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According to a US State Department 2020 approach report titled” US Strategy for Central Asia 2019– 2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity,” Washington aims to acculturate Central Asia into its sphere of influence. To date, its initiatives have &nbsp, come up somewhat and miserably short.

It’s not too quickly for Washington’s foreign policy experts to start considering a new strategic approach to this great region rich in natural resources and historical significance for transatlantic connection as a fresh US administration is expected to take business next month. &nbsp,

What would it take for a new US Embassy in Central Asia? For beginners, it would prioritize political engagement, de-emphasize political adventurism and modest ideological pronouncements.

Diplomacy, which usually presupposes speech and settlement, is the smartest, most cost-effective way to resolve problems in an progressively unstable and unsafe world. &nbsp,

Therefore, it would be wise for the US State Department and the rest of the DC foreign policy formation to prevent equatering strength with failure and pointless “forever war” as if the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were insufficient to spark new thought.

Also, a new emphasis on politics should not be construed as protectionism, which is impossible even if it were socially acceptable, which it is not. Instead, it may indicate a revival of the wonderful American foreign policy practices of John Quincy Adams, William Henry Seward, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz.

Some disingenuous people contend that bright politics does not imply peace in a bid to stop any alternatives to the United States ‘ current foreign policy. It may end the inclination of so many US foreign policy elites to consider good and bad as a straightforward logic. The US needs a foreign plan based on morality, no dogmatism.

When Washington persuades local states that they should act as independent citizens rather than as pawns on a political chessboard and that they should pursue socially beneficial economic policies, which are frequently misinterpreted as progress and prosperity, will gain new strategic momentum.

The US State Department must exert more pressure on Central Asians to persuade them that Washington’s mentoring and foreign aid initiatives are not intended to change the world, lead to the implementation of historically antiquated ideologies, or make the claims of the area financially dependent on the US. However, these perceptions are widespread in the region today.

Washington would be wise to attune its support for the “winner-take-all” class of geoeconomics, which disobeys Central Asia’s goal of achieving sustainable growth through the proper and fair planning, usage, and control of limited natural resources in the assistance of local unity and economic integration.

Presidential treatment

It will be difficult for the United States to catch up with China, Russia, and Turkey in the battle for power in the Eurasian heartland.

This is due to the strong historical, cultural, and geographic disparity between Eastern and Western customs and ways of thinking, as well as its rivals ‘ head start in trade and transportation connectivity.

The single metric of US versus China exports to Azerbaijan over the past few years provides insight into Washington versus Beijing’s economic engagement throughout the region.

Since year-end 2018 through the second quarter of 2024, Chinese exports to Azerbaijan, located on the western rim of the Caspian Sea, have ballooned four times from approximately US$ 40 million to over$ 160 million/per month.

US exports to Azerbaijan increased by$ 40 million over the same time frame, matching the level of Chinese exports five years prior, starting from a much lower base of just around$ 20 million. Similar trends can be seen in the growth rates of Chinese exports to other Central Asian countries.

The next US president should travel to the region if Washington truly wants to strengthen its ties with Central Asia. No US president has ever visited Central Asia ( defined as any country excluding Afghanistan, which Donald Trump visited in 2019 ), which is a source of great dissatisfaction for the leaders of the region. A visit like this could significantly alter the relationship.

President Joe Biden has settled in the area with frequent references to its strategic significance and a one-time, highly scripted 45-minute ceremonial pow-wow with Central Asian heads of state on the United Nations General Assembly’s 2023 sidelines.

That may be better than nothing, but it is insufficient given Central Asia’s strategic significance and desire to defend its independence from external power meddling.

In sharp contrast, the heads of state of China, Russia and Turkey, as well as India, South Korea and other Eurasian countries, have traveled to Central Asia some 40 times since 2019. Likewise, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have met face-to-face with their counterparts or traveled to foreign capitals over 100 times.

Central Asian officials want the United States to go beyond” Zoom call diplomacy” and get down to real business, i. e., quit saying. We care so much about your independence, drop the criticism of their social policies and their inadequacy, which are frequently deeply incompatible with Central Asian traditional values, and acknowledge that multipolarity ( witness BRICS), like it or not, is gaining momentum and wo n’t fade away.

The US must accept and face the reality of Central Asia in its present form in order to successfully pursue American interests in the area. Despite all the publicity and the ballyhooed launch of a rare earth metals initiative, the 2023 New York” C5 1″ meeting between Biden and regional heads of state did not account for decades of wasted diplomatic time. &nbsp,

Various US policies, including ^the financing of major infrastructure, have stalled across ^the region as if bogged down in a Karakum desert sandstorm. Tellingly, most Central Asian leaders skipped ^this year’s UN General Assembly confab, while ^the upcoming 16^th BRICS Summit ( October 22-24 ) is expected to attract over 23 heads of state.

Central Asians will undoubtedly continue to communicate with the United States, but if Washington does n’t deliver soon on their part, they will undoubtedly travel elsewhere to obtain the best infrastructure, logistics, and mining deals that China and other countries have to offer. This only becomes logical when the US de facto leaves the equation.

Stick to what the document’s title,” US Strategy for Central Asia 2019– 2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity,” says in black and white and clearly:” The United States ‘ primary strategic interest in the region is to build a more stable and prosperous Central Asia that is free to pursue political, economic, and security interests with a variety of partners on its own terms.

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, president of Kazakhstan, and other regional leaders of state, are expressing their hope that the US will follow through. The Kazakh leader has characterized the objectives of Central Asian diplomacy as follows:” Kazakhstan ‘s]diplomacy ] is very simple and clear – we do not believe in zero-sum games. For all in the heart of Eurasia, we want to replace the” Great Game” with” Great Gain.” We are interested in sustaining and growing trust, friendship, and strategic partnership with our neighbors as well as with all nations who are actively interested in expanding Kazakhstan’s cooperation.

In other words, Central Asians do not want to passively observe external powers and continue to fight against the superannuation theories of British geopolitical thinker Halford Mackinder.

A Trump pivot

If Trump is elected president in November, he should send a clear message that Washington’s policy on Central Asia will proceed in a more business-like manner, i .e., work to create political and economic synergies that lead to mutually beneficial outcomes.

If Trump’s policy vis-à-vis Central Asia were to be grounded in confident, smart diplomacy and no-nonsense realism, Central Asians would welcome the change in American leadership, just as they would applaud the cessation of US lectures on internal governance matters. Such moralizing has proven self-defeating for US strategic interests.

In order to reshape the” US Strategy for Central Asia 2019– 2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity” and increase the momentum of US-Central Asian relations and strengthen its position against China, Russia, and other countries in the region, a Trump 2.0 administration should redraft the document.

Central Asian’s policymakers should keep in mind that the country is serious about upholding its sovereignty, spiritual and cultural heritage, civilized harmony, and traditional family values.

Should Trump win, he would be wise to send personalized notes to the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, saying to all:” I’ll see you in Central Asia in 2025″ .&nbsp, The personal touch would go a long way toward deepening US-Central Asian relations and advancing US strategic and national interests in the region.

Javier M Piedra is former acting assistant administrator, Bureau for Asia, United States Agency for International Development ( USAID ).

Alexander B. Gray was the White House National Security Council’s chief of staff from 2019 to 2019 as a deputy assistant to the president.

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India’s ambitious project to build two nuclear-powered attack submarines ( SSN) is its most recent bold move to counteract China’s growing naval presence and defend its position of supremacy in the Indian Ocean.

This month, Reuters reported that India has approved plans to construct two new SSNs, estimated to cost around 450 billion rupees ( US$ 5.4 billion ). According to the record, these ships are a component of a larger project to construct six of these vessels, increasing India’s standing in its traditional sea sphere of influence.

These new ships, which will be constructed at the government’s manufacturing facility in Visakhapatnam with the assistance of building major Larsen and Toubro, will be more quickly, quiet, and capable of longer underwater missions than conventional diesel-powered submarines ( SSK).

India has a record of leasing nuclear-powered boats from Russia, which is in line with wider plans to grow its regional arms business and become more self-sufficient for its weapons. Following deadly conflicts along their disputed Himalayan border in 2020, the move is likely to add to that tension.

The new course of boats will be different from the atomic ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN), which is theoretically capable of launching nuclear weapons, according to Reuters.

The fact that the Indian Ocean may be the only theatre in the world where it can surpass China thanks to local geography’s power forecast potential may contribute to India’s plan to purchase SSNs, known as Project 75. That said, India’s latest underwater ships leaves much to be desired.

Lalit Kapur claims in a May 2021 content for the Delhi Policy Group that India’s desire to strengthen its maritime punishment and combat skills in the face of growing regional risks, especially from China. The Indian Navy’s wish list is also unfilled almost a decade after it was first approved by the government in 2015, despite significant delays caused by the program.

Kapur notes that SSNs are more efficient for defensive and offensive operations because they have better range, stamina, and speed as compared to SSKs. He mentions that SSNs can escort SSBNs, defend carrier battle groups, and hunt down enemy surface forces in international waters.

But, Kapur says India’s latest underwater fleet, composed principally of aging SSKs, is inadequate to counter China’s expanding marine power and increasingly assertive sea plan.

According to Kapur, governmental gravity, budgetary constraints, and an ongoing reliance on foreign cooperation continue to hinder progress despite the American Navy’s revised 30-year plan, which calls for the replacement of six of its remaining 18 SSKs with locally constructed SSNs.

Without more proper investment and more rapid SSN growth, India risks falling behind in the Indo-Pacific seafaring power dynamics, which undermines its regional security and punishment posture.

Requirements of India’s prepared SSNs remain obscure and are probably also classified. In an April 2024 content, the Indian Defense Research Wing ( IDRW) points out that India’s SSNs are known to remove 6, 000 tons and that they are aiming to get equipped with sophisticated targeting methods and versatile stockpiles to help different activities.

These include anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, strike missions, special operations, mine warfare, subsea seabed warfare, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ( ISR ).

IDRW asserts that the inclusion of patrol aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles will improve India’s ability to have precise and contextual attention. The SSN plan is key to the implementation of cutting-edge engine systems, particularly pump aircraft propulsion systems, which were developed by France.

In June 2024, Asia Times reported that India’s Bay of Bengal underwater center known as Project Varsha may be its main foundation in the Indian Ocean. In potential problems with Pakistan and China, the foundation offers better protection than the active waters of the Arabian Sea, and it will allow India’s SSBNs to insert the Bay of Bengal without the aid of satellites or plane.

SSNs from India’s SSNs will likely operate in the Bay of Bengal, escorting SSBNs and allowing them to launch SLBMs at Pakistani and Chinese targets from this secure area.

In May 2024, India revealed plans to build a third aircraft carrier to strengthen its naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean in response to potential threats from Pakistan and China, according to Asia Times. The move aims to keep one carrier in operation while another is in need of maintenance, making sure India can keep its maritime security in top shape.

The Indian Navy’s carrier-centric approach focuses on sea control and denial strategies vis-à-vis Pakistan and China. However, the initiative faces challenges, including funding, technical hurdles and the need for advanced training facilities. Despite India’s SSN ambitions, the ships may not be operational by 2030, when it might be difficult to overthrow China’s expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

The US Department of Defense’s 2023 China Military Power report states that China’s People’s Liberation Army–Navy ( PLAN ) is the world’s numerically largest navy, with 370 ships and submarines and 140 major surface combatants. The report says that the PLAN is expected to grow to 390 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030, with much of that growth in major surface combatants.

In June 2024, Asia Times reported&nbsp, that China is expanding its military presence in the Indian Ocean, raising concerns of encirclement in India. China is known to be seeking base agreements in Sri Lanka and Myanmar and has the power to launch warships into the Indian Ocean from its Djibouti base. China’s naval presence in the area could be enhanced by its bases in Gwadar, Pakistan, and Hambantota, Sri Lanka.

China still faces significant logistical and political difficulties in the Indian Ocean, including its reliance on civilian resources for logistics and its partner nations ‘ refusal to grant full military basing access. But China’s push underscores its broad ambition to secure maritime trade routes and bolster its Indian Ocean position, to India’s detriment and trepidation.

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” Middle East Spectator”, is a pro-regime Telegram channel based in Tehran, as all advertising programs based in Tehran are – by law. Last year, Middle East Spectator&nbsp, leaked two delicate intelligence files. The documents originated in the US&nbsp, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency&nbsp, ( NGA ), and the information pertained to Israel’s preparation to retaliate for Iranian missile attacks. &nbsp,

I have no re-published the papers leaked on Telegram. The above link will lead users there if they are interested.

Middle East Spectator claims that Tehran is a separate procedure. If we take this at face value, a resource in the knowledge area contacted the Spectator and shared the two documents with them. In a later article, Spectator states that the cause was in the US Defense Department to understand things more.

Spectator could only have obtained the regime’s approval to publish these papers because “news” and knowledge in Iran are really tightly controlled. &nbsp,

It is incredibly important material that Iran may, and probable will, use to make its defenses.

One of the two leaked documents&nbsp, is classified above best solution. The document’s headline reads NOFORN, which means it cannot be shared with foreign institutions. &nbsp, Assuming that the documents were not shared with allies ( such as the&nbsp, Five Eyes party, whose members have unusual access to US knowledge knowledge ), that information strengthens the claim made by the Spectator, that the leak came from United States persons or businesses. &nbsp,

The papers describe an “large push employment training” by Israel on October 15 and 16. &nbsp, The report was published on Telegraph by ^the&nbsp, Spectator on ^the 18^th. &nbsp,

Whoever leaked it to Tehran was a source of alarm about an Israeli attack on the horizon. It also explained to People the types of weapons that could be used and the likely targets, which included primarily Persian air defense installations and long-range radars. &nbsp, &nbsp,

How do we understand? The two papers information activities at three Israeli air bases that are under extensive US surveillance and provide very detailed data on Israeli Air Force preparations for a hit.

The report properly identifies the types of cruise missiles Israel was preparing, especially a system called&nbsp, ROCKS&nbsp, ( which may be Israel’s longer range Crystal Maze or Crystal Maze II air launched cruise missile ) and Golden Dawn, another type of cruise missile that could be a derivative of the&nbsp, Sparrow series&nbsp, that originated as a specific program emulating Iranian long range weapons.

The report also says that the platform carrying these missiles would be the&nbsp, F-15I, not Israel ‘s&nbsp, F-35″ Adir” jets. It also mentions the surveillance platforms and refueling tankers that Israel would use. &nbsp, &nbsp,

There is more. &nbsp, The lesser-classified document ( secret level ) discusses Israel ‘s&nbsp, Jericho II&nbsp, medium range ballistic missiles, which are believed to be a critical part of Israel’s nuclear deterrent.

Jericho II is solid-fueled and can be silo based or transporter-erector-launcher ( TEL ) vehicle based. The US accepts Israel’s nuclear weapons, even though the US has never publicly acknowledged that before, according to the documentary context.

According to the relevant document, Israel may have dispersed the Jericho missiles to stop Iran from pursuing them. It further asserts that Israel’s use of its Jericho II missiles has not been detected by the US, and that a nuclear strike by Israel is unlikely. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Israel is without a doubt suffering significantly as a result of the leak of geospatial-origin intelligence. Additionally, it is likely that Iran has leaked much more sensitive information to the Iranians, information Iran may be keeping private.  Some Spectator channel releases acknowledge this.

Why would the Iranian government (either via Spectator or by giving permission to Spectator ) leak ANY of the information?

Some speculate that the intention was to persuade Israel that the Iranian government had knowledge of the retaliation plan, preventing Israel from an attack it genuinely did n’t want to face. &nbsp, Second, perhaps, it was to warn ( boast? ) that Israel was concerned about what other information had been compromised because Iran was being given secret information by the US.

Consider this.

On October 18, ^the Iranian leak was made public. &nbsp, On ^the 19^th, an alleged Hezbollah-origin drone attacked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s private home in Caesarea near ^the coast. Accurately targeting Netanyahu’s home required “scene matching”, as any drone from Lebanon, Syria or Iraq likely would have been outside of radio control communication. Significant intelligence preparation would be required for scene matching.

Was there any assurance that Netanyahu would be at home during the attack? Or confidence that he would n’t be? Aside from the retaliation that would surely follow an actual assassination, striking the house knowing he was n’t there would be another way to tell Israel what Iran knows. Were US assets complicit? In other words, was the leak a law violation or was it the result of a decision by the administration or a member of the administration with political goals? No one can say, yet.

All of this is likely to cause Israel to undergo a significant revision. &nbsp, At minimum, the Israelis will have the opinion that US intelligence is unreliable and penetrated. &nbsp, Beyond that, some will understand the US to be overtly hostile and acting against Israel. The prime minister received phone calls from foreign heads of state, former US President Trump, and US House Speaker Mike Johnson ( after the drone attack ). Neither&nbsp, President Biden nor Vice President Harris called. )

In the real world this is a very sad development. &nbsp, Israel has some of the best human intelligence ( HUMINT ) in the world and has significant access to Iran’s nuclear programs. &nbsp, Israel has, on many occasions, warned friendly ( and not so friendly ) countries about threats, including against foreign leaders, that the Mossad and other intelligence centers in Israel have detected. Leaks like this directly harm the US and put a severe damper on intelligence cooperation.

The US has apparently launched an investigation, according to House of Representatives Speaker Mike Johnson. &nbsp, Documents of this type are often sent via secure internet to security-cleared personnel. &nbsp, There could be hundreds, perhaps even more, with access. It might be possible to review time stamps on the individuals who accessed or copied the documents, which could help narrow the search. &nbsp, It may also be possible to track documents sent outside the US using the National Security Agency’s massive capabilities. Much depends on whether the investigation conducted is serious.

One suggestion being floated is that&nbsp, maybe the documents were hacked. However, such sensitive information is not only transmitted through secret channels; it is also encrypted, making hacking less likely to yield useful results. For the record, there are no public reports of any hacks of US security information.

It is n’t clear what Israel will do. Now that at least some of Israel’s plans and preparations have been leaked, which was the original idea, it would be reckless to retaliate. Apparently, Israel and the US had already agreed not to strike Iran’s nuclear or oil facilities. &nbsp, Will that agreement hold now, or will Israel consider the agreement void? &nbsp, &nbsp,

Beyond that, Israel is concerned that US intelligence leaks could put another strain on its other operations against Iranian proxies from the Red Sea to Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.

Stephen Bryen served as the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Middle East subcommittee’s policy director and as its deputy undersecretary of defense.

This article was originally published on his Substack, Weapons and Strategy. It is republished with permission.

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Nothing to see here, people. Keep selling fluctuation

David Goldman contends that market expectations for a possible China signal, followed by sadness over its scope, were exaggerated. Because the current levels of volatility cannot be justified by any immediate policy changes, selling fluctuation on Chinese assets is a compelling business.

The risk is greater than the Middle Eastern executions.

Because big powers, including China, have a vested interest in preventing an increase in this conflict, David Goldman contends that a wider Middle East conflict is doubtful. Additionally, Beijing has a significant effect over Iran, which may stifle more missile strikes against Israel.

ASML: Orders decline, sales and revenue advice cut

According to Scott Foster, ASML, the largest manufacturer of silicon lithography equipment, saw a 15.6 % decrease in share prices after announcing a significant decline in new directions. The general semiconductor industry was severely impacted by the statement.

Germany’s Ukraine plan becoming difficult to reconcile

According to Diego Faßnacht, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is wrestling with a gentle balance between Germany’s aid for Ukraine in the midst of the ongoing conflict. Scholz has shown increasing flexibility to peace deals with Vladimir Putin, even though he has a strong support for Ukraine.

Zelensky readies tale of Eastern “betrayal”

According to James Davis, Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, may soon be making this scenario community and articulating Kiev’s inability to win as a result of the country’s limited support from the West as it struggles to find skilled soldiers and lacks of artillery. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Discussions and challenges in East Asia

According to Scott Foster, conflicts and negotiations in East Asia continue as the Middle East dominates global news and Taiwan continues to negotiate Chinese naval and air exercises, and Japan does not support the idea of an Asian NATO.

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China’s October 14″ Joint Sword 2024B” military exercise, the fourth large exercise near Taiwan in the last two years, reconfirmed Beijing’s vow to use force if necessary to compel Taiwan to join the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ) against the will of Taiwan’s people.

According to PRC officials and the media, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te’s alleged controversial statement on the Republic of China National Day was the subject of the exercise. &nbsp, That declare was evidently false. &nbsp,

Lai’s conversation was comparatively slight toward China. Some of his Democratic Progressive Party colleagues who prefer to call their nation the” Republic of Taiwan” are irritated by the fact that he even said he is comfortable with the brand” Republic of China.”

However, Beijing called a previous big practice in May, after Lai’s commencement,” Joint Sword 2024A”, indicating there was already a strategy for another one before the end of this year. So it now appears that big PLA exercises are no longer responses to new ways by Taiwan or the US toward&nbsp, de jure&nbsp, Taiwan freedom. &nbsp, More, they follow a plan set by Beijing.

Joint Sword 2024B may have a good flicker, which means that the exercise appeared to be primarily a rehearsal for a siege. &nbsp, The Chinese Coast Guard’s (CCG) membership was important and significant promoted by PRC representatives and the press. &nbsp, The CCG would be a big person, as important as the PLA Navy, in a siege situation.

Gwent warships sailed close to two little Taiwan-held islands close to the island of China’s coast and took positions on all sides of the main area of Taiwan. &nbsp,

PRC state media organ&nbsp, Global Times&nbsp, said,” This indicates that the CCG, as a sea law enforcement power, will enhance and increase the frequency of its activities around Taiwan”, foretelling a larger responsibility for the CCG in future Chinese efforts to force Taiwan toward unity.

To hammer home the information, China dispatched CCG vehicle 2901 to join in the practice. &nbsp, This fleet, the largest beach protect vehicle in the world, is heavier and longer than a US&nbsp, Arleigh Burke-class battleship. &nbsp,

Big Chinese vessels would have an edge in a situation where ships bump and block each other, as has become common in the South China Sea, as Beijing wants to remind Taiwan.

One Chinese military spokesperson&nbsp, said&nbsp, the purpose of the drill was to “form a situation where the island is pinned down from both sides” .&nbsp, Another&nbsp, said&nbsp, the exercise scenario included cutting off Taiwan’s imports and setting up a picket line to prevent “foreign” —spelled US—intervention from the east. &nbsp,

Because the PLA was using the defense to compel unification in a blockade scenario is significant, it was used in a different way than when they attempted to seize Taiwan by sending troops to literally conquer the island.

Researchers have long been at odds with whether China would impose a siege or launch an invasion. Many&nbsp, have &nbsp, argued&nbsp, that war is Beijing’s chosen method.

Brandon Weichert&nbsp, wrote&nbsp, in The National Interest&nbsp, in June 2024 that” Most Western observers believe that China will pursue a bolt-from-the-blue attack on Taiwan… because it would get the globe by surprise” and help Beijing to directly achieve its goal of “decapitating Taiwan’s leadership” .&nbsp,

To be sure, plenty of&nbsp, others&nbsp, have &nbsp, contended&nbsp, that from China’s standpoint, a blockade is a better strategy than an invasion. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

The most recent exercise, Joint Sword 2024B, and the highlighted operations related to a blockade, may indicate that PRC military planners believe they would prefer a blockade over an invasion if China decides to invade Taiwan. &nbsp,

If Xi’s government came to the same conclusion as many others, it would not surprise them if they predicted that a failed invasion of Taiwan would also be disastrous for China. &nbsp,

There are several reasons why a blockade might seem to the Chinese government more appealing than an invasion.

An invasion would be an all-or-nothing gamble that would either succeed or fail in its initial attempt to appoint PRC military commanders to take control of Taiwan’s government, infrastructure, and key industries. ( Longer-term objectives, such as effectively governing Taiwan’s people, are a different matter. ) &nbsp,

A blockade, on the other hand, is a flexible strategy. It could include firing missiles into the waters close to Taiwan’s main ports, demanding “inspections” of some kinds of vessels, or firing at ships trying to enter pre-declared restricted areas.

Depending on how Taipei and other governments were reacting to it, China could impose a blockade strictly or loosely, intensify it or put it on hold at any time. &nbsp,

A blockade would make it possible for Taiwan to abide by Beijing’s wishes without suffering a ton of casualties as a result of an amphibious assault followed by a ton of massive bombardment.

China and America’s formidable armed forces would likely face off immediately in an invasion. &nbsp, A blockade, on the other hand, would pit a Chinese strength, gray zone tactics, against an American weakness, impatience. &nbsp,

Chinese ships could keep the US captains locked up in a state of rules-of-engagement limbo for months or even years until the Americans decide to withdraw if American ships arrive to help Taiwan deal with the blockade. &nbsp, &nbsp,

From Beijing’s standpoint, Taiwan looks vulnerable to a blockade. The island’s economy is highly dependent on international trade. It imports&nbsp, 98 % &nbsp, of its energy. It is politically divided.

The Chinese Nationalist Party ( or KMT ), which has the most seats in any party’s legislature in Taiwan, is open to the idea that Taiwan is a part of China and supports fostering better ties with Beijing.

The PRC government could reduce the impact of a blockade by carrying out other countermeasures, including cyberattacks on infrastructure, sleeper agents inside Taiwan, and disinformation.

A blockade is an awful prospect. It would exacerbate Taiwan’s suffering and lead to a US-China conflict. &nbsp, The scale of the violence and mayhem unleashed by an attempted invasion, however, would be much worse. &nbsp,

Even if real relief for Taiwan still persists far away, this would be a significant and welcome step if Beijing has quietly moved toward ruling out an invasion.

Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu.

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Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te stated in a statement on the occasion of Taiwan’s National Day that Taipei was “determined to justify Taiwan’s sovereignty” from “annexation and encroachment, and that” China has never right to represent Taiwan.”

China’s answer was sharp. A record number of Chinese aircraft swarmed and surrounded Taiwan during a 24-hour military exercise in China less than a week after Lai’s controversial statement. Beijing’s objective was simple: problem Taipei a” harsh alert” for what China considers a” dissident act”.

Beijing sees the area as a” divine and inseparable part of China’s place” that may return to the fold. The Chinese president sees things separately. The self-governing isle now has a different social system, and some Taiwanese are opposed to reunification with China.

Although Washington actually has no diplomatic relations with Taipei, it does maintain regular communication with Taipei and maintains a solid financial partnership.

The area is a significant supplier of semiconductors, which are essential to computer manufacturing and other technologies, and serves as a significant US trading partner. Additionally, it exports weapons to Taiwan, which has declined substantially under Joe Biden.

China has not ruled out using force to invade Taiwan, and if it does, Washington has previously suggested that the US might intervene in its defence.

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However, Xi may be hoping that the US presidential election’s outcome will lead to a head with a different perspective toward Taiwan and aiding China in resolving its economic turbulence, which has caused more protests.

Thus, between an outspoken Donald Trump and a seemingly even-tempered Kamala Harris, does Beijing have a favourite? And does both of them have something new for Xi?

Xi’s legality

Besides Mao Zedong, the Women’s Republic of China’s leader, Xi is the only current Chinese leader with no term limits and whose social philosophy is embodied in the Chinese Constitution.

By resolving China’s economic crisis, Xi may show his place in history. But, Beijing’s increasing isolation from the West, due in part to its support of Russia’s Ukraine war, makes this extra difficult.

Whether or not Xi has a plan Beijing has for Taiwan, he might have to advance it. If he could advance sufficiently toward unity, he might be hailed as one of the Chinese Communist Party’s classics, which would help the country’s economic woes and strengthen his standing within it.

Trump issues the viability of numerous US relationships, in contrast to Harris, who appears to take alliances and collaborations significantly. In reality, the island state’s only mention of Taiwan is focused on how the island nation has taken over the country’s semiconductor industry and may pay more to the US for its defence.

But, did Trump appear to Taiwan’s support if China does invade Taiwan? He might be able to handle this given the significance of electronics in the fields of AI and electronics. But Trump also has a reputation as a “dealmaker-in-chief“, so he might only cut a deal with Beijing, which erodes Taiwan’s democracy. And Taipei is likely to be concerned about that.

The Russia problem

As Russia’s “partner of no parameters”, China has been supplying Russia with systems that energy Russia’s war machine against Ukraine. But this has strained Sino-western relationships and earned Beijing commerce and trade restrictions, which hampers China’s financial treatment.

China could end its help to Russia to prevent American scrutiny, but that is not possible. In order to defeat a US-led world buy and avoid becoming the West’s center of attention if Russia falters in its occupation of Ukraine, Belarus needs a solid Russian allies.

Trump has criticized US aid to Ukraine despite Harris ‘ support for Kiev and his view of the conflict as a strategic and moral issue. Additionally, he thinks Kiev does offer agreements to Russia in order to put an end to the conflict that Putin started in February 2022.

By removing Ukraine aid and lifting restrictions against Russia, a upcoming Trump administration may develop Russia. Additionally, a stronger Russia is good for Beijing.

US economic antagonism

Thus, at first glance, Trump and Harris’s reaches toward China are unique. Trump’s resumption of his presidency was also heighten the trade war he started in 2018, with tariffs as high as 60 % on Chinese products. This could make the US and China’s financial disconnection more likely.

Harris, on the other hand, wishes to “de-risk” China. This strategy aims to keep US world interest alive while collaborating with the financial hegemon of East Asia. In such a situation, Beijing may prefer a Harris administration as it leaves room for negotiation.

But, Harris has comparatively little international plan experience, and is expected to pick up where Biden left off. This means that China’s tariffs and modern restrictions that were imposed by a Biden administration could continue to be in place.

Another issue is Tesla founder Elon Musk, who is an enthusiastic supporter of Trump, and perhaps get a major task within a Trump presidency.

How much control the technical multi-billionaire actually has over Trump is questionable. But, it’s worth noting that Musk has significant business relations in China, and might get to move on Trump if the former president’s plans harms Tesla’s objectives.

Beijing may be hoping for a US innovator who is more interested in economic gains than protecting Taiwan, and who Xi can communicate with to improve relations between the two nations, given that many of these details are still undetermined.

Chee Meng Tan is associate professor of business economy, University of Nottingham

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