Tariffs targeting China and Mexico can’t solve US fentanyl crisis – Asia Times

About 6 % of the US population regularly uses illegal medications, compared to more than anyone else in the world.

One of these drugs, fentanyl, a synthetic opioid that is 50 to 100 times more potent than morphine, is the main cause of the rise in US overdose incidents in recent years. Although recent fentanyl overdose deaths have decreased a little, they are also significantly higher than they were only five years ago.

Ending the fentanyl problems won’t be easy. The U.S. has a decades-long addiction problem, which predates the development of fentanyl, and many attempts to regulate, constitutional, and confine people to drug use have had little impact. Americans are only a victim of the narcotic crisis, which costs them tens of billions of dollars annually.

President Donald Trump appears to be considering a new tool to combat America’s substance problem, trade policy, after previous policies that failed to stop fentanyl deaths.

Trump pledged to impose tariffs on Canada and Mexico if they don’t stop the flow of drugs across American territories during his plan. Trump also promised to implement a fresh tariff regime on China if it doesn’t act more to implement more restrictions on the production of the fentanyl-making substances. He reiterated his plan on his first day back in office, saying to reporters,” We’re thinking in terms of 25 % on Mexico and Canada because they’re allowing … fentanyl to come in”.

As a teacher who studies interpersonal plan, I believe that both the proposed transfer taxes and fentanyl pose significant risks to the US. The real issue is whether tariffs did work, or increase what is already a crisis, despite the unquestionable people toll of morphine.

Fentanyl: The’ second greatest problem ‘

More than 107, 000 Americans died from overdoses in 2021, making it the most of any overdose to date, and almost seven out of those incidents involved methadone or other chemical drugs. In 2022, methadone was killing an average of 200 folks each day. And despite a slight decline in fentanyl deaths in 2023, almost 75, 000 Americans still perished from synthetic opioids that time. The then-secretary of homeland security declared fentanyl to get” the single greatest challenge we face as a land” in March of that year, the most recent for which full-year data on overdose deaths is available.

However, record demonstrates that government efforts to stop drug use frequently fail miserably.

These plans have generally failed to reduce the supply and use of drugs, and they have also been known to seriously hurt people and communities of colour. For example, between 1980 and 1997, the number of detainment for nonviolent drug acts went from 50, 000 to 400, 000. But these guidelines barely put a dent in use. The share of high school seniors using drugs dipped only slightly over the same period, from 65 % in 1980 to 58 % in 1997.

In short, previous US efforts to reduce improper substance use haven’t been particularly successful. The US appears to be moving toward using taxes right now, but research suggests that those measures won’t produce better outcomes and may actually lead to significant damage.

Why taxes didn’t job

The Tax Act of 1789, which was passed in the United States, dates back to the beginning of its experimentation with levies. This much history has shown that protectionist policies, commercial subsidies, and tariffs can also cause global economic instability by raising prices for consumers. Additionally, story demonstrates that tariffs are ineffective as negotiating tools and fail to cause major policy changes in goal nations. The benefits of taxes are usually weighed against the costs, according to economists.

The average effective tariff rate on Chinese imports increased from 3 % to 11 % during Trump’s first term. However, while China’s imports decreased significantly, the total trade relationship didn’t significantly change: China continues to be the second-largest US supplier of goods.

Vietnam and various local nations with relatively low labor costs were benefitted by the levies. Basically, the tariffs on China caused production to change, with international companies investing billions of dollars in rival countries.

Trump has previously used industry plan to impose fentanyl on China; he did this in his first term. However, despite China‘s plan adjustments, such as adding fentanyl to its list of prohibited substances in 2019, morphine deaths in the US continued to rise. Already, China also ranks as the No. 1 maker of morphine precursors, or substances used to make illegal fentanyl. And there are others in the business: India, over that exact time, has become a major supplier of fentanyl.

A problem of supply and demand

Drug use has been a common practice throughout US story. And when you look at this story and examine how other countries are handling this issue without making it illegal, you discover that the Swiss and French have approached it as a potential habit issue. They realized that the illegal business is fueled by desire. And as any analyst will tell you, if you don’t restrict the desire, provide will find a way. That’s why care functions and bans don’t.

The US government’s ability to regulate these medicines ‘ production is at best limited. The issue is that fresh chemical products will continue to be developed. Basically, failure to restrict demand simply places dressings on hemorrhaging wounds. What the United States needs is a more comprehensive method of dealing with the requirement that is causing the medication crisis.

At Miami University, Rodney Coates is a professor of critical culture and cultural reports.

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Trump doesn’t talk softly, but does he carry a big stick? – Asia Times

Donald Trump, the president of the United States, claims to be an agent of great change both domestically and internationally. However, a closer examination of the possibility that he’ll overturn previous foreign policy decisions, including those made by his predecessor Joe Biden, suggests that the extent of his adjustments might not be in line with his New Golden Age language.

It’s unusual to change a plan from president to president. According to experts, free promises of remarkable shifts can be socially dangerous when they backfire.

” Across administrations—even people as diverse as those of Biden and Trump – foreign policy is something like an iceberg”, Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security, wrote lately. The apparent portion is sharp and gleaming, and it draws a lot of the attention. Yet it also has a much bigger and underexamined base, one that tends to be largely unchanged”.

Current examples of promises that were implied or broken were also present.

Clinton situation: China MFN position

Clinton, the Democratic Party’s nominee for president in 1991, accused the first President Bush of being smooth on China, disregarding its human rights record for business benefits, while running against Republican incumbent George H. W. Bush. Clinton vowed to be more tough.

He was no.

Shortly after Clinton’s arrival in Washington, human rights came in second place, trailing only American businesspeople’s desire to capitalize on Chinese trading. Clinton offered China the&nbsp, business benefits conferred by most-favored-nation position, which guarantees non-discriminatory care between business associates. China may benefit from just making a small political movement or two at home.

The petition was rejected by Chinese officials. Clinton provided MFN anyhow.

Obama scenario: Arab chemical arms

President Barak Obama issued a stern warning to Palestinian leader Bashar al-Assad not to use chemical arms against rebels in 2012 after he had begun his second term in office. &nbsp, Doing so would mix a “red range” and result in serious US military action.

A year later, Assad bombarded pro-democracy residents with hazardous chemicals, and killed some 1, 400 people, women and children. Obama only laid the blame on the US Congress for forogling military actions.

Trump has three significant pieces of executive power left over from the previous leadership: the end of the Gaza conflict, forceful China in East Asia, and the Ukraine war. He might discover that politics benefits more from choice.

Then Ukraine

Biden vehemently supported Ukraine and decidedly detested Putin himself. In the runup to the November vote, Trump described Vladimir Putin as a “genius” and seemed ready to break with Biden plans.

Last year, however, Trump changed his tune. Acclaim for Putin morphed into mockery. ” It’s a ridiculous war”, he said of the Ukraine carnage. ” I think Russia’s going to be in big trouble”.

He said Putin is” not doing so well”, suggested that the Russian president’s leadership was” no way to run a state”. Trump said Putin had made a “big oversight” by invading Ukraine.

One important feature of his counterpart’s legislation that Trump now shared: opposiiton to sending US troops to fight the Russians.

Trump is inherited a pair of significant crises, aside from Russia, and it appears he is never considering making a reversal from current policies, including a belligerent China and a Middle Eastern conflict.

China

Washington’s reactions to the three governments have been careful because China has increased its threat to Taiwan and established marine isolation areas in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

Obama was concerned about China’s expanding economic dominance in the US market, but he frequently supported Beijing’s bourgeois stance. Nevertheless, he coined the phrase “pivot to China”, to attempt the US to bolster security in the Western Pacific.

Trump followed up during his 2017-2021 second phrase, and warned of increasing Chinese military strength. He claimed that Beijing was attempting to “displace the US in the Indo-Pacific area, expand the reach of its state-driven economic unit, and rearrange the region in its favour.” He increased US military spending by about 17 % compared to Obama’s.

In addition, Trump tried to rebalance US trade with China, an action that had little effect on China’s exports to the US ( they increased ) or American exports into China ( they decreased ).

After Biden took strength, he maintained and expanded Trump’s taxes. He even built on Trump’s and Obama’s China fears by &nbsp, beginning to revive traditional relationships along the China Seas and into the Pacific Ocean: with &nbsp, South Korea, Japan, The Philippines and Australia. Chinese leader Xi Jinping signaled his irritation with the move, accusing Biden of trying to” contain” China.

Trump has never spoken of undoing Biden’s job.

His choice of two China hawks to direct his foreign interests team, including new secretary of state Marco Rubio and former head of the country Michael Waltz, is widely regarded as strong on Beijing.

Rubio had a telephone conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and was informed in his post the week before being confirmed. The conversation centered on the” United States ‘ responsibility to our allies in the region.” According to a State Department consideration, he even expressed” critical concern over China’s aggressive behavior against Taiwan and in the South China Sea.”

Wang reacted with a dose of condescension-infused proper diplomacy. ” We will not help Taiwan to be separated from China”, Wang said. Wang finally added a term used by teachers to chastise rebellious kids,” I hope you will operate accordingly”, which roughly translates as “behave yourself”.

Waltz has praised Biden’s alliance building in Asia, a rare piece of praise in highly partisan Washington. Shortly after his nomination, he called China the “greatest adversary” of the United States.

Trump has yet to remark, or remake, one of Biden’s most surprising declarations. In a dozen statements, Biden pledged that if Beijing attacks Taiwan, which China considers its own, the US will militarily defend it. The statements violated almost a half-century of US” strategic ambiguity” intended to keep China guessing what the Americans would do if they invaded the island.

Middle East

Trump wants to put an end to the conflict between Israel and Hamas, the Islamist terror organization, in the Middle East. He supports Israel, which is one of the longest-lasting constants of US foreign policy. Nonetheless, he has expressed horror at the heavy death toll among Palestinians.

Trump and Bidden entered into a diplomatic partnership as he was getting ready to travel back to Washington. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu objected to Biden’s attempts to reach a truce despite the US administration sending naval warships to the Levantine coast to deter Iranian attacks on the Jewish state.

Trump worked to get Netanyahu to agree to a 42-day ceasefire, by adding enticements to the diplomatic pressure. Beyond anything Biden had to offer, both sweeteners went:

  • He would direct the US to levy sanctions on Netanyahu’s allies who occupy West Bank settlements and brutally assault Palestinian residents.
  • He also suggested a radical solution to the issues that Palestinians will encounter when they return to their severely damaged homes in the community. He suggested moving more than half of the two million people into Egypt and Jordan.

Trump said the exile could be for a short time or “long-term”.

The offers appealed to Netanyahu. A significant portion of the electorate supports his government, according to settlers. Moreover, Netanyahu has long favored” transfer” of Palestinians from both Gaza and the West Bank to Arab countries. He was once associated with an organization called” Jordan is Palestine, Inc”.

The neo-transfer idea died quickly. Egypt and Jordan rejected hosting expelled Palestinians.

The truce agreement, which includes an unrestricted Israeli exit from the Gaza Strip, may face problems in the future.

Ultra-nationalist members of Netanyahu’s government coalition are threatening to bring&nbsp, down the government. Hamas must be totally destroyed, they insist, and Israel forces must stay in the Gaza Strip for an open-ended period occupation, they said. They remarked that their demands were objectives that Netanyahu had set out.

If the Netanyahu government falls, it’s not clear if a new coalition can be built. The public at large wants Hamas destroyed. Elections would take time and undermine Trump’s desire to end the war immediately.

In short, it’s likely that Trump’s deal-making skill will face plenty of challenges before the Gaza war is over.

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Trump’s Columbia beatdown a message to China, Russia – Asia Times

Gustavo Petro, the president of Colombia, initially believed he would adjust strained relationships with his returning US rival by immediately rejecting two recently agreed military flights for the repatriation of his government’s illegal immigrants, but he was finally taught an unforgettable lesson.

Trump&nbsp, reacted with fury&nbsp, by threatening 25 % taxes that would twice in a year’s time and sanctions high-level officers on national security reasons among other disciplinary measures, which immediately prompted Petro&nbsp, to surrender.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt then&nbsp, confirmed&nbsp, her country’s triumph in its short dispute with Colombia, soon after which Petro&nbsp, rage-tweeted a complex rant&nbsp, about imperialism and racism as a parting shot against Trump that was frequently met with scorn online, particularly from Americans.

Trump’s handling of this brief-lived scandal was significant because he demonstrated how serious he is about using tariffs and sanctions to coerce Ibero-American nations into accepting the return of their repatriated citizens.

He won the 2016 election in part because of his campaign pledge to stop illegal immigration along the southern border, but after an estimated 8 million illegals flooded into the country during Biden’s term, he then promised to expulse as many as possible if voters returned him to power like they did in the end.

However, it’ll be challenging to return all of them, which is why his administration wants to coerce them into voluntarily resigning by making the most difficult conditions for those who remain.

In order to intimidate some of them into returning home on their own terms, ergo the importance of making sure these flights aren’t rejected by sending them back to their homelands on military flights, including what just happened to some illegal immigrants from Brazil.

In parallel with this, the Trump Administration is&nbsp, exploring an agreement&nbsp, to deport asylum seekers to El Salvador, which is now globally known for its zero-tolerance of gang members.

On the topic, US-sanctioned Venezuela&nbsp, halted&nbsp, repatriation flights last February after&nbsp, briefly allowing&nbsp, their resumption in October 2023, so suspected Venezuelan gang members might be sent straight from the US to Salvadoran prisons if a deal is reached.

People who remain in the US illegally will always have to look over their shoulders and be afraid of being deported back to their homelands or sent to El Salvador, depending on who they are, with an unprecedented ramping up of ICE raids across the country.

Trump’s harsh response to Petro’s rejection of those two previously agreed military flights is due to the fact that the Trump administration recognizes illegal immigration as a threat to national security.

If he didn’t inspire others to follow him, the majority of Ibero-American nations would, as one might expect, defy the US on this front as well, ruining his ambitious repatriation plans. Trump, therefore, had to remind Colombia and every other country in the hemisphere that they’re the US ‘ junior partner.

Failure to comply with its reasonable demands for repatriated citizens who illegally immigrated to the US will result in severe tariff and sanctions that will threaten their economies and severely inconvenience their political elite.

In what Trump called the nascent” Golden Age of America,” disrespecting Trump and the US personally as Petro did is completely unacceptable, and those who do so will be forced to pay the price, both politically and personally.

Regarding the assertion that every nation is supposed to be equal and must adhere to the same rules, the Biden administration falsely claimed that the so-called “rules-based order” was never what it was.

It was always about upholding the US’s declining unipolar hegemony in the emerging Multipolar World Order by strengthening the post-Old Cold War international hierarchy that dominated where it is now. To coax countries into meeting goals with varying success, a carrot-and-stick strategy pairs explicit double standards with.

Like most Ibero-American nations, those that are dependent on the US market and/or military equipment are more reliant on it, while those who are more autarkic and strategically independent are more receptive.

Trump is more direct than the Obama and Biden administrations, trying to hide this reality with lofty rhetoric and occasionally blinding its partners in ways like those Ibero-American nations that have previously refused to accept their repatriated citizens.

He doesn’t feel guilty about disclosing their junior status in the US because, per Machiavelli, he prefers his country to be feared over loved.

Additionally, Trump is preparing for&nbsp, negotiations with Putin&nbsp, over Ukraine as well as with Xi over trade and likely also Taiwan, so he’d appear weak in their eyes if he let middling leader like Petro publicly defy and even insult him without consequence. He became more aggressive with Colombia because of these demands.

The example that Trump just made out of Petro will, therefore, reverberate across the world. The” Golden Age of America,” as he affectionately describes it, is the US’s most extreme form of hyper-realism in foreign affairs, which explicitly declares its goals and aggressively pursues them without considering the opinions of other countries.

Thus, it might be better for Russia and China to&nbsp, compromise with the US&nbsp, instead of challenge it if they won’t replicate this policy, or if they lack the same power or will to use it.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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How DeepSeek did it – Asia Times

With the release of highly effective AI models that can compete with cutting-edge products from US companies like OpenAI and Anthropic, Chinese artificial intelligence ( AI ) company DeepSeek has shocked the tech industry.

With a fraction of the money and computing power of its competitors, DeepSeek, which was founded in 2023, has been able to achieve its goals.

DeepSeek’s “reasoning” R1 unit, released last week, provoked enthusiasm among academics, shock among shareholders, and reactions from AI heavyweights. A model that you work with both images and text was released on January 28th.

But what has DeepSeek done, and how did it do it?

In December, DeepSeek released its V3 type. This is a very effective” normal” large language model that works at a similar amount to OpenAI’s GPT-4o and Anthropic’s Claude 3.5.

These types can perform tasks like writing essays, writing system script, and correcting errors when they are prone to make up their own facts. On some testing of problem-solving and scientific argument, they score better than the average man.

V3 was trained at a noted value of about US$ 5.58 million. This is dramatically cheaper than GPT-4, for example, which cost more than$ 100 million to develop.

DeepSeek even claims to have trained V3 using around 2, 000 professional computer chips, especially H800 GPUs made by Nvidia. This is again little fewer than other businesses, which may have used up to 16, 000 of the more prominent H100 cards.

On January 20, DeepSeek released another unit, called R1. This is a so-called “reasoning” unit, which tries to work through difficult problems step by step. These models appear to be better at a number of tasks that call for context and have numerous linked components, including reading comprehension and strategic planning.

The R1 concept was modified to make room for V3 using a method known as reinforcement learning. R1 appears to work at a similar amount to OpenAI’s o1, released next year.

DeepSeek also used the same technique to make “reasoning” types of little open-source designs that can work on household servers.

This announcement has caused a significant increase in interest in DeepSeek, increasing the popularity of its V3-powered robot app, and causing a significant price drop in tech stocks as investors reevaluate the Artificial industry. At the time of writing, chipmaker Nvidia has lost around$ 600 billion in value.

DeepSeek’s advances have been in achieving greater performance: getting good results with fewer tools. In specific, DeepSeek’s engineers have pioneered two methods that may be adopted by AI researchers more widely.

The first involves a scientific concept known as” sparsity.” Although V3 has around 671 billion guidelines, only a small portion of these variables is used for any given type, AI models have a lot of them.

But, identifying which criteria will be needed isn’t simple. DeepSeek used a new approach to do this, and subsequently trained solely those guidelines. As a result, its types needed much less education than a standard method.

The other flaw is related to how V3 shops data in memory. DeepSeek has discovered a smart way to condense the relevant data to make it easier to store and get immediately.

People can download and change the concepts and methods used by DeepSeek under the complimentary MIT License.

Although this may be bad for some Artificial companies– whose profits may be hampered by the availability of readily available, effective models – it is also good for the broader Iot research community.

At present, a lot of AI exploration requires access to huge amounts of technology solutions. Scientists like myself who are based at universities ( or anywhere else besides big tech firms ) have had limited access to conducting tests and tests.

The condition can be changed by more effective designs and methods. For us, research and growth may now be much simpler.

For consumers, exposure to AI may also become cheaper. More AI designs may be run on people ‘ personal tools, such as devices or apps, rather than running “in the sky” for a membership fee.

More productivity may have a smaller impact for scientists who already have a lot of sources. Whether DeepSeek’s strategy will help to create models with better overall performance or just more effective designs remains to be seen.

Tongliang Liu is the chairman of the University of Sydney’s Sydney AI Centre and associate professor of machine learning.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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DeepSeek’s shock in wider US vs China perspective – Asia Times

What this second says about the world’s two biggest markets is what makes the DeepSeek-driven property judgment most intriguing.

To supply with the clear, neither Donald Trump’s 2017-2021 trade conflict nor Joe Biden’s more precise limits these last four years halted Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s technology ambitions. Although there are a few speed bumps occasionally, Xi’s” Made in China 2025″ feast is undoubtedly its biggest public relations triumph.

The most positive headlines Xi’s market has had in a while came from the shockwaves that Foreign artificial intelligence company DeepSeek sent through international markets.

Its claim of a cost-effective AI type using less-advanced cards has America’s Nvidia and French huge ASML&nbsp, reeling. Additionally, it removed the burden of Silicon Valley executives who were warming up to US President Trump. Immediately, US tech supremacy is in question as often before.

DeepSeek’s appearance also managed to confine Trump’s great AI instant below the fold. On January 21, Trump stood with OpenAI’s Sam Altman, &nbsp, SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son and Oracle’s Larry Ellison to consider an AI triumph for America. The US$ 5 billion Stargate AI infrastructure project seems to be outdated and a probable huge boondoggle at this point.

However, it’s the financial lessons that stand out the most. In China, Xi’s victory may give the country an even stronger incentive to make more strides toward fostering confidence in the country’s economy. This is a stark warning for Trump that tariffs won’t revive US digital technology in ways that equalize the China danger; only daring policy choices you accomplish that.

New data revealed that China’s stock activity surprisingly decreased in January, ending three months of expansion at the same time DeepSeek was sputtering global markets.

China’s standard purchasing managers ‘ score slid to 49.1. The non-manufacturing PMI test, which includes companies and design, slowed to 50.2 from 52.2 in December. Industrial profits, meanwhile, are now down for three consecutive years, dropping 3.3 % in 2024 alone.

According to Zichuan Huang, an economist for China at Capital Economics,” the disheartening PMI data highlights the challenge that policymakers face in sustaining a sustained treatment in growth.” China is struggling as Trump considers taxes and intensifying challenges, Huang said, despite hints that were made in late 2024 that trigger attempts were taking off.

Many pre-existing conditions at home are bringing in new risks from abroad. China’s home crisis resulted in the longest negative run since the 1997-98 Asian problems. Poor family demand and&nbsp, near-record&nbsp, children poverty are slamming confidence.

” To even have a chance to boost prices and confidence”, says Hui Shan, chief China scholar at Goldman Sachs, Beijing has install” a big stimulus from the state” to generate a real “turning stage”.

Zhiwei Zhang, president of Pinpoint Asset Management, notes that “part of the decline may be expected to weaker outside requirement, as the new import orders score dropped to its lowest level since March last time.”

If Trump fulfills his threats to impose 60 % tariffs on all domestic goods, things could start to get worse. Trump’s implementation of trade restrictions has been much slower than anticipated by international investors.

According to analysts at Singapore-based UOB Global Economics &amp, Markets Research,” a lot of what Trump pledged to do was carried out on day one with the absence of concrete tariff measures are a significant relief.” ” There is, after all, another four years of Trump to go”.

These dangers only make Xi’s team’s task more pressing to stabilize China’s financial system. Immediate priorities include repairing a weak property sector fueling deflation, building more vibrant capital markets, reducing youth unemployment, addressing runaway local government debt, curbing the dominance of state-owned enterprises and increasing transparency.

Team Xi also must create a vibrant network of social&nbsp, safety&nbsp, nets&nbsp, to encourage consumption over saving. Last week, Xi’s government intensified efforts to support China’s volatile stock markets. That included encouraging mainland households to buy more shares and encouraging pensions and mutual funds to make more domestic stock investments.

According to Wu Qing, the head of the China Securities Regulatory Commission,” This means that at least several hundred billion yuan of long-term funds will be added to A-shares every year.”

Such steps are only necessary, though, because Team Xi has been too slow to address the economy’s pre-existing conditions. In financial circles, is it a hot button whether Beijing should use a yuan-sheen deflation strategy to boost growth? &nbsp,

The pros are obvious. Exports, which were a major factor in China’s 5 % growth in 2024, would be further boosted by a weaker exchange rate. In December alone, overseas shipments jumped 10.7 % year on year.

However, the disadvantages prevent Team Xi from choosing the less effective yuan route. For one thing, it might make it more difficult for highly indebted property developers to pay off offshore bonds. That would increase&nbsp, default&nbsp, risks &nbsp, in Asia’s biggest economy. Seeing# ChinaEvergrande or# ChinaVanke&nbsp, trending again is the last thing Xi’s Communist Party needs in 2025.

Another is that deleveraging efforts could be wasted due to the monetary easing required to lower the yuan. Beijing has made significant strides over the past few years in reducing China’s financial woes and raising the standard of its gross domestic product. As a result, Xi and Premier Li Qiang have been reluctant to let the People’s Bank of China ease more assertively, even as deflation deepens.

The yuan’s use in trade and finance might be Xi’s biggest reform accomplishment over the past dozen years. In 2016, China won a place for the yuan in the International Monetary Fund’s” special drawing rights” basket, joining the dollar, yen, euro and pound. Since then, the currency’s use in trade and finance has soared. Excessive easing now might damage trust in the yuan, slowing its progression to reserve-currency status.

It also might trigger a broader&nbsp, Asian currency war&nbsp, that’s in no one’s best interest. Tokyo might be all-in on a much weaker yen, entice South Korea into the fray.

Memories of 2015 are clearly entering into Beijing’s equation. A destabilizing capital flight that still lingers among party bigwigs was caused by China’s decision to devalue the yuan by nearly 3 % ten years ago. Over the next year, Xi’s team had to draw down Beijing’s foreign exchange reserves by&nbsp, US$ 1 trillion&nbsp, to restore calm.

However, Trump World should also take a wake-up call about its top economic policy initiatives this week. A massive trade war, like that one in Exhibit A, might have worked better in 1985, when a select few industrialized nations had more economic power.

This same stuck-in-1985&nbsp, problem&nbsp, helps explain why Japan’s efforts since 2012 to increase competitiveness and rekindle innovation came up short. The enterprise, led by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, is largely about bringing back the trickle-down economics of the 1980s Ronald Reagan era.

Abe backed up his wager that monetary easing and currency depreciation would cause a rise in corporate profits and initiate a virtuous cycle. The intention was for boom stocks to spur CEOs on to fatten their paychecks, thereby boosting consumer spending and accelerating economic growth.

The plan for Japan was correct about the stock boom. The Nikkei 225 Stock Average reached its highest point last year thanks to aggressive Bank of Japan easing, a plunging yen, and some efforts to improve corporate governance.

Yet wages didn’t surge as hoped, ending the year on average or below the roughly 2.5 % inflation rate. Reaganomics is even less effective at raising living standards today than it was 40 years ago, according to all so-called Abenomics.

This is the way Trump 1.0 went, too. A$ 1.7 trillion tax cut, which primarily targeted the top 1 %, was the centerpiece of Trumponomics. More importantly, the maneuver made it more advantageous to reduce income inequality and put the national debt on track to reach the current$ 36 trillion level.

Now, Trump 2.0 is angling to make the$ 1&nbsp, trillion-plus tax cuts from his first term permanent while adding new ones to the books that will inevitably exacerbate Washington’s already serious debt woes.

The US net foreign investment position, or the difference between foreign assets owned by Americans and those owned abroad, is now nearly twice the size of the US gross domestic product. It’s negative$ 24&nbsp, trillion compared with negative$ 18&nbsp, trillion&nbsp, when Biden entered office in 2021.

A big dilemma now faces Trump: widen Washington’s investment imbalances or reduce its addiction to imports and capital inflows. For now, Trump’s new economic team is more interested in protecting the status quo than disruption.

Washington’s budget would be reliant on the savings of both Japanese and Chinese households as well as the world’s developing countries as more tax cuts are proposed. Trump’s tariffs and trade restrictions would increase US inflation and reduce domestic consumption.

Many economists believe that Trump should concentrate more on boosting domestic economic stoke. Biden, for all his policy missteps, paved the way for the US to compete with China more organically.

Biden’s 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, for example, deployed$ 300&nbsp, billion &nbsp, to strengthen domestic research and development. Biden took other steps to incentivize innovation, raise America’s semiconductor capabilities, improve infrastructure and increase productivity.

It was only a start, though. Despite his deregulation comments, Trump has not yet come up with a strategy to replace Biden’s tech upgrade policies.

As Trump prioritizes old-school tariffs, lower Federal Reserve interest rates and a weaker dollar, Xi’s China is engaged in a multi-trillion-dollar effort to lead the future of electric vehicles, semiconductors, renewable energy, robotics, biotechnology, aviation, high-speed rail and, of course, AI.

This last priority is now paying, and this has never before been a positive outcome for China. And serving as a wake-up call for both Xi’s party and Trump 2.0 that it’s time to raise their games.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ stirring expanded war fears in the Baltic – Asia Times

Tensions between local nations and an increased NATO appearance have been the result of numerous instances of suspected Russian-linked damage of underwater wires in the Baltic Sea.

The Scandinavian coast protect boarded a ship in the Baltic Sea on January 26 on suspicion of outlet drag and alleged damage of vital undersea cables that run through the area.

Additionally, Latvia conducted a ship search of the incident to discover fiber-optic wires ‘ injuries. The Russian vessel is now under inspection. The ship’s user has denied any involvement in damage.

The countries along the Baltic Sea coastline have started stationing military ships at sea every day and have started to worry about suspected destroy of their underwater facilities in recent months due to ships deliberately drag their anchors along the seabed.

Anchor drag can quickly damage important underwater system. Russia has denied involvement in these situations. However, there are also reliable information that Russia has been conducting undersea system mapping.

NATO increased its local naval presence in response to rising concerns about network protection by launching the Baltic Sentry vision on January 14 and adding maritime patrol vessels to its list of local marine bases.

What’s the perspective?

As vessels pass through the Baltic Sea, there have been numerous studies in recent months of harm being done to subterranean cables. Attacks on underwater cords are comparable to conventional operations in espionage and knowledge.

This activity is conducted at a level that is comparable to warfare, intended to send specific signals to hostile powers. The intention could be to convey that the ability to effectively cut off and isolate people from the outside world is present.

These cords are extremely important. They are used to move online traffic, gas, and power between nations. Additionally, recent events have resulted in a decrease in the amount of light that can be transported, despite the fact that this has not already resulted in widespread power outages.

Another issue is that destruction to digital wires could thwart the flow of financial market data. Due to its sensitive nature, this is especially prone.

Map of the Baltic Sea.
Map: PorcupenWorks / Shutterstock

How does cables get protected?

Protecting the connectors is a difficult endeavor. Due to the idea of high seas freedom of navigation, there is little that can be actually done to stop another warships from crossing the seas and oceans. And Russia has a right of passage for its ships, for instance, from St Petersburg to the North Sea.

Without really seizing the vehicle or preventing its advancement in any way, investigations into apparent threats may be conducted. This can be accomplished by combining GPS tracking data with other data, such as witness testimony, and using GPS tracking data.

Targeting these cables may help a country fight its adversaries in a more subtle way and without the threat of armed conflict, despite the possibility of natural causes.

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A fleet suspected of being involved in damage was taken by the Scandinavian army.

Unintentional engagement is most likely to blame for the large volume of traffic on these oceanic cables. However, Russian military ships ‘ increased activity in mapping the Baltic Sea ground has raised questions.

To better understand where these cables are located, the most possible justification for the enhanced Russian ocean mapping activity. However, it might be a concept that this crucial infrastructure is difficult to defend and vulnerable to attack and damage.

Some merchant vessels are registered in international provinces, and equity can be hard to monitor. This gives a degree of believable denial over who may have directed or managed the businesses that might have damaged wires.

It makes taking action harder, but it also leads to charges that these boats are posing as part of Russia’s” shadow fleet.”

However, this more naval presence in the Baltic might serve as a barrier and give the wires greater safety. Sweden has then boarded a vehicle. Another drawback is that the country where the vehicle is registered is in no way required to cooperate with any research.

Various factors are even involved. The Baltic states and Finland have thoughts of the social control&nbsp, imposed upon them by the Russian government&nbsp, due to, and, in some cases, after, the Second World War, and this will add to the stress.

Russia’s war of Ukraine has heightened local concerns about what might transpire future. Moscow may be attempting to put more pressure on the European countries to stop them from continuing to support Ukraine by mounting tension along the coast.

However, increasing worry about Russia’s position of authority in the Baltic Sea may have the same result by escalating the tide of suspicion. It might also indicate that the Baltic and Nordic countries are more eager to spend more money on security and make plans for potential military action.

Matthew Powell is a training fellow in corporate and heat energy research, University of Portsmouth

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Trump’s Ukraine peace plan looking like a non-starter – Asia Times

Donald Trump had promised to put an end to the Soviet aggression against Ukraine in the 24 days that he had promised. But Trump’s second month since his inauguration on January 20, 2025, has yet been a busy one regarding Ukraine.

Trump criticized his father Joe Biden of running a “government that has given unrestricted cash to the defense of international borders but refuses to support American borders” in his inauguration address, making just a passing and direct reference to Ukraine.

Trump threatened Russia with fees, taxes, and restrictions if his Russian counterpart doesn’t agree to a deal soon in a blog on his TruthSocial community. He reiterated this on January 23 in remarks made at the World Economic Forum in Davos, adding that he “really would like to be able to meet with President Putin.”

Cut out of Donald trump truth social post about Russia and Ukraine
Donald Trump/Truth Social

Trump’s candidate for government secretary, Scott Bessent, had previously backed Trump’s view during his Senate confirmation hearing on January 16. Bessent especially emphasized increasing sanctions against Russian crude companies” to levels that would take the Russian Federation to the table” in the same way as Trump.

Putin responded the following day, saying that Trump and he should actually talk about Ukraine and fuel prices. But this was much from a strong commitment to provide into discussions, and especially not with Ukraine.

Putin alluded to an October 2022 order by Ukraine’s leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, banning any agreements with the Kremlin after Russia fully annexed four parts of Ukraine. Since then, Zellensky has stated that all except him is covered by the decree, indicating that he won’t interfere with any direct conversations with Russia.

However, Putin is likely to remain playing for time. A ceasefire that stops the line of communication at the time of agreement will be the most good first step in a Trump-brokered package. Every day of fighting gives Putin more territorial gains because his forces are also advanceing on the ground in Ukraine.

Russian friends ‘ aid is showing no signs of waning, either. Few and far between as they may remain, China, Iran and North Korea have been important in sustaining the Kremlin’s war effort. Moscow has then ratified a comprehensive strategic agreement with Iran in addition to the one it signed with North Korea in June 2024.

However, the Russia-China no-limits association of 2022, more deepened in 2023, shows no signs of strengthening. Additionally, it’s unlikely that Putin is all too concerned about extra US sanctions given that Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko won a sixth consecutive term on January 26.

Zelensky, like Putin, may sing for day. Trump’s hazard of sanctions against Russia good indicates a US president’s feeling of frustration that Putin doesn’t seem to be willing to compromise. Russia may continue to expand its regional ties to eastern Ukraine, but it hasn’t made any proper strides.

War of attrition

Since September 2024, the US military has probably increased significantly, and Kyiv has likely been able to maintain its current protective efforts through 2025 as a result of commitments from European allies, including the UK.

Ukraine might not be able to build a major offensive, but it may still be able to keep Russia’s costs higher. On the field, these fees are estimated at 102 fatalities per square mile of Ukrainian place captured. Beyond the frontlines, Ukraine has likewise continued its aircraft battle against targets inside Russia, particularly the government’s oil facilities.

Trump won’t succeed in putting an end to the fighting in Ukraine, that is for sure. However, a significant distinction can be made between a peace and a lasting peace deal. And while a peace, at some point, may be in both Russia’s and Ukraine’s attention, green harmony is much more difficult to achieve.

Putin’s goal of a complete success poses the same challenges as Western reluctance to offer Ukraine reliable security guarantees.

At this point, it seems unlikely to be possible to join the NATO or join a western-led security power that may serve as a credible deterrent.

Without a doubt, it would be impossible for Europe to carry the 200 000 soldiers Zelensky had in mind for a implementation to Ukraine to ensure any offer with Putin. But a smaller power, led by the UK and France, may be achievable.

No one has blinked in Kyiv or Zelensky’s ongoing retention conflict, which continues to be waged by them in Kiev and Moscow. It is not clear but whether, and in which manner, Trump did bend the stability and how this may affect either side’s commitment to submit to his deal-making work.

Thus far, Trump’s moves are certainly a game-changer. This is the first major attempt to put an end to the battle in nearly three years of conflict, though. Whether Trump, and everyone else, have the mind and may persevere to ensure that this course will inevitably lead to a just and stable peace for Ukraine remains to be seen.

Stefan Wolff is professor of global surveillance, University of Birmingham

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Trump’s ‘clearing out’ Gaza call assures ceasefire won’t last – Asia Times

The area has been shocked by Donald Trump’s most recent speech, which described Gaza as a “demolition blog” and his advice to “evacuate” Palestinians in Gaza to Egypt and Jordan to” clear out that entire thing.”

Trump officially told Air Force One reporters that he had spoken with King Abdullah of Jordan and that he intended to speak with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the president of Egypt, over the weekend. “You’re talking about probably a million and a half individuals, and we just clear out that entire thing”, he said.

He added that relocating Palestinian civilians to” some of the Arab nations, and build]ing ] housing in a different location, where they can maybe live in peace for a change” could be “done temporarily or could be long term”.

Israel’s serious ultra-nationalist events, both in and outside of the Jewish state, are thrilled by the plan. It’s one they have much advocated.

However, it has received a lot of negative reviews in the region as a possible” second Nakba” – in reference to the displacement and violence against Palestinians following Israel’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1948. Egypt and Jordan have likewise completely rejected the proposal. It has also been highly condemned by the Palestinians.

Although it’s not clear how closely this ties with US policy and diplomacy, such speech could undermine local political efforts that are crucial. These work, led by Qatar and Egypt in nearby cooperation with Washington, are focused on continuing the conversations on the peace, monitoring progress, and evaluating compliance.

So it’s not sure whether this is a US president’s official statement or another instance of the president’s stance being untrue. However, it is obvious that his most recent statement will make the January 17 peace agreement even more complicated.

Not the least of which is the underlying hostility between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, the agreement now faces significant challenges and risks. History tells us that this lack of trust has developed, in element, because of the many times ceasefires have been used for purposes other than pursuing long-term arrangement, such as opportunities to recover, regroup or reposition carefully.

The current deal’s staged character also poses a significant risk, as it opens up the door for” trailers” on both sides to disrupt the process. Other examples of events that could thwart the ceasefire include the latest riots by Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Hamas ‘ active encouragement of conflict.

The negotiation procedure is more complicated by relationships tied to the social life of Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. One party, the Jewish Power, has now dissolved his coalition government in protest of the peace. However, the president of the Catholic Zionist group, Bezalel Smotrich, has threatened to do the same if the military operation against Hamas is no resumed.

Hamas, in move, has attempted to establish its power in Gaza. During the prisoner swap process, when Hamas fighters were glaringly present during the handovers, we witnessed instances of this. Hamas may have experienced a significant decline, but it still has power over much of Gaza’s police and government and wants the rest of the world to understand.

There is a high chance that one area may blame the other for violating the terms of the peace if any part of the agreement fails. In the second phase, choosing who will rule Gaza and how to employ a full Israeli withdrawal are two of the most controversial issues.

Israel continues to cooperate with the Palestinian Authority ( PA ) in the West Bank for security, but it is vehemently opposed to any PA presence in Gaza. There is also a lot of uncertainty as to whether Israel will consent to a long-term solution that calls for the Israeli Defense Forces ( IDF) to completely leave Gaza.

The IDF’s chief of staff Herzl Halevi’s resignation on October 7 as he accepted responsibility for its mistakes has more destabilized the political and military relationships in Israel. A lot will depend on his leader.

Transactional politics

Regional dynamics have been reshaped by new political shifts. This presents difficulties and options for any political efforts involving Israel and Palestine.

The deterioration of Iran’s so-called” shaft of weight,” which includes Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon and the now defunct Assad government in Syria, may provide an option for normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

This, in turn, will provide an opportunity to restructure the Middle East’s political landscape. This potential discovery builds on the Abraham Accords, which was one of Trump’s international policy initiatives. It’s a interpersonal approach to politics, which prioritizes logical and results-oriented conversations.

The new US Middle East minister, original real estate developer Steve Witkoff, has emphasised” valiant diplomacy”, as well as strong leadership and what he called “reciprocal behavior” from the events to the peace deal. It’s uncertain whether the fresh US administration may revive the Arab state’s 2020 plan.

Palestinians would receive 70 % of the West Bank and Gaza, according to the plan, while Israel would be able to maintain Jerusalem’s sovereignty. Additionally, the US approved the invasion of Jewish-occupied West Bank regions by Israel.

For Israel, standardization with Saudi Arabia would be a significant diplomatic triumph. Washington is critical in this situation by offering incentives like Riyadh the sale of sophisticated American weapons systems.

However, according to reports, Saudi Arabia has reportedly demanded immediate action to establish a Palestinian position as part of the package. Trump’s latest strategy, if it becomes standard US coverage, would make that a non-starter.

Karin Aggestam is professor of social knowledge, CMES Director, Lund University

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China lacks control over provinces expanding distant-water fishing – Asia Times

Since the late 2010s, China has shown a growing sensitivity to the negative effects of its distant-water fishing ( DWF ) growth, as well as the reputational damage that some international environmental advocates have caused.

DWF describes nations that seafood outside their own borders and expand their range of activities to the financial exclusive areas or high seas of other nations.

Was China’s hyperbolic DWF development always a direct result of Beijing’s great strategy to create what’s known as a “blue economy” and became a maritime power? What are China’s major obstacles to halting this progress, exactly?

In an article published in Marine Policy, I want to examine the pivotal part of Chinese regions in driving this growth and change the state-centric view on China’s rapidly expanding DWF.

Municipal versions

Not all of China’s southern counties are extremely interested in expanding their DWF sector. Between 2010 and 2020, Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, Fujian and the China National Agricultural Development Group Co. Ltd. played a significant role in boosting China’s DWF pursuits, as measured by the number of vessels, power and fish get.

These institutions collectively owned 84 percent of China’s DWF vessels as of 2020, and they combined foresaw a complete power of 86.6 % of the total horsepower for all other Chinese DWF vessels. Additionally, their catch made up 87 percent of the total fat and 86.8 % of the total value of China’s DWF find.

Fujian was the state where the highest returns on investment in catch fish were found in Fujian. It didn’t have the most powerful DWF fleet ( Zhejiang did ) or the largest DWF fleet ( Shandong did ). However, it was only next to Shandong in terms of capture value per vessel and full DWF catch volume, which was both second.

Strategic Fujian

Fujian was not immediately selected as a captain province for the development of the marine economy in 2010, but it soon established what is known as a leading small group, led by the provincial governor, to renew.

In 2011, this endeavor was successful, giving Fujian more managerial and budgetary authority to grow its marine economy. To improve coordination and conformity across administrative levels, sub-provincial leading little groups were also established.

When Fujian’s sea business development gained national significance, it rapidly expanded its DWF industry. The municipal authorities urged attempts to” float to the Western Ocean for the next time” in the year 2013. Regional businesses seized this chance to gain help from their provincial counterparts.

Starting in 2014, the provincial government promoted targeted plan incentives across the company’s value chain: vehicle construction, access to angling grounds, business operations and human resources. The development of the Maritime Silk Road was further aided by Fujian’s participation in the developing of the Maritime Silk Road in 2015.

These steps led to a production-focused, extraction-driven DWF progress in Fujian. From 2012 to 2015, the number of Fujian’s DWF arteries and get rose by 78 per cent and 50 per cent, substantially exceeding national goals of 15.5 per share and 18 per cent.

Reining in growth

Since 2016, amid heightened international scrutiny, Beijing started to recentralize and tighten control over China’s DWF fleet. However, this work was slow to come down to the local level. The province’s DWF growth was aided by the Fujian incentive measures, which remained in place until 2018.

Beijing began putting forth concrete centralized policies to halt DWF growth toward the end of the decade. These included a blacklist for vessels and captains involved in illegal, unreported and unregulated ( IUU) fishing, a compliance ranking for DWF companies and revisions to China’s DWF regulations.

Fujian appeared to follow Beijing’s plan to slow down fleet growth, but it made a different move to make it easier to establish a national DWF base on its coast. This type of terraqueous infrastructure seeks to reorganize spaces that connect land and sea. The objective is to shorten the time it takes to sell DWF catch as commodities and increase its commercial value.

Information-gathering challenges

Beijing’s delegation of some administrative and fiscal authority to local governments is crucial to boosting the provinces ‘ economic performance. However, local governments may be motivated by economic interests to pursue policies that lead to exaggerated growth and have unintended foreign policy effects on China.

Fujian’s incentive policies suggest a firm commitment to a DWF growth model focused on enhancing capacities, maximizing outputs and boosting production. These policies don’t take into account potential environmental repercussions beyond its borders.

A performance evaluation report on Fujian’s special subsidy fund for marine economic development praises the shift in Fujianese fishermen from offshore fishing close to its coast to distant-water fishing.

It says there are” social” and “environmental” benefits that include supplying more DWF professionals and easing offshore over-fishing. The report doesn’t mention potential concerns about overcapacity or the ensuing environmental and foreign policy issues.

Measures taken by Beijing during the 13th Five-Year Planning Period in 2017 marked a first step toward recentralizing control and oversight over such provincial activism. Beijing faces a challenging task when monitoring DWF because its environmental effects are not directly borne by Chinese citizens and occur outside of China.

Looking ahead

China’s 2023 White Paper on DWF reaffirms efforts to improve information-gathering and monitoring on DWF fleet capacities and operations. These include expanding the national fisheries observer program and creating an inclusive DWF data collection framework.

Beijing says the West is” strongly suppressing and restricting” China’s DWF, but the white paper supports dialogue with international non-governmental organizations regarding sustainable fisheries management and measures against IUU fishing. In other words, it acknowledges the importance of global bottom-up monitoring in resolving Beijing’s perennial issue with obtaining information on DWF.

Since China replaced the DWF fuel subsidy with the international compliance capacity enhancement subsidy in 2021, improving information-gathering and verification regarding any violations of both domestic and international regulations by Chinese DWF vessels has become important.

This new subsidy is in part related to DWF enterprise compliance scores. Each year, these scores are released by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture. Any of the 14 DWF-regulated violations leads to lower scores, which in turn reduces the subsidy amount for offending enterprises.

Therefore, prompt and trustworthy information on IUU breaches is necessary to achieve the desired deterrent effect. Beijing should encourage and support its efforts to monitor and maintain the transparency and monitoring efforts of fisheries NGOs, as well as to maintain their ongoing collaboration with regional and international fisheries organizations.

Hang Zhou is a graduate student at Université Laval and an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science.

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If reshoring’s happening, where does the US get the capital goods? – Asia Times

In a remark that was republished by Asia Times on January 27, Noah Smith asserts that “reshoring US economy is achievable and happening.” His argument is based on flagrant misrepresentation of the facts.

Some of his mistakes depend on cherry-picking the day range – for example, a table that shows cell production up 20 % since 2018. But US battery production is down 20 % from 2014, if one looks at a long-term chart ( below ). That’s certainly a success story. Nevermind that the Federal Reserve index’s peak for manufacturing output in 2007 was 106, which is now only 99.

When the Biden Administration made the announcement about its CHIPS Act subsidies, which Smith describes as a significant advance for British manufacturing, there were shortages of labor and materials when building device processing plants began. An unheard-against production increase resulted in a 37 % increase in the Producer Price Index for new plant construction in a single year. At the same time, the number of vacant construction positions nearly doubled.

Smith is relieved that the US’s solar panels manufacturing capacity reached 27, 000 megawatts in 2024, which indicates that the US is” just way behind China.” How far behind? Smith doesn’t state. I may: China may make 890, 000 megawatts of solar panels – 33 times the US number.

The mistake in Smith’s panegyric to US business is how heavily America depends on imported capital goods, which are used to make other goods.

At only$ 400 billion annually, US imports of capital goods exceed private orders by almost three days. Both figures are deflated to January 2000 using the government’s price index for cover commodities exports and private investment products, both. Both set exclude trucks. Whatever the US is producing, it produces it generally with imported investment products.

Of course, the US imports a lot of electronics, whose prices have fallen by half since 2000, and it exports machinery, whose price has doubled ( the US exports about half as much capital goods as it imports ). It’s hard to get an apples-to-apples evaluation of local cover products purchases and cover products imports. But the developments however are striking: US cover goods exports jumped after Covid, rising by 60 % from 2020 through 2024.

Yes, Taiwan’s TSMC, which built a grow in Arizona, which is staffed primarily by workers and technicians from Taiwan, was able to create more computer chips inland because TSMC couldn’t get enough qualified workers in the country. That’s the kind of achievement that makes failure seemed interesting by comparison.

The reality is that America’s dependency on foreign countries is rapidly increasing. In the last ten years, the entire business output has remained essentially unchanged, while capital goods imports have almost doubled. It will require more to re-shore American industries than to publish economy blogs with hot weather.

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