From chatbot to sexbot: lessons from Korea’s AI hate-speech fiasco – Asia Times

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The techniques of governing businesses and websites continue to raise ethical and legal issues as artificial intelligence technologies advance at rapid pace.

Many Canadians view proposed laws regulating AI offerings as assaults on free speech and excessive state control over software companies. This reaction has come from free speech activists, right-wing images and liberal thought officials.

However, these critics ought to pay attention to a heartbreaking North Korean circumstance that teaches crucial lessons about the dangers of AI that can be viewed from the perspective of the general public and the crucial need for customer data protection.

In late 2020, Iruda ( or” Lee Luda” ), an AI chatbot, quickly became a sensation in South Korea. Artificial bots are computer initiatives that simulate conversations with people. In this case, the bot was designed as a 21-year-old women school student with a cheerful personality. Marketed as an interesting” AI friend”, Iruda attracted more than 750, 000 people in under a month.

Iruda quickly turned into an ethics case investigation and a tool for addressing South Korea’s lack of data management. Soon, she began to use disturbing language and hold nasty views. The growing trend of online sexual harassment and discrimination was exacerbated and accelerated by the condition.

Making a discriminatory, cruel bot

The tech company that founded Iruda, Scatter Lab, had already created well-known apps that looked at text messages and offered dating advice. The company subsequently used data from those software to teach Iruda’s capabilities in intimate interactions. However, it failed to fully explain to customers how their private messages would be used to teach the robot.

Customers noticed Iruda repeating personal conversations straight from the company’s dating advice applications, which caused the issues. These reactions included curiously true names, credit card information and house names, leading to an investigation.

Additionally, the bot began to express cruel and unfair opinions. This occurred after some people purposefully” trained” it with harmful language, according to studies by internet retailers. On well-known online people’s boards, some consumers even wrote user manuals on how to create Iruda a” sex slave.” Thus, Iruda began answering customer causes with sexist, racist and gendered hate speech.

Poor old Iruda Image: Scatter Lab

This raised important questions about the operations of AI and it firms. Beyond just law and policy, the Iruda event raises questions for AI and it companies. In a wider perspective of North Korean virtual sexual harassment, what transpired with Iruda needs to be considered.

A design of online harassment

North Korean female researchers have documented how online platforms have evolved into staging areas for gender-based issues, with coordinated campaigns aimed at women who speak out on female issues. Social media amplifies these dynamics, creating what researcher in Korea calls “networked misogyny” ( networked misogyny ).

South Korea, home to the radical feminist 4B movement ( which stands for four types of refusal against men: no dating, marriage, sex or children ), provides an early example of the intensified gender-based conversations that are commonly seen online worldwide. According to journalist Hawon Jung, the corruption and abuse that Iruda exposed was the result of existing social conflicts and outdated legal frameworks that refused to address website sexism. Jung has written extensively about the decades-long battle to bring charges against those who use secret monitors and commit revenge video.

Beyond protection: The mortal cost

Of training, Iruda was just one event. Many other instances have been made that show how unchecked and inappropriately omitted applications like AI chatbots may become tools for harassment and abuse.

These include Microsoft’s Tay. ai in 2016, which was manipulated by users to post cruel and racist comments. More recently, a specialty bot on Character. AI was linked to a child’s murder.

Chatbots are uniquely positioned to remove incredibly private information from their customers, making them appear like likeable characters that feel more mortal as technology develops.

These endearing and cordial AI figures best illustrate what technology experts Neda Atanasoski and Kalindi Vora refer to as the rationale of” surrogate society,” in which AI systems are intended to replace human interaction but end up exacerbate existing social inequalities.

AI morals

In South Korea, Iruda’s shutdown sparked a national conversation about AI morals and data rights. The government responded by creating new AI guidelines and fining Scatter Lab 103 million won (US$71,000).

Chea Yun Jung and Kyun Kyong Joo, two Asian legal scholars, note that these procedures focused more on self-regulation in the technology sector than on more fundamental structural problems. The steps did not address how profound learning systems used by predatory adult users to spread gender-based rage and misogynist beliefs.

Unfortunately, looking at AI rules as a business issue is simply not enough. Feminist and community-based viewpoints are necessary for holding technology companies guilty because of the method these chatbots extract personal data and establish relationships with people users.

Scatter Lab has collaborated with experts to show the advantages of bots since this occurrence.

A more recent type of Iruda is displayed below. Image: Scatter Lab

In Canada, the proposed Artificial Intelligence and Data Act and Online Harms Act are still being shaped, and the limitations of what constitutes a “high-impact” Artificial system remain unknown.

American policymakers must find frameworks that both safeguard development and prevent systemic abuse from developers and vile users. This entails developing explicit rules for data consent, putting in place safeguards to prevent abuse, and putting together valuable accountability standards.

These aspects will only get more important as AI becomes more and more prevalent in daily life. The Iruda event demonstrates that when it comes to AI regulation, we must consider the very real people effects of these technologies in addition to professional specifications.

At the University of Toronto, Jul Parke is pursuing a PhD in advertising, systems, and lifestyle.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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When Trump talks to Putin about Ukraine – Asia Times

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The date of February 12, 2025, will forever be remembered as the day the NATO-Russian substitute war in Ukraine actually ended.

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth started everything off by&nbsp, declaring&nbsp, that: Ukraine didn’t visit NATO, the US doesn’t think that Ukraine is regain its pre-2014 borders, the US hasn’t deploy troops to the conflict zone, the US wants the Europeans to assume some peacekeeping responsibilities it otherwise, but the US didn’t extend Article 5 guarantees to Union forces there.

Donald Trump, US President Donald Trump, and Vladimir Putin, Russian President, spoke for the first time since the former took office. Trump called Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky to brief and likely coerce him as he allegedly promised Putin, and they agreed to start peace talks right away.

Trump also&nbsp, suggested&nbsp, that he’ll soon meet Putin in Saudi Arabia and that each of them might then visit each other’s countries as part of the peace process. Here are some briefings that cover the larger picture:

* January 3:” Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal“

* January 17:” The Merits Of A Demilitarized’ Trans-Dnieper ‘ Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers”

* February 3:” Territorial Concessions Could Precede A Ceasefire That Will Lead To New Ukrainian Elections”

* February 4:” Trump’s Interest In Ukraine’s Rare Earth Minerals Might Backfire On Zelensky”

* February 7:” Trump’s Special Envoy Shed More Light On His Boss ‘ Ukrainian Peace Plan”

A dozen compromises are suggested for each side in the first analysis of creative energy diplomacy to advance their negotiations. In fact, the policy per Hegseth is that the US should not grant Article 5 guarantees to EU forces in Ukraine, so it’s possible that some others will follow.

Additionally, Trump just remarked about&nbsp, how unpopular Zelensky has become, which suggests that he’s planning the “phased leadership transition” via new elections as was also proposed in that piece.

Which of these additional suggestions might soon become US policy, with the same being said for the ones that Russia might put into practice, such as agreeing to a few restrictions on its side of the DMZ that will likely be put in place by the end of this process.

What are the five main issues that will affect the outcome of Russian-US peace talks with Ukraine’s leaders, diplomats, and any experts who might be invited to participate in the initiative through Track II talks:

* Territorial parameters

Where will the new Russian-Ukrainian border fall next, and that is the most urgent issue that needs to be resolved. Hegseth’s suggestion that Trump might coerce Zelensky into resuming its territorial conflict in Ukraine suggests that his forces might fall as far as Zaporizhzhia city as a result of his remarks about Ukraine’s inability to restore its pre-2014 border. It’s unlikely at this time that Russia would be able to control that city and the parts of its new western Dnieper.

That’s because Trump might not want to take the flak that would follow giving Russia a city of over 700, 000 whose residents didn’t vote in September 2022’s referendum. West of the river, in particular, are included in Russia’s new regions.

Instead, he might suggest a UN-supervised referendum to resolve this aspect of their territorial dispute once the fighting has stopped, while also allowing Russia to keep formally claiming those areas. That might be enough pragmatism for Putin to concur.

* DMZ terms &amp, peacekeeper roles

The DMZ’s terms and the role of the peacekeepers who would likely be deployed there after this are the next two issues to be addressed.

Hegseth’s claim that the US won’t grant Article 5 guarantees to EU forces could deter them from playing a significant role, which would require the UNSC resolution to approve, in any case, per Permanent Representative Vasily Nebenzia, because they’ll be legitimate targets. Non-Western ones are thus much more agreeable.

As it turns out, the majority of UN peacekeepers are from non-Western nations, so they could potentially be deployed there under a UN Security Council mandate, according to Nebenzia’s suggestion, and possibly even lead to the total exclusion of any Western peacekeepers if it’s decided that none will contribute to this mission.

It’s unclear exactly what they will be able to or not do, but that directly leads to the next issue because their terms would have to be acceptable to both Russia and the US for this resolution to pass.

* Demilitarization &amp, denazification

Two of Russia’s main goals in its&nbsp,” special&nbsp, operation” &nbsp, are to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, which it initially sought to do by militarily coercing Ukraine into this per the terms established in&nbsp, spring 2022’s draft peace treaty, though that didn’t succeed due to the UK&nbsp, and Poland.

It’s unthinkable to think that Trump will permit Russia to deploy its armed forces throughout the entirety of Ukraine in order to accomplish this, since it can only be accomplished through similar diplomatic means involving Kyiv’s consent.

UN peacekeepers might have a role to play in monitoring and putting into action any final agreements made to demilitarize and denounce Ukraine. This could include inspecting suspected illegal arms sites and all of Ukraine’s cross-border traffic ( including at its ports ), as well as having the authority to require changes to its media coverage and curriculum.

After the conflict is over, Ukraine will only be able to remain demilitarized and denazified in this way.

* Sanctions relief

Russia has repeatedly demanded the lifting of all Western sanctions, but the argument can be made that “deal-master” Trump wouldn’t ever agree to do this all at once, instead preferring to draft a plan for phased sanctions relief as a reward for Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, armistice or peace treaty.

This might take the form of the suggestion that some Russian exports to the EU could resume in the first phase as a trust-building measure.

Russia’s policymakers might decide that a phased plan is preferable to accept if that’s all Trump is comfortable offering rather than nothing at all, even though Russia would prefer that they all be immediately lifted.

Trump would do well, though, to engage in the goodwill gesture of lifting sanctions on Russia’s oil exports by sea, too, since that could convince Moscow’s policymakers that he’s serious about relieving pressure on Russia. Putin would be able to sell the deal on phased sanctions relief at home in part because of this.

* New security architecture

According to the security guarantee requests it shared with them at the time, Russia considered drafting a new European security architecture through bilateral agreements with the US and NATO in December 2021.

In retrospect, these were intended to diplomatically address their security difficulty, which was fueled by NATO’s continued expansion eastward following the Old Cold War, particularly its clandestine expansion into Ukraine, in place of the special operation that Putin had secretly planned when that failed.

Since that time, separate, comprehensive discussions on this must begin right after any agreement they reach on Ukraine. The new issues include NATO’s eastern military buildup, Finland and Sweden’s new memberships, Russia’s hypersonic&nbsp, Oreshniks, their&nbsp, deployment to Belarus, Russia ‘s&nbsp, deployment of nukes there too, the&nbsp, future of the New START&nbsp, that expires next year and the&nbsp, new space arms race, et al. Agreeing on a new security architecture will, therefore, stabilize the world.

The path to success will undoubtedly be very difficult because Russia and the US must resolve some contentious issues, but their leaders have shown that they are willing to negotiate in good faith.

Given the circumstances, neither side is likely to accomplish their full goals, but diplomacy is the art of the possible, and each will do everything in their power to accomplish this goal. In the best case scenario, there will be a just and lasting solution that will truly address the root causes at the heart of the conflict.

This&nbsp, article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Japan goes for broke with trillion Trump bet – Asia Times

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In an effort to prevent slowing China’s expansion and recession, Japan Inc.’s foreign direct investment in the US reached a record substantial of US$ 77.3 billion in 2024.

However, as Japan tries to protect itself from an even bigger financial string, Donald Trump’s business battle wrath as the US senator makes Asia the first stop on his tax punishment journey, America hasn’t seen anything yet.

Shigeru Ishiba, the prime minister of Japan, announced last week that his country would invest about$ 1 trillion in the US from$ 783 billion at the start of 2024.

To set that titanically huge number in view, it’s almost the same amount of Tokyo’s US Treasury security assets. And it raises a clear question: Does Japan Inc. truly believe the US market is a purchase, or are CEOs handing over the business equivalent of ransom money in hopes that Trump’s 2.0 president doesn’t devastate them?

Chances are, it’s far more the latter than the previous. Japan is right in the middle of the collateral damage territory, despite the fact that Trump’s tax arms race is primarily focused on China. And Ishiba’s Oval Office attend on February 7 served as a reminder of the dangers of trusting” Trumponomics”.

As Ishiba flew up from Washington, he claimed to have a “deal” with Trump on Nippon Steel’s effort to acquire US Steel. Team Ishiba purchased the business in exchange for a share of the classic American firm, giving them exclusive ownership of the business. Now, that assumption seems more roll than fact.

Trump basically made the teasing of the Nippon-US Steel deal seem linguistic rather than concrete when he was seated next to Ishiba in the White House. Nippon, he said, is “going to do a great investment. I didn’t want]US Steel ] purchased, but investment I love. I’m fine with it, positive”.

Nevertheless, Ishiba’s nation seems okay with a 22 % increase in Japan’s 2023-level bet on the US. Chinese companies are eying opportunities in sectors including semiconductors, unnatural intelligence, autos and vehicles products, liquefied natural gas, chemicals, manufacturing-related research and development, system, funding and others.

Despite Trump 2.0 throwing a wrecking ball at the economic scaffolding that keep it on the street, it does so. Trump’s policies may have a negative impact on America’s credit rating because of how he wants to lower taxes, abuse the rule of law, and obstruct the US Federal Reserve’s democracy.

Elon Musk and his group of it bros, who are Tesla billionaires, may also reduce confidence in US assets by allowing them to demolish government structures and entry sensitive data. Especially after learning that Musk and his supporters had access to the federal payments program, Scott Bessent, the novel Treasury Secretary, was reportedly viewed as a moderating power in MAGA Land.

In a new New York Times op-ed, five former Treasury leaders raised” large cause for concern” that Washington’s economic agreements and procedures may be “unlawfully” undermined. Any tinge of the selective expulsion of congressionally authorized payments may constitute a breach of trust and, in the end, a default. And our trust, once lost, may prove hard to regain”, they argued.

Bottom line:” No Treasury Secretary in their first weeks in office should be put in the position where it is necessary to reassure the nation and the world of our payment system or our commitment to make good on our financial obligations,” Bessent’s predecessors warn.

For today, Ishiba’s government is focused on the good. In his efforts to protect Japan from Trump’s taxes, Ishiba stressed that his nation is already the nation’s biggest US trader. Not just in US Treasuries, but also the biggest investment in corporate America for five decades.

” Japan is the closest financial partner of the United States”, Ishiba said. Toyota and Isuzu, two of Japan’s biggest automakers, are making ambitious plans for fresh US manufacturer construction, according to Ishiba. Additionally, he promised a significant increase in LNG payments.

All of this is in line with SoftBank’s incredible funding strategies for the US. Over the next four years, CEO Masayoshi Son says he’ll invest at least$ 100 billion into the US. Many of these opportunities will be synthetic intelligence-related, winning pursuit with a White House good to have the approach of China’s DeepSeek AI business.

But the measurement that most hobbies Trump is Tokyo’s trade deficit. Trump pressed Japan to close its$ 100 billion trade pact with Washington last week when the US leader sat down with Ishiba.

As last year’s tete-a-tete wrapped away, Trump told investigators he’d be prepared to smack tariffs on Tokyo if the deficit isn’t reversed. Team Trump makes hints as to add a punctuation to the point that the US currently enjoys a trade deficit with Australia, which will be subject to recently imposed 25 % metal tariffs.

The Liberal Democratic Party’s deficit continues to be a significant issue. A weak yen has been the ruling LDP’s most steady economic plan over the past 25 years, making Asian returns mostly export-driven affairs.

Enter Trump, whose administration is already objecting to Japan’s underwhelming imports.

Given the economic risks, Ishiba’s$ 1 trillion pledge sounds more like an insurance against high tariffs than assurance that the US will be a welcome investment destination once Trump 2.0 leaves in 2029.

” While Japan may not avoid all the effects of future US tariff policies, Tokyo may avoid the targeted treatment seen with countries like Canada, Mexico, and China”, James Brady, vice president of Teneo, said in a Saturday note.

Because it appears to enjoy the status of one of Trump’s most favored nations, it may even hope for more lenient trade treatment than other major economies.

The Bank of Japan is tightening its grip on inflation, much of it caused by a weak exchange rate, thining the plot. Unsettling both households and businesses are the highest short-term rates in 17 years.

The rising cost of borrowing is also having a chilling impact on business sentiment. That might undermine government efforts to accelerate wage growth. Or, at the very least, ensure that wage gains keep pace with the rate of inflation.

All of this leaves Japan with a number of already-existing issues that will affect the upcoming Trumpian storm. Retail sales are soft even before Trump’s broader trade war arrives. And the 10 % levies Trump&nbsp, has slapped on China so far could be but a taste of what’s to come.

Had Ishiba’s party acted urgently to reduce bureaucracy, incentivize a startup boom, modernize labor markets, empower women or increase productivity, Japan might be less vulnerable to Trump’s trade war.

Tokyo is beginning to realize that 25 plus years of zero rates have turned out badly because of this last obstacle. The real monetary fireworks started in 2013, despite the BOJ’s experimentation with zero rates dating back to 1999.

The government urged the BOJ to launch its quantitative easing experiment in a different direction that year. Through exchange-traded funds, the BOJ actively hoarded government bonds and stocks. By 2018, &nbsp, the&nbsp, BOJ’s balance sheet&nbsp, topped&nbsp, the&nbsp, size of Japan’s annual gross domestic product ( GDP ).

Trouble is, the resulting plunge in&nbsp, the&nbsp, yen &nbsp, is now coming back to haunt Tokyo.

” A weaker yen means it takes more yen to buy the same amount of food or oil as before”, says Richard&nbsp, Katz, author of” The Contest for Japan’s Economic Future”. Imported inflation, according to the report, “has caused political pressure to try to stop the yen from weakening even more” ( poena ).

It also deadened&nbsp, the&nbsp, urgency&nbsp, for lawmakers to level playing fields and increase competitiveness. It took pressure off corporate CEOs to innovate, restructure, disrupt and boost productivity.

The International Monetary Fund claims that Japan’s economy’s overall factor productivity growth has been sluggish for ten years and has fallen even further behind the United States in its most recent assessment of the country. Productivity has been hampered by a steady decline in allocative efficiency since the early 2000s, which most likely reflects an increase in market frictions.

What’s more, the IMF notes,” Japan’s ultra-low interest rates may have allowed low-productivity firms to survive longer than they otherwise would have, delaying necessary economic restructuring. Improved labor mobility across companies would improve Japan’s overall efficiency and productivity.

However, it’s unclear how much political capital Ishiba has to reinvigorate the reform process with his&nbsp, approval ratings in the 30s. Or, to convince Trump he’s a worthy sparring partner.

” Ishiba’s weak political standing may also be a liability, as Trump tends to respect strong leaders”, says David Boling, an analyst at Eurasia Group, a risk consultancy.

Boling notes that Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister from 2012 to 2020, “enjoyed comfortable majorities in the national parliament when he was prime minister, so he could negotiate with Trump from a position of political strength, but&nbsp, Ishiba&nbsp, does not enjoy that luxury”.

As Japan’s economy runs into fresh headwinds, accelerating the structural upgrade process will become more and more important.

Not surprisingly, Ishiba’s Trade Minister Yoji Muto is lobbying Trump World for a pass on Washington’s 25 % taxes on steel and aluminum. Yet Tokyo’s real challenge may be getting past Trump’s trade advisors, led by anti-globalization activist Peter Navarro.

Navarro contends that the US aluminum market is being harmed by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s economy, despite Trump’s hints that Australia might be granted a waiver. ” Australia is just killing our aluminum market”, Navarro told CNN. ” President Trump says no, no, we’re not, we’re not doing that anymore”.

All this uncertainty could leave Japan Inc&nbsp, pledging big US-based investments with buyers ‘ remorse. The consumer price index increased by 0.5 %, increasing the annual inflation rate by 3 %, as US inflation increased once more in January.

” This is not a good number”, says economist Brian Coulton at Fitch Ratings. It shows how the Federal Reserve is still working to reduce inflation as new risks from tariff increases and labor supply growth squeeze new levels emerge.

It will undoubtedly make hopes that the Fed will cut interest rates in 2025 more difficult. In fact, it supports the claim that the Fed is more likely to tighten than relax next.

This makes things even more disorienting in corporate boardrooms in Tokyo and New York. Japanese leaders might have more trouble making good on US investment pledges as the year progresses and economic trajectories turn sour.

Case in point: Son’s SoftBank swinging to a surprising$ 2.4 billion loss in the October-December quarter as its Vision Fund investment went awry. It prompted fresh concerns about Son’s ability to fulfill his commitments to invest$ 500 billion in the Stargate AI project, which Trump announced last month at a glittering White House event.

The news led Fitch company CreditSights to downgrade SoftBank’s US dollar and Eurobonds to “underperform” from “market perform”. As CreditSights analyst Mary Pollock puts it,” we think there’s more scope for downside, as]SoftBank Group ] is clearly willing and able to ramp investment” by resorting to project finance funding strategies.

For now, Ishiba’s economy has a decent US investment story to sell Trump. Toyota Tsusho, a division of Toyota Motor, is building a roughly$ 14 billion battery factory in North Carolina that could start shipping in April. Honda Motor plans to start producing electric vehicles in the US soon and is investing$ 1 billion in upgrading its Ohio production facility.

Resonac Holdings, a Japanese materials maker, is eyeing land in Silicon Valley to assemble cutting-edge chips. This year, Sumitomo Chemical will start a mass production facility in Texas to put itself at the forefront of the newly revitalized US chipmaking supply chains.

Nissin Foods Holdings, the world’s largest instant ramen company, will open its first new US factory in almost 50 years in August. By the end of the year, soybean-soy sauce snob Kikkoman plans to begin shipping from Wisconsin.

And so on, and so on. The question, of course, is whether the macroeconomic trajectory of the US can stay on the rails these next four years. Markets might not cooperate as Trump and Musk upend government agencies and cause chaos.

A US national debt of up to$ 36 trillion is at a time when Trump threatens to veer off the Fed’s mandate, slack the dollar, and impose a wave of tariffs that the world’s financial system might not anticipate.

Japan Inc. can run, hide and try to limit the fallout. But no Asian economy, friend or foe, can likely escape the Trump 2.0 onslaught on free trade to come.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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The silver linings in Trump’s trade war storm clouds – Asia Times

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Trade colleagues including China, Canada, Mexico, and the US fast experienced waves of punitive measures as a result of US taxes, both threatened and imposed. The latest commodities in the sights of President Donald Trump are steel and aluminum – with&nbsp, tariffs of 25 % &nbsp, announced for all imports.

But not only do these fees destroy well-established trade flows, they ignite problems over the very prospect of modernization.

But amid this doubt, it’s possible that there may be a silver lining. Trump may unintentionally become opening the door for the creation of new financial blocs and a restructuring of trade relationships. These assistance opportunities could lead to stronger, locally focused economic assistance.

The underlying principles of the weight type of trade are undermined by Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on its main trading partners. This theory claims that trade between two countries is generally affected by their financial size and proximity.

For example, introducing tariffs to the US and Canada’s near economic relationship, which is supported by their shared border, essentially reduces bilateral trade in terms of costs and volume.

However, these problems can unwittingly encourage the growth of business relationships. Companies and governments may begin looking for new markets and other supply chains as they try to reduce the risks posed by tariffs. This could eventually result in a more distributed and, possibly, more secure global trade system.

However, as Trump continues to exercise his legal authority, he is beginning to realize that it is not always so simple to defy weight. Now, the president has dialed down levies on Canada and Mexico, while China has struck again with punitive actions.

The consolidation of local partnerships might be a positive outcome of the trade war. Nations are increasingly encouraged to develop relationships with surrounding economy as traditional business moves are disrupted.

North American view

The US has much viewed Canada and Mexico as their normal trading partners, and they may cooperate to expand their economic cooperation. They might even look into pursuing new industry, strengthening ties with China and Japan, and pursuing bilateral treaties with other partners.

The USMCA ( United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement ) provides a strong foundation for trade. However, attempts to break up this arrangement was cause Canada and Mexico to accelerate efforts to consolidate economic ties with different regions, lowering their exposure to the US market.

YouTube video

]embedded articles]

Trump makes his ideas for imposing massive metal tariffs on “everyone.”

Trump’s proposed steel tariffs have the potential to destroy the USMCA.

After all, it is intended to promote low-tariff economic assistance among the three nations and integrated supply stores. This is likely to worsen trade tensions across the bloc, causing the vital terms of the trade agreement to be revised, and destabilizing existing relationships.

The EU’s taxes may encourage more regional integration, according to the EU’s member states. The EU may expand initiatives aimed at harmonising regulations, promoting intra-European supply chains, and responding to new pressures from the US.

Member state, with France at the forefront, are now advocating for a united reaction to counter US protectionism. They want to show that they are willing to put pressure on Trump with a powerful political will.

China, as the world’s second-largest business behind the US, may get to increase its business associations in the Asia-Pacific area and above. As China’s economic development model is export-led, it does get stronger partnerships with local players and invest in new business contracts. This might lead to an even more diverse Eastern financial area.

A fresh economic get

Whatever else occurs, these price war indicate a reorganization of the world’s economy. For disruptions, though terrible in the short term, can produce long-term changes that rebalance financial systems.

The normal trading partner assumption confirms this view by highlighting how nations with similar cultural, historical, and geographic relationships are more likely to enhance their economic relations in the face of external surprises.

Tables of US business

table showing Canada and Mexico as biggest importers into US
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis ( 2025 ) Author provided

Traditional powers may find themselves battling off consolidated responses from other countries in this new world order. By imposing taxes, the US runs the risk of isolating itself from these emerging alliances, and its main trading partners may come together to try to counteract rising American protectionism.

The impact of the US price dispute has important implications for global trade networks, going beyond the countries that are directly affected. For the UK, currently coping with the aftermath of Brexit, this new culture offers both problems and opportunities.

The UK could profit from the disruption of US-led isolationism by forging stronger relationships with the Union and looking deeper into its Commonwealth relationships.

It may strengthen its standing as a gateway for global trade while preserving its partnership with the US. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and managing Trump are expected to be in business for four times, so it is a delicate balancing act.

A word of caution: the negotiation of international trade agreements takes time and effort. The UK has learned a valuable lessons from this. Its trade with the EU ( its most important commercial partner ) shrank after Brexit, driving the quest for new trading partners and agreements. But these crops are slower to occur.

The UK signed the accession process in July 2023, but the country officially requested it in February of that year.

And remember that after two years of negotiations, the UK and Canada stopped their trade talks in 2024 because there were differences over the requirements for some agricultural goods.

Levies come with difficulties, but they could also represent the start of a gradual, painful transition toward a more healthy and strong international economic order.

Scott Mahadeo is senior teacher in Macroeconomics, University of Portsmouth, Gabriella Legrenzi is senior lecturer in finance, Keele University, and Reinhold Heinlein is senior lecturer in finance, University of the West of England

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Chinese media in a good news, soft power push into Africa – Asia Times

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The minister of foreign affairs of China embarks on a typical odyssey across Africa every year. The custom began in the late 1980s, when Beijing’s top diplomat traveled to many African countries to restate relationships.

The most recent attend, by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, took place in mid-January 2025 and included starts in Namibia, the Republic of the Congo, Chad and Nigeria.

China’s burgeoning impact in Africa was exemplified by fantastic displays of structural might for more than 20 years. From Nairobi’s gleaming buildings to wide ships dotting the country’s shores, China’s opportunities on the globe have surged, reaching over US$ 700 billion by 2023 under the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s massive global infrastructure development plan.

Beijing has, however, attempted to go beyond just streets and skyscrapers and create a play for American people’s hearts and minds. With a clever mixture of reasoning, power and money, Beijing has turned to American internet as a potential pipeline for its political ambitions.

Partnering with local retailers and journalist-training efforts, China has expanded its press footprints in Africa. Its goal? To alter perceptions and establish Beijing as a supplier of resources and assistance as well as a model for development and management.

With proof that some sections of the media give positive coverage of China, the ploy seems to be paying off. However, as people looking into the impact of China’s effect abroad, I’m beginning to hear negative reporting from pro-Beijing countries.

Media beauty rude

China’s policy toward Africa is largely driven by its use of” sweet power,” which is demonstrated by things like the media and cultural programs. Beijing presents this as “win-win assistance” – a ultimate Chinese political phrase mixing collaboration with ethnic politics.

Key to China’s media approach in Africa are two institutions: the China Global Television Network ( CGTN) Africa and Xinhua News Agency.

CGTN Africa, which was set up in 2012, offers a Chinese perspective on American media. The system produces content in several languages, including English, French and Swahili, and its insurance frequently portrays Beijing as a creative partner, reporting on infrastructure projects, trade agreements and social initiatives. Also, Xinhua News Agency, China’s position news agency, today boasts 37 departments on the globe.

By contrast, American media existence in Africa remains relatively limited. The BBC, much inserted due to the United Kingdom’s colonial legacy, also maintains a huge footprints among foreign outlets, but its influence is generally historic rather than expanding.

And as American internet influence in Africa has plateaued, China’s state-backed internet has grown rapidly. The online site is a particularly impacted by this expansion. On Twitter, for instance, CGTN Africa commands a remarkable 4.5 million followers, greatly outpacing CNN Africa, which has 1.2 million — a striking signal of China’s growing soft power reach.

China’s zero-tariff trade policy with 33 African countries showcases how it uses economic policies to mold perceptions. And state-supported media outlets like CGTN Africa and Xinhua are essential to highlighting these initiatives and promoting China’s status as a benevolent partner.

Stories of an “all-weather” or steadfast China-Africa partnership are broadcast widely, and the coverage frequently depicts the grand nature of Chinese infrastructure projects. Amid this glowing coverage, the labor disputes, environmental devastation or debt traps associated with some Chinese-built infrastructure are less likely to make headlines.

Questions of media veracity notwithstanding, China’s strategy is bearing fruit. China’s approval ratings in Africa increased as a result of a Gallup poll from April 2024, as US ratings dropped. Afrobarometer, a pan-African research organization, further reports that public opinion of China in many African countries is positively glowing, an apparent validation of China’s discourse engineering.

Further, studies have shown that pro-Beijing media influences perceptions. According to a survey of Zimbabweans conducted in 2023, those who were exposed to the Chinese media were more likely to have a favorable opinion of Beijing’s economic activities there.

Three people hold hands on stage.
China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, center, holds hands with his counterparts, Senegal’s Yassine Fall, left, and the Republic of the Congo’s Jean-Claude Gakosso, after a joint news conference. Photo: AP via The Conversation / Andy Wong

Co-opting local voices

The integration of local media is a clear indication of China’s media strategy’s effectiveness. Through content-sharing agreements, African outlets have disseminated Beijing’s editorial line and stories from Chinese state media, often without the due diligence of journalistic skepticism.

Meanwhile, StarTimes, a Chinese media company, delivers a steady stream of curated depictions of translated Chinese movies, TV shows and documentaries across 30 countries in Africa.

However, China is not just pushing its point through African channels. It’s also taking a lead role in training African journalists, thousands of whom have been lured by all-expenses-paid trips to China under the guise of “professional development“. On such junkets, they receive training that critics say obscures the distinction between skill-building and propaganda, presenting them with perspectives conforming to Beijing’s line.

Ethiopia exemplifies how Beijing’s media and infrastructure investments have largely contributed to a favorable perception of the country. State media outlets, often staffed by journalists trained in Chinese-run programs, consistently frame China’s role as one of selfless partnership.

The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line is one of the highlights of the project’s benefits, but reports on the subpar labor conditions associated with them are ignored. This is a strategy that is consistent with Ethiopia’s media landscape, where state-run outlets prioritize economic development stories and heavily rely on Xinhua as the main news source.

Chinese oil companies in Angola extract a lot of resources and invest billions in infrastructure projects. The local media frequently portrays Sino-Angolan relations in glowing terms, once again regularly staffed by journalists who have accepted invitations to travel to China.

In the name of common development, allegations of corruption, the displacement of local communities, and environmental degradation are relegated to side notes.

War for Africa’s media soul

Despite all of the Chinese influence, media perspectives in Africa are far from uniformly pro-Beijing.

In Kenya, voices of dissent are beginning to rise, and media professionals immune to Beijing’s allure are probing the true costs of Chinese financial undertakings. Media watchdogs in South Africa are raising alarms by pointing out a gradual decline in press freedoms that comes with growth and prosperity.

In Ghana, concerns about Chinese media influence are more permeated than the journalism industry, as officials have expressed concerns about the impact of Chinese media cooperation agreements. When local journalists started reporting that Chinese-produced content was being prioritized over domestic stories in state media, the heightened vigor in Ghana became even more apparent.

A significant countervailing force exists that challenges uncritical representations and pursues rigorous journalism beneath the surface of China’s well-known projects and media offerings, and the African nations or organizations that embrace Beijing’s line.

However, as CGTN Africa and Xinhua become established in the media ecosystems of Africa, a pressing issue arises: Will journalists and journalists be able to uphold their impartiality and maintain intellectual independence?

As China continues to make strategic inroads in Africa, it’s a fair question.

Mitchell Gallagher is PhD candidate in political science, Wayne State University

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Will Gaza ceasefire hold? Will Trump’s ‘takeover’ happen? – Asia Times

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The likelihood of the peace agreement making its way to its appointed second stage on March 1 seems exceedingly unlikely as the deadline for the finish of phase one of the agreement between Israel and Hamas approaches. Middle East professional, Scott Lucas, addresses the important concerns.

What are the probabilities of the peace continuing through period two?

An arrangement to move from step one to step two at the start of March was a far-fetched chance yet before Donald Trump’s request for the opening and restoration of Gaza, which would amount to ethnic cleaning.

We were close to missing a second period. Netanyahu, the leader of Israel, had been holding out for times against a deal, and two hard-right officials, Bezalel Smotrich, the minister of finance, and Ben-Gvir, the chancellor, were pressuring him to back down.

In the end, Netanyahu agreed because of the pressure from Hamas ‘ hostage-taking individuals and a response from Trump’s minister Steve Witkoff.

Ben-Gvir left while Smotrich remained in the government, but his party declared it would continue to support the government. Yet, both demanded that there be no second step. They&nbsp, called instead&nbsp, for martial action to eliminate Hamas and the relocation of the populace of Gaza– volunteer or then.

The Israeli government is supposed to completely leave Gaza in the coming days while Arab rule is restored in the Strip. Hamas will refuse to step down from energy and Israel and the US does require that Hamas step down. However, Israelis may ask Hamas leaders to step down.

Trump’s need for an ending of “occupation” of Gaza, not by the Israelis but by Gazans, confirmed the fate of the process. There is no possibility that Hamas diplomats will agree to a” option” in which most, if not all, people are evicted.

That is why Trump, using the excuse of Hamas barrier of step one, stopped portraying himself as a “peacemaker” on Monday. Otherwise, he proclaimed:” All bets are off and let heaven tear out” — in consequence, returning to a blank search for Israel’s military actions, siege of humanitarian aid, and mass killing across Gaza.

Does Donald Trump have any intention of revitalizing Gaza?

Some media outlets have acted carelessly by discrediting Trump’s comments by implying that he is not severe or that his remarks are” thinking outside the box” with their outrageous statements.

Trump’s request for “development” of Gaza, clearing out the people, was not just a thought bubbles. In his first name, he frequently spoke of North Korea’s “great seashores” and “waterfront home” as a perfect place for flats and hotels.

In March 2024, his son-in-law Jared Kushner turned to the Middle East, saying:” Gaza’s waterfront property could be very useful … From Israel’s standpoint, I would do my best to move the folks out and then clean it up”.

The Trump administration requested Joseph Pelzman, a teacher of financial and international politics at George Washington University, to come up with a plan for the Strip next summer. He put it in perspective by saying,” You have to destroy the entire area, you have to resume from scrape.” It requires that the location be completely emptied out. I mean, actually emptied out”.

Trump was telling reporters that the “demolition page” should be evacuated from Gaza’s civilians within a year of his White House visit on January 20. Only over a week later, alongside Netanyahu, he expanded on the charter – apparently in a statement written by Kushner.

How about foreign rules?

Trump’s plan clearly violates international law. The Geneva standards forbid citizens from being transferred outside of their country unless it is “impossible” to do otherwise.

UN official Stéphane Dujarric told writers:” Any forced movement of individuals is equivalent to tribal cleansing”.

However, the Trump presidency doesn’t seem to care about international laws at all. Trump signed an executive order granting the International Criminal Court two weeks after his look with Netanyahu.

In fact, the leadership doesn’t think there should be any legal monitoring in the US. As Trump and Elon Musk attempt to destroy US agencies, with large firings and seizure of records that may be illegal and illegitimate, the US vice-president, J. D. Vance, maintains:” Judges aren’t allowed to handle the executive’s genuine power”.

Trump, demanding the impeachment of a judge who ruled against the unauthorized access to records, said:” No judge should, frankly, be allowed to make that kind of a decision”.

Does the US have the necessary backing to accomplish this?

Absolutely not, especially if Trump tries to fulfill his pledge that the US should “own” Gaza. Apart from Israel, no country has given support to Trump’s proposal. And most Americans, even Trump backers, would be loath to have “ownership” which required intervention by US troops.

The nations Trump wants to send Palestinians to are vehemently opposed to. Within hours of Trump’s February 4 statement, he got a firm rebuttal from Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh cited” the Kingdom’s firm and supportive positions on the Palestinian people’s rights” and emphasized its recent shift to “firm and unwavering” support of a Palestinian state.

Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s position was confirmed by the foreign ministry, who also cited his phone call with Jordan’s King Abdullah as a sign of unity. After Netanyahu said the Saudis “have plenty of territory” for a Palestinian state, Riyadh denounced the “extremist, occupying mentality” that seeks to expel Palestinians from Gaza.

Egyptian Foreign Minister&nbsp, Badr Abdelatty&nbsp, told US Secretary of State&nbsp, Marco Rubio&nbsp, on Monday in Washington that Arab states rejected Trump’s pitch. Abdelatty emphasized the necessity of Palestinian reconstruction in Gaza while ensuring that no one was killed there.

‘ We may be sending some guests your way ‘: Donald Trump greets Jordan’s King Abdullah at the White House, February 11, 2025. Image: The Conversation

And, on the eve of King Abdullah’s visit to Washington, Jordan expressed its “rejection of any attempts to annex land and displace the Palestinians”.

How do you anticipate this to change over the coming months?

Trump and the Israelis will now turn their attention to Hamas as an existential threat that cannot be included in a phase two ceasefire.

Phase one is scheduled to end on March 1. I anticipate that Israel will resume its long-running conflict in Gaza, probably sooner.

And Trump, who only recently presented himself as a “peacemaker”, will give unconditional backing – while bemoaning that Gazans, up to 90 % of them displaced from their homes, still won’t leave the Strip.

Scott Lucas is professor of international politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Does Tesla’s slump owe to Musk’s behavior? – Asia Times

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Elon Musk’s apparently solid upward drift has led to actions and statements that have sparked a lot of controversy over the past couple of years. Musk, the revolutionary leader of X Corp. and the CEO of Tesla, SpaceX, is a person attempting to bring people to Mars. Additionally, he is the wealthiest person on the planet.

Most recently, these controversies include his endorsement and support of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) party, gestures interpreted as a Nazi salute during Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration and accusations of election interference.

In January, profits of Tesla vehicles slumped across five Western countries – the UK, France, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands. California, the state with the largest car market in the US, saw profits decline as well. And Musk and his politics, in at least one review, might be a major contributor to the issue.

When Directors are in the public eye, their private companies and beliefs, and those of the firms they represent, can be hard to distinguish. Our research has discovered that frequently, the CEO’s brand identity and popularity will be impacted by the person’s popularity and reputation, and vice versa.

As a human being, Musk’s specific actions and statements directly impact the corporations he represents. His public image makes it difficult to tell the two apart due to his high profile.

Some Tesla customers have turned off by Musk’s controversial remarks and political endorsements, specially in progressive markets like California and Europe.

In these locations, Tesla has previously been famous with environmentally conscious consumers. When a CEO’s patterns and his or her product don’t align, this can compromise the company benefit of both the CEO and the business.

Artists, officials, CEOs and other public figures tend to attract viewers whose personal values is at times depart from those of the leader. Where this occurs, devoted followers could be at a loss as to how to react to these numbers or the goods of the individuals or organizations they are associated with.

A popular misconception is that fascinated fans are also obsessed with expressing their dislike. Instead, they are more likely to acquiesce ferociously and defend their champions ‘ deeds. Intense deeds of “fan forces” on social media platforms have certainly helped with these beliefs.

But in truth, our research has shown that devoted fans may be important. We found that more than less committed consumers are more likely than not to react in severe criticism when they feel betrayed by the actions of people they associate with or hold dearly dear.

Devoted fans and consumers could react in a variety of ways to personalities like Musk, whose businesses produce physical goods. Some obstinate Tesla supporters and supporters may dismiss criticism of his conduct as an assault on their own beliefs or free speech.

They are likely to continue to purchase Teslas despite, and they may even change their own opinions to fit their “hero”‘s.

Out of phase

For other users, owning a Tesla may never longer sign essentially their views about sustainability. There may be a smile to ideologies or political affiliations that conflict with theirs.

If Tesla’s behaviour is perceived as dangerous in their social networks, some consumers may want to cut him off from Tesla. Nevertheless, as a purchase requiring large engagement and devotion, switching from Tesla to another Volt may be difficult.

The current trend of Tesla users displaying explanation tags on their cars is a way to reduce the strain between owning one and the actions of the CEO they don’t like.

The stickers give people a way to separate themselves from Musk’s activities while avoiding being severely perceived by their social networks. This is more likely to lead to a continuous product erosion than a drop in sales right away.

On the other hand, clients of businesses like BrewDog, a brand that has previously been accused of instilling a culture of fear, may be more apt to respond to negative CEO behavior. They at least have the option to move to a different company for a reasonable price. ( BrewDog, for its part, apologiszd and said it was” committed to doing better”. )

And if Live voters oppose engineer James Dyson’s position on Brexit, they might be offended but still be able to justify keeping a mid-priced object like a vacuum cleaner until it breaks, probably switching for new ones rather than abandoning them completely.

When a leader CEO disappoints them, users may react in a variety of ways. But brands risk losing blind, unquestioning loyalty, perhaps from devoted fans.

James Obiegbu is lecturer in experienced advertising and control, Bournemouth University and Gretchen Larsen is professor in advertising, Durham University Business School, Durham University

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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​Europe gasping for air as Trump makes his Ukraine move – Asia Times

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President Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have dealt a major blow to European officials who have been vocal supporters of keeping the Ukraine war on. Most of them must be in surprise, gasping for breath.

Let’s begin with Hegseth. He made the following statements:

1. Ukraine’s participation in NATO is off the board. Ukraine won’t get invited to join NATO.

2. The US will not take any soldiers to Ukraine for any reason, including security.

3. The US will not long provide or pay for Ukraine’s assistance and arms. The members of the German NATO will have the authority to offer Ukraine help.

4. British participation must be fair and equitable, which means that NATO people will have to significantly improve their efforts.

5. The US anticipates significant regional agreements from Ukraine because it will be unable to reclaim its former enclaves as it did before 2014.

President Trump, however, held an hour-and-a-half telephone conference with Russian President Putin. The main lesson is that Putin stated that he would like to start discussions with the US regarding Ukraine and additional safety concerns.

The Trump-Putin talk covered many matters, for example: safety concerns, energy, artificial intelligence and” the power of the money”.

Trump allegedly made the call after the phone,” to tell” Ukrainian President Zelensky of his talk with Putin. He likewise immediately formed his negotiation group. The discussions were led by Ambassador and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, Director of the CIA John Ratcliffe, National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Significantly, the listing of members did not contain retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg. Klugg had openly opposed the idea of substantially raising Russia’s sanctions in an effort to gain concessions from Ukraine. On a range of one to 10, as he put it, the existing sanctions against Russia are just a three. He suggested making them much higher ( assuming this could be accomplished ).

These opinions immediately undermined Trump’s method to Putin and Russia, and seem to have been Kellogg’s thought (among some ) to make sure the Ukraine war continued. It’s unknown whether Kellogg will once more play as a person in Ukraine.

It will take occasion for Europe’s pro-war officials, along with the EU, to contemplate the future, now that the floor has quite nicely been pulled out from under their feet.

The Ukrainian conflict cannot be fought with the weapons, troops, or income by the Europeans. Without the United States ‘ participation in the game, they didn’t receive little support for the game’s continuation. In fact, if Europe want to remain on its own, without the United States, it may harm the future of the NATO ally.

Many of the frontrunners in Europe are in trouble internally. The growing insecurity in the German leadership class is best illustrated by the cancellation of presidential elections in Germany, France, Poland, and perhaps Romania, where the leading opposition candidate was unable to win.

Discoveries about US and EU intervention in the political process in Georgia, Serbia and Slovakia, perhaps even Moldova, emphasize the squalid character of current-day elections in Europe.

The Trump presidency is liquidating USAID, which has been acting as a sort of CIA-front in many of the preceding countries, including Ukraine. The EU is facing a major issue that extends far beyond financing as a result of that funding and help being cut off. The fraudulent argument that the Union ( and, with it, NATO ) is upholding republic is now exposed. The ruling leaders are in genuine danger of losing their validity.

Trump has an important political view. It has the following message: Western security is crucial, but it is not actually threatened by Russia. The US faces a resurgent China that has a ( largely Western-supplied ) very modern industrial base, a massive workforce and an increasingly well-equipped and powerful military.

From Trump’s point of view, he needs a more pleasant Russia that can help stabilize global energy relationships. He must find new ways to reinvent the deeply fractured and hostile US-Russia marriage. In his 90-minute dialogue with Putin, Trump was poking at financial and technology features that was, in future, give a basis for improving relationships.

No one can yet say whether a bargain will be struck with Ukraine, but there is reason to be more positive that the two parties can work things out.

We will have to wait and see if the Europeans rebel and attempt to damage a deal with Ukraine. In fact, Europe has very little to do if Putin and Trump reach a bargain.

Stephen Bryen is a former US assistant secretary of defense for plan and a special correspondent for Asia Times. This post, which previously appeared on his Substack email Weapons and Strategy, is republished with authority.

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DeepSeek: China’s open-source AI caused a geopolitical earthquake – Asia Times

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Readers in a hurry may wish to put this article aside for later. It is an important long-form exploration, not a quick read. – Editors

We are in the early days of a seismic shift in the global AI industry. DeepSeek, a previously little-known Chinese artificial intelligence company, has produced a “game changing”“ large language model that promises to reshape the AI landscape almost overnight.

But DeepSeek’s breakthrough also has wider implications for the technological arms race between the US and China, having apparently caught even the best-known US tech firms off guard. Its launch has been predicted to start a “slow unwinding of the AI bet” in the West, amid a new era of “AI efficiency wars.”

In fact, industry experts have been speculating for years about China’s rapid advancements in AI. While the supposedly free-market US has often prioritized proprietary models, China has built a thriving AI ecosystem by leveraging open-source technology, fostering collaboration between government-backed research institutions and major tech firms.

This strategy has enabled China to scale its AI innovation rapidly while the US – despite all the tub-thumping from Silicon Valley – remains limited by restrictive corporate structures. Companies such as Google and Meta, despite promoting open-source initiatives, still rely heavily on closed-source strategies that limit broader access and collaboration.

What makes DeepSeek particularly disruptive is its ability to achieve cutting-edge performance while reducing computing costs – an area where US firms have struggled due to their dependence on training models that demand very expensive processing hardware.

Where once Silicon Valley was the epicentre of global digital innovation, its corporate behemoths now appear vulnerable to more innovative, “scrappy” startup competitors – albeit ones enabled by major state investment in AI infrastructure. By leveraging China’s industrial approach to AI, DeepSeek has crystalized a reality that many in Silicon Valley have long ignored: AI’s center of power is shifting away from the US and the west.

It highlights the failure of US attempts to preserve its technological hegemony through tight export controls on cutting-edge AI chips to China. According to research fellow Dean Ball: “You can keep [computing resources] away from China, but you can’t export-control the ideas that everyone in the world is hunting for.”

DeepSeek’s success has forced Silicon Valley and large Western tech companies to “take stock,” realizing that their once-unquestioned dominance is suddenly at risk. Even the US president, Donald Trump, has proclaimed that this should be a “wake-up call for our industries that we need to be laser-focused on competing.”

But this story is not just about technological prowess – it could mark an important shift in global power. Former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo has framed DeepSeek’s emergence as a “shot across America’s bow,” urging US policymakers and tech executives to take immediate action.

DeepSeek’s rapid rise underscores a growing realization: Globally, we are entering a potentially new AI paradigm, one in which China’s model of open-source innovation and state-backed development is proving more effective than Silicon Valley’s corporate-driven approach.

I’ve spent much of my career analyzing the transformative role of AI on the global digital landscape – examining how AI shapes governance, market structures and public discourse while exploring its geopolitical and ethical dimensions, now and far into the future.

I also have personal connections with China, having lived there while teaching at Jiangsu University and then written my PhD thesis on the country’s state-led marketization program. Over the years I have studied China’s evolving tech landscape, observing firsthand how its unique blend of state-driven industrial policy and private-sector innovation has fueled rapid AI development.

I believe this moment may come to be seen as a turning point not just for AI but for the geopolitical order. If China’s AI dominance continues, what could this mean for the future of digital governance, democracy, and the global balance of power?

China’s open-source AI takeover

Even in the early days of China’s digital transformation, analysts predicted the country’s open-source focus could lead to a major AI breakthrough. In 2018, China was integrating open-source collaboration into its broader digitization strategy, recognizing that fostering shared development efforts could accelerate its AI capabilities.

Unlike the US, where proprietary AI models dominated, China embraced open-source ecosystems to bypass Western gatekeeping, to scale innovation faster and to embed itself in global AI collaboration.

China’s open-source activity surged dramatically in 2020, laying the foundation for the kind of innovation seen today. By actively fostering an open-source culture, China ensured that a broad range of developers had access to AI tools, rather than restricting them to a handful of dominant companies.

The trend has continued in recent years, with China even launching its own state-backed open-source operating systems and platforms, in 2023, to further reduce its dependence on western technology. This move was widely seen as an effort to cement its AI leadership and create an independent, self-sustaining digital ecosystem. .

While China has been steadily positioning itself as a leader in open-source AI, Silicon Valley firms remained focused on closed, proprietary models – allowing China to catch up fast. While companies like Google and Meta promoted open-source initiatives in name, they still locked key AI capabilities behind paywalls and restrictive licenses.

In contrast, China’s government-backed initiatives have treated open-source AI as a national resource, rather than a corporate asset. This has resulted in China becoming one of the world’s largest contributors to open-source AI development, surpassing many western firms in collaborative projects. Chinese tech giants such as Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent are driving open-source AI forward with frameworks like PaddlePaddle, X-Deep Learning (X-DL) and MindSpore — all now core to China’s machine learning ecosystem.

But they’re also making major contributions to global AI projects, from Alibaba’s Dragonfly, which streamlines large-scale data distribution, to Baidu’s Apollo, an open-source platform accelerating autonomous vehicle development. These efforts don’t just strengthen China’s AI industry, they embed it deeper into the global AI landscape.

This shift had been years in the making, as Chinese firms (with state backing) pushed open-source AI forward and made their models publicly available, creating a feedback loop that western companies have also – quietly – tapped into.

A year ago, for example, US firm Abicus.AI released Smaug-72B, an AI model designed for enterprises that built directly upon Alibaba’s Qwen-72B and outperformed proprietary models like OpenAI’s GPT-3.5 and Mistral’s Medium.

But the potential for US companies to further build on Chinese open-source technology may be limited by political as well as corporate barriers.

In 2023, US lawmakers highlighted growing concerns that China’s aggressive investment in open-source AI and semiconductor technologies would eventually erode western leadership in AI. Some policymakers called for bans on certain open-source chip technologies, due to fears they could further accelerate China’s AI advancements.

By then, however, China’s AI horse had already bolted.

AI with Chinese characteristics

DeepSeek’s rise should have been obvious to anyone familiar with management theory and the history of technological breakthroughs linked to “disruptive innovation.” Latecomers to an industry rarely compete by playing the same game as incumbents – they have to be disruptive.

China, facing restrictions on cutting-edge western AI chips and lagging behind in proprietary AI infrastructure, had no choice but to innovate differently. Open-source AI provided the perfect vehicle: a way to scale innovation rapidly, lower costs and tap into global research while bypassing Silicon Valley’s resource-heavy, closed-source model.

From a Western and traditional human rights perspective, China’s embrace of open-source AI may appear paradoxical, given the country’s strict information controls. Its AI development strategy prioritizes both technological advancement and strict alignment with the Chinese Communist party’s ideological framework, ensuring AI models adhere to “core socialist values” and state-approved narratives.

AI research in China has thrived not only despite these constraints but, in many ways, because of them.

China’s success goes beyond traditional authoritarianism; it embodies what Harvard economist David Yang calls “Autocracy 2.0.” Rather than relying solely on fear-based control, it uses economic incentives, bureaucratic efficiency and technology to manage information and maintain regime stability.

The Chinese government has strategically encouraged open-source development while maintaining tight control over AI’s domestic applications, particularly in surveillance and censorship.

Indeed, authoritarian regimes may have a significant advantage in developing facial-recognition technology due to their extensive surveillance systems. The vast amounts of data collected through these networks enable private AI companies to create advanced algorithms, which can then be adapted for commercial uses, potentially accelerating economic growth.

China’s AI strategy is built on a dual foundation of state-led initiatives and private-sector innovation. The country’s AI roadmap, first outlined in the 2017 new generation artificial intelligence development plan, follows a three-phase timeline: achieving global competitiveness by 2020, making major AI breakthroughs by 2025, and securing world leadership in AI by 2030. In parallel, the government has emphasised data governance, regulatory frameworks and ethical oversight to guide AI development “responsibly.”

A defining feature of China’s AI expansion has been the massive infusion of state-backed investment. Over the past decade, government venture capital funds have injected approximately US$912 billion into early-stage firms, with 23% of that funding directed toward AI-related companies. A significant portion has targeted China’s less-developed regions, following local investment mandates.

Compared with private venture capital, government-backed firms often lag in software development but demonstrate rapid growth post-investment. Moreover, state funding often serves as a signal for subsequent private-sector investment, reinforcing the country’s AI ecosystem.

China’s AI strategy represents a departure from its traditional industrial policies, which historically emphasized self-sufficiency, support for a handful of national champions and military-driven research.

Instead, the government has embraced a more flexible and collaborative approach that encourages open-source software adoption, a diverse network of AI firms and public-private partnerships to accelerate innovation. This model prioritizes research funding, state-backed AI laboratories, and AI integration across key industries including security, healthcare and infrastructure.

Despite strong state involvement, China’s AI boom is equally driven by private-sector innovation. The country is home to an estimated 4,500 AI companies, accounting for 15% of the world’s total.

As economist Liu Gang told the Chinese Communist Party’s Global Times newspaper: “The development of AI is fast in China – for example, for AI-empowered large language models. Aided with government spending, private capital is flowing to the new sector. Increased capital inflow is anticipated to further enhance the sector in 2025.”

China’s tech giants including Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and SenseTime have all benefited from substantial government support while remaining competitive on the global stage. But unlike in the US, China’s AI ecosystem thrives on a complex interplay between state support, corporate investment and academic collaboration.

Recognizing the potential of open-source AI early on, Tsinghua University in Beijing has emerged as a key innovation hub, producing leading AI startups such as Zhipu AI, Baichuan AI, Moonshot AI and MiniMax — all founded by its faculty and alumni.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences has similarly played a crucial role in advancing research in deep learning and natural language processing.

Unlike the West, where companies like Google and Meta promote open-source models for strategic business gains, China sees them as a means of national technological self-sufficiency. To this end, the National AI Team, composed of 23 leading private enterprises, has developed the National AI Open Innovation Platform, which provides open access to AI datasets, toolkits, libraries and other computing resources.

DeepSeek is a prime example of China’s AI strategy in action. The company’s rise embodies the government’s push for open-source collaboration while remaining deeply embedded within a state-guided AI ecosystem. Chinese developers have long been major contributors to open-source platforms, ranking as the second-largest group on GitHub by 2021.

Founded by Chinese entrepreneur Liang Wenfeng in 2023, DeepSeek has positioned itself as an AI leader while benefiting from China’s state-driven AI ecosystem. Liang, who also established the hedge fund High-Flyer, has maintained full ownership of DeepSeek and avoided external venture capital funding.

Liang Wenfeng, founder of DeepSeek. Photo: CCTV,

Though there is no direct evidence of government financial backing, DeepSeek has reaped the rewards of China’s AI talent pipeline, state-sponsored education programs and research funding. Liang has engaged with top government officials including China’s premier, Li Qiang, reflecting the company’s strategic importance to the country’s broader AI ambitions.

In this way, DeepSeek perfectly encapsulates “AI with Chinese characteristics” – a fusion of state guidance, private-sector ingenuity and open-source collaboration, all carefully managed to serve the country’s long-term technological and geopolitical objectives.

Recognizing the strategic value of open-source innovation, the government has actively promoted domestic open-source code platforms like Gitee to foster self-reliance and insulate China’s AI ecosystem from external disruptions. However, this also exposes the limits of China’s open-source ambitions. The government pushes collaboration, but only within a tightly controlled system where state-backed firms and tech giants call the shots.

Reports of censorship on Gitee reveal how Beijing carefully manages innovation, ensuring AI advances stay in line with national priorities. Independent developers can contribute, but the real power remains concentrated in companies that operate within the government’s strategic framework.

The conflicted reactions of US big tech

DeepSeek’s emergence has sparked intense debate across the AI industry, drawing a range of reactions from leading Silicon Valley executives, policymakers and researchers. While some view it as an expected evolution of open-source AI, others see it as a direct challenge to western AI leadership.

Microsoft’s CEO, Satya Nadella, emphasized its technical efficiency. “It’s super-impressive in terms of both how they have really effectively done an open-source model that does this inference-time compute, and is super-compute efficient,” Nadella told CNBC. “We should take the developments out of China very, very seriously.”

Silicon Valley venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, a prominent advisor to Trump, was similarly effusive. “DeepSeek R1 is one of the most amazing and impressive breakthroughs I’ve ever seen – and, as open source, a profound gift to the world,” he wrote on X.

For Yann LeCun, Meta’s chief AI scientist, DeepSeek is less about China’s AI capabilities and more about the broader power of open-source innovation. He argued that the situation should be read not as China’s AI surpassing the US, but rather as open-source models surpassing proprietary ones. “DeepSeek has profited from open research and open source (e.g. PyTorch and Llama from Meta),” he wrote on Threads. “They came up with new ideas and built them on top of other people’s work. Because their work is published and open source, everyone can profit from it. That is the power of open research and open source.”

Not all responses were so measured. Alexander Wang, CEO of Scale AI – a US firm specializing in AI data labeling and model training – framed DeepSeek as a competitive threat that demands an aggressive response. He wrote on X: “DeepSeek is a wake-up call for America, but it doesn’t change the strategy: USA must out-innovate & race faster, as we have done in the entire history of AI. Tighten export controls on chips so that we can maintain future leads. Every major breakthrough in AI has been American.”

Elon Musk added fuel to speculation about DeepSeek’s hardware access when he responded with a simple “obviously” to Wang’s earlier claims on CNBC that DeepSeek had secretly acquired 50,000 Nvidia H100 GPUs, despite US export restrictions.

Beyond the tech world, US policymakers have taken a more adversarial stance. House speaker Mike Johnson accused China of leveraging DeepSeek to erode American AI leadership. “They abuse the system, they steal our intellectual property. They’re now trying to get a leg up on us in AI.”

For his part, Trump took a more pragmatic view, seeing DeepSeek’s efficiency as a validation of cost-cutting approaches. “I view that as a positive, as an asset …. You won’t be spending as much, and you’ll get the same result, hopefully.”

The rise of DeepSeek may have helped jolt the Trump administration into action, leading to sweeping policy shifts aimed at securing US dominance in AI. In his first week back in the White House, the US president announced a series of aggressive measures, including massive federal investments in AI research, closer partnerships between the government and private tech firms and the rollback of regulations seen as slowing US innovation.

The administration’s framing of AI as a critical national interest reflects a broader urgency sparked by China’s rapid advancements, particularly DeepSeek’s ability to produce cutting-edge models at a fraction of the cost traditionally associated with AI development. But this response is not just about national competitiveness – it is also deeply entangled with private industry.

Musk’s growing closeness to Trump, for example, can be viewed as a calculated move to protect his own dominance at home and abroad. By aligning with the administration, Musk ensures that US policy tilts in favour of his AI ventures, securing access to government backing, computing power,and regulatory control over AI exports.

At the same time, Musk’s public criticism of Trump’s US$500 billion AI infrastructure plan – claiming the companies involved lack the necessary funding – was as much a warning as a dismissal, signaling his intent to shape policy in a way that benefits his empire while keeping potential challengers at bay.

Not unrelated, Musk and a group of investors have just launched a US$97.4 billion bid for OpenAI’s nonprofit arm, a move that escalates his feud with OpenAI CEO Sam Altman and seeks to strengthen his grip on the AI industry. Altman has dismissed the bid as a “desperate power grab”, insisting that OpenAI will not be swayed by Musk’s attempts to reclaim control. The spat reflects how DeepSeek’s emergence has thrown US tech giants into what could be all-out war, fuelling bitter corporate rivalries and reshaping the fight for AI dominance.

And while the US and China escalate their AI competition, other global leaders are pushing for a coordinated response. The Paris AI Action Summit, held on February 10 and 11, has become a focal point for efforts to prevent AI from descending into an uncontrolled power struggle.

France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, warned delegates that without international oversight, AI risks becoming “the wild west,” where unchecked technological development creates instability rather than progress.

But at the end of the two-day summit, the UK and US refused to sign an international commitment to “ensuring AI is open, inclusive, transparent, ethical, safe, secure and trustworthy … making AI sustainable for people and the planet.” China was among the 61 countries to sign this declaration.

Concerns have also been raised at the summit about how AI-powered surveillance and control are enabling authoritarian regimes to strengthen repression and reshape the citizen-state relationship. This highlights the fast-growing global industry of digital repression, driven by an emerging “authoritarian-financial complex” that may exacerbate China’s strategic advancement in AI.

Equally, DeepSeek’s cost-effective AI solutions have created an opening for European firms to challenge the traditional AI hierarchy. As AI development shifts from being solely about compute power to strategic efficiency and accessibility, European firms now have an opportunity to compete more aggressively against their US and Chinese counterparts.

Whether this marks a true rebalancing of the AI landscape remains to be seen. But DeepSeek’s emergence has certainly upended traditional assumptions about who will lead the next wave of AI innovation – and how global powers will respond to it.

End of the ‘Silicon Valley effect’?

DeepSeek’s emergence has forced US tech leaders to confront an uncomfortable reality: They underestimated China’s AI capabilities. Confident in their perceived lead, companies like Google, Meta, and OpenAI prioritized incremental improvements over anticipating disruptive competition, leaving them vulnerable to a rapidly evolving global AI landscape.

In response, the US tech giants are now scrambling to defend their dominance, pledging over US$400 billion in AI investment. DeepSeek’s rise, fuelled by open-source collaboration, has reignited fierce debates over innovation versus security, while its energy-efficient model has intensified scrutiny on AI’s sustainability.

Yet Silicon Valley continues to cling to what many view as outdated economic theories such as the Jevons paradox to downplay China’s AI surge, insisting that greater efficiency will only fuel demand for computing power and reinforce their dominance. Companies like Meta, OpenAI and Microsoft remain fixated on scaling computational power, betting that expensive hardware will secure their lead. But this assumption blinds them to a shifting reality.

DeepSeek’s rise as the potential “Walmart of AI” is shaking Silicon Valley’s foundation, proving that high-quality AI models can be built at a fraction of the cost. By prioritizing efficiency over brute-force computing power, DeepSeek is challenging the US tech industry’s reliance on expensive hardware like Nvidia’s high-end chips.

This shift has already rattled markets, driving down the stock prices of major US firms and forcing a reassessment of AI dominance. Nvidia, whose business depends on supplying high-performance processors, appears particularly vulnerable as DeepSeek’s cost-effective approach threatens to reduce demand for premium chips.

The growing divide between the US and China in AI, however, is more than just competition – it’s a clash of governance models. While US firms remain fixated on protecting market dominance, China is accelerating AI innovation with a model that is proving more adaptable to global competition.

If Silicon Valley resists structural change, it risks falling farther behind. We may witness the unraveling of the “Silicon Valley effect”, through which tech giants have long manipulated AI regulations to entrench their dominance. For years, Google, Meta,and OpenAI shaped policies that favored proprietary models and costly infrastructure, ensuring AI development remained under their control.

DeepSeek is redefining AI with breakthroughs in code intelligence, vision-language models and efficient architectures that challenge Silicon Valley’s dominance. By optimizing computation and embracing open-source collaboration, DeepSeek shows the potential of China to deliver cutting-edge models at a fraction of the cost, outperforming proprietary alternatives in programming, reasoning and real-world applications.

More than a policy-driven rise, China’s AI surge reflects a fundamentally different innovation model – fast, collaborative and market-driven – while Silicon Valley holds on to expensive infrastructure and rigid proprietary control. If US firms refuse to adapt, they risk losing the future of AI to a more agile and cost-efficient competitor.

A new era of geotechnopolitics

But China is not just disrupting Silicon Valley. It is expanding “geotechnopolitics”, where AI is a battleground for global power. With AI projected to add US$15.7 trillion to the global economy by 2030, China and the US are racing to control the technology that will define economic, military and political dominance.

DeepSeek’s advancement has raised national security concerns in the US. Trump’s government is considering stricter export controls on AI-related technologies to prevent them from bolstering China’s military and intelligence capabilities.

As AI-driven defence systems, intelligence operations and cyber warfare redefine national security, governments must confront a new reality: AI leadership is not just about technological superiority, but about who controls the intelligence that will shape the next era of global power.

China’s AI ambitions extend beyond technology, driving a broader strategy for economic and geopolitical dominance. But with over 50 state-backed companies developing large-scale AI models, its rapid expansion faces growing challenges, including soaring energy demands and US semiconductor restrictions.

China’s president, Xi Jinping, remains resolute, stating: “Whoever can grasp the opportunities of new economic development such as big data and artificial intelligence will have the pulse of our times.” He sees AI driving “new quality productivity” and modernizing China’s manufacturing base, calling its “head goose effect” a catalyst for broader innovation.

To counter western containment, China has embraced a “guerrilla” economic strategy, bypassing restrictions through alternative trade networks, deepening ties with the global south, and exploiting weaknesses in global supply chains. Instead of direct confrontation, this decentralized approach uses economic coercion to weaken adversaries while securing China’s own industrial base.

China is also leveraging open-source AI as an ideological tool, presenting its model as more collaborative and accessible than western alternatives. This narrative strengthens its global influence, aligning with nations seeking alternatives to western digital control. While strict state oversight remains, China’s embrace of open-source AI reinforces its claim to a future where innovation is driven not by corporate interests but through shared collaboration and global cooperation.

But while DeepSeek claims to be open access, its secrecy tells a different story. Key details on training data and fine-tuning remain hidden, and its compliance with China’s AI laws has sparked global scrutiny. Italy has banned the platform over data-transfer risks, while Belgium and Ireland launched privacy probes.

Under Chinese regulations, DeepSeek’s outputs must align with state-approved narratives, clashing with the EU’s AI Act, which demands transparency and protects political speech. Such “controlled openness” raises many red flags, casting doubt on China’s place in markets that value data security and free expression.

Many western commentators are seizing on reports of Chinese AI censorship to frame other models as freer and more politically open. The revelation that a leading Chinese chatbot actively modifies or censors responses in real time has fueled a broader narrative that western AI operates without such restrictions, reinforcing the idea that democratic systems produce more transparent and unbiased technology. This framing serves to bolster the argument that free societies will ultimately lead the global AI race.

But, at its heart, the “AI arms race” is driven by technological dominance. The US, China, and the EU are charting different paths, weighing security risks against the need for global collaboration. How this competition is framed will shape policy: lock AI behind restrictions, or push for open innovation.

DeepSeek, for all its transformational qualities, continues to exemplify a model of AI where innovation prioritizes scale, speed and efficiency over societal impact. This drive to optimize computation and expand capabilities overshadows the need to design AI as a truly public good.

In doing so, it eclipses this technology’s genuine potential to transform governance, public services and social institutions in ways that prioritize collective wellbeing, equity and sustainability over corporate and state control.

A truly global AI framework requires more than political or technological openness. It demands structured cooperation that prioritizes shared governance, equitable access, and responsible development.

Following a workshop in Shanghai hosted by the Chinese government last September, the UN’s general secretary, António Guterres, outlined his vision for AI beyond corporate or state control: “We must seize this historic opportunity to lay the foundations for inclusive governance of AI – for the benefit of all humanity. As we build AI capacity, we must also develop shared knowledge and digital public goods.”

Both the west and China frame their AI ambitions through competing notions of “openness” – aligned in both cases with their strategic interests and reinforcing existing power structures.

Western tech giants claim AI drives democratization, yet they often dominate digital infrastructure in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, exporting models based on “corporate imperialism” that extract value while disregarding local needs.

China, by contrast, positions itself as a technological partner for the rest of the Global South. However, its AI remains tightly controlled, reinforcing state ideology.

China’s proclaimed view on international AI collaboration emphasizes that AI should not be “a game of rich countries,”as President Xi stated during the 2024 G20 summit.

By advocating for inclusive global AI development, China positions itself as a leader in shaping international AI governance, especially via initiatives like the UN AI resolution and its AI capacity-building action plan. These efforts help promote a more balanced technological landscape while allowing China to strengthen its influence in global AI standards and frameworks.

However, beneath all these narratives, both China and the US share a strategy of AI expansion that relies on exploited human labor, from data annotation to moderation, exposing a system driven less by innovation than by economic and political control.

Peter Bloom is a professor of management at the University of Essex.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Russia better than China for making Afghan-Pakistan peace – Asia Times

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Russian Ambassador to Pakistan Albert Khorev told&nbsp, TASS&nbsp, over the weekend that his nation supports Pakistan and&nbsp, Afghanistan’s individual counter-terrorism work. He therefore added that it encourages both of them to work together to overcome boundary disputes via bilateral or multilateral methods.

This suggests that they want to serve as mediators. China has previously tried to do so but has &nbsp, struggled to achieve something, yet Russia has a better chance of success.

Russia’s great geo-economic plan&nbsp, in this piece of Eurasia is to pioneer opposite connection and electricity corridors to India via Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. To that end, Russia has maintain likewise outstanding relationships with Afghanistan and Pakistan, help solve their border tensions, and then do the same&nbsp, with Pakistan and India’s.

The first step has already been achieved upon&nbsp, carefully partnering with the Taliban&nbsp, past summer and finally clinching a&nbsp, strategic reference alliance with Pakistan&nbsp, in December.

The next step will be much harder to complete, but that’s the reason for Ambassador Khorev’s most recent comments regarding Russia’s assistance for Pakistan and Afghanistan’s individual counter-terrorism efforts.

He acknowledged the host nation’s issues with Afghan-emanating terrorist threats on the one hand, but he shied away from blaming the Taliban for them like Islamabad does, and otherwise offered to give them flimsy “necessary help.”

Each person appears to have their own means of empowerment, with the first one being political support for halting all extremist invasion from Afghanistan, and the second being training their special forces to combat ISIS-K.

Left unsaid is any reference to Pakistan’s claims that the Taliban backs the TTP (” Pakistani Taliban” ) and&nbsp, other terrorist groups, however, though commenting on this either way would ruin Russia’s careful balancing act.

China has already taken the same position on this issue, which is in contrast to Russia’s geo-economic perspective, which favors strengthening Afghan-Pakistani ties over the course of its wider geographical strategy.

Since the first uses the Belt & Road Initiative’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor premier to achieve this goal while the second has road exposure to it via Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan don’t need to do business with China on their own country.

So, although China does indeed like its neighboring associates to work more closely up, this isn’t required to advance its geo-economic objectives. Russia’s great geo-economic program necessitates Afghanistan and Pakistan patching up their problems in order to create horizontal connectivity and energy corridors that may one day preferably approach India. The situation is completely different.

Those two, therefore, obviously know that Russia has substantially greater bets in counseling than China does.

After their tensions are resolved, neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan would receive any more financial benefits from China, but Pakistan may eventually get more direct overland connectivity with Russia and perhaps even energy from it as well, if that happens, both via Afghanistan.

Also, Afghanistan may benefit from its intermediary role in these hallways, especially if they ever extend to India. If Beijing were to effectively resolve between them, no such perks would be derived from China.

In response, it is incumbent on Russia to make innovative use of innovative means to advance this political process to the fullest of its ability, including sharing detailed plans of its proposed energy and connectivity investments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan if they agree to resolve their differences.

These may include certain tasks, the estimated number that’ll be invested, lending terms if required, the chance for joint rights of some kind, and the local work that might be employed.

It might still not be enough for a breakthrough, but it would still be more than what China has offered to do if they make peace, which is nothing. In addition, if the political and/or military environment changes and they decide to fix their issues, they would have a mutual interest in revitalizing Russia’s plans.

Russia is expected to push for peace, and its efforts will be more effective than China’s, but it’s too early to say what will happen either way.

This&nbsp, article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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