New US missile aims to pierce China’s rising air power – Asia Times

The US Air Force’s newly unveiled AIM-260A Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM) promises to reshape aerial warfare with its extended range, advanced guidance and stealth compatibility—just as China’s airpower developments escalate the fight for air superiority.

Last month, The War Zone reported that the US Air Force had confirmed the authenticity of the recently released AIM-260A JATM’s rendering.

With a more extended range yet a similar size to the AIM-120 AMRAAM, this missile is poised to replace the latter in US military service. Included in a US Navy industry day briefing, the JATM remains highly classified, with technical and programmatic details withheld.

However, it is believed to feature advanced propulsion systems, multi-mode guidance technologies and the capability to receive guidance from various sources such as ground radar and satellites.

While publicly available information about the AIM-260A’s range is scant, Naval News mentions that the most recent AIM-120D-3 variant was nearing the threshold range of the AIM-260A at 190 kilometers, but the latter missile likely exceeds that range.

The rendering reveals a sleek design optimized for high speed and low drag. It features a notably longer rocket motor than the AIM-120, suggesting significantly enhanced range and speed capabilities.

The AIM-260A is anticipated to be fitted in stealth fighters like the F-22 and F-35, as well as future stealthy drones under the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. This development reflects the US military’s response to longer-range threats, particularly from Chinese missiles.

Despite active testing, the exact timeline for the AIM-260A’s fielding remains unclear, and there has been no public confirmation of its operational status yet. The JATM’s advanced propulsion and potentially multi-mode seeker technology highlight significant advancements in US air-to-air combat capabilities.

This development follows the relatively recent unveiling of advanced Chinese air-to-air missiles. The People’s Liberation Army-Air Force (PLAAF) has unveiled its J-16 fighters equipped with the PL-17 missile, a long-range beyond visual range (BVR) weapon designed to neutralize high-value aerial targets, such as airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and tankers.

The PL-17, significantly larger than its predecessor, the PL-15, features a dual-pulse rocket motor, thrust-vectoring controls, and speeds exceeding Mach 4. Its guidance system integrates an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and a two-way datalink, enhancing resistance to electronic countermeasures.

Additionally, China is developing hypersonic air-to-air missiles to counter US stealth bombers, such as the B-21 Raider. These weapons, reportedly capable of reaching Mach 9, leverage solid-fuel pulse engines and extreme heat resistance, allowing unpredictable flight paths.

China’s missile strategy aligns with its broader anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) doctrine, aiming to push US and allied forces farther from its coastline.

The BVR revolution in fighter combat has shifted engagements from close-range dogfights to long-range, sensor-driven confrontations, with fighters using stealth, electronic warfare (EW), and active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar to detect and engage adversaries from standoff distances, often before detection, says  Samuel Leiter in a March 2023 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) paper.

Leiter mentions that this shift reduces attrition and maintains an advantage, emphasizing the critical need for enhanced capabilities in modern aerial warfare.

He points out that simulations show that US and Japanese forces with superior aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 consistently perform those of China in engagements despite numerical disadvantages.

However, China may already have countermeasures for the AIM-260A and similar missiles. In June 2024, Asian Military Review mentions that China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) are deploying sophisticated EW platforms like the Y-9DZ and J-16D.

These platforms, equipped with advanced jamming pods and electronic support measures (ESM), are designed to disrupt enemy missile guidance systems and radar operations.

China’s innovation in EW aims to neutralize BVR threats and maintain air superiority in contested regions, reflecting a shift towards dominating the electronic spectrum to counter advanced missile technologies.

As to how US and Chinese stealth fighters compare, Brent Eastwood mentions in a 1945 article this month that while China’s J-20 features radar-evading features, advanced avionics, and long-range strike capabilities, its stealth is considered inferior to US fifth-generation jets such as the F-22 and F-35.

However, Abraham Abrams mentions in a November 2024 article for Aviation Geek Club that the J-20’s combat radius, nearly double that of the F-22 and F-35, allows for extended operational reach, crucial for Pacific theater engagements.

Abrams notes that the J-20’s advanced stealth design and high-thrust WS-15 engines enhance its speed, maneuverability and non-afterburner supersonic flight capabilities.

With its large internal fuel capacity and sophisticated avionics, Abrams says the J-20’s features provide superior endurance and operational flexibility.

Discussing how US F-22s and F-35s could be used in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, Kris Osborne mentions in a September 2022 article for The National Interest (TNI) that the deployment of F-22 and F-35 fighter jets could be crucial in countering a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan, ensuring air superiority over the Taiwan Strait.

F-22s flying from Kadena Air Base in Japan, the F-35B’s vertical take-off and landing capabilities enabling operations from austere Pacific island airbases, and the F-35C’s carrier-launch versatility would significantly bolster US and allied air power.

Despite that technological advantage, US fighter readiness levels leave much to be desired. Last month, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported that in 2024, F-22 readiness levels fell from 52% to 40.19%, while that of the F-35A held steady at 51.4%.

The ratings of older fighters, such as the F-15E and D, increased to 33% from 55%, respectively, to 52.9% and 63.7% as the oldest, worst-performing aircraft were retired. The F-15EX fleet, with just eight aircraft, had an 83.13% rating.

Further, David Deptula mentions in a May 2024 Forbes article that the US Air Force faces a critical fighter aircraft gap, exacerbated by recent cuts to F-35 purchases, which undermines its ability to counter China’s growing military power in the Pacific.

In line with those cuts to F-35 purchases, the program was placed under US Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) scrutiny as it faces serious questions over its USD 2 trillion price tag, upgrade delays, software issues, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and maintenance and logistics problems.

Deptula points out that the US struggles to maintain air superiority with 55 fighter squadrons compared to 134 during Operation Desert Storm.

He stresses that China’s production of approximately 100 J-20 fighters annually, far exceeding the US F-22 fleet fixed at 187 units, further widens this gap, posing a significant threat to Taiwan.

Given those figures, General David Allvin mentioned in a February 2024 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that it would be cost-prohibitive for the US to build enough aircraft to maintain air superiority for days and weeks.

While Allvin says the US in the Pacific should not resign itself to operating in mutually denied airspace as seen in the Russo-Ukrainian War, he calls for further development of affordable, off-the-shelf, unmanned aircraft to bolster numbers.

Continue Reading

China explores military applications with DeepSeek – Asia Times

DeepSeek’s artificial intelligence (AI) model can be used in various military applications, from controlling unmanned vehicles to giving commands, according to a white paper recently published by Chongqing Landship Information Technology, an autonomous driving solution provider.

Landship said DeepSeek has excellent potential in military use, such as command, communications, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).

“In military strategic planning, DeepSeek can conduct in-depth analysis of massive intelligence information and provide military commanders with accurate decision-making support,” it said. “DeepSeek has powerful language understanding and generation capabilities, allowing it to adapt to battlefield tasks quickly.”

Landship added that DeepSeek could collaborate with satellites, radars, and drones to improve the efficiency and accuracy of military reconnaissance. It can quickly identify key military targets from satellite images and estimate their sizes and numbers, supporting military decision-making.

Landship, formerly Beijing Landship Information Technology Co Ltd, was co-founded in 2012 by Zhang Dezhao and several other autonomous driving experts from Tsinghua University.

In 2015, the same team founded Beijing Zhixingzhe Technology Co, or IDriverPlus, to develop self-driving solutions, including a product called IDriverBrain.

IDriverPlus and Landship brand their products as Xingji, which means “star horse” (or Qianlima — a mythical horse that can run very fast) in Chinese.

Landship said on February 27 that it has deployed DeepSeek in a self-driving military vehicle called Xingji P60. It displayed the vehicle at the International Defence Exhibition and Conference (IDEX 2025) in Abu Dhabi from February 17 to 21. 

The company said the P60 integrated Landship’s civil-use self-driving software and DeepSeek’s military-use large language models (LLMs) to achieve efficient information processing and decision-making in complex and changing environments. LLMs refer to AI models like ChatGPT, which can understand human language.
 
IDriverPlus’ Chief Technology Officer and Landship’s General Manager Wang Xiao said the company hopes to lead new trends in the defense sector by offering high-performance products at affordable costs.

According to online footage, the vehicle was not called P60 but CS/VP16B at the exhibition. It was shown at the booth of Norinco, or China North Industries Corporation, a state-owned defense and technology company.

Last October, IDriverPlus signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Harbin No.1 Jiqi Manufacture Group Company Ltd, a unit of Norinco, to jointly develop all-terrain unnamed rescue vehicles.

Huawei’s support

DeepSeek launched its latest AI model, DeepSeek R1, on January 20. It trained the AI model using only 2,000 Nvidia H800 graphic processing units and a low-cost method called “knowledge distillation.”

During the distillation, DeepSeek asked a more intelligent chatbot, such as Alibaba’s Qwen or OpenAI’s ChatGPT, many questions and used the answers to fine-tune its logic to become more intelligent.

DeepSeek R1’s debut in late January caused a slump in United States stocks, as investors worried they might have overvalued AI stocks.  

Xu Bingjun, a military columnist and a senior researcher with Xinhua Liaowang think tank, praised DeepSeek’s low-cost strategy in a recent article titled “How DeepSeek changes military AI and its impact on the United States and Western countries.” 

“DeepSeek can be applied to intelligent combat systems to significantly improve combat effectiveness by analyzing real-time battlefield situations, optimizing combat plans, and predicting enemy actions,” he says in the article.

“With DeepSeek, more autonomous weapons, drones, and unmanned tanks and ships can be developed,” he says. “These unmanned combat platforms can perform tasks autonomously in complex environments, reducing casualties while improving combat efficiency.”

In early February, US lawmakers introduced a bipartisan congressional bill to ban DeepSeek from government devices due to national security concerns. Some states, like New York and Virginia, the US Navy, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), have stopped their employees from using DeepSeek on official devices.

Landship said it worked with Huawei Technologies’ Mobile Data Center (MDC) to draft its latest White Paper about DeepSeek’s potential military applications. It said it hopes to promote using DeepSeek in the military field through cooperation.

The White Paper disclosed Huawei’s AI goals for 2025:

  • March – Deploying DeepSeek R1 on Huawei MDC’s system to realize semantic understanding and assisted decision-making, and also to improve real-time reasoning;
  • April – Deploying DeepSeek’s Janus-pro 7B on Huawei MDC’s system to realize multi-modal video understanding and improve real-time image understanding;
  • June –  Running DeepSeek’s natural language processing (NLP) program with Huawei’s 310P and Fuzhou Rockchip Electronics’ RK3588 chips;
  • September – Testing DeepSeek-powered drones;
  • December – Using the drones to identify complex camouflage targets.

On August 17, 2022, IDriverPlus and Huawei signed a comprehensive cooperation agreement to develop “autonomous driving + AI” solutions using Huawei’s Ascend AI chips.

On September 9 of the same year, Huawei’s Vice President Deng Taihua visited IDriverPlus’ headquarters in Beijing to discuss self-driving vehicle projects. IDriverPlus said it would test its software at Huawei’s Ascend AI Computing Center, which commenced operations in February 2023.

Yong Jian is a contributor to the Asia Times. He is a Chinese journalist who specializes in Chinese technology, economy and politics. 

Read: DeepSeek is now the brain of Chinese state-owned firms

Continue Reading

Trump and Vance clash angrily with Zelensky over ‘minerals deal’ – Asia Times

The visit of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to the White House has not gone to plan – at least not to his plan. There were extraordinary scenes as a press conference between Zelensky and Trump descended into acrimony, with the US president loudly berating his opposite number, whom he accused of “gambling with world war three.”

“You either make a deal or we’re out,” Trump told Zelensky. Vice President JD Vance also got in on the act, accusing the Ukrainian president of “litigating in front of the American media,” and saying his approach was “disrespectful.” At one point he asked Zelensky: “Have you said ‘thank you’ even once?”

Reporters present described the atmosphere as heated with voices raised by both Trump and Vance. The New York Times said the scene was “one of the most dramatic moments ever to play out in public in the Oval Office and underscored the radical break between the United States and Ukraine since Mr Trump took office.”

Underlying the angry exchanges were differences between the Trump administration and the Ukrainian government over the so-called “minerals deal” that Zelensky was scheduled to sign.

Any lack of Ukrainian enthusiasm for the deal is understandable.

In its present form, it looks more like a memorandum of understanding that leaves several vital issues to be resolved later. The deal on offer is the creation of what will be called a “reconstruction investment fund,” to be jointly owned and managed by the US and Ukraine.

Into the proposed fund will go 50% of the revenue from the exploitation of “all relevant Ukrainian government-owned natural resource assets (whether owned directly or indirectly by the Ukrainian government)” and “other infrastructure relevant to natural resource assets (such as liquified natural gas terminals and port infrastructure).”

That means that private infrastructure – much of it owned by Ukraine’s wealthy oligarchs – is likely to become part of the deal. This has the potential of further increasing friction between Zelensky and some very powerful Ukrainians.

Meanwhile, US contributions are less clearly defined. The preamble to the agreement makes it clear that Ukraine already owes the US. The very first paragraph notes that “the United States of America has provided significant financial and material support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.”

This figure, according to Trump, amounts to US$350 billion. The actual amount, according to the Ukraine Support Tracker of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, is about half that.

Western and Ukrainian analysts have also pointed out that there may be fewer, and less accessible, mineral and rare earth deposits in Ukraine than are currently assumed. The working estimates have been based mostly on Soviet-era data.

Since the current draft leaves details on ownership, governance and operations to be determined in a future fund agreement, Trump’s very big deal is at best the first step. Future rounds of negotiations are to be expected.

Statement of intent

From a Ukrainian perspective, this is more of a strength than a weakness. It leaves Kyiv with an opportunity to achieve more satisfactory terms in future rounds of negotiation. Even if any improvements will only be marginal, it keeps the US locked into a process that is, overall, beneficial for Ukraine.

Take the example of security guarantees. The draft agreement offers Ukraine nothing anywhere near NATO membership. But it notes that the US “supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace,” adding that: “Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments.”

The significance of this should not be overstated. At its bare minimum, it is an expression of intent by the US that falls short of security guarantees but still gives the US a stake in the survival of Ukraine as an independent state.

But it is an important signal both in terms of what it does and does not do – a signal to Russia, Europe and Ukraine.

Trump does not envisage that the US will give Ukraine security guarantees “beyond very much.” He seems to think that these guarantees can be provided by European troops (the Kremlin has already cast doubts on this idea).

But this does not mean the idea is completely off the table. On the contrary, because the US commitment is so vague, it gives Trump leverage in every direction.

He can use it as a carrot and a stick against Ukraine to get more favorable terms for US returns from the reconstruction investment fund. He can use it to push Europe towards more decisive action to ramp up defense spending by making any US protection for European peacekeepers contingent on more equitable burden-sharing in NATO.

And he can signal to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, that the US is serious about making a deal stick – and that higher American economic stakes in Ukraine and corporate presence on the ground would mean US-backed consequences if the Kremlin reneges on a future peace agreement and restarts hostilities.

That these calculations will ultimately lead to the “free, sovereign and secure Ukraine” that the agreement envisages is not a given.

For now, however, despite all the shortcomings and vagueness of the deal on key issues – and the very public argument between the parties – it still looks like it serves all sides’ interests to move forward in this direction.

This article has been updated with details of the meeting between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump.

Stefan Wolff is a professor of international security at the University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko is a professor of international relations and the Jean Monnet professor of European security at the National University Odesa Law Academy.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Steps needed after robot nearly head-butted China festival spectator – Asia Times

Humanoid robots are supposed to be our loyal assistants, but we saw another side to them the other day. Chinese robot manufacturer Unitree was demonstrating its latest H1 robots at a lantern festival in the city of Taishan, Guangdong province, when one walked up to the crowd barrier and seemed to lunge at an elderly woman, nearly headbutting her.

The incident quickly went viral, and sparked a fierce debate about whether the robot actually attacked the woman or had tripped up. It’s mostly being overlooked that we’re a long way from having robots that could intentionally attack someone – machines like these are often remote controlled – but the danger to the public is clearly real enough.

With sales of humanoid robots set to skyrocket over the next decade, the public will increasingly be at risk from incidents of this kind. In our view as robotics researchers, governments have put very little thought into the risks.

Here are some urgent steps that they should take to make humanoid robots as safe as possible.

1. Increase owner requirements

The first important issue is to what extent humanoid robots will be controlled by users. Whereas Tesla’s Optimus can be remotely operated by people in a control center, others such as the Unitree H1s are controlled by the user with a handheld joystick.

Currently on sale for around $110,000, they come with software development kits on which customers can develop artificial intelligence (AI) systems, though only to a limited extent. For example, your robot could say a sentence or recognize a face but not take your kids to school.

Who is to blame if someone gets hurt or even killed by a human-controlled robot? It’s hard to know for sure – any discussion about liability would first involve proving whether the harm was caused by human error or a mechanical malfunction.

This came up in a Florida case where a widower sued medical robot-maker Intuitive Surgical Inc. over his wife’s death in 2022. Her death was linked to injuries she sustained from a heat burn in her intestine during an operation that was caused by a fault in one of the company’s machines.

The case was dropped in 2024 after being partially dismissed by a district judge. But the fact that the widower sued the manufacturer rather than the medics demonstrated that the robotics industry needs a legal framework for preventing such situations as much as the public does.

While for drones there are aviation laws and other restrictions to govern their use in public areas, there are no specific laws for walking robots.

So far, the only place to have put forward governance guidelines is China’s Shanghai province. Published in summer 2024, those regulations include stipulating that robots must not threaten human security, and that manufacturers must train users on how to use these machines ethically.

For robots controlled by owners, in the UK there is currently nothing preventing someone from taking a robot dog out for a stroll in a busy park, or a humanoid robot to the pub for a pint.

As a starting point, we could ban people from controlling robots under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or when they are otherwise distracted such as using their phones. Their use could also be restricted in risky environments such as confined spaces with lots of members of the public, places with fire or chemical hazards, and the roofs of buildings.

2. Improve design

Robots that looks sleek and can dance and flip are fun to watch, but how safe are the audiences? Safe designs would consider everything from reducing cavities where fingers could get caught, to waterproofing internal components.

Protective barriers or exoskeletons could further reduce unintended contact, while cushioning mechanisms could reduce the effect of an impact.

Robots should be designed to signal their intent through lights, sounds and gestures. For example, they should arguably make a noise when entering a room so as not to surprise anyone.

Even drones can alert their users if they lose signal or battery and need to return to home, and such mechanisms should also be built into walking robots. There are no legal requirements for any such features at present.

Robot opening a door
‘I am now exiting the room.’ Simple Line

It’s not that manufacturers are entirely ignoring these issues for walking robots. Unitree’s quadroped Go2, for instance, blinks and beeps when the battery is low or if it is overheating.

It also has automatic emergency cut-offs in these situations, although they must be triggered by a remote operator when the robot is in “telemetric mode.” Crucially, however, there are no clear regulations to ensure that all manufacturers meet a certain safety standard.

3. Train the operators

Clearly there will be dangers with robots using AI features, but remote-operated models could be even more dangerous. Mistakes could result from users’ lack of real-world training and experience in real-life situations.

There appears to be a major skills gap in operator training, and robotics companies will need to prioritize this to ensure operators can control machines efficiently and safely.

In addition, humans can have delayed reaction times and limited concentration, so we also need systems that can monitor the attention of robot operators and alert them to prevent accidents. This would be similar to the HGV-driver distraction-detection systems that were installed in vehicles in London in 2024.

4. Educate the public

The incident in China has highlighted current misconceptions about humanoid robots as the media are once again blaming AI despite the fact that this was not the issue. This risks causing widespread mistrust and confusion among the public.

If people understand to what extent walking robots are owner-operated or remote-operated, it will change their expectations about what the robot might do, and make everyone safer as a result.

Also, understanding the owner’s level of control is vital for managing buyers’ expectations and forewarning them about how much they’ll need to learn about operating and programming a robot before they buy one.

Carl Strathearn is a lecturer in computer science at Edinburgh Napier University and Emilia Sobolewska is a lecturer and researcher in applied informatics at Edinburgh Napier University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Trump tariffs could be bargaining chip or economic bomb – Asia Times

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s statement on February 25 that the US was experiencing a personal business crisis and that the Trump administration intended to “re-privatize” the economy flashed crisis instructions.

The previous administration over-relying on excessive government spending and excessive regulation, according to Trump’s chief economic official in a speech.” We had an economy that may have had some reasonable metrics but finally was brittle underneath.

Does the Trump administration use the threat of tariffs to stifle international funding in the US, or did taxes began a trade conflict with Europe and Asia, depending on one important political matter: whether the US will experience a recession this year.

Higher tariffs will have a significant impact on domestic inflation because the United States is so dependent on imports. However, the outcome will benefit US growth if the response of the European Community, Japan, and China is an increase in investment in the US.

Recession indicators include the worst consumer confidence survey results since 2021, a decline in freight shipment volumes, a decline in equipment investment in the fourth quarter of 2024, and a 0.9 % decline in retail sales ( before factoring in inflation ) in January.

It’s difficult to connect the dismal survey results released last week by the Conference Board and the University of Michigan with the fact that the top tenth of US earners account for half of consumer spending. The average consumer may be pessimistic, but a tenth of US households ‘ spending choices will determine the pace for aggregate data.

The decline in private investment during the fourth quarter is a major concern. The worst investment report since 2021 was nearly 6/10ths of a percentage point off the fourth quarter’s GDP growth.

The final GDP report for 2024 should be read with caution because the investment component is volatile and the gross domestic product is one of the least reliable series we have. However, it’s still a problem.

A rise in investment in subsidized semiconductor manufacturing facilities was a result of the Biden CHIPS Act. The end of the Biden subsidies likely accounts for a large portion of the equipment investment decline.

Graphic: Asia Times

A harder number to find is nondefense capital goods orders that exclude aircraft, and this indicates a year-over-year decline of more than 20 % as of December 2024.

Graphic: Asia Times

The CASS Index of Freight Volume, which was created from billions of CASS payments, is one of the few reliable indicators of US economic activity. This indicates a significant decline in January. Although wet might be a factor, but freight volume has been declining for several months.

Graphic: Asia Times

If tariffs result in higher prices for both consumers and industrial users, Treasury Secretary Bessent’s “private sector recession” could quickly worsen.

Graphic: Asia Times

Since 2020, imports of capital goods ( excluding cars ) have increased by nearly 40 % in real terms. Semi-finished goods and other production inputs are some of the items that the US currently imports more than it does domestically.

It will be difficult for domestic manufacturers to replace imports with local production because so much of US manufacturing is dependent on foreign inputs. Ex ante, it’s impossible to predict how much of the tariffs will be absorbed by foreign exporters, either through currency devaluation or lower prices, and how much of it will result in price increases.

The Trump administration has threatened that the answer to 20 % tariffs on Chinese imports and 25 % tariffs on European imports will be” a lot.”

Follow David P. Goldman on X at @davidpgoldman

Continue Reading

Australia’s Albanese falls victim to a Chinese burn – Asia Times

As the Albanese government struggles to stay on its political feet, who would have thought the China issue would suddenly insert itself into the campaign, leaving the prime minister looking, at best, flat-footed?

Improving and stabilising what had become a toxic bilateral relationship under Scott Morrison has been one of the Albanese government’s major pluses in its foreign and trade policy.

China has taken off all of the roughly A$20 billion (US$12.4 billion) in barriers it had enacted on Australian exports. Australian lobsters are back on Chinese menus. And who can forget the prime minister’s visit to China, when he was lauded as “a handsome boy.”

But now, almost on the eve of the formal campaign, a Chinese military exercise in the Tasman Sea has not just reminded Australians of Chinese military power, but has left the prime minister appearing poorly informed. Or not wanting to offend the Chinese.

Of course, China did not set out to force Anthony Albanese into what were publicly misleading comments. That was all his own doing. The China incident was on the morning of Friday last week, when its navy commenced the live-fire exercise.

Albanese was briefed on Friday afternoon. Later in the day, a reporter asked him about an ABC report of “commercial pilots [being] warned about a potential hazard in airspace” where three Chinese warships had been sailing.

The prime minister said: “China issued, in accordance with practice, an alert that it would be conducting these activities, including the potential use of live fire.” This told, at best, a sliver of what was a rather alarming story.

The government says the Chinese had acted in accordance with the law, but the amount of notice they’d given (which was not provided directly to Australia) was inadequate. Representations about this were made by Foreign Minister Penny Wong to the Chinese.

It took evidence before Senate estimates hearings this week to paint a full picture of what happened.

On Monday, Rob Sharp, CEO of Airservices Australia (the country’s civil air navigation services provider) told senators: “We became aware at two minutes to ten on Friday morning – and it was, in fact, a Virgin Australia aircraft that advised one of our air traffic controllers – that a foreign warship was broadcasting that they were conducting a live firing 300 nautical miles east off our coast. So that’s how we first found out about the issue.”

Initially, “we didn’t know whether it was a potential hoax or real.” Meanwhile, a number of commercial planes were in the air and some diverted their routes.

On Wednesday, Australian Defense Force Chief David Johnston was asked at another estimates hearing whether Defence was only notified of what was happening from a Virgin flight and Airservices Australia 28 minutes after the Chinese operation firing window commenced. Johnston’s one-word reply was “Yes.”

Australia does not know whether the Chinese ships, which proceeded towards Tasmania, intend to circumnavigate the continent, or whether they have been accompanied by a submarine.

Relations with China won’t be a first-order issue with most voters at this cost-of-living election. But these events play to the Dutton opposition, for whom national security is home-ground territory. They reinforce the broader impression, which has taken hold, of Albanese being poor with detail.

Dutton said on Sydney radio on Thursday, “I don’t know whether he makes things up, but he seems to get flustered in press conferences. You hear it – the umming and ahing, and at the end of it, you don’t know what he’s actually said.

“But what we do know is that he is at odds with the chief of the defense force, and he needs to explain why, on such a totemic issue, he either wasn’t briefed, that he’s made up the facts, that he’s got it wrong.”

Wong hit back, “We have been very clear China is going to keep being China, just as Mr Dutton isn’t going to stop being Dutton – the man who once said it was inconceivable we wouldn’t go to war is going to keep beating the drums of war.

“The Labor government will be calm and consistent; not reckless and arrogant.”

There’s one political complication for Dutton in seeking to exploit the China issue. Despite his natural hawkishness, in recent times he has been treading more softly on China, with an eye to the importance of voters of Chinese heritage in some seats.

The Trump administration has dramatically increased the uncertainty of the international outlook that the Australian government, whether Labor or Coalition, will face during the next parliamentary term.

Defense Minister Richard Marles this week talked up the US administration’s policy in the region. “We are very encouraged by the focus that the Trump administration is giving in terms of its strategic thinking to the Indo Pacific.”

Treasurer Jim Chalmers, who was in Washington lobbying for a tariff exemption was also upbeat, declaring that “the alliance and the economic partnership between Australia and the US is as strong as it’s ever been.”

Whether we get that exemption will be an early indication of where we stand in terms of the special relationship with the US. But who knows what the US might want in return.

A volatile world and perhaps pressure from the US may push Australia into spending more on defense, which on present planning is due to tick past 2% of GDP.

Dutton has already said he would put more funding into defence, although, like most other aspects of opposition policy, the amount is vague. The Coalition says when it produces its costings (which will be in the last days before the election) there will be more precision.

We’ve yet to see how the crucial US-China relationship evolves. That trajectory will have implications for Australia, positive or negative.

On the very worst scenario, if China, encouraged by US President Donald Trump’s benign attitude to Russia, moved on Taiwan, the security of which the president has refused to guarantee, that could produce a dire situation in the region.

Australia remains confident of continuing American support for AUKUS. But if Trump becomes even more arbitrary and adventurous, AUKUS could become a lot less popular not in America but in Australia.

Michelle Grattan is professorial fellow, University of Canberra

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

China’s live-fire flex shows Australia is no naval match – Asia Times

The actions of Task Group 107 of the Chinese navy have been the focus of the American media over the past few weeks as it has sailed north along the American coast and conducted a number of live-fire routines.

Much of the conversation focused on “gunboat politics,” with some rumors floating around.

The American political controversy has also been predominated by the live-fire exercises. The fact that these activities are routine and completely legal has become lost in the wake of all the charges.

When one of these exercises caused disruption to human aircraft, the American government was right to house a problem with its Chinese counterpart. However, the general response was an incredible overreaction.

No evidence that Chinese ships engaged in surface-to-air exercises, and it’s not clear whether the primary firings involved medium-sized or smaller arms.

In any case, the facts suggest that the Chinese ship’s disturbance was caused by incompetence or inadequate execution rather than by some more wicked reason.

The People’s Liberation Army-Navy’s ( PLA-N) deployment is not unimportant, but as it happens frequently, the Australian public debate is lacking in substance.

While a number of resigned naval commanders have formally underlined the significance of the live-fire tasks, these voices have typically been drowned out by the militarization of the topic. This demonstrates how poorly the Department of Defense communicates with the government.

Senior officers are much more able to make public comments in issues of their concern in various nations, including the United States.

We might have avoided this pointless stoush if Vice Admiral Mark Hammond, the main of military, or Vice Admiral Justin Jones, the main of joint operations, had been given the authority to describe how live-fire exercises are performed frequently by American warships deployed in our area.

Body from the maritime sector

The true impact of Task Group 107’s activities is how it has shown the very different paths of the PLA-N and its Royal Australian Navy rival.

A Type 055 Renhai-class ship, a Model 054A Jiangkai II ship, and a Type 903 Fuchi-class replenishment send make up the work group. This strong force embodies the Chinese navy’s fast expansion.

It is acknowledged that the Renhai-class ships are some of the most effective surface combatants already in use.

They weigh 13 000 tons and have 112 vertical-launch system (VLS ) missile tubes. The Hobart-class battleship, the flagship area warship of the American navy, weighs only 7, 000 tonnes and has 48 VLS weapon cells.

Although these are quite simplistic measures, it would be foolish to assume that Chinese tech is significantly superior to that of Australia or its friends. Similar to the general-purpose battleships that Australia is attempting to gain, China’s Type 054A battleships are made available.

China has installed eight Type 055 cruisers as of 2020, adding to its fleet of over 30 Model 52C and Model 52D warships and a ton of Type 054A frigates.

This navy’s overall growth is far greater than any other navy’s overall. Every few years, Chinese ships produce the same level of combat power as the whole Royal Australian Navy.

We have seen extremely little of this marine ability in our area up until recently. In 2022, a PLA-N task army was stationed off Australia’s east coast. A similar power was present in the South Pacific next year. In the foreseeable future, the majority of economists predict more Chinese warships will be stationed in the area.

The PLA-N’s little army of replenishment boats, which resupply naval vessels at sea, have a significant impact on Chinese international operations.

This appears to be changing as the PLA-N’s features and objectives change. China was anticipated to “build more replenishment ships” in a recent US Department of Defense report in order to help its expanding long-duration hero ship deployments.

trying to keep up with the rhythm

Australia is making significant investments to recover its army in response to the Chinese expansion. This method, however, has been delayed and problematic.

However, this year, the Defense Department revealed that the style for the new American frigate has been moved forward until 2026. So the army now has a small fleet of only 10 surface warriors, the majority of which are small and aging Anzac-class frigates.

The appearance of the Chinese job group also unfavors another new decisions.

From a certain perspective, the Arafura-class onshore police vehicle program’s reductions make sense. However, these ships would have offered more options for Australians who had repeatedly spied on foreign warships in their prime.

In addition, the growing need for American ships to chaperone Chinese vessels in our region will put an extra strain on American replenishment capacity.

Both of Australia’s supplies boats are currently out of services. Extra funding was also eliminated from the most recent defense budget. The Chinese work force’s actions are not some ostentatious use of gunboat diplomacy in our area.

This unscientific communication has, in many ways, distracted attention from a much bigger problem. Foreign naval ships will be a fact of life in our area. And because of the past 15 years of failures on both sides of politics, Australia’s army is unprepared to face that challenge.

Richard Dunley is UNSW Sydney’s senior lecturer in background and sea plan.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Learn the article’s introduction.

Continue Reading

Asia easing fast and furious against Trump’s tariffs – Asia Times

Japan — It’s been years since financial activities in Bangkok had global repercussions. But the Bank of Thailand’s surprise rate cut on Wednesday ( February 26 ) signals how rapidly Donald Trump’s trade curbs are upending Asia’s 2025.

Bangkok was the site of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the next day it experienced financial conflict. Back then, the economy of Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea collapsed in spectacular currency crises style.

That dark time isn’t always about to repeat itself. The area has come a very long approach: banks are healthier, currencies trade more widely, governments are more visible, markets are more tenacious and main banks have enormous foreign exchange reserves.

But the BOT’s 25 basis-point cut to 2 %, its lowest level since July 2023, follows similar moves in Jakarta and Seoul to counter downside risks that bear US President Trump’s prints.

Bank Indonesia kicked points off with a 25 % interest rate cut in the middle of January. Governor&nbsp, Perry Warjiyo&nbsp, called the split “pro-stability and development” given “global and regional economic relationships”.

The Bank of Korea hit the economic fuel this year. On Tuesday, Governor Rhee Chang-Yong’s team sharply reduced its economic growth projection as it cut prices to 2.75 %. In the BOK’s speech, it cited Trump’s fast-expanding business conflict as the main motivator for easing.

Due to deteriorating socioeconomic sentiment and US price policies, the BOK predicted that local demand growth and export growth would be slower than originally anticipated. It is believed that local economic growth will continue to be stable while inflation will continue to grow.

Of course, the BOK is burying the result, financially speaking. Trump, it’s obvious, is only just getting started. And in a way that sends the three markets into a whirl and battens down the doors. On Thursday, for example, Trump said he’ll double tariffs on China to 20 %.

” While industry have begun to respond to these advances, deep tax risks are still being underpriced”, says Kamakshya Trivedi, a leading global strategist at Goldman Sachs.

Deborah Tan, an analyst at Moody’s Ratings, says Asia’s “overall plan response may be crucial in determining the total effect on credit power. We expect governments will probably work pragmatically, aiming to avoid increase with the US, preferring to communicate on a diplomatic basis, as shown by new developments”.

Even Trump seems unsure about where he’ll impose tariffs next and the scope of the curbs, according to earlier statements. Trump immediately addressed tariffs in Canada and Mexico at a Cabinet meeting this week about the latter being a done deal. Then, he suggested no taxes will ultimately be imposed.

” I have to tell you that, you know, on April 2, I was going to do it on April 1″, Trump said. ” But I’m a little bit superstitious, I made it April 2, the tariffs go on. Not all of them, but many of them.

In a note to clients, Capital Economics claims that Donald Trump’s victory in the November presidential election has only increased the uncertainty by causing significant penalties, tariffs, and the potential upheaval of traditional geopolitical alliances, which could also cause the rest of the world to become more uncertain.

The uncertainty, Capital Economics warns,” could end up weighing on global investment and consumer spending for an extended period, particularly if Trump repeatedly pushes back his tariff deadlines”.

To Paul Donovan, chief economist at UBS Global Wealth Management, the bewilderment factor makes for a uniquely challenging year for markets.

Case in point, he says, is” Trump’s very big announcement on reciprocal tariffs, which turned out to be a plan to investigate taxing US consumers at a future date. Markets had to decide whether the president was being a pushover or a protectionist, and for the time being, they are leaning in favor of pushover.

Of course “delay is seen as an opportunity to do’ deals,'” Donovan says. ” So far, such deals have been more spin than substance”.

Even though the headlines about US import tariffs continue to be a hot topic, according to Thierry Wizman, global rates strategist at Macquarie Bank,” there has been a clear deceleration of the” tax train.” There’s a sense that the administration’s approach to economic and national security issues is more transactional and less punitive”.

One explanation for the ever-shifting trade war plans is that Trump does indeed have his “kryptonite” ,&nbsp, notes Benjamin Tal, economist at CIBC World Markets. Shortly after the stock market reacted negatively to the news, Canada and Mexico were granted 30-day extensions on the 25 % tariff, Tal says.

One world leader who’s not confused about the turbulence to come is Xi Jinping, whose economy is Trump 2.0’s main obsession. Trump’s most recent announcement is a plan to levy an additional 10 % on imports from mainland China.

However, this week, China’s leader sounded more jittery than confident when he urged officials to stay calm as Beijing’s economic storm clouds loom.

China “must strengthen its political will and calmly respond to challenges brought about by changes in the domestic and international situation,” Xi told Politburo and State Council party members, according to Xinhua News Agency.

As Trump raises the stakes, Xi’s economic team begins. Trump has so far avoided paying 60 % tariffs on China, which he frequently threatened during the campaign trial. And now he’s reversing his previous approach, Joe Biden, and specifically focusing on the trade war.

For all its Biden criticisms, Team Trump is mulling ways to expand Biden’s curbs on Chinese semiconductors. The White House is also encouraging influential allies around the world to intensify efforts to stop China’s chip industry from expanding.

DeepSeek, a Chinese AI startup, is being investigated in the US. White House investigators are looking into DeepSeek‘s suspicions that it violated export controls to purchase sophisticated Nvidia chips in Singapore through a third party.

Tariffs, though, are still the main Trumpian event, raising collateral damage risks for Asia. And Trump trade advisors, like China hawk Peter Navarro, are angling for more.

” Trump’s new ‘ America First Investment Plan ‘ seals the fate of a deepening US-China conflict, reinforcing the earlier America First Trade Plan”, says Yale University’s Stephen Roach, formerly chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia.

” This isn’t an artful ploy for a grand deal with Beijing. Trump’s MAGA base is incredibly anti-China, which makes it all but impossible for him to change his tune. He’s cornered”!

From Trump World, new ways to complicate China’s year keep coming in. Case in point: possible fees on China-made commercial ships used for moving goods to slow China’s domination of ship-building.

China’s place in harm’s way has officials in Bangkok, Jakarta, Seoul and elsewhere slashing rates – and odds are there’s more monetary easing to come. That includes the Philippine central bank, which cut interest rates by 25 basis points in December.

It’s not that developing Asia worries about sustaining direct hits from Trump’s tariffs. It’s prepping for the indirect, but still devastating, blows to come as mainland China’s trade, investment and tourism shifts into reverse. China, which is subject to Trump’s tariffs, poses a serious threat to all of the world’s South.

Risks abound as Trump and his unelected enforcer Elon Musk systematically monitor US institutions that safeguard the value of US Treasury securities and the dollar, which are crucial to developing Asia’s trade-dependent economies. A US national debt that is close to$ 37 trillion would be significantly increased by the trillions of dollars in proposed tax cuts, according to Trump.

Trump and Musk are undermining the Internal Revenue Service’s function, which could alarm investors and credit rating organizations. This includes Asian central banks, which have nearly$ 3 trillion in assets.

Regardless, there are numerous economists who disagree on whether Trump’s bite will be as bad as his bark. &nbsp,

Our “aggressive Trump” scenario, which assumes high trade tariffs and significant deportations, would be stagflationary for the US economy and likely plunge the rest of the world into recession, according to Schroders ‘ economists in a note.

But, Schroders argues, “upside risks are also emerging. While DeepSeek could speed up AI adoption, macroeconomic reform is back on the agenda for governments looking for growth, and bank lending displays signs of life.

The economists add that” steep falls in oil prices could also conceivably relieve inflation pressures later in 2025″ at the same time.

Of course, the inflationary effects of Trump’s tariffs could dominate global pricing dynamics instead.

According to Chief Goldman Sachs economist Jan Hatzius, Trump’s tariffs will increase personal consumption expenditures (PCE), the preferred measure of the US Federal Reserve, by about 1 %. Already, that rate is running at 2.8 % annually.

According to our general rule,” We estimate that the proposed tariff increases would increase core PCE prices by 0.9 % if implemented, based on the assumption that every 1percentage point ] increase in the effective tariff rate would raise core PCE prices by 0.1 %.”

Gene Ma, head of China research at the Institute of International Finance, adds that “tariff-driven inflation complicates monetary policy, raising uncertainty for the Fed”. And for developing nations who fear that Trump might restore Asian financial crises.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

Continue Reading

Cruel hoax: the political economy of anti-immigration – Asia Times

If citizens have been properly cultivated by decades of demonizing and scapegoating them, deporting immigrants may win them political victories. For its patients, the atrocities involved are tragic.

But for repatriation makes little sense financially. It is a poorly understood immigration finance software that has the potential to destroy the nation. What once “made America great” ( at least for the majority light people ) were its successive waves of refugees.

What highlighted the strength of the British economy was its capacity to withstand those ripples despite tensions between them: a truly effective melting pot. Through my PhD, my National education stressed these items.

What therefore caused such a favorable perception of emigration to change? What otherwise made immigration a pressing threat to American greatness? What lets Trump pose as “protecting” us by strongly reducing immigration and substantially deporting refugees?

I’m referring to the vast majority of people who are poor and meet the working class at lower rates of pay. Foreign-born US citizens comprise about 14 % of the total population or around 46 million. About 12 million of them are undocumented. )

The social sector of emigration provides answers to these questions. However, those responses and the political economy that underpin them are utterly excluded from mainstream discussions and consciousness. The Republican party’s subsequent years of anti-immigration language and the policies in place for immigrant imprisonment during the last three presidencies serve as examples of this absence.

Deportation is a necessary response to the” costly invasions” of immigrants ( often equated to criminals ) by many politicians from both the Republican and Democratic parties. Proof for this marginalization system has been very indisputable. Its supporters appear to be mainly ignorant of the realities of immigration.

The majority of immigrants to the United States are younger people. The adolescent can best handle migration’s difficulties and dangers. They are most likely to be able to find the hardest work under the least amount of money because of their precarious and fragile surroundings. The illegal among them are the most susceptible.

When companies take advantage of and misuse them, they dare not complain to the police or another government officials. Immigrants often send portions of their wages ( “remittances” ) back to the countries they left.

Payments help care for children, the old, and others who remained there and partially compensate those countries of origin for losing their migrants ‘ performance.

Before older refugees arrived in the United States, their education was supported by their countries of origin. Their individuals and institutions spent considerable amount feeding, clothes, hiding, educating, etc., them from beginning to 15-18 years of age.

Because the younger people immigrated to the United States, they “invested” in their young individuals but made little money from that purchase. Their decades of production benefitted the US market, not the economies of the nations that made investments in them.

Prior to becoming full-time individuals, Americans who were born and raised in the country are already paying high financial costs to the US economy. US people partly cover those costs ( foods, clothing, and shelter ). The federal, state, and local institutions cover different parts of those expenses ( people teaching, public services, etc. ).

The US economy benefits from its child performance as a profit on its expense in their upbringing because comparatively few Americans immigrate. The United States increases the efficiency of immigrants they didn’t engage in, adding to that payoff.

The emigration of their residents to the United States is a rebate from and paid for by the poor because many of the nations where immigrants frequently reside are among the poorer nations. The globalization of socialism is not only reflected in its global imbalances, but it also makes them worse.

The child performance that migrants ‘ countries of origin lacks is what they most depend on. The wealthy nations that the least have them are transferred those rewards.

Numerous decades of large and successive waves of refugees made up the “great” National past that MAGA celebrates. The grants provided by refugees contributed a lot to the US’s amazing GDP growth in the 19th and 20th ages.

First waves of refugees stimulated economic growth that in turn attracted, welcomed, and integrated after waves. Each american wave faced difficulties, and the majority of them finally rose to higher wages. Some yet left the working class and became employed. Immigration and expansion were able to coexist in a routine that some perceived as “exceptional.”

As each expat flood arrived, its members tended to have the worst jobs, the lowest wages, and lived in the worst neighborhoods, including underserved ones like the poor schools for their children. When the next flood arrived, its people accepted the equal.

The economic expansion that earlier waves of refugees contributed eventually allowed their fights for better work, pay, and cover to achieve. Additionally, this development made it possible for the after waves of immigrants to take the place of the previous ones at the lowest echelons of the social scale.

Thus, nearly all immigrants could fairly anticipate better years back. The United States could boast of having a remarkable level of” social mobility.” Carefully exaggerated by “rags to riches” fables like those in the many novels of Horatio Adler ( 1832–1899 ), working-class belief in social mobility served social peace and often blunted socialism’s appeal.

Migration has not yet been considered in terms of its regional or economic effects by this analysis. Migration furthermore has economic effects: its effects on the employee-employer relationship. Immigration is typically less lucrative than what native-born people will recognize. Still less is accepted by illegal refugees.

Because immigrants may indicate a real economical threat, the native-born, better-paid workers is fear, hate, and oppose their appearance. Demagogs frequently use their reflection and reinforcement to bolster their hate and opposition to win seats.

If the migrants display “racial” differences, demagogues can integrate racism ( traditional or new ) to aggravate the competition between immigrant and native-born employees.

Companies have frequently pitted immigrants against native-born workers and illegal immigrants against both. Employers ‘ divide and conquer strategies have stifled native and immigrant employees ‘ collective actions and stifled or destroyed labor unions and strikes.

On the other hand, in recent years, significant portions of the US labor movement have revived partly by pointedly unifying immigrant ( documented and undocumented ) and non-immigrant employees and, thereby, defeating employers. Not surprisingly, some companies, worried about a reviving work activity, cultivated a reaction to strengthen groups among employees.

They were persuaded to reject emigration. Denunciations of and demands to remove diversity, equity, and inclusion ( DEI ) commitments became popular covers for and companions to anti-immigrant agitation.

New American presidents have criticized immigrants and used hostile language and actions as votes in the country. Those leaders ‘ plans and the resulting arrests were a response to several years of significant immigration. Whites and demagogues in politics used their common functions.

Trump lifted them into his efforts and congresses. His next term is intended to be the largest imprisonment in US history.

US companies will be disappointed that the persecution have reduced the number of profitable and low-paying immigrant workers (especially those who are undocumented ). Of course, companies retain their usual solution of technology: replacing actually more employees with computers, drones, and AI.

Millions of people who have been denied government jobs ( as a result of Trump, Musk, and DOGE ) will compete for shrinking job opportunities in the US private sector.

The Trumpian goal is a working class purged of refugees, organizations and La differences. It is a MAGA earth that has properly resubordinated most non-whites, people, refugees, and all others deemed inferior by the likes of Trump and Musk, and those they select.

Immigration has always been primarily responsible for the demands of US socialism. Migration was generally expensive, dangerous, and painful to the migrants who generally lacked additional ways to survive. The US working class was frequently threatened by emigration, which cast a negative light on it, but it lacked the democratic will to cease it.

On the other hand, the working group was also appreciative of the opportunities and life that immigration provided for their ancestors and people. In that way, they saw immigration favorably.

Over many subsequent years, slow, uneven economic development redistributed US wealth and income forward. A declining US empire, rising global competition (especially from China ), climate change’s escalating effects, and subsequent global conflicts, all combined, led to significant journeys to the country as its jobs, wages, and prospects were being stifled.

Immigration’s perceived bad results came to overshadow the good ones. Enough about the US working class’s support and appreciation of immigration prevented right-wing demagogues from snooping on their most recent great opportunity.

The working class’s changing circumstances and sentiments helped the populists shake up US politics. During the upsurge of the US dynasty in the 19th and 20th centuries, regular executive orders have stifled the political consensus that existed between the GOP and Democratic institutions.

Republicans and Democrats have since turned ever more harshly against one another as the US empire and socialism have begun their socially expanding drop. In terrible conflicts, their ancient social structure fell apart.

Immigration became one battlefield, one way to create a new democratic way out of the wane that no gathering official would dare to acknowledge. Trump has so far greatest grasped the opportunity to drive an extraordinary place on immigration—mass deportation—to energy. But, since it will soon became apparent that deporting immigrants solves small and worsens the US drop, the political program’s prospects are uncertain.

Much the same applies to the other initiatives that he and Elon Musk have in mind. These include neocolonialist plans to retake control of Greenland, Gaza, and the Panama Canal and make Canada the nation’s 51st position. Additionally, these include imposing tariffs on all countries and preventing the United States from participating in global efforts to combat climate change and health ( WHO ).

Abandoning the Ukraine war and shifting its prices to the Europeans does cause their opposition and expected frustration, which Trump and Musk may face.

As with immigration, the political economy of other Trump-Musk jobs ( and much of Project 2025 ) raise similar profound questions about their logic, blind spots and unintended consequences.

The deep contradictions of anti-immigration—and other projects —are not overcome by hiding them under the veneer of slogans like” America First”. The British version of what the term “declining kingdom” means is still present.

Richard D. Wolff is visiting professor in the student programme in foreign affairs at New School University in New York and professor of economics professor at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Wolff’s regular show, “Economic Update”, is syndicated by more than 100 television channels and goes to millions via various TV systems and YouTube. Understanding Capitalism ( 2024 ), his most recent book, is a response to readers ‘ requests for his earlier books,” Understanding Socialism” and” Understanding Marxism.”

The Independent Media Institute’s Market for All project produced this content. It is reproduced around with kind agreement.

Continue Reading

Japan’s birth crisis is a leadership failure – Asia Times

The birth rate in Japan is falling because of a lack of political authority and no simple answer. It is a statistical crisis.

The sharp reduction in births, which is the lowest birth rate in 125 years, has exposed the powerless and impotentiary effects of Chinese state intervention.

Policymakers have consistently attempted to reverse this trend by using scant incentives, flimsy reforms, and expressive social campaigns, only to have their efforts continue to decline.

The stark reality is this: Japan’s officials are not just facing a shrinking people, they are failing to ensure the government’s long-term practicality. The inability to change the pattern suggests that political tactics have been rooted in stale stereotypes about work, community, and social structure.

Politicians have long believed that people should own children if they receive financial support. However, the steady decline in delivery charges demonstrates that the issue is not related to money only.

Deeper factors are at play, including historical shifts, financial pressures, and a firm work environment, which make raising children difficult for some young Japanese.

Political leaders have shown a glaring lack of resilience, holding onto outdated options instead of promoting true, fundamental alter. Just offering incentives and tax cuts will not be much, there must be a rethinking of how the state supports people, particularly in areas like work-life stability, housing, and education.

This crisis has also laid bare an unpleasant fact about management: Japan’s deeply rooted government struggles to address issues that require mobility, technology and long-term perspective.

Local governments have tried policies like a four-day week, but these are still isolated initiatives rather than a part of a federal technique.

The social class, apparently mired in gravity and resistant to change, must shift from short-term democratic cycles to millennial planning. As the population ages, younger workers may bear an even greater financial burden to support social service and income systems.

Any efforts to increase birth costs will be pointless without a basic change in how Japan supports its labor.

The effects of silence extend beyond finance. A declining people weakens regional endurance, making it more difficult to maintain industries, maintain equipment and uphold global impact.

Japan’s industrial and manufacturing supremacy is not immune to demographic swings. To keep companies dynamic, a shrinking workforce means fewer entrepreneurs, fewer entrepreneurs, and fewer experienced employees.

This fact, which impacts everything from customer industry to international trade agreements, threatens the stability of the economy.

Japan must employ a number of detailed measures that address the root causes of its declining delivery rate in order to change this downward trend.

Initially, work culture may undergo dramatic transformation. Couples are discouraged from having children because of the region’s famous extra culture and lack of parental keep options. Parenthood would become more available by requiring shorter operating hours, expanding care options, and encouraging employers to offer more flexible working arrangements.

Next, the cost of raising children may be substantially reduced. While financial opportunities only have proven inadequate, direct interventions in education, care, and accommodation costs may ease the financial stress on young families.

More people would be encouraged to consider starting families by expanding access to free or discounted nursery, increasing child allowances, and reducing education costs.

Third, immigration plan may be reconsidered. Japan has generally resisted large-scale emigration, but with an aging population and shrinking labor, integrating experienced foreign workers may help maintain economic growth.

The effects of a declining native population may be mitigated by more stringent visa regulations, stronger support for immigrant families, and programs that promote long-term residency.

This conundrum is made more urgent by a changing global landscape. South Korea, a nation struggling with demographic issues, has seen a slight rise in fertility rates, an indication that changes in policy and social norms can affect change.

Meanwhile, nations like China, grappling with their own population declines, are increasingly looking at long-term economic sustainability rather than short-term fixes.

In a world where workforce size is a increasingly important metric of competitiveness, if Japan fails to adapt, it runs the risk of not only demographic decline but also economic stagnation.

For Japan’s political leaders, this should be a moment of reckoning. Their persistent inaction will be remembered as the catalyst for Japan’s population crisis’s descent into economic and social collapse.

Is the nation willing to change the traditional workplace culture to encourage parenthood? Will it change its immigration practices to make up for population decline? Can leaders support policies that address the wider social reluctance to marry and raise a family?

These are existential challenges that demand bold, imaginative leadership.

The political establishment can no longer afford to treat this crisis as a rambling issue that can be resolved incrementally. It calls for urgent, radical changes to Japanese society’s fundamental foundations.

The long-term effects of continuing to stifle lawmakers ‘ reluctance could be catastrophic, stifling economic growth, lowering national security, and leaving Japan struggling to maintain its position in an increasingly competitive world.

In the coming years, whether Japan’s leaders are capable of governing in the long run or remain shackled to policy stagnation.

George Prior is a global political and economics expert.

Continue Reading