action.

The world has been left speculating whether President Trump can really be serious when he says he wants Gaza to become US territory, given his previous resistance to spending American money or risking American lives on conflicts overseas. Yet the real implication is something more immediate: Almost certainly, this wild move will act as a cover for Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu to break the ceasefire and resume his war against Hamas.

That may have been Trump’s intention, or it may just be a consequence.

Regardless of the explanation, he has thrown aside any idea of a collaborative effort with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to rebuild and govern Gaza, for those states all demand negotiations for the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state to go alongside the ceasefire and reconstruction.

The fact that he has countered that demand with his own demand that the 2.1 million Palestinians who were living in Gaza be taken in by Egypt, Jordan and other Arab states means that he has no interest in serious negotiations. Soon, citing evidence that Hamas militias have moved back into Gaza, the Israeli forces are likely to invade again.

A second pattern that emerges from Gaza but also from his threats of import tariffs on Canada and Mexico is that it is wrong to call Trump a “negotiator,” as Giorgia Meloni has done. If he were a negotiator, he would genuinely want to make deals with other countries, just as he did during his first term when his administration made a new trade arrangement with America’s two giant neighbours.

Instead, what we have seen is a man who wants “wins,” not deals, and uses his threats not to achieve a sustainable outcome but rather to emphasize and display his own power.

That is why he has followed his pressure for a Gaza ceasefire so swiftly with his destabilizing claim to Gaza as potential US territory. And it is why he was willing to suspend his tariff threats against Canada and Mexico as soon as both governments offered concessions, even though the concessions they offered were trivial.

To Trump, if it can be made to look like a win, it is a win regardless of the truth.

The third pattern is related to this desire to display power. Trump and the zealots around him know that he is currently at the peak of his political power, having won November’s election and having turned the Republican Party in Congress into a largely supine group.

Soon, some things are bound to go wrong, reducing his popularity and, crucially, giving Republicans a motive to diverge from him to save their seats in the mid-term congressional elections due in November 2026.

He and the zealots in his team know they must move fast if they want to achieve anything. More crucially, they are also trying to exploit his current political power to increase the practical power of the presidency, to guard against the revival of congressional opposition.

Musk’s destruction of US AID, the development aid agency, is part of this effort: It is a small and weak target, as it mainly employs people overseas. But is a symbolic one – as, by succeeding in destroying it, he has shown that the US Constitution, under which Congress is supposed to have the final say over such agencies, can be ignored.

This is a genuine constitutional crisis, yet for the time being is one in which the part of the constitution whose powers are being violated, Congress, is doing nothing about it. That will now be tested further, as Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency, a new body that has no constitutional status, will seek to impose further spending cuts and even to abolish whole federal government departments. Only private lawsuits and the courts are currently standing in their way.

This brings in the final pattern that is emerging. The Trump teams’ mission to establish “America Alone,” to impose trade tariffs on allies to achieve “wins” and to withdraw from international collaboration is creating an open goal for China.

If Beijing wants to strengthen its friendships with the Global South or even with long-time American allies, it now has a huge chance to score.

Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist, Bill Emmott is currently chairman of the Japan Society of the UK, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the International Trade Institute.

First published on his Substack newsletter Bill Emmott’s Global View, this English original of an article in Italian in La Stampa is republished with permission.

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In response to growing threats from China and North Korea, Japan is expanding its fast weapons arsenal, but modern gaps and reliance on the US defense sector could stymie progress.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense ( MOD ) announced this month that it had successfully conducted flight tests for its island defense hypersonic glide vehicle ( HGV ). Four check launches were conducted at a page in California, with one start in August 2024, two in November 2024 and one in January 2025.

The stand-off missiles, designed to neutralize threats first and at long range, effectively demonstrated their expected aircraft performance, according to the Japanese dialect news. Japan’s HGV study will be finished by 2025, while mass production has been afoot since 2023.

Previously, Japan’s Acquisition, Technology &amp, Logistics Agency ( ATLA ) released footage of a successful test launch of the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile ( HVGP ) in July 2024, signaling apparent significant hypersonic weaponry progress.

The” Early Deployment Version ( Block 1 )” test featured extended-range variants planned for 2030.

The 900-kilometer-range HVGP will enter the Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces ( JGSDF) service in 2026, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is reportedly speeding up the weapon’s production.

In March 2020, Japan unveiled two hypersonic weapon concepts: the Hypersonic Cruise Missile ( HCM) and the HVGP. The HCM, which is powered by a scramjet website, resembles regular cruise missiles but has longer ranges and faster speeds. A solid-fuel jet motor propels the HVGP’s bomb while maintaining high velocity as it glides toward its target.

At the military level, fast weapons are necessary to Japan’s emerging counterstrike features, although using them poses professional challenges.

HGVs and HCMs demonstrate advanced missile systems. Launched from nuclear missiles, HGVs may strike speeds of up to Mach 20 and glide suddenly to escape interception. If the power permits, they may evade during the final step.

Likewise, HCMs use ramjets or scramjets for sustained speeds over Mach 6 and a boost for motion, enabling detailed strikes in rough, strong dives.

Satoru Mori and Shinichi Kitaoaka explain the military justification for Japan’s purchase of hypersonic arms in a February 2021 RAND statement. They claim that they can attack weapon defenses, attack critical infrastructure, including air and naval bases, logistics centers, and control centers.

But, Masashi Murano points out in a March 2024 content for the Hudson Institute that Japan lacks sufficient flying ships and escort jammers for serious hit functions.

Murano notes that Japan has substantial gaps in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting ( ISR-T) capabilities for hitting mobile, time-sensitive targets and still struggles to build warheads for hardened targets.

Japan needs to address its significant dependence on the US and the security industry constraints, even though it is speeding up its fast weapons system to protect against a possible conflict in its disputed islands with China and Russia and to hinder local missile threats.

In a possible conquest of its distant islands, especially in the Senkaku Islands contested with China, Japan may use fast weapons to breach opponent defenses, according to Katsuhisa Furukawa’s report for Open Nuclear Network in April 2021.

Furukawa advises using multiple platforms and trajectories to launch them at various speeds to maximize the advantages of hypersonic weapons. He claims that maneuvering could narrow those weapons ‘ ranges, necessitating air-launch platforms like the F-35, even though they could theoretically strike missile storage and launch facilities in China and North Korea.

Furthermore, The Mainichi reported in December 2024 that Japan would earmark US$ 1.57 billion to speed up hypersonic weapons development.

That figure is in addition to the$ 130 million that will be used to mass-produce long-range missiles starting in FY 2025, which will cost$ 130 million. Japan will allocate$ 110 million to mass-produce an improved version of its Type 12 extended-range shore-based anti-ship missile and$ 19.75 million for a submarine-launched version.

However, Japan’s defense industry faces significant challenges in achieving these goals. In an article for Asia Military Review this month, Gordon Arthur mentions that Japan is still dependent on imported US weapons and that its defense sector is uncompetitive due to the JSDF’s small order sizes and self-imposed export restrictions.

He mentions Japan’s efforts to address these shortcomings by providing direct financial support to its defense manufacturers.

However, Grant Newsham says Japan’s long-term overreliance on the US has hobbled its ability to defend itself. He concludes that there is no substitute for the US defense” services” in Asia and that Japan cannot defend itself against China alone, let alone adding in North Korea and Russia.

As for the strategic impact of Japan’s counterstrike capabilities, Fabian Hoffman mentions in a May 2024 article for the peer-reviewed Journal of Strategic Studies that long-range conventional strike ( LRS ) weapons, such as cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, have four primary strategic functions: counter-population, strategic interdiction, counter-leadership and counterforce.

He mentions that LRS weapons can weaken an adversary’s will or capacity to resist by targeting enemy populations, critical infrastructure, leadership and military assets.

In a complex security environment, Japan’s National Security Strategy 2022 and National Defense Strategy 2022 provide the country’s justification for acquiring conventional counterstrike capabilities.

In response to rising missile threats and geopolitical conflict, the National Security Strategy emphasizes the need for proactive measures to safeguard Japan’s sovereignty and regional stability.

In the meantime, the National Defense Strategy emphasizes counterstrike capabilities as crucial for preventing and halting missile attacks. In order to bolster deterrence while upholding Japan’s defense-oriented policy, it emphasizes that these capabilities will be used as a last resort under constitutional and self-defense principles.

Japan’s efforts to develop counterstrike capabilities may also contribute to a regional arms race.

In a November 2023 article in the peer-reviewed Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Michiru Nishida mentions that China has expressed serious concerns about Japan’s development of intermediate-range missiles, particularly in light of their dual-use nature, which could allow them to carry conventional or nuclear warheads, with some voices advocating for Japan to obtain the latter. &nbsp,

From the perspective of China, Nishida believes it is crucial to prevent a regional arms race and lower the chance of miscalculation by making sure these missiles are not equipped with nuclear warheads. However, he says China remains skeptical of Japan’s military intentions, perceiving these missile developments as a potential threat to its security and regional influence.

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Donald Trump has hit the 30-day pause button to impose 25 % tariffs on Mexico and Canada, but he is still planning to impose 10 % tariffs on Chinese imports. Tariffs on the EU are also on his agenda.

Trump has declared that “tariff” is” the most beautiful word in the dictionary”. The president might want to get a record book and put out the dictionary as he weighs up the broad repercussions of his tariff fixation.

The US Smoot-Hawley Tax Act, which was passed in 1930, is referenced in terms of their scale and scope.

For instance, Paul Krugman, a Nobel Laureate scholar, stated to Bloomberg that” we’re actually talking about taxes on a level that we’ve never seen,” adding that” we’re talking about a reversal of actually 90 years of US plan.”

The Smoot-Hawley taxes were originally intended to support the greatly obliged US agricultural field at the end of the 1920s and shield them from foreign rivals, which are both well-known themes in the anti-free-trade speech being smuggled out by Trump supporters today.

The introduction of the Great Depression had generated common, albeit not general, demands for security from imports, and Smoot-Hawley increased now considerable tariffs on international goods. Members of Congress were keen to protect their constituents ‘ industries by trading votes in exchange for assistance.

Although, at the time, more than&nbsp, 1, 000 economics implored&nbsp, President Herbert Hoover to reject Smoot-Hawley, the act was signed into law. On 20, 000 or consequently different types of imported goods, income amounted to nearly 40 % as a result of the resulting price action.

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The culmination resulted in a dramatic decrease in US trade with other nations, especially those that retaliated, which is now widely acknowledged to have significantly worsened the Great Depression. According to one estimate, the sum of US imports plummeted by almost half.

What’s more, the consequences were felt worldwide. Around half of the 25 % decline in global business is thought to have been caused by protectionism, which in turn contributed to the development of the economic factors that led to the second world war.

The impact on Capitol Hill was significant, as well: due to the optics of the tax act’s vote-trading, Congress delegated power of business plan to the leader just four years later because the behavior was viewed as being so careless.

All of this was set against the landscape of American political protectionism in the 1930s, which is similar to many of Trump’s present attempts to veer away from or even harm multilateral institutions.

For instance, the US previously joined the United States despite receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919 for his contributions to founding the League of Nations, a precursor of the United Nations.

In this time, the phrase” America First” was also frequently used to refer to a target on local legislation and high taxes.

Fast forward to the day.

Trump has stated that his levies will” produce some problems,” but that they are “worth the amount that must be paid.” Trump’s taxes may increase fees for the common US home by more than US$ 1,200 annually, according to new estimates from the non-partisan Peterson Institute for International Economics.

When actual prices start to rise, it’s still up to US voters to decide whether or not they will support Trump.

However, many Republicans on Capitol Hill have rushed to Trump’s defense. New York’s congressional representative Claudia Tenney expressed gratitude to the United States for “projecting strength for once on the world stage.”

Senator Eric Schmitt of Missouri argued that tariffs were” not a surprise,” pointing out that Trump had campaigned tirelessly for “enhancing our standing in the world.”

Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, who described the tariffs as a “bad idea,” was perhaps the Republican’s most severe rebuke.

According to public opinion data, tariffs are fraught with controversy, with partisanship influencing both general opinions of tariffs and those of specific national targets.

According to a January 2025 Harvard CAPS/Harris poll, 52 % of Americans overall approve of placing new tariffs on China, with 74 % of Republicans in favor, but just 34 % of Democrats.

Support is more modest for imposing tariffs on America’s neighbors. Only 40 % of voters think tariffs on Canada and Mexico are a good idea, including 59 % of Republicans and 24 % of Democrats.

Tariffs rank low on a list of national priorities. Only 3 % of Americans believe that Trump should prioritize tariffs on Mexico and Canada, while only 11 % view China as top priority.

a potential for a more extensive trade war

What seems clear is that Trump’s proposed tariffs against Canada, Mexico, and China could be just the opening salvos in a broader tit-for-tat that may extend to Europe, and beyond.

The political challenge for Trump is to maintain what is increasingly looking like a fragile coalition at home, balancing the needs of hardline Maga supporters who oppose free trade and tech titans who believe tariffs are stumbling down crucial supply chains, especially in Asia.

After Trump’s election, former adviser and populist nationalist Steve Bannon warned that America would no longer be “abused” by “unbalanced trade deals”. ” Yes, tariffs are coming”, he said. You will have to pay to enter the US market. It is no longer free, the free market is over”.

Meanwhile, Silicon Valley has been mostly silent on the tariffs. Tech moguls have been assured that the tariffs are about leverage and will be eliminated soon enough, despite doubtlessly trying to win their favor for tariff exemptions or total tariff reductions.

Trump is showing that tariffs are a significant component of his” America First” foreign policy, a kind of belligerent unilateralism that treats allies and adversaries alike as pieces that can be moved around a chessboard.

Under Trump, the” art of the deal” means throwing America’s weight around as the world’s economic superpower, and waiting for the leaders of other nations to fold. His resolve may depend on whether American voters will bear the economic costs associated with his plans.

Trump might believe that the word “tariff” is a beautiful one at this time. However, its economic shadow might soon appear gloomy if even a hint of the 1930s is repeated.

Michael Plouffe is a lecturer in international political economy at UCL, and Thomas Gift is associate professor and director of the Center on US Politics.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Could China’s fresh electrical wake detection technology bring an end to stealthy submarine combat? It may, according to recent Chinese study.

Researchers at Northwestern Polytechnical University ( NPU) in Xian, China, have developed a novel detection method that can track even the most elusive submarines ‘ magnetic wakes, according to South China Morning Post (SCMP ) reporting this month.

The group, led by Associate Professor Wang Honglei, discovered that the electromagnetic fields generated by the wake of ships, such as the US Seawolf-class, may be detected using flying magnetometers. Exploits the electrical interactions between water ions that are impacted by the motion of the submarine and the Earth’s magnetic field.

According to the study, which was published in Harbin Engineering University’s Journal in December of last year, underwater dimensions, depth, and accelerate all affect the intensity of these magnetic signatures. Electrical wakes cannot be silenced and leave a continual trace, unlike traditional acoustic detection techniques.

The USS Connecticut’s wiring in the South China Sea in 2021, which among other items highlighted the growing difficulties of cunning operations in contested waters, is the focus of the Chinese study. Underwater naval battle may experience a revolutionary shift as China incorporates electromagnetic monitoring into its wider “kill web” of detection technologies.

The rapid evolution of underwater detection technologies poses a threat to submarines ‘ standard stealth and tactical utility, which could require changes in underwater design, countermeasures, and operational strategies to keep their relevance in upcoming issues.

Traditional radar systems are less effective in deep water, like the Taiwan Strait, while new monitoring capabilities and limitations, such as those from Magnetic Anomaly Detection ( MAD), are introduced.

In shallow lakes as thin as the Taiwan Strait, which is only 150 meters deep, magnetic detection has a number of advantages over radar. Low-frequency radar success is reduced by deep depths, according to Bo Raskin of the Naval Submarine League, which causes good directing, where energy is absorbed by the ground and exterior reflections.

He adds that towed radar arrays have trouble detecting small targets and selection because longer wavelengths of low-frequency good struggle to spread in shallow water and because wet seafloor clutter and powerful bottom reverberation prevent detection.

But, Rajiv Sithiravel and other authors make mention of an aerial Wild with a non-linear trouble in an October 2020 article in the peer-reviewed Ia Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems book, which is complicated by the complex relationship between a ship’s magnetic name and motion, which makes it difficult to perform accurate tracking and estimation.

Sithiravel and others claim that without additional maneuvers, such as curved flight paths, MAD cannot determine whether a detected anomaly is to the left or right of the aircraft’s flight path due to the left or right positional ambiguity. In addition, they note that MAD’s short detection range makes it more suitable for short-range confirmation rather than long-range detection.

Advancements in stealth tactics and techniques can keep submarines relevant in upcoming conflicts despite the threat posed by MAD and other sensor technologies.

A January 2025 article by the Australian Naval Institute says submarines use anechoic tiles, vibration-damping materials, radar-absorbing materials and periodic degaussing to enhance stealth. Additionally, the article mentions how submariners use methods like using uncrewed underwater vehicles ( UUVs ) to evade detection and noise manipulation.

However, Roger Bradbury and other authors make mention of this in a March 2023 article for The Conversation that advancements in sensor technology, underwater communications, and artificial intelligence ( AI ) may have the potential to make submarines both detectable and obsolete by the 2050s.

According to Bradbury and others, these new technologies can detect subtle changes in the ocean’s physical, chemical, and biological markers as well as changes in the Earth’s magnetic field, which could compromise their stealth and significance in upcoming conflicts.

The US Navy must adapt its submarine design and operational strategies to counteract the growing need for multi-layered detection systems that combine advanced technologies.

Combining airborne MAD with other technologies, such as magnetic wake detection, terahertz-based devices, airborne extremely low-frequency ( ELF ) radar, and light detection and ranging ( LIDAR ) satellites, can create a multi-layered detection grid to track US and allied submarines in near real-time.

These advancements have the potential to have a significant impact on US submarine operations and design. In a March 2018 article for Georgetown Security Studies Review, Ryan Neuhard asserts that the US Navy’s submarine force must work through a variety of strategies to adapt to changing detection technologies.

Neuhard suggests that upcoming submarine designs should use propulsion, hull design, and magnetic cloaking innovations to improve stealth capabilities in favor of minimizing sound, magnetic, and wake disturbances in order to evade advanced detection systems.

He adds that the US can enhance the security and effectiveness of its submarines by implementing defensive measures like jammers and unmanned vehicles while also transitioning them to function as autonomous systems ‘ command centers.

The South China Sea’s underwater surveillance system poses significant challenges and threats to US submarine operations, as well as having important strategic implications for regional security and nuclear deterrence.

China’s new submarine detection technologies, which offer secure nuclear second-strike capability, can help secure the South China Sea as a protected bastion for its nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN).

Dolma Tsering claims that China has constructed an” Underwater Great Wall” ( UGW), a comprehensive underwater sensor network in the South China Sea that combines sensors, sonar, unmanned underwater vehicles, and surface ships to track both surface and underwater activity in real-time in a report for the National Maritime Foundation in December 2016.

Tsering mentions that China’s UGW, modeled after the US Cold War-era SOSUS, improves China’s submarine detection and tracking capabilities. She points out that it directly challenges US operations and calls for a rethinking of its undersea strategy, particularly in the crucial Taiwan Strait.

Further, in a March 2024 report, the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI), a Chinese think tank, mentioned that in 2023 at least 11 US nuclear attack submarines ( SSN) and two US SSBNs appeared in the South China Sea.

While the report says they aim to “exert deterrence”, the US SSNs may track China’s SSBNs in the South China Sea. Because China is most likely to respond to threats that threaten its nuclear arsenal with retaliation, such actions have a strategic impact.

The development of Chinese magnetic detection technology may well signal the end of submarine stealth. As detection capabilities evolve, future conflicts could see submarines forced to shed their traditional invisibility cloak and adopt new roles, emphasizing long-range precision strikes, drone coordination and command-and-control functions.

Submarines are supposed to adapt, but the question is whether they will remain relevant in a new era of transparency beneath the waves.

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This past year, past Nissan Motor Co. professional Greg Kelly was charged with violating Japan’s Financial Instruments and Exchange Act by allegedly conspiring with ex-CEO Carlos Ghosn to underestimate future earnings in a Tokyo court.

Kelly, who wasn’t in Japan for the decision, says he didn’t do it, and the appeals court, like the lower court before it, found that to be the case regarding the first seven of eight times mentioned in the accusation against him — governmental 2010 to fiscal 2016. &nbsp,

However, the lower court’s criminal verdict regarding the seventh month, fiscal 2017, was upheld by the Tokyo High Court. The judge’s decision was based on a seven-to-eight-minute meeting in June 2018 at which the mind of Nissan’s secretary, Toshiaki Ohnuma, claims to have shown Kelly a calculator adding up undisclosed settlement for Ghosn dating back to the end of governmental 2009, when Ghosn took a almost 50 % give cut.

Kelly has appealed afterwards, to the government’s Supreme Court.

The seventh charge’s initial guilty verdict was delivered in March 2022. Under pressure from the US government and with help from the US embassy, Rahm Emanuel, the jury suspended Kelly’s word — six months in prison — for three times.

There are many issues with the Chinese legal justice state’s handling of the case, including Nissan’s and the Tokyo attorney’s company’s withholding of circumstantial evidence from Kelly’s professionals. &nbsp, There are distinct anti-foreign tones. Of four leading generals working on post-retirement career plans to keep Ghosn when he retired, just Kelly, a non-Japanese, was charged.

Kelly denied having seen the file, but acknowledged having met with Ohnuma at Nissan office in June 2018. So was lined up a traditional “he said, he said” position.

But one “he”, especially Ohnuma, was onside with the Chinese system, having entered into an immunity deal with the Tokyo attorney’s business in October 2018, three days before Ghosn and Kelly were arrested. No specific proof existed that Kelly and Ohnuma had the record in place.

The courts at both levels chose to ignore the information that two Chinese executives, no Kelly, had proposed the March 2011 post-retirement program that is at the heart of the case against Kelly, a bigger lady.

Toshiyuki Shiga, Nissan’s chief operating officer and a representative director, together with Itaru Koeda, Nissan’s former co-chairman, proposed the agreement in a March 28, 2011, document titled” Remuneration Payment Plan”. Moreover, Shiga was a representative director in March 2011. Kelly was not.

Documents reveal that Ohnuma and Shiga collaborated on the plan. Two weeks later, on April 14, Ohnuma created a spreadsheet for Ghosn, which Ohnuma then revised and reverted to March 24.

Specifically, the spreadsheet was not proposed by Kelly, but by two Japanese executives ( Shiga and Koeda ) who were not indicted. We have asked the Tokyo prosecutor’s office to comment about why they targeted only a non-Japanese. There’s been no response yet.

Kelly would be involved with preparing three later proposals, the latter two signed by himself and Hiroto Saikawa, Ghos n’s hand-picked successor. All three of the proposals required board approval in order to be considered for post-retirement employment. There was no proof that there was a way to conceal upcoming profits from Japanese financial regulators.

Ghos n’s position all along has been that there was no “undisclosed compensation”. As he he told this writer:

There was no compensation package. After my retirement, there were suggestions for after-retirement that needed to be made but were not yet defined and decided.

Whether Ghosn, who is living in Lebanon as a fugitive from Japanese justice, might have used those proposals to pressure a future Nissan board for a future contract is speculation, although it wouldn’t have been unthinkable.

Because of Japan’s secretive court rules, it is difficult to gather and publish court documents. However, a Nissan internal document, the Kali 10 Compensation Investigation Report, provides proof that Shiga, Koeda and Ohnuma – not Kelly and Ohnuma – came up with the plan Kelly’s guilty verdict was based on.

One of the lawyers from Latham &amp, Watkins LLP, a firm that had advised and supported the anti-Ghos n clique at Nissan as it planned and carried out its coup against Ghosn, brought the Kali 10 report to court.

During cross examimation, however, when Kelly’s lawyers tried to press the Latham lawyer on that report and another document, the prosecution objected on the basis that both documents had come by way of whistle-blower sources – journalists. Thus, the prosecutors claimed, the information was hearsay. The judges refused to give the two documents into evidence.

Here are excerpts from the Kali 10 report that, if they had been admitted to the evidence, would have presented the situation in a completely different light. :

According to internal records, Ohnuma, Shiga, and Koeda discussed the payment of Ghos n’s haircut in March 2011. A proposal by Shiga and Koeda dated March 16, 2011 titled’ Payment for CEO ( Proposal by SK)’ lists three options for payment of the haircut: ( a ) as incentive compensation paid after retirement ( without disclosure ), ( b ) as a retirement allowance ( with disclosure ) and ( c ) as an advisor fee paid 1-2 years after retirement ( without disclosure ).

Working as an advisor, Shiga told us that he preferred option ( b ), but Ghosn preferred option ( c ). On the basis of option ( c ), Ohnuma gave Shiga and Koeda a draft memorandum of which to amend on March 18, 2011, and Koeda gave it to Ghosn on March 23, 2011.

The memorandum, titled” Remuneration Payment ( Plan )”, proposed to pay the haircut]Ghos n’s deferred or unpaid remuneration ] as an advisor or consultant fee after Ghos n’s retirement. The fee amount is unfilled. According to the memo, board approval would be necessary for the payment of the fee.

Shiga informed us that he remained committed to this requirement because he believed board approval would help resolve any potential irregularities in the arrangement. According to the email correspondence, Shiga and Koeda gave Ghosn the” Remuneration Payment ( Plan )” on March 28, 2011. See Exhibit 4.5.20.

among Exhibit A. 4.5.20 points:

• ” Payment after retirement of XXX yen as contribution rewards, conditions will be fixed by written documents every year&nbsp, ]and ] GM of the Secretariat] Ohnuma] will make a calculation, the amount]to] &nbsp, be informed to the person who receives payment]Ghosn ]”.
• ” To enter into a contract with Nissan as an executive advisor or consultant for one to two years after retiring.” &nbsp, Before making a contract, it needs approval at BoD. Remuneration is handled at secretariat. Remuneration amount does not need to be disclosed ]and ] there is no legal problem”.

According to the Kali 10 report, Ohnuma claimed to have told Nissan’s internal investigators that he had not shown the draft agreement to Koeda or Shiga and that Ohnuma and Ghosn were the only people who had seen it.

On February 5, Kelly’s legal team appealed to the Japanese Supreme Court. Although it’s unlikely that Japan’s top court will overturn the lower and appeals court decisions, Kelly’s attorneys felt they had to try in light of the conflicting evidence in the spreadsheet.

Read: Disclosures show Nissan Kelly charges are fabricated

Read: Kelly ‘ guilty’ in Ghosn case, sentence suspended

Read: Former Nissan executive Greg Kelly sums up ordeal

Roger Schreffler is a former president of the Foreign Correspondents ‘ Club of Japan and a veteran correspondent for Ward’s Automotive.

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From the massive-scale surrender of 1949 to the problems over Quemoy, the ROC’s military forces have huge symbolized patience amidst suffering. But, amid Xi Jinping’s increasing stress on Taiwan through China’s new Joint Sword Exercises, ADIZ attacks and mental war, military confidence has become an existential problem.

Low morale is having a significant impact on Taiwan’s defence because it is dealing with a severe lack of soldiers, with some combat units having under 80 % staffing as a result of early retirements and discharges.

This article examines the historical causes of the ROC’s military confidence crisis, examines how Taiwan’s struggle for identification affects defense confidence, and offers suggestions for how to handle this pressing problem.

The ROC military’s confidence crises dates back to ^the early 20^th centuries. After ^the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, China was divided by regional warlords fighting over lands and cultures, who distanced ^themselves from ^the principles of liberty, equality, and normal privileges.

This decentralization and infighting between warlord armies proved fatal, with rising provincialism, defection, and bribery shaping the early ROC, and preventing the creation of a unified national military.

In his article,” Historical origins of the party-army relations in the Soviet Union and China,” Professor Luyang Zhou explains how collective treason exploded in the 1910s and 1920s, replacing actual fighting with defection and bribery. Dialects, topography and self-sufficiency further fueled the already-rising provincialism in China’s Warlord Era.

In 1925, the National Revolutionary Army ( NRA ) was formed, comprising of the KMT Party Army and four military forces loyal to regional leaders. The NRA’s heterogeneity with its individual regional leaders exemplified the decentralization of control.

As outlined in the book” The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics”, informal relationships and personal loyalties, rather than ideology, dominated the officer corps dynamics. This fragmentation of the NRA led to widespread defections, further eroding morale.

Additionally, poor military leadership exacerbated the morale crisis. General George Wetzell, a German advisor, criticized Chiang Kai-shek’s rapid promotion of unqualified military officers, which led to underdeveloped leadership development. Officers frequently prioritized socializing, planning logistics, and dealing with budgetary issues over training, leaving troops underprepared for conflict scenarios.

By ^the mid-20^th century, military morale had deteriorated significantly. A total of two Kuomintang army divisions deserted in 1946, and an entire section defected to ^the CCP in 1945.

In a 1947 article from the Far Eastern Survey, high troop losses and desertion rates in the KMT army, as well as the loss of strategic advantages as American forces halted supplies, provided clear evidence of declining morale.

According to 1947 media reports, the CCP was most likely to prevail in the civil war because of the KMT’s declining morale and ideological weakness. The demoralized KMT military had already lost the Chinese Civil War by 1949 and had retreated to Taiwan.

The ROC military’s dual allegiance to a party and a state added to the difficulty of democratizing and addressing historical morale issues after the retreat. Under President Lee Teng-hui’s leadership, efforts to reform the military in the 1980s faced opposition from the military bureaucracy.

President Lee was the first to endorse civilians for the role of defense minister, appointing Chen-Li-an and Sun Chen in succession, but the military leadership’s refusal to cooperate with them led to the appointment of retired General Chiang Chung-ling to the position instead.

Following President Lee’s attempt to reform the military, President Chen Shui-bian enacted critical reforms to democratize the military. The Ministry of National Defense’s Organization Act and the National Defense Act established civilian-level control over the military, making it necessary for the minister to be a civilian.

However, this requirement was removed during a number of administrations, with retired generals taking the job. The military’s isolationist culture and inability to democratize through civil society have increased the identity dissonance between the military and civilians, making it more difficult to maintain the military’s morale crisis.

Beyond its historical and structural challenges, Taiwan’s evolving identity has a significant impact on military morale because shifting perceptions of national identity affect how the military interacts with the civilian society it serves.

In 1992, the National Chengchi University Election Study Center started conducting annual polls on national identity, with results that year showing that 46.4 % of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese and Chinese, 25.5 % identified as Chinese, and 17.6 % as Taiwanese.

By 2024, 64.3 % of Taiwanese considered themselves primarily Taiwanese, 30.4 % considered themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese, and only 2.2 % considered themselves primarily Chinese. The significant shifts in distribution show a significant shift in how people perceive national identity in Taiwan.

However, this identity evolution clashes with the ROC military’s traditions, many of which are relics from the country’s Nationalist era. Military songs like the” Military Discipline Song” ( 軍紀歌 ) and” I Love China” ( 我愛中華 ) perpetuate outdated symbols and ideas such as the” National Revolutionary Army” ( 國民革命軍 ) and” Revitalizing China” ( 復興中華 ), and consequently alienate younger conscripts who identify more closely with being Taiwanese than being Chinese.

Furthermore, societal perceptions of military service exacerbate morale issues and impact military recruitment. The interaction between military and civilian societies, which crosses both, is represented by conscription. Conscripts frequently complain that their service is mediocre, with tasks like housekeeping obscuring meaningful training. This problem has its roots in the Republican era, which was attributed to the NRA.

In” The Nationalist Army on the Eve of the War” by Chang Jui-te, the author cites a conversation between Xu Yongchang, director of the ROC Nationalist government’s Military Affairs Commission, and a friend where he stated:” If we implement a conscription system, people will join against their will and will lack ardor. This being so, to defeat Japanese aggression, we must reform the education system to change people’s attitudes or our country will perish”.

Improvements in the conscription system’s quality should be prioritized in order to improve the military’s reputation, as the military is subject to both internal and external criticism.

The reality of Taiwan’s conscription system depicts deeper issues tied to civil-military relations and public perception. The death of 23-year-old conscript Hung Chung-chiu in 2013, as he served a detention sentence, led to allegations of military abuse.

Over 100, 000 people participated in protests and signed petitions against Taiwan’s military justice system, which caused a decline in public confidence in the military and the conscription system.

Taiwan was supposed to move to an all-volunteer force by 2015, but the incident exacerbated the military’s recruitment crisis. This conflict between civilian and military societies raises questions about how compatible the military is with contemporary Taiwanese values.

Taiwan’s bloody history of civil-military relations also complicates contemporary reform efforts. The memory of the White Terror, a period of authoritarian rule marked by state-led violence and widespread political and intellectual persecution that claimed the lives of 3, 000 to 4, 000 civilians, continues to shadow Taiwanese society today, severely impacting civil-military ties. Although democratization led to progress, structural and cultural issues still persist.

Defense Minister Wellington Koo has started reforms at the moment to modernize and localize the military, including removing dated methods like goose-stepping and bayonet training.

As the first civilian defense minister in over ten years, Koo has the crucial responsibility of reducing the wide civil-military gap and further “democratizing” the military. His position is especially crucial given that the ROC’s military still suffers from issues like poor maintenance and outdated equipment, low morale, and a lack of noncommissioned officer training.

Bureaucratic resistance from within the military, however, has hindered significant progress. President Tsai Ing-wen made an attempt in 2017 to reform the military pension system, which was viewed as being extremely generous in comparison to other public sectors. The reform aimed at reducing the fiscal burden on Taiwan’s economy, ensuring its long-term sustainability.

Tsai’s DPP suffered a massive defeat in the 2018 local elections as a result of fierce opposition from retired military personnel’s protests. This military community resistance demonstrates how resistant it is to reform and how the military has an impact on civilian life.

The military’s consistent investment in symmetrical warfare equipment is another example of reform resistance. Retired or active generals have a tendency to benefit their own branches by investing in powerful weapons like submarines and fighter jets throughout the ROC’s history.

The absence of civilian oversight in the military bureaucracy and the sector’s structure, which are infused with cultural dissonance between the military and civilian societies, have contributed to the country’s persistent morale crisis.

For the highest levels of control to modernize, democratize, and better align themselves with the expanding Taiwanese identity, significant reform is required moving forward. They must abandon their dated customs, which range from military songs to symbols, and instead embrace Taiwan’s new and democratic ways of representing the values of the nation they support.

These reforms must serve to foster transparency, improve training quality, and ensure that the military represents the developing Taiwanese identity.

The roots of Taiwan’s military morale crisis emerges from historical, structural, and societal issues that require critical attention from policymakers. Taiwan is coming to an end to China’s siege. Through its Joint Sword exercises, naval fleet expansion, political and cognitive warfare, China’s pressure on Taiwan underscores the need for resilient civilian and military societies.

From the military’s fragmented origins and the scars of martial law to the evolving Taiwanese identity, these fundamental vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s defense demands urgent attention. The morale crisis is not only a matter of identity but also an existential threat which resonates with Taiwan’s future, security, and sovereignty.

The military must adapt and go through reforms that are in line with the democratic values of contemporary Taiwan as Taiwan’s identity has evolved.

Safe Spaces, a policy consulting firm based in Taiwan and Washington, is the home of Patrick Ko, a policy analyst. His research focuses on international affairs in East Asia and Latin America.

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