Bolen C (Page 64)

Powers occasionally find it difficult to persuade smaller allies to accomplish their goals with the support they offer. Generally, it is to the detriment of the larger port’s interests.

In subsequent years, the United States has experienced a lot of this. US colleagues in Chad, Niger, and Burkinabe have diverted US security assistance and training in Africa to combat terrorism, allowing military coups to undermine human right and only increase the risk of violence.

Similar to how Saudi Arabia expanded and re-entered Yemen in the 2010s with US military aid to start a terrible conflict that ultimately led to the US military bolstering the Houthi rebels who are currently attacking US ships in the Red Sea.

Social scientists have a phrase that covers this trend: moral hazard. It defines a dynamic in which a great power pledges to defend an ally who has a revisionist streak, i .e., a wayward ally seeking to change the status quo or change the established order, while encouraging reckless deeds.

And nowhere else in the Middle East causes more of a pain for Washington than moral risks. Israel has ignored or undermined US pressure over the past year to lower the battle in Gaza and then, Lebanon, thanks to the country’s vast security umbrella and impenetrable support offered by the US.

As an expert on relationships and the Middle East region, I am aware of the high costs already paid to the United States and will almost definitely go up if Israel continues to hostile, which could result in Iran becoming a hot conflict from its place mostly on the sidelines.

What appears to be lacking in the US’s ability to have Israel adhere to its pleas to de-escalate is another political principle that has, it is argued, worked abroad: proper ambiguity.

No gash in US’s impenetrable support

The US-Israeli marriage is grounded on two fundamental principles: an alliance seeking to change the status quo and a strong great-power commitment to that alliance’s protection.

US President Joe Biden has frequently reiterated the country’s “ironclad devotion to the safety of Israel” since Hamas-led attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023.

Israel has for its part stated its intention to physically and physically end Hamas and, perhaps, Hezbollah, reestablish Israel’s lacked of deterrence following the Hamas attack.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu just said,” We did take whatever action is necessary to restore stability.

I believe that this balancing act between an Jewish commitment to US security and Israeli intentions to completely destroy its allies is creating a moral hazard, which makes Israeli actions appear to conflict with US wishes.

For instance, Biden instructed Israel to launch surgical strikes and stop a significant ground invasion in northeastern Gaza immediately after the October 7 attack. Two weeks later, Israel did the opposite, launching its cruelly dangerous strategy.

Therefore, on May 5, 2024, Biden informed Netanyahu that an invasion of Rafah would be a “red collection.” The next day, Israel did just that.

In addition, Israeli killings, voicemail attacks, and stubbornness at the negotiating table have repeatedly undermined efforts by Washington to broker a peace in Gaza and stop a battle with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The Jewish government’s refusal to listen to its far larger alliance has sparked outrage in the United States. Washington has done very little to indicate, however, that it will ever reverse its commitment to protecting Israel, regardless of what.

The harm to the US from this moral risk is now already felt. Israel has received billions of dollars in fresh security assistance from Washington, sending further US troops to the area, and defending Israel for the first time ever from an Iranian direct attack.

In addition, three Americans have died and many more have been injured in the more than 200 missile strikes by Iranian-backed proxy as a result of the increase of the issue.

And a higher price may appear. There have been initial concerns that the conflict in Gaza might ignite a full-fledged regional conflict, with Iran stepping up in the fight in a significant way.

Iran has reportedly resisted doing so, but it is significant that its occasional missile attacks on Israel have come after Jewish actions that have taken place allegedly without the consent of its US protector, first in response to an Israeli embassy attack in Damascus, then in response to a main offensive against Tehran’s principal proxy in the region, Hezbollah.

A Taiwan unit for Israel?

The issue is not whether Israel is acting in a certain way to defend itself, but rather whether it is doing so without the US’s visible consent and frequently against Washington’s wishes. In addition, Israel is acting in this way knowing that its behavior will not be enough to weaken US security, which shields Israel from the full effects of its activities.

But, what would mitigate this political social hazard? The truth, I believe, is corporate confusion. Friends are forced to reconsider acting in ways that may be foolish when great forces make their pledges to allies more confusing.

The US’s security devotion to Taiwan is a typical example.

The Bush administration’s commitment to protect Taiwan from an war by Communist China and strengthen Taipei’s sense of security increased in the first few years. The shift backfired, Taiwan’s leader, Chen Shui-bian, used the US vow to start a plan for Chinese democracy, which significantly&nbsp, ratcheted up tension&nbsp, with China and, for a time, deepened antagonism between Beijing and Washington.

The Bush administration returned to the proper confusion that had governed the US’s China legislation since the 1970s in an effort to reduce Chinese moral hazard.

Bush achieved this by formally stating in 2003 that he opposed any changes to Taiwan’s or China’s status quo. Then he refrained from stating what the US would do to prevent it or what constituted a violation of the status quo.

The confusion worked: Taiwan backed away from democracy, and conflicts with China calmed.

Taiwan-style proper misunderstanding may, I believe, offer a better model for the Middle East today. A less sure pledge that the US simply “reserves the right” to protect Israel at its own choosing might help to reinforce the cautions against an escalation that have been made in Washington but have been so much ignored in Israel.

Charles Walldorf is professor of politics and foreign affairs, Wake Forest University

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

Continue Reading

The US has unveiled a next-generation air-to-air missile, signaling a potent new weapon to counter China’s expanding Anti-Access/Area-Denial ( A2/AD ) strategies around Taiwan and the wider South China Sea.

This quarter, The War Zone reported the US Navy has confirmed the existence of the AIM-174 weapon, an air-launched version of the SM-6 surface-to-air weapon that marks a innovative section in its long-range security features.

Following reports of sightings during US Navy exercises in 2024, including images of Super Hornet aircraft carrying the missile during Hawaii’s Rim of the Pacific ( RIMPAC ) war games, the missile was first made publicly known.

The AIM-174, with an estimated collection of 320 meters, provides superior air-to-air, anti-ship and ballistic missile intrusion features, extending beyond the reach of lineage marine missile systems.

The weapon is described as a part of the US Navy’s wider effort to combat China’s growing propensity to thwart US troops ‘ capability to invade critical areas through a network of anti-ship arms, long-range ballistic missiles, and supersonic risks, according to The War Zone.

According to the cause, the AIM-174 allows US Navy airplane to employ targets at intense ranges beyond device awareness, leveraging advanced “kill web” systems that utilize connected sensor data from various air, sea and space-based platforms.

The US Navy’s defensive and offensive abilities in the Pacific drama are significantly improved by its advantages, especially in situations involving a possible conflict with China over Taiwan or the South China Sea, despite The War Zone’s claim that the rocket’s full capabilities remain defined.

The AIM-174 is anticipated to be crucial in extending the US Navy’s reach and shielding carrier strike groups from increasingly sophisticated Chinese threats as it enters service.

A” shooting the archer” approach allows the AIM-174 to be used, removing missile carriers before they can strike US carrier battlegroups or Pacific bases.

In November 2022, Asia Times reported that China’s strategic bomber, the Xian H-6K, was discovered carrying a brand-new, air-launched hypersonic ballistic missile, possibly a CM-401, highlighting its A2/AD and standoff strike capabilities against US forces and bases in the Pacific. The missile has formidable combat characteristics, including a speed of up to Mach 6 and a range of 290 kilometers, with the ability to perform terminal diving attacks.

The H-6 K’s air launch capability significantly extends the missile’s range and performance. Similar to Russia’s Kinzhal hypersonic missile, the H-6K underscores China’s strategy to diversify its hypersonic weapon platforms, including ship and road-mobile launchers, to counter US and allied forces.

By putting its own personal touch on modern air defenses, China’s hypersonic advancements aim to deter adversaries and pose a significant threat to US military installations in Guam and Wake Island.

Aside from targeting missile carriers, the AIM-174 can be used to hit large, slow and vulnerable high-value aerial targets such as tankers, airborne warfare and control ( AEW&amp, C ) and special mission aircraft. These could include sophisticated airborne electronic warfare platforms.

Last month, Asia Times mentioned that China’s Y-9LG airborne electronic warfare platform, with its “balance beam” radar, can disrupt enemy communications, radar and navigation systems while gathering intelligence on threat emitters.

This platform, which entered service with the People’s Liberation Army-Air Force ( PLAAF ) in early 2023, operates from a standoff position similar to the US Air Force’s EC-37B Compass Call.

The Y-9LG’s deployment underscores China’s strategic investment in airborne standoff intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ( ISR ) and airborne early warning and control ( AEW&amp, C ) systems. This development is a part of China’s wider plan to improve its ability to use electronic weapons and establish information dominance in potential conflict scenarios, particularly in the Pacific.

However, the AIM-174’s reliance on kill webs may also be its vulnerability. Nicholas O’Donoughue and other authors claim in a January 2021 RAND report that the vulnerabilities of US kill chains and kill webs are a result of their reliance on networked systems and information sharing across various platforms.

O’Donoughue and others emphasize that a break in any part of this chain, such as sensors, communication links or decision-making processes, could disrupt the entire chain’s functionality.

According to them, vulnerability makes US kill chains and kill webs susceptible to cyberattacks, electronic warfare, and other disruptive technologies that aim to attack the chain’s weakest links. The traditional linear kill chain in the US is becoming more sophisticated “kill webs,” where data from various sensors and shooters are distributed across different domains to create more adaptable and resilient systems.

O’Donoughue and others point out, however, that these kill webs are also vulnerable because of their greater complexity. They make the case that effective real-time data synchronization and integration are required for distributed kill chains that involve a number of sensors and platforms. They point out that failures in these areas can cause delays or inaccurate targeting, which could allow adversaries to exploit system gaps.

In line with targeting US kill chains or kill webs, Joel Wuthnow, in a March 2023 presentation for the Institute for National Strategic Studies ( INSS), mentions that China’s” system destruction warfare” concept represents the core of the People’s Liberation Army’s ( PLA ) modern operational strategy.

Wuthnow makes note of the doctrine’s intention to defuse an enemy’s capacity to conduct coordinated operations. According to Wuthnow, it targets critical operational systems, including command structures, reconnaissance intelligence, firepower and support capabilities, using both kinetic and non-kinetic methods.

He makes the claim that China’s goal is to disrupt crucial decision-making processes in adversary systems through coordinated strikes, which could involve sophisticated precision weapons to devastate key command and control nodes, electronic warfare, and cyberattacks.

He notes that the PLA’s focus on “multi-domain precision warfare” further exemplifies its reliance on emerging technologies, such as AI and big data, to enhance these attacks.

Wuthnow points out that the PLA’s modernization efforts, including new hardware like the J-20 stealth fighters, Type-055 cruisers and advanced missiles equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles, are geared toward enhancing its system destruction capabilities.

He claims that these developments are in line with China’s strategic goals for 2027-2049, which highlights the importance of information warfare and joint combatants in its military operations.

He claims that even with the PLA making strides in these areas, institutional laggards like centralized decision-making and limited joint experience may still present challenges.

Continue Reading

Iran and Israel are at battle. In reality, the two parties have been fighting for years, but the conflict has mostly occurred under secret and covert operations.

The nature of the conflict has been altered by the new actions of both sides in this again” dark battle.” It is not evident that de-escalation is on the ocean.

On October 1, 2024, Iran launched a large, clear strike against Israel notionally in punishment for Israel’s two assassinations of Hamas head Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s chief, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.

In six weeks, there was a second storm like that. According to many accounts, Israel was not seriously harmed by the preceding Persian invasion on April 13 that included over 300 missile and cruise missile launches and strike robots.

Israel’s quick military answer therefore, an attack against a single developed Egyptian air defense system in the Isfahan state, was somewhat measured. Perhaps because of this, and good in part because of US encouragement of restraint.

The measured change from April was widely seen as a sign that both parties would prefer to de-escalate instead than engage in continuous open warfare. However, additional Israeli military operations that followed have sparked escalatory Iranian military actions, thereby bringing the issue back into focus.

Israel’s military leaders announced in June that they were “ready to face” Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Palestinian militant group whose frequent jet attacks against north Israel have prompted tens of thousands of people to evacuate the area after Hamas ‘ capabilities and authority were undermined in the Gaza Strip.

Israel spins north

Israel’s tilt from Gaza toward Lebanon coincided with the July 31, 2024, death of Hamas ‘ social commission president, Haniyeh, during his remain in Tehran. The purported Jewish activity was seen as an affront to Iran’s autonomy. The domestic security apparatus of Iran was exposed through an embarrassment as well, which highlighted its fragility and absorption.

Even though Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei&nbsp, vowed a “harsh response” &nbsp, against Israel, by September, Iran had taken no action.

Many Middle Eastern analysts were unsure whether the Egyptian response would actually materialize and, in turn, what it would mean for Khamenei’s commitment to his proxies due to Tehran’s inaction.

If Iran’s command did choose caution following the assassination of Hamas ‘ leading political figure, the same could not be said of its response to Israel’s microfluidic operation against Hezbollah in the middle of September.

Israel launched a covert operation to create chaos and confusion in Hezbollah’s authority through the use of damaged violent communication devices. Israel finally carried out attacks eliminating Hezbollah’s top officials including Nasrallah.

The Israeli army next launched what the country’s officials describe as a “limited]ground ] activity” into southern Lebanon to reduce Hezbollah posts along the northern borders.

Many Middle Eastern experts and even Iranian military leaders believed that Tehran’s October 1 attack against Israel was primarily a retaliation for the two ostensible assassinations against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.

These were certainly key factors. But as an expert on Iran’s defense strategy, I argue that Iran’s leaders also felt compelled to attack Israel for three equally, if not more important, reasons: to slow Israel’s advance in Lebanon, to save face, and to restore deterrence.

Challenging Israel’s advance

Iran wants to halt and possibly reverse Israel’s efforts to defeat Hezbollah, especially as it launches ground forces into southern Lebanon. Israeli ground forces must now battle what is perhaps the most effective guerrilla fighting force in the world, which successfully fought the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2006 with success.

Israel’s strategy and operational planning and execution ability are far superior to that of Hezbollah, despite the fact that it is still in the middle of a localized war and even after Israel’s leaders announced its intention to engage in it.

And that is a major blow to Iran’s view of the Islamic Republic as its” Axis of Resistance “‘s crown jewel.

In this respect, the Oct. 1 retaliatory strike by Iran can be seen as an attempt to afford Hezbollah time to appoint replacement leadership, regroup and organize against Israel’s ground invasion.

The brutal art of save face?

Additionally, it aids Iran in preserving its face, particularly in how other parts of its external proxy network view it.

Orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC – Tehran’s primary arm for coordinating external operations – Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support enabled and encouraged the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack against Israel – even, as it has claimed, Iran had no prior warning of the assault.

Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. With many of its members either dead or hiding and unable to launch a coherent offensive campaign, causing Israel’s military leaders to claim that Hamas has been successfully overthrown as a threat, has undoubtedly contributed to this lack of support.

Unsurprisingly, Iran is glad to enable Palestinians to fight Tehran’s enemies and absorb the human costs of war, because this arrangement primarily benefits the Islamic Republic.

Once the fighting in Gaza started, the IRGC was nowhere to be found.

Iran ca n’t afford to sit back and watch now that Israel has turned its attention to Lebanon and achieved a number of initial tactical victories against Hezbollah. For two main reasons. First, a year of fighting in Gaza has demonstrated that Israel is willing to take any threat that might exist along its borders, including a willingness to withstand the pressure of international political pressure or to operate within Iran’s borders.

Second, other Iranian proxy organizations are monitoring Iran to see if Tehran will continue to support them or to step down, as it appears to have done with Hamas.

Reclaiming deterrence

Perhaps above all, in Tehran’s calculus over how to respond is Iran’s need to restore a deterrence.

The two defining features of Iran’s interrelated external, or “forward defense“, and deterrence strategies is its regional network of militant proxies and its long-range weapons arsenal, which includes a large number of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones.

In two ways, these Iranian defense tactics aim to deter enemies from attacking Iran: first, by imposing a punishment on Israel and other regional US allies with proxy militia or long-range weapon attacks, and second, by providing scapegoat targets for Iran’s enemies to launch their anger. In effect, Iran’s proxy forces act as proxy targets that pay the costs for Iran’s hostile policies.

Iran’s ability to deter attacks against the country is threatened by Israel’s continued support for Hamas and its ongoing operations against it. For the Islamic Republic’s leaders, this is an unacceptable risk.

Who plays the next move?

The leaders of Iran are likely to have been motivated by these interconnected imperatives to launch a second significant, direct missile attack on Israel on October 1. It is unknown how successful the strike will be in achieving any of Tehran’s goals.

Despite unverified cellphone videos that show several ballistic missiles detonating after reaching land in Israel, the Islamic Republic claimed that as many as 90 % of the ballistic missiles hit their intended targets.

What is almost certain, however, is that this will not be the last move in the conflict. Israel’s operation in Lebanon is unlikely to stop until it accomplishes its goals for border security. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has threatened to punish Iran for its most recent retaliatory attack.

In response to this warning, the IRGC leaders issued a counter-warrant of their own, saying that Iran will once more engage in unspecified” crushing and destructive attacks” if Israel militarily responds to the October 1 attack.

Rhetorically, neither side is backing down, militarily this may be true, too. Make no mistake, this is a war. The nature and scope of Israel’s next move will determine how the war with Iran develops.

Aaron Pilkington is a Fellow at the University of Denver’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

How China extended its suppression into an American city was the title of a new Washington Post article.

The Post claims that anti-China organizations who turned out to protest Xi’s visit were violently attacked at the 2023 APEC summit in San Francisco by Chinese American community leaders and leaders who allegedly met under the leadership of the Communist Party of China ( CPC ) during the visit. &nbsp,

This, the Post states, was all part of a Chinese political gloomy tale of international repression, directing those within” diaspora groups” to thwart rebel anti-China voices elsewhere. &nbsp, But the exact opposite is true.

In reality, it is the billionaire-owned Washington Post that is quashing the free speech of regular Americans in support of the Washington leadership’s dangerous new Cold War plan. &nbsp,

What truly happened&nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

Let’s look at what actually happened at the APEC mountain, the funding resources for anti-China organizations like the Hong Kong Democracy Council and Individuals for a Free Tibet, and the Post’s exceptional use of facial recognition technology to identify and objective leaders in the Chinese American society.

As an observer of a conflict between the anti-China parties and the Xi welcomers, I witnessed the exact reverse of what the Washington Post claims. The anti-China protest were the most well-trained and organized organization I have always witnessed.

All these photos and videos that they produced? We did everything to them, but they charged into our traces, threatened us and created conflict. Finally, at the height of the conflict, they began filming on their smartphones and telling fabricated accounts of our attacks. They edited the picture to make it appear as though they were recording it on camera. &nbsp,

When mainstream media reframes events to support a predetermined anti-China narrative, you see an extremely advanced information operation exclusively designed to provoke also peaceful welcomers. &nbsp, &nbsp,

In other words, this was a very sophisticated and organized activity that adhered to a formula used by the US creation. In an effort to achieve a significant propaganda victory, it skillfully combined resources, systems, and complex training of a relatively modest team of provocateurs. &nbsp, &nbsp,

There were a number of different verbal exchanges between the anti-China activists and the Xi welcomers. Here, we’ll study two examples tightly.

The aircraft bridge incident&nbsp,

One incident occurred at a gate close to the road where Xi was scheduled to take his return to China from the aircraft. Xi welcomers were waving Chinese banners and were standing on the gate wall facing the path. &nbsp,

Eventually, the anti-China activists brought their unique Hong Kong and Tibetan banners onto the bridge. Then, they suddenly turned and&nbsp, charged&nbsp, into the Xi welcomers from behind, trying to push the welcomers apart and capture their location on the bridge wall. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Here’s a picture of that fee taken at that moment: &nbsp,

You can see how the Xi welcomers were completely caught off guard as the anti-China demonstrators gathered behind them and swarmed into their rates. &nbsp,

A fresh Tibetan rebel vehemently pushed her manner through our lines. The Tibetan woman aggressively pushed our people aside, all the time yelling”, Do n’t touch me, do n’t touch me! ” as she was actually pushing her way through us. &nbsp,

They were extremely skilled at playing the victim while really being the aggressors, especially when making videotapes. It looked evidently rehearsed. &nbsp,

The young Tibetan activist girl placed herself in a position of encirclement, pushing past all of us, and coming to the front of the bridge wall, away from her own citizens. This was great for their video.

She kept yelling”, Do n’t touch me! ” the whole day pretending to be the target, &nbsp, i. electronic. that of a young girl fenced in by her political critics, a tremendous advertising video for their area. &nbsp, &nbsp,

The anti-China protesters started recording on their phones while dictating a clearly fraudulent, prepared script that claimed the Xi welcomers started the conflict, even though the welcomers were actually caught off guard and ambushed from behind, waiting until the two sides were locked together facing each other.

The conflict lasted until the police arrived, perhaps an hour later, and finally divided the two parties. &nbsp,

Fake” Yellow Emperor”

Another incident was recorded by the anti-China protesters themselves and posted on Radio Free Asia:

]embedded content]

If you look&nbsp, closely, you first see a Xi welcomer ( wearing a red scarf ) down on the ground with another man – an anti-China protester – on top of him, while other Xi welcomers ( wearing red items ) try to pull him off. Then a larger man in a yellow Chinese emperor costume&nbsp, charges in&nbsp, and punches a smaller Xi welcomer. &nbsp, &nbsp,

This is followed by anti-China protesters trying to&nbsp, forcibly&nbsp, seize the Chinese flags away from some Xi welcomers, followed by the larger man in a yellow costume again charging in.

The anti-China protesters keep moving in on them, much like the situation on the bridge to the airport road, and the Xi welcomers wearing red items and holding Chinese flags are pushed up against a railing behind them.

Hong Kong terror comes to America&nbsp,

The anti-China protesters ‘ 2023 APEC summit’s tactics were far more sophisticated than those that are typically employed by either the left or the right in the United States. &nbsp,

These tactics, however, are in line with those employed in the 2019 Hong Kong riots, which involved violent rioters attacking anyone who disagrees with them for ten months. &nbsp, &nbsp,

The Hong Kong Democracy Council, one of the organizations that supported the 2019 rioters in Hong Kong, was one of the groups that spearheaded the Xi welcomers ‘ attacks on the US, which has been accused of having ties to the US Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ).

The anti-China protesters merely introduced those strategies to the US. The South China Morning Post documented the riots in their nine-minute video summary”, A year of anti-government protests in Hong Kong”: &nbsp,

]embedded content]

The tactics used in this demo were basically a&nbsp, version of what occurred in Hong Kong in 2019, only without the thousands of&nbsp, rocks, umbrellas and firebombs ( Molotov cocktails ) that they used in Hong Kong. But the lies, choreographed and taped provocations, &nbsp, and the aggressors faking being the victims are the same game.

The mainstream media here, like the Western media in Hong Kong, was a weaponized accessory to this violence: completely biased, framing the rioters as peaceful protesters, ignoring evidence to the contrary, and acting as a propaganda multiplier for their violence. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Nury Vittachi ‘s&nbsp, book, &nbsp” ,The Other Side of the Story: A Secret War in Hong Kong,” &nbsp, documents these tactics in great detail: &nbsp,

Who were the Xi welcomers? They were senior citizens of the Chinese American community, many of whom had no history of violence or aggression, who arrived to welcome the president of China meeting with the president of the United States and who hoped for peace between their new and old nations. &nbsp, &nbsp,

The anti-China protesters were mostly young people. Would a group of many senior citizens attack a group of teenagers? It does n’t make sense. &nbsp,

This is extreme hypocrisy on the part of the Washington Post, not to mention journalistic malpractice. It is using its support for transnational rioters from Hong Kong and Tibet to silence Chinese Americans who are exercising their free speech exactly what it was accusing these innocent seniors of doing. It did so using unethical, police state-like methods, including the use of facial recognition technology. &nbsp,

Chinese Americans who came out have stated that the spotlight placed on them by the Washington Post article has made them anxious to speak freely. This kind of media lynching not only silences Chinese Americans, but also makes them feel like they’re on their backs. &nbsp,

Due to anti-China propaganda, Chinese and Asian people have already experienced terrible physical attacks. This will make things worse, putting all Asian Americans in real danger, not just for Chinese Americans. &nbsp,

Repressive methods, repressive goals&nbsp,

How the Washington Post created the report is one of the most significant and astounding aspects of this story. &nbsp, &nbsp,

The Washington Post deployed facial recognition technology&nbsp, to surveil, identify – and slander – Chinese American community members exercising their free speech. The use of facial recognition technology is a flawed, imperfect biometric that courts have largely outlawed. Without science, it is what experts refer to as a forensic.

According to a 2019 article from The Washington Post, facial recognition is unreliable because it can contain bias and errors. White men are more likely than men from other races to be misidentified 100 times more often than men from China and Africa. &nbsp,

In fact, many countries, states and cities, including San Francisco, have banned the use of facial recognition technology by their government departments. In the EU, it is completely prohibited. &nbsp,

In particular, it was prohibited in San Francisco to stop the abuse the Washington Post article described as intended to stop organized crime from utilizing it to identify and target people at large gatherings who are legitimately exercising their constitutional rights. &nbsp,

The US mainstream media’s support of quasi-police state actions in the name of a one-sided anti-China agenda is chilling. One of the anti-China demonstrators was the only one who was detained on the scene by the San Francisco police and charged with numerous counts of serious felonies for beating and seriously injuring a member of the Chinese American community, according to The Post. &nbsp,

New McCarthy era

This is all a part of a new McCarthy era in America that bans all forms of dissent and silences free speech. Just as Senator&nbsp, Joseph McCarthy&nbsp, persecuted dissident Americans during Cold War 1, the establishment is now doing the same in today’s new Cold War 2. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Nancy Pelosi, a member of Congress, recently urged the FBI to look into Code Pink as Chinese agents in protest of the genocide in Gaza. Three members of a Black Socialist group, the Uhuru 3, were charged with being Russian agents and put on trial in September 2024 for allegedly opposing the Ukrainian War.

Young university students who are protesting the Gaza war are being detained and prohibited from going back to school. And Chinese American scientists were arrested under Trump’s” China Initiative,” which may be reinitiated soon. &nbsp,

These are dangerous, repressive times to be an American. The crackdown has the makings of an all-out war against free speech and dissent, sparing no individual, group or media platform that puts forth a perspective different from Washington’s official line. &nbsp, &nbsp,

This totalitarian approach, silencing opposition groups to manufacture consent, history shows is often a precursor to war or harbinger of fascism, or both. &nbsp,

To combat this, we should band together and work together to oppose this with all of our efforts. And we should call out corrupt media that seeks to oppress and erode our rights. If we do not stand together, we will all be picked off individually. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Former Veterans For Peace national vice president Michael Wong currently sits on its national board. He co-chairs the China Working Group for Veterans For Peace and is one of Pivot To Peace’s co-founders.

He has been published in the anthologies”, Veterans of War, Veterans of Peace, “edited by Maxine Hong Kingston”, A Matter of Conscience,” by William Short and Willa Seidenberg, and in” Waging Peace in Vietnam, “edited by Ron Carver, David Cortright, and Barbara Doherty.

He is also featured in the documentary film”, Sir! No Sir! is a retired social worker with a Master of Social Work degree, and she is” about the GI anti-war movement from the Vietnam era.” &nbsp,

Continue Reading

In their most recent book, the first independent investigation into military administrative abuse in the American Defence Force, Ben Wadham and James Connor explain that “participants expected the costs of war, but they were not prepared for the prices of service.”

Warrior, Soldier, Brigand draws on interviews with almost 70 victims and analyses every review and investigation into military society ( 35 in full ) since the Vietnam War.

It’s a heartbreaking accounts of more than a century of common administrative misuse in Australia’s military forces. Brutality was carefully inflicted on young recruits, who were beaten, violated and humiliated under the justification of “bastardization”. In a hypersexualized culture, sexism and gender-based crime were widespread.

Women were constantly at risk of sexual abuse from their bosses and peers. This misuse was often compounded by a” next assault”, where patients were punished for reporting, with managerial abuse and “mob fairness”.

The terms “warrior, soldier, brigand”, which describe different military identities, are contested ( as the authors concede ). The Brereton review, which found” reliable” data to indict 25 current or former American special forces personnel in the immoral dying of 39 people in Afghanistan, also found that alleged war criminals self-identified as “warrior champions”.

However, these terms are not used by the authors to explain their findings. They use the key values they identify in Australian military culture: martial, fraternal and exceptional. These values, they show, are twisted into an obsession with violence, exclusivity and elitism within the Australian Defence Force.

The book begins by outlining the” character of military institutional abuse” before focusing on different kinds of abuse in three eras: bastardization ( 1969–87 ), gender-based violence ( 1987–96 ), and administrative abuse and military justice reform ( 1996–2011 ). This violence, the authors write, serves to maintain the military institution.

The Australian Defence Force’s cultural analyses from 2011 to 2022 are the focus of the final two chapters. They provide insight into survivors ‘ experiences of abuse as well as how patterns of abuse continue to exist today. Finally, the book explores the ethicalness of international organizations like the Australian Defence Force.

Hazing or torture?

Bastardization is described as a form of fraternal violence. It brutalizes those perceived to be inferior to foster a brotherhood that is “exclusive, defensive, and aggressive in sustaining its dominance”.

The authors trace the origins of bastardization to “fagging” at British private schools, a custom that used older boys to treat younger boys as servants and obediently humiliated them. Similar practices immediately emerged when the Royal Military College was established at Duntroon in 1911.

Bastardization is based on the idea that separating people allows them to be reunited as a whole. These hazing rituals foster lifelong bonds between the perpetrators:” As young men advance in rank and status, their brotherhood extends to ADF leadership and governance.”

The details of bastardization are horrific. Many times I believed the term” torture” would have been more appropriate to describe the physical, sexual, and psychological abuse Australian service personnel were subject to by one another.

Collective hazing rituals included being tied to moving vehicles, covered in foul chemicals, forced to eat bodily waste, thrown off ladders and tables with fire hoses, and belted with knotted wet towels and belts. Blanket bashings, sleep deprivation and gang rape were described as routine.

Sexual violence was particularly pronounced. Basetardization is “heavily invested in certain body parts,” including forcing victims to sex with superiors, injuring genitalia, and penetrating body parts with objects. According to Wadham and Connor, ADF members must” choose between being a victim or an offender” because they frequently “escape being the victim of violence.”

The authors excluded “lower levels of bastardization” from their study because” they are generally intended for training”. In this sense, the book parallels the Brereton report, in which only clear-cut cases of war crimes were examined and “fog of war” incidents were excluded.

Yet, just as examining “fog of war” incidents reveals how deliberate war crimes were disguised as legitimate operations, examining how these “lower levels” of violence developed, operate, and are justified would reveal how brutality evolved to become standard practice in ADF training.

Date rape, morning porn and ‘ survivor sex ‘

In the 1980s, women constituted 6.5 % of the ADF. By the 1990s, that percentage had nearly doubled, and today, women make up around 20 % of the Australian military.

Sexual violence against women was becoming more prevalent in the ADF as the gender dynamics changed. Wadham and Connor argue the growing presence of women intensified the sexualized culture of the military to reiterate the “white, hypermasculinist” fraternity.

A method of humiliation and reputation destruction was used during the date rape. Sexual assault was often done by superiors, in view of other serving members, and always followed by a” code of silence, victim-blaming and discouragement from commanders and military police”. One interviewee sought support after being assaulted, but was warned by the military psychologist:” Defense does n’t look fondly on people that see a psychologist”.

Some women were coerced into” survival sex” in exchange for protection due to constant threats and acts of violence from peers. In one of the book’s most heartbreaking testimonies, a young aviator was forced into sleeping with her sergeant for years to stop other abuse. Then I learned that he was actually responsible for the years-long stalking and sexual assault that had taken place.

A deeply misogynistic culture supported sexual violence against women. Harassment of women was a “daily occurrence” in the 1980s. By the 1990s, women reported practices such as “pornos in the mornos” – watching porn at morning tea in communal spaces.

Harassment and intimidation continue to this day: in 2018, one woman claimed she was” choosing not to eat, not go out, not do any sites” to avoid the executive officer who was constantly harassing her. When she reported him, she was informed that” I would have had a better case if I had allowed it to advance to rape.”

More than 300 abusive terms that reduced women to literal sexual objects were included in a 1993 book of cadet slang, according to Wadham and Connor. These included:” a body to wank into, cum bucket, fuck bag, life support system for a cunt”. This language was taught daily and was steeped in the culture from the top down.

One veteran claimed that her instructor “would talk about how to get the daughter thrown in for a dollar and where to get the cheapest sex in Asia.” The authors analyze the function of banter in the military, explaining that “lingo” works to” create a shared culture” but can also be used to “target, exclude, belittle”. The sexualized “banter” was frequently used to stifle women and was” the first step in creating cultures of abuse and violence” ( p. 1 ).

The book’s focus on gender dynamics in the military is a key strength. However, race is not afforded the same scrutiny.

Wadham and Connor stress the whiteness of the Australian military identity and acknowledge the deaths of non-white soldiers ( suicide and murder ). However, more research on the racial dynamics of institutional abuse would have helped, especially given the strategic significance of ADF-placed cultural diversity.

Punishing the victims

The ADF’s prevalence of administrative abuse, known as a” second assault” after reporting physical or sexual abuse, is one of its most important findings. This intentionally plagiarizes the hierarchy and disciplinary frameworks in order to punish those who violate silence.

This top-down abuse is often reinforced with “mob justice” in the form of alienation, harassment, sabotage and physical violence by peers. Anyone who has the guts to speak out about institutional violence is intended to be broken by administrative abuse. It demonstrates institutional aversion to handling other forms of abuse.

The overwhelming evidence of administrative abuse in the book contradicts the ADF’s claim that it is promoting cultural change and weeding out “bad apples.”

Wadham and Connor show that the ADF has overlooked, condoned, minimized and covered up widespread institutional abuse” for more than a century”. They come to the conclusion that the ADF simply “tinkers around the edges” when responding to scandals. Efforts at redress, they conclude, were poorly implemented.

The Defence Abuse Task Force response, for instance, was described by the ADF Association’s Victims of Abuse as “more concerned with keeping a lid on things than fully supporting victims” after the Skype sex scandal in 2011.

Ongoing efforts toward military reform, they say, are more about” slowing scrutiny and defusing critique” than addressing the core problems. Meanwhile, they show that cultures of bastardization, gender-based violence and mob justice persist at Duntroon.

A damning indictment

Warrior, Soldier, Brigand is a damning indictment of the Australian Defence Force. Many survivors endured excruciating trauma and were forced to leave their jobs by an organization that purports to protect Australians. Many did not survive.

The book shows that military institutional abuse weakens Australia’s defense capability. Individuals are incapable of focusing on their work because they are aggressive toward peers and superiors. Many are forced to leave the service – either by discharge, or suicide.

Institutional abuse breeds a military force that is more likely to use excessive and unlawful violence among those who remain. The authors also question whether an ethical military could exist, but their own research suggests that the Australian military has n’t tried.

Mia Martin Hobbs is research fellow, Deakin University

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading