Apparent Trump vision: Divvy up the world into demarcated empires – Asia Times

Technically, America– whether led by Joe Biden, Kamala Harris or Donald Trump– may be trying to remain the country’s pre-eminent corporate power.

The realist perspective holds that the global system of states compels specific states to seek as much power as possible in foreign relations theory. &nbsp, This is the only means to effectively make themselves more stable.

From these, there is a cut between defensive and offensive realists.

Protective realists think that as a condition improves its standing over potential rival states, it stops at the accelerator and concentrates more on upholding the status quo than leading.

According to insulting realists, a state can never have too much security, and states will not give up trying to bolster their relative power over other nations, who could also be adversaries. &nbsp, Any condition that has the capability may try to dominate its relatives.

John J. Mearsheimer portrayed as” Mearchiavelli”, by Marwane Pallas, the Philomathean Society. Image: mearsheimer.com

One of the most popular American proponents of authenticity, University of Chicago doctor John Mearsheimer, is in the unpleasant station. &nbsp, His outlook&nbsp, predicts:” The United States is going to come to great lengths to make certain that China does not occupy Asia”.

Wonderful measures include declaring war on Taiwan. Americans “would fight and die to support Taiwan”, he&nbsp, believes.

He dissects questions about whether US citizens would be in favor of a war by stating that the US government had “manipulate the discourse on what is happening in ways that manifest China as a corporeal threat.”

Mearsheimer&nbsp, gives&nbsp, two causes why Washington had try so hard to have PRC expansionism.

Second, the United States has worldwide economic passions to defend. A possible adversary, such as China, do threaten American prosperity if it gained control of a significant region with its wealth, commercial potential, and economic power. &nbsp,” It is evident from the traditional record”, he&nbsp, writes, that” the US does not tolerate friend competition”.

Second, Mearsheimer argues that a strong country that establishes domination over its region is “free to roam” .&nbsp, Not threatened by any of its own neighbors, it will make aggressive probes into some other major power’s neighborhood. &nbsp, So if the US wasn’t blocking Beijing’s power over areas of China’s close overseas such as Taiwan, the East China Sea and the South China Sea, China may be challenging US protection in the Northern Hemisphere.

Mearsheimer’s unpleasant realism, nonetheless, has a built-in weakness. He acknowledges that governments, including those of the US, do not always work as his theory suggests, despite the reasoning that seems to suggest that America should hang onto proper hegemony at all costs and ensure China does no achieve hegemony over Asia.

For example, he&nbsp, says, &nbsp, it was “foolish” and a” proper blunder” for the US to energy China’s rapid economic growth and technical progress starting in the 1980s in the mistaken belief&nbsp, that this would preclude potential security conflicts with China– an opinion that many other analysts then share.

Mearsheimer claims that his theory accurately predicts how major powers will act in response to external circumstances, but that some nations, including the most important nation on earth, reject to act in accordance with his theory.

Despite the pressures of the international system, it seems as though this makes room for the possibility that a government in the US that is no longer interested in preventing Chinese hegemony in East Asia might emerge.

This may in fact be happening. &nbsp,

Trump’s strategy appears to involve dividing the world into clearly defined empires, rather than an activist America that favors liberal rules and institutions and seeks to shape regions around the world to stop the rise of powerful adversaries. His continued rant about annexing Canada and Greenland seems more like a joke to his domestic political rivals.

Trump may have accepted the Russian and Chinese empires, according to some sources. &nbsp, His government has signaled acceptance of Russia&nbsp, keeping&nbsp, its recent territorial gains in Ukraine.

Recent statements by Trump’s controversial Defense Secretary&nbsp, Pete Hegseth&nbsp, and Vice President&nbsp, J. D. Vance&nbsp, have deepened European&nbsp, fears&nbsp, that Trump II intends to scuttle US security commitments to Western Europe.

Trump has frequently said the US alliances with Japan and South Korea are worthwhile only if America&nbsp, makes a profit&nbsp, from them. He has said little about the strategic significance of these alliances, which suggests he is not in favor of strategically containing China, even though some of his senior officials are.

Trump reportedly&nbsp, wants&nbsp, to withdraw US troops from South Korea. &nbsp, He has also&nbsp, said&nbsp, he has” no problem” with North Korea testing short-range missiles that cannot reach the US, even though such missiles threaten South Korea. If Trump were to remove America from Pyongyang’s target list, it seems as though he would be willing to let go of South Korea’s defense.

As for the possibility of US intervention in a Taiwan Strait war, Trump has said Taiwan is&nbsp, indefensible and is&nbsp, unimportant&nbsp, compared with China – and that he resents Taiwan for allegedly” stealing” the semiconductor manufacturing business from the US.

After taking part in annual drills at the Tsoying naval base in Kaohsiung, Taiwanese sailors in this file photo, taken on January 31, 2018, salute the island’s flag on the deck of the Panshih supply ship. Photo: AFP / Mandy Cheng

Trump sees China as a threat as an economic threat, which he would address primarily through economic policy rather than military strategy.

He has always preferred tariffs as a tool. Trump argues that tariffs can help to balance the US trade deficit and encourage manufacturing to relocate there. &nbsp, In late 2024 Trump&nbsp, said&nbsp, in an interview with the&nbsp, Wall Street Journal&nbsp, that he would respond to a PRC attack on Taiwan by imposing high tariffs on China, not by sending US forces to help.

Contrary to Mearsheimer’s expectation, Trump seems not to fear that a Chinese hegemony over Asia would seriously jeopardize US prosperity.

Despite China’s impressive economic development, accumulation of wealth and military buildup, America is still the world’s leading economic, military and innovation power. &nbsp, Washington also has a network of strong allies, unlike China.

The US has not abandoned its efforts to support global arrangements made up of liberal principles that serve US interests, or to oppose Chinese expansionism in East Asia. &nbsp, Rather, the Trump II administration may be choosing to let&nbsp, Pax Americana&nbsp, die in a case of domestic politics triumphing over international imperatives that are clearly not irresistible.

Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu.

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​US-Russia meeting in Riyadh successful, more to follow – Asia Times


The great level political meeting, held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 17th, is reported to have been successful by both the Russian and US sides.

Steve Witkoff, who is Trump’s range one troubleshooter, said that the conference was “positive, cheerful, creative and really good”. Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister and rival to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, said the appointment in Riyadh was “very useful”.

Actually the US group was led by Rubio along with Mike Waltz, national security advisor to the President, and Witkoff. We are unable to identify any individuals on the US area.

Rubio claimed that there were three main points at the table:

  • establishing diplomatic team to improve Washington and Moscow’s political operations
  • establishing higher levels groups to sort out the “parameters of the issue” in Ukraine, and
  • a second track to discover potential financial partnerships that could arise after the resolution of the Ukraine conflict, which the US part characterized as a “potentially historical financial prospect” for Russia.

Additionally, Lavrov stated that a meeting of the deputy foreign ministers would be held to discuss the specifics of a Trump-Putin meeting. No specific date was set for a Trump-Putin meeting.

Sergey Lavrov and Yury Ushakov, the president’s foreign affairs advisor, made up the top-level Russian delegation. Kirill Dmitriev was also a member of the Russian delegation. The Russian Direct Investment Fund ( RDIF), Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, is led by Dimitri V. Vladimir Proskuryakov and Dmitry Balakin were also present on the Russian side.

Proskuryakov has a focus on Arctic affairs and works for the Russian Embassy in Canada. Possible cooperation in the Artic was a topic of conversation in Riyadh. Although no specifics are available, it is likely that the discussion focused on the use of Artic resources and the creation of shipping routes if climate change continues to affect shipping.

It is reported that Dmitriev held side meetings in Riyadh on monetary and investment issues, but we don’t know who served as Dmitriev’s counterpart, although that could have been Steve Witkoff.

Both the US Embassy in Moscow and the Russian Embassy in Washington are conducting diplomatic operations while restrictions need to be lifted, essentially accelerating diplomatic normalization. This includes many elements. Following the meeting, Mr. Lavrov called attention to this and stated after the meeting that” It is necessary to remove the obstacles created by the Biden administration that impede the work of diplomats, including ongoing expulsions and seizures of real estate.”

In the debriefing of the meeting, Lavrov made a powerful point about Ukraine. Lavrov said” Not only did we listen, but we genuinely heard each other”.

Kyiv was not invited to speak at the talks, nor was any other state or organization from Europe. A flurry of activity in Europe has resulted from the lack of participation, leading to an “emergency” meeting called by France ( but excluding some NATO members who are opposed to supporting the Ukrainian war ).

Director General of NATO Marc Rutte, did attend the Paris meeting. It isn’t exactly clear why he did so, with some NATO members not invited, nor is it clear why he would do so without US agreement.

One result of the meeting, attended by the EU as a participant, were harsh statements aimed primarily at Washington and British pledge to send troops to Ukraine as part of some “peacekeeping” venture. The Germans, Italians and Poles disagreed with the British initiative.

The Russians have made it clear at the Riyadh meeting and in public statements, that NATO “peacekeepers” would not be welcome.

Lavrov said in his debriefing that a so-called three-step plan for Ukraine&nbsp, is a fake. &nbsp, The alleged plan has been attributed to Marco Rubio. ” The&nbsp, plan includes&nbsp, high-level meetings involving Ukraine and European nations and concessions from all sides, Rubio said”. The three steps are said to be ( 1 ) a ceasefire, ( 2 ) elections in Ukraine and ( 3 ) a final agreement.

It isn’t clear that a ceasefire was discussed, or Ukrainian elections. According to all credible reports, President Trump and President Putin both agreed to discuss potential terms for a settlement.

Numerous maps have been published in the press that show what a deal would look like and how the key points were discussed in Riyadh.

Readers should be informed that none of these maps appear to accurately represent the actual discussion in Riyadh, which covered the Russian and US positions on the conflict but did not go far enough to authorize further discussions to prepare for a Trump-Putin meeting.

Daily Mail graphic on a’ deal’ for Ukraine

The Riyadh meeting was conducting in a professional manner, without posturing or accusations. This is a major change from the rhetoric that dominated the Biden administration, although it remains a key component of Euro-rhetoric.

Stephen Bryen is a former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy and a special correspondent for Asia Times. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter&nbsp, Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.

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Risking Trump wrath, Ukraine bombs US oil project in Russia – Asia Times

Ukraine carried out a large-scale drone strike against the&nbsp, partially US-owned Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s ( CPC ) pumping station in Russia’s Krasnodar region early Monday ( February 17 ) morning.

Some were hitherto conscious of this job, let alone that it continued operating without any difficulties amidst the NATO-Russian substitute conflict in Ukraine and the West’s anti-Russian punishment, but it’s one of America’s most important regional opportunities. This bold strike, thus, risks incurring Donald Trump’s fury.

Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian leader and Security Council deputy president, made a&nbsp, a long Telegram post  on February 18 in which he claimed Zelensky was aware of the US connection to the CPC but that the large-scale drone strike was still carried out despite this.

In response to rumors that the US president will obstruct Ukraine’s peace with Russia, Medvedev claimed it was intended to be” a triple blow to American businesses, the oil business, and Trump personally.”

If Ukraine consents to Trump’s proposed US rights of its crucial material resources, Volodymyr Zelensky, president of Ukraine, revealed that the country’s Volodymyr Zelensky is upset about Trump’s attempt to impose expectations on Ukraine that “would number to a higher discuss of Ukrainian GDP than compensation imposed on Germany at the Versailles Treaty.”

Russian MP Dmitry Belik&nbsp, speculated&nbsp, the day before Medvedev’s post that adversarial elements within the US “deep state” might have also cooked this provocation up with the UK to “get under ( Trump’s ) skin”.

Either way, the attack’s orchestrators likely also didn’t know that the CPC is integral to the energy security of America’s top ally, Israel, which received a significant amount of oil from the megaproject over the course of its last regional war against the&nbsp, Iran-led Resistance Axis.

Readers can learn more about that&nbsp, here, which analyzed data about Kazakhstan’s and even Russia’s oil exports to Israel during that 15-month-long conflict, which few were also hitherto aware of.

Given that Hamas and/or Hezbollah’s ceasefires are fragile, it is unlikely that Israel’s president will engage in any negotiations with Trump to ensure the CPC’s security in the event that the region turns back into conflict.

Trump might at least make a threat in the background to stop Ukraine from receiving financial and/or military aid unless it renounces its unilateral policy of attacking the Russian oil infrastructure.

The larger context of&nbsp, ongoing Russian-US peace talks over Ukraine&nbsp, could even lead to Moscow following suit by eschewing its own such attacks against that country’s energy infrastructure as&nbsp, the first step&nbsp, toward a possible ceasefire for facilitating the elections that could then&nbsp, lead to Zelensky’s replacement.

It, of course, remains to be seen exactly how Trump responds to Zelensky’s provocation, but it’s extremely unlikely that he’ll ignore it, especially considering how this also indirectly harms Israel.

Ukraine’s large-scale drone attack against the partially US-owned CPC will, therefore, probably end up being something it comes to regret. It would be premature to describe it as a game-changer, but it couldn’t have occurred at a worse time for Ukraine given the ongoing Russian-US talks over its future.

Given how detrimental it will foreseeably end up being for Ukraine’s interests at this crucial time in the conflict, those responsible for planning and approving the attack could even lose their jobs or worse.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Myanmar’s fluid war edging toward an endgame – Asia Times

The State Administration Council ( SAC ) junta reversing its downward spiral in the wake of Myanmar’s military coup’s fourth anniversary, decisive Chinese intervention to rescue the regime and its off-ramp election strategy, resistance factions, ethnic and Bamar, sour relations, and bizarre combinations of all the above.

If there’s one word that adequately sums up the war in 2025, it’s “fluidity,” the uncertainty of a fragile balance of common weaknesses and antagonisms that leaves no room for comfortable forecast. Save, that is, for the clarity of the region’s accelerating financial decline and humanitarian crisis.

However, two starkly contrasting floor realities stand out against this shifting landscape. How they communicate with one another in the upcoming months will almost certainly determine the outcome of the conflict, possibly quickly and in a way that will probably foil Beijing’s efforts to implement a Pax Sinica over Myanmar.

The success of racial armies, or so-called cultural revolution organizations, has been the first and most widely praised for using normal forces and manoeuvre warfare to largely secure their own homelands.

Since the beginning of” Operation 1027″ in late 2023, the Kokang army in northeastern Shan state, its ally and neighbor, theTa’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA ) in Kachin state, and, most strikingly, the Arakan Army ( AA ) in Rakhine have all inflicted crushing defeats on SAC forces to carve out autonomous territories.

The ethnic Bamar resistance in Myanmar’s opposition to developing a unified strategy to move a four-year-old guerrilla conflict waged by a plethora of local Peoples Defense Forces ( PDFs ) to the next level of mobile warfare waged by regular forces that might defeat the national army has been a different reality.

The anti-coup National Unity Government’s Ministry of Defense ( MoD ), a blatantly bureaucratic rather than operational body hampered by a lack of resources ( waffen and money ) and by the near inapprehension of imposing top-down command-and-control on the spontaneous upsurge of popular revolt that characterized the Spring Revolution in 2021, is at the center of the fault.

However, a lack of military experience, tactical vision, and specific personality have also contributed to a floor circumstance that appears unlikely to change in the near future.

Army garrisons with weak morale but rich firepower are more or less firmly buried into urban centers in today’s situation. While somewhat well-armed PDFs are increasingly able to tactically defeat regime forces in freed but institutionally dispersed hinterlands, they remain fundamentally devoid of any overall force structure or corporate plan to remove and defeat them.

The transitional areas where liberated racial territories border the national periphery and border the Myanmar heartland are the key to unlocking this impasse are undoubtedly those keys. These regions have now started to serve as defense buffer zones for tribal borderlands in the face of a perilous future.

ERO buffer zone scheme, which was a natural extension of the temple and education offered to Bamar children fleeing SAC crime in 2021, has involved cultural forces arming, supplying, and directing Bamar PDFs in and out of their own territories. It has also seen ERO products fighting alongside allied PDFs in Myanmar’s plains.

The northern Sagaing place, where the KIA has built up PDFs and participated in the record of Kawlin and Pinlebu, has seen the most buffer zone operations since 2022.

The TNLA’s involvement in mentoring and supporting the Mandalay PDF and moving with it into northern townships of the Mandalay region has been even more impressive in terms of cultural support for a second, somewhat large PDF pressure operating under cultural command-and-control.

The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA ) has since expanded operations northward on both sides of the river to Toungoo, the military’s Southern Regional Military Command ( RMC), to expand its reach beyond Karen state in the Sittaung valley of east Bago.

The most recent buffer zone established by the AA, first in the Arakan Yoma range’s hills bordering the Magwe and Bago regions with allied Chin PDFs, and then, since January this year, in townships inside the delta region of Ayeyarwady, is arguably the most crucial buffer zone to emerge.

The former area has a view of the Ayeyarwady River valley and Myanmar’s industrial heartland, where the military’s Directorate of Defense Industries ( better known by its Burmese acronym, Ka Pa Sa ), has long run a network of plants whose production of a wide range of munitions ultimately keeps the military on the ground. &nbsp,

Abutting Yangon region, the delta zone constitutes the economically crucial rice basket of Myanmar, an ethnically mixed area where Bamar, Karen and Rakhine communities co-exist and where, in the past, the KNLA has had deep roots.

The rapid response that the army command in Naypyidaw has responded to recent AA probing attacks reflects the strategic importance of both regions. A sizable tactical operations group, consisting of 360 members from the Meiktila-based 99th Light Infantry Division, was dispatched in mid-January to stop the AA’s advance across the Arakan Yoma, but by the first week of February, it had lost the majority of its workforce.

As the southwestern RMC attempted to stop AA advances along the Bay of Bengal coast and through the hills toward Thabaung township, reinforcements including a significant armored contingent from Hmawbi were rushed from the Yangon command in early January. Fighting is reportedly ongoing.

It seems unlikely that AA will attempt to storm large population centers in the Bamar heartland, such as Pathein in the Delta or Pyay in the Ayeyarwady valley, at this point in the conflict.

Other allied EROs are subject to similar restrictions. For instance, as part of Beijing’s wider plan to at least ensure the regime’s survival until it can hold the stage-managed elections it has touted since the coup, the TNLA is currently under heavy Chinese diplomatic pressure to reach a ceasefire with the SAC in the north.

However, in what might be referred to as a “buffer zone-plus” strategy, increased AA logistical support for allies reinforced by the insertion of tactical advisory teams and possibly even regular units is likely to result in defensive buffers being extended into areas of offensive guerrilla operations. &nbsp,

Given the strikingly short distances between the Delta rice basket and the strategically important Ayeyarwady Valley industrial belt, which are both strategically and economically important, this development has the potential to significantly shorten the war.

It is still up for debate whether the regime could withstand the disruption, let alone the loss, of significant industrial and agricultural centers if it were occurring at the same time as the stepped-up pressure in and beyond the KIA, TNLA, and KNLA, without acknowledging the need for a change of course.

It’s impossible to say when such a turning point will occur, including the resignation of SAC supremo and commander of the armed forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, or the initiation of negotiations, or both. &nbsp,

However, it might happen before the SAC’s electoral ploy tentatively scheduled for the end of this year as large-scale guerrilla operations led by powerful EROs are now threatened the core territories of a politically and economically bankrupt regime. &nbsp,

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N Korea missile puts all of US mainland in nuclear attack range – Asia Times

North Korea is developing weapon defenses to attack the US island, which could sabotage US forces and raise concerns about a potential strategic shift in the Asian Peninsula’s power balance.

In a statement this month before the US Senate Armed Forces Committee, General Gregory Guillot, head of US Northern Command ( USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command ( NORAD), said that North Korea’s growing intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) capabilities pose a direct threat to the US mainland, with its latest solid-propellant Hwasong-19 missile likely capable of delivering a nuclear payload to targets across North America.

The new aircraft’s solid-fuel design drastically reduces release preparation time, complicating proactive recognition and interception efforts.

Guillot warned that if North Korea’s arsenal exceeds present estimates, its rapid change from missile development to sequential production was soon outweigh US ballistic missile defenses.

He even made a point about the potential for modern exchanges between North Korea and Russia, as well as potential quid-for-quo agreements that would support the latter’s highly developed strategic weapons program.

The likelihood of continuous multi-domain threats to the US land is increased by these innovations and wider strategic cooperation between US adversaries, adding even more pressure on already-existing missile security systems.

In reply, Guillot emphasized the immediate need for developing next-generation missile defenses, including the development of NGI-based domain awareness technologies and the prompt deployment of NGI-based NGIs, to combat the threat of more complex adversary missiles.

In a November 2024 article for 38 North, Vann Van Diepen says North Korea’s Hwasong-19 ICBM represents a significant advance in the country’s strategic missile capabilities, likely incorporating a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle ( MIRV ) system.

Van Diepen states that the larger solid-fuel Hwasong-19, compared to the Hwasong-18, has improved increase capability that increases payload capacity without extending range, as the earlier ICBM can now accomplish the US mainland. He notes that the Hwasong-19’s launch footage shows a probable post-boost vehicle ( PBV), essential for MIRV deployment.

He points out that a successful MIRV-equipped Hwasong-19 may increase the number of missiles per weapon, increase second-strike endurance, and put US missile security at risk. However, additional testing is required to ensure the MIRVs survive atmospheric rehabilitation.

But, Thomas Newdick argues in a The War Zone article from June 2024 that while it may be technically possible for North Korea to place several warheads on a weapon, it is more complicated to put them on many targets.

According to Newdick, it’s unclear whether North Korea has the skill to accurately place a bomb on a goal after it has been detonated from a nuclear weapon.

North Korea might have benefited greatly from the continuing conflict in Ukraine. According to Newsweek’s report from this month, North Korean nuclear missiles launched against Ukraine have increased in correctness since last year, hitting targets 50 to 100 feet away from them, up from their earlier range of 1 to 3 meters.

As North Korea transitions to published ICBM generation, it raises the possibility of overextending the US’s missile threats. After displaying 10-12 Hwasong-17 Squadrons during a nighttime rally in Pyongyang, Polititico reported in February 2023 that North Korea might have more than the US has ships.

Politico notes that if North Korea could meet four weapons on each weapon, those weapons could potentially destroy the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense ( GMD) system, which has only 44 ships. The GMD has only demonstrated 55 % success in very scripted testing and frequently required three ships to intercept a single weapon, adding to the problem of limited ships.

Cognizant of US missile defense limitations, in January 2025, US President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order to build a US” Iron Dome”, a next-generation missile defense system incorporating space-based interceptors ( SBI ) to defeat hypersonic weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks.

However, experts have disagreements regarding the US Iron Dome project’s viability and potential impact on instability or deterrence.

Ankit Panda claims in a Breaking Defense article this month that the US Iron Dome does not address the vulnerability issue and merely encourages US adversaries to develop new nuclear weapon delivery techniques, such as fractional orbital bombardment ( FOB ) systems.

In accordance with that, North Korea has developed the” Haeil” nuclear-armed underwater drone that is intended to enter enemy waters and detonate to produce a radioactive tsunami to obliterate enemy ships and ports. However, it is not clear whether North Korea’s Haeil is a real weapon or a propaganda ploy.

Additionally, Jessica West and Victoria Samson make mention for Breaking Defense in which they claim that space-based interceptors could fuel international agreements against the militarization of space.

Todd Harrison claims in a January 2025 American Enterprise Institute ( AEI ) article that while the cost of building a system of 1, 900 SBIs could reach US$ 11-27 billion, such a constellation could only intercept two incoming missiles while all other interceptors would remain out of range.

Harrison cites the absence issue where low-Earth orbit ( LEO ) satellites spend most of their time above the wrong region of the planet. Given the conflict between North Korean nuclear capabilities and US missile defenses, there are also divergent opinions on the latter’s position regarding its nuclear arsenal.

In a December 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Defense &amp, Security Analysis journal, Hwee-rhak Park and Wooyun Jo mention that North Korea has two objectives when developing its nuclear arsenal: first, to break US nuclear extended deterrence ( NED ) in the Korean Peninsula, and second, to reunify the Korean Peninsula under its regime.

Park and Jo mention that North Korea is concerned about its nuclear retaliation against the US mainland and that the US may reverse its NED position on the Korean Peninsula. They assert that the US may use tactical nuclear weapons only as long as North Korea forbids the use of nuclear weapons against South Korean military installations.

In the worst case, Park and Jo claim that North Korea might launch a number of nuclear weapons at South Korean cities to demoralize or cripple those forces before moving ground forces into the latter’s territory to compel their surrender.

They claim that North Korea can attempt to avoid US forces in South Korea while threatening a nuclear attack on them if they launch an offensive and compel the US to leave the Korean Peninsula. They point out, however, that the North Korean government would make the decision to use nuclear weapons against the US or South Korea.

Given those options, Park and Jo advise that the US and South Korea implement stronger nuclear deterrence measures, such as the permanent deployment of US nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN ) close to the Korean Peninsula, the deployment of nuclear gravity bombs and missiles in Guam, and sign a nuclear-sharing agreement to prepare US and South Korean forces for a nuclear war.

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Social media lens on Prabowo’s first 100 days – Asia Times

Social media has become the new open place where people can express their expectations, concerns, and concerns about their governments in the age of modern politics.

Websites like X ( previously Twitter ), Reddit and TikTok are no longer just places for entertainment—they serve as indicators of public mood, shaping and reflecting political conversation in real time.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto was frequently discussed virtual by the South Eastern nation’s technologically savvy population during his first 100 days in workplace. Social media meetings offer valuable insights into both the difficulties and opportunities that his administration faces, despite considerable attention from the president.

According to social media survey study conducted by CARMA Asia, a Singapore-based world insights and knowledge company, online conversations about the ex-soldier government’s first 100 days identify a prevailing sense of dissatisfaction among netizens.

Much of the criticism stems from unmet expectations regarding economic reforms and his administration’s close ties to the former president, Joko Widodo, whose eldest son now serves as vice president.

Indonesian concerns about continuity rather than change are fueled by Prabowo’s inability to create a distinct political identity from Widodo’s legacy, according to the research findings.

Source: CARMA

Prabowo’s administration assumed office in October 2024 and immediately ignited online debates. While some users praised the peaceful transition of power to a democratic system, many others questioned Prabowo’s history of human rights, corruption concerns, and dubious cabinet appointments.

The tone for the months that came after this early discourse was. In November, the administration’s handling of the Thomas Lembong corruption trial, involving an ex-trade minister, and the Gus Miftah controversy, wherein the president’s special envoy was caught on video mocking an elderly tea seller, further eroded public confidence.

The abrupt cancellation of Yos Suprapto’s” Revival: Land for Food Sovereignty” art exhibition at the National Gallery in December was a watershed online moment, triggering the most significant spike in negative sentiment, the research showed. The artist refused to remove five paintings that critically depicted Widodo, causing its cancellation.

The government’s request to remove the artworks was viewed not merely as an isolated incident, but as a troubling signal about the administration’s stance on artistic freedom and public discourse.

These incidents, highlighted by figures like former minister Susi Pudjiastuti, show social media’s power to shape politics and hold leaders accountable.

January saw a slight improvement in sentiment, which may give Prabowo’s government a glimmer of hope, but the persistent undercurrent of negativity suggests deeper structural issues that time alone are unlikely to solve.

The former president Widodo’s nomination as” Most Corrupt Person of the Year” by The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project and Prabowo’s defensive response highlight the delicate balance between upholding free speech and maintaining transparency.

Source: CARMA

One thing is clear about Prabowo’s early months in office: Indonesia’s digital revolution is transforming the way politics unfolds. And Prabowo’s administration can ill-afford to ignore the power of online discourse in influencing the nation’s collective consciousness.

Each decision, whether related to policy, governance or public statements, is subject to immediate scrutiny and reaction from a highly engaged Indonesian digital population.

Prabowo’s administration must acknowledge that today’s governance requires both decisive leadership and the ability to effectively engage with public sentiment in order to navigate this new reality. Digital engagement is no longer optional, it is an essential component of modern leadership.

In the coming months, Prabowo’s response to this reality may well determine how he will lead Indonesia.

Methodology: The content collected and analyzed focused on high-quality, high-engagement posts from major social media platforms, including Twitter, Reddit, and Facebook. Volume, engagement, and post sentiment are among the metrics that were analyzed. The full report can be viewed here.

Divika Jethmal is an analyst at CARMA, a global leader in media intelligence that empowers our clients to make informed decisions and achieve their public relations objectives with precision. She provides actionable insights and unrivaled media analysis. Visit CARMA’s website here.

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How China can really pivot to the Global South – Asia Times

The Trump administration’s most recent pronouncements have reaffirmed the need for Taiwanese companies to reduce their reliance on the British market.

Trump’s 10 % more taxes on all Chinese exports have consistently invited Chinese measures. And the industry are still concerned that Trump will continue to impose the 60 % tariffs he promised to establish while campaigning. &nbsp,

Trump’s decision to eliminate the$ 800 de minimis hole on items shipped into the US further demonstrated the risk of destabilizing Sino-American business. If he did not hold application at the last minute, the US company of Taiwanese cross-border e-commerce companies like Temu and Shein, making up 60 % of all de minimis items, would have been wiped out overnight. &nbsp,

Western leaders may follow suit to plant a glut of manufactured products that have been rerouted from America as Trump carefully restrains Chinese imports. The European Union’s decision to impose tariffs on “unfairly discounted” Chinese electric vehicles in October 2024 may serve as a launching point for an extremely skewed business partnership with China, particularly as Europe seeks to develop its strategic autonomy in high-value, future-oriented industries supporting its modern and green energy goals. &nbsp,

In fact, the EU has launched a number of anti-dumping investigations into Chinese goods, including wood, after a Commission on EU Competitiveness statement had made it clear that China was a threat to the tech sector in Europe. It would be reasonable to assume that at least some of these will result in sector-specific tariffs on Chinese imports, related to Trump’s recently announced 25 % cover tariff on steel and aluminum goods. &nbsp,

The Chinese trade environment has quickly been shifted from the West to the International South as a result of the more stringent restrictions on Chinese goods in America and Europe. Data shows that, from 2022 to 2023, Chinese exports to the US declined by 22.5 %, with those to Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Canada, Australia, Japan and the Netherlands falling above or near double digits.

Imports to the UAE, India, Turkey, Russia, and Central Asia all increased above or practically triple digits, indicating that business relationships are tighter as a result of shifting supply stores brought on by Western sanctions for the Ukrainian conflict.

Yet as consumers praise the high-quality products China is now provide for low prices, local underdevelopment from South America to Southeast Asia is a result of Chinese shipments of cars and clothes.

But, as China Inc. moves to the International South, it is a victim of a labor shortage that is well-versed in emerging markets. Foreign companies find it challenging to locate their products because there aren’t enough Chinese persons studying, working, and living in several International South countries.

Without “bicultural” workers who can bridge native preferences and Chinese production, Chinese companies may struggle to keep selling goods that satisfy consumer demand. &nbsp,

This grassroots-level transition to the Global South is first and important hindered by the persistent Chinese aversion to American training. Generations of Taiwanese young people have studied and worked in the West since the government’s financial reforms in the late 1970s, before moving back to China to form some of its most creative and successful businesses.

The same haigui phenomenon continues today, with the vast majority of the country’s nearly 1 million strong study abroad population based in the US ( 349, 000 ), Australia ( 166, 000 ), the UK ( 135, 000 ), Japan ( 121, 000 ) and Canada ( 105, 000 ). &nbsp,

In comparison, the number of Chinese acquainted with the Global South is plainly lacking. Despite increasing attention due to pricing and physical contact, Southeast Asia is just home to approximately 50, 000 Taiwanese students, with more than quarter in Singapore. There is little information publicly available about Chinese kids in the Middle East, Africa, and South America, which suggests an underpopulated people. &nbsp,

China’s absence of a grass-roots appearance in the World South is not limited to students. According to estimates, there are nearly 1 million and half a million ethnic Chinese life in Africa and the Middle East, both.

Also, the newness of Chinese areas in these areas means they are less morally included, despite obvious challenges in defining Chineseness. The Chinese real existence in the Global South is minute next to the well-established, 5.6 million-strong Taiwanese American society.

Recognizing this lack of familiarity with the Global South requires a two-pronged method. First, Chinese companies may work more closely with each other to use the growing number of international students who attend Chinese universities.

In 2023, China hosted more than 300, 000 American students, with some understanding about the Chinese language and traditions while acquiring professional experience. Foreign companies should positively look to employ these graduates to help them with international expansion plans for their nations and regions of origin.

Next, the Chinese govt may encourage young people to look for study abroad opportunities in the Global South to advance their careers abroad without relying on the West. Measures like recognizing the academic credentials of more prestigious colleges in the International South and awarding government-funded scholarships particularly to non-Western institutions had become steps in the right direction. &nbsp,

Predictably, many Chinese students hoping for the best training their money can buy are wary of the value offered by Global South-based educational establishments. The first step might be to encourage more students to consider Western institutions based on the Global South in order to lessen these concerns.

Due to the combination of English-language programs offered by British and American universities and financial incentives for Chinese students to stay in the city after graduation to advance their careers, Dubai has grown in popularity, if it is still relatively unknown, for young Chinese people.

By this logic, top Western programs in other parts of the Global South, such as Northwestern in Qatar, NYU Abu Dhabi and CMU Africa, deserve more attention. With a mix of Global South students in China and Chinese students in the Global South, China Inc should be able to find a future workforce that is culturally adept at facilitating China’s shifting away from the West.

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Musk’s politics taking a toll on troubled Tesla – Asia Times

Tesla is always going out of style in Europe and some parts of North America as a result of Elon Musk’s hard-line social bent. At the same time, competition in the markets for electric vehicles ( EVs ), autonomous driving and self-driving taxis ( robotaxis ) is rapidly intensifying, putting Tesla’s future at risk.

In Europe, income of Tesla cars were over 50.4 % year-on-year in January, according to statistics reported by EV Magazine and other media outlets. The largest declines were recorded in Spain ( 75.4 % ), France ( 63.4 % ) and Germany ( 59.5 % ).

In Holland, where Tesla registrations hit an 18-month low, NL Times ( Netherlands news in English ) reported bumper stickers reading” I bought a Tesla, not an Elon” and” Where is the Stop Elon button on this thing”? – as well as symbols that were spray-painted on a Tesla shop in The Hague.

In the Netherlands, EV sales were led by Kia Motors, Volkswagen and Volvo ( which is owned by China’s Geely ) in January. In the UK, BYD licenses were significantly higher.

Then the blowback has spread to North America, where some 50 anti-Musk/anti-Tesla rallies have been reported from the San Francisco Bay Area to Manhattan. Functions and threats of graffiti, including fire and suspected arson at retailers, have been reported at various locations in the US. A broken glass and a blaze at a Tesla shop are being looked into by police in Salem, Oregon, where I live.

The Action Network,” an open system that helps individuals and groups to arrange for democratic factors” on the Internet, posted an offer to a” TeslaTakedown” event on February 15, sponsored by Dissenters of Seattle. ” Buy your Teslas, dump your share, visit the picket ranges”, it read. Tesla is” Hurting Musk,” Musk claims. Stopping Musk may help save lives and our democracy”.

A poll by Electrifying.com (” The Electric Car Experts” ) showed that 59 % of prospective car buyers were unlikely to purchase a Tesla because of their dislike for Elon Musk. According to the same poll, 56 % of potential buyers and 61 % of EV owners are willing to buy a Chinese EV.

Some Europeans disapprove of Musk’s relationship with President Donald Trump and help for right-wing democratic parties in Germany and the UK. His use of DOGE ( Department of Government Efficiency ) to defraud government agencies like USAID is opposed by left-leaning Americans. People find boycotting Tesla to be a quick response to Trump’s plan to make Canada the nation’s 51st status.

Tesla car registrations in the US dropped about 10 % year-on-year in January according to Motor Intelligence, and were over 12 % in California, according to the California New Car Dealers Association.

Data from February may provide a more accurate assessment of how significant a problem Tesla has in its home business is. Right-wing Musk and Trump supporters may react in the same way to the toxicity of the left-wing anti-Tesla activity in the US.

Meanwhile, BYD has begun offering autonomous driving features on vehicles priced below$ 10, 000. Furthermore, all BYD models priced above$ 13, 500 are now equipped with the company’s God’s Eye advanced driver assistance system, which was previously available only on models costing more than$ 30, 000. Some observers see another Vehicle price war in the offing given that Tesla vehicles with comparable features start at around$ 32,000.

Launched in 2023, BYD’s God’s Eye incorporates laser, millimeter-wave sensor, devices and ultrasound cameras. Its City Navigate on Autopilot is designed to manage traffic lights and intricate roads, prevent obstacles, change lanes and beat slower cars. God’s Eye may also understand highways, including on and off stairs, and park quickly.

Nvidia and China’s Horizon Robotics are both buying automatic leading integrated circuits from BYD. As reported by DigiTimes, God’s Eye is divided into three value and tech levels: entry-level, mid-range and high-end. Entry-level and mid-range use NVIDIA DRIVE Orin SoCs ( systems-on-chip ), while the high-end uses Horizon’s Journey 6 onboard computer system in what is reported to be its first commercial implementation.

Nvidia made it known last week that it is the third-largest investor in China’s WeRide, trailing just Robert Bosch and the Carlyle Group. WeRide, which went public on the Nasdaq next October, holds autonomous car permits in China, Singapore, the UAE and the US. WeRide even employs NVIDIA DRIVE Orin. Its cars are made by GAC, Geely, Nissan, Yutong and JMC-Ford, which is Ford’s joint walk with Jiangling Motors.

WeRide’s item line includes self-driving cars, cars, delivery trucks, street workers and passenger cars. The business runs commercial operations in more than 30 cities in 9 different countries around the world and is currently conducting Levels 2 ( partial automation with human monitoring and control ) and Level 4 ( high automation with human override ). Its robotaxis are on the streets of Guangzhou, Beijing, Nanjing, Ordos ( Inner Mongolia ), Suzhou and Abu Dhabi.

In the US, ride-hailing business Lyft plans to launch self-driving cars in Dallas, Texas, using tech from Mobileye” as soon as 2026″ in a fleet of cars owned by Chinese trading business Marubeni. Waymo expects to build its self-driving cars on the Uber game in Austin, Texas, in the near future, probably in March.

Waymo currently offers more than 150, 000 self-driving car trips per week for more than one million miles. It offers robotaxi&nbsp, service in Phoenix, San Francisco and Los Angeles and is also preparing to start companies in Atlanta, Miami and Tokyo. &nbsp,

Next October, Waymo and Hyundai Motor announced plans to incorporate Waymo’s autonomous driving tech with Hyundai’s energy IONIQ 5 SUV. The Hyundai Motor Group Metaplant in Georgia, US, will be where the cars will become assembled. By the end of 2025, road assessments are expected to be conducted in preparation for the 2026 business roll-out.

In light of this, Musk stated to Tesla’s shareholders on its Q4 2024 earnings call at the end of January that the firm is “on track to conduct an initial start of uncontrolled Full Self Driving in Austin in June,” adding on X that he anticipates a “roll out to several cities in America by the end of this year.”

Despite the hype, Tesla is a follower, not a leader, in self-driving taxis. It is unclear how quickly or slowly a follower troubled Tesla might be given the delayed Robotaxi unveiling last year.

Follow this writer on&nbsp, X: @ScottFo83517667

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Behind China’s ‘secret’ laser facility – Asia Times

A US satellite image of what was described as a massive light center being constructed in southwest China recently appeared in a torrent of articles in the press. This appeared to be a newly discovered secret job, to the viewers. The reality is quite different.

The US, France, and China are currently the three main players in light integration. China now operates the world’s second most powerful light, the Shenguang-III, located near the” Science City” Mianyang in Sichuan Province. ( The Chinese expression shénɡuānɡ ( 神光 ) translates as “divine light”. ) Completed in 2015, &nbsp, Shenguang-II I is hailed in China as one of the country’s greatest technological achievements.

Before Shenguang-II I went on series, preparing had already begun for a much larger light program, Shenguang-IV, capable of reaching integration fire. This is undoubtedly the service that is depicted in the satellite image. Although it’s difficult to find up-to-date knowledge about Shenguang-IV, Chinese sources had previously reported that the task was being built in Mianyang and was scheduled to be finished” sometime after 2020.” It would have away to 228 light columns and a full signal strength of between 1.5 and 2 megajoules.

Schema of China’s SG-II I laser system, the third largest in the world Image: Zheng Wanguo et al., Laser performance of the SG-II I laser facility. ( 2016 )/ High Power Laser Science and Engineering / Creative Commons license CC-BY.

Shenguang-IV would thereby rival the largest presently existing system, the US National Ignition Facility ( NIF), and most likely be superior to it in important respects. When NIF was constructed, Shanguang-IV could use modern solutions.

Given that NIF is now a relatively new hospital, which construction began in 1997 and was finished in 2009, with no subsequent job, China would rank first in the world in terms of light integration capabilities.

One should not overlook that Mianyang, where the Shenguang light services are situated, is the leading facility in China for research and development of nuclear weaponry, directed energy weapons and other military-related innovative technology. There are nuclear arms produced it.

Among many other issues, Mianyang is also the site of the fast wind hole, JF-12, the most effective in the world up to the opening of China’s JF-22 hole two years ago.

Photos of SG-II I light bay and specific room. Photos: Creative Commons license CC-BY / Xian He, The updated progress of orbital confinement integration system in China / Journal of Physics: Conference Series. 688 ( 2016 )

The legendary Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics ( CAEP), which was formerly known as the” Ninth Institute,” owns the Shenguang facilities. From its creation in 1958 it played a key role in China’s effort to develop nuclear weapons, in the context of the” two bombs, one satellite” ( 两弹一星 ) strategy.

JT-12 fast weather hole. Photo: Institute of Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Laser integration has always had a strong defense connection, aside from being one of the most significant pathways to integration as a functional energy source. A giant pulse of laser power, combined with a particle of integration energy the size of a grain of sand, causes the laboratory-scale equivalent of a small hydrogen bomb explosion. This makes it possible to thoroughly investigate bomb-relevant mechanics without violating the US and China’s Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, among other things.

One should not undervalue the significance of the Shenguang light facilities in order for China to strive to be the first country to construct a functioning integration power plant.

The focus of its integration efforts is on electrical confinement systems, especially tokamaks, but China is no putting all of its eggs in one basket. Supporting light fusion and so-called orbital incarceration in general has a number of distinct advantages. The benefits include app to spacecraft propulsion and ultra-high power densities.

China is even looking into laser integration, which has a close relationship to orbital captivity integration.

Graphic: China Academy of Engineering Physics

The most intriguing task of Peng Xianjue, a senior scholar at the above-mentioned China Academy of Engineering Physics, is the Z-FFR fusion-fission combination furnace. In place of a light, this furnace uses the so-called Z-pinch, in which a large pulse of electromagnetic energy&nbsp, compresses and ignites the fusion energy. In Peng’s furnace the particles, generated by merging responses, set fission reactions in a surrounding cover of nuclear materials, thereby releasing large amounts of energy.

A great advantage of this hybrid scheme is that the fusion part can operate below the breakeven, which is much easier to achieve, while the fission part operates below the level of criticality, making a run-way chain reaction impossible.

The government approved the construction of the world’s most powerful Z-pinch device in 2021 for construction in Sichuan province’s Comprehensive Science Center at Xinglong Lake, which will be the first step in its development. According to some reports, construction in already under way.

Meanwhile, it is intriguing to speculate as to when the recent press reports regarding a mysterious new laser facility in Mianyang came to light. We can be certain that the US annually captures dozens, if not hundreds, of satellite reconnaissance images of the Mianyang region. The construction of such a massive laser facility would not have been easy to ignore.

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Beijing’s private sector push will hold key to China’s growth – Asia Times

The latest meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping with business leaders sends a clear message: Beijing acknowledges the crucial role that private companies play in financial stability and growth. &nbsp,

China’s long-term achievement depends on an inspired and modern private sector rather than relying on fiscal stimulus, an strategy with diminishing returns. Politicians must shift their focus from short-term treatments to creating an financial environment where private firms can prosper if they are serious about ensuring lasting success.

For decades, China’s economic type relied on state-led assets and infrastructure growth to generate growth. While this method has propelled China into the rates of the nation’s largest economy, it has also led to rising debts, problems, and overcapacity in important areas. &nbsp,

Fiscal stimulus may offer a temporary increase, but it doesn’t address underlying architectural weaknesses. In comparison, unlocking the full potential of personal companies creates self-sustaining financial momentum by creating competition, performance, and creativity.

The statistics provide a powerful narrative. Private firms contribute over 60 % of China’s GDP, nearly 50 % of foreign trade and more than 80 % of urban employment, according to state broadcaster CGTN.

These businesses are the engine of China’s financial dynamism, influencing everything from consumer technology to alternative energy solutions. However, in recent years, regulation doubt, crackdowns on big tech firms, and tightened authorities supervision have eroded company confidence and curtailed investment.

The recovery of investor confidence is one of the most immediate outcomes of a shift toward private market support. Both domestic and foreign investors have been tense by regulatory changes in sectors like technology, knowledge, and real estate, which has resulted in cash flow shifting.

Beijing is revitalize company sentiment and rekindle entrepreneurial activity by implementing clearer policies, ensuring regulation predictability, and lowering administrative obstacles. Owners need confirmation that private companies won’t be subject to sudden policy changes or harsh economic sanctions.

Beyond funding, the private market is also the major to China’s second wave of technology development. Over the past two years, Chinese private companies have been at the vanguard of advances in artificial intelligence, financial and advanced manufacturing. &nbsp,

Firms like Alibaba, Tencent and BYD have demonstrated how private-sector innovation can push China back in world markets. However, technology has been hampered by heavy-handed condition intervention and governmental regulations. &nbsp,

Beijing you harness the potential of innovative ability to propel long-term economic growth by lowering the barriers to money, strengthening intellectual property protections, and fostering an empty and competitive market.

A new private sector law has recently been discussed, and this is a crucial moment. Such legislation could be a turning point for China’s economic policy if it were implemented with relevant protections and incentives. A pro-business legal framework would encourage more private investment, fuel job creation and make China’s economy less dependent on state-driven stimulus. Additionally, it would signal to global markets that China is committed to maintaining a stable and predictable business environment.

The global implications of China’s policy direction cannot be ignored. If Beijing sticks to its word about supporting private businesses, it could cause a resurgence in trade partnerships and foreign direct investment. &nbsp,

On the flip side, failure to do so would likely exacerbate capital outflows and economic stagnation, reinforcing reliance on inefficient state-driven projects. The course of action China chooses will have a long-lasting impact on both its domestic and global financial systems.

Fiscal stimulus is still an option to address pressing economic issues, but it does not do so in place of structural reform. Promoting innovation, ensuring consistency in regulations, and empowering private enterprises to compete and grow are key factors for sustainable growth.

If Beijing truly commits to strengthening the private sector, it will create a more resilient, self-sustaining economy – one that is driven not by state intervention, but by the ingenuity and ambition of its businesses. &nbsp,

In the long run, that’s the only viable path to lasting prosperity.

The CEO and Founder of deVere Group is Nigel Green.

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