Chinese media in a good news, soft power push into Africa – Asia Times

The minister of foreign affairs of China embarks on a typical odyssey across Africa every year. The custom began in the late 1980s, when Beijing’s top diplomat traveled to many African countries to restate relationships.

The most recent attend, by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, took place in mid-January 2025 and included starts in Namibia, the Republic of the Congo, Chad and Nigeria.

China’s burgeoning impact in Africa was exemplified by fantastic displays of structural might for more than 20 years. From Nairobi’s gleaming buildings to wide ships dotting the country’s shores, China’s opportunities on the globe have surged, reaching over US$ 700 billion by 2023 under the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s massive global infrastructure development plan.

Beijing has, however, attempted to go beyond just streets and skyscrapers and create a play for American people’s hearts and minds. With a clever mixture of reasoning, power and money, Beijing has turned to American internet as a potential pipeline for its political ambitions.

Partnering with local retailers and journalist-training efforts, China has expanded its press footprints in Africa. Its goal? To alter perceptions and establish Beijing as a supplier of resources and assistance as well as a model for development and management.

With proof that some sections of the media give positive coverage of China, the ploy seems to be paying off. However, as people looking into the impact of China’s effect abroad, I’m beginning to hear negative reporting from pro-Beijing countries.

Media beauty rude

China’s policy toward Africa is largely driven by its use of” sweet power,” which is demonstrated by things like the media and cultural programs. Beijing presents this as “win-win assistance” – a ultimate Chinese political phrase mixing collaboration with ethnic politics.

Key to China’s media approach in Africa are two institutions: the China Global Television Network ( CGTN) Africa and Xinhua News Agency.

CGTN Africa, which was set up in 2012, offers a Chinese perspective on American media. The system produces content in several languages, including English, French and Swahili, and its insurance frequently portrays Beijing as a creative partner, reporting on infrastructure projects, trade agreements and social initiatives. Also, Xinhua News Agency, China’s position news agency, today boasts 37 departments on the globe.

By contrast, American media existence in Africa remains relatively limited. The BBC, much inserted due to the United Kingdom’s colonial legacy, also maintains a huge footprints among foreign outlets, but its influence is generally historic rather than expanding.

And as American internet influence in Africa has plateaued, China’s state-backed internet has grown rapidly. The online site is a particularly impacted by this expansion. On Twitter, for instance, CGTN Africa commands a remarkable 4.5 million followers, greatly outpacing CNN Africa, which has 1.2 million — a striking signal of China’s growing soft power reach.

China’s zero-tariff trade policy with 33 African countries showcases how it uses economic policies to mold perceptions. And state-supported media outlets like CGTN Africa and Xinhua are essential to highlighting these initiatives and promoting China’s status as a benevolent partner.

Stories of an “all-weather” or steadfast China-Africa partnership are broadcast widely, and the coverage frequently depicts the grand nature of Chinese infrastructure projects. Amid this glowing coverage, the labor disputes, environmental devastation or debt traps associated with some Chinese-built infrastructure are less likely to make headlines.

Questions of media veracity notwithstanding, China’s strategy is bearing fruit. China’s approval ratings in Africa increased as a result of a Gallup poll from April 2024, as US ratings dropped. Afrobarometer, a pan-African research organization, further reports that public opinion of China in many African countries is positively glowing, an apparent validation of China’s discourse engineering.

Further, studies have shown that pro-Beijing media influences perceptions. According to a survey of Zimbabweans conducted in 2023, those who were exposed to the Chinese media were more likely to have a favorable opinion of Beijing’s economic activities there.

Three people hold hands on stage.
China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, center, holds hands with his counterparts, Senegal’s Yassine Fall, left, and the Republic of the Congo’s Jean-Claude Gakosso, after a joint news conference. Photo: AP via The Conversation / Andy Wong

Co-opting local voices

The integration of local media is a clear indication of China’s media strategy’s effectiveness. Through content-sharing agreements, African outlets have disseminated Beijing’s editorial line and stories from Chinese state media, often without the due diligence of journalistic skepticism.

Meanwhile, StarTimes, a Chinese media company, delivers a steady stream of curated depictions of translated Chinese movies, TV shows and documentaries across 30 countries in Africa.

However, China is not just pushing its point through African channels. It’s also taking a lead role in training African journalists, thousands of whom have been lured by all-expenses-paid trips to China under the guise of “professional development“. On such junkets, they receive training that critics say obscures the distinction between skill-building and propaganda, presenting them with perspectives conforming to Beijing’s line.

Ethiopia exemplifies how Beijing’s media and infrastructure investments have largely contributed to a favorable perception of the country. State media outlets, often staffed by journalists trained in Chinese-run programs, consistently frame China’s role as one of selfless partnership.

The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line is one of the highlights of the project’s benefits, but reports on the subpar labor conditions associated with them are ignored. This is a strategy that is consistent with Ethiopia’s media landscape, where state-run outlets prioritize economic development stories and heavily rely on Xinhua as the main news source.

Chinese oil companies in Angola extract a lot of resources and invest billions in infrastructure projects. The local media frequently portrays Sino-Angolan relations in glowing terms, once again regularly staffed by journalists who have accepted invitations to travel to China.

In the name of common development, allegations of corruption, the displacement of local communities, and environmental degradation are relegated to side notes.

War for Africa’s media soul

Despite all of the Chinese influence, media perspectives in Africa are far from uniformly pro-Beijing.

In Kenya, voices of dissent are beginning to rise, and media professionals immune to Beijing’s allure are probing the true costs of Chinese financial undertakings. Media watchdogs in South Africa are raising alarms by pointing out a gradual decline in press freedoms that comes with growth and prosperity.

In Ghana, concerns about Chinese media influence are more permeated than the journalism industry, as officials have expressed concerns about the impact of Chinese media cooperation agreements. When local journalists started reporting that Chinese-produced content was being prioritized over domestic stories in state media, the heightened vigor in Ghana became even more apparent.

A significant countervailing force exists that challenges uncritical representations and pursues rigorous journalism beneath the surface of China’s well-known projects and media offerings, and the African nations or organizations that embrace Beijing’s line.

However, as CGTN Africa and Xinhua become established in the media ecosystems of Africa, a pressing issue arises: Will journalists and journalists be able to uphold their impartiality and maintain intellectual independence?

As China continues to make strategic inroads in Africa, it’s a fair question.

Mitchell Gallagher is PhD candidate in political science, Wayne State University

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Will Gaza ceasefire hold? Will Trump’s ‘takeover’ happen? – Asia Times

The likelihood of the peace agreement making its way to its appointed second stage on March 1 seems exceedingly unlikely as the deadline for the finish of phase one of the agreement between Israel and Hamas approaches. Middle East professional, Scott Lucas, addresses the important concerns.

What are the probabilities of the peace continuing through period two?

An arrangement to move from step one to step two at the start of March was a far-fetched chance yet before Donald Trump’s request for the opening and restoration of Gaza, which would amount to ethnic cleaning.

We were close to missing a second period. Netanyahu, the leader of Israel, had been holding out for times against a deal, and two hard-right officials, Bezalel Smotrich, the minister of finance, and Ben-Gvir, the chancellor, were pressuring him to back down.

In the end, Netanyahu agreed because of the pressure from Hamas ‘ hostage-taking individuals and a response from Trump’s minister Steve Witkoff.

Ben-Gvir left while Smotrich remained in the government, but his party declared it would continue to support the government. Yet, both demanded that there be no second step. They&nbsp, called instead&nbsp, for martial action to eliminate Hamas and the relocation of the populace of Gaza– volunteer or then.

The Israeli government is supposed to completely leave Gaza in the coming days while Arab rule is restored in the Strip. Hamas will refuse to step down from energy and Israel and the US does require that Hamas step down. However, Israelis may ask Hamas leaders to step down.

Trump’s need for an ending of “occupation” of Gaza, not by the Israelis but by Gazans, confirmed the fate of the process. There is no possibility that Hamas diplomats will agree to a” option” in which most, if not all, people are evicted.

That is why Trump, using the excuse of Hamas barrier of step one, stopped portraying himself as a “peacemaker” on Monday. Otherwise, he proclaimed:” All bets are off and let heaven tear out” — in consequence, returning to a blank search for Israel’s military actions, siege of humanitarian aid, and mass killing across Gaza.

Does Donald Trump have any intention of revitalizing Gaza?

Some media outlets have acted carelessly by discrediting Trump’s comments by implying that he is not severe or that his remarks are” thinking outside the box” with their outrageous statements.

Trump’s request for “development” of Gaza, clearing out the people, was not just a thought bubbles. In his first name, he frequently spoke of North Korea’s “great seashores” and “waterfront home” as a perfect place for flats and hotels.

In March 2024, his son-in-law Jared Kushner turned to the Middle East, saying:” Gaza’s waterfront property could be very useful … From Israel’s standpoint, I would do my best to move the folks out and then clean it up”.

The Trump administration requested Joseph Pelzman, a teacher of financial and international politics at George Washington University, to come up with a plan for the Strip next summer. He put it in perspective by saying,” You have to destroy the entire area, you have to resume from scrape.” It requires that the location be completely emptied out. I mean, actually emptied out”.

Trump was telling reporters that the “demolition page” should be evacuated from Gaza’s civilians within a year of his White House visit on January 20. Only over a week later, alongside Netanyahu, he expanded on the charter – apparently in a statement written by Kushner.

How about foreign rules?

Trump’s plan clearly violates international law. The Geneva standards forbid citizens from being transferred outside of their country unless it is “impossible” to do otherwise.

UN official Stéphane Dujarric told writers:” Any forced movement of individuals is equivalent to tribal cleansing”.

However, the Trump presidency doesn’t seem to care about international laws at all. Trump signed an executive order granting the International Criminal Court two weeks after his look with Netanyahu.

In fact, the leadership doesn’t think there should be any legal monitoring in the US. As Trump and Elon Musk attempt to destroy US agencies, with large firings and seizure of records that may be illegal and illegitimate, the US vice-president, J. D. Vance, maintains:” Judges aren’t allowed to handle the executive’s genuine power”.

Trump, demanding the impeachment of a judge who ruled against the unauthorized access to records, said:” No judge should, frankly, be allowed to make that kind of a decision”.

Does the US have the necessary backing to accomplish this?

Absolutely not, especially if Trump tries to fulfill his pledge that the US should “own” Gaza. Apart from Israel, no country has given support to Trump’s proposal. And most Americans, even Trump backers, would be loath to have “ownership” which required intervention by US troops.

The nations Trump wants to send Palestinians to are vehemently opposed to. Within hours of Trump’s February 4 statement, he got a firm rebuttal from Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh cited” the Kingdom’s firm and supportive positions on the Palestinian people’s rights” and emphasized its recent shift to “firm and unwavering” support of a Palestinian state.

Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s position was confirmed by the foreign ministry, who also cited his phone call with Jordan’s King Abdullah as a sign of unity. After Netanyahu said the Saudis “have plenty of territory” for a Palestinian state, Riyadh denounced the “extremist, occupying mentality” that seeks to expel Palestinians from Gaza.

Egyptian Foreign Minister&nbsp, Badr Abdelatty&nbsp, told US Secretary of State&nbsp, Marco Rubio&nbsp, on Monday in Washington that Arab states rejected Trump’s pitch. Abdelatty emphasized the necessity of Palestinian reconstruction in Gaza while ensuring that no one was killed there.

‘ We may be sending some guests your way ‘: Donald Trump greets Jordan’s King Abdullah at the White House, February 11, 2025. Image: The Conversation

And, on the eve of King Abdullah’s visit to Washington, Jordan expressed its “rejection of any attempts to annex land and displace the Palestinians”.

How do you anticipate this to change over the coming months?

Trump and the Israelis will now turn their attention to Hamas as an existential threat that cannot be included in a phase two ceasefire.

Phase one is scheduled to end on March 1. I anticipate that Israel will resume its long-running conflict in Gaza, probably sooner.

And Trump, who only recently presented himself as a “peacemaker”, will give unconditional backing – while bemoaning that Gazans, up to 90 % of them displaced from their homes, still won’t leave the Strip.

Scott Lucas is professor of international politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Does Tesla’s slump owe to Musk’s behavior? – Asia Times

Elon Musk’s apparently solid upward drift has led to actions and statements that have sparked a lot of controversy over the past couple of years. Musk, the revolutionary leader of X Corp. and the CEO of Tesla, SpaceX, is a person attempting to bring people to Mars. Additionally, he is the wealthiest person on the planet.

Most recently, these controversies include his endorsement and support of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) party, gestures interpreted as a Nazi salute during Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration and accusations of election interference.

In January, profits of Tesla vehicles slumped across five Western countries – the UK, France, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands. California, the state with the largest car market in the US, saw profits decline as well. And Musk and his politics, in at least one review, might be a major contributor to the issue.

When Directors are in the public eye, their private companies and beliefs, and those of the firms they represent, can be hard to distinguish. Our research has discovered that frequently, the CEO’s brand identity and popularity will be impacted by the person’s popularity and reputation, and vice versa.

As a human being, Musk’s specific actions and statements directly impact the corporations he represents. His public image makes it difficult to tell the two apart due to his high profile.

Some Tesla customers have turned off by Musk’s controversial remarks and political endorsements, specially in progressive markets like California and Europe.

In these locations, Tesla has previously been famous with environmentally conscious consumers. When a CEO’s patterns and his or her product don’t align, this can compromise the company benefit of both the CEO and the business.

Artists, officials, CEOs and other public figures tend to attract viewers whose personal values is at times depart from those of the leader. Where this occurs, devoted followers could be at a loss as to how to react to these numbers or the goods of the individuals or organizations they are associated with.

A popular misconception is that fascinated fans are also obsessed with expressing their dislike. Instead, they are more likely to acquiesce ferociously and defend their champions ‘ deeds. Intense deeds of “fan forces” on social media platforms have certainly helped with these beliefs.

But in truth, our research has shown that devoted fans may be important. We found that more than less committed consumers are more likely than not to react in severe criticism when they feel betrayed by the actions of people they associate with or hold dearly dear.

Devoted fans and consumers could react in a variety of ways to personalities like Musk, whose businesses produce physical goods. Some obstinate Tesla supporters and supporters may dismiss criticism of his conduct as an assault on their own beliefs or free speech.

They are likely to continue to purchase Teslas despite, and they may even change their own opinions to fit their “hero”‘s.

Out of phase

For other users, owning a Tesla may never longer sign essentially their views about sustainability. There may be a smile to ideologies or political affiliations that conflict with theirs.

If Tesla’s behaviour is perceived as dangerous in their social networks, some consumers may want to cut him off from Tesla. Nevertheless, as a purchase requiring large engagement and devotion, switching from Tesla to another Volt may be difficult.

The current trend of Tesla users displaying explanation tags on their cars is a way to reduce the strain between owning one and the actions of the CEO they don’t like.

The stickers give people a way to separate themselves from Musk’s activities while avoiding being severely perceived by their social networks. This is more likely to lead to a continuous product erosion than a drop in sales right away.

On the other hand, clients of businesses like BrewDog, a brand that has previously been accused of instilling a culture of fear, may be more apt to respond to negative CEO behavior. They at least have the option to move to a different company for a reasonable price. ( BrewDog, for its part, apologiszd and said it was” committed to doing better”. )

And if Live voters oppose engineer James Dyson’s position on Brexit, they might be offended but still be able to justify keeping a mid-priced object like a vacuum cleaner until it breaks, probably switching for new ones rather than abandoning them completely.

When a leader CEO disappoints them, users may react in a variety of ways. But brands risk losing blind, unquestioning loyalty, perhaps from devoted fans.

James Obiegbu is lecturer in experienced advertising and control, Bournemouth University and Gretchen Larsen is professor in advertising, Durham University Business School, Durham University

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

Continue Reading

​Europe gasping for air as Trump makes his Ukraine move – Asia Times

President Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have dealt a major blow to European officials who have been vocal supporters of keeping the Ukraine war on. Most of them must be in surprise, gasping for breath.

Let’s begin with Hegseth. He made the following statements:

1. Ukraine’s participation in NATO is off the board. Ukraine won’t get invited to join NATO.

2. The US will not take any soldiers to Ukraine for any reason, including security.

3. The US will not long provide or pay for Ukraine’s assistance and arms. The members of the German NATO will have the authority to offer Ukraine help.

4. British participation must be fair and equitable, which means that NATO people will have to significantly improve their efforts.

5. The US anticipates significant regional agreements from Ukraine because it will be unable to reclaim its former enclaves as it did before 2014.

President Trump, however, held an hour-and-a-half telephone conference with Russian President Putin. The main lesson is that Putin stated that he would like to start discussions with the US regarding Ukraine and additional safety concerns.

The Trump-Putin talk covered many matters, for example: safety concerns, energy, artificial intelligence and” the power of the money”.

Trump allegedly made the call after the phone,” to tell” Ukrainian President Zelensky of his talk with Putin. He likewise immediately formed his negotiation group. The discussions were led by Ambassador and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, Director of the CIA John Ratcliffe, National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Significantly, the listing of members did not contain retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg. Klugg had openly opposed the idea of substantially raising Russia’s sanctions in an effort to gain concessions from Ukraine. On a range of one to 10, as he put it, the existing sanctions against Russia are just a three. He suggested making them much higher ( assuming this could be accomplished ).

These opinions immediately undermined Trump’s method to Putin and Russia, and seem to have been Kellogg’s thought (among some ) to make sure the Ukraine war continued. It’s unknown whether Kellogg will once more play as a person in Ukraine.

It will take occasion for Europe’s pro-war officials, along with the EU, to contemplate the future, now that the floor has quite nicely been pulled out from under their feet.

The Ukrainian conflict cannot be fought with the weapons, troops, or income by the Europeans. Without the United States ‘ participation in the game, they didn’t receive little support for the game’s continuation. In fact, if Europe want to remain on its own, without the United States, it may harm the future of the NATO ally.

Many of the frontrunners in Europe are in trouble internally. The growing insecurity in the German leadership class is best illustrated by the cancellation of presidential elections in Germany, France, Poland, and perhaps Romania, where the leading opposition candidate was unable to win.

Discoveries about US and EU intervention in the political process in Georgia, Serbia and Slovakia, perhaps even Moldova, emphasize the squalid character of current-day elections in Europe.

The Trump presidency is liquidating USAID, which has been acting as a sort of CIA-front in many of the preceding countries, including Ukraine. The EU is facing a major issue that extends far beyond financing as a result of that funding and help being cut off. The fraudulent argument that the Union ( and, with it, NATO ) is upholding republic is now exposed. The ruling leaders are in genuine danger of losing their validity.

Trump has an important political view. It has the following message: Western security is crucial, but it is not actually threatened by Russia. The US faces a resurgent China that has a ( largely Western-supplied ) very modern industrial base, a massive workforce and an increasingly well-equipped and powerful military.

From Trump’s point of view, he needs a more pleasant Russia that can help stabilize global energy relationships. He must find new ways to reinvent the deeply fractured and hostile US-Russia marriage. In his 90-minute dialogue with Putin, Trump was poking at financial and technology features that was, in future, give a basis for improving relationships.

No one can yet say whether a bargain will be struck with Ukraine, but there is reason to be more positive that the two parties can work things out.

We will have to wait and see if the Europeans rebel and attempt to damage a deal with Ukraine. In fact, Europe has very little to do if Putin and Trump reach a bargain.

Stephen Bryen is a former US assistant secretary of defense for plan and a special correspondent for Asia Times. This post, which previously appeared on his Substack email Weapons and Strategy, is republished with authority.

Continue Reading

DeepSeek: China’s open-source AI caused a geopolitical earthquake – Asia Times

Readers in a hurry may wish to put this article aside for later. It is an important long-form exploration, not a quick read. – Editors


We are in the early days of a seismic shift in the global AI industry. DeepSeek, a previously little-known Chinese artificial intelligence company, has produced a “game changing”“ large language model that promises to reshape the AI landscape almost overnight.

But DeepSeek’s breakthrough also has wider implications for the technological arms race between the US and China, having apparently caught even the best-known US tech firms off guard. Its launch has been predicted to start a “slow unwinding of the AI bet” in the West, amid a new era of “AI efficiency wars.”

In fact, industry experts have been speculating for years about China’s rapid advancements in AI. While the supposedly free-market US has often prioritized proprietary models, China has built a thriving AI ecosystem by leveraging open-source technology, fostering collaboration between government-backed research institutions and major tech firms.

This strategy has enabled China to scale its AI innovation rapidly while the US – despite all the tub-thumping from Silicon Valley – remains limited by restrictive corporate structures. Companies such as Google and Meta, despite promoting open-source initiatives, still rely heavily on closed-source strategies that limit broader access and collaboration.

What makes DeepSeek particularly disruptive is its ability to achieve cutting-edge performance while reducing computing costs – an area where US firms have struggled due to their dependence on training models that demand very expensive processing hardware.

Where once Silicon Valley was the epicentre of global digital innovation, its corporate behemoths now appear vulnerable to more innovative, “scrappy” startup competitors – albeit ones enabled by major state investment in AI infrastructure. By leveraging China’s industrial approach to AI, DeepSeek has crystalized a reality that many in Silicon Valley have long ignored: AI’s center of power is shifting away from the US and the west.

It highlights the failure of US attempts to preserve its technological hegemony through tight export controls on cutting-edge AI chips to China. According to research fellow Dean Ball: “You can keep [computing resources] away from China, but you can’t export-control the ideas that everyone in the world is hunting for.”

DeepSeek’s success has forced Silicon Valley and large Western tech companies to “take stock,” realizing that their once-unquestioned dominance is suddenly at risk. Even the US president, Donald Trump, has proclaimed that this should be a “wake-up call for our industries that we need to be laser-focused on competing.”

But this story is not just about technological prowess – it could mark an important shift in global power. Former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo has framed DeepSeek’s emergence as a “shot across America’s bow,” urging US policymakers and tech executives to take immediate action.

DeepSeek’s rapid rise underscores a growing realization: Globally, we are entering a potentially new AI paradigm, one in which China’s model of open-source innovation and state-backed development is proving more effective than Silicon Valley’s corporate-driven approach.

I’ve spent much of my career analyzing the transformative role of AI on the global digital landscape – examining how AI shapes governance, market structures and public discourse while exploring its geopolitical and ethical dimensions, now and far into the future.

I also have personal connections with China, having lived there while teaching at Jiangsu University and then written my PhD thesis on the country’s state-led marketization program. Over the years I have studied China’s evolving tech landscape, observing firsthand how its unique blend of state-driven industrial policy and private-sector innovation has fueled rapid AI development.

I believe this moment may come to be seen as a turning point not just for AI but for the geopolitical order. If China’s AI dominance continues, what could this mean for the future of digital governance, democracy, and the global balance of power?

China’s open-source AI takeover

Even in the early days of China’s digital transformation, analysts predicted the country’s open-source focus could lead to a major AI breakthrough. In 2018, China was integrating open-source collaboration into its broader digitization strategy, recognizing that fostering shared development efforts could accelerate its AI capabilities.

Unlike the US, where proprietary AI models dominated, China embraced open-source ecosystems to bypass Western gatekeeping, to scale innovation faster and to embed itself in global AI collaboration.

China’s open-source activity surged dramatically in 2020, laying the foundation for the kind of innovation seen today. By actively fostering an open-source culture, China ensured that a broad range of developers had access to AI tools, rather than restricting them to a handful of dominant companies.

The trend has continued in recent years, with China even launching its own state-backed open-source operating systems and platforms, in 2023, to further reduce its dependence on western technology. This move was widely seen as an effort to cement its AI leadership and create an independent, self-sustaining digital ecosystem. .

While China has been steadily positioning itself as a leader in open-source AI, Silicon Valley firms remained focused on closed, proprietary models – allowing China to catch up fast. While companies like Google and Meta promoted open-source initiatives in name, they still locked key AI capabilities behind paywalls and restrictive licenses.

In contrast, China’s government-backed initiatives have treated open-source AI as a national resource, rather than a corporate asset. This has resulted in China becoming one of the world’s largest contributors to open-source AI development, surpassing many western firms in collaborative projects. Chinese tech giants such as Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent are driving open-source AI forward with frameworks like PaddlePaddle, X-Deep Learning (X-DL) and MindSpore — all now core to China’s machine learning ecosystem.

But they’re also making major contributions to global AI projects, from Alibaba’s Dragonfly, which streamlines large-scale data distribution, to Baidu’s Apollo, an open-source platform accelerating autonomous vehicle development. These efforts don’t just strengthen China’s AI industry, they embed it deeper into the global AI landscape.

This shift had been years in the making, as Chinese firms (with state backing) pushed open-source AI forward and made their models publicly available, creating a feedback loop that western companies have also – quietly – tapped into.

A year ago, for example, US firm Abicus.AI released Smaug-72B, an AI model designed for enterprises that built directly upon Alibaba’s Qwen-72B and outperformed proprietary models like OpenAI’s GPT-3.5 and Mistral’s Medium.

But the potential for US companies to further build on Chinese open-source technology may be limited by political as well as corporate barriers.

In 2023, US lawmakers highlighted growing concerns that China’s aggressive investment in open-source AI and semiconductor technologies would eventually erode western leadership in AI. Some policymakers called for bans on certain open-source chip technologies, due to fears they could further accelerate China’s AI advancements.

By then, however, China’s AI horse had already bolted.

AI with Chinese characteristics

DeepSeek’s rise should have been obvious to anyone familiar with management theory and the history of technological breakthroughs linked to “disruptive innovation.” Latecomers to an industry rarely compete by playing the same game as incumbents – they have to be disruptive.

China, facing restrictions on cutting-edge western AI chips and lagging behind in proprietary AI infrastructure, had no choice but to innovate differently. Open-source AI provided the perfect vehicle: a way to scale innovation rapidly, lower costs and tap into global research while bypassing Silicon Valley’s resource-heavy, closed-source model.

From a Western and traditional human rights perspective, China’s embrace of open-source AI may appear paradoxical, given the country’s strict information controls. Its AI development strategy prioritizes both technological advancement and strict alignment with the Chinese Communist party’s ideological framework, ensuring AI models adhere to “core socialist values” and state-approved narratives.

AI research in China has thrived not only despite these constraints but, in many ways, because of them.

China’s success goes beyond traditional authoritarianism; it embodies what Harvard economist David Yang calls “Autocracy 2.0.” Rather than relying solely on fear-based control, it uses economic incentives, bureaucratic efficiency and technology to manage information and maintain regime stability.

The Chinese government has strategically encouraged open-source development while maintaining tight control over AI’s domestic applications, particularly in surveillance and censorship.

Indeed, authoritarian regimes may have a significant advantage in developing facial-recognition technology due to their extensive surveillance systems. The vast amounts of data collected through these networks enable private AI companies to create advanced algorithms, which can then be adapted for commercial uses, potentially accelerating economic growth.

China’s AI strategy is built on a dual foundation of state-led initiatives and private-sector innovation. The country’s AI roadmap, first outlined in the 2017 new generation artificial intelligence development plan, follows a three-phase timeline: achieving global competitiveness by 2020, making major AI breakthroughs by 2025, and securing world leadership in AI by 2030. In parallel, the government has emphasised data governance, regulatory frameworks and ethical oversight to guide AI development “responsibly.”

A defining feature of China’s AI expansion has been the massive infusion of state-backed investment. Over the past decade, government venture capital funds have injected approximately US$912 billion into early-stage firms, with 23% of that funding directed toward AI-related companies. A significant portion has targeted China’s less-developed regions, following local investment mandates.

Compared with private venture capital, government-backed firms often lag in software development but demonstrate rapid growth post-investment. Moreover, state funding often serves as a signal for subsequent private-sector investment, reinforcing the country’s AI ecosystem.

China’s AI strategy represents a departure from its traditional industrial policies, which historically emphasized self-sufficiency, support for a handful of national champions and military-driven research.

Instead, the government has embraced a more flexible and collaborative approach that encourages open-source software adoption, a diverse network of AI firms and public-private partnerships to accelerate innovation. This model prioritizes research funding, state-backed AI laboratories, and AI integration across key industries including security, healthcare and infrastructure.

Despite strong state involvement, China’s AI boom is equally driven by private-sector innovation. The country is home to an estimated 4,500 AI companies, accounting for 15% of the world’s total.

As economist Liu Gang told the Chinese Communist Party’s Global Times newspaper: “The development of AI is fast in China – for example, for AI-empowered large language models. Aided with government spending, private capital is flowing to the new sector. Increased capital inflow is anticipated to further enhance the sector in 2025.”

China’s tech giants including Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and SenseTime have all benefited from substantial government support while remaining competitive on the global stage. But unlike in the US, China’s AI ecosystem thrives on a complex interplay between state support, corporate investment and academic collaboration.

Recognizing the potential of open-source AI early on, Tsinghua University in Beijing has emerged as a key innovation hub, producing leading AI startups such as Zhipu AI, Baichuan AI, Moonshot AI and MiniMax — all founded by its faculty and alumni.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences has similarly played a crucial role in advancing research in deep learning and natural language processing.

Unlike the West, where companies like Google and Meta promote open-source models for strategic business gains, China sees them as a means of national technological self-sufficiency. To this end, the National AI Team, composed of 23 leading private enterprises, has developed the National AI Open Innovation Platform, which provides open access to AI datasets, toolkits, libraries and other computing resources.

DeepSeek is a prime example of China’s AI strategy in action. The company’s rise embodies the government’s push for open-source collaboration while remaining deeply embedded within a state-guided AI ecosystem. Chinese developers have long been major contributors to open-source platforms, ranking as the second-largest group on GitHub by 2021.

Founded by Chinese entrepreneur Liang Wenfeng in 2023, DeepSeek has positioned itself as an AI leader while benefiting from China’s state-driven AI ecosystem. Liang, who also established the hedge fund High-Flyer, has maintained full ownership of DeepSeek and avoided external venture capital funding.

Liang Wenfeng, founder of DeepSeek. Photo: CCTV,

Though there is no direct evidence of government financial backing, DeepSeek has reaped the rewards of China’s AI talent pipeline, state-sponsored education programs and research funding. Liang has engaged with top government officials including China’s premier, Li Qiang, reflecting the company’s strategic importance to the country’s broader AI ambitions.

In this way, DeepSeek perfectly encapsulates “AI with Chinese characteristics” – a fusion of state guidance, private-sector ingenuity and open-source collaboration, all carefully managed to serve the country’s long-term technological and geopolitical objectives.

Recognizing the strategic value of open-source innovation, the government has actively promoted domestic open-source code platforms like Gitee to foster self-reliance and insulate China’s AI ecosystem from external disruptions. However, this also exposes the limits of China’s open-source ambitions. The government pushes collaboration, but only within a tightly controlled system where state-backed firms and tech giants call the shots.

Reports of censorship on Gitee reveal how Beijing carefully manages innovation, ensuring AI advances stay in line with national priorities. Independent developers can contribute, but the real power remains concentrated in companies that operate within the government’s strategic framework.

The conflicted reactions of US big tech

DeepSeek’s emergence has sparked intense debate across the AI industry, drawing a range of reactions from leading Silicon Valley executives, policymakers and researchers. While some view it as an expected evolution of open-source AI, others see it as a direct challenge to western AI leadership.

Microsoft’s CEO, Satya Nadella, emphasized its technical efficiency. “It’s super-impressive in terms of both how they have really effectively done an open-source model that does this inference-time compute, and is super-compute efficient,” Nadella told CNBC. “We should take the developments out of China very, very seriously.”

Silicon Valley venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, a prominent advisor to Trump, was similarly effusive. “DeepSeek R1 is one of the most amazing and impressive breakthroughs I’ve ever seen – and, as open source, a profound gift to the world,” he wrote on X.

For Yann LeCun, Meta’s chief AI scientist, DeepSeek is less about China’s AI capabilities and more about the broader power of open-source innovation. He argued that the situation should be read not as China’s AI surpassing the US, but rather as open-source models surpassing proprietary ones. “DeepSeek has profited from open research and open source (e.g. PyTorch and Llama from Meta),” he wrote on Threads. “They came up with new ideas and built them on top of other people’s work. Because their work is published and open source, everyone can profit from it. That is the power of open research and open source.”

Not all responses were so measured. Alexander Wang, CEO of Scale AI – a US firm specializing in AI data labeling and model training – framed DeepSeek as a competitive threat that demands an aggressive response. He wrote on X: “DeepSeek is a wake-up call for America, but it doesn’t change the strategy: USA must out-innovate & race faster, as we have done in the entire history of AI. Tighten export controls on chips so that we can maintain future leads. Every major breakthrough in AI has been American.”

Elon Musk added fuel to speculation about DeepSeek’s hardware access when he responded with a simple “obviously” to Wang’s earlier claims on CNBC that DeepSeek had secretly acquired 50,000 Nvidia H100 GPUs, despite US export restrictions.

Beyond the tech world, US policymakers have taken a more adversarial stance. House speaker Mike Johnson accused China of leveraging DeepSeek to erode American AI leadership. “They abuse the system, they steal our intellectual property. They’re now trying to get a leg up on us in AI.”

For his part, Trump took a more pragmatic view, seeing DeepSeek’s efficiency as a validation of cost-cutting approaches. “I view that as a positive, as an asset …. You won’t be spending as much, and you’ll get the same result, hopefully.”

The rise of DeepSeek may have helped jolt the Trump administration into action, leading to sweeping policy shifts aimed at securing US dominance in AI. In his first week back in the White House, the US president announced a series of aggressive measures, including massive federal investments in AI research, closer partnerships between the government and private tech firms and the rollback of regulations seen as slowing US innovation.

The administration’s framing of AI as a critical national interest reflects a broader urgency sparked by China’s rapid advancements, particularly DeepSeek’s ability to produce cutting-edge models at a fraction of the cost traditionally associated with AI development. But this response is not just about national competitiveness – it is also deeply entangled with private industry.

Musk’s growing closeness to Trump, for example, can be viewed as a calculated move to protect his own dominance at home and abroad. By aligning with the administration, Musk ensures that US policy tilts in favour of his AI ventures, securing access to government backing, computing power,and regulatory control over AI exports.

At the same time, Musk’s public criticism of Trump’s US$500 billion AI infrastructure plan – claiming the companies involved lack the necessary funding – was as much a warning as a dismissal, signaling his intent to shape policy in a way that benefits his empire while keeping potential challengers at bay.

Not unrelated, Musk and a group of investors have just launched a US$97.4 billion bid for OpenAI’s nonprofit arm, a move that escalates his feud with OpenAI CEO Sam Altman and seeks to strengthen his grip on the AI industry. Altman has dismissed the bid as a “desperate power grab”, insisting that OpenAI will not be swayed by Musk’s attempts to reclaim control. The spat reflects how DeepSeek’s emergence has thrown US tech giants into what could be all-out war, fuelling bitter corporate rivalries and reshaping the fight for AI dominance.

And while the US and China escalate their AI competition, other global leaders are pushing for a coordinated response. The Paris AI Action Summit, held on February 10 and 11, has become a focal point for efforts to prevent AI from descending into an uncontrolled power struggle.

France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, warned delegates that without international oversight, AI risks becoming “the wild west,” where unchecked technological development creates instability rather than progress.

But at the end of the two-day summit, the UK and US refused to sign an international commitment to “ensuring AI is open, inclusive, transparent, ethical, safe, secure and trustworthy … making AI sustainable for people and the planet.” China was among the 61 countries to sign this declaration.

Concerns have also been raised at the summit about how AI-powered surveillance and control are enabling authoritarian regimes to strengthen repression and reshape the citizen-state relationship. This highlights the fast-growing global industry of digital repression, driven by an emerging “authoritarian-financial complex” that may exacerbate China’s strategic advancement in AI.

Equally, DeepSeek’s cost-effective AI solutions have created an opening for European firms to challenge the traditional AI hierarchy. As AI development shifts from being solely about compute power to strategic efficiency and accessibility, European firms now have an opportunity to compete more aggressively against their US and Chinese counterparts.

Whether this marks a true rebalancing of the AI landscape remains to be seen. But DeepSeek’s emergence has certainly upended traditional assumptions about who will lead the next wave of AI innovation – and how global powers will respond to it.

End of the ‘Silicon Valley effect’?

DeepSeek’s emergence has forced US tech leaders to confront an uncomfortable reality: They underestimated China’s AI capabilities. Confident in their perceived lead, companies like Google, Meta, and OpenAI prioritized incremental improvements over anticipating disruptive competition, leaving them vulnerable to a rapidly evolving global AI landscape.

In response, the US tech giants are now scrambling to defend their dominance, pledging over US$400 billion in AI investment. DeepSeek’s rise, fuelled by open-source collaboration, has reignited fierce debates over innovation versus security, while its energy-efficient model has intensified scrutiny on AI’s sustainability.

Yet Silicon Valley continues to cling to what many view as outdated economic theories such as the Jevons paradox to downplay China’s AI surge, insisting that greater efficiency will only fuel demand for computing power and reinforce their dominance. Companies like Meta, OpenAI and Microsoft remain fixated on scaling computational power, betting that expensive hardware will secure their lead. But this assumption blinds them to a shifting reality.

DeepSeek’s rise as the potential “Walmart of AI” is shaking Silicon Valley’s foundation, proving that high-quality AI models can be built at a fraction of the cost. By prioritizing efficiency over brute-force computing power, DeepSeek is challenging the US tech industry’s reliance on expensive hardware like Nvidia’s high-end chips.

This shift has already rattled markets, driving down the stock prices of major US firms and forcing a reassessment of AI dominance. Nvidia, whose business depends on supplying high-performance processors, appears particularly vulnerable as DeepSeek’s cost-effective approach threatens to reduce demand for premium chips.

The growing divide between the US and China in AI, however, is more than just competition – it’s a clash of governance models. While US firms remain fixated on protecting market dominance, China is accelerating AI innovation with a model that is proving more adaptable to global competition.

If Silicon Valley resists structural change, it risks falling farther behind. We may witness the unraveling of the “Silicon Valley effect”, through which tech giants have long manipulated AI regulations to entrench their dominance. For years, Google, Meta,and OpenAI shaped policies that favored proprietary models and costly infrastructure, ensuring AI development remained under their control.

DeepSeek is redefining AI with breakthroughs in code intelligence, vision-language models and efficient architectures that challenge Silicon Valley’s dominance. By optimizing computation and embracing open-source collaboration, DeepSeek shows the potential of China to deliver cutting-edge models at a fraction of the cost, outperforming proprietary alternatives in programming, reasoning and real-world applications.

More than a policy-driven rise, China’s AI surge reflects a fundamentally different innovation model – fast, collaborative and market-driven – while Silicon Valley holds on to expensive infrastructure and rigid proprietary control. If US firms refuse to adapt, they risk losing the future of AI to a more agile and cost-efficient competitor.

A new era of geotechnopolitics

But China is not just disrupting Silicon Valley. It is expanding “geotechnopolitics”, where AI is a battleground for global power. With AI projected to add US$15.7 trillion to the global economy by 2030, China and the US are racing to control the technology that will define economic, military and political dominance.

DeepSeek’s advancement has raised national security concerns in the US. Trump’s government is considering stricter export controls on AI-related technologies to prevent them from bolstering China’s military and intelligence capabilities.

As AI-driven defence systems, intelligence operations and cyber warfare redefine national security, governments must confront a new reality: AI leadership is not just about technological superiority, but about who controls the intelligence that will shape the next era of global power.

China’s AI ambitions extend beyond technology, driving a broader strategy for economic and geopolitical dominance. But with over 50 state-backed companies developing large-scale AI models, its rapid expansion faces growing challenges, including soaring energy demands and US semiconductor restrictions.

China’s president, Xi Jinping, remains resolute, stating: “Whoever can grasp the opportunities of new economic development such as big data and artificial intelligence will have the pulse of our times.” He sees AI driving “new quality productivity” and modernizing China’s manufacturing base, calling its “head goose effect” a catalyst for broader innovation.

To counter western containment, China has embraced a “guerrilla” economic strategy, bypassing restrictions through alternative trade networks, deepening ties with the global south, and exploiting weaknesses in global supply chains. Instead of direct confrontation, this decentralized approach uses economic coercion to weaken adversaries while securing China’s own industrial base.

China is also leveraging open-source AI as an ideological tool, presenting its model as more collaborative and accessible than western alternatives. This narrative strengthens its global influence, aligning with nations seeking alternatives to western digital control. While strict state oversight remains, China’s embrace of open-source AI reinforces its claim to a future where innovation is driven not by corporate interests but through shared collaboration and global cooperation.

But while DeepSeek claims to be open access, its secrecy tells a different story. Key details on training data and fine-tuning remain hidden, and its compliance with China’s AI laws has sparked global scrutiny. Italy has banned the platform over data-transfer risks, while Belgium and Ireland launched privacy probes.

Under Chinese regulations, DeepSeek’s outputs must align with state-approved narratives, clashing with the EU’s AI Act, which demands transparency and protects political speech. Such “controlled openness” raises many red flags, casting doubt on China’s place in markets that value data security and free expression.

Many western commentators are seizing on reports of Chinese AI censorship to frame other models as freer and more politically open. The revelation that a leading Chinese chatbot actively modifies or censors responses in real time has fueled a broader narrative that western AI operates without such restrictions, reinforcing the idea that democratic systems produce more transparent and unbiased technology. This framing serves to bolster the argument that free societies will ultimately lead the global AI race.

But, at its heart, the “AI arms race” is driven by technological dominance. The US, China, and the EU are charting different paths, weighing security risks against the need for global collaboration. How this competition is framed will shape policy: lock AI behind restrictions, or push for open innovation.

DeepSeek, for all its transformational qualities, continues to exemplify a model of AI where innovation prioritizes scale, speed and efficiency over societal impact. This drive to optimize computation and expand capabilities overshadows the need to design AI as a truly public good.

In doing so, it eclipses this technology’s genuine potential to transform governance, public services and social institutions in ways that prioritize collective wellbeing, equity and sustainability over corporate and state control.

A truly global AI framework requires more than political or technological openness. It demands structured cooperation that prioritizes shared governance, equitable access, and responsible development.

Following a workshop in Shanghai hosted by the Chinese government last September, the UN’s general secretary, António Guterres, outlined his vision for AI beyond corporate or state control: “We must seize this historic opportunity to lay the foundations for inclusive governance of AI – for the benefit of all humanity. As we build AI capacity, we must also develop shared knowledge and digital public goods.”

Both the west and China frame their AI ambitions through competing notions of “openness” – aligned in both cases with their strategic interests and reinforcing existing power structures.

Western tech giants claim AI drives democratization, yet they often dominate digital infrastructure in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, exporting models based on “corporate imperialism” that extract value while disregarding local needs.

China, by contrast, positions itself as a technological partner for the rest of the Global South. However, its AI remains tightly controlled, reinforcing state ideology.

China’s proclaimed view on international AI collaboration emphasizes that AI should not be “a game of rich countries,”as President Xi stated during the 2024 G20 summit.

By advocating for inclusive global AI development, China positions itself as a leader in shaping international AI governance, especially via initiatives like the UN AI resolution and its AI capacity-building action plan. These efforts help promote a more balanced technological landscape while allowing China to strengthen its influence in global AI standards and frameworks.

However, beneath all these narratives, both China and the US share a strategy of AI expansion that relies on exploited human labor, from data annotation to moderation, exposing a system driven less by innovation than by economic and political control.

Peter Bloom is a professor of management at the University of Essex.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Russia better than China for making Afghan-Pakistan peace – Asia Times

Russian Ambassador to Pakistan Albert Khorev told&nbsp, TASS&nbsp, over the weekend that his nation supports Pakistan and&nbsp, Afghanistan’s individual counter-terrorism work. He therefore added that it encourages both of them to work together to overcome boundary disputes via bilateral or multilateral methods.

This suggests that they want to serve as mediators. China has previously tried to do so but has &nbsp, struggled to achieve something, yet Russia has a better chance of success.

Russia’s great geo-economic plan&nbsp, in this piece of Eurasia is to pioneer opposite connection and electricity corridors to India via Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. To that end, Russia has maintain likewise outstanding relationships with Afghanistan and Pakistan, help solve their border tensions, and then do the same&nbsp, with Pakistan and India’s.

The first step has already been achieved upon&nbsp, carefully partnering with the Taliban&nbsp, past summer and finally clinching a&nbsp, strategic reference alliance with Pakistan&nbsp, in December.

The next step will be much harder to complete, but that’s the reason for Ambassador Khorev’s most recent comments regarding Russia’s assistance for Pakistan and Afghanistan’s individual counter-terrorism efforts.

He acknowledged the host nation’s issues with Afghan-emanating terrorist threats on the one hand, but he shied away from blaming the Taliban for them like Islamabad does, and otherwise offered to give them flimsy “necessary help.”

Each person appears to have their own means of empowerment, with the first one being political support for halting all extremist invasion from Afghanistan, and the second being training their special forces to combat ISIS-K.

Left unsaid is any reference to Pakistan’s claims that the Taliban backs the TTP (” Pakistani Taliban” ) and&nbsp, other terrorist groups, however, though commenting on this either way would ruin Russia’s careful balancing act.

China has already taken the same position on this issue, which is in contrast to Russia’s geo-economic perspective, which favors strengthening Afghan-Pakistani ties over the course of its wider geographical strategy.

Since the first uses the Belt & Road Initiative’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor premier to achieve this goal while the second has road exposure to it via Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan don’t need to do business with China on their own country.

So, although China does indeed like its neighboring associates to work more closely up, this isn’t required to advance its geo-economic objectives. Russia’s great geo-economic program necessitates Afghanistan and Pakistan patching up their problems in order to create horizontal connectivity and energy corridors that may one day preferably approach India. The situation is completely different.

Those two, therefore, obviously know that Russia has substantially greater bets in counseling than China does.

After their tensions are resolved, neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan would receive any more financial benefits from China, but Pakistan may eventually get more direct overland connectivity with Russia and perhaps even energy from it as well, if that happens, both via Afghanistan.

Also, Afghanistan may benefit from its intermediary role in these hallways, especially if they ever extend to India. If Beijing were to effectively resolve between them, no such perks would be derived from China.

In response, it is incumbent on Russia to make innovative use of innovative means to advance this political process to the fullest of its ability, including sharing detailed plans of its proposed energy and connectivity investments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan if they agree to resolve their differences.

These may include certain tasks, the estimated number that’ll be invested, lending terms if required, the chance for joint rights of some kind, and the local work that might be employed.

It might still not be enough for a breakthrough, but it would still be more than what China has offered to do if they make peace, which is nothing. In addition, if the political and/or military environment changes and they decide to fix their issues, they would have a mutual interest in revitalizing Russia’s plans.

Russia is expected to push for peace, and its efforts will be more effective than China’s, but it’s too early to say what will happen either way.

This&nbsp, article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

Continue Reading

How Vietnam can parry and dodge Trump’s tariffs – Asia Times

One of the biggest success stories of the past ten years has been Vietnam’s financial fall. Its location as a major manufacturing hub and preferred alternative to China in global supply chains has seen notable growth and international investment.

Hanoi now has a distinctive time as President Donald Trump is resuming his presidency and Washington is extremely watching trade imbalances.

Vietnam’s trade deficit with the US soared past season, making it one of the largest in Asia. If the Trump administration decides to take a decidedly more interventionist approach, it becomes a prime target for tariffs and other industry measures.

Trump has yet to declare strong action against Vietnam, but history suggests that may change quickly. His earlier rhetoric has been unambiguous—Vietnam was labeled “almost the second worst abuser” of business practices in 2019.

If tariffs returning, they didn’t just reach exports, they’ll thorn investor confidence, undermine supply chains and complicated Hanoi’s ambitions of deeper global economic integration. The government may take proactive steps to prevent a repeat of the previous business unrest that left it looking for solutions. Hanoi has options—but the time to action is now.

Strategic comment

Vietnam can’t manage to rely so heavily on the US market. Diversifying trade markets should be the first step in order to lessen sensitivity to American tariffs.

Expanding trade agreements with neighbors in the Middle East, ASEAN, and the European Union would offer new markets for Asian goods.

Despite this, Hanoi has also strengthen its relationship with Washington because the US is still a crucial business partner. One way to increase National goods is one way to accomplish this.

Although recent agreements to purchase US aircraft and liquid natural gas ( LNG ) were good, Vietnam needs to make more progress. Expanding these commitments and emphasizing imports from politically sensitive US industries, such as agriculture, power and high-tech production, may make it harder for Washington to support punishing business measures.

It would also be useful to have a conventional system in place to adjust trade. Negotiating a well-defined, multi-year program with the US to gradually close the deal gap could stop Washington from launching violent action.

Vietnam’s victory has been fueled by foreign direct investment, especially from China. If Washington opinions Vietnam as merely an extension of Taiwanese production rather than a real trading partner, that dependency may turn into a liability.

A Trump White House would be even more aggressive if the Biden administration had now closely watched Chinese assets in Vietnam.

Hanoi has encourage investment from businesses that offer more than just low-cost manufacturing. High-value areas such as semiconductor production, AI-driven technology and advanced transportation should be prioritized.

Further joint ventures with US companies may also aid in changing the narrative, turning the nation from a viewed as a trade surplus criminal to a crucial component of America’s supply chain resilience strategy.

Vietnam’s work force is another advantage that should be leveraged. The nation is place itself as a place for high-tech investment rather than merely as a low-cost substitute for China with the right policies.

Strengthening collaborations in research, technical training, and knowledge with American institutions may strengthen the country’s reputation as a long-term economic partner rather than a potential rival by taking advantage of tariff loopholes.

Deeper political commitment

Hanoi’s political skill has helped it understand past business issues, but the stakes are higher this day. The authorities should ramp up relationship with US politicians, business leaders and industry associations.

It will be important to strengthen our standing in Washington, not just through formal diplomatic channels but also through strong industry lobbying.

Vietnam’s rapid economic growth has been a success story in many ways, but it also means the nation lacks the deep-rooted corporate and political bonds that, say, Japan or South Korea enjoy in the US.

A more active business and political group to Washington may help Vietnam shape the conversation around its business plans. It should be emphasized both the advantages the nation has for the US market, such as the creation of new jobs through Taiwanese goods, and its contribution to the world’s supply chain resilience, which is still a top priority for American businesses.

While relationship, growth and funding strategies can help Vietnam prevent the worst-case situation, it must also be prepared for it. Strategies for preventing possible tariffs, currency fluctuations, and supply chain disruptions should be included in a contingency plan.

If trade policies have an impact on investor confidence, the Asian central bank may ensure stability in the financial markets. Businesses may be encouraged to increase domestic source chains where possible to reduce physical shock coverage.

Hanoi has the resources to improve its relationship with the US while safeguarding its wider financial interests. The key is whether it will apply them before Trump decides to impose his will.

Continue Reading

US Sentinel missile stalls as China, Russia steam ahead – Asia Times

China and Russia are working hard to develop cutting-edge missiles, potentially lowering the global nuclear stability in their favor, as the US struggles with difficulties and cost overruns with its Sentinel missile system.

According to a report released this month by Defense One, the US Air Force has halted work on key parts of its Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) program to reduce rising costs and restructure its acquisition strategy.

The US$ 141 billion program—81 % over its first budget—is intended to replace the aging 1970s-era Minuteman III ICBMs, which may have reached the end of their company life and advancement possible.

Northrop Grumman, the agency’s excellent company, was directed to end design, testing, and design work for the Command and Launch Segment at different features, including Vandenberg Space Force Base in California and Hill Air Force Base in Utah. Additionally, work on security systems and training equipment has been halted.

Following a restructuring announcement from July 2024, where alternative programs were ruled out by US Department of Defense ( DOD ) officials because of rising costs. Kathy Warden, the CEO of Northrop, acknowledged the labor delay in January and said the reform may take up to 24 months.

Despite the setback, Northrop still managed to meet goals under the contract for engineering and developing development ( EMD).

In order to lower costs, the US Air Force is considering opening some of its surface system to competition. The Sentinel program is crucial for modernizing the US nuclear triad, which includes the Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN ) and B-21 bomber, despite the uncertainty surrounding the timeline and scope of the restructuring.

According to a report released in November 2024 by the US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ), Sentinel is designed to address both current and future threats while being more affordable, modular, and maintain the industrial base. By 2029, the US Air Force intends to change the Minuteman III weapons with Sentinel.

While Sentinel’s compact style promises cost-effective maintenance and future upgrades, these advantages are overshadowed by soaring prices and timeline slip, possibly reducing the preparation of the US land-based atomic army.

In stark contrast, the US DOD’s 2024 China Military Power report highlights China’s rapid expansion and modernization of its ICBM capabilities. According to the report, China has about 400 operational missiles, including fixed and mobile launchers that can launch unitary or multiple warheads.

China’s strategic missile forces include silo-launched and road-mobile ICBMs. It has recently completed three new solid-propellant ICBM fields housing at least 300 silos, with development consistent with the US and Russia’s launch-on-warning ( LOW) systems.

Further, the report adds that China is developing advanced nuclear delivery methods that can bypass US missile defenses, such as hypersonic glide vehicles ( HGVs ) and fractional orbital bombardment ( FOB ) systems.

Meanwhile, Russia is also upgrading its strategic missile forces. Russia is replacing Soviet-era ICBMs with advanced systems like the RS-24 Yars, which can carry four multiple independent targetable reentry vehicles ( MIRVs ) in a March 2024 report by Hans Kristensen and others for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

According to Kristensen and his co-authors, Russia is gradually phasing out the RS-20V Voevoda and introducing the RS-28 Sarmat, a missile with a range that can carry up to ten warheads with an extended range, including over the North and South Poles. By 2030, new systems like the Yars-M and Kedr are anticipated to replace the old ones, focusing on greater mobility and stealth.

The delays that are preventing the Sentinel program may make it more difficult for the US to rely on the aging Minuteman III than originally anticipated. Keeping those missiles operational poses a significant challenge, especially since some important upgrade guides and component manufacturers no longer exist.

However, Matt Korda argues in a March 2021 Federation of American Scientists ( FAS ) report that life-extending the Minuteman III is a more cost-effective and safer option than Sentinel, whose projected life-cycle cost of US$ 264 billion could severely strain the US defense budget.

He highlights that a 2000s-era Minuteman III life extension program effectively turned 450 decades-old missiles into nearly new ones—except for their steel shells—at a cost of just$ 7 billion.

Korda points out that many crucial Minuteman III subsystems remain extremely reliable, and that cutting-edge non-destructive testing techniques could ensure their longevity without sacrificing operational readiness. He contends that modernizing Minuteman III would put resources at risk for more pressing security issues by putting them on hold for decades.

His proposal gains more weight when taken into account the significant budget constraints posed by modernizing the US nuclear triad’s three legs. Although the B-21 bomber program is estimated to cost$ 203 billion for 100 aircraft, it could face severe scrutiny given the US budget deficit that is growing to close to$ 2 trillion annually, according to Caleb Larson in a recent article from 1945.

Similarly, a September 2024 US Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) report highlights significant cost overruns and delays in the Columbia-class SSBN program. The lead submarine could be delivered 12 to 16 months late, between October 2028 and February 2029, according to the report, putting off anticipated operational readiness in 2030.

Persistent issues such as late materials, incomplete design products, and inexperienced staff undermine construction performance. The US Navy and shipbuilder estimates cost overruns of hundreds of millions of dollars, far exceeding their optimistic estimates. Additionally, the report criticizes the US Navy for inadequate cost and schedule analysis, limiting effective risk management and corrective actions.

When the US is confronted with renewed great power competition and potential nuclear brinksmanship, these difficulties are crucial. By 2030, the US will be facing two major nuclear powers, China and Russia, for the first time in history, as potential adversaries and strategic rivals, according to the US 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.

In light of that growing difficulty, Philip Sheers and others assert in a May 2024 article for the Center for a New American Security ( CNAS ) that the US can take specific steps to mitigate the effects, even if it cannot prevent China and Russia from joining it as world’s leading nuclear powers.

In a more complex, multipolar world, they stress the value of maintaining the US’s nuclear arsenal while developing novel deterrence strategies. By doing so, the US can maintain its strategic advantage and adapt to the changing security environment.

Continue Reading

Trump’s retreat leaves Myanmar wholly to China – Asia Times

Lee MAI – US President Donald Trump’s proceed to freeze British international aid programs will influence legal war-wracked Myanmar, where multi-million-dollar USAID programs have supported health, rights, democracy, governance and impartial media programs along the Thai-Myanmar border.

The funding stop is a significant component of the large Trumpian assault on USAID, but it also highlights the earlier restrictions and potential complete end to US support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement and associated broad opposition to the now four-year-old coup-installed defense regime.

Before Donald Trump, Washington’s devotion to Myanmar’s fight against the coup that deposed a de facto overthrown government de post led by Aung San Suu Kyi was in question, with many in the opposition believing that the US could and should have done more in such a blatant conflict between democratic and autocratic forces. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

With Trump’s visible significant departure from the turmoil, China will weave ever larger over Myanmar’s upcoming. China is the only inside power with the resources, capacity, and motivation to effectively engage in and use armed conflict to its advantage in Myanmar.

People have tried and failed. Under its so-called “five-point consensus,” which includes recommendations for dialogue between the junta and the opposition, the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, made a weak and ineffective attempt to reach a truce in the civil wars.

ASEAN has, as ever, been hamstrung by its two cardinal principles—non-interference and consensus—which means the union has not solved a diplomatic disagreement between its members, allow mediates an ending to an military conflict inside a member state, in its 58-year history.

Despite this, the dysfunctional and ineffective regional bloc has largely outsourced the administration of Myanmar’s war to Australia and the European Union. New efforts to mediate the conflict under Malaysia’s 2025 rotational leadership, with particular help from Thailand, are likewise likely destined to go nowhere.

It leaves China and its long-term plans for Myanmar in the open field. Despite the war, trade is still brisk across the two sides ‘ 2, 185-kilometer border and will be brisker if multi-billion-dollar plans to upgrade Myanmar’s roads, railways and a major port under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, an offshoot of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, are finally realized.

In Myanmar, China engages in a complex double-play. On the one hand, it distributes arms to the officially neutral United Wa State Army ( UWSA ), which is the country’s largest armed militia that distributes Chinese weapons to various anti-military armed groups. It is the successor of the Communist Party of Burma that Beijing supported during the Cold War.

At the same time, China has backed Myanmar’s often isolated and persistently abusive military regimes, not least after soldiers crushed a pro-democracy uprising in August-September 1988, an episode that still haunts the inflamed nation.

After a brief squabble with the US and the West in the 2010s, which was supported by a period of political openness and limited democratization, Myanmar’s generals have since retreated to China following the 2021 coup, which overthrew Suu Kyi and inaugurated a new era of US and EU sanctions and condemnation. &nbsp,

To be sure, China has no interest in the emergence of a strong, peaceful, democratic and federal Myanmar—the aim of most resistance armies.

China can play its traditional carrot-and-stick game, which involves dangling trade and investment on the one hand and blatantly deniable indirect support for ethnic armies via the UWSA on the other. Myanmar is at war and weak.

China does not want the conflict in Myanmar to get out of hand, as serious instability in border regions could cause torrents of refugees crossing its border and halt lucrative cross-border trade, which provides China’s landlocked hinterlands with a crucial outlet.

China does not like the Chinese-run scams that have grown out of the lawless border areas of Myanmar that target Chinese citizens.

That is why China recently used its manipulative hand in northern Shan state by repressing the insurgent Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army ( MNDAA ) and its ally, theTa’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ), both of whom at Beijing’s orders halted their advance on junta-controlled territory.

After ethnic Kokang chieftain Peng Daren traveled to China for what rumors called “medical treatment,” the MNDAA agreed to a ceasefire with the Myanmar junta in early December. According to the MNDAA on December 3, a resolution to the conflict would be sought” under Chinese government arbitration.”

The TNLA made a similarly-worded announcement in late November, saying that it would “always cooperate with China’s mediation efforts and continue to cooperate]to achieve ] good results”.

The Arakan Army ( AA ), the third organization under the so-called Brotherhood Alliance that has seized the majority of Rakhine state, announced on December 29 that it is prepared to negotiate with the military regime, even though hostilities have raged on for a while. In fact, AA appears to be on the verge of winning in its native state of Rakhine.

Beijing is heard by the AA, but it is more independent than some other armed groups. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA ), a largely Christian fighting force based in northern Kachin state, was established and trained in 2009 under the guidance of the AA to balance out its reliance on China. It has strong international ties, including with church groups in the US and ethnic Kachins in India.

The KIA’s Laiza headquarters is where the majority of its AA leaders are still based, reducing its dependence on China over its MNDAA and TNLA allies. The UWSA’s leaders must pass through Chinese territory when they travel from Laiza to the Wa headquarters in Panghsang, which they reportedly do frequently, and a large portion of AA’s weapons are sourced indirectly from it.

Therefore, it is surprising that the AA has so far stopped fighting in Rakhine state, where the Chinese have significant interests in a deep sea port and oil and gas pipelines that connect southern Yunnan province to China.

China may be a strategic advantage because it is the only foreign power that could possibly act as a mediator between the AA and the junta in Naypyitaw, but those interests do, in fact, give it a strategic advantage.

India isn’t as exposed as China to Myanmar’s instability but likewise has a keen interest in the conflict’s trajectory and outcomes.

One of India’s main goals is to depose ethnic Assamese, Manipuri, and Naga rebels from cross-border sanctuaries in remote and mountainous northwestern Myanmar, where they frequently launch raids into India and smuggle arms into its volatile northeastern region.

Up until the 2021 coup, when angry new resistance groups were established in the Sagaing region and Chin state of Myanmar, unrest has recently spread to Manipur in northeastern India. &nbsp,

Economically, India has sought to import oil, gas and hydropower from Myanmar to fuel its fast-growing economy – plans that have been complicated or put on hold by the war’s instability.

India also seeks, via its long-held” Act East” policy, to link with Southeast Asia’s vibrant markets via a preferably stable Myanmar. &nbsp, Yet even with these economic interests and security concerns, India is hardly in a position to challenge China’s pervasive influence over Myanmar.

There is now a lot of, if not quixotic, speculation that Myanmar’s collective resistance forces could soon overthrow the junta regime after seizing unprecedented territory from its troops. Some even went so far as to predict a sudden collapse scenario, as has recently occurred in Syria. &nbsp,

But as China’s recent interventions in and control over Myanmar’s wars show, that won’t happen unless Beijing wants it to – and it’s not at all clear that it does.

And Myanmar’s various resistance forces are fighting for the restoration of a democracy stolen by military forces without the real or even symbolic support of the US, with the US now fully withdrawing from the conflict.

Bertil Lintner is a Thailand-based journalist, author and security analyst. His most recent book is” The Golden Land Ablaze: Coups, Insurgents and the State in Myanmar”, which can be purchased on Amazon&nbsp, here.

Continue Reading

Putin’s diminishing returns and Russia’s shrinking world – Asia Times

Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, emailed Donald Trump a cautious congratulations information on the day of his inauguration, before making a protracted call with Xi Jinping, the country’s leader.

From Putin’s standpoint, this makes sense. Russia gets billions of dollars from power sales to China and engineering from Beijing, but from Washington, until recently, generally sanctions and fear.

Moscow is hoping for a more positive relation with the White House’s present owner, who has made it known that he wants a “deal” to stop the Ukrainian conflict.

However, Putin should not be faking the fact that this three-year-old issue has had one of the worst years in Russian foreign policy since the Cold War’s finish.

Transatlantic unification

Russia’s actions around the world have been stifled by the conflict in Ukraine and limited by its possibilities.

The 2022 war, in contrast to the 2014 annexation of Crimea, resulted in an extraordinary amount of intercontinental unity, including the growth of NATO and sanctions against Russian commerce and finance. Both the US and the European Union have recently expanded their sanctions measures.

The EU also forbids the re-export of Soviet liquefied natural gas and ends help for an Arctic LNG project by Russia for the first time.

EU-Russian industry, including Western imports of vitality, has dropped to a fraction of what it was before the battle.

The two Nord Stream pipes, designed to bring Russian oil to Germany without transiting East Europe, lie crippled and unoccupied. Energy profits have about one-half of what they did two years ago.

The West has also provided billions in humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine, giving Russia a degree of endurance for which Russia was ready. In addition, international businesses and professional authorities and intellectuals have flocked to Russia in droves.

China has been the nation’s major lord despite Russia’s” shadow fleet,” an aged group of ships sailing under different administrative and technical evasions.

Since the end of 2021, trade between China and Russia has increased by nearly two-thirds, and the US cites Beijing as the primary cause of Russia’s “dual apply” and other systems.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has moved from an energy-for-manufactured-goods business partnership with the West to one of protectorates with China, as one Russia researcher termed it.

Hosting an October gathering of the BRICS countries – today counting 11 people, including the five original people: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa– is unlikely to account for political costs elsewhere.

Two men in suits hold wine glasses.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping bread their companionship in March 2023. Photo: Pavel Byrkin / AFP via Getty Images/ The Talk

Problems at home …

The Russian economy is deeply distorted by increased military spending, which represents 40 % of the budget and 25 % of all spending. The government currently needs the equivalent of US$$ 20 billion annually to pay for new hires.

Russian officials may find a way to satisfy at least some of the populace, but consistent inflation and shortages of supply money directly from the conflict have made this task more difficult.

On the field, the battle itself has killed or wounded more than 600, 000 Russian men. Operations during 2024 were especially dangerous, producing more than 1, 500 Russian deaths a day.

The head who anticipated Kyiv’s acquiescence in time then discovers that Russia’s place is occupied, its naval troops are withdrawn from the Black Sea, and one of its own commanders was murdered in Moscow.

The fact that this presumptive great energy, which has a community of 144 million, has to rely on North Korean troops to help conquer its own land is probably the biggest humiliation.

… and in its yard

Moscow’s commitment to the conflict has affected its ability to influence activities abroad, even in its unique community.

For instance, Russia had much supported Armenia in its ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over borders and people in the Caucasus following the fall of the Soviet Union.

Moscow has engaged in various ceasefire negotiations. Despite the presence of about 2, 000 Soviet troops dispatched to defend the remaining Armenian population in some of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, continuous attacks and territorial benefits for Azerbaijan persisted.

In September 2023, Azerbaijan’s troops immediately took command of the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh. In the largest ethnic purging incident since the end of the Balkan Wars, over 100 000 Armenians have fled. The soldiers stayed out of the situation and afterwards withdrew. The Russian army, absorbed in the terrible efforts in Ukraine, was not rear up or reinforce them.

In recent years, the Azeris ‘ diplomatic and economic standing have improved, helped by support from NATO member Turkey and increased demand for its gas as a substitute for Russia’s.

The Iranian state, which is feeling betrayed by Russia, has for the first time emailed its sentiments to the West, which is content to accept such requests.

Losing control and associates

Russia’s losses in the Caucasus have been dwarfed by the Middle East’s negative impact and impact on its defense.

Russia backed Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian government during the Arab Spring in 2011 and directly aided it by starting defense action in 2015.

However, a mix of rebel groups quickly swept Assad out in December 2024. With the conflict in Ukraine having drained Russia’s potential for more, the protection offered to Assad by Moscow was the closest it could offer.

Russia’s potential departure from the Arab naval base at Tartus and the airport at Khmeimim would eliminate property that made it able to work with Iran, its main strategic companion in the region.

In recent years, Jewish attacks on Iran and other Iranian-backed troops in Lebanon and Syria have had an impact on Russia’s credibility as an alliance and arsenal.

The loss of the Arab foundations, which are crucial start points for expanding Russian energy, and Moscow’s apparent ability to influence the situation on the ground across the Sahel area in north-central Africa would also have a negative impact on Russia’s position in Africa.

Diminishing results

Moscow is increasingly reliant on a variety of different means to try to influence others, given the impasse in Ukraine and the Russian’s corporate losses in Syria and elsewhere.

Disinformation, election interference and various threats are not fresh and are part of Russia’s deeds in Ukraine. However, recent efforts in East Europe have not been very successful.

For instance, massive Russian funding and propaganda in Romania helped to pave the way for a flimsy victory for a candidate for president against NATO in December 2024, but the Romanian government quickly exposed these practices, and the election was voided.

Russia has long been a target of threats and propaganda in neighboring Moldova, especially during recent presidential elections and a referendum on stipulating a” European course” in the constitution.

The tiny nation made a move to lower its dependence on Russian gas, but it is still largely squat on a territorial level due to the separatist region of Transnistria, which had previously provided most of the nation’s electricity.

Despite these factors, the results were not what Moscow wanted. In both votes, a European direction was favored by the electorate. When the Transnistrian legislature in February 2024 appealed to Moscow for protection, none was forthcoming.

It’s fair to say that your power ranking has decreased when Moldova criticizes you.

Wounded but still dangerous

Not all recent events have had an impact on Moscow. The state’s economic dominance has led to the quick reconstruction of a weakened military and support for its technology sector in the near future. With Chinese assistance and evasion of sanctions, sufficient resources and energy will allow the conflict in Ukraine to continue.

Despite some ambiguous signals, Donald Trump’s election will likely favor Putin. A task force headed by Biden, which was established in the US, was threatened with tariffs and additional sanctions, as well as the US president’s threat to impose sanctions on Russian oligarchs who evaded sanctions.

Someone in the White House has publicly admired Putin, expressed doubts about US support for Ukraine, and hurriedly bullied America’s most enticing allies in Latin America, Canada, and Europe.

Most importantly, Trump’s eagerness to make good on his pledge to end the war may provide the Russian leader with a deal he can call a “victory”.

The shrinking of Russia’s world has not necessarily made Russia less dangerous, it could be quite the opposite. Some Kremlin observers contend that a more isolated Russia is less receptive to American economic pressure.

A retreating Russia and a troubled Putin might also choose to make even more careless threats and actions, such as those involving nuclear weapons, especially if reversing their policies in Ukraine would threaten his standing. It is, after all, Putin’s war.

The acrimonious dictum” Russia is never as strong as she looks… nor as weak as she looks” has been ominously rephrased by Putin himself as” Russia was never so strong as it wants to be and never so weak as it is thought to be” would be wise to all observers to take note of.

Ronald H Linden is professor emeritus of political science, University of Pittsburgh

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading