Bolen C (Page 50)

In recent days, Kyiv to Seoul has been alarmed by the growing defense shaft between North Korea and Russia. In the latest development, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service ( NIS ) &nbsp, reported&nbsp, on Friday that some 1, 500 North Korean special forces had been sent already to the Russian Far East in preparation for deployment to the Ukrainian war front.

Yoon Suk Yeol, the president of South Korea, convened a security emergency meeting, stating that this poses” a major security threat” to both the international community and our nation.

Following its large shipments of weapons and ammunition, Pyongyang’s decision to send armed forces to Russia’s war effort comes from the security alliance that was sealed next June during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attend to North Korea.

What Moscow has agreed to give Pyongyang in return is revealed in more enticing ways. That, the evidence is less reliable, but it is possible to draw a conclusion that Russia has abandoned its long-standing commitments to avoid atomic use and non-proliferation.

Even more disturbing, these innovations take area amidst growing conflicts along the inter-Korean border, fueled by North Korea’s decision to officially reject the goal of peaceful unification. Otherwise, in a visit to an army headquarters on October 17, Kim Jong-un&nbsp, told&nbsp, forces that any use of pressure against the South had form an action against a “hostile country”, no against “fellow countrymen”.

North Korean army and arms implementation

The NIS accounts of North Korean army implementation follow many reports from Ukraine of their existence, prompting&nbsp, statements&nbsp, from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy about their appearance. One&nbsp, report&nbsp, claimed that a Russian missile strike killed some North Korean military officers. More lately, Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security&nbsp, released&nbsp, a picture that appears to show North Korean soldiers lining up at a Russian center in the Far East to collect clothing and other products.

So far, however, neither US nor NATO officials have independently confirmed these reports. Yoon spoke with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte about the potential deployment of North Korean forces. Rutte argued that North Korea’s deployment of troops to Ukraine would represent a significant escalation.

As&nbsp, reports&nbsp, have pointed out, it is hardly unprecedented for North Korea to dispatch military advisors, or even combatants, to conflicts. The North Koreans fought for the Bashar al-Assad regime during the Syrian civil war, in support of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, in Egypt during the Yom Kippur War, and recently.

There is some skepticism, however, about&nbsp, reports&nbsp, that the North Koreans are preparing to dispatch large numbers of forces – 10, 000 or more – to join the Ukrainian front. According to long-time Russian military analyst Aleksandr Golts, who is currently based at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, that would only occur if Putin were looking for an “immediate and decisive victory on the battlefield.”

The logistical challenge of training, arming, and moving that many forces is daunting. In an email interview, the veteran military analyst stated,” I believe Russia cannot support such a deployment.”

Russian combativeness has already depended heavily on the support of North Korea. Although the supply of artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles is estimated to vary, even at the lower end ( roughly 1 million shells ), it would make up a quarter of all the ammunition used, according to Golts. Russia’s ability to halt a Ukrainian offensive in the last year and achieve clear gains on the battlefield was viewed as crucial to the North Korean supplies.

Officials from the US and South Korea have noted recent supplies ‘ significant volumes. Robert Koepcke, US deputy assistant secretary of state for Japan, Korea, and Mongolia, &nbsp, told&nbsp, a conference in Washington last month that more than 16, 500 containers of munitions had been sent from North Korea since September of last year and that Russia had launched more than 65 North Korean ballistic missiles into Ukraine.

Alliance, or marriage of convenience?

Some analysts believe that this military axis has reached a point where North Korean stockpiles may soon be run out, and that this axis has a limit on its reach. RAND analyst Bruce Bennett&nbsp, argues&nbsp, that, rather than an alliance, this is a marriage of convenience – one that may not outlive the supply of munitions. He points to evidence of China’s unease with the relationship and, in particular, with Kim’s efforts to reprise the Cold War games that his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, employed to play off Moscow against Beijing.

Whatever may occur, the Russians are indicating a commitment to this axis since the Korean War. During his June visit, Putin signed a&nbsp, Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership&nbsp, between the two countries, which included a mutual defense clause under which each country agreed to help the other repel external aggression. The Russian State Duma received the treaty in writing on October 14 to formally ratify it. When asked if Russia would get involved in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Kremlin&nbsp, spokesman&nbsp, Dmitry Peskov told reporters that the two countries would engage in” strategic deep cooperation in all areas, including ensuring security”. As to the treaty’s implications,” the wording in the agreement does not need clarification, it is quite unambiguous”, he said.

Putin’s visit and the signing of the treaty sparked a lot of discussion about the potential financial support Russia might offer North Korea, particularly the technological and military support it might provide to bolster its nuclear and long-range ballistic missile programs. Observers have examined Russian aircraft’s travels to and from North Korea and meetings with senior government officials in search of evidence that Russian assistance may have helped the North Koreans solve their missile testing problems.

Any Russian assistance that effectively helps North Korea perfect its nuclear delivery systems would represent a significant change from Russian policy, which was actively trying to stop any potential technology leakage and opposed to nuclear proliferation in principle.

I was among the first Western correspondents to&nbsp, report&nbsp, on this during my time as the Moscow Bureau Chief for&nbsp, The Christian Science Monitor. The North Koreans made an effort to entice a sizable group of Russian missile developers from the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau to work there after the Soviet Union was overthrown. Although some design data may have been transferred, the KGB eventually stopped the group at the airport as they were about to leave Pyongyang.

Nuclear implications

The war in Ukraine, among other things, seems to have led to a clear shift in Russian nuclear policy. Most prominently, there is increasing high-level discussion of lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. On September 25, Putin&nbsp, presided&nbsp, over a meeting of a previously unknown organization, the Security Council Standing Conference on Nuclear Deterrence, where he talked about the need to revise the country’s doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons in response to aggression even from non-nuclear states.

This shift mirrors the&nbsp, doctrinal declarations&nbsp, of the North Korean regime, envisioning the use of tactical and other nuclear weapons, even in a conflict with South Korea. However, it also suggests that Russia would no longer perceive a barrier to aiding North Korea in that area.

” Russia supported non-proliferation for many years”, Golts told this writer. ” But now the situation has changed dramatically. The main objective has become the West’s intimidation.

Golts makes reference to statements Putin made when he traveled to North Korea that warned Russia might offer” sensitive” military assistance to US allies in response to the West’s supply of long-range weapons to Ukraine.

Putin&nbsp, who spoke to international reporters ahead of his trip to North Korea, said,” We are thinking that if someone thinks it is possible to supply such weapons to a war zone in order to strike at our territory and cause problems for us, then why do we not have the right to distribute our weapons of the same class to those regions of the world where there will be strikes on sensitive facilities of those countries that are doing this to Russia?”

After signing the treaty with Kim, Putin&nbsp, repeated&nbsp, that he does” not rule out” arming North Korea with such weapons. ” From this point of view, Kim is the best possible recipient”, observes Golts. He draws attention to the instance of Russia leasing nuclear submarines to India, which could also include funding for the development of long-range missiles under the guise of aiding North Korea’s satellite launch capabilities.

Already, the level of Russian military interaction goes beyond anything seen in decades. The recent&nbsp, visit&nbsp, of a Russian naval vessel to Chongjin, reportedly to ferry North Korean troops to Russia, was the first such entry since 1990.

There are still many unanswered questions about the nature of the growing military axis between Russia and North Korea. However, it is clear that both these developments are escalating and that the growing threat they pose for both the Korean Peninsula’s future security and stability as well.

Daniel Sneider is a Non-Resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI ) and a Lecturer in International Policy and East Asian Studies at Stanford University. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.

This article was first published by KEI’s The Peninsula. It is republished with permission.

Continue Reading

On October 20, past public Jokowi Subianto sworn in as Indonesia’s seventh leader. Twenty-five centuries ago he was a leper, and for good reason.

In 1998, special forces soldiers under his command abducted democracy activists in Jakarta, 13 of whom have never been seen once, and he was accused of human rights violations in Papua and East Timor. Those who did gain had been tortured.

The kids had been calling for the departure of President Suharto, Prabowo’s father-in-law, who eventually stepped down in May 1998 after widespread violence that some believe Prabowo helped expert. Therefore, backed by forces under his command, Prabowo tried to storm the presidential palace, gun in hand, to intimidate the new leader, BJ Habibie.

Jokowi was prohibited from visiting the United States for 20 years, but he never went on trial for the campaigners ‘ disappearances.

And his beloved defense career came to an end fast: he was fired from the military for “misinterpreting orders.” Disgraced, and seen as embodying the violence and repression of Suharto’s plan, Prabowo went into voluntary banishment in Jordan. He appeared to have no hope for the democratic Reformasi ( reformation ) system that had come out of the ashes of the oppressive New Order.

But Prabowo was far from finished. His recovery and extraordinary ascendance to the president may presently signal the end of Indonesia’s delicate, ambitious liberal democracy and a profit to the New Order design.

The conclusion of Reformasi?

Prabowo lacks passion for democracy, it is obvious enough. He has said, for instance, that it “very, quite relaxing” and “very, very noisy and expensive”.

Gerindra, the political party he founded and prospects, yet has, as its number one mission statement, a transfer to the Constitution” as stated on August 18, 1945″. This is the conservative original Constitution that Soeharto relyed on to act. It gave the president enormous power, who was not elected and had no word limits, but it did not guarantee individual freedom or a separation of powers.

Following Soeharto’s fall, the Constitution was changed to adopt a progressive, democratic design. Thus, a return to the original 1945 Constitution may in itself possible finish Indonesia’s hard-won, if troubled, democracy.

But Prabowo may not need to go this far to love the sweeping authority his former father-in-law exercised. Numerous New Order components are already in position. Much of the work of dismantling Indonesia’s liberal democracy has already been done by the outgoing president, Joko Widodo ( Jokowi ), whose son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, is now Prabowo’s vice president.

For instance, a key foundation of the New Order was “dual work”, a theory that allowed serving military members to get human content, allowing them to occupy the government. Following Suharto’s fall, this was ended.

However, new amendments to the civil support law that were passed in October last year re-authorize active members of the police and army to hold human positions. The proposed changes to the Indonesian National Army ( TNI ) Law currently being debated could expand this. When questioned about the military’s return to human life, the military forces chief welcomed the alterations, saying the troops would not be exercising a “dual work” but a “multi-function”.

Also, under Soeharto, restrictive laws tightly restricted media freedom. A contentious new criminal script that goes into effect in 2026 may presently restore the bans on criticizing the government that the Constitutional Court had formerly outlawed. Additionally, “broadcasting investigative journalism information” may be prohibited under a proposed fresh television law.

Under the New Order, legal community engagement was likewise cruelly restricted. There has been a constant increase in libel and threats against state critics over the past ten years under Jokowi. Additionally, a law passed in 2017 allows the state to break non-governmental businesses without the use of a court system. Now, three NGOs have been banned.

Some activists now openly admit their dread of being targeted and intimidated by state trolls or even intelligence organizations. Some fear Prabowo will use his connections to Sunni civil society organizations to&nbsp, force or vilify another groups&nbsp, he sees as reviewers.

Keeping the leaders content

Jokowi is also forming a sizable alliance in the DPR, the federal government, by in the footsteps of Soeharto and Jokowi. Only one group is remaining, with over 80 % of the members already voting for the other.

Jokowi will also increase his government, allowing him to honor areas to supporters and co-opt others, including members of civil society. This will further weaken the opposition.

This kind of government of elite “unity” makes politics opaque. Before measures are put to a vote, political fights occur in secret and are resolved through power plays and agreements. As it was under Soeharto, it would render the national legislature as little more than a rubber stamp.

This assumes Prabowo is capable of handling Indonesia’s powerful political leaders, particularly the rivalry between Megawati Soekarnoputri and Jokowi. Together, they now control the two biggest parties in the legislature ( PDI-P and Golkar, respectively ).

In the February elections, Jokowi, a still incredibly popular man, backed his ex-liar Prabowo because he believed that this would help him maintain his influence after he left office. Prabowo will, however, be reluctanced for very long to give someone real power. One of his biggest obstacles to rule is likely to be his relationship with Jokowi.

Having to deal with a obstructive court

The Constitutional Court, which has the authority to impose laws, is one of the few remaining obstacles to Prabowo acquiring the kind of dictatorial powers Soeharto had. Prabowo will not want a non-compliant and obstructive ( that is, independent ) Constitutional Court. Politicians are already openly discussing the need to “assess its performance.”

The court could simply withdraw from the court, as it has done in the past, if the legislature passes laws that weaken the court.

But the court was established by the amendments to the original 1945 Constitution. This implies that a return to the 1945 Constitution could be used to replace it if the government is unable to pass laws that would weaken, stack, or intimidate independent judges.

Before doing this, Prabowo would need to feel confident that his rule is secure and that he has the backing of the elites, but it is undoubtedly possible. Returning to the original Constitution would simply require a two-thirds vote in the MPR, Indonesia’s highest representative assembly.

Bold promises on the economy

In exchange for high economic growth and development that freed millions of people from poverty, Soeharto’s system was based on a Faustian agreement that allowed him to rule corruptly and oppressively.

Prabowo is likely to adopt the same approach. He campaigned on an annual GDP growth target of 8 %, a rate reached under Suharto, but never by subsequent governments. Jokowi put a lot of emphasis on development, especially in infrastructure, but he never saw much growth above 5 % annually.

Many people are optimistic about the state of the economy under the new president. Prabowo’s father was a prominent economist and finance minister. Prabowo has also&nbsp, asked&nbsp, Jokowi’s highly regarded finance minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, to stay in her role.

However, Prabowo comes to office with some enormously expensive commitments that would make Sri Mulyani’s job extremely difficult. These include his free school lunches program (upwards of US$ 30 billion ), which Sri Mulyani has publicly questioned, and Jokowi’s signature new capital city, Nusantara, currently under construction. ( The initial phase alone will cost at least US$ 35 billion ).

Moreover, Prabowo’s main priority will be to keep the elites happy and maintain his enormous coalition. His supporters and allies will demand access to concessions and lucrative appointments for their cronies to make up the large sums spent on the February elections, including his brother, tycoon Hashim Djojohadikusumo, who has funded his political career. Rational economic policy-making will therefore be highly constrained.

Indonesia’s high growth rate has always been attained through foreign investment, but Prabowo’s protectionist rhetoric has not stopped there. In reality, Indonesia will continue to be open for business. That will likely make the 8 % GDP annual growth target impossible.

More active foreign relations

Prabowo, who was educated overseas and speaks English fluently, feels comfortable on the global stage. Given its enormous size and new status as a middle-income nation, he will want a more prominent place in international affairs for his nation.

As Jokowi’s defense minister, he was active internationally, even attempting to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. And to his great surprise, countries like the US, which had previously denied him entry, have congratulated him on his victory.

Prabowo’s main foreign affairs challenge will be the same as his predecessor’s: managing the difficult relationship with China.

Indonesians harbor a strong sense of suspicion for China, which is fueled by a potent combination of deeply ingrained racist beliefs, a fear of communism, and an underlying hegemonic concern. The elite rely heavily on Chinese trade and investment, and Indonesia is one of the largest recipients of Belt and Road investments.

Like Jokowi, Prabowo will have to manage this difficult balance.

Indonesian civil society leaders are already referring to the new administration as” New Order Volume II” or “neo-New Order,” and it is obvious why. All the evidence suggests that the process begun under Jokowi will continue under Prabowo, moving much more toward a liberal democracy reform movement that was attempted 25 years ago.

There is nothing in Prabowo’s past or his campaign promises to suggest otherwise. The only thing that remains to be seen is probably how quickly it occurs and how far he will travel.

Tim Lindsey is the director of The University of Melbourne’s Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam, and Society, Malcolm Smith professor of Asian law.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

As the Russian government tries to capture as much territory as it can, perhaps with one eye on a possible peace deal, reviews have emerged in recent months of especially violent casualties among Soviet troops fighting in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.

Many will depend on how the US election turns out. If Donald Trump is elected, he did stop providing military aid to Ukraine, ending the conflict in “one day.”

Kiev may be forced to cede Russian country in accordance with the country’s recent occupation strategy. Because the place that Ukraine had captured in August would serve as a useful bargaining chip in negotiations, analysts have speculated that this was one of the reasons behind the country’s Kursk unpleasant inside Russia.

However, Russia’s offensive in eastern Ukraine has been specifically terrible, with US knowledge studies of fatality numbers of up to 1, 000 per time, dead and wounded. This calls to mind the “meat grinder” methods of past Russian and Russian military activities.

A “meat grinder” is a group tactic on the battlefield that values great troop density and intensity of defeat. It is a truly Russian approach&nbsp, nine decades&nbsp, in the doing, consisting of a combination of two little older strategies, especially retention and large mobilization.

At the heart of attrition is the notion of abundance. The sheer force of numbers causes the opponent to physically and psychologically exhaust them as wave after wave of cannon fodder is relentlessly used.

Mass mobilization refers to the extensive troop movements made at a specific location in an effort to overthrow the adversary. The intrinsic value of individual lives is not acknowledged by either approach.

Despite being outmatched in terms of organization and tactics, the Russian army successfully waged an attrition campaign in 1812 to defeat Napoleon’s invasion. The Russian empire suffered significant casualties a century later, but it was able to launch massive counterattacks during the First World War.

The “meat grinder” became embedded in Soviet military tactics. The idiom “quantity has a quality of its own” has apocryphal roots in Stalin’s administration during the Second World War.

Millions of soldiers were deployed during important battles like Stalingrad and Kursk, and the Soviet army eventually overcame the Nazi blitzkrieg due to the sheer volume of the numbers on the eastern front.

Success from the past is not guaranteed in the future. However, it seems that the dead and disabled bodies of their own soldiers are required collateral damage, according to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and his military planners.

Since 2022, more than 70 000 Russian soldiers have died, according to estimates. However, it has been reported that Russian casualty rates are now rising more quickly as a result of the country’s growing reliance on inexperienced fighters.

Since the invasion started, civilian recruits now account for the majority of deaths. Their lack of military training in a difficult environment against a highly motivated enemy contributes to this increase.

However, &nbsp, inadequate medical care&nbsp, and poor-quality protective kit are also important factors. Russian state media circulates expertly curated images and accounts of the dead, but morale is still waning and military wives and mothers are rebelling.

Ultimate sacrifice

Putin’s meat grinder continues to expand, however. The Russian government announced plans to spend £133.8 billion ( US$ 174 billion ) on national security and defense in 2025, equivalent to 41 % of annual government expenditure. All healthy men aged 18 to 30 can now be conscripted, and Russia has recently ordered a third increase in Russian troops.

The recruitment of a further 180, 000 soldiers will make Russia’s army the second largest in the world, with nearly 2.4 million members. However, this army is unqualified and does n’t protect the individual soldier.

Ukraine’s soldiers are comparatively well-trained and resourced, compared to other nations, and they do not view their lives as disposable. But the dynamic in Ukraine may be changing.

In April of this year, Volodymyr Zelensky, the nation’s president, passed new conscription laws that made men eligible for the army recruiters be dragged out of bars and nightclubs.

Russia’s meat-grinder tactics are not infallible and will eventually collapse. In a world of remote reconnaissance, large formations can quickly turn into large targets.

A large, unmotivated army is not well-equipped for contemporary warfare and will eventually result in diminishing returns, despite Russia’s ability to coerce military participation with high wages and the force of forced conscription.

Even a declaration of martial law in Russia, such as Putin’s recently introduced martial law in the occupied region of Ukraine in September 2022, would not address the deeply ingrained structural issues Russia faces.

Long-term challenges will be posed by the inadequate care of soldiers and veterans, including post-traumatic stress disorder ( PTSD ) treatment and disability.

In Russia, poor care practices are already causing social and cultural harm. Veterans who return home have committed 190 serious crimes. We can only hope that the Russian war machine burns itself out and that the long-term effects are not terminal now that Putin shows no interest in peace.

Becky Alexis-Martin, Peace Studies and International Development, University of Bradford

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

The dramatically worsening situation in Myanmar once again occupied a high position on the agenda of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) leaders’ meetings earlier this month in Vientiane, Laos.

The Chair’s Statement was a discomforting reminder of one of ASEAN’s greatest-ever diplomatic failures: the Five Point Consensus (5PC ) on Myanmar.

The five “agreed” points between ASEAN and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the head of Myanmar’s State Administration Council ( SAC ) junta, have essentially accomplished nothing since it was finished in April 2021.

We reaffirmed our commitment to the use of ongoing and sustainable strategies and methods to assist the people of Myanmar in finding a quiet solution that is jointly owned and led by Myanmar and aimed at promoting peace, stability, and security in the region, according to the statement. &nbsp,

This “reaffirmation” has been on duplicate in every standard ASEAN statement for over three centuries. But, too, has an internal evaluation of the 5PC, a quarterly training in pointing out the apparent loss of the discussion.

The local grouping claimed that” we reaffirmed the Chair’s thorough report on the application of the 5PC and, in accordance with the assessment of the report, we demanded more progress in all 5PC areas because we were concerned about the substantial lack of progress being made in the application of the 5PC.” We therefore catered to the agreement that the 5PC may continue to serve as the primary tool for addressing Myanmar’s political crisis and that it should be fully implemented.

Malaysia is expected to take over in 2025 while Laos has served as ASEAN’s rotary head this time. Indonesia continues to work on Myanmar concerns despite the fact that its well-intentioned authority in 2023 was thwarted by the browbeating of the SAC and Min Aung Hlaing, who have been denied ASEAN conferences for more than two years.

However, many observers refuse to acknowledge that ASEAN’s partnership with Myanmar is primarily program, prosaic, and generally coup-blind. Myanmar’s coup-installed government attends in-person and online regional discussions on everything from connection, climate change, health, violence, free trade and foreign affairs.

Many speech partners, including Australia, China, Japan, Japan, the European Union, the United States, Russia, and China, each have their own opinions on how to best handle Myanmar and its bloody conflict, but they all place greater value on their interactions with ASEAN than on one imploding member status.

Myanmar just hosted the ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting, which was held under the clever motto” Road toward peace and prosperity.” In September, the head of the Myanmar Air Force attended the ASEAN Air Chiefs Conference ( AACC ) in Cambodia.

In 2023, a similar conference hosted in Naypyidaw was boycotted by the air pressure rulers of Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. However, recent quakes have not been in the air, even as the Myanmar Air Force launches its terrifying flying airstrikes and massacrates hundreds of civilians in unrestrained assaults across the nation. Additionally, the military has been bombing towns along numerous rivers and along the coast. &nbsp,

The 5PC’s failure is shared globally, from the United Nations ( UN), Western states, Japan and the SAC’s ostensible allies in China and Russia, who have all committed to ASEAN’s lead role in engaging Myanmar’s regime and resolving the country’s crisis. The single compromise the 5PC has managed to reach so far is social silence.

Some people may believe that the 5PC’s loss is the cause of a wider political dead-end after the SAC’s plan of war crimes against the people of Myanmar for almost four times. Nevertheless, it is an easy-out to throw ASEAN as the ultimate blame of this horrible cul-de-sac.

Min Aung Hlaing and the routine, who have consistently refrained from working on the consensus despite their dishonest people commitment to the international forum, are the main villains, of course. A corrupt UN program, a special envoy of the secretary-general who is still finding her legs after being appointed six months ago, political conflict between China, Russia, and the US, and a world of raging issues and philanthropic needs have all conspired to make Myanmar the country’s “forgotten” war.

A significant gap in diplomatic relations between those groups within China’s orbit, those close to the West, especially the K2C ( Karen, Karenni and Chin revolutionary actors ), and those like the Arakan Army ( AA ), which straddles China, Bangladesh, and Indian demands, has not been convincingly reconciled by the exiled National Unity Government ( NUG) and multiple Ethnic Armed Organizations ( EAOs ).

The diplomatic divides make for an extremely challenging and contradictory environment to navigate, but it’s not insurmountable.

Myanmar thought leaders, think tankers, scholars, media commentators, civil society leaders in women’s groups and human rights organizations are all providing valuable and sophisticated input publicly and quietly to revolutionary figureheads.

However, the majority of the revolution’s senior members only pay close attention. How many 5PC reform or review papers were produced by the revolutionary actors K2C ( Karen, Karenni, and Chin ) prior to the ASEAN Summit in Laos? Where can one go to get Malaysia to become the new chair?

While supporters of the NUG and EAOs talk up “territorial control” and battlefield gains against the Myanmar military, the diplomatic dimension of the anti-SAC struggle is a dismal non-performer.

There is no diplomatic equivalent to Operation 1027, a rebel offensive launched a year ago that had dramatic success and persuaded many that a military victory over the SAC was possible.

The NUG’s international diplomacy is almost irredeemably sclerotic. Most of the efforts to defeat Western governments are wooden, illogical, and indicate that Myanmar’s political leaders are operating abroad.

Most ASEAN states have come to the conclusion that the SAC has a steadfast hold on power, and they are now gearing up for a potential election in 2025 as a subpar re-engagement opportunity. The 5PC of ASEAN has failed, to be sure, but the bloc has provided a useful deflector shield from the fumbling diplomatic ineptitude of the West.

Lurking under all this, as opposed to looming over it, is American absenteeism on Myanmar. The US has a sizable support for humanitarian aid and a sizable US Agency for International Development ( USAID ) program to support revolutionary governance.

However, its embassy in Yangon is mostly silent and appears to lack the leadership that the US would expect from the diplomatic corps. Washington has likely come to the conclusion that the NUG is ineffective and refuses to accept the propaganda being produced by pro-NUG think tanks and activists that a military victory is in store.

China’s interventionism is a reversed version of what it has done recently, as evidenced by its criticism of the Three Brotherhood Alliance ( BBA ) and their allies for phase two of Operation 1027 and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO ) for their understated but remarkably impressive military victories over the past few months.

It is obvious that Beijing has chosen to support the SAC as a means of negotiating with the numerous revolutionary actors in its purview, or at least to give that appearance for the time being.

The numerous Western donors and peace organizations ‘ competing mediation efforts add to the complexity of the ASEAN deflector shield. Revolutionary leaders are constantly distracted by incessant consultations in regional capitals or travel to Europe or the US rather than developing a credible strategy for engaging ASEAN.

If these efforts have produced any tangible results, they are not publicly discernable. Many of them do n’t go beyond meetings or statements, and they appear to be very repetitive. Implementing a strategy is the goal, not endless tinkering with it.

Without a clear foreign policy direction, opportunism by international actors abounds. But the NUG and EAOs must limit these distractions and concentrate on a collective political, military, economic and diplomatic focus.

There is also the perilous use of some international actors ‘ humanitarian aid as a means of political mediation, which involves essentially gambling with civilian lives. The reality of the past four years, when the regime has directly targeted aid as a weapon of war, is ignored when one assumes there is any chance to engage the SAC in humanitarian aid.

Ire at ASEAN’s inaction misses the point. That much was crystal clear in the immediate wake of the coup in April 2021 regarding the regional grouping, which will always be limited. It also paradoxically gives Myanmar’s revolutionary foreign policy new life, which various anti-coup groups are capable of doing.

ASEAN is correct in saying that the development of Myanmar must be “owned and led”

David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst who studies human rights, conflict, and human rights in Myanmar.

Continue Reading

Reports from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service ( NIS ) state North Korea has moved to&nbsp, deploy 12, 000 troops&nbsp, to Russia to support its military operations against Ukraine.

This ability deployment expands North Korea’s and Russia’s defense cooperation, which is a significant development in foreign geopolitics. It raises questions about the presence of outside forces and the dynamic change in the Ukraine conflict.

Such a shift might change the course of the conflict, causing European nations to put pressure on South Korea to reevaluate its self-imposed policy of not providing destructive military equipment.

According to reports, North Korea began sending unique functions troops to Russia between October 8 and 13, with original operations of around 1,500 troops. According to reports, they are fitted out with false identification and Russian clothing to make an appearance as locals, which suggests they were making clever moves to cover up their presence.

This development comes in response to recent political encounters between North Korea and Russia, including the filing of a pact for military assistance.

The implementation represents an increase. In South Korea, issue is growing that the pressure will push the Yoon Administration to&nbsp, raise or to change&nbsp, its plan to help the payment of destructive military technology.

There is very little private assistance for changing or expanding Ukraine’s assistance plan.

A change in policy that permits the contribution of destructive military equipment may have a bearing on South Korea’s commerce with Russia and, specifically, Central Asia, and bring it even further in line with the US, Japan, and NATO.

With the importation of raw materials and energy sources, South Korea’s commerce with Russia continues to be strong. Also, despite restrictions, South Korea’s export via next countries in Central Asia remain higher.

Some South Koreans have questioned the most recent knowledge:

1. Statistics and sources

The NIS figures are pretty high, critics say. Although it is believed that the information came from US and/or Ukrainian solutions, no details about where it came from have been made people. Several&nbsp, online sources&nbsp, corroborating that North Korean workers are being transported to Russia travel from and are frequently dispersed through Russian accounts.

2. Other explanations

The critics add that there are other possible explanations for the rollout being alleged. The number of 12, 000 army could indicate a prediction rather than confirmed operations, based on North Korea’s broader military programs. Additionally, it’s possible that smaller, gradual deployments are planned, and that the intelligence community’s recent figures reflect possible rather than actual existence. These soldiers might even provide non-combat functions, such as border guards and rear-guard procedures, rather than back range operations.

3. National Intelligence Service democratization

Additionally, interlocutors point out that South Korean intelligence service have a history of overstripping or undermining North Korean pursuits, which might put pressure on national security concerns. In this case, the large estimation of 12, 000 troops may serve some strategic purposes. The NIS does argue that closer security cooperation between South Korea, the US, and friends by highlighting the size of the implementation.

As this is an evolving situation and mistakes in first intelligence assessments may be anticipated, those who question caution caution that it will still be necessary to deny final judgment until further credible information is available. The fluidity of intelligence gathering, particularly when there is n’t any independent verification from international sources, could contribute to the overestimation.

A North Korean deployment’s justification must also be taken into account. &nbsp, North Korea will benefit&nbsp, from the move, which will secure monetary or in-kind payments for each soldier. In order to continue receiving secure technological assistance and political support to ease sanctions, it will strengthen and secure the relationship with Russia. Finally, it will also provide modern war combat experience for elite troops.

If the deployment is confirmed at scale, it is likely to lead to&nbsp, increased challenges for North Korea. These includes enhanced sanctions monitoring, a heightened state of alert in South Korea and defections.

Additionally, there are concerns about desertions and operational failures involving North Korea’s troops, which are further complicating the situation. South Korean defense officials also point out the possibility of casualties among the forces already present, though details are still undetermined.

The situation remains fluid, and more reliable evidence is needed to confirm the full scope of North Korea’s involvement.

The actual deployment’s size and effects will depend heavily on regional monitoring and western intelligence. As a result, such confirmation would lessen the ability of opponents to doubt the deployment.

In the short term, within the next year, further troop movements from North Korea may be observed, potentially escalating tensions among South Korea, the US and North Korea. The uncertainty that is currently being expressed would be significantly lessened by this.

In the medium term, one to five years, the deepening Russia-North Korea partnership could reshape regional power dynamics, impacting Northeast Asia’s security environment.

Looking five to ten years in, Moscow and Pyongyang’s persistent military cooperation may alter geopolitical alignments, potentially enticing other small states to form similar strategic alliances.

Jeffrey Robertson is a Yonsei University in Seoul’s associate professor of diplomatic studies. This article was originally published on his Substack, Diplomatic Seoul. It is republished with permission.

Continue Reading