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When South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol issued his now-infamous military law order in the early days of December 3, 2024, it seemed to some spectators that his fate was sealed. With no obvious cause for the order beyond reining in some stubborn lawmakers in the legislature, Yoon’s military legislation move looked like a large overreaction.

While reserving assessment on whether the senator ’s steps were unconstitutional, without having exhausted various social options, we argued at the time that Yoon’s martial law was a social misstep.

Also if Yoon survived the following impeachment trials, we wrote, he had consigned his administration to everlasting lame-duck status—a much fade-out into obscurity. And thus, it seemed to us then, the post-martial-law Yoon administration had limp along in humiliation.

But one factor stays regular then and now. A military law charter is a social problem, one made at the choice of the chief executive. Recall that when Yoon declared martial law on December 3, he was doing so as the sitting president. Martial laws is something he had every right to declare. But, there was never any large legal question at play in that regard.

Whether declaring martial law without an apparent reasonable reason amounts to an egregious illegal act–that is, an indictable offense–is a problem for the Constitutional Court to handle. Also, whether Yoon’s martial law order constitutes an act of rebellion, as opposition parties but claim, is a question for the same court and judicial authorities to handle.

To that end, the issue surrounding Yoon’s December 3 charter is fully liquid under the local law and regulation. It should have begun and ended as a simple problem of what is allowed under the Constitution.

But Yoon’s opponents–namely the opposition Democratic Party and the analytical company probing Yoon–have changed the margins. If something, their decision to aggressively rise tensions in response to Yoon’s military law strategy has inadvertently bolstered the explanation for its necessity.

Let’s begin with the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials ’ ( CIO ) fixation on arresting a sitting president on allegations of inciting an insurrection. After one failed effort, the CIO on January 15 apprehended Yoon from his house under a controversial permit issued by the Seoul Western District Court.

Four days later, determine Cha Eun-kyung from the same judge granted a proper imprisonment of the leader, extending the incarceration for another 20 times, including the original 48 hours allowed under local law.  

Besides the exceptional nature of for warrants in North Korean story, they are almost certainly unlawful. The CIO, first and foremost, does not have authority to investigate the leader on rebellion costs.

This analytical agency was created in 2020 under the communist Moon Jae-in management, which sought to grip in the trial, an entity the left had usually viewed as overwhelmed. By its own rules, the CIO’s power is confined to investigating high-ranking officials, notably courts, public prosecution and police officers, for fraud and the like.

But to gain an upper hand in a turf war among other investigative agencies over this “case of the century, ” the CIO pressed forward with absurd reasoning that it had the right to probe the president for abuse of power, with insurrection charges being a natural extension of that crime.

In other words, the CIO decided that Yoon was guilty of insurrection–even before the CIO arrested him for it–and then used that presumption of guilt to justify an expansion of its scope of power to include a sitting president.

Even more astounding, the courts actually bought their argument. Two judges issued arrest warrants and one recently granted a formal arrest warrant against Yoon by ignoring the Criminal Procedure Act and never addressing exactly how the CIO has jurisdiction over the case.

More egregiously, during the execution of the second arrest warrant on January 15, the CIO and its authorities reportedly coerced the military commander at the presidential residence into authorizing their entrance.

According to news reports, this was done using falsified documents. The paperwork lacked the required seal of the Presidential Security Service’s chief, and instead, an unrelated scrap of paper bearing the stamp of a military commander was affixed to the official document, rendering the entire arrest procedurally invalid.

As if detaining Yoon weren’t enough, the CIO has lately escalated matters by preventing the president from meeting anyone other than his attorneys—not even his wife, the First Lady. And all this is taking place as Yoon’s trial at the Constitutional Court, determining whether he will be reinstated or formally removed from office, is pending decision.

For his part, Yoon is rightly pushing back. This is a classic example of the fruit of the poisonous tree: if the source ( CIO’s jurisdictional overreach and illegal warrants ) is tainted, everything derived from it is inherently compromised.

The chaos unleashed by the CIO is only half the story, however. Let us now turn our attention to the madcap maneuvers of the main opposition Democratic Party and their run-amok impeachment obsession.

Since the December 3 martial law declaration, the party has impeached President Yoon and the first acting president Prime Minister Han Duk-soo, the latter under an arbitrary rule set by the speaker of the parliament from the Democratic Party.

They have even gone so far as to threaten impeachment against the current acting president Choi Sang-mok and everyone in the line of succession if their demands are not met. This is on top of some two dozen impeachment motions against state officials and prosecutors filed by the Democratic Party since Yoon’s inauguration in May 2022. Several prosecutors involved in the ongoing probes into opposition leader Lee were also impeached.

For the past six weeks, moreover, the Democratic Party has relentlessly promoted the notion that Yoon incited insurrection on December 3, aggressively shaping the narrative for public consumption. But perhaps realizing the uphill battle of proving insurrection—a charge with a high burden of proof and in Yoon’s case very little proof—they are now pivoting away from it.

Rather, they have amended articles of impeachment to claim that Yoon failed to follow proper procedures when declaring martial law. This is quite the about-face for a party that, just a while ago, was steadfast in accusing Yoon of spearheading an insurrection, deploying the term as if it were a mantra and repeating it 29 times in their impeachment article.

What, then, is driving the Democratic Party’s perilous behavior? Beyond their clear intent to end a conservative presidency, they are seizing this moment to pave an unobstructed path for their leader, Lee, to ascend to the helm.

With two of Lee’s liberal rivals, Cho Kuk and Song Young-gil, recently imprisoned, and no viable contender emerging from the ruling party, Yoon’s fall would all but ensure Lee’s rise. For this reason, the party is intent on crushing any attempts to sabotage their plan, even if it means further elevating the tension already paralyzing South Korean society and politics.

Earlier this month, the Democratic Party unveiled the Minju Police Box, an online platform inviting citizens to report individuals for allegedly spreading false information about the December 3 martial law declaration. Unsurprisingly, what qualifies as false information remains entirely subjective.

Despite mounting criticism over censorship, the opposition has doubled down, pledging to track and pursue legal action against those accused of conspiring in an insurrection by spreading “false claims. ”

One opposition lawmaker has even floated the idea of monitoring Kakaotalk, South Korea’s most widely used messaging app. Already, the party has filed police complaints against ten conservative Youtubers and several ruling party lawmakers.

But perhaps what the opposition party and the CIO have overlooked in their calculations is the very real possibility that their hotheaded pursuits could spectacularly backfire–which they clearly have.

Yoon’s supporters, who initially seemed to have been taken aback by Yoon’s declaration of martial law and resigned to the political consequences of that seemingly rash decision, are rallying decisively to his defense.

The South Korean electorate appears to have seen through the opposition’s facade. The president ’s ratings have now surpassed 50 % and the ruling People Power Party’s ratings have overtaken that of the opposition Democratic Party.

By escalating the martial law issue by means of injudicious use of judicial authority, the South Korean oppositionists have, ironically, sidelined the martial law issue and energized Yoon’s base like never before.

The tables have turned. The left is caught in a political whirlpool over the martial law debacle, while the right is taking the moral high ground, fighting for the survival of the country.

Because the calculus is different now, most South Korean conservatives are no longer concerned with the fate of Yoon alone but also with that of the constitutional order. South Korea, it would seem, is undergoing a coup d’etat by the left seeking to overwhelm executive power with judicial power applied in entirely dubious ways.

Many are in South Korea are thus asking the question: who are the real insurrectionists?

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Taiwanese leader Xi Jinping has been evident that he intends to acquire Taiwan – one way or another. He has great causes. It may create Xi as one of the gods by accomplishing anything Mao Tse Tung was n’t.

By taking Taiwan, China breaks through the first island chain – the island countries stretching from Japan to Taiwan and on to the Philippines and Malaysia – that inhibit China ’s freedom of entry to the Pacific and beyond. Break the chain and the Army finally gets quick access to the Pacific and potentially can encompass Japan, cut off Australia and proceed forward. These are functional rewards.

As essential are the social and psychological benefits. Consider Taiwan and Beijing has demonstrated the US government had n’t save the 23 million free citizens of Taiwan. Neither had American economic and financial stress. And US nuclear weapons did n’t stop China both.

In assets all over Asia, the calculus will shift and many will reduce the best offers they can and change “red ” immediately rather than attempt to resist Chinese pressure on their own. The United States may be finished as a Western power. And worldwide nobody will believe a US guarantee of protection – explicit or implicit.

Is China taking Taiwan?

The late released 2024 US Department of Defense  China Military Power Report  presents a bleak portrait of a rapidly developing Chinese government. But the report  assesses  that while Taiwan is a primary goal, the Chinese government really is n’t ready for procedures against the beach.  

No matter how many progress the Army makes, it seems it ’s not quite ready to attack Taiwan. China specialists can rattling off the reasons why a Taiwanese assault on Taiwan won’t be coming in the near future.

Here’s the lotto cards of reasons. And why, probably, the claims may not be all they seem.

1.     There are only two little windows during the year ( April and October ) when the weather is good enough for an invasion force to get across the Taiwan Strait.

When asked about this, a Chinese works noted: “Look at the bridge schedule. They run all time. ”  And someone should include told Dwight Eisenhower about the climate in June 1944. He just needed 72 hrs of good wind to get across the English Channel.

2.   Only a small quantity of small beaches on Taiwan’s western coast are suitable for an aquatic landing.

Marine forces sometimes don’t have much of a beach…or one at all…if you ’ve struck the keeper tight enough or deceived him. The U. S. Marines pushed a division across a beach about 200 yards wide in one day at Tinian in 1944. And amphibious operations include troops delivered by helicopter, airborne, and infiltrated in advance along with fifth columnists.

3.   PLA needs to seize a port – and that’ll never happen because 1 ) it ’s a port and Taiwan is presumably defending it; 2 ) The Chinese are not smart enough to have their fifth column, including organized crime, already in place to up up, say, Kaosiung.

The “barges ” China is  building  can, in combination with redundant ships, be used to build breakwaters and other components of an artificial port.

4.   PLA has n’t got the “lift ” – enough ships – to take troops and equipment across the strait.

A Marine Corps University professor in the late 2010’s had a PowerPoint presentation making this case. He was counting the wrong ships. Add in “old ” amphibious ships and civilian ships and boats that were integrated under the “military-civil fusion ” doctrine and the PLA had plenty of lift. It’s got even more now. And the world’s second-largest merchant marine has more than enough shipping to deliver up to six brigades and 60 days of supplies ( particularly if they build an artificial harbor ).

5.     Amphibious operations are the hardest, most complex military operation known to man.

This argument boils down to “the Chinese just aren’t as smart as us. ”  That’s mistaken, and when it comes to amphibious operations, read Toshi Yoshihara’s  book  on how they performed in the Chinese Civil War.

6. PLA can’t do joint operations.

Look at recent exercises and ongoing training. They’re getting better. In fact, they’ve been doing joint training for going on two decades and intensely since Xi came to power 12 years ago. And you don’t have to be perfect. Just good enough to do a specific task in a specific place.

7.     PLA can’t do “joint logistics over-the-shore. “

Once again, the Chinese aren’t smart enough and can’t possibly be our equals.

8.     The PLAN has aircraft carriers but they’re nowhere near our level.

Do you see a pattern? The Chinese aren’t intelligent or capable enough. Just as was said about the Japanese in 1941. Remember, the PLA’s carriers will be operating within and along the edge of the First Island Chain and with the support of the PLAAF and PLA Rocket Force.

9.   PLA has n’t got combat experience.

Neither does the US Navy, except against the Houthi Navy. And the rest of the US military has n’t fought a high-end opponent in decades.

10.   The PLA is corrupt.

Andrew Erickson at the Naval War College gets it  right: “If Xi and the PLA were in the disarray that some myopically focused on their system’s chronic corruption imagine, there’s no way China ’s military could be developing, deploying, exercising and otherwise preparing in the ways that the CMPR chronicles. ”

11.   Xi Jinping can’t trust his generals and admirals.

Neither could Hitler or Stalin. One almost got to Moscow. The other took Berlin.

12.   The PLA is “restive” and pushing back at Xi’s efforts to give himself total power.

Have we ever seen any real evidence that any PLA officer has “pushed back”? And on our side, how many US Navy admirals pushed back against the systematic degrading of their service’s capabilities over the last 30 years? It was also said before 1939 that the Wehrmacht Generals – the elite of the elite – would never actually let “that Corporal” run things.

13.   The Chinese can’t innovate. They can only copy.

There’s “Chinese ingenuity ” just as there was “Yankee ingenuity. ” It works well enough, no matter who invented the thing improved upon. the PLA Strategic Rocket Force has been very innovative…anyone heard of the DF-21D, DF-26, and DF-17? Or the new Type 076 amphibious assault carrier that is going to carry and launch drones, fixed wing and helicopters and put amphibious vehicles on the beach?

14.   PLA officers and NCOs  won’t take the initiative  – like ours will.

Maybe. But have you ever heard a Korean War vet say he wanted to fight the Chinese again?

15.   China won’t attack Taiwan until 2027, 2035, 2049.

It’s always some years off. Xi is said to have told his military to be ready to go against Taiwan by 2027. In fact, Hu Jintao in 2008 and Xi in 2013 ordered the PLA to be ready to take Taiwan in 2020.

The shoe could drop at any time. Would Xi really tell us his attack date in advance? Remember that the British assessed in the 1930s that Germany would not be ready to fight a war until 1943.

16.   China has so many one-child families that Xi would n’t dare attack.

The popular anger over families losing their only child would be too hard for Xi and CCP leaders to handle, it is argued. But make them “heroes of the revolution ” and provide a house and a handsome pension – and complaints about it disappear.

17.   Economic costs would be too high.

Tough, yes, but Xi is sanctions-proofing the country. And he’s telling his people to toughen up and get ready for what’s coming. What is never discussed is the economic benefits that taking Taiwan and establishing the PRC’s global domination over the global trading system would mean for the PRC. It is always viewed in the negative…but they don’t consider that Xi and the CCP see it as a step towards economic supremacy.

18.     The blow to China ’s reputation will be too high.

As if the CCP cares about its reputation. If the CCP does n’t mind the flack that comes from taking organs out of live prisoners and selling them, the criticism from taking Taiwan won’t move the needle much. Nor is there likely to be much. Who is still talking about the subjugation of Tibet or the strangling of Hong Kong?

19.   Taiwan has a million reservists.

999,000 of whom get about four days of training a year.

20. Taiwan’s military and civilians will fight like tigers.

Maybe. But the Taiwanese may not be the Ukrainians or the Finns, especially if outside support does n’t come quickly.

21.   Taiwan has mountains. Mountain combat is tough.

Just too hard for the Chinese, it seems. However, selected PLA brigades train in the mountains annually and unless there is a war with India, they might be deployed to Taiwan after the beaches are secure.

22.   Taiwan has cities. Urban combat is tough.

The Americans, the Russians and many others have figured out urban combat. But it ’s too hard for the Chinese?

23. The US military has a qualitative superiority with its hardware, training and experience.

The French thought ‘elan’ would overcome the German Maxim guns in 1914. It did n’t. They also had faith in the fact their tanks were superior in 1940. And these days, America’s technological superiority is eroding almost daily.

24.     The U. S. military calculated that taking Formosa from the Japanese in 1944/1945 would have been a herculean effort.

True. But perhaps Xi thinks it ’s worth it for him. And what he thinks matters. And it probably is worth more to the PRC and Xi these days than Formosa was to the US in 1944/1945.

Also, let’s not forget that our invasion force had to travel 1,200 nautical miles to the invasion beaches on Taiwan versus 120nm for the PLA. We only had carriers for air support for the first week. Again, the PLA has the full strength of the Eastern and Southern Theater Command Air Forces as well as the PLARF ( PLA Rocket Force ). We had nothing to compare to the PLARF in 1944-45.

25.     The American invasion of Sicily in 1943 was really hard…so the PLA can’t possibly do an invasion of Taiwan.

Really. One fellow  wrote  a piece about this a few years ago.

26.     The Japanese will step in.

With what? And not if Japan’s business community and the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs ” “China club” and the “political class ” China sympathizers have anything to say about it.

These are all practical articles of faith for a sizeable chunk of the US China analyst community. And they create  “threat deflation ” – as retired US Navy Captain James Fanell and Dr Bradley Thayer call it – that justifies complacency.

It is, of course, possible that some combination of these reasons may dissuade Xi Jinping from attacking Taiwan. And nothing in war is easy– not least an assault across the Taiwan Strait.

But one imagines a similar “bingo card ” could have been created to demonstrate why the Chinese would n’t or could n’t attack across the Yalu River into Korea in 1950. It’s equally dangerous to underestimate the PRC in 2025.

So, the United States has a choice: start acting like the threat to Taiwan ( and to us ) is immediate and not a couple of years or more into the future – and move a lot faster.

Or, if that ’s too hard, just read and re-read reasons 1-26 until you are lulled into a comfortable stupor. No points for guessing which one Xi would prefer.

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Grant Newsham  is a retired US Marine officer and senior fellow at The Center for Security Policy, The Japan Forum for Strategic Studies and The Yorktown Institute. He is the author of  When China Attacks: A Warning to America. This article first appeared on RealClear Defense and is republished with the author’s kind permission.

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​The New York Times reports that US officials are planning to propose an “armistice ” for Ukraine, allegedly similar to how the Korean War ended in 1953. Nevertheless, an Armistice Partnership like the Asian one does not coincide with Russia’s targets and perhaps can’t be achieved if limited to a ceasefire.

The 1953 agreement was reached after hard discussions that involved the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, the former Soviet Union and United Nations troops. Its key rules were:

1. ​suspending opened conflicts;
2. withdrawing all military forces and products from a 4,000-meter-wide area, establishing the Demilitarized Area as a cushion between the troops;
3. ​ ​ both sides ​w​ill not enter the air, ground or sea areas under control of the other;
4. ​a​n design for the release and resettlement of prisoners of war and displaced persons; and
5. ​a​ Military Armistice Commission ( MAC ) and other agencies to discuss any violations and to ensure adherence to the truce terms.

T​he Asian ceasefire is then 72 years older. For the most part, it has prevented opened conflict involving North and South Korea.

​The demilitarized area, or DMZ, in Korea is around 160 km long and 2. 5 yards broad. Running through the DMZ is a Military Demarcation Line ( MDL ) which is where the opposing forces were when an armistice was reached.

The DMZ does not expand to the Yellow Sea which was not included in the ceasefire. The DMZ itself does not follow the 38th parallel northeast which was the limit agreed by the US and the USSR at the end of World War II, although sections of the DMZ follow the 38 horizontal.

Other than the Yellow Sea issue ( including a number of islands that are heavily militarized ), the DMZ is reasonably close to a final border should North and South Korea ever normalize their relations and sign a peace treaty.

The North Koreans have hinted, from time to time, that they are seeking a peace agreement ( and especially US recognition and US security assurances ), while the issue in South Korea is far more divisive and uncertain, fearing that normalization could undermine stability in South Korea and lead to a deal where US and allied forces would be withdrawn.

The Ukraine problem is regional, military and political. Russia annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions in September 2022 and Crimea in 2014. While the edges of Crimea are usually well recognized, the edges of the four regions are not so obvious.

Based on the official Ukrainian Oblast names, Russia does not completely handle any of these lands and battle is going on as the Russian army appears to be aiming at occupying as many place as possible before negotiations start. Assuming that a deal may be made on territories, there are a number of concerns that are more complicated.

Among them are the rights of citizens on both sides of any boundary line, deal between Ukraine and Russia, whether important utilities can be restored and utilized such as the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power advanced, water supply to Crimea from Ukraine, the status of ports and port and storage facilities on the Black Sea, the status of military ports on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, the location of long-range weapons and the presence of NATO forces on Ukraine’s soil.

More problems include the position of Ukraine’s military forces, Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO, types of security offers, oil and gas transport and associated sanctions on Russia.

An armistice would need to cover the presence of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk area ( Russia has liberated about 50 % of the Kursk incursion, but it could take months before the Ukrainians are finally pushed out if the war continues ).

When the Korean Armistice was signed in 1953, United Nations Forces were stationed in South Korea, and Chinese “volunteers ” were in the North. Ukraine is different: officially there are no NATO forces ( strictly defined ) in Ukraine, although the Russian army is in Ukraine.

Numerous reports say that a number of NATO countries ( UK, France and even Germany ) are preparing to send troops to Ukraine when an Armistice is agreed and to offer Ukraine security guarantees. One concern is that an Armistice tracking pressure and an Armistice military rollout that would provide security guarantees to Ukraine are not the same thing.

Under the original Minsk agreements ( 2014, 2015 ) the OSCE ( Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ) was supposed to monitor the Minsk agreements. OSCE sent spectators, hardly an army. OSCE therefore had 57 people including Russia and Ukraine. Essentially the bargain was to finish conflicts and to give freedom to Luhansk and Donetsk ( although both may be lands inside Ukraine ). The package was not implemented.

Russia’s battle objectives, as we understand them, include not only acknowledgment of the conquered areas but the disarmament of Ukraine and an arrangement that Ukraine will not become a NATO part. Whether this includes security guarantees with major NATO countries is not clear. It is hard to see how an Armistice Agreement could be concluded without addressing these issues.

The US view is that Russia is hurting enough economically and its losses in the Ukraine war serious enough to incentivize the Russians to accept an Armistice, that would include some sort of buffer zone, essentially freezing the conflict and conceding some Ukrainian territory on a de facto, but not de jure basis. In this context, such a deal on these broad terms would be similar to the 1953 Korean Armistice.

Obviously, the Russian outlook does not align with the one under development in Washington. Russia is not looking for an armistice but for a comprehensive deal with the US and NATO.

A temporary Armistice Agreement (essentially a ceasefire in place ) might be possible if it was linked to agreed political steps, but it seems unlikely to be accepted as any long-term solution. Biden administration informants have hinted at a 10-year or even 20-year pause, but that idea does not have much traction for Russia as it would allow Ukraine to rebuild its army and its weapon stockpile.

President Trump has some cards to play. He could send more aid to Ukraine to prolong the conflict but it is doubtful this is Trump’s aim. He can offer sanctions relief to the Russians, even some accommodation with NATO.

At the same time, the new administration knows how fragile Ukraine itself is, with its military losing one battle after another, short on manpower, encountering popular resistance to the enforced draft, and suffering high casualties.

It is hard to predict where any of this will go but President Trump has signaled his desire to speak to Russian President Vladimir Putin, starting with a phone call in the days ahead. Trump will table the idea of an Armistice Agreement: the Russians will demand considerably more.

Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This  article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter  Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.

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This month, multiple media outlets reported on the US Navy’s evolving plans for the next-generation DDG( X ) destroyer, emphasizing its advanced capabilities and challenges. But while the US Navy bets on the DDG( X )’s futuristic concept to outpace China ’s naval surge with advanced tech, logistical and industrial hurdles loom large.

Notable design changes for the DDG( X ) include removing the traditional Mark 45 main gun, which implies integrating directed-energy weapons like lasers and microwaves and a new vertical launch system (VLS ) layout.

Designed to replace the aging Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the DDG( X ) will incorporate state-of-the-art weapons, radar systems and a powerful Integrated Power System ( IPS) to meet the high-energy demands of next-generation combat. But, steep costs, technical uncertainties and technological limitations present fierce obstacles to the program’s success.

The DDG( X ) will feature hypersonic and directed-energy weapons, the AN/SPY-6 radar, enhanced stealth and increased payload capacity. This technological step is critical for countering evolving challenges like robots, hypersonic weapons and advanced naval platforms. The ship’s IPS, adapted from the Zumwalt-class ships, promises unparalleled power generation essential for supporting its high-powered techniques.

However, these advancements come with a significant price tag: the DDG( X ) is estimated to cost US$ 4. 4 billion per fleet, far exceeding its forebears. Structure will begin in 2032, with a three-year overlap alongside continued Arleigh Burke-class production to maintain business continuity.

Directed-energy weaponry promise infinite magazine level, low-cost engagements and rapid strikes against different threats ranging from drones to fast weapons. Nevertheless, they require significant storage, power and heating. Also, atmospheric disturbances and collection restrictions pose challenges to light tool success.

The US Navy’s aging Ticonderoga-class cruisers and maxed-out Arleigh Burke-class destroyers cannot meet these demands, underscoring the importance of the DDG( X ) in the US Navy’s future surface fleet. Directed-energy weapons may also alleviate the US Navy’s rely on expensive fighter missiles, freeing area for anti-ship missiles essential for high-end conflicts, particularly against China.

China ’s marine development poses a major challenge to US sea dominance. According to the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) 2024 China Military Power report, China now fields over 370 ships and submarines, including 140 major surface combatants, outpacing the US fleet numerically.

Moreover, China ’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy ( PLAN ) has achieved over 50 % of the US Navy’s vertical launch system (VLS ) capacity, with nearly 4,300 VLS cells on 84 principal surface combatants, compared to the US Navy’s 8,400 cells on 85 ships.

In an article for the International Institute of Strategic Studies ( IISS), Johannes Fischbach highlights that China ’s construction of high-end platforms, such as Type 052D destroyers and Type 055 cruisers, further narrows the VLS gap.

The Type 052D battleship has 64 Vocabulary, while the Model 055 ship has 112 VLS. In contrast, the Journey IIA and later Arleigh Burke-class warships have 96 Vocabulary, while the Ticonderoga-class ships have 122 VLS.

Despite that power gap, the PLAN’s quick shipbuilding—producing 3. 1 Model 052D ships every compared to the US’s 1. 6 Arleigh Burke destroyers—illustrates the size of China ’s business benefits.

The DDG( X ) is designed to address this disparity, offering greater operational range and reduced logistical needs, vital for countering the “tyranny of distance ” in Pacific operations.

US Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro has emphasized the critical need for the Transferrable Reload At-Sea Method ( TRAM ), which enables at-sea VLS reloading. Properly tested in October 2024, The War Zone information Metro addresses a major logistical challenge by minimizing the moment warships spend out of action for disarming.

This ability is essential for sustaining a ahead existence during conflicts, especially with China, where rearming at distant foundations like Guam may become impractical and dangerous. By integrating TRAM with the DDG( X )’s design, the US Navy aims to bolster combat readiness and mitigate the presence gap created by extended resupply periods.

Despite its promise, the DDG( X ) program is hampered by systemic challenges hounding US shipbuilding. Post-Cold War expenditure cuts significantly reduced the number of naval architects and engineers, creating obstacles in both design and production.

Over 60 % of US Navy ship repairs are not completed on time, reflecting inadequate infrastructure and outdated practices. Also, US factories cannot match China ’s industrial production.

China ’s civil-military fusion strategy—which combines military and civilian shipbuilding facilities —has enabled unmatched efficiency and surge capacity. In comparison, the US’s scattered approach and selection of big ships over smaller, cost-effective vessels slow development efforts.

US politicians, including Representative John Moolenaar, warn that without striking policy changes and important investments, the US cannot hinder or succeed in a possible conflict with China, as quoted by the Associated Press.

Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi underscores the disparity, noting that China can produce 359 ships for every US ship made annually. He has emphasized the need to revitalize the US defense industrial base to maintain global stability.

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