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This is the next of two components. Learn part one,’ US needs a solution to China’s trouble.’

China, the country’s production power, is piling on nevertheless more production capacity. In what some experts refer to as the next China impact, different nations are concerned about losing their manufacturing bases.

To prevent over-reliance on China in manufacturing, if the US labor with like-minded places or go it alone? In my previous blog, I promised to address that concern in this one. Two passages are included below that serve as a framework for the discussion.

The first is from Princeton University professor and expert on international relations Aaron Friedberg, who writes in Foreign Affairs that” no country only can prevent or contain the upcoming second China shock.” In other words, we have no choice but to work with other states.

The second is from Lord Palmerston, a 19th century American statesman:” Regions have no lasting friends, merely continuous interests”. In other words, nations that are actively fighting China could choose to side with them later.

Contemplate in the abstract two ways to avoid over-reliance on another nation by approaching the argument from a different perspective. One is to make products internally – self-sufficiency. The other is for many nations to produce them, perhaps your country is one of them, perhaps no, but due to the variety of suppliers, you can count on them.

This second method is illustrated by China’s grain procurement. China produces less than 20 % of the beans it needs despite having many species to serve. The US was the main cause of the nation’s beans back then. Then, fearing over-reliance on us, China extremely imports from Brazil and to a lesser degree Argentina.

China is also motivating Russia, a neighbor with geopolitical favors, to grow more beans. More manufacturers reduce the chance of being fired if a strong supplier declines to buy during a crisis.

What if multiple suppliers do n’t exist? What if one nation’s creation is so dominant that it is threatening to overtake its rivals, as China has done with solar panels and other goods lines?

Friedberg’s answer: To assure several manufacturers, concerned countries may band up in a” trade protection partnership” and harmonize their production subsidies and their tariffs on Chinese products. New alternative suppliers would receive the security and incentives they need to invest in new productive capacity if there was a unified price wall and organized business policies.

Friedberg envisions the US and its allies playing key roles in the coalition, but that does n’t mean we’d produce everything. The goal is merely to encourage” the development of creative capacity for a wide range of created goods,” making it clear that China is not the only or dominant supplier of products or weapons “essential to the functioning of contemporary economies and societies.”

On this, Palmerston students had problem Friedberg. ” If you do n’t want to be reliant on another country”, they’d argue, “would n’t it be better to make the product yourself? Coalition friends may be enemies tomorrow.

They’ve got a place. Locations can be as volatile as enthusiasts– and as deceptive. Germany and the Soviet Union quietly agreed to divide northern Europe in 1939 by signing a non-aggression agreement. Germany launched a large defense assault on the Soviet Union in 1941.

But perhaps accepting that history is replete with such deceits, there’s also an argument for Friedberg’s business security alliance. By encouraging the development of manufacturers in several countries, the alliance would recreate the safety-through-diversification China enjoys in soybeans. It’s unlikely all of your “friends” will turn against you at the same time.

Another reason to think about joining a coalition is that the US lacks the industrial base to produce everything it needs in the long run. Washington has already requested that Japan produce Patriot missiles. The Navy is flirting with Korean and Japanese shipbuilders because, as the Wall Street Journal puts it,” the US barely registers on the global rankings” in shipbuilding.

It would n’t be simple to form a strong trade defense coalition. To Friedberg’s credit, he spells out the obstacles in detail.

Negotiations would be contentious and difficult. Political support would be difficult to come by in every nation. China would have to develop plugs to plug the holes in the collective wall.

Coordinated higher tariffs on Chinese goods would be in contravention of World Trade Organization regulations. According to Friedberg, China has already distorted them and used WTO rules to defend its discriminatory practices. However, further tarnishing the WTO might have negative effects on US exporting goods like agriculture.

Bottom line: According to Friedberg,” It takes little imagination to foresee a future crisis or conflict in which China could suddenly and potentially paralyze its allies” ( p. 2 ).

It would take a lot of time for the US to act on its own to avoid that danger. Working with other nations would make things happen quicker, which would encourage a proliferation of suppliers.

As I’ve argued more than once, we need a strategy to rejuvenate American manufacturing. After studying the questions that surround it, we need a bipartisan national commission of experts to come to an agreement on that strategy.

One of the biggest issues the commission would face is whether to form a trade defense coalition.

Former longtime Wall Street Journal Asia correspondent and editor&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, is editor emeritus of DTN/The Progressive Farmer.

This&nbsp, article, &nbsp, originally published on October 14&nbsp, by the latter news organization and now republished by Asia Times with permission, is © Copyright 2024 DTN/The Progressive Farmer. All rights reserved. Follow&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, on&nbsp, X @urbanize

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Nepal’s efforts to bring justice and accountability after its decade-long civil conflict froze more than two years ago with much progress, but a new development has given rise to hope that it will immediately be revived and revamped.

A long-awaited act that sets the stage for appointing a second – and finally last – square of truth commissions to conduct investigations into the more than 66, 000 issue victim cases that have been accumulating dust since the last commissions ended in July 2022 was passed by the nation’s parliament in August 2024.

The Nepalese government established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission ( TRC ) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons ( CEN ) in 2015 to deal with crimes committed during Nepal’s ongoing conflict, also known as” The People’s War.”

Communist rebels launched an insurrection against the Nepali authorities in eastern Nepal in 1996, which sparked a 10-year civil war. According to United Nations projections, the issue resulted in the deaths of 13, 000, with 1, 300 individuals also missing and an unknown amount of abuse and conflict-related sexual assault victims.

The Women’s War ended with the drafting of the Comprehensive Peace Accord that, among other responsibilities, required the Nepalese government to create a high-level fact fee.

To day, the earnings have completed two sessions. The government extended its two-year mission to include the majority of the target cases three times before the first, which initially collected the sufferer cases. The second large, mandated from 2020 to 2022, was shut down for decades due to COVID-19.

The charges were tasked with three main objectives: to reveal the truth about gross human rights violations, to create an environment of peace, faith and peace, and to make legitimate recommendations for target reparations and perpetrators from the issue.

However, despite seven years of work, little progress toward any of these objectives has been made. No case investigations have been completed, no perpetrators have been held accountable, and no victim reparations have been distributed. Reconciliation in a nation that still suffers from conflict is still a distant thought.

From 2022 to 2023, I conducted research in Nepal about the country’s transitional justice process. During my research, I heard people refer to Nepal’s prolonged process as” a judicial merry-go-round”,” Groundhog Day” and” transitional injustice“.

Many Nepalis who spoke with me believe that the government intentionally extended the transitional justice system in an effort to avoid accountability. They believe that people will eventually get tired of it and forget. In addition, the commissions had experienced a significant cloud of hopelessness and frustration as a result of the first two rounds ‘ legal and political restraints and political biases, severely stifling progress and impairing the commissions ‘ functionality and local trust.

Justice was” ajourned.”

In 2022, I interviewed a conflict victim in the rolling hills of Rolpa, in the country’s west, where the conflict began. Seven years prior, she had filed a complaint with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, but nothing has been said about it. ” In a way, our complaints are in adjournment”, she said. ” They have not ended, yet they are not being forwarded either”.

One of the roughly 300 women who formally reported a case of sexual violence committed during a conflict to the TRC was her.

However, a former truth commissioner claimed that some cases of sexual violence victims were treated as” torture” in order to distance themselves from the stigma and shame that are frequently associated with it in Nepal. This figure, however, could be as high as 1, 000.

I also met women’s organization leaders who have written reports of thousands of cases of conflict-related sexual abuse in Nepal, but they have n’t yet submitted these cases to the TRC due to ongoing concerns about confidentiality and trust.

Nepal’s truth commissions are lagging behind in their efforts to implement what I refer to as” transitional justice ritualism,” the practice of a state creating hollow institutions without the support of actual outcomes.

I think Nepal’s post-conflict coalition government has been using the truth commissions as a political tool to demonstrate to the international community that it is upholding its obligations under the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord and to avoid having universal jurisdiction, the international legal principle that allows other countries to prosecute individuals for serious human rights violations regardless of where the crimes took place.

Since 2013, when Colonel Kumar Lama, a former Royal Nepal Army commander, was detained in the United Kingdom on suspicion of torture and war crimes, the threat of universal jurisdiction has been a particular source of concern for alleged perpetrators in Nepal. While Lama was cleared there due to the lack of evidence, those in positions of power during the civil war continue to be at risk of having universal jurisdiction over war crimes perpetrators in Nepal.

A contested step forward

However, the recent change in Nepal’s political leadership and the passage of the new law, which amended the Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, offer an opportunity for the government to move beyond transitional justice lip service.

A third round of appointed commissioners will be in place for four years under the new law. Additionally, the amended act allows for the creation of specialized subunits within the TRC.

• truth-seeking and investigations,
• reparations,
• rape and sexual assault
• victims coordination.

The subunits have the potential to speed up the flow of resources and advance some of these commissions that are still in place.

Nonetheless, hope has been tempered by apprehension and uncertainty. Some victim groups support the legislation, while others object to provisions they claim could undermine justice, particularly by preventing criminals from receiving lower sentencing.

International human rights organizations have criticized the current law’s positive and long-awaited changes, but they also issue a warning about serious accountability gaps that could impair the transitional justice system.

UN Human Rights Commissioner Volker Türk called the revised law” an important step forward” and praised it as” an important step forward” while adding that it is necessary for the legislation to be interpreted and put into place in full accordance with international human rights standards.

Potential for international support

Although it appears as though Nepali-led transitional justice processes will continue, opportunities for international assistance in the form of financial or technical assistance may be opening, a significant shift in the process.

The amended act establishes a “fund” to support the investigation and victim reparations that will be supported by the Nepali government and are open to contributions from other local and international organizations.

Sushil Pyakurel, a former member of Nepal’s National Human Rights Commission, is among a group of human rights defenders, lawyers and victims establishing a civil monitoring committee to serve as a watchdog for the revived process. Pyakurel stressed the importance of Nepali civil society, alongside the international community, pressuring the government to fulfill its promises of a victim-centric implementation.

According to Pyakurel,” You can make any law you want, but the essence of the matter is how you put it into practice.” ” Although the law is different, if the mentality remains the same, then nothing will change”.

The government has a chance to show its commitment to a transparent and legitimate process by returning Nepal’s truth commissions. However, I think it must depart from the previous two commissions’ ritualistic transitional justice practices to actually offer justice and recognition to the country’s victims of the civil war.

Tracy Fehris is a PhD student in sociology at the University of Colorado Boulder.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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In early October, Israel’s foreign secretary, Israel Katz, announced on X he had declared the United Nations secretary-general, António Guterres, persona non grata. In other words, he had banned Guterres from setting foot in Israel.

Katz said Guterres ‘ failing to “unequivocally condemn” Iran’s new assault on Israel was the cause he was no more pleasant. Additionally, the UN commander was accused of failing to “denounce” Hamas ‘ murder in southern Israel on October 7, 2023 in a clearly worded speech. He added:

A secretary-general who gives backing to extremists, rapists and killers from Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and presently Iran — the mothership of international terror — will be remembered as a blot on the background of the UN.

Security Council members expressed their help for Guterres after Katz’s charter. And Guterres ‘ spokesperson called it” a political statement” and” just one more attack ]… ] on UN staff” by the Israeli government.

What is the value of Israel’s charter? And what kind of effect might it include?

The Latin word “persona non grata” means” an unexpected man.” It refers to the right of state to oust a minister or judicial officer from their own place in global laws. A minister may be expelling them or denying them access in one way.

Under international norms, governments are not required to provide a rationale for for a declaration.

Under international laws, diplomats and diplomatic employees have a wide range of privileges and immunities. They are prohibited from entering any kind of custody or imprisonment, as well as from entering any legal proceedings in a criminal or civil jury.

The diplomat’s country of residence may grant immunity in order for this kind of action to be taken.

Hence, the idea of persona non grata was created as a counterweight to these privileges and immunities. A country can essentially bar them from their place if they are upset by the actions of a envoy or consular officer, without even giving a justification.

The UN and its member states have a long-standing discussion about the propriety of such statements.

The UN claims that its officers are not officials who have been granted diplomatic ties to those nations and cannot be barred from joining member states. Instead, they are foreign civil servants who are responsible to a worldwide organization.

The UN even notes that declaring its officials&nbsp, image no grata&nbsp, really interferes with the organization’s features, as well as the power of the UN secretary-general under the UN Charter.

Many countries, however, do not agree with the UN’s position. In recent years, Ethiopia, Mali, Sudan and Armenia have all declared UN officials to be persona non grata, just to name a few.

Israel’s declaration is only the second time a nation has specifically banned the UN secretary-general. The first time was in the 1950s when both the Soviet Union and the Republic of China declared the first secretary-general, Trygve Lie, persona non grata.

In 1961, the Soviet Union also said it would not recognize Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold as an “official of the United Nations”.

I am researching this issue, which has not yet been widely explored. In my study, the two main issues that are posed are whether states have the authority to ban UN officials and the consequences of doing so.

On the first question, I believe there are strong legal reasons to support the rights of states to kick out – or keep out –&nbsp, UN officials.

For one, each country has a set of distinct sovereign rights that they can use to decide who enters and exits their territory. This is a cardinal principle of sovereignty.

It also has a right to defend and protect itself if UN officials are suspected of engaging in behavior that threatens a nation’s national security and interests. Expeling the suspected UN official is one way to go about doing this. Finally, international law does not specifically prohibit this kind of behavior.

Beyond these legal rights, the crucial question of what such a move means for the UN’s credibility and efficacy over the long term is still unsolved. Because nations are not required to provide a justification for banning a foreign diplomat, using it as a weapon against a UN official is a powerful political tool.

And specifically outlawing UN officials could seriously undermine the organization’s work and put innocent lives in danger. This is especially true when there are armed conflicts in which the UN is requested to provide humanitarian aid.

For example, in 2021, Ethiopia expelled five UN humanitarian officials who were providing food, medicine, water and other life-saving items to more than 5&nbsp, million people in a region that was engaged in armed conflict with the federal government. The action slowed the coordination and assistance delivery because the expelled officials were high-ranking employees.

And banning the secretary-general, in particular, is perhaps the strongest indicator of the breakdown of the relationship between a state and the UN.

The secretary-general is the chief international civil servant and the embodiment of the organization. Their assistance is also crucial for bringing about emergency relief, negotiating ceasefires, and promoting peace.

Declaring the secretary-general persona non grata, therefore, seriously damages his or her standing, especially in the context of an armed conflict. Additionally, it makes a strong political statement in favor of the UN in general, which could make its humanitarian work more difficult.

Countries must exercise restraint in how they use this power, even though they do have the sovereign power to declare UN officials persona non grata. What such restraint should appear to be is a subject that needs to be resolved urgently.

Samuel Berhanu Woldemariam is lecturer in law, University of Newcastle

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Reaction Weapon ( ARRW) job, the US government’s shop to China and Russia’s foe, more advanced hypersonic missile plans, has received fresh funding despite earlier symptoms of withdrawal due to poor test results.

The US Air Force made an additional US$ 13.4 million for the ARRW, according to The War Zone’s report this fortnight.

The ARRW program could be ended or a related follow-on program, known as the Tactical Boost Glide ( TBG), which is suggested as the funding could be used to stifle the ARRW or accelerate a related follow-on program, which would indicate a potential classified evolution or adaptation of the ARRW program. The money knock raises Lockheed Martin’s ARRW agreement’s full price to over$ 1.3 billion.

A jet booster is used to force an unpowered fly vehicle to fast speeds exceeding Mach 5, making it challenging for adversaries to spot, track, and intercept. The ARRW is a fast boost-glide vehicle.

The TBG system is a cooperative DARPA-Air Force work to help air-launched military range hypersonic boost-glide systems that can be launched from existing platforms, according&nbsp, to Pentagon documents cited by The War Zone. The software will even consider tracking, compatibility and connectivity with the US Navy’s Vertical Launch System, it said.

The ARRW, estimated to cost between$ 14.9 and$ 17.5 million per unit, is considered essential for countering greatly defended, high-value goals such as vital air defense and other command and control networks, including people housed in dried services. The ARRW would only be fielded in a small number due to its high costs.

However, the Arms Control Association (ACA ) reported in November 2023 that the ARRW faced termination in fiscal year 2024 due to repeated live-fire testing failures. The$ 150 million requested for its ongoing development was eliminated by the US Senate and House of Representatives versions of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.

According to the ACA report, the program’s setbacks had caused delays in the procurement that had been originally anticipated for 2023. These problems highlighted the lack of a coherent strategy for developing the hypersonic weapons China and Russia needed to compete with. The program’s “final” cost has been reported at$ 1.7 trillion.

In a July 2024 National Defense Magazine article, Josh Luckenbaugh notes how America’s hypersonic weapon program lags behind China, which boasts the world’s leading hypersonic arsenal, and Russia, which has deployed three hypersonic systems and used them in battle against Ukraine.

Luckenbaugh cites China’s significant investments in hypersonic research and infrastructure, including numerous wind tunnels, over the past 20 years. That, Luckenbaugh says, contrasts with US hypersonic expertise, which has deteriorated since the end of the previous Cold War and now resides mostly in academia, not industry.

The program continues with planned flight tests, including a significant demonstration over the Western Pacific in March 2024, despite the US Air Force’s budget’s 2025 budget’s exclusion of additional ARRW funding. That’s likely due to rising US concerns about China’s hypersonic-bolstered anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD ) capabilities.

The US Air Force may now be using the ARRW program to test new technologies, methods, and procedures for maintaining safe separation from launch aircraft, collecting data and telemetry, and gathering information to inform other classified and future US projects involving sustained hypersonic flight.

The US’s apparent strategic shift toward air-breathing designs such as the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept ( HAWC ) missile, which the US Air Force said it preferred over the ARRW in March 2023, may lead to more cost-effective, versatile solutions, potentially avoiding the costly complexities of the ARRW’s boost-glide system.

In April 2022, Breaking Defense reported that air-breathing hypersonic weapons, which have no moving parts, offer significant advantages over boost-glide systems.

Because the HAWC operates in the atmosphere, it lessens the need for exotic materials to withstand the high temperatures that boost-glide systems experience, and thus lowers production costs. Additionally, the feature makes it possible to use it with a wider range of platforms, including fighters and bombers.

In contrast to air-breathing hypersonic weapons, Asia Times noted in April 2023 that the ARRW’s boost-glide design, which requires the careful integration of multiple subsystems, could contribute to test failures. Additionally, this complexity could cause more failure points, making design validation needs to be reworked.

Moreover, an August 2024 US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report says that boost-glide systems&nbsp, do not travel faster than traditional ballistic reentry vehicles despite their unpredictable flight paths complicating missile defense.

The CRS report says that while boost-glide systems can evade some missile defenses due to their maneuverability, they suffer from overall speed limitations.

Additionally, it is noted that US research on conventional weapons focuses primarily on conventional warheads, necessitates higher precision than China’s and Russia’s nuclear-armed counterparts, increasing the technical complexity of the weapon’s development.

In order to compete with China and Russia, air-breathing hypersonic cruise missiles may be more practical, versatile, and affordable, influencing US development and deployment strategies.

Thus, it’s likely that the US’s resembling preference for air-breathing hypersonics over boost-glide designs will have a significant impact on its upcoming defense development and procurement decisions.

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China’s growing J-20 cunning warrior ships, bolstered by new cutting-edge systems and home engines, is gaining fast on the US as it grapples with rising costs, development delays and domestic debates over the future of air dominance.

This month, defense resource Janes reported that China’s People’s Liberation Army-Air Force ( PLAAF ) has rapidly expanded its fleet of Chengdu J-20″ Mighty Dragon” fifth-generation fighters, with 12 air brigades equipped as of May 2024.

According to Janes, based on recent satellite imagery, this number has significantly increased from only 40 in the first year to over 70 in the first year alone.

It says that the J-20, designed to competitor America’s F-35, plays a key role in China’s plan to work power beyond its southern threats, particularly in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait and Western Pacific.

The implementation of the aircraft across vital theater commands, according to the report, highlights China’s commitment to enhancing its fifth-generation air power.

Also, Janes says the PLAAF is also replacing older J-11s and Su-27s with J-20s, supported by progress in domestic website systems like the WS-15 that have reduced China’s rely on Russian-made engines.

Nonetheless, the report points out that cost aspects, with each J-20 priced at US$ 110 million, may reduce output. It mentions that China’s growing defence resources, projected at$ 232 billion in 2024, supports more fighter purchasing.

Janes says this development may push the US and local powers, including Japan and South Korea, to expand their fifth- and sixth-generation warrior programs, intensifying military investing in the Asia-Pacific area.

China’s rapid expansion of its J-20 fleet, which outsmarts the US in advanced stealth fighter numbers, is causing the US to struggle with rising costs and delays in updating its close F-35 program, which could affect China’s position in the Pacific.

The US halted F-22 fifth-generation warrior output in 2011, capping its ships at 187. Meanwhile, the US Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) noted in May 2024 that the program’s costs had soared to over$ 2 trillion, with modernization efforts adding$ 16.5 billion.

The document mentions that the F-35’s development, including radar and website upgrades, has been delayed due to program security issues and unknown electricity and heating requirements despite reaching full-rate production.

While the report says that while about 630 F-35s are currently in service, with plans to acquire approximately 1, 800 more, projected sustainment costs have risen from$ 1.1 trillion in 2018 to$ 1.58 trillion in 2023, partly due to efforts to extend the aircraft’s service life to 2088.

Although the report mentions efforts to reduce costs, such as improving parts ‘ reliability and maintainability, which have saved an estimated$ 84 billion, repair times remain slow, reducing the jets ‘ availability for missions.

In addition, the report says the US Air Force and US Navy have reduced their planned annual flying times by 19 % and 45 %, respectively, to meet affordability targets.

The balance of air power in the Pacific may have already been shifted to China’s favor as a result of these difficulties. The US combat air force is 12 squadrons short of all other aircraft types, according to Asia Times in September 2022.

Those shortages are &nbsp, most acutely felt in the Pacific, where the US has only 11 of 13 required fighter squadrons in the region.

US pilots ‘ skill levels may also be affected by reduced flying hours. A fighter pilot needs 200 hours of flight time annually and three or four practice flights each week to maintain proficiency. A pilot’s abilities may decline with just one or two sorties per week.

Powered by cutting-edge domestic engines and advanced avionics, China’s J-20 program is rapidly closing the technological gap with its US counterparts, transforming it into a formidable force in modern aerial warfare.

In a May 2021 article for ISIC Japan, Roger Cliff says that the J-20 boasts advanced stealth features, including a small radar cross-section achieved through external shaping, radar-absorbent materials and internal weapon carriage.

Cliff says the J-20 is equipped with a wide-band, active electronically scanned array ( AESA ) radar, similar to the F-22’s APG-77, and advanced datalinks for secure networking.

China’s aerospace industry has long relied on quality jet engines, but Asia Times reported in July 2023 that China’s J-20 stealth fighter could have overcome that handicap by using domestically produced WS-15 jet engines, potentially closing capability gaps with US jets.

China’s WS-15 engines, rivaling the US-made F-22’s Pratt &amp, Whitney F119 engines, reportedly have a thrust rating in the 150-kilonewton range. This upgrade departs from the less powerful Russian Saturn 117S and Chinese WS-10C engines, which limited the J-20’s speed and combat effectiveness.

Cliff mentions that China’s aerospace industry also focuses on developing high-temperature-resistant materials, integrally bladed rotors and full authority digital engine control ( FADEC ) systems to enhance engine performance.

He says thrust vector control technology, demonstrated in the J-10B, is being integrated to improve maneuverability. Additionally, he points out that China’s development of advanced air-to-air missiles, such as the PL-15 and PL-21, further enhances the J-20’s combat capabilities, targeting high-value aircraft to gain air superiority.

By enhancing China’s military autonomy, reducing supply chain vulnerabilities, and improving performance and independence from foreign technology, these advancements improve the J-20’s operational effectiveness.

While China’s J-20 fleet grows, the US faces tough choices: double down on sixth-generation fighters to outmatch China or pivot to cost-effective solutions to maintain its edge in the Pacific.

According to Asia Times, the US Air Force’s NGAD ( Next Generation Air Dominance ) sixth-generation fighter program is confronted by significant obstacles due to tight budgets, challenging technology, and shifting air dominance theories.

NGAD aims to replace the aging F-22, which was originally intended to serve as the centerpiece of upcoming US air superiority. However, due to rising costs, which are estimated to cost$ 300 million per aircraft, and the increasing preference for unmanned systems and emerging technologies over traditional crewed fighters, the project has experienced delays and uncertainty.

US Air Force leaders have resisted fully committing to the program despite Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman remaining competitors in the NGAD competition.

The US Air Force is also grappling with the pricey modernization of its F-22 fleet, which will require a$ 22 billion investment over the next ten years, compounding these issues.

Meanwhile, the broader air superiority debate now centers on whether the US should invest in costly sixth-generation fighters or shift focus toward more adaptable, cost-effective solutions like light fighter aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and space-based systems.

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The celebration of the October 7 attacks, when Hamas assailants murdered roughly 1,200 Israelis and foreign citizens and kidnapped another 251, has received a lot of media attention recently.

Coverage has also centered on Israel’s expanding surface activity in Lebanon, which follows an intense bombing strategy of the country’s north, west and capital, Beirut.

But nevertheless, the Israeli government has been continuing its operations in Gaza, where the dying burden has risen to 42, 000, according to the Hamas-run health department. In Jabalia, which reportedly had been brought under the strict control of the Israel Defense Forces ( IDF), has yet another instance of renewed Hamas paramilitary activity.

The Israeli suffering has been huge and sustained, and Hamas has been seriously damaged. In fact, the conflict in Gaza has turned into a bloody standoff, with neither side having the best chance of winning or losing.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, though, is determined to press on in Gaza while extending the battle to Lebanon.

The level of criticism that Netanyahu is facing in Israel over the hostages ‘ fate has been his main issue. A general strike in support of a prisoner package in early September and the size of some of the subsequent demonstrations against his government served as examples.

But, that has changed with the start of Israel’s military activities in Lebanon, which has given Netanyahu breathing room. At the end of September, polling&nbsp, indicated&nbsp, that Netanyahu’s right-wing Conservative party would then get more votes than any other if a public vote were held.

This acceptance may continue for the time being, based in part on what the Army does future. But the longer-term course of the war is possibly dependent on the far-right parts of Netanyahu’s governing alliance, and particularly the increase of messianic Judaism.

Messianic Judaism is best understood as a fusion of ultra-orthodox Judaism and spiritual patriotism. The motion, which has grown in Israel in recent years, seeks a true Jewish state. This includes the restoration of the Temple of Solomon on the site of Islam’s third-most divine page, the Al-Aqsa Mosque, in the Old City of Jerusalem.

In the defense, it has also gained more and more significance. This is partly due to the fact that many men have attended religious military training, and that a large proportion of recent military recruits have come from religious families.

Indeed, some of the most active Israeli military units in the Gaza war are drawn specifically from such cohorts, an example being the Netzah Yehuda ( Judah Forever ) battalion.

An element of Israeli politics that is underappreciated in democratic study is Messianic Judaism. Despite offering support to Netanyahu’s state on its own words, it takes a particularly tough line in terms of what is appropriate in ending the war.

A condition built out of fight

In three different periods, the Jewish condition has moved greatly to the right. The second came after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The next occurred in the 1990s as a result of the arrival of hundreds of thousands of newcomers from the former Soviet Union. And the third was a response to the first intifada ( or uprising ) in the early 2000s.

The most recent shift to the right was demonstrated by a rise in assistance for both smaller events that were firmly Zionist and fiercely opposed to any Israeli influence on Israeli politics.

From 2010 onward, it appeared to be a more robust time. There was a standoff in Lebanon, and the IDF kept a strict command over Gaza and the occupied West Bank. Israel’s army stayed primarily south of the border despite the fact that Hezbollah’s rocket attacks into northern Israel were uncommon.

However, the hostages ‘ deaths and their record on October 7 were a traumatic and heartbreaking surprise. Hamas would be the president’s main focus, it was obvious right away, and the government would be there.

A year later and that prospect seems diminished. However, if there ever is a more peaceful cooperation between Israel and Palestine, then the conservative Israeli position must be acknowledged, especially given their significant contribution to the current Netanyahu state.

To put it bluntly, in their perspective, something has to be done about the Palestinians. The Economist newspapers reported on August 29 that the hardliners “want to conquer the West Bank, destroy the Palestinian Authority, completely reoccupy and relocate Gaza, and drive Palestinians abroad.”

They even want Israel to walk away from atheism. In accordance with the same post, Netanyahu’s abandoned attempt to stifle judicial authority in the first few months of this government was only the first step in this direction.

His government’s target, the post argues, is to destroy the liberal “deep condition” and seize control of the army, security agencies and courts. Their issue is that such a goal, if ever a chance, is incredibly constrained by the near-globalization of Israel as a rogue position.

What is already evident, though, is that Zionist society is becoming more aggressive. This is probably aided by large new migration, including a “brain dump” from the liberal wealthy.

For now, the Netanyahu state may seem safe. Social security is, however, difficult to win and all too quickly lost, especially in a time when war is starting to build.

Paul Rogers is professor of harmony research, University of Bradford

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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According to senior Ukrainian and South Korean officials who were quoted in a The War Zone report, North Korea is intensifying its role in the Ukraine battle. Defense engineers are now helping Russia launch nuclear missiles at Ukraine.

North Vietnamese army, including soldiers, have been deployed alongside Russian causes, marking the first example of a foreign government sending armed troops to support Russia’s war. NATO countries are known to have sent defense “advisors” to the Ukraine area.

The War Zone report claims that North Korea gains by testing its ammunition and gaining real-world, high-intensity battle knowledge. Ukraine has responded in kind by destroying Russian North Korean munitions depots. &nbsp,

Declassified US intelligence reports indicate that Russia has used North Korean short-range ballistic missiles ( SRBMs), including the KN-23 and KN-24, in attacks targeting Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. North Korea reportedly gave Russia more than a million artillery shells since the conflict broke out in February 2022.

A Russian success may have contributed to North Korea’s support, which it believes will set precedent for the lifting of US and UN sanctions. Undermining its corporate autonomy, the punitive measures have made North Korea rely heavily on China for its financial success.

Ukraine&nbsp has retaliated by targeting these troops and disrupting supply lines as North Korea has increased its presence by sending troops to the battle.

In a Politico article this quarter, Ketrin Jochecova mentions that South Korea’s defence minister, Kim Yong-Hyun, confirmed accounts of North Vietnamese deaths in Ukraine, indicating that Ukrainian troops have killed North Korea’s men.

A June 2024 The Telegram content reveals that North Korea intended to send three of its ten executive brigades as part of an agreement under which Russia may give North Korea US$ 115 million periodically, despite the difficulty of determining the number of its military personnel in Ukraine. North Korea perhaps therefore have as many as 15, 000 men in Ukraine.

Ellie Cook and John Feng make reference in a Fortune article this month to how Ukraine has increased its crackdown on Russian munitions warehouses, particularly those that are supplied by North Korea.

Cook and Feng note that since late summers, Ukraine has struck many important websites, including a large station in Sergeevka, Voronezh and another in Soldatskoye, destroying weapons provided by North Korea.

Additionally, they say that in mid-September Ukraine targeted a station in Mariupol, followed by strikes on storage locations in Tikhoretsk and Karachev, both of which housed North Korean items.

Cook and Feng point out that the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine’s ( GUR), Main Directorate of Intelligence, has played a significant role in these operations, which aim to disrupt Russian logistics and weaken its arsenal.

However, they point out that Ukraine remains irritated by Western allies ‘ reluctance to review long-range-strike weaponry, which could further boost its potential to reach deep inside Russian place.

Ukraine’s” Victory Plan” is complicated by NATO’s continuing reluctance to give long-range weapons and the ever-present danger of Russian nuclear weapons, which are intensifying its missile strikes on warehouses full of North Korean weapons.

In September 2024, RBC-Ukraine reported that Ukraine’s Victory Plan, as outlined by Mykhailo Podolyak, assistant to the mind of Ukraine’s National Office, is a strategic framework for modern war against Russia.

Although the plan’s specifics are still ambiguous, Podolyak emphasized that a clear understanding of the necessary military equipment, quantities, and costs was needed to successfully conclude the war. He urged allies to stop feigning Russia’s propaganda about nuclear redlines and escalation and stressed the value of international support.

According to RBC-Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky intends to explain the strategy to US President Joe Biden to find out whether Ukraine’s allies are committed to a Ukrainian victory or are merely trying to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression.

Podolyak advocated for a principled decision to support Ukraine fully, warning that the cost of war with Russia would escalate if not addressed right away. According to the report, the strategy emphasizes the need for a strong, unwavering stance against Russian aggression to ensure a just and lasting resolution.

In a Politico article this month, former NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg criticized the alliance’s cautious attitude toward providing long-range munitions to Ukraine for strikes deep inside Russian territory.

Stoltenberg emphasized that despite NATO allies ‘ unmatched support for Ukraine, including cruise missiles, advanced battle tanks, and high mobility artillery rocket systems ( HIMARS ), there is still a significant debate over the use of these weapons on Russian soil.

He says NATO aims to uphold Ukraine’s right to self-defense, including targeting legitimate military sites in Russia. He points out, however, that NATO has a variety of positions, with some members imposing restrictions to stop further escalation.

Regardless of the outcome of the upcoming US presidential election, he insists that it is crucial to avoid making self-fulfilling predictions and maintain US support for Ukraine.

Reuters reported in September 2024 that Putin had announced significant changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, emphasizing that any conventional attack on Russia, supported by&nbsp, nuclear power, would be considered a joint nuclear assault.

According to the report, this change, which was made public during a UN Security Council meeting, makes things more difficult for Russia to deploy nuclear weapons.

According to Reuters, Russia’s 2020 doctrine only permitted a&nbsp, nuclear response when the state faced existential threats from conventional or nuclear attacks.

However, it points out that the updated policy now includes aggression against Russia or its ally Belarus, even with conventional weapons, as grounds for a nuclear response.

According to the report, Putin claimed that these amendments are a response to US and UK discussions allowing Ukraine to launch Western missiles against Russia.

Russia may choose to escalate in other ways besides threatening the use of nuclear weapons. Iran acting as a broker, according to a Reuters report from September 2024 that Russia is considering sending advanced P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles to Yemeni rebels.

Despite the fact that the missiles would significantly increase the Houthis ‘ ability to threaten commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea, Russia has not yet made the transfer.

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