The Nippon Steel deal: taking another look – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

” States have no friends – only interests”, or so goes the copied version of Lord Palmerston’s speech. That was so cynical – so 19th Century British Empire. But 170 years later, try buying another nation ‘s&nbsp, steel&nbsp, company and you might think Lord Palmerston was right. &nbsp,

Japan’s largest steel company, &nbsp, Nippon Steel, wants to acquire&nbsp, US Steel. It was a veritable example of American industrial might and technological prowess many decades ago. Less so these days.

United States President&nbsp, Joe Biden&nbsp, pronounced himself opposed to the deal. That was only two months after his love-fest with Japanese Prime Minister&nbsp, Fumio Kishida touting the strength of the&nbsp, Japan-US alliance: rock solid and based on shared mutual values.

The decision to approve or reject the agreement has been postponed until after the November election.

Both Senator JD Vance, the Republicans ‘ vice presidential candidate, and former president Donald Trump are against the deal.

If foreigners obtain US Steel, one might get the impression that the end of the republic is near. &nbsp,

The main reason given is national security.

Is there a problem with national security?

It is prudent for a nation to closely monitor its main industries and the owners of them. But maybe the biggest issue with the&nbsp, US Steel&nbsp, deal is that it’s embarrassing. &nbsp,

For one thing, people are nothing if not tribal. And who does n’t want the home team to succeed, on its own? &nbsp,

This case serves as an embarrassing reminder that America’s business and political elites have abandoned the nation’s manufacturing dominance over the past five decades by moving much of it overseas.

However, a little embarrassment can sometimes be helpful if it helps you grow.

And this is a deal where it pays to swallow one’s pride.

Not unusual, to say the least.

For one thing, the Japanese are our friends. And Nippon Steel’s proposal is not unprecedented.

Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group&nbsp, ( MUFG ) wrote a$ 9 billion USD check to save&nbsp, Morgan Stanley, the American financial icon and a key player in global capital markets. That was in 2008 when it was within hours of collapse. &nbsp,

Morgan Stanley’s life had a fresh start. The Japanese got a good investment while becoming the bank’s largest shareholder. And it has worked out well for both sides. Nowadays nobody even knows Morgan Stanley is Japanese-owned.

The Japanese, in effect, did this as a favor to the Americans. They stepped in to profit instead of letting the Wall Street company collapse due to the irresponsibility of its own making. They did n’t.

Does allowing foreigners to own a US company, however, put us in danger? &nbsp,

That depends on which foreigners and the particular agreement. &nbsp,

In this case, Japan is a longtime ally – and an excellent partner. Also, the deal benefits both nations.

Landing page for the United States Steel ( US Steel ) website. Photo: screenshot, October 7, 2024

A deal that leads to employment in the US

Japan’s existence as an independent country depends on the United States and the&nbsp, US military. &nbsp,

Tokyo is well aware of that. &nbsp,

A weak America poses a threat to Japan.

Investing in US&nbsp, Steel&nbsp, and modernizing it will create great-paying jobs in the US. Importantly, it will give Japan a strategic asset that the United States has neglected and provides insurance for its survival. &nbsp,

Opponents have n’t produced a believable scenario in which Nippon Steel would ( or could ) shut down US steel production. Or in which it could create any political brouhaha that would endanger the essential&nbsp, US-Japan relationship&nbsp, and defense coverage.

As importantly, Japanese investment has been good for the nation. &nbsp,

jobs in Japan come from manufacturing

Toyota, &nbsp, Nissan and&nbsp, Honda&nbsp, are just the most well-known Japanese companies in America. Moreover, they support over 450, 000&nbsp, manufacturing&nbsp, jobs in the United States. &nbsp,

In addition to its significant research and development operations, Japan is the top overall foreign investor in the US.

The litmus test: Americans want to work for Japanese companies. And union organizers struggle to persuade them that they are unhappy.

Does anyone recall the 1980s, when Japan and its businesses were vilified on Capitol Hill and other locations? We were all going to turn into slaves as Japan seized control of our nation and economy. &nbsp,

Hardly.

However, it seems as though what is being said now will happen to American workers if Nippon Steel buys US Steel. Lose jobs, pensions, everything. &nbsp,

Actual US Steel employees support Nippon Steel’s efforts to modernize and strengthen its workforce, which is less well known.

China Ties?

Listen to deal opponents and one would think Nippon Steel were conspiring with the&nbsp, People’s Republic of China&nbsp, to destroy a US company.

Like many other companies, Nippon Steel has business dealings in the PRC. &nbsp,

These should be carefully and precisely weighed against actual security risks. And not shaded to keep the United Steelworkers&nbsp, union bosses happy.

If necessary, Nippon Steel should be required to modify or even end any China operations. &nbsp,

And so should &nbsp, Boeing, General Electric, Ford, GM, &nbsp, Tesla, Honeywell and the hundreds of other American companies in the China market. They have done far more than Nippon Steel to build up the&nbsp, Chinese economy&nbsp, and the People’s Liberation Army over the last four decades.

US sailors prepare to transport the wreckage of the Chinese ‘ spy balloon’ on February 10, 2023, in Virginia Beach, Virginia, USA. Photo: US Navy

Remember the Chinese&nbsp, spy balloon&nbsp, that flew over America in 2023? You might have noticed that the Biden administration refused to release a report on the findings. A likely reason is that the balloon’s innards had American components. &nbsp,

Is racism a cause of the deal’s opposition?

Probably.

If a British company were attempting to purchase US Steel, one doubts that we would be in this discussion. Does anyone care that the Italians and the French own Chrysler, you ask? &nbsp, Also, there is an air of “yellow peril” in some of the&nbsp, commentary.

However, the racism angle is a wash in this case. Take a look at the days when it appeared Renault would overtake Nissan. Company executives and Japanese government officials effectively took Nissan Chairman&nbsp, Carlos Ghosn&nbsp, hostage via charges of corporate misconduct. Furthermore, along with him, they arrested a senior executive, &nbsp, Greg Kelly, an American.

Avoid bringing up resentments between the US and Japan by remembering that they are friends. They need to stay focused on defending themselves.

Use Japan to rekindle US Steel’s greatness?

This would n’t be the first time.

In the 1970s and 1980s, American automakers were losing billions and producing subpar automobiles. Just look up “K-Car” on the internet. Detroit was in fact forced to get its act together by the Japanese.

Furthermore, Japan backed off and gave the American carmakers the breathing space to get their acts together.

Was that embarrassing? Sure. Infuriating? Sometimes. And there was occasionally excessive gloating from Japan.

But it worked out pretty well for everyone.

Damage Done?

Do n’t think Japan is n’t irked by Nippon Steel’s treatment. Japan has always felt uneasy about the commitment made by the United States.

Tokyo wo n’t be mollified by lines like” This is just business” or” This is just politics”.

Japan might start to wonder how trustworthy an ally the US is. &nbsp,

And maybe the US administration decides it ca n’t defend Japan when the Chinese start to be brutal with it. Nothing personal, and we still love you. However, an election is about to take place or ( fill in the blank ).

If the Nippon Steel deal is rejected, the alliance wo n’t collapse. But it will leave a scar, instead of deepening and strengthening the US-Japan relationship.

Early 20th century US Steel coal miners including the author’s grandfather, Mike Hlohinecz ( far left ). Photo: ©Grant Newsham family

The writer’s grandfather, Michal Hlohinecz, was a miner in one of the US Steel coal mines many years ago. What would he think of all of this? I have no idea. But he might have taken some offense at the idea that “foreigners” are the problem.

And the Japanese are not the cause of the Nippon Steel deal.

Former US diplomat and former US Marine officer Grant Newsham. He is the author of the book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/When-China-Attacks-Warning-America/dp/1684513650″ target=”_blank” rel=”noreferrer noopener”>When China Attacks: A Warning To America.

This article was first published by Japan Forward. It is republished with permission.

Continue Reading

Vote restores hope to Kashmir but Modi’s still in charge – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

Jammu and Kashmir, India’s westernmost region, held its first local elections in a controversial way since the region’s government abruptly removed its semi-autonomous status in 2019. Additionally, they were the first municipal elections held in Muslim-majority Kashmir since 2014.

It marked a major event for the area. The election will recover, at least half, some degree of self-rule five centuries after Prime Minister Narendra Modi took it away.

When the official results of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata party ( BJP) were released this week, they were a resounding defeat. 48 seats in the 90-seat regional legislature were secured by the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference ( JKNC ) and the Indian National Congress. The BJP won 29, mostly in the Hindu-majority Jammu place.

The former chief minister, Omar Abdullah, was likewise reinstated as president. Given that he lost his competition for a chair in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament, in the recent federal elections, this was a surprising turn.

What’s changed?

In the past, strikes and low voter turnout have caused elections in Jammu and Kashmir, mainly due to the government’s mistrust.

There was also a sense of treachery after Modi’s government revoked Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. This had given the area its own law and the authority to pass its own rules, as well as giving special privileges to local residents.

But, voter participation in this year’s election reached 64 %. Additionally, the participation of separatists and independent individuals suggested a shift in perspective regarding the democratic process.

The elections provide evidence that normal has returned to Kashmir after decades of continued violence, according to the BJP. In a tweet, Modi wrote,” Some citizens claimed that if Article 370 was removed, Jammu and Kashmir had fire.” However, it did n’t burn, it blossomed”.

Modi had promised during the battle that” independence” would be restored, though he suggested this would be realized only if the BJP was winning.

With Modi’s criticism winning, some believed the vote to have been a de-facto vote on the state’s unique position.

The JKNC has generally opposed the withdrawal of Article 370 and the cutting of Kashmir’s freedom. The group has pledged to work toward restoring that particular status, as well as repealing the harsh Public Safety Act, which allows for the incarceration of persons for up to two years without being charged, and requesting amnesty for detainees.

In reality, however, the result wo n’t undo the revocation of Article 370. The new nearby assembly will be able to pass laws, hold discussions about local issues, and endorse decisions for the territory, especially those relating to culture and education. However, Abdullah will still need to ask for the colonel president’s approval before making any significant choices.

The BJP still has some influence in New Delhi, despite the fact that some Kashmiris oppose their efforts to stop it from gaining access to the area.

The BJP expanded the colonel governor’s power over people buy and surveillance. The Directorate of Public Prosecutions and the local anti-corruption commission are also under the command of the lieutenant government.

These power received a lot of negative feedback from the regional opposition parties.

Coming of democracy?

American security forces have recently cracked down on regional media outlets, social media, and other forms of communication, focusing particularly on any expressions of Kashmiri unity with Palestine.

According to human rights advocates, there are still crimes and persecution in the area, and the current state of affairs has been exacerbated by the climate of fear.

One of the biggest complaints against Kashmiris is still that they are stateless. Abdullah said himself that “restoration of full, pure independence for]Jammu and Kashmir ] is a necessity for these votes”.

Just time will tell if these needs can be met, but there is a chance that a new local government will begin to ameliorate Kashmir’s miserable condition.

As I mentioned in a new audio, there is faith that the new government will contribute a lot to restoring some form of independence to Kashmir as long as the lieutenant governor’s new forces do not interfere with it.

At Flinders University, Leoni Connah teaches on foreign connections.

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

Continue Reading

Nobel goes to anti-nukes Japan A-bomb bomb survivors’ group – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

Nihon Hidankyo, a local Chinese firm founded by survivors of the two US nuclear weapons that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, has received the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize.

The Norway Nobel Committee praised the firm” for its efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear arms and for showing through see evidence that nuclear arms must never be used afterwards.”

Discussion of the attacks, which killed more than 100, 000 Japanese people, was essentially a stigma in the immediate post-war time. This was, in part, owing to British media repression in held Japan.

However, in 1954, a Chinese fishing vessel, the Lucky Dragon, was killed by rays toxicity as a result of an American nuclear weapons check at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.

The Happy Dragon tragedy prompted many of the atomic bomb individuals, who are known as the hibakusha, to talk out about their experience. And it was in this environment that Nihon Hidankyo was founded in 1956.

The hibakusha have since engaged in uncountable engagement against nuclear arms around the world. Their testimony, according to the Nobel council, “has contributed to the generation and consolidation of popular opposition to nuclear arms around the world.”

For instance, Setsuko Thurlow, a part of Nihon Hidankyo and a distinguished advocate against nuclear weapons, was one of the members of a group of hibakusha that organized an exhibition on the atomic bombings in the Toronto public library in 1975.

This contributed to the birth of a major anti-nuclear movements in Canada. Tens of thousands of Canadians had a regular demonstration against their president’s support for US nuclear weapons in the early 1980s.

Then, in 1984, Takashi Morita, a second Hiroshima bombing victim, co-founded a hibakusha organization based in So Paulo to share their experiences and raise awareness of the damaging effects of atomic weapons in Brazil.

Europes were protesting against the implementation of innovative nuclear weapons in their nations as a result of growing recognition of the activities of the hibakusha throughout the 1980s. The saying” no Euroshima”! became a well-known phrase for the Western peace movement.

Nihon Hidankyo’s efforts have focused on utilizing the experiences of Hibakusha to raise money for the widespread ban on nuclear weapons.

The UN convention prohibiting nuclear weapons has been a significant supporter of the business. This agreement, which entered in power in 2017 and has been signed by 94 countries, prohibits state from participating in any nuclear weapons actions.

For its attempts to pass this legally binding ban on nuclear arms, Setsuko Thurlow is a key figure in the International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, which received the Nobel peace prize in 2017.

There is still work to be done.

Within Japan, Nihon Hidankyo has worked to issue the president’s place on nuclear weapons. Despite the horrors that occurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Chinese government supports American nuclear weapons, relying on them as a barrier against its numerous nuclear-armed neighbors.

Successive Japanese governments have emphasized the importance of atomic weapons for the nation’s protection. However, it continues to be a contentious position for many in Japan. Every university student in Japan travels to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to find out about the dreadful effects of nuclear weapons.

Nihon Hidankyo’s choice to receive the Nobel Peace Prize is a significant development. In 2023, the country’s nine nuclear forces spent over US$ 91 billion on nuclear arms. Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, has constantly threatened to employ his nuclear arsenal since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.

The Nobel committee took note of these troubling advances. The committee’s awarding the reward to Nihon Hidankyo was “alarming that this stigma against the use of nuclear weapons is under force.”

The country’s nuclear power, particularly China and the US, are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme is growing. And conflicts are hard escalating between nuclear-armed Israel and near-nuclear Iran.

Nuclear weapons ‘ challenges are more pronounced than they have ever been since the cold war. With little 100, 000 hibakusha dead now, it is important that we listen to their tones and their instructions.

At The Open University, Luc-André Brunet is a mature teacher in modern worldwide history, and Eirini Karamouzi is one of the University of Sheffield’s older lecturers.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

Continue Reading

The normalization and legitimation of political assassinations – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu definitely admitted responsibility for the shooting when the Israel Defense Forces killed Hezbollah’s head Hassan Nasrallah on September 27 in an underwater vault in Beirut. ” Nasrallah was not a terrorist”, he boasted. ” He was the criminal”.

The White House sent similar disobedient information. The US senator, Joe Biden, called the death” a estimate of justice for his many subjects”. However, a State Department director called his dying” an unmitigated good”.

Both Israel and the US federal expressed regret over the deaths of up to 300 residents in the attack. They might have thought of them as acceptable” credit destruction.”

However, while many world leaders criticized the region’s rising crime, responses were less incisive when it came to directly criticizing the death. Most governments, excluding Hezbollah’s allies, both stayed silent or accepted the claim that the death had been” just.”

In fact, the response to Nasrallah’s murder suggests that European governments have grown to be more and more used to qualified killings, to the point where a brutal, recognized murder failed to lead to meaningful condemnation.

For Israel, “targeted murders” emerged as standard legislation in the first 2000s as part of its effort to fight the so-called “al-Aqsa intifada”. Israel’s says that attacks against Palestinian insurgents did not amount to death were generally refuted perhaps by US authorities, who called them “extrajudicial killings” as late as July 2001.

Israel was n’t deterred. Eventually, Israeli officials later acknowledged that they had launched a coordinated effort to reform international law. ” If you do something for longer enough”, as one standard put it,” the world will embrace it”.

Targeted deaths

After a congressional examination in 1976, the US government began making legal claims that allowed the targeting of jihadists despite the ban. Washington’s demeanor changed again in the aftereffects of 9/11. The Bush presidency eventually decided that “targeted killing” was a crucial part of its “global war on terror.”

The US launched its first successful drone attack in Yemen’s hostile territory in 2002. One of the jihadists responsible for the attack on the USS Cole, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, was killed in the explosion, as well as a traveler from the United States.

The US government only referred obliquely to the strike, but US officials dismissed the UN’s criticism. Targeted deaths, primarily via drone strikes, expanded radically during Obama’s first term. More importantly, under Obama, the US government engaged more explicitly in an effort to justify drone strikes under international law.

Socially and carefully, members of the administration described focused deaths as” surgical”. They were portrayed as being superior to conventional war and superior to other types of bombing.

On the constitutional front, subsequent US governments expanded their definition of self-defense and imminentness, arguing in part that the US may strike a criminal even if they did not pose an immediate danger. In its constitutional arguments, the US government would frequently invoke Jewish law.

The US used these and other dubious interpretations of international law and human rights law to give itself ( and its allies ) a powerful green light to target ( suspposed ) terrorists in various nations around the world.

These justifications for the killing of Iranian military chief Qassem Soleimani were adapted by the Trump administration for the murder of a status official in January 2020. Initial assertions made by management authorities concerned the threat posed by Soleimani and self-defense. But these were swiftly dropped.

Otherwise, American officials claimed that Soleimani had US blood on his hands, a finding that suggested more to justice than self-defense.

And still, the death elicited much worldwide condemnation. In fact, a joint declaration by the British, French, and European governments two weeks after Soleimani’s death just condemned what it described as Iran’s position in the crime in the region. It failed to even notice Soleimani’s shooting.

These beliefs endured. In 2021, Biden largely justified the withdrawal from Afghanistan through the presence of “over-the-horizon” powers to “act strongly and quickly if needed”. A year later, the United States National Security Strategy hailed the shooting of al-Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Kabul at the end of July 2022 as a proof of concept.

Whose righteousness?

By this stage, the US government had stopped engaging in complex legal arguments. Otherwise, it may say that” justice had been delivered”. This was the same language used by Barack Obama in his statement announcing the demise of Osama Bin Laden, who had stated that” justice has been done” to the same audience.

Although, from a legal standpoint, both the killings of Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri were very questionable, the US did not feel the need to provide a rationale under international rules for either.

As Nasrallah’s shooting demonstrates, legitimizing efforts by Israel and the US have been so effective in correcting death that, even when they acknowledge assassinations, they often engage in legal justifications again. Rather, they simply chat of” justice”.

The standardization of death and targeted killings has been attributed to two main factors.

First, there are more of them. In the conduct of their ( covert ) foreign policies, some countries now regularly resort to assassinations and targeted killings. They describe them as” surgical” and better strategic alternatives to ground attacks and broad aerial bombing ( though they frequently occur alongside “targeted assassinations” ).

Second, some states have been making an effort to make their actions as compliant with international law, especially Israel and the US. The deadly legacy of this method is that a hit can now be explicitly claimed as an “assassination”, neither” operative” nor an alternative to earth conflict, with little worry of international repercussions.

Luca Trenta is associate professor in international relations, Swansea University, Emil Archambault is Addison Wheeler Fellow in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, and Sophie Duroy is lecturer in law, Essex Law School, University of Essex

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Ways to break China’s legacy chip hold – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, Technology

Back in June, the Federation of American Scientists teamed up with Noahpinion, ChinaTalk, and Chris Miller to hold a crowdsourced policy competition.

We asked for ideas on how to deal with the problem of China potentially controlling the supply of foundational chips (also called “trailing-edge” semiconductors). Here was the post where we made the announcement:

The US has implemented export controls to try to stop China from getting a technological edge in advanced cutting-edge chips. But as I explained in a recent post, export controls have no hope of stopping China from building simpler types of chips — called “legacy chips”, “foundational chips”, or “trailing-edge chips.” These legacy chips are used for a huge number of things in our economy, from cars to smartphones to fighter jets.

And China is gearing up to build these legacy chips in absolutely staggering numbers. Check out this post by Jimmy Goodrich of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and this post by the Rhodium Group for details. Basically, China is applying the same approach to legacy chips that it has successfully applied to batteries and EVs — massive scale and enormous subsidies. Already,

This basically presents at least three potential dangers to the US:

  1. First, China could deprive non-Chinese chipmakers of huge amounts of revenue by outcompeting them in the legacy chip market, making it harder for them to sustain their leading-edge chip businesses. Already investors are pressuring US companies to avoid competing with China by canceling their semiconductor fabs.
  • Second, if China controls the legacy chip market, it could cut off our supply of chips in a war.
  • Third, Chinese security services might be able to put back doors into Chinese-made chips, using them to spy or even to attack US infrastructure.

In other words, there are plenty of national security reasons for keeping Chinese-made legacy chips out of our supply chain. But how can we do it? It’s a tough problem.

First of all, as things stand, we don’t even know which products contain Chinese-made chips. If a Vietnamese-made phone or a Mexican-made PC includes Chinese-made legacy chips, the US currently has no way of knowing.

Second, even if we did know, it might be politically unpopular to ban those chips. A lot of US companies want to get chips as cheaply as possible, especially for new AI applications. We’d need some way to make chip restrictions politically palatable.

And finally, lots of Chinese legacy chips — and the products that contain them — aren’t going to be sold in the US or our allied countries. How do we make sure non-Chinese chipmakers stay competitive in markets like Vietnam, Brazil, Indonesia, etc?

We asked contestants to give us their ideas for addressing this problem. In the end, we decided that four of the submissions we received really stood out. These winners are listed in alphabetical order by first author.

Winner #1: Weaponizing EDA and using targeted industrial policy

By: Zenghao (Mike) Gao, Charles Yockey, and Felipe Chertouh

Gao et al point out an important weapon in the US’ arsenal of export controls that hasn’t been used yet: Electronic design automation software (EDA). We hear a lot about where the production of chips happens, and some about where the production of chipmaking tools happens, but not very much about where the software used to design chips comes from.

In fact, almost all of it comes from America, with a little bit coming from US-allied countries like Japan and Australia. And this software doesn’t just design chips in the first place; it’s also what chipmakers use to correct problems with the fabrication process as they arise.

Gao et al. suggest that EDA could be “weaponized” by mandating that it run on US-based cloud servers:

In hosting all EDA in a US-based cloud—for instance, a data center located in Las Vegas or another secure location—America can force China to purchase computing power needed for simulation and verification for each chip they design. This policy would mandate Chinese reliance on US cloud services to run electromagnetic simulations and validate chip design.

Under this proposal, China would only be able to use the latest EDA software if such software is hosted in the US, allowing American firms to a) cut off access at will, rendering their technology useless and b) gain insight into homegrown Chinese designs built on this platform.

Since such software would be hosted on a US-based cloud, Chinese users would not download the software which would greatly mitigate the risk of foreign hacking or intellectual property theft.

While the United States cannot control chips outright considering Chinese production, it can control where they are integrated. A machine without instructions is inoperable, and the United States can make China’s semiconductors obsolete.

This idea wouldn’t stop China from making foundational chips — Chinese companies could still use American EDA software. But it might give the US one more piece of leverage to hold over China in case hostilities broke out — and another way to try to slow down the Chinese chip industry in general, if that becomes necessary.

On the defensive side of things, Gao et al. also call for the US to form a trade bloc with Latin American nations to ensure safe supply of rare earths and NAND memory. They also have some additional ideas, such as forcing Chinese companies to release the source code for the firmware and other software for their chips.

You can read Gao et al’s full policy proposal here.

Winner #2: Working with other countries on industrial policies and tariffs

By: Andrew Lee

Lee sees the creation of a non-China foundational chip supply chain as the central problem to be solved. He envisions a program modeled after Lend-Lease — the system by which the US delivered arms to the UK in World War 2, and by which it’s currently delivering arms to Ukraine. The program would license US technology cheaply to friends and allies in exchange for cooperation in creating completely China-free chip supply chains:

The United States Federal Government could negotiate with the “Big Three” EDA firms to purchase transferable licenses to their EDA software. The US could then “lend-lease” licenses to major semiconductor producers in partner countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, or even Latin America.

The US could license this software on the condition that products produced by such companies will be made available at discounted prices to the American market, and that companies should disavow further investment from or cooperation with Chinese entities.

Partner companies in the Indo-Pacific could further agree to share any further research results produced using American IP, making further advancements available to American companies in the global market.

(Side note: It occurs to me that this might dovetail well with Gao et al.’s proposal for putting EDA on a US-based cloud.)

Lee also suggests coordinating with friendly countries in order to put tariffs on Chinese foundational chips. Recall that one of the big challenges here is that we don’t currently know which products contain Chinese-made chips, so we have no idea how many we’re importing.

Lee’s solutions to this problem are 1) an international database of which products contain Chinese chips, and 2) reporting requirements for importers, enforced by random audits:

How would tariffs on final goods containing Chinese chips be enforced? The policy issue of sanctioning and restricting an intermediate product is, unfortunately, not new. It is well known that Chinese precursor chemicals, often imported into Mexico, form much of the raw inputs for deadly fentanyl that is driving the United States opioid epidemic.

Taking a cue from this example, we further suggest the creation of an internationally-maintained database of products manufactured using Chinese semi- conductors. As inspiration, the National Institutes of Health/NCATS maintains the Global Substance Registration System, a database that categorizes chemical substances, along with their commonly used names, regulatory classification, and relationships with other related chemicals.

Such a database could be administered by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security, allowing the personnel who enforce the tariffs to also collect all relevant information in one place.

Companies importing products into the US would be required to register the make and model of all Chinese chips used in each of their products, so that the United States and participating countries could to impose corresponding sanctions.

Products imported to the US would be subject to random checks involving disassembly in Commerce Department workshops, with failure to report a sanctioned semiconductor component making a company subject to additional tariffs and fines. Manual disassembly is painstaking and difficult, but regular, randomized inspections of imported products are the only way to truly verify their content.

Finally, he suggests efforts to protect US critical infrastructure by 1) identifying Chinese hardware within the infrastructure, and 2) improving cyber defense capabilities.

You can read Lee’s full policy proposal here.

Winner #3: An “Open Foundational” design standard and buyers’ group

By: Alex Newkirk

Newkirk also sees Chinese disruption of the chip supply chain — along with possible backdoors and other security issues — as the main problem to be solved. He proposes two ideas. First, Newkirk would create an “Open Foundational” design standard for legacy chips, in order to ensure that China doesn’t get proprietary control over any type of computer chip.

The chip companies who joined up to help create this standard would form a sort of cartel that could act to create a China-free manufacturing supply chain. Newkirk also suggests an international buyers’ group to create a strategic reserve of chips. This would serve the dual purpose of building up a chip stockpile and providing demand to encourage the adoption of the Open Foundational design standard. He writes:

To secure supply of foundational chips, I recommend development of an “Open Foundational” design standard and buyers’ group…[T]he US federal government…would establish a strategic microelectronics reserve to ensure access to critical chips. This reserve would be initially stocked through a multi-year advanced market commitment for Open Foundational devices. 

The foundational standard would be a voluntary consortium of microelectronics users in critical sectors, inspired by the Open Compute Project. It would ideally contain firms from critical sectors such as enterprise computation, automotive manufacturing, communications infrastructure, and others.

The group would initially convene to identify a set of foundational devices which are necessary to their sectors…and identify design features which…could be standardized.  From these, a design standard could be developed…

Steering committee firms will…be asked to commit some fraction of future designs to use Open Foundational microelectronics…[T]he buyers’ group would represent demand of sufficient scale to motivate investment, and that supply would be more robust to disruptions once mature. 

Government should adopt the standard where feasible, to build greater resilience in critical systems if nothing else. This should be accompanied by a diplomatic effort for key democratic allies to partner in adopting these design practices in their defense applications.

The foundational standard should seek geographic diversity in suppliers…The foundational standard also allows firms to de-risk their suppliers as well as themselves. They can stipulate in contracts that their tier one suppliers need to adopt Foundational Standards in their designs…

Having developed the open standard through the buyers’ group, congress should authorize the purchase through the Department of Commerce a strategic microelectronics reserve (SMR). Inspired by the strategic petroleum reserve, the microelectronics reserve is intended to provide the backstop foundational hardware for key government and societal operations during a crisis…

The foundational standard provides the product specification, and the advanced government commitment provides demand…This demand should be steady, with regular annual purchases at scale, ensuring producers consistent demand through the ebbs and flows of a volatile industry….The SMR could also serve as a backstop when supply fluctuations do occur, as with the strategic petroleum reserve…

This would ensure government access to core computational capabilities in a disaster or conflict scenario. But as all systems are built on a foundation, the SMR should begin with Foundational Standard devices. 

It’s notable how Newkirk’s ideas support each other. The international chip design standard he would create would make it easier to build up a stockpile of reliable chips. And building up the stockpile would create the guaranteed demand that would encourage adoption of the design standard.

That’s a very clever synergy. And as an added bonus, the consortium of companies that create and run the foundational chip standard would also be able to help carry out friend-shoring and de-risking, instead of leaving all the planning to the government.

You can read Newkirk’s full policy proposal here.

Winner #4: A legal plan for blocking Chinese chips

By: Ben Noon

Noon focuses on the difficult problem of identifying and restricting Chinese-made foundational chips contained within US imports from other countries. He vividly lays out the dangers of allowing China to control the foundational chip industry:

The list of examples of Chinese economic coercion is long…Washington faces less blatant coercion compared to its allies…This may be because Beijing does not believe it yet maintains necessary leverage over Washington…China’s growing position in the legacy semiconductor market could change that. How would Beijing’s behavior change if sales of the Ford F-150 relied on Beijing’s willingness to sell its semiconductors?

Noon argues that export controls have little or no hope of containing the Chinese foundational chip industry. And he argues that CHIPS Act-type subsidies alone are insufficient to maintain a US foothold in the market because Chinese subsidies will always be larger. Thus, he concludes, protectionism is necessary in order to keep China from dominating the global market for foundational chips.

The question, of course, is how to restrict imports of Chinese foundational chips contained in other products. Noon goes through and explains a list of various legal and administrative vehicles that the US government has at its disposal to accomplish that task:

  • Investigation of and restrictions on imported goods linked to unfair trade practices
  • Federal government purchasing restrictions
  • The Office of Information and Communications Technology and

Services (ICTS) at the Commerce Department, a recently created agency with broad authority to protect critical infrastructure from dangerous imported products

Noon believes that the most important legal justification for tariffs on Chinese chips is Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which both Trump and Biden have used extensively in order to put tariffs on Chinese products.

The really tough question, of course, is enforcement. Noon recommends “a major expansion of supply chain analytical capabilities across the US government,” but doesn’t say much more about that. He also suggests enlisting private companies as whistleblowers.

You can read Noon’s full policy proposal here.

Anyway, all of these proposals are quite interesting, and we’ve already contacted the authors to talk about following up on their development. I was very impressed by the diversity of ideas here — different contributors targeted different aspects of the problem, which helped them come at the issue from a variety of angles.

I continue to be impressed by the creativity and technical acumen of Noahpinion readers. Expect more policy contests at some point in the future!

This article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion Substack and is republished with kind permission. Read the original here and become a Noahopinion subscriber here.

Continue Reading

Israel pressure pushing Iran over the nuclear edge – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

Iran appears to be getting backed into a spot as Israel fights against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Israel’s work to diminish Iran’s substitute community have focused on a number of targets: eliminating important Hezbollah officials, destroying their arms and other military sites, and targeting large numbers of fighters and sympathizers.

Iran has undoubtedly faced a problem because Hezbollah has weakened in recent months. Could Iran’s major militant proxy group’s continued pressure lead to the eventual acquisition of a nuclear weapon?

Iran’s punishment approach

Countries around the world have a well-known deterrence strategy utilizing armed substitute systems.

Iran has effectively used this tactic for generations, starting with Hezbollah in Lebanon and then spreading to Palestinian militant groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, several Kurdish militant groups, and Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Iran has been able to use this technique to deter any direct military hostilities from its adversaries while imposing a stronghold on the region and fend off pressure from Israel, the United States, and their allies.

Both Iran and Israel have, until late, appeared reluctant to engage in a full-scale battle. Rather, they have adhered to a certain code of conduct, which requires that they put pressure on one another without causing a full-french issue. This is something neither area you purchase.

Iran has much avoided direct conflict with Israel, yet when Israel has targeted its organizations in Syria and murdered a number of Iranian nuclear professionals over the past few years.

Lately, however, this approach has shifted. Iran has responded by launching two strong missile attacks against Israel in the last six months, acknowledging the influence of Israel’s continued attack on its substitute system.

This suggests that Tehran may significantly resort to other tactics to reestablish successful deterrence against Israel and its Western allies as the pressure on Iran’s proxies grows.

Some experts think that Israel may remain gaining what is referred to as “escalation supremacy” over Iran. As one group of experts has explained, this happens when one warrior escalates a fight

either because it has no options for escalation or because the options may not enhance the adversary’s situation, which would be detrimental or expensive for the adversary while the adversary would not be able to do so in return.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pledged a “harsh answer” to Israel’s most recent weapon strike in early October. This may force Iran further towards changing its punishment strategy, especially if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear services.

Calling for a new nuclear plan

The Iranian government is presently openly discussing whether to declare a martial nuclear programme as a result of growing pressure on Iran’s officials.

This may change Egyptian policy significantly. Iran has long maintained that its nuclear arsenal is exclusively for human purposes and that it has no intention of developing a defense part. This claim has been disputed by the US and its supporters.

The Egyptian parliament announced on October 8 that it had received draft regulations for the “expansion of Iran’s nuclear business,” and that it would be discussed in parliament. It’s not known what this development may be; it’s not clear whether it will have a military component. However, recent remarks by Iranian leaders suggest like an agenda.

Kamal Kharrazi, a top legislator and part of the Expediency Discernment Council, a high-ranking operational council appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, forewarned of a revision of Iran’s nuclear program. In an interview in May, he said:

If Iran’s life is threatened, Iran’s degree of deterrence may be altered. We have no authority to make a nuclear weapon, but if such a threat does occur, we will have to alter our nuclear policy.

Iran is becoming more and more vocal about a revision of its security theory. This year, nearly 40 politicians wrote a notice to the Supreme National Security Council, which decides on Iran’s public safety plan.

They urged the government to reconsider the existing nuclear policy, noting that Khamenei’s fatwa, which forbids the production of nuclear weapons, may change as a result of recent developments.

In the same spirit, Ayatollah Hassan Khomeini, the granddaughter of the leader of the Islamic revolution and previous Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, called last week for “enhancing the level of deterrent” against Israel. The Persian internet interpreted this as referring to nuclear arms.

Additionally, there have been rumors that the earthquake that occurred in Iran last year may have been the result of a nuclear bomb check. The US has stated that there is still no proof that Iran is working toward developing nuclear weapons.

Revived radioactive offer exceedingly improbable

Iran, Germany, and the European Union were the signatories of Iran’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA ) in 2015. With some limits on its crucial nuclear services, this agreement made it possible to pursue a civilian nuclear programme. In exchange, the US and its allies agreed to raise sanctions on Iran.

Yet, the US withdrew from the deal under then-president Donald Trump in 2018 and reimposed sanctions on Iran. Iran has since banned a number of international inspectors from inspecting some of its nuclear websites.

It is now thought to be only months away from developing enough weapons-grade material to build a weapon.

Although Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s new leader, suggested his state would be willing to reengage with the West and continue the discussions, attempts to revive the nuclear discussions have not been successful in recent years.

However, as has been speculated, Iran may decide to go ahead with a nuclear weapons program if Israel launches an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in retaliation for the missile attack last week.

Iran would launch a military nuclear program with the intention of restoring a deterrence balance with Israel that could stop a full-fledged conflict. Israel’s claim to have nuclear weapons has never been confirmed, though it is still ongoing.

However, such a choice is likely to have a significant impact on Iran and the region as a whole.

It undoubtedly would increase the pressure from other countries and US sanctions on Iran, which would make it even more isolated. Additionally, it could cause the region to become more hostile to nuclear weapons, as Saudi Arabia has already agreed to develop one if Iran develops one.

Ali Mamouri is research fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University and Shahram Akbarzadeh is convenor of the Middle East Studies Forum ( MESF ) and deputy director ( International ) of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Trump’s China tariffs won’t make America great again – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

Donald Trump is urging the government to impose a 60 % tax on products made in China and a 20 % tariff on imports from other countries as part of his” Make America Great Again” plan.

His rationale seems easy: tariffs will increase American jobs, lower the federal deficit, reduce food prices and yet generate revenues to subsidize childcare. &nbsp, But the former mayor’s supposed all-purpose business repair is inherently flawed.

Trump’s proposed tariffs aim to increase factory work in the US by increasing the cost of international items and encouraging domestic production, one of Trump’s main promises.

In principle, this sounds attractive, but the reality is much more difficult. However, history shows that tariffs often lead to long-term career development in professional sectors. &nbsp,

In fact, many US firms that relied on imported material elements were forced to raise rates or hire employees as a result of Trump’s taxes after the US government imposed them in 2018. &nbsp,

The taxes led to short-term problems, but they did n’t result in a lasting boost in manufacturing jobs.

Rather, businesses frequently automated tasks to reduce costs or relocate to lower-wage nations without the same tariff regulations.

Fast forward to the current, and Trump’s proposed 60 % tariffs on Chinese-made products will not prevent American firms from seeking cheaper options abroad. &nbsp,

Many US companies would just change their purchasing to nations like Vietnam, India, or Mexico to prevent paying the innovative 60 % taxes because global supply chains are more efficient than ever.

Chinese manufacturers can avoid tariffs by working with companies in other countries and labeling their goods as” Made in Vietnam” or” Made in Mexico” despite Trump’s claim that it is his main adversary in his trade dispute.

So, tariffs on China wo n’t bring back jobs to the US; instead, they’ll probably just move them abroad.

The false promise that tariffs will decrease US food prices is another major weakness in Trump’s price plan. &nbsp, Ultimately, tariffs are a tax on exports and the problem of those fees almost generally falls back on customers. &nbsp,

When taxes are imposed on goods that Americans frequently consume—such as technology, clothing, or food ingredients—the costs of these items will increase. &nbsp,

For example, if agrarian tools, fertilizers, and presentation materials are subject to tariffs, the cost of producing meals will ultimately increase. &nbsp,

When faced with higher input costs, American farmers are likely to pass those costs on to distributors and grocers, which will increase the cost of food.

Ironically, this will have the opposite effect as Trump claims: tariffs can be expected to increase food inflation, which is a particularly contentious political issue on the campaign trail.

Moreover, tariffs on a wide range of imports, especially from China, will affect countless industries—from technology and automotive to construction and consumer goods.

American companies, many of which rely on imported parts, will face increased costs, making US goods more expensive domestically and less competitive internationally.

This could cause businesses to increase prices, reduce investment, and even slash jobs. American consumers will ultimately bear the brunt of Trump’s proposed tariffs’ higher costs.

More broadly, Trump’s tariff plan risks destabilizing global trade networks. If tariffs cause higher prices and slower economic growth in the US, consumers will spend less, businesses will invest less, and overall economic activity will decline.

Additionally, the retaliatory tariffs that will likely come from nations affected by Trump’s tariffs could further stifle global growth and set the stage for a devastating, far-reaching trade war.

On a diplomatic level, Trump’s tariffs would exacerbate tensions with key allies and trading partners. &nbsp, Countries affected by the tariffs, not just China but also allies like Canada, Mexico, Japan and EU nations, are likely to respond by imposing their own new duties on American goods. &nbsp,

This would hurt US exporters, particularly in industries like agriculture, manufacturing and technology. &nbsp,

No country actually wins by distorting free trade, as trade wars are a zero-sum game. Instead, history demonstrates that they cause persistent economic suffering and diplomatic strife.

A breakdown in US trade relations with its key trading partners could also threaten America’s reputation abroad. Countries targeted by US tariffs may turn toward other global powers, not least China, to form new alliances, weakening America’s global influence and power.

A US-led switch to high-wall protectionism in favor of multilateral trade agreements would ultimately lead to a more disorganized and less prosperous global economy and not have the opposite effect on China that Trump’s tariffs are meant to impose.

Continue Reading

Don’t expect too much from Japan’s Ishiba – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

Pacific Forum published this article at its original publication. It is republished with authority.

Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ) got a facelift last month. The vote of Shigeru Ishiba, a five-time prospect, as party leader gives the group a fresh look. But, as with all plastic surgery, the adjustments are more simplistic than substantial.

Ishiba may have a difficult time guiding the group in the desired direction. The most sarcastic interpretation is that he was elected to help the group win the general election he has scheduled for later this month. After that task is finished, the old guard will begin working against him to regain its standing in the group.

Ishiba scored a come-from-behind get in the current group vote. Nine prospects, the most ever, contested the competition for LDP leader. ( Because the LDP holds a majority in the Diet, or parliament, the party president automatically becomes prime minister. )

He came in second in the first round of voting, but because no prospect secured a lot, a discharge was held among the top two vote-getters, Ishiba and then-Economic Security Minister Takaichi Sanae. One of the two people in the race for the position is Takaichi, a liberal separatist and supporter of former prime minister Abe Shinzo, who was killed two years ago.

Even though she received the most votes in the first round, Takaichi’s radical views and, let’s be honest, the idea of a person as prime minister are both deeply unpopular. In the next round, Ishiba won because Takaichi’s followers of the other seven individuals chose him over Takaichi.

Ishiba, the persistent opponent, owes his victory to a malfunction of the LDP’s corporate structure. It has remained largely ununified despite being a large, sprawling group that covers a range of viewpoints thanks to the advantages that come with electricity.

People have joined groups, habatsu, headed by senior officials. These groups offer funds to younger people and the chance to advance through the ranks. The party gives those elders status and authority within the group, which can change depending on the size of the party.

In the past, elders gathered before elections to choose the winners and distribute crucial party and cabinet positions. The result was a typical smoke-filled room. In his four prior events, Ishiba was sidelined during those discussion.

Next time, however, a political money controversy hit the biggest and most powerful parties the hardest, properly stripping them of their strength.

Additionally, it tarnished Fumio Kishida, the prime minister whose sluggish comment and ability to punish those who broke the law caused his and his Cabinet’s approval ratings to drop to historic highs and forced him to renounce his desire for a second term.

The LDP lawmakers who voted for celebration president were free to cast their ballots however top party members still had a lot of control because of their experience and age.

The victor’s expected effect on their electoral chances was intensely weighed in their deliberations. They were considering who they wanted to be seen standing following to in advertisements for their upcoming battle, according to a minister who explained.

Stand by me

Ishiba is that man. He has a sympathetic public support, and both his plans and his political stance are more in tune with the major Japanese views.

He is politically liberal, anxious about growing injustice and budget deficits. He thinks that Japan has obligations abroad, but he does n’t want to see the high profile that recent Tokyo governments have pursued.

He has faced opposition from former prime minister Abe in elections and on the Diet surface, giving him the nickname” the anti-Abe” and a striking contrast to him. His opposition to the LDP major, which has been shaped by and reflects Abe’s values and jobs, made him a leper in the group —until now.

Ishiba’s fresh Cabinet is distinguished by the presence of people of the biggest parties, those tarred by the incident. However, it looks a lot like its successors, with some lawmakers either remaining in their current articles or returning to those they held earlier.

There is stability in another, dispiriting sense: People are suddenly under-represented, holding only two of the 19 positions: minister of education and position minister in charge of children’s policies.

Yoshihide Suga and Kishida, his two immediate successors as prime minister, helped Ishiba win. Both concerned that Takaichi was very traditional and extreme, and that she threatened to end some of their most significant successes. They abused their control to win back the original entrepreneur.

Although that support may not be enough to stay Ishiba in the place he had long desired, it may not be enough to do so. The party may support him throughout the plan for the general election, profiting from his popularity and new photo for that ballot. However, once the voting is over and its parliamentary majority is secured, the old guard will begin pushing its mission and objectives.

It can get dirty. It has happened before. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi faced like strong opposition to his plans that he wooed prospects to issue incumbents from his own party twenty years ago. He called them “assassins”.

While many of them won in public elections, his – and their – control proved limited. While he was in power, his attempts to implement significant reforms either failed or were later resisted by later governments.

Ishiba may face similar challenges. The state has fundamental problems. Japan is the world’s grayest nation, and it is already facing a statistical problems. The government may get more money to support an aging population, promote care, and meet the commitment to increase defence spending despite its national debt of 265 percent of GDP being the largest of any developed economy.

One of the main contradictions Ishiba has with the Abe tradition, which views quite finance as” an end in itself” is how he deals with reconciling those demands with revenue.

Addressing those problems would be a concern for any politician, much less one who is outside his own party’s popular. Worse, the old guard has previously drawn outlines and signaled that it is hesitant to deviate from party orthodox two days after winning.

While these are issues of Japan’s local politics, they matter a lot to the United States. Japan is a vital ally and companion in the Indo-Pacific, the most active region in the global market.

When the US has struggled, Tokyo has provided the intellectual framework for its thinking about this crucial region as well as the diplomatic energy to support crucial economic initiatives like the Comprehensive Partnership for Trans-Pacific Prosperity ( CPTPP ) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP ).

Japan is at the centre of the network of regional safety initiatives, connecting different channels and acting as the nation’s main local ally. No matter who the primary minister is, the United States wants security and stability in Japanese politics. Washington might want to plan for stress.

Brad Glosserman&nbsp, ( brad@pacforum .org ) is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser ( nonresident ) at Pacific Forum. He is the author of” Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions” ( Georgetown University Press, 2019 ).

Continue Reading

China lacks will and way to lead the world – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

The” China Dream”, President Xi Jinping’s perspective to restore China’s great power status, was the main topic of Xi’s 75th National Day statement.

Many&nbsp, important individuals&nbsp, and&nbsp, policymakers&nbsp, in Washington agree as a matter of fact that the one of the China Dream’s aims is to remove the US-led global order and so Washington’s international leadership and power.

As exemplified by the lack of problem for international politics in Xi’s subsequent remarks, they’re wrong. Beijing is willing and—more importantly—unable to change America on the international level. To prioritize British interests, US policy must adjust to this fact.

Xi ‘s&nbsp, 2017 talk to the 19th National Party Congress&nbsp, is&nbsp, often&nbsp, cited&nbsp, as proof of Beijing’s intention to reject America’s role in the world. In that speech, Xi envisions China as” a global leader” having “mov]ed ] closer to the center stage”.

If Washington is to get Xi at his term, as&nbsp, some are wont&nbsp, to recommend, therefore China simply seeks a greater say in the world buy commensurate with its rise in power – no world domination.

When assessing Xi’s remarks at the 20th National Party Congress in 2022, he had even less to say about global leadership – only that China should aim to have the&nbsp, most” comprehensive national strength” and “international influence” &nbsp, by mid-century.

Although it is a stronger speech than it was in 2017, it is based on incredibly personal factors. The Chinese concept of” Comprehensive National Power,” which seeks to assess power through both qualitative and quantitative factors, is the foundation of comprehensive national power.

Various sources produce different output. With China ‘s&nbsp, low efficiency, &nbsp, making socioeconomic crisis and&nbsp, limited natural resources, it is difficult to see how Beijing claims the best energy place by 2050.

Equally, given the&nbsp, decline in China’s favorability&nbsp, in the United States, Europe and US-allied Asian countries and&nbsp, growth of” tough on China” policies, China has a long road ahead to reverse its influence fortunes.

Even if one were to read the worst into Xi’s and other Chinese Communist Party leaders ‘ speeches, Beijing’s three major foreign policy visions – the&nbsp, Global Development, &nbsp, Global Security, &nbsp, and Global Civilization Initiatives&nbsp, – do n’t call for an overthrow of” American leadership” or the international order.

At worst, they all point to a multipolar order in which China is the most admired great power in East Asia.

Outside of China’s words and ideas, the People’s Republic’s actions show that it is not willing or capable of displacing the United States ‘ global role.

While Beijing has established and expanded various international institutions, such as&nbsp, BRICS&nbsp, and the&nbsp, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, these have been opened to new members who will likely dilute China’s influence.

By virtue of their more limited scopes, Chinese-created institutions cannot replace the UN system, which even Beijing&nbsp, acknowledges is the premier representative of international order.

Militarily, China cannot project power globally. It has only&nbsp, one formal military alliance&nbsp, with its neighbor North Korea compared to the United States’&nbsp, 51 treaty allies&nbsp, across the Americas, Europe and the Indo-Pacific, thereby limiting the scope of its military activities.

So far, China has n’t sought additional treaty alliances – including its “better than an alliance” with Russia, which has not seen Chinese troops join Russia’s in Ukraine.

Beijing also lacks the world’s largest base system, which is essential for power projection. While US intelligence asserts China is working to establish bases in eight other countries outside of existing arrangements in&nbsp, Djibouti&nbsp, and&nbsp, Cambodia, this would be a far cry from Washington ‘s&nbsp, over 750 military bases&nbsp, in 80 countries.

If successful, Beijing’s facilities would be limited to countries along its global trade routes.

China does seek global economic and cultural influence, but this is likely to fail, in contrast to the world’s military power. De-risking, reshoring, nearshoring and friendshoring are the&nbsp, commerce terms of the day&nbsp, with countries and companies seeking alternative sources to China.

Beijing is unlikely to buck these global trends as it seeks to&nbsp, produce more at home&nbsp, while its&nbsp, economic coercion fails abroad. Similarly, Chinese cultural exports have not taken off and improved views of China, a striking contrast with its neighbor&nbsp, South Korea.

Due to China’s more traditional culture, difficult language, and censorship concerns, American levels of global cultural status appear out of reach.

Finally, China probably feels that the cost of removing the United States as the only global leader is too high. Historically, overextension has led to the&nbsp, fall of states. From a contemporary standpoint, the&nbsp, multitrillion-dollar price tag&nbsp, of US-style global leadership is astronomical.

Beijing must acknowledge that East Asian and domestic resources could be better utilized.

Washington would make sense of Beijing’s understanding that it does not and cannot not attempt to replace America as a global superpower. Policymakers should prioritize the real American interests rather than wasting resources on preventing something that China does n’t want.

This means maintaining dominance of the Western Hemisphere, bolstering economic security, deterring threats to the homeland and adhering to Constitutional principles. Only then can the US’s position of power and security be increased.

&nbsp, Quinn Marschik is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities.

Continue Reading

Han Kang, South Korean fiction writer and poet, wins Nobel – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

Poetry is frequently written in appealingly brilliant and quick prose when it’s written in a novel. The Vegetarian ( 2007 ) by Han Kang is a prime example of this work, and it is undoubtedly the one that had a major impact on the Swedish Academy’s choice to give her the Nobel Prize in literature in 2024. The commission praised Kang for winning the prestigious prize because of her “innovator in fashionable prose” and poetic and empirical style.

Han Kang is the first North Korean author to receive the Nobel Prize in Literature, joining the other 18 women to have received the award in its 121 victors over 117 years. She was born in 1970 in Gwangju, and she has received numerous other notable national and international awards, including the Prix Médicis Etranger in 2023 for her book Difficult Goodbyes. She was even awarded the International Booker Prize in 2016.

The Vegetarian is Kang’s best-read job. It was published in 2007 and translated into English for use in the UK and the US in 2016. The name was appropriate because it coincided with a rapid rise in people becoming vegetarians and vegans, especially in the UK.

The book considers the effects of becoming vegetarians when everyone around you consumes meat, even though it is not a vegetarian manifesto. It conveys protagonist Yeong-hye’s struggle to maintain bodily firm in response to her father’s disgust at her determination ( he sees it as rebellion ), her brother-in-law’s romantic fascination with it and her husband’s violent acts, force-feeding her meat.

The Vegetarian is described as an anti-capitalist and ecofeminist protest that provides an expanded perception into masculine power of the adult body.

The tale perception and voice changes in each section of the book, which are organized into three parts. In the history of her own system and the choices she makes about it, Yeong-hye is not a first-person speaker. This glaring absence of tone seems to have been appropriate for the Nobel Prize. The committee argued that the writer’s devotion to “invisible sets of rules” and” the weakness of human life” was a factor in her choice because of her “unique consciousness of the contacts between body and soul.”

Although they are less well known and have more mysterious themes, Han Kang’s writing and short stories are just as impressive and significant as her novels. Her poetry often explores places ( walking on the city street ), juxtaposed with objects ( streetlamps, candles, mirrors ) and the fragmented human body ( a hand reaching out, fingertips, frozen cheeks, tongues, eyelids ).

We Do Not Part, her most recent book, may be published in English in February of next year. At least in terms of subject matter, We Do Not Part is perhaps more mysterious and complicated than The Vegetarian. After Inseon is hospitalized following a wood-chopping accident, Kyungha visits her companion Inseon’s remote home to care for a puppy animal. Trapped by a storm, she uncovers characters from the 1948-49 Jeju slaughter, in which around 1, 000 people were killed.

Responses to Kang’s get

There has been extensive praise for this year’s win. The Washington Post recognizes the medal as a possible resource for other Asian authors. The Guardian, however, acknowledges Kang’s accolades and expands on the agency’s reasons for awarding the prize: her emotion, distinct consciousness, experimental style, and “metaphorically charged prose”.

The award for writing is often questionable. Online forums debunk the legitimacy of victors and make complaints about the choices ‘ politics. Some observers are offended if the artist is very mysterious, as was the case with Norway Jon Fosse, who won in 2023. They are extremely offended if the prize is given to a figure who is too conventional, as it was the case with Bob Dylan in 2016.

The efficiency of Kang’s language and the nearby sensitivity of her writing, which brings Asian history and places to a worldwide audience, make her job innovative and compelling both in both form and content. A worthy success.

At Nottingham Trent University, affiliate teacher of colonial and world literature Jenni Ramone.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

Continue Reading