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Given the depth of hostility and enmity between the warring factions, the weak Gaza ceasefire between Israel and Hamas continues against all odds.

In exchange for some 400 Arab captives from Israeli jails, Hamas has released more than a few Jewish hostages since its enactment almost three weeks ago. More captives and prisoners are scheduled to be released during the majority of the first step of the truce if the procedure proceeds as easily as it has so far.

This is reason for a level of enthusiasm. However, negotiations over the size, words, and application of the second and third stages of the peace will turn out to be quite difficult.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, has already declared the ceasefire to become “temporary”.

In exchange for lots of prisoners, all Jewish hostages, both alive and dead, are supposed to be freed during the next level. As a precursor to the restoration of the coastal area in the final stages of the ceasefire, Israel is also anticipated to remove all of its causes from Gaza.

There are many problems that may disrupt the process, two of which are important:

• Israel’s unattainable goal of putting an end to Hamas and establishing Gaza as a security for itself
• Hamas’s steadfast desire to restore its supremacy over Gaza.

Another issue is the effect of the new US president, Donald Trump. While Trump has allies with Netanyahu, it’s not clear how eager the US president is to escalate Middle Eastern hostility.

A meeting between the two in Washington this year may be crucial to the resolution of the ceasefire’s second stage or the restart of the Gaza battle.

Hamas ‘ life at conflict with Israel’s war seeks

Over the past 15 months of Hamas ‘ scorched-earth operations in Gaza, which Israel launched in response to Hamas ‘ attacks on October 7, 2023, Israel has undoubtedly degraded it. But, it has not eliminated the party.

The team’s survival is demonstrated by the well-armed and well-composed Hamas soldiers ‘ appearance during the choreographed three rounds of captive transfers in the regions Israel has destroyed.

It effectively indicates that Netanyahu and his radical supporters are unable to accomplish their main objectives, which are establishing a defense for release of the hostages.

The folly of using power as the only way to retaliate against Hamas is clearly demonstrated by Netanyahu’s approval of the ceasefire at this time.

He may have accepted the ceasefire much earlier, allowing for a quicker captive launch without more lives lost or more harm to Israel’s already tarnished reputation.

Hamas ‘ success means it is still a dangerous power, according to previous US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in the middle of January. He claimed that the organization has “recruited almost as many fresh insurgents as it has lost” during the conflict.

In addition, reviews claim that Hamas has continued to have control over Gaza’s security forces despite Israel’s attempts to wrest control of it.

If that is the case, Jewish citizens have the right to seriously question the leadership of the prime minister, who have been greatly divided between those who want the hostages to be freed through a ceasefire and those who support Netanyahu’s administration to continue the war.

The same applies to Israel’s inside supporters, especially the United States.

However, this may not occur. The war-makers does get over the serenity candidates. For Netanyahu and his backers, the task is not finished. Some experts believe that Hamas’s very existence will only increase their motivation to rekindle the conflict once all of the victims have been freed.

What does Trump want?

The future of the peace now seems to pivot on Netanyahu’s conference with Trump in Washington. The Jewish leader is interested to know where Trump stands on the second phase of the agreement before the conversations begin, according to reports in the media.

Trump just rebuffed his proposal to” certain out” the 2.3 million people of Gaza by moving them to Egypt and Jordan, despite a number of 1.5 million. Nothing more would please the extremists in Netanyahu’s fragile partnership, given the past claims of its leaders, than a depopulated and annexed Gaza.

Cairo and Amman, as well as other Muslim countries, have strongly rejected the idea. Hamas and the ailing Arab Authority in the West Bank have unwaveringly condemned it.

Trump has argued that the Egyptian and Syrian leaders will ultimately change because of US support, probably because they rely heavily on American aid each year.

If this scenario were to occur, it may lead to more hostilities and bloodshed in the Middle East as well as more international support for the Palestinian cause and the two-state option.

While there is still hope for the continuation of the peace and the completion of the next phase of the stalemate, it is still possible that Netanyahu will engage in military action to annihilate Hamas and annex Gaza in the manner that Trump has suggested.

The Jewish leader might even be able to declare West Bank independence because of the strong relationship between Trump and Netanyahu.

Given these risks, the next phase of the stalemate regarding the restoration of Gaza, which is estimated to be upward of&nbsp, US$ 80 billion, is, at this point, nothing more than thoughts on a piece of paper.

At the Australian National University, Professor Amin Saikal is retired teacher of Middle Eastern and Central Asian research.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Trump’s Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg told&nbsp, Reuters&nbsp, that he’d like to see Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky hold legislative and presidential primaries, though that site’s resources in Kyiv say that Washington has yet to officially make the request.

Ukrainian law requires that elections be held during times of conjugal union rules, requiring the need to first uphold it. That didn’t happen without a peace, yet, but therein lies the problem since Russia’s ceasefire conditions are also unethical to Ukraine.

Vladimir Putin, the leader of Russia, stated in a statement last June that Russia would stop hostilities once Ukraine withdrawn from all the country it now claims as its own and declares that it no longer wants to join NATO.

Negotiations may continue soon afterwards, but he&nbsp, specified at the time&nbsp, that they would have to be held with the parliamentary listener instead of Zelensky, whose constitutional term expired at the end of May per Putin’s checking of the Ukrainian Constitution. He then&nbsp, reiterated this position&nbsp, past week but with an additional spin.

According to Putin, Zelensky could also potentially participate in discussions, but he’d be useless to signal anything. This followed Zelensky ‘s&nbsp, claim&nbsp, that October 2022’s prohibition on talks with Russia applied to everyone but himself.

He therefore told the&nbsp, Associated Press&nbsp, over the weekend, around the same day as Kellogg’s interview with Reuters, that he is interested in resuming talks with Russia but doesn’t think that it wants a peace. Amidst these remarks from Kellogg, Putin and Zelensky were Trump’s.

He&nbsp, claimed&nbsp, that” We’re having very serious discussions ( with Russia ) about that war, trying to get it ended”, but said that he hadn’t yet talked to Putin about it, thus implying that talks are only taking place at the embassy level. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Rybakov&nbsp, confirmed&nbsp, on the same day that” there is no development” on organizing those leaders ‘ future visit.

However, their unavoidable talk will likely be about a peace and, specifically, the agreement Trump hopes to agent.

In order to ensure compliance with the ceasefire, he might ask: 1 ) Ukraine withdraws from Kursk and Donbas, the latter of which is at the center of the territorial dispute with Russia, but stays where it is everywhere else; 2 ) neither side rescinds its territorial claims to the other; 3 ) Ukraine holds its next elections; and 5 ) the new government begins peace talks with Russia after taking office.

Ukraine can be coerced into all this by threatening to withhold military aid&nbsp, while&nbsp, threats of maximally disbursing such to Ukraine alongside the imposition of maximum secondary sanctions against Russia’s top energy clients ( China&nbsp, and&nbsp, India ) could coerce it into compliance as well.

As an opportunity to Russia, which has been continuously advancing for the past two years, the US might consent to mobilise the” trans-Dnieper” place and place it under the command of non-Western soldiers.

That request forms one of the two hundred concessions that were analyzed on these pages&nbsp, these &nbsp, and elaborated on in detail&nbsp, around.

In order to convince Russia to accept a peace, its full implementation or some other variant thereof may prove crucial in terms of achieving this goal without Ukraine initially fully adhering to Putin’s demands from last June regarding its claim to all the place that Russia claims as its own. Trump’s diplomats had, so, do well to seriously consider this plan.

The previously mentioned threats could still be used as compulsions to encourage compliance if they can persuade Ukraine and Russia to accept a ceasefire, while carrots may involve more Ukrainian aid for reconstruction and gradual sanctions relief, increasing the chances that it will be implemented.

The US may yet consent to the US allowing the EU to resume pipeline fuel imports from Russia, whether through the last intact portion of Nord Stream or across Ukraine if Kyiv agrees. As part of the benefits of Russian compliance, the US may also agree to do so.

In terms of the successive election step in this process, the US might like that Zelensky never work for re-election; in addition, it may support one of his possible rivals as part of a “phased leadership transition” to facilitate a peace deal, which is premised on Putin wanting him out of the way.

Between the hypothetical ceasefire and Ukraine’s next elections, Zelensky might still participate in talks, but Russia wouldn’t allow him to sign anything, so he’d only take part in them for self-serving political reasons.

In any case, the legal changes that Russia’s stated objectives of restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality and “denazifying” its society entail can only be advanced once the elections establish a new parliament, which could then bring these changes under US pressure ( the second goal perhaps only partially ).

Prior to that, the size of the armed forces could be curtailed in partial compliance with Russia’s demilitarization goal as a trust-building measure, but Russia ‘s&nbsp, spring 2022 demands&nbsp, might not ever be met in full.

Trump’s strategy to broker a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine mostly depends on the latter’s agreement because the former can be much more coerced, necessitating pragmatic compromises that meet some of Putin’s ceasefire demands from last June.

This might include imposing sanctions on Russia on Ukraine, seriously considering a demilitarized” Trans-Dnieper” region under the control of non-Western peacekeepers, and promising gradual sanctions relief.

Putin might agree to these conditions if they are followed by threats to provide Ukraine with the most military aid and the enactment of the most severe secondary sanctions against China and India, two of Russia’s top energy clients.

Putin’s continually proven his preference for avoiding escalations, notably reaffirmed last November through&nbsp, Russia’s unprecedented use of the hypersonic Oreshniks &nbsp, for de-escalation purposes vis-a-vis the US, while a sizeable share of Russia’s budgetary revenue is dependent on Asian energy imports.

If Trump agrees to the ceasefire terms that were discussed as well as the threatened consequences if Putin rejects them, these things will work in his favor.

A ceasefire will undoubtedly lead to peace, which will likely require some territorial concessions from Ukraine in order for Russia to agree to a compromise on Putin’s demands. Then new elections can be held to validate peace negotiations. The most likely scenario is to diplomatically end the conflict.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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China’s government may be modernizing quickly, but its ability to fight on the front lines in a possible battle with the US and its allies may be hampered by deep-rooted architectural flaws, political power, and a lack of battle experience.

Last month, the RAND Corporation think tank released a report questioning the combat readiness of China’s People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) despite its breakneck modernization.

RAND contends that while the PLA boasts world-class weapons and the largest navy in the world, it prioritizes upholding Chinese Communist Party (CCP ) rule over actually preparing for war.

The report makes attention to structural issues, such as promotions based on merit over loyalty, intellectual training over combat realism, and unified decision-making that prevents battlefield adaptability.

RAND uses the Russo-Ukrainian War, which is ongoing, and the Sino-Vietnamese War from 1979 to compare the PLA’s development to historic examples of military might failing to ensure battlefield success. The document suggests China’s military reforms remain sluggish and imperfect, emphasizing deterrence and social control over functional effectiveness​.

A split RAND statement examines the PLA’s double issue of demographic change and development. The PLA has a considerably larger children pool than the US, despite China’s declining population raising long-term issues. However, efforts to get wealthy talent are hampered by poor selection incentives, insecure service conditions, and competitors from the private market.

Social restrictions, such as military company’s low social status and a conscription-based unit, further aggravate China’s military development. Despite significant assets, the PLA struggles to match Chinese President Xi Jinping’s perception for a world-class war. RAND suggests that China may need to reevaluate its military theory and power structure if recruitment issues persist.

While RAND criticizes the PLA’s unified command structure, Chinese military doctrine emphasizes philosophical cohesion and social oversight, which the Constitution views as a plus as a plus.

Payton Rawson explains that China’s two command structure in the PLA combines military and political management to maintain State control in a November 2023 article for The Strategist.

According to Rawson, the structure includes a party committee, political commissar, and political organizations to support party leadership, stop corruption, and ensure alignment.

He points out that the advantages include a stronger political base, a lower chance of military coups, and a unified command that coordinates military actions with party objectives. However, he notes that this system may hinder decision-making speed and innovation.

However, emphasizing the PLA’s dual command system’s perceived shortcomings, lack of combat experience and recruitment problems risks underestimating China’s military modernization.

The PLA compensates using advanced simulators, provides realistic Blue Force ( BLUFOR ) opposition in training scenarios and integrates AI into military decision-making processes.

Despite these advancements, using technology as a substitute for combat experience could only lead the PLA so far, as simulations can never fully recreate a combat zone. AI is no substitute for human judgment as it lacks self-awareness and accountability. The institutions and processes that make up the PLA must be used to convert that experience into operational and strategic advantages.

Those challenges may stymie the development of a professional non-commissioned officer (NCO ) corps, which provides experienced, independent lower-level leadership in Western militaries.

In response, China is developing a “made-to-order” NCO corps focusing on technical skills essential for the PLA. It offers a stable career path and invites young people with the appropriate qualifications to enroll in the program. China’s military may train NCOs with technical expertise, but whether they can lead under fire is another question.

China has also hired outside talent, notably former NATO fighter pilots, to train its air force. These former NATO service members can still teach their Chinese counterparts sensitive tactics, techniques, and procedures ( TTP ) despite not piloting the most recent Western combat aircraft.

They still think like their active-duty counterparts and may help refine Chinese pilots ‘ on-the-fly decision-making skills and mission planning.

China uses cognitive and information warfare to achieve “victory without gun smoke,” in addition to using technology, focusing on technical skills, and employing outside talent.

Josh Baughman describes how China’s cognitive warfare strategy focuses on controlling perception and decision-making in a January 2023 article for the China Aerospace Studies Institute ( CASI) to avert direct military hostilities.

Baughman points out that China’s cognitive warfare strategy works both during and during wartime, utilizing psychological flaws like fear and misinformation to undermine the resolve of its allies. He says it integrates military, political, economic, and technological tools, using AI and social media to shape narratives and public perception.

He points out that China prefers to win conflicts through psychological means rather than purely military force by controlling events and defining events.

However, China’s cognitive warfare may have a limited effect on a population inoculated against such, as shown by the results of Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential elections, where state and civil society actors worked effectively to “pre-bunk” and discredit such efforts.

Additionally, Koichiro Takagi mentions that the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War supports kinetic combat arms like airpower, infantry, artillery, and armor in a July 2022 War on the Rocks commentary. Takagi also contends that decisive physical battles determine wars, not just cognitive positioning or positioning of forces.

While cognitive warfare shapes adversary perceptions, its limitations in actual conflict underscore the PLA’s reliance on external military observations, such as the Russo-Ukrainian War, for operational insights.

Being able to observe others ‘ trials and errors without being directly involved in a conflict, allows China to learn from them. This approach can result in mature, ready-to-absorb TTPs and operational and strategic lessons that could be contextualized according to China’s unique requirements.

M. Taylor Fravel mentions that China’s assessment of the Russo-Ukrainian War teaches important military lessons for a potential Taiwan conflict in an October 2023 article for The Washington Quarterly.

First, Fravel says Russia’s failure to achieve a swift victory underscores the difficulties of large-scale operations, especially in complex joint-force engagements like an amphibious assault on Taiwan.

Second, he notes that Russia’s battlefield failures reveal the dangers of centralized command and rigid leadership structures, pushing China to refine decision-making flexibility.

Third, Fravel says Ukraine’s resilience suggests Taiwan may not capitulate easily, forcing China to prepare for prolonged conflict.

Fourth, Fravel points out that the US’s involvement in Russian intelligence cooperation and coalition-building raises doubts about a similarly retaliatory military exercise, which might give China a sense of strategic surprise.

Lastly, he says Western sanctions on Russia reveal China’s economic vulnerabilities, incentivizing efforts to insulate its economy.

Despite its high-tech ambitions, China’s military remains unproven in actual combat. If war comes, it won’t be China’s gadgets determining the outcome—but rather the soldiers controlling them.

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China’s People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) is reportedly building a new command center in the capital, Beijing, that, upon completion, will be at least 10 times larger than the US Pentagon.

Financial Times&nbsp, said&nbsp, that the design of the mega-sized service, which has been widely reported in&nbsp, mainstream&nbsp, advertising, has raised concern among American intelligence firms, which think Beijing is preparing for a large-scale or perhaps nuclear conflict. &nbsp,

The initiative under development is on a 1, 500-acre page 30 kilometers south of Beijing, according to the FT report, newly-analyzed dish images revealed. The photographs showed at least 100 crane operating over a five-square-kilometer place.

According to the report, military experts believe the facility will house high-level bunkers to protect the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s ( CPP ) leaders in the event of a major conflict. It claimed that midway through the 20th century the hospital had been constructed.

According to some, the project’s name,” Beijing Military City,” may eventually become the largest military command centre in the world. &nbsp,

FT reported that security guards blocked writers who attempted to travel near the building site. The blog is a military-related place, according to a local business owner. &nbsp,

The document coincided with US President Donald Trump’s contact for building an wide, next-generation” Iron Dome” missile defence weapon for the island US. The weapon, which will cover many more ground than Israel’s, may be designed to deflect intercontinental ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles. &nbsp,

As China observes the Chinese New Year on January 28 through February 4, the country’s Foreign Ministry has yet to respond to the FT review and Trump’s Iron Dome system. &nbsp,

It is no mystery, however, that China now has nuclear tanks and underwater military command centers. In 2017, China Central TV reported that the PLA’s control office in Xishan in west Beijing is 100 feet beneath. According to the statement, PLA soldiers have been directing military exercises that since 2013.

” Our land adopts an active security strategy”, Qian Qihu, a Taiwanese military expert, told CCTV in an interview in August 2022. ” As we don’t fire the first shot, we need to protect ourselves from our enemy’s first attack, then we can fight back”.

” Our corporate arms must be fully protected. We may be able to keep ourselves safe from any of the enemy’s problems, including nuclear hits”, Qian said. ” As the army’s methods of attacks continue to evolve, our protection techniques also need to develop. And we shouldn’t rely on just one security tactic.

After graduating from Harbin Engineering University in 1961, Qian was transferred to the Soviet Union’s Kuybyshev Military Engineering Academy, which is now known as the Combined Arms Academy of the Russian Federation, to analyze military architecture and geography.

In Kuybyshev ( also known as Samara before 1935 and after 1991 ), Qian learned how the Soviet Union constructed a vault in 1942 for its supreme leader Joseph Stalin.

The service, 37 meters below the surface, was aimed to get Stalin’s other military command offices. However, it was never used by Stalin, and it even served as a 1990s visitor attraction.

After China successfully tested its first hydrogen weapon in June 1967 with the help of the Soviet Union, Qian led China’s growth of nuclear-resistant properties. &nbsp,

As the West developed large artillery projectiles ( MOP) capable of destroying targets hundreds of meters below the surface, Qian led a team of researchers to style underground tanks in the 1980s.

Today, the United States ‘ GBU-57A/B MOP may reach 60-meter-thick plaster and as far as 200 feet underground. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Hsu Yen-chi, a researcher for the Taipei-based Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies, told the media that the Beijing construction project is more like an operational body or a sizable training facility than a radioactive basement.

In fact, the Army has previously located a location close to where it would build its atomic basement. &nbsp,

In January 2018, Qin Dajun, a lieutenant scientist at the Institute of Geology and Geophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, told the South China Morning Post that Chinese analysts found a solutional bunker suitable for building a nuclear-resistant basement.

He said the large stone cave, located at the Xishan Forest Park, 20 km southwest of Beijing, has a healthy water supply. He said the grotto is 2, 000 feet beneath, compared with the degree of 2, 200 feet of Krubera Cave in Georgia.

Qin made his remarks after North Korea defied Beijing’s orders to examine its nuclear weapons in 2017. &nbsp,

Even if the CCP has the resources and a heavy cave to construct a nuclear basement, according to some observers, it would not be wise to cover all gathering leaders in a single location during a war. &nbsp,

Canada-based Chinese critic Wen Zhao&nbsp, says&nbsp, on his YouTube channel that when a war breaks out, CCP officials may disguise in different areas to improve their success chances. He claims that a mega-military command center will trigger more enemy military assaults than usual. &nbsp,

In fact, some other observers predicted that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping would relocate to Xian in Shaanxi during the war because the city’s high mountains and missile systems make it safe for the city. &nbsp,

In 1900, when the troops of the Eight-Nation Alliance, led by the US, France and Germany, marched into Beijing, Qing Empress Cixi fled to Xian, where she claimed to enjoy hunting, and stayed there for a year.

Yong Jian contributes to the Asia Times. He is a Chinese journalist who specializes in Chinese technology, economy and politics. &nbsp,

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