Philadelphia’s Chinatown has a rich tradition of activism – Asia Times

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Philadelphia’s Chinatown is a popular destination for tourists looking to take Chinese food and learn about Chinese culture. But for lifelong members of the Chinese community, the town – home to over over 5, 000 residents– is also defined by its perseverance and success.

Residents and allies have strongly opposed the Philadelphia 76ers ‘ plans to build a baseball market in the Market East community at the southern border of Chinatown, a display that has been present for the past two and a half years.

A city-sponsored society effect study found that the industry may have resulted in the “loss of Chinatown’s primary identity and local significance”. According to estimates, half of the town’s small businesses may have suffered as a result of worsening traffic, possible rent increases, and a new group of people less likely to patronize the area’s cultural businesses.

Although it is unclear why the Sixers made the rapid decision to abandon the Market East industry, the news in January 2025 was welcomed by Chinatown residents who felt they had prevented still another threat to the existence of their neighborhood.

I’m an Eastern American, industrial dweller, and writer with a focus on Asian Americans, places, and social activities. I’ve seen how urban people take for granted the existence of Chinese in major cities across the country, and even internationally, from London to Havana and Ho Chi Minh City. Due to the people and friends who fight for them, Chinatowns continue to exist and flourish.

The battle over the Pacers market was only the latest conflict in over 50 years of group organizing in Philadelphia’s Chinatown.

A shelter from nativism

Like other American Chinatowns, Philadelphia’s formed during an age of severe anti-Chinese racism. The area was established in the 1870s as a haven for refugees who were escaping the American West, where light rail workers and railroad workers proclaimed,” The Chinese had go”!

Among the earliest companies were a handful of laundries and a cafe on the 900 wall of Race Street, just north of Philadelphia’s key business area.

In the age of anti-Chinese immigration rules from 1875 to 1943, Chinatowns were associated with opium-smoking, playing and trafficking. Philadelphia, a core of evil and danger, was targeted and stigmatized by law enforcement. In addition, area and secret engineers were interested in Chinatown as early as the 1920s.

The Bell Telephone Company purchased more real estate along the corridor in 1923 to build its fresh high-rise tower and parking lot, causing Chinese citizens to flee. In the same century, the town used eminent domain to dismantle accommodation blocks to make way for the Broad-Ridge Spur, which connects the Eighth Street and Vine Street train stations. Chinatown was described as” a thing of the past” in a 1934 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin article.

Race Street was transformed into a major thoroughfare in the city as more car owners began to drive over the now-named Delaware Valley Bridge. The Delaware River Bridge was completed in 1926, in a move that echoed the xenophobic slogans that prompted Chinese workers to leave western states half a century earlier.

But Chinatown persisted.

More Chinese women immigrated to the US as China’s immigration restrictions eased following World War II. The area’s transition from a working-class bachelor society to a multigenerational community of families.

‘ Save Chinatown ‘ movement forms

During the social upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s, Philadelphia’s Chinatown youth took inspiration from the Black Power and anti-war movements to fight for their community.

The city proposed expanding Vine Street into an expressway in 1966, which would have destroyed large sections of Chinatown, including the adored Holy Redeemer church and school. Holy Redeemer, which was founded for Chinese American Catholics in 1941, provided community gatherings, amusements, and religious services. One instance of the national trend of urban renewal was the Vine Street Expressway project, which sought to clear and redevelop areas that had been designated as blighted.

The nonprofit organization Philadelphia Chinatown Development Corporation collaborated with Yellow Seeds, a group of radical Asian American youth who fought against racism and imperialism in the United States, and other members of the Chinatown community, to fight the construction of the expressway.

These groups comprised the 1970s Save Chinatown movement. They organized numerous protests, appeared in numerous media accounts, and used the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act as the framework for their strategy. They demanded an environmental impact statement, which, when issued in 1983, recommended a much smaller expressway than originally designed. Holy Redeemer was saved. Two off-ramps that would have traversed the neighborhood were also eliminated in the final plans. The expressway’s construction was finished in 1991.

Resisting a prison, baseball stadium and casino

The Save Chinatown movement persisted throughout the years as locals successfully opposed the construction of a federal prison in 1993, a baseball stadium in 2000, and a casino in 2008, all of which were planned for locations in or close to Chinatown.

In a 2002 documentary that was released shortly after the baseball stadium fight ended, activist Debbie Wei stated that” the future of Chinatown is going to be a huge battle.” ” We’re going to fight it, and my kids’ going to probably have to fight it as well,” he said.

Her words were prescient. 20 years later, her daughter Kaia Chau emerged as a key figure in the fight against the Sixers arena.

Together with fellow student leader Taryn Flaherty, Chau co-founded Students for the Preservation of Chinatown. The group organized teach-ins, galvanized Philadelphia-area students to join protests, and highlighted arena developers ‘ ties to local universities, including the University of Pennsylvania and Drexel University. Students made connections between the proposed arena and the gentrification of West Philadelphia, including the demolition of the University City Townhomes, an affordable housing complex whose residents were overwhelmingly Black, by focusing on the developers.

The movement against the Sixers arena became part of a multiracial, citywide fight against displacement. As the Reverend Gregory Holston of Black Philly 4 Chinatown, part of the Save Chinatown coalition, put it:” In North Philadelphia, in West Philadelphia, in South Philadelphia, the same process is happening over and over and over again where people are pushing and displacing people of color out of this city”.

Thriving intergenerational community

Activists have also created new housing, educational and arts institutions to keep Chinatown a family-friendly neighborhood.

Hing Wah Yuen, a 51-unit mixed-income affordable housing complex created by the Philadelphia Chinatown Development Corporation, the same organization that spearheaded the fight against the Vine Street Expressway in the 1970s, is now the location where the prison was planned in 1993.

The grassroots Chinatown-based organization Asian Americans United teamed up with the Philadelphia Folklore Project and the arts and culture organization in 2000 to establish the Folk Arts-Cultural Treasures School.

The K-8 school, situated in the footprint of the proposed stadium, teaches Mandarin and emphasizes art and music classes that reflect students ‘ cultural background.

Student leaders Chau and Flaherty founded the Ginger Arts Center in 2024, more recently acknowledging the need for more” third places” for youth beyond home and school. The organization offers young people in Chinatown a space for recreation and arts education.

The new community organizations that have emerged in response to failed development projects serve as examples of how Chinatown is neither a food and culture destination nor a place to go shopping.

Instead, Chinatown is a vibrant community that has long fought to survive, reinvent itself, and decide its own future, one that bears the legacy of previous generations of resistance.

At Swarthmore College, Vivian Truong serves as an assistant professor of history.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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S Korea’s new missile both bunker buster and nuclear hedge – Asia Times

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The new KTSSM bunker-buster missile from South Korea improves standard strike capabilities while subtly positioning the nation for a possible independent nuclear deterrent.

The missile’s deployment represents a wider strategic shift that might allow standard and radioactive postures to be blurred.

This quarter, Yonhap News Agency reported that South Korea has fielded the Asian Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missile (KTSSM), a internally developed precision-strike tool designed to destroy North Korea’s underwater artillery websites.

Dubbed” Ure” ( Thunder ), the KTSSM can conduct rapid, simultaneous precision strikes, targeting North Korea’s long-range artillery, much of which is positioned within striking distance of Seoul.

With a range of 180 meters, the weapon increases South Korea’s deterrent posture amid escalating conflicts. The rollout gives the government an “overwhelming” ability to “destroy” army posts in a situation, according to the North Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Following North Korea’s assault of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, the KTSSM was first developed. KTSSM is a reasonably priced tactical ballistic system comparable to the US Army’s Tactical Missile System ( ATACMS ), but it offers improved accuracy at the expense of a shorter range. &nbsp,

There are two variants: KTSSM-1, which is intended to target North Korea’s M1978/M1989 Koksan 170-mm howitzers and M1985/M1991 240-mm multiple rocket launchers ( MRL), and KTSSM-2, a self-propelled unit designed to strike North Korea’s KN-09 300-mm MRLs and KN-02 short-range ballistic missiles ( SRBM ).

The Koksan’s collection with regular shell is 40 km and 60 km with rocket-assisted weapons, while North Korea’s 240-millimeter MRLs have a similar spectrum. The KN-09 has an estimated collection of 200 meters and the KN-02 falls within the 120-170 mile range.

KTSSM Block 1 features a infrared absorbing weapon, while Block 2 employs a sovereign high-explosive weapon. While its Army Missile Command maintains the Hyunmoo and ATACMS systems, South Korea uses the KTSSM at the army levels.

North Korea’s hardened artillery sites ( HARTS ) remain a significant threat. In a January 2021 article for The National Interest ( TNI), Kyle Mizokami claims that North Korea has between 200 and 500 HARTS positioned in the mountains north of the Demilitarized Zone ( DMZ).

These weaponry parts may fire before reloading in the mountains. These websites will be used by North Korea as a means of assault against Seoul or to help a possible invasion. It can also apply its artillery risk to coerce the US and South Korea without using chemical or nuclear weapons as a force weapon.

According to a report from August 2020 RAND Corporation, North Korea reportedly has about 6, 000 jet and pipe artillery pieces that are capable of striking major South Korean population centers with highly explosive ammunition. Yet a small, focused barrage could inflict fatal damage.

RAND warns that if these artillery products fired for an hour, there could be 100, 000 mortality, and strikes on business services could wreak havoc on South Korea’s business. The report asserts that the US and South Korea’s ability to stop a large number of casualties or protect human populations may be hampered by the rapid onset of destruction.

Other experts advise against overstating North Korea’s artillery functions, despite these assessments highlighting the threat’s scope.

In a November 2024 Modern Warfare Institute ( MWI ) article, Ju Hyung Kim argues that North Korea’s artillery, though significant, may not be as formidable as often portrayed. He points out that North Korea is only possible to have 200 240 mm MRLs and about 100 self-propelled guns that are capable of reaching Seoul.

Kim furthermore highlights the poor reliability and great disappointment level of North Korea’s artillery. During the 2010 Yeonpyeong assault, North Korea fired 400 shells, but merely 80 reached their goals, while 320 fell into the sea. Of the 80 that hit their targets, 20 failed to ignite.

From that, Kim estimates that in a full-scale assault on Seoul, North Korea’s 170-millimeter artillery was fire 100 shells, while its 240-millimeter MRLs could flame 4, 400 missiles, but just 48 shell and 1, 840 missiles would reach the city.

He contends that a similar attack would cause significantly less damage than worst-case projections suggest given Seoul’s large urban sprawl, prevalence of reinforced concrete structures, and high prevalence of dud-rate munitions in the country.

South Korea’s investment in conventional arms like the KTSSM demonstrates the ongoing impact of non-nuclear deterrence, despite North Korea’s nuclear arsenal dominating discussions about deterrent.

In a 2019 Federation of American Scientists ( FAS ) report, Adam Mount critiques South Korea’s reliance on the US nuclear umbrella, arguing that it is an inadequate response to North Korea’s limited acts of aggression and risks unnecessary escalation.

He contends that standard responses are desirable due to nuclear escalation’s functional, socioeconomic, political, human and prescriptive costs. Mount adds that using nuclear weapons to deter war is a proper choice while having little real liquidity.

Socially, he contends that South Korea’s rely on US extended punishment presents a problem, the US is unlikely to forward-deploy atomic weapons to the Asian Peninsula, and even if it did, their operating power may be limited. Further, the US’s potential use of nuclear weapons against the former’s will could complicate South Korea’s strategic calculations.

Given these constraints, South Korea’s development of the KTSSM aligns with its broader conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy.

Ian Bowers and Henrik Hiim argue in a 2021 International Security journal article that South Korea’s pursuit of these capabilities is a result of a long-term strategy of hedging against potential US abandonment while strengthening its nuclear latency.

The threat that the US might weaken its nuclear-extended deterrence commitments to South Korea is increased by North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBMs) capable of striking the US mainland.

South Korea is encouraged by this strategic uncertainty to improve its ability to use its own deterrence, as well as to ensure that it will continue to be able to preemptively neutralize North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and leadership if necessary.

South Korea can effectively threaten North Korean military assets in the short term thanks to its emphasis on conventional deterrence, without going so far as to demonstrate nuclear brinkmanship.

However, in the long run, developments like the KTSSM provide South Korea with the technological foundation for rapid nuclear weaponization in the event that the security environment requires a change.

Bowers and Hiim say South Korea’s nuclear hedging strategy is based on dual-use missile systems. This implies that South Korea is purposefully developing capabilities that could be used to deter nuclear war, if necessary, while avoiding the immediate risks and political ramifications of developing nuclear weapons.

The KTSSM’s deployment highlights South Korea’s evolving security calculus. South Korea’s investment in advanced conventional strike systems, which is still covered by the US nuclear umbrella, indicates a growing need for strategic autonomy.

The missile serves an immediate tactical purpose—countering North Korea’s artillery threat—but its broader implications extend into nuclear strategy.

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How China-Russia can seize the climate action lead – Asia Times

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China and Russia have developed a more significant relationship that goes beyond their conventional military and economic ties as Moscow’s loneliness from the West grows and Beijing’s great power rivalry with Washington intensifies.

While both powers maintain that they are not formal allies, their proclamation of a” no limits” partnership with” no forbidden areas” has crystallized into what Western observers view as a de facto alliance, particularly in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The evolving China-Russia relationship encompasses wide-ranging collaboration that encompasses many cross-cutting areas. Climate change is cited as the defining issue of the 21st century among which both nations have pledged to address it up.

Russia adopted a National Security Strategy in 2021 that directly addresses climate change and incorporates the idea of natural protection. This commitment to climate change has been strengthened by following diplomatic announcements, with particular emphasis on plans to improve cooperation in renewables and weather action.

In a joint statement signed by China and Russia in 2024, it was committed to intensify bilateral investment in low-carbon areas, including solar power and carbon markets.

Some critics point out that meaningful collaboration is somewhat excluded from their bilateral agenda despite their linguistic commitments to weather collaborations. The 2024 China-Russia Joint Statement tellingly emphasizes “deepening” participation in conventional power areas, such as natural gas, petroleum, and oil refining, while simply suggesting the possibility of “developing” cooperation in emerging areas like carbon markets and solar power.

This gap is more evidenced in the 2024 book on diplomatic opportunities, published by the Russia-China Investment Collaboration Committee. While references to regular “power generation” appear sixteen times, specifically in the framework of natural gas projects, terms like “green” and “low carbon” collect only brief mention.

Beyond reasonable proposals for gas and acid development, the handbook’s power and miners section is generally devoted to fossil fuel projects. However, 2024 customs statistics shows that Russia has become China’s top crude oil and natural gas provider, with fossil fuel surpassing climate-related merchandise exports.

The slow progress in China and Russia’s bilateral climate cooperation is alarming. As the world’s largest and fourth largest carbon emitters, both nations have pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2060.

However, they continue to invest in infrastructure that uses fossil fuels, which could undermine global confidence. It detracts economic resources from incentives for renewable energy and sustainable infrastructure, and it prevents the transition to net zero from other developed nations.

Other significant emitters are required to uphold their commitments, as evidenced by the US’ stunning withdrawal from multilateral climate agreements under the second Trump administration. China and Russia have a chance to take a bigger part in shaping the global climate transition in this leadership vacuum.

Both nations must, however, turn diplomatic rhetoric into concrete action, set forth precise deadlines for climate projects, and reduce their extensive fossil fuel collaboration in order to gain credibility as leaders of the world.

Several sectors offer promising pathways for meaningful climate cooperation between the two nations, including hydrogen development, carbon market integration, and critical minerals partnerships.

Hydrogen infrastructure development

In a wide range of applications, from transportation fuel sources and energy storage medium to feedstock in industrial processes like steelmaking, hydrogen has enormous potential as a clean alternative to fossil fuels.

In contrast to fossil fuels, hydrogen does not release carbon dioxide when burned. However, its climate benefits are reliant on low-emission production techniques. Hydrogen produced with water electrolysis using renewable power can be completely emission-free, but its exorbitant costs remain a significant hurdle for large-scale commercialization.

Blue hydrogen refers to hydrogen that has been produced from natural gas and has carbon capture and storage facilities. Although blue hydrogen is currently receiving criticism, it has been viewed as a less expensive, more acceptable compromise before the costs of green hydrogen start tolerable.

Enhancing joint investment in the hydrogen industry aligns with China’s and Russia’s strategic advantages. Russia is well-suited for producing and transporting blue hydrogen due to its abundant natural gas reserves and extensive pipeline infrastructure.

Gazprom’s current pipelines already have up to 20 % hydrogen in them, with upgraded infrastructure capable of up to 70 %. This potential is essential to Russia’s ambitious strategy of capturing 20 % of the global hydrogen market by 2035. Europe is undoubtedly a major source of Russian hydrogen, but European sanctions against Russian exports following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have made this adversity unlikely.

Along with its position as the world’s top producer of renewable energy, China adds its technological expertise in hydrogen production and storage to these assets. The two nations should make joint R&amp, D and investment in CCS technologies in their national hydrogen industry strategies in order to increase the benefits of blue hydrogen’s emission reduction.

Beyond the contentious blue hydrogen, the partnership could use China’s renewable capacity to produce green hydrogen for transportation via Russia’s extensive pipeline network, potentially lowering production costs significantly.

Hydrogen is notoriously challenging to transport and store. Russia needs to develop its energy infrastructure along their shared border to attract China’s hydrogen exports. New dedicated pipelines for hydrogen and ammonia would be necessary in addition to the already existing natural gas pipelines.

The expansive, underdeveloped regions along the Sino-Russian border offer ideal testing grounds for innovative hydrogen infrastructure. These areas could host integrated hydrogen hubs combining production, storage, and diverse end-use applications, establishing replicable models for hydrogen ecosystem development.

The partnership might have the power to influence global standards beyond just physical infrastructure. Joint research into pipeline materials that are best suited for hydrogen transport and advanced liquefaction techniques could establish new standards for safety and effectiveness.

Such technical cooperation would advance both nations ‘ positions in the developing global hydrogen market while accelerating the development of technology.

Carbon market integration

Another area with strong potential for collaboration is the carbon market. Sinopec and SIBUR’s involvement in China’s Carbon Trading Market is a recent illustration of potential collaboration. Sinopec, the largest integrated petrochemicals company in Russia, is a shareholder of Sinopec, which also has the second-largest carbon emissions reduction projects in the nation.

SIBUR will become the first Russian company to issue carbon units in an international system since the creation of Russia’s carbon trading system as a result of the project’s registration with the Global Carbon Council system. Five climate projects have been added to the Russian carbon emissions registry system thanks to SIBUR.

On top of that, these projects are anticipated to reduce total CO2 emissions by 7.5 million tons over the course of ten years. As long as appropriate validation systems and high standards are established, SIBUR’s relationship to Sinopec opens up opportunities for entry into the Chinese carbon trading market.

The potential for further collaboration in carbon markets is still largely untapped despite these initial efforts to promote cross-border carbon trading. China and Russia could develop novel methodologies for carbon valuation that better reflect their national idiosyncrasies rather than simply linking existing systems.

For instance, they could jointly develop new methodologies for valuing natural carbon sequestration, such as Russia’s vast Siberian forest. It is a significant carbon sink hub, and the Russian government is expressing its growing support for monetization through carbon offset. The two countries could also develop novel financial instruments that combine clean technology transfer and carbon credits, making them more appealing investment vehicles for foreign investors.

A second untapped opportunity is the creation of joint carbon accounting standards specifically for international industrial projects. This might include establishing specialized carbon credit categories for emissions reductions achieved through Sino-Russian technological collaboration, particularly in difficult-abating industries like steel and cement production.

These standards could later serve as a model for other developing nations trying to strike a balance between industrial growth and emissions reduction.

Critical minerals

China is rapidly ascending as a global hub for clean technology R&amp, D and manufacturing, particularly in the “new big three” sectors: solar, electric vehicles ( EVs ), and batteries. These important minerals are strategically important because Russia has these key points of China’s clean energy initiative.

Russia is one of the largest copper and nickel reserves in the world, ranking among the top ten for both metals globally. These resources are fundamental to the clean energy transition, especially in transportation.

Copper serves multiple functions in EVs, from battery components and motor windings to charging infrastructure, while nickel is essential for high-energy-density batteries and corrosion-resistant components in wind turbines and solar cells.

As an example of Russia-China collaboration in critical minerals, Nornickel, Russia’s leading metals and mining company, produces 15 % of the world’s best high-grade nickel and is also a global leader in copper production.

The company is pivoting toward the Chinese market to reduce the sanction’s impacts. The company made plans to significantly increase the supply of metals to China and establish joint ventures in copper refinery and battery materials processing in 2024.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US and UK introduced a ban on imports of Russian aluminum, copper, and nickel. Russian metals can no longer be exchanged on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and London Metals Exchange.

Russian minerals are increasingly important to China’s supply chains, which is partly fueled by growing pressure from the West. Cooperation with Russian producers allows Beijing to diversify its supply chain while allowing Moscow to gain capital and technical expertise for production expansion as the United States pressures allies like Indonesia to impose restrictions on mineral exports to China.

The Shanghai Futures Exchange could become famous as a result of this partnership, which could reshape global metals markets: Western exchanges are currently closed to Russian metals, and it will gain more visibility for setting international benchmarks and encouraging yuan-denominated trading.

Copper and nickel are prominent in current bilateral agreements, but the deepening global climate transition implies that demand for these metals will increase exponentially. Both nations have the potential to quickly increase their mining and refining capacities, potentially outpacing the industry’s traditionally slow-moving one.

The partnership could extend to other strategic minerals, notably palladium, where Russia dominates global production. It is used to connect chips to circuit boards using metal connections. Russia is the world’s largest palladium producer. Through just two projects, Russia controls 40 % of world palladium output, a metal crucial for semiconductor manufacturing.

Climate cooperation leadership

Climate cooperation remains underdeveloped in the ever-growing China-Russia partnership. Some areas, including hydrogen development, carbon market integration, and critical mineral collaboration, offer transformative potential.

The success of their climate collaboration will depend on a number of crucial elements. First, both nations must implement their diplomatic agreements through actionable plans, established procedures, and measurable outcomes.

Second, their cooperation in important minerals and hydrogen infrastructure must go beyond bilateral benefits to contribute to global climate change. Third, their efforts to integrate the carbon market must shift from sporadic initiatives to coordinated efforts that can inspire other developing nations.

Strong Sino-Russian leadership in climate policy could significantly affect the trajectory of global emissions reduction efforts, but only if both countries place long-term climate gains preceding short-term fossil fuel interests.

Chris Zou works for the World Resources Institute ( wri ) as a climate policy researcher. org ) based in Washington DC.

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Trump’s bow to Putin no cause for panic, yet – Asia Times

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Under the Trump presidency, the United States ‘ unwavering allegiance to Ukraine appears to be rapidly deteriorating after three years of fighting Russia.

On February 19, 2025, President Donald Trump referred to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as” a despot” and made up his own accusation of the war that Russia started as a border region land get.

Zelensky, however, said on February 19 that Trump is trapped in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “disinformation place”.

The US and Russia are holding discussions in Saudi Arabia without including Ukraine in order to end the conflict, which is getting worse.

The US and Russia have long been enemies, and the US, to day, has given Ukraine more than US$ 183 billion to help battle against Russia. However, that cash came when Joe Biden was in office. Trump doesn’t seem to have an anti-Ukraine bias.

Tatsiana Kulakevich, a professor of Eastern German politics and international relations, spoke with The Conversation to discuss the repercussions of this sudden change in Trump’s approach to US-Russia plan.

In initial conversations, Kulakevich sees Trump’s actions as being part of a calculated plan rather than as being self-interested.

A person holds a newspaper that shows back-to-back profiles of two men in black and white.
On February 19, 2025, a passenger on an airplane reads a Financial Times post about Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump. Photo: Horacio Villalobos Corbis / Corbis via Getty Images/ The Talk

Does you describe the current relationship between Russia, Ukraine, and the US?

Because the US and Russia are merely having experimental discussions, people shouldn’t get anxious. We may not call them peace deals, per se, at least not yet.

Because there isn’t much to discuss in Saudi Arabia, it was expected that Ukraine wouldn’t be invited to the deals. Other than agreeing to resume normal operation of each other’s diplomatic missions, we are unsure of what the US and Russia are really discussing.

People believe that Russia and the US are in like. But, Trump’s Russia plan has been more aggressive than generally portrayed in the media. Looking back at the previous Trump administration’s report, we can see that if everything is done in the US’s pursuits, then it will not be done. Trump does not do benefits.

He approved the sale of anti-tank missiles to Ukraine in 2019. That same year, Trump withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, an arrangement with Russia that limited what arms each state was order, over Russian transgressions.

Trump also imposed financial sanctions on a Russian ship that was involved in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines in 2019. These sanctions attempted to stop Russia’s immediate fuel exports to Germany, but Ukraine perceived this link as a threat to the country.

Based on Trump’s talks with Russia and notes against Ukraine, it could seem like the US and Russia are no longer enemies. How do you think this is?

There are no conclusive evidence that Russia and the US no longer had a relationship with one another. Despite Trump’s infrequent usage of terms like “friends” in politics, his language usually serves as a tactical movement rather than a real shift in partnerships. His interaction with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, where Trump alternated between politeness and threats to extort money, is a prime example.

Even if the US is meeting with Russia and the public tale seems to suggest then, carefully, abandoning Ukraine is not in the United States ‘ best interests. One reason for this is that the US’s rejection of Ukraine did bring both China and Russia joy. Trump has viewed China as a major risk to the US, and it has supported Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is even quoted as saying that everyone will be present for a potential peace agreement, including Ukraine.

Before this national election, there was a long-running campaign claiming that Russia was holding some data over Trump and blackmailing him, but that this was before Trump started imposing measures against Russia during his first name.

More than 50 policy steps were taken by the first Trump administration to combat Moscow, mainly through public statements and restrictions.

What benefits does Russia’s political relationship offer the US?

Trump is a contextual politician. As some Russian officials have said in recent Saudi Arabian deals with the Trump administration, British businesses may benefit from US alignment with Russia and Soviet businesses.

But the US may also benefit financially from the Trump government’s proposed bargain with Ukraine to give the US quarter of Ukraine’s estimated US$ 11.5 trillion in unusual earth minerals.

This year, Zelensky rejected that suggestion, claiming that it does not include the assurance that the US will continue to provide Ukraine with security guarantees.

Generally, since the Cold War, there has been a political square between the Soviet Union – after Russia – China and the US. And there have always been rival edges on both sides. Trump may be trying to distance himself from China by trying to establish a better political relationship with Russia.

A similar dynamic is playing out between the US and Belarus ‘ autocratic president, Alexander Lukashenko, a co-aggressor in the conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine has close ties to both China and Russia.

In exchange for the transfer of imprisoned people of Belarus ‘ political opposition, the US administration is considering a relaxation of sanctions against Belarusian businesses and export of potash, a crucial component of fertilizer.

There are over 1, 200 political detainees in Belarus. This US international policy approach aims to give Lukashenko the opportunity to grow less financially dependent on China and Russia.

A person brushes snow at a gravesite that has photos of people on crosses and blue and yellow flags.
A contractor clears snow from a cemetery in Kramatorsk, Ukraine, on February 17, 2025. More than 46, 000 Russian soldiers have died in battle, according to some estimates, since Russia’s war in February 2022. Photo: Pierre Crom / Getty Images/ The Talk

Is this level of collaboration between the US and Russia exceptional?

While US-Russia ties are often defined by conflict, history shows that pragmatic cooperation has occurred when both countries saw mutual benefits – whether this relates to arms power, area, terrorism, Arctic affairs or wellbeing.

In addition, the US has always given its own objectives precedence over those of Russia. For instance, the US and its allies imposed restrictions on Russia’s plutonium and copper companies just in May 2024, over two decades after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. If America sanctioned plutonium and nickel, it would have had to balance its proper economic ties and concerns about market stability.

The US and other European nations imposed mainly symbolic sanctions after Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, which Russia claims to have its own and supported Russian hardliners in Ukraine’s Donbas region. This included chilling goods of Russian people, restricting some financial dealings and limiting Russia’s exposure to Western technology.

We may also take note that Trump promised to sanction Russia if the Ukraine war does not end in January 2025. Despite the opinions of a near relation between Trump and Putin, the US continues to evade any existing sanctions, which shows its commitment to a hard stance on Russia.

Trump’s harsh speech on Zelensky may be a deliberate negotiation strategy intended to pressure Ukraine into making more concessions in future peace talks more than signaling abandonment, given his transactional nature in terms of foreign policy.

Tatsiana Kulakevich serves as associate professor of education at the University of South Florida’s School of Interdisciplinarity.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Why elections aren’t a path to peace in Ukraine – Asia Times

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Volodymyr Zelensky, chairman of Ukraine, was prevented from attending the debate about the future of his nation that took place on February 18, 2025 in Saudi Arabia. In reality, there were no Russian representatives, nor any European Union ones – simply US and Russian representatives, and their Arabian guests.

The meeting was joyfully celebrated in Moscow following a socially beneficial phone call between Russian leader Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump a few days prior.

The fact that Ukraine is not able to determine its own potential is in line with Putin’s approach to its neighbors. Putin has long criticized the legitimacy of the Russian state, or “Kyiv regime,” as he affectionately calls it.

The Trump administration’s actions and words undoubtedly undermined Kyiv’s position and influence, despite the US delegation’s assertion that Ukraine may be involved in coming discussions at some point.

In order to vilify Zelensky and the Russian government, the US is extremely aligning itself with Moscow on a crucial component of the Kremlin’s call for votes in Ukraine as part of any peace package.

The Russian government’s intentional ongoing propaganda campaign to discredit Zelensky’s legitimacy is a way to remove Ukraine’s support from its important allies, and make Zelenskyy – and possibly Ukraine – a partner in negotiations.

Given Russia’s ongoing hostility toward its neighbor and its steadfast refusal to accept any momentary truce, the president’s claims that his nation is available for peace negotiations have been very suspect to numerous observers of its three-year conflict.

The Kremlin continues to propagate the idea that the issue is stems from the absence of any genuine Ukrainian authorities with which it can deal. Putin is thus declare his devotion to peace without making any compromises or commitments required for a genuine dialogue process.

However, painting Zelensky as a “dictator” dampens the passionate support that again greeted him from democratic nations. This, in turn, can adapt to the lessening or even stop of military aid for Kyiv, Putin hopes, allowing him a boost in what has become a war of attrition.

Putin needs a willing partner to help spread the word that Zelensky and the recent Ukrainian authorities are no legitimate representatives of their nation, and the new US management appears to have stepped in to bridge this gap.

A man holds a piece of paper in front of a yellow and blue curtain.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the then-candidate, stands at a polling place in Kiev on March 31, 2019, during the Ukrainian national poll. Photo: Genya Savilov / AFP via Getty Images/ The Talk

Dictating words

Get the tale on primaries.

The US officially discussed Ukraine elections as a crucial component of any peace deal at the conference in Saudi Arabia. Trump himself has raised the possibility of votes, noting in a February 18 hit event:” We have a position where we haven’t had votes in Ukraine, where we have fighting law”.

The US president went on to claim, incorrectly, that Zelensky’s approval rating was down to” 4 %”. According to the most recent polls, the Russian president currently enjoys a 57 % approval rating. A day later, Trump upped the problems, describing Zelensky as a “dictator without votes”.

Such claims echo Russia’s tale that the state in Kyiv is illegal. The Kremlin’s claims regarding what it describes as the “legal aspects related to his]Zelensky’s ] legitimacy” are based on the premise that the Ukraine president’s five-year term as president of Ukraine should have ended in 2024.

And elections in Ukraine may have taken place in May of that year if it hadn’t been for the military laws that Ukraine put in place when the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022.

The Ukrainian Martial Law Act directly forbids all votes in Ukraine for the duration of the incident activity.

And while the Ukrainian Constitution simply lists provisions that would apply to the expansion of senate’s powers until martial legislation was removed, legal attorneys in Ukraine tend to agree that this also applies to political powers.

Despite what the legislation says, Washington has recently gotten traction for the Kremlin’s criticism of Ukraine’s democratic institutions and its support for elections there.

Trump’s special minister, General Keith Kellogg, declared on February 1 that elections “need to be done” as part of the harmony approach, saying that elections are the “beauty of a good democracy”.

Poll field trap

Zelensky has stated that votes may be held when the right time is right and is not opposed to elections in process. ” When martial law is over, then the game is in legislature’s court – the parliament next picks a day for votes”, Zelensky stated in a January 2 meeting.

And he appears to have the majority of Ukrainian ‘ support. 69 % of Ukrainians polled in May 2024 agreed that Zelensky should hold office until the end of military rules, after which elections should be held.

The problem, as Zelensky has said, is the schedule and conditions. ” During the conflict, there can be no votes. It’s important to change regulations, the law and so on. These are important issues. But there are also nonlegal, really human problems”, he said on January 4.

Yet Ukrainian opposition leaders concur that this is not the day. Petro Poroshenko, Zelensky’s major political rival, has dismissed the idea of military elections, as has Inna Sovsun, the leader of the opposition Golos Party.

In addition to the operational difficulties of ensuring free and fair elections in the middle of a conflict, the issue may provide logistical challenges for fighting and accessing polling places.

Additionally, it’s important to consider whether and how to incorporate Ukrainian in Russian-occupied provinces, those who have fled fighting, and those who are internally displaced.

Good elections … and poor

Russia did, of course, hold primaries during the latest issue. But the 2024 vote that Putin won with 87 % of the voting was, according to most foreign spectators, neither free nor fair.

Instead, it was a false election that only confirmed what the majority of social scientists will say: Elections are at best a required but unsatisfactory indicator of democracy.

This place is not wasted on Ukrainians, whose commitment to democracy strengthened in the years leading up to the 2022 war. In fact, a survey conducted a few months after the war revealed that 76 % of Ukrainians believed democracy to be the best form of government, an increase from 41 % three years prior.

There are other reasons why Ukraine may be afraid of primaries. Political campaigns may be antagonistic, especially in a world under intense anxiety.

Politicians in Ukraine have made the clear argument that holding elections during the war would destabilize Russian society and undermine inside cohesion in the face of Russian aggression.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrives in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on February 18, 2025 for a conference between Russia and the United States. &nbsp, Image: Russian Foreign Ministry / Anadolu via Getty Images / The Talk

Outdoor effect

Then there is the issue about outside effect in any election. Ukrainians have sufficiently political experience with Russian interference to know that the Kremlin will try to put a verdict on the situation.

Russia has since the separation of the Soviet Union in 1991 employed its considerable resources to control Ukraine’s elections through all available methods, ranging from misinformation, economic pressures and incentives to energy coercion, threats and use of crime.

In 2004, Moscow’s electoral manipulations in favor of the pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, led to the Orange Revolution– in which Ukrainians rose up to reject rigged elections.

Nine years later, Yanukovich, who took office in 2010 as president, was ousted thanks to the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, which led to the removal of a man many thought of as a Russian stooge in favor of a path toward greater European integration.

Putin’s history of meddling in elections extends beyond Ukraine, of course. Most recently, the Romanian Constitutional Court annulled the country’s presidential elections, citing an electoral process compromised by foreign interference.

An impossible position

In bringing elections as a prerequisite for negotiations, Putin is entering a” catch-22″ trap for Ukraine: The Ukrainian Constitution mandates that elections can only be held after the “hot phase” of the conflict has ended. So without a ceasefire, no election is possible.

However, by refusing to support elections, Ukraine can be seen as the blockade of any peace agreement, refuting a myth that the US administration already believes Kyiv is the source of the issue and needs to be ignored in order for progress to be made.

In other words, the US puts the Ukrainian government in an impossible position by reversing Russian statements that suggested an election was necessary for peace, or agree to the vote and risk internal division and interference, or reject it and permit Moscow and, perhaps, Washington to deny their leaders ‘ legitimacy and impede negotiations on their behalf.

Lena Surzhko Harned is the political science associate professor at Penn State.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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India in American F-35 vs Russian Su-57 fighter quandry – Asia Times

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Just NATO countries, Japan, South Korea and Israel have the best fighter plane in the US army, the F-35. The aircraft, which has advanced sensors and electronics, is described as a multirole system that can be used to perform strike missions and obtain air superiority. It is competing in India against Russia’s 5th-generation stealth-like flight, the Su-57.

The Su-57 and F-35 are competing with one another to meet India’s needed for a sizable number of new jets, but they are actually quite diverse.

The F-35 is optimized for secrecy, although it falls short of the cunning protection of its great brother, the F-22. Congress decided decades ago that the&nbsp, F-22 could not be exported, &nbsp, leaving the Chinese in the lurch as they sought the warrior to ward off China. Compared to the F-35, the F-22 is a heavier plane with two motors, greater selection and supercruise.

Supercruise is defined as an plane’s ability to fly at supersonic speed without exhaust. In reality, fast speeds does need much more energy on any platform without supercruise, which is true. An airplane without a supercruise will typically take longer to reach its intended destination and gain, been restricted to more distant targets, or need air-to-air refueling.

Russia’s Su-57 is more like the F-22 than the F-35. It has superior supercruise, improved technology, and improved run and variety than the F-35.

India has been inclining toward its own-built warrior jets, but domestic demand will need to be met for a while before it can. Even so, India will have to buy crucial elements or collaborate with foreign companies to produce them.

It’s probably fair to say that the cameras and electronics in the F-35 are more superior than those in the Su-57. The “black boxes” in the F-35, including even the built-in shipping structure that connects to Lockheed for extra parts and technology changes, are kept safe by Lockheed Martin, the US defence company that builds the aircraft.

Customers of the F-35 must, therefore, depend on Lockheed. Israel was the only nation to require greater freedom from Lockheed dependent. Obviously, Lockheed and the US Defense Department viewed the Jewish demand as reasonable, primarily because Israel can repair and enhance its F-35 systems and procedures.

It is also the only state that has used the F-35 in battle, over Syria, Lebanon and probably Yemen and Iran. However, Israel needs the&nbsp, full F-35 provide chain&nbsp, for extra parts and it almost lost entry to some of that during the Gaza battle.

Russia, on the other hand, has been a dependable vendor to India without any noticeable breaks. Generally, India has required considerable co-production rights where there is a foreign sales of security hardware.

The Russians do not oppose that at all, largely because they value the social connection as much as the business opportunities, and partly because the Russian aerospace industry is stretched.

It is unlikely that Lockheed will want to co-create a lot of content for India. In the end, this might undermine any potential arrangement for the flight.

Both the F-35 and the Su-57 were together for the first day on display in India. The Russians put on a stunning show of the Su-57, the F-35 was only on static show.

Had the F-35 flown a presentation, it would have been superior to the Su-57. That is because the layout philosophy behind these aircraft is unique.

The F-35 is tailored for secrecy. The surfaces on the aircraft’s skin have coatings and design features to deflect radar ( specifically&nbsp, X-band radar, &nbsp, which is the primary type of military radar ), the aircraft requires computers to keep it aloft and its design is not great for platform maneuverability.

As a battle system, the F-35 is designed for conflict activities, meaning that it can fire a weapon for 50 miles or more before the army can find it, or so the US Air Force claims. Similar disagreement weapons, such as smart weapons and cruise missiles, would also be launched hundreds of miles away from the target for battle ground support.

The Su-57 is designed to serve as a dogfighting aircraft, much like the venerable A-10 or the aging Russian Su-25, despite the Russians ‘ trend of going in the same direction.

The F-35 is equipped with a gun system, although it was not in the original plan. Having the gun is largely pointless. In a dogfight, the F-35 would have difficulty against a more agile opponent, and the Su-57 and Su-35 qualify as very agile indeed.

The US Air Force reportedly kept it in, claiming that the F-35’s presence was equivalent to the powerful 30mm A-10, despite the various reports about the F-35. Despite making a significant contribution to US warfighters in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the Air Force is determined to liquidate the A-10.

A-10 with guns blazing.

In fact, the US Air Force is dominated by its desire for “low observable” technology, the Air Force terminology for stealth.

Never have the Russians been as persuaded of the value of stealth technology as they have in the US. Some say that is because they lack stealth technology, which is highly classified by the US Pentagon. But stealth technology also creates design problems, thus the F-35 while allegedly multirole, cannot dogfight and can’t really provide close ground support for troops.

Take note: when firing from far away, the target may move before the weapon arrives. Artificial intelligence might be able to reduce some of this constraint, but a wise enemy will quickly learn to dodge bullets.

Keeping the super-secret surface coatings of stealth planes in repair is a major task, requires specialized equipment and security-cleared personnel, special dust-free enclosures and considerable training and supervision.

Under peaceful conditions, this adds a lot of cost, but is doable. In combat circumstances, stealth coatings are likely to degrade and combat teams may be hard-pressed to clean them up for operations. Even older combat aircraft consider a degraded stealth plane to be a sitting duck.

The Russians also have focused on two other components: strong air defenses, including mobile air defenses, and on advanced ways to detect stealth threats.

So they are deploying new ground sensor designs that can be used in both the VHF and UHF frequency ranges. L Band transmitter-receivers that can pick up US and other stealth fighters that are designed for X Band are also included in their more recent jets.

Russia’s Su-57.

L Band is good enough to generally locate a threat, but it lacks the accuracy of X Band or anywhere near it. With modern computers, L Band sensors may have already evolved or can be teamed with ground radars and sensors, taking away some of stealth’s advantages.

For India, the two main threats are Pakistan and China. Pakistan’s Air Force is a mashup of old French Mirage fighters, Chinese fighters and around 75 F-16s. China has stealth aircraft with the J-20 operational and the J-36 under development.

The Chinese complain a lot about India buying either Russian or perhaps American weapons, but they don’t complain much about it.

The challenge for India is the cost of the F-35 compared to the Su-57, the very high demand for effective maintenance and training, and various problems the F-35 encounters operationally, especially aircraft availability.

Today ( and optimistically ), the F-35’s availability is around 51 % for the US Air Force. Because India’s aerospace industry is less developed, it almost certainly would be lower. Because India would purchase approximately 100 aircraft, it could never hope to field more than half of them, probably less.

Although there are so few Su-57s operating today, it is likely that the availability figures for the Su-57 will be significantly better than the F-35 in India. This is just guesswork as to how things will ultimately turn out.

It is obvious that keeping the Su-57 will be easier and less expensive than keeping it, especially if it is co-produced in India.

US President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi sway in a hug.

India wants to have stronger ties to the US and have more access to US technology. Additionally, there are thousands of Indian engineers and technicians who want to work and train in the United States, as well as investments by Indian high-tech US companies.

Given that it could be cheaper to invest billions of rupees in the F-35, India is questioned about its willingness to do so.

Stephen Bryen is a former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy and a special correspondent for Asia Times. This&nbsp, article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter&nbsp, Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.

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Reasons for hope Trump won’t sink world’s critical minerals supply – Asia Times

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There is a possibility that Donald Trump’s second term as president of the United States will have a long-term negative impact on the supply and demand of what are referred to as essential nutrients. These include metal, lithium, copper, cobalt and the “rare world parts”, such as lanthanum and yttrium.

They are essential for the alternative energy move, being used in electric car batteries, solar panels and wind turbines. Trump’s decision to withdraw from the UN’s Paris agreement to stop global warming has stoked some negative opinions regarding the effects of this policy.

The price opportunity for new mine projects for important minerals may decrease, along with long-term source, if Trump’s shift toward oil and gas is interpreted by the markets as permanent. This has the potential to impair the shift to clean energy.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to fear this negative situation. Contrary to this, we think the new US administration’s approach to energy change is merely a temporary impact without profound altering the world’s trajectory. In consequence, volatile material industry will continue to be positive over the long and medium term. This place is based on three major claims.

1. In crucial material areas, the US is in a unique position to compete.

The US is viewed as dependent on the import of crucial nutrients from other nations, such as China, in general. Although a select few have this trait, America is one of the most aggressive nations in terms of producing the minerals needed for natural technology overall.

However, exporting a wide range of materials, including the most crucial ones, has been demonstrated by the US as having a comparative advantage.

Germanium processed ore
China has a tight control over its supply of tungsten. RHJPhtotos

Therefore, maintaining the beneficial and vital nutrient industry will be in the interests of the United States. Even if the US reduces its sustainability interests, slowing its demand for new fresh technology, it is likely to do it properly so as not to hurt its own business.

In fact, we anticipate that the US will show more interest in developing processing companies to recover some materials from some manufacturing techniques ‘ intermediate stages or electronic waste. These include germanium and chromium, which are tightly controlled by China ( their biggest maker ) but which are vital for computer cards and renewable energy technology, as well as night-vision sunglasses.

2. Just a small percentage of fresh systems are produced and used in the US.

China and Europe drive these businesses. No fresh clean technologies are produced by the US, neither by the desire nor by the source. On the demand side, the US represents only 10 % of world electric car sales, while China and Europe account for 66 % and 20 % of the market respectively.

Similarly, for the world installed solar energy capacity China represents over 43 % of the market, Europe 20 % and the US only 10 %. On the supply side, the US produces around 15 % of the country’s electric vehicles, while China represents more than 50 % of the business.

Similar statistics exist for another fresh technologies, including China’s remarkable leadership in solar panel and wind turbine production.

Therefore, the laws adopted by China and Europe are likely to have a much bigger impact on the energy shift than those adopted by the US. The cost of slowing the natural transition’s modern capture up for the US will be too high in the event that these nations continue to push forward the natural transition.

Additionally, Middle Eastern oil-producing nations are intensely betting on fresh clean technologies, which could help US oil producers ‘ lower appetite for natural assets. But, regardless of what Trump’s administration decides, it will have a minimal impact on the market for clear technologies.

3. New tariffs may further enhance some minerals’ singularity

Buy tariffs imposed by Trump’s second management to promote local production damaged US imports of those sectors using imported middle, or partially finished, goods. In other words, global commerce along global value chains has modified the text relationships of protectionism, and imports are hindered – and no promoted – by trade security.

Trump has stated that he intends to establish 25 % more stringent import tariffs on goods coming from Mexico and Canada. This may make some nutrients more difficult for the US. For example, copper and aluminium may become even more crucial to the US market because Canada supplies nearly 40 % of the copper employed by US business, and 70 % of the metal.

As a consequence, fresh tariffs could really increase the importance of some minerals. In fact, this was likely the reason behind the decision to defer the price increases and to only implement them on a limited number of products.

The new administration’s energy policies may include a repercussions. These are likely to be transitory, and it is unlikely that the market for important nutrients will suffer in the long run. For the moment, the transition to clean electricity seems healthy.

Carlo Pietrobelli is a professor of economics at the Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology ( UNU-MERIT ), United Nations University, and Jorge Valverde is a PhD fellow there.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Idea that Kyiv should’ve signed 2022 peace deal doesn’t hold water – Asia Times

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It has been a week or so of events that were alarming for Ukraine and its Western allies. They first learned that Vladimir Putin, the president of the United States, and US President Donald Trump had a 90-minute telephone conversation. In one injury, Trump upended three times in which his father, Joe Biden, had sought to remove Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Pete Hegseth, the newly appointed secretary of defense for Trump, stated to a gathering of mature military authorities in Brussels on February 12 that Ukraine had never hope to rejoin NATO or restore the territory Russia had illegally occupied since 2014.

Hegseth added that any peace activity in Europe would not be conducted under the shelter of Nato’s Article 5 and that not only would the US certainly add to any security force to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal, but that any peace activity in Europe would not be conducted under the shelter of NATO’s Article 5.

This was soon followed by the US vice-president, J. D. Vance, telling the Munich Security Conference that it was Europe, not Russia or China, that was the main security threat – the “enemy within” that fostered anti-democratic practices and sought to curtail free speech.

This week, a US team led by the secretary of state, Marco Rubio, sat down with their Russian opposite numbers led by the foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, to discuss peace negotiations. Ukraine was not represented. Nor was Europe. Lavrov declared that Russia would not accept any European peacekeepers in Ukraine, whether or not they were there, and perhaps by taking his cue from Hegseth.

Trump has since repeated several of his favorite Kremlin talking points on his TruthSocial platform. Ukraine was responsible for the war, he said. Its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, was a “dictator” who had cancelled elections, and whose popularity with his own people was now as low as 4 % ( it’s actually 57 %, at least 10 points higher than Trump’s rating in the US).

Trump also mocked Zelensky’s concern at his country’s exclusion from the Riyadh talks, telling reporters:” Today I heard: ‘ Oh, well, we weren’t invited.’ You’ve been there for three years, so you ought to have stopped now. You could have made a deal”.

This leads us back to the Istanbul communique, produced at the end of March 2022 after initial peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Antalya, Turkey. Some US observers have suggested that if Ukraine had signed this deal, it might be in better shape.

Istanbul communique

What happened in Istanbul, and how close Russia and Ukraine were to an agreement, has been hotly debated, with some arguing a deal was close and others refuting this.

Despite declining to join NATO, Ukraine reportedly agreed to a number of concessions, including a commitment to avoiding upcoming neutrality. Russia, in turn, would apparently have accepted Ukraine’s membership of the EU. This concession, incidentally, is still on the table.

But there were sticking points, primarily over the size of Ukraine’s armed forces after a deal – Kyiv reportedly wanted 250, 000 soldiers, the Kremlin just 85, 000 – and the types of weaponry Ukraine could keep in its arsenal.

There were also issues about Ukraine’s Russian-occupied territory, particularly Crimea – this was projected to be resolved over 15 years with Russia occupying the peninsula on a lease in the meantime. Zelensky was asked by the Kremlin to step down as president, and Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian politician, took over the presidency.

Negotiations ended in April 2022 when Russian atrocities were discovered in Bucha, a town that Ukrainian troops had taken back as part of their spring counter-offensive. However, a conclusion never came to an end.

The UK’s former prime minister, Boris Johnson, has taken much flack over reports that he urged Zelensky not to accept the deal. However, there was never a reasonable chance that Ukraine would approve of this deal. A weak Ukraine would have no way of defending itself against any incoming aggression.

If Ukraine had struck a deal based on the Istanbul communique, it would have essentially resulted in the nation becoming a pro-Russian province under the auspices of a pro-Russian government and being prohibited from forming alliances with western nations. Regarding joining the EU, the Kremlin’s opposition to Kyiv’s participation in the EU in 2013 sparked the Euromaidan protests and led to Russia’s initial Crimea annexation the following year.

What next?

Kyiv’s signing of the Istanbul communique may have quickly put an end to the hostilities and the killings. However, the Kremlin has repeatedly demonstrated that it can be relied upon to follow agreements; all you need to do is to take a look at how it has repeatedly broken the Minsk accords of 2015, which sought to put an end to hostilities in eastern Ukraine.

A deal that rewards Russian aggression by requiring the victim’s neutrality and agreeing to its territory seizure would further undermine international security and encourage other illegal foreign policy aventurism.

If the Trump administration has the blueprint for a fair peace agreement, it’s effectively hiding it at this time. Instead, European leaders have been forced to deal with the possibility of having to fund Ukraine’s ongoing defenses while adjusting to the US’s withdrawal from its security guarantees for Europe as a whole.

Either that or accept some pretty awful consequences, as my University of Bath colleague Patrick Bury wrote on X this week.

Europe is in a crisis that it could have anticipated following Russia’s massive invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The US and European relations appear to be getting more and more tense now that Trump is back in power. However, Europe is also bitterly divided on how to deal with this crisis.

Germany vehemently opposed the idea of providing troops as peacekeepers in Ukraine after initial discussions between Britain and France. Despite a report that the UK prime minister has considered creating a 30-person “monitoring force” outside the ceasefire line, both Emmanuel Macron and Keir Starmer have since changed their minds.

The Kremlin reacts to signals. Joe Biden’s statement that he would not send troops to defend Ukraine demonstrated the limitations of US involvement, even though it was clearly in full swing toward the invasion in late 2021. A clear signal to Putin and the Trump administration that Europe is serious would be sent a strong signal that Europe is prepared to dispatch peacekeepers to Ukraine right away.

Stephen Hall is a lecturer ( assistant professor ) in Russian and post-Soviet politics at the University of Bath.

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What if a sitting US president becomes dangerously unstable? – Asia Times

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The Gridiron Club is one of the oldest, most unique literary organizations in Washington, DC. Much like the White House Correspondents ‘ Association, this mysterious, members-only party hosts an annual dinner where authors and politicians change funny barbs and increase their glasses in a heart of camaraderie. Custom dictates that the sitting president visits, making it a crucial fixture in Washington’s social and political calendar.

A fictitious account of this annual dinner features at the start of Fletcher Knebel’s 1965 novel, Night of Camp David, which is back in the cultural spotlight ( again ). This bestselling social thriller about a US leader spiralling into anxiety and delusion feels oddly pertinent in the era of Trump 2.0 because of its amazing ability to anticipate reality.

Everything appears to be regular as Knebel’s history gets underway. At the Gridiron team, Democrat President Mark Hollenbach, a likable Democrat who served in the Korean War, has really stepped up to speak. Before him remain” the aristocracy of America’s perfectly mixed political-industrial culture, the men who ran the political parties and the great corporations”.

Hollenbach sets his places on his political rivals after making a few playful rants against the media. He claims that the Republican party’s leadership is based on a short pause to taking a sip of water.

my capacity for seriousness is frequently mystifying me. The idea might be in what they say to one another. I’ve given the subject a lot of consideration, and I believe I’ve found a way to answer it.

Hollenbach, who is up for reelection, suggests the FBI become empowered to keep an involuntary touch on all phone in the country. We Democrats could discover what enigmatic material serves as the adhesive for Republicanism, and what they actually say to one another to make them so gloomy, with a permanent wiretap.

The crowd erupts in laugh, assuming Hollenbach is joshing. But he’s dangerous significant. He admits this to the novel’s main protagonist, Jim MacVeagh, an idealistic young senator from Iowa, when he afterwards invites him for a nightcap at Camp David, the lonely political retreat nestled in the Maryland mountains.

It would have to be done carefully, with great legal restraints and protection, naturally. However, no decent citizen would have a thing to worry about. It’s the hoodlums, the punks, the syndicate killers and the dope peddlers we’re after. Automatic wiretapping, aided by computers to store the telephone calls, would drive them all out of business.

MacVeagh can hardly believe what he’s hearing. He tries to understand the president, citing the danger that the vaguely Nixon-like scheme” could be an awful weapon for evil in the wrong hands.” Who knows what kind of man might be able to bring you success?

These pleas are deaf to ears. With a wave of his hand as he dismisses MacVeagh’s objections, Hollenbach switches the conversation to a topic he thinks is more pressing: his choice for vice-presidential running mate.

Hollenbach dangles a tantalizing carrot before MacVeagh, suggesting he might be the ideal candidate for the position, with a sly grin. Flattered but unsure, MacVeagh demurs. He is soon called back for another meeting, where it becomes alarmingly obvious that something is wrong with the president. He rants about nefarious journalists and insists there is” some kind of conspiracy afoot afoot discredit me in the eyes of the country.”

These minor grievances are only the start of his larger plans. With feverish intensity, Hollenbach unveils his vision to make America great again. He speaks of forging

the world’s most powerful core ever seen. Not just an alliance, but a union – a real union, political, economic, social – of the great free nations of the world.

At first, MacVeagh is unsure what he’s talking about. However, it turns out Hollenbach is referring to a takeover of America’s northern neighbour:

The mineral riches beneath her soil are incredible in size. … Believe me, Jim, Canada will be the seat of power in the next century and, properly exploited and conserved, her riches can go on for a thousand years.

Hollenback argues America also needs to take control of Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland – by force if necessary. These predominately white nations” will give us the character and discipline we sadly lack”

A plane carrying Donald Trump Jr. lands in Nuuk, Greenland, last month. Photo: Emil Stach / AAP

MacVeagh is stunned by the president’s alarmingly erratic behaviour, messianic posturing and white supremacist rhetoric. He decides that he must take action. However, how can one confront the most powerful person on earth without being labeled a traitor? The reader begins to doubt MacVeagh as he searches for allies in Washington before it is too late.

A climate of dread

Although Night of Camp David is very much a product of its time, it also resonates in the here and now, especially in its prefiguration of some of Donald Trump’s more outrageous foreign policy pronouncements, like wanting to annex Greenland.

The political and socio-cultural climate in the 1960s was marked by a deep sense of suspicion. Many people were concerned about the cold war, fear of perceived subversion from within, and high-profile political assassinations.

In his influential 1964 essay” The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” historian Richard Hofstader poignantly captured the era. He suggests that American political life has long been influenced by conspiratorial theories and exaggerated fears about internal enemies in it.

Knebel’s novel, which appeared a few months after Hofstader’s study, delved directly into this mindset, creating an all too plausible scenario where the greatest threat to American democracy comes from the seat of highest office itself, rather than from a shadowy external adversary.

As seen in movies like” The Manchurian Candidate,” in which a decorated war veteran is unwittingly brainwashed into becoming a sleeper assassin, and” Seven Days in May,” which follows a Pentagon insider who uncovers a right-wing military coup against the leader of the free world, this climate of dread and distrust permeated 1960s popular culture.

Elsewhere, Stanley Kubrick’s” Dr. Strangelove” satirized the terrifying possibility of nuclear destruction, with the deranged figure of General Ripper embodying the fear of unstable leaders wielding absolute power. The 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy, meanwhile, fueled intense anxieties about the process of presidential succession.

What if a president in power suddenly became dangerously unstable, the question that Night of Camp David raised was profound and unsettling. And, more urgently, What could be done about it?

In fact, Knebel’s book was only published two years prior to the 25th Amendment‘s ratification, which clarifies procedures for removing a president who is deemed unable to discharge the office’s responsibilities. The amendment was passed as a direct response to the political chaos that followed the Kennedy assassination right away.

Different eras

Fletcher Knebel. Photo: Goodreads

Knebel was, in the words of JFK,” Washington’s most widely read and widely plagiarized” commentator. His book still has a lot to say about the fragility of our democratic institutions and the dangers of unchecked authority, whether read as a relic from the Cold War or as an urgent warning.

In addition, the contrast between Trump and Knebel’s fictional president highlights a significant contrast between their respective historical and political eras.

Despite his desire for a new world order, the president ultimately makes a choice in Night of Camp David that shows him to be oddly patriotic and scrupulous.

One simply can’t imagine such a scenario under Trump.

Hollenbach, for all of his delusions and grandiosity, still sees himself as acting in the nation’s best interest – however warped or dangerous his vision may be. Trump, on the other hand, operates with ruthless, transactional logic, focused above all on his power and survival.

Trump’s statements on international affairs, whether they rename the Gulf of Mexico or quote Napoleon to support his government’s purging, veer into the realm of the bizarre. However, his approach is more about calculated dominance than untrammelled paranoia.

When it comes to Trump, the issue is more with remorseless, calculated restructuring of institutions to serve his own goals.

In this regard, Night of Camp David may feel oddly quaint and antiquated, the narrative of which might strike the contemporary reader as a bit tame.

Its cast of characters, irrespective of party and persuasion, are ultimately driven by duty to the nation, where’s today’s political landscape in the United States is increasingly defined by ideological entrenchment and loyalty tests.

Knebel imagines a president’s instability as a crisis to be resolved. With Trump’s second coming, instability has itself become a governing principle.

Alexander Howard is the University of Sydney’s senior lecturer on the subject of writing and English.

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Japan, S Korea and Poland need nuclear weapons, now – Asia Times

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In 1994, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons, in exchange for security guarantees from the United States and Russia to respect Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty.

In 2022, Russia violated that agreement, launching an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine’s borders, claiming pieces of its territory. In 2025, US President Donald Trump held talks with Russian leaders, falsely blamed Ukraine for starting the war, and reportedly offered a “peace deal” that would endorse Russian conquests of Ukrainian territory.

Contrast this with the experience of North Korea. In 2006, the country tested its first nuclear weapon and is now reckoned to have about 50. Despite being impoverished and surrounded by hostile powers and questionable allies, North Korea has never been seriously threatened with war in the years since it went nuclear. Indeed, during his first term, Trump went out of his way to accommodate and befriend North Korea’s leader.

The moral of these stories and others1 is painfully, uncomfortably clear. The modern world is a place where nuclear-armed great powers, led by authoritarian leaders, often feel the impulse to bully smaller nations.

If those smaller nations lack nuclear weapons, they lie prostrate and vulnerable at the feet of the bullies. But if they have nukes, they are much harder to push around. This doesn’t mean they’re impervious to attack — Israel has been struck by Iran and its proxies — but having nukes dramatically improves a small country’s security.

There are at least three smallish nations for whom this lesson is especially urgent right now. In Europe, Poland is menaced by Russia, which seeks to dominate Poland as it did under the Tsarist Empire and again under the USSR.

Trump is frantically appeasing and trying to befriend Russia, and the West European nations are not yet willing to fill the gap. If Ukraine falls, Poland will be next on Russia’s menu — and Russia will have plenty of newly conscripted Ukrainian troops to throw as cannon fodder against Poland.

In Asia, meanwhile, Japan and South Korea confront a bully far more powerful than Russia. China is the world’s manufacturing superpower, with industrial capacity far exceeding the US and all its Asian allies combined; even if Trump’s America decides it wants to defend Asia against a Chinese takeover, it’s not clear it has the ability to do so.

And as Palmer Luckey eloquently pointed out in a recent interview, there’s every indication that China wouldn’t be satisfied with the conquest of Taiwan — it’s building a case to claim Japan’s island of Okinawa, and might support a North Korean takeover of South Korea in order to turn the whole peninsula into a Chinese satellite state.

Poland, Japan, and South Korea need something to replace the failing deterrence of their alliances with the U.S. Almost exactly one year ago, I made the case that that “something” is nuclear weapons of their own. I usually wait at least two years to “rerun” a post of mine, but in this case the situation seems rather urgent and the message is painfully timely.

I don’t like nuclear proliferation any more than you do, but in the new terrifying world of authoritarianism and great power conquests, it’s probably inevitable; best to do it in a way that preserves as much as possible of the stability and freedom that Europe and Asia have rightfully come to treasure.

Anyway, here’s my post from last year:

I am, to put it mildly, very unhappy about the need to write this post. I’ve been putting it off for a long time. And yet I’m going to write it, because it’s true, and someone needs to say it, and warning people about unpleasant geopolitical realities has kind of become one of my roles as a blogger over the past year.

I wrote about how the US isn’t psychologically or economically prepared for war with China, about the US’ withered defense-industrial base, and about the vulnerability of world commerce to area-denial strategies. But today it’s time for me to write about the scariest of these topics — the need for controlled nuclear proliferation. Japan and South Korea, and possibly also Poland, need to create their own nuclear deterrents.

For my entire life, it’s been an article of faith among most of the people I know that nuclear proliferation is a bad thing. And that makes sense because nuclear weapons are truly terrifying weapons. The US and USSR had many close calls during the first Cold War; if even one of those had resulted in a nuclear exchange, much of human civilization would have been laid waste.

The more pairs of countries are staring each other down with nukes, the greater the chance that one of those pairs will have a false alarm or accidental launch. That simple math should make us terrified of nuclear proliferation.

Furthermore, from 1990 through 2010, nuclear disarmament made the world a lot safer. U.S. and Soviet/Russian nuclear stockpiles dwindled from over 60,000 between them to fewer than 10,000:

Source: Federation of American Scientists via Wikipedia

And fewer than 4,000 of those are actually deployed; most are kept in reserves or have already been retired.

So why on Earth would we turn our back on a successful strategy of disarmament and actually recommend that more countries build their own nukes? Isn’t that pure stark raving world-destroying insanity?

Well, no, for several reasons. First, I’m not recommending that countries go back to keeping tens of thousands of nukes on hair-trigger alert like the US and USSR did; instead I’m recommending that a couple of countries develop modest nuclear deterrents along the lines of France’s, the UK’s, or India’s.

Second, countries outside of the U.S. alliance system have been engaging in nuclear proliferation for half a century now, so to simply do nothing in the face of that strategy will not stop nuclear proliferation from occurring; it will simply make it one-sided.

Third, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s threat to invade Taiwan signals a new expansionism on the part of the totalitarian great powers, which will be difficult to deter conventionally. Fourth, internal political divisions mean that Japan, South Korea, and Poland can’t rely on the US nuclear umbrella like they used to.

Fifth, evidence from South Asia suggests that modest nuclear deterrents can act as a stabilizing force at the regional as well as the global level. And finally, breaking the one-sided taboo on nuclear proliferation will probably make it easier to set up an effective new global nonproliferation regime.

In other words, Japan and South Korea getting nukes is not a good thing, but it’s probably the least bad option available at this unhappy juncture.

Nuclear proliferation is already happening

The original five nuclear powers, as defined in the nonproliferation regime set up in the 1960s, were the US, the USSR, China, the UK, and France. These were also the countries with permanent seats on the UN Security Council, and they were the victors of World War 2. So the original list of approved nuclear powers made sense as an extension of the postwar global order.

Those states generally tried to keep nuclear weapons to themselves, but not always. It’s an open secret that China helped Pakistan build nuclear weapons:

In 1982, a Pakistani military C-130 left the western Chinese city of Urumqi with a highly unusual cargo: enough weapons-grade uranium for two atomic bombs, according to accounts written by the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, and provided to The Washington Post.

The uranium transfer in five stainless-steel boxes was part of a broad-ranging, secret nuclear deal approved years earlier by Mao Zedong and Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto that culminated in an exceptional, deliberate act of proliferation by a nuclear power, according to the accounts by Khan…

According to Khan, the uranium cargo came with a blueprint for a simple weapon that China had already tested, supplying a virtual do-it-yourself kit that significantly speeded Pakistan’s bomb effort. The transfer also started a chain of proliferation: U.S. officials worry that Khan later shared related Chinese design information with Iran; in 2003, Libya confirmed obtaining it from Khan’s clandestine network.

France, meanwhile, helped Israel build a nuclear reactor to produce material for nuclear bombs.

Pakistan, once it had nukes, had few reservations about proliferating them. It helped Iran, which doesn’t quite have nukes yet, but is close. And it did succeed in helping North Korea to go nuclear.

Meanwhile, although China isn’t exactly happy that North Korea has nukes, it has steadfastly refused American entreaties to take strong action to force North Korea to denuclearize.

Chinese aid kept the North Korean economy and military afloat in the face of US sanctions, allowing it to build up its nuclear arsenal and its missile capabilities. And China has never showed much interest in helping to curb Iran’s nuclear program, buying a large amount of Iranian oil and enabling the Iranian economy to stay afloat in the face of US sanctions.

So nuclear proliferation is happening, and it’s mostly being done by China and its allies. Increasingly, this means that U.S. allies are facing nuclear-capable enemies without nukes of their own. India has nukes to balance Pakistan’s, and Israel has nukes to balance any future Iranian arsenal. But three key US allies are in a very perilous situation right now: Japan, South Korea, and Poland.

The US nuclear umbrella is no longer reliable

Japan, South Korea, and Poland have been staring down the teeth of nuclear-armed China, North Korea, and Russia for decades now.

But in the past, they could always rely on the US nuclear umbrella to protect them from those enemies. The US nuclear umbrella is an explicit or tacit agreement with an ally. The US promises that if someone nukes that ally, the US will use its own nuclear weapons in retaliation. In exchange, the ally agrees not to develop nuclear weapons of its own.

In the 1990s or the 2000s, the US side of that bargain was a credible promise. But under Donald Trump, the solidity of the nuclear umbrella was called into question. During his presidency, Trump demanded that South Korea and Japan pay the US to provide them with nuclear protection, implying that the nuclear umbrella was conditional.

Trump has consistently shown hostility toward NATO, threatening to withdraw from the alliance, and recently declaring that if he won the presidency again, he would encourage Russia to conquer any US allies that didn’t spend enough on their militaries.

Meanwhile, US politics has now developed a “MAGA” faction — loyal to Trump, but not dependent on Trump — that is openly friendly to Russia and hostile to NATO. House Speaker Mike Johnson has blocked aid to Ukraine, resulting in the momentum of the war shifting to Russia. A pro-Russia online media ecosystem, including Tucker Carlson and others, has gained influence on the Right.

In this situation, allies should not be confident that America would come to their defense with nuclear weapons if they were attacked. If a Democrat is President, the nuclear umbrella is probably still in place (barring Congressional stonewalling), but a Democrat will not always be President.

If Trump is rejected in 2024, a Republican will still probably win in 2028 or 2032, and that Republican will have to at least placate the “MAGA” wing that wants to support Russia and withdraw from NATO.

In other words, the US’s domestic political divisions mean that it’s no longer a reliable nuclear protector. It might still come to the aid of Japan or South Korea or Poland with nukes, but betting the continued existence of your country on what America might do is an incredibly risky strategy.

Attack of the Slow Empires

America’s descent into unreliability comes at the most perilous possible time for Japan, South Korea, and Poland. China and Russia are on the march, led by personalistic totalitarian dictators and emboldened by both US weakness and by China’s manufacturing dominance.

Russia has, of course, invaded Ukraine. But there’s no indication that swallowing it would satisfy Putin’s appetite. Estonia and Moldova are probably next on the menu, since the former has a large population and the latter has a Russian-controlled enclave. (Estonia is in NATO, but if Trump refuses to come to its aid when it’s attacked, NATO is a defunct alliance.)

But Russia’s real prize is Poland, which Russia views as its ancient and most dangerous rival for influence in the Slavic world. Russian government mouthpieces regularly issue threats against Poland:

In general, it’s clear that Putin wants to restore some sort of Russian control over all of the lands that were part of the old Russian Empire. Whether he has the capability to do that is another question.

Technology has shifted toward the defense, and drones, mines, and portable missiles are now fairly easily able to stop fleets armored vehicles in their tracks. Putin’s initial attempt to take Ukraine by blitzkrieg failed for this reason, and an attack on Poland wouldn’t go any better.

But Putin may not need a lightning victory in order to keep on rolling. He’s reoriented Russia’s entire economy around the Ukraine war and mobilized all of its manpower. With robust oil revenues, Chinese manufacturing support, and a demographic advantage over the other East European states, there’s no reason Putin can’t just keep on attacking and attacking for decades.

Renard Foucart believes that Russia is so committed to the Ukraine war that its economy basically now depends on continuing that war:

Russia’s economy has not collapsed. But it does look very different, and is now entirely focused on a long war in Ukraine – which is actually driving economic growth…Put simply, the war against Ukraine is now the main driver of Russia’s economic growth…

A protracted stalemate might be the only solution for Russia to avoid total economic collapse. Having transformed the little industry it had to focus on the war effort, and with a labour shortage problem worsened by hundreds of thousands of war casualties and a massive brain drain, the country would struggle to find a new direction…The Russian regime has no incentive to end the war and deal with that kind of economic reality.

Russia thus seems to be trying to invent a new kind of empire — a “slow empire”, for which perpetual war is a way of life instead of a means to an end. It may never execute the kind of rapid, lightning conquests that empires of the past hoped to achieve, but it will relentlessly grind forward for decades on end.

China hasn’t launched any major attacks yet, but it does seem to be moving in a bit of a Russia-like direction. In addition to its threat to conquer — excuse me, “reunify with” — Taiwan, China has been trying to slowly slice off bits of territory from India, the Philippines, and Bhutan. And it’s also now pushing a claim to the Japanese island of Okinawa — not some small outlying island, but an important Japanese province.

Thus, while Xi Jinping might not be quite as reckless or aggressive as Putin, he clearly seems to want to carry out a similar policy of continuous slow expansion. And China’s economic and population advantages over its neighbors are far larger than Russia’s; China can continue a “slow empire” strategy for many decades.

If you’re in the path of a “slow empire”, how do you defend against it? You can’t out-manufacture China or a China-supplied Russia. You can’t throw more bodies into the fray than China and Russia can. What do you do? Other than surrender, you basically have two choices:

  1. Get the US, West Europe, or other external powers to protect you, or
  2. Develop nuclear weapons.

For Japan and South Korea, the choice here is very clear. The US is their only external protector against China, and the rise of MAGA politics (and the shriveling of the US defense-industrial base) means that the US is no longer reliable.

Nuclear weapons are the only real possibility of an enduring security guarantee for Japan and South Korea. And that’s not even taking into account the need to deter the loose cannon of North Korea, whose nuclear-capable missile arsenal is growing more deadly by the day.

For Poland, the case is less clear. It has another potential protector besides the U.S.: the European powers of Germany, France, and the UK. Those countries can theoretically outmatch Russia in terms of both population and manufacturing, even if Russia gets Chinese help. And the UK and France have nukes of their own. And there’s no loose cannon like North Korea in the neighborhood.

The main danger for Poland is that Germany, France, and the UK, like America, will remain mired in political paralysis, and that their defense-industrial bases will remain moribund, and that they will fail to come to Poland’s aid against Putin.

Even if its manufacturing base allowed Poland to hold out against Russia by itself, a non-nuclear Poland might be cowed into submission by Russian nuclear threats. If West Europe allows Ukraine to fall, Poland will almost certainly strongly consider scrambling for nukes.

So for Japan, South Korea, and possibly Poland, getting nukes is the obvious strategy for dealing with the expansionist empires next door. If these countries went nuclear, it would draw “hard boundaries” past which Xi and Putin could not pass, even if they succeeded in gobbling up Ukraine, Taiwan, and other small nations in the area.

Japanese, South Korean, and Polish nukes would freeze the battle lines of Cold War 2, potentially stopping it from turning into World War 3.

Nuclear weapons have restrained conflict in South Asia

Of course, as I mentioned, Japanese, South Korean and Polish nukes could also start World War 3, in case of an accidental launch. And some people might worry that if they possessed nukes, these three countries would themselves become more aggressive.

In the case of Japan and South Korea, I’m not so worried. These are peace-loving, non-expansionist countries with zero interest in starting wars with their neighbors. Furthermore, they would not be able to win a nuclear confrontation with China, only to make China pay a very high price for any victory. So even if they wanted to be aggressive, they couldn’t.

And both Japan and South Korea are known for highly competent civil servants and well-functioning national institutions; the danger of accidental launch isn’t zero, but it’s probably less than for the US, China, Russia, or other existing nuclear powers.

I can’t think of any countries on the planet more capable of maintaining a nuclear deterrent safely and using it wisely. I have a bit less confidence in Poland, since it escaped communism and endemic corruption only recently, and its technocratic elite has been in power for a far shorter time.

But there’s another reason I’m not so worried about Japanese or South Korean nukes, which is that nuclear deterrence seems to have had a salutary effect on war in South Asia. India and Pakistan have fought each other four times (with India winning all four contests).

Their fourth war, the Kargil War of 1999, came right after both had developed nuclear weapons. But although there were some nuclear threats, the nuclear factor is part of what made Pakistan eventually back down. Ultimately, casualties in that war were very low — probably less than 2000 deaths all told.

An India-Pakistan standoff in 2019, meanwhile, fizzled in part because of worries over nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s President Imran Khan famously declared: “With the weapons you have and the weapons we have, can we afford miscalculation? Shouldn’t we think that if this escalates, what will it lead to?” Ultimately, both countries backed off of hostilities.

This is a very encouraging outcome. India and Pakistan are much poorer countries than Japan or South Korea, and have a recent history of warfare. And yet nuclear weapons very clearly acted as a restraint on war between the two bitter enemies. Obviously, the possibility of a nuclear war between the two remains, and people are right to be scared of it.

But South Asia offers a glimmer of hope that nuclear deterrence can stop or prevent conventional war between major powers, just as it stopped the superpowers from going to war with each other during the first Cold War.

Where does nuclear proliferation stop?

So while I think Japan and South Korea getting nukes would reduce the risk of major conflict, there’s one more issue to consider: Where does it end? Every instance of nuclear proliferation prompts other countries to think “Why not us, too?”.

If Japan and South Korea get nukes, why not Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia? If Poland gets nukes, why not Hungary, Armenia, or Azerbaijan? A world where every country has nuclear weapons will almost certainly see them used at some point, after which their use could become normalized.

What we need in order to prevent this is a strict internationally enforced nuclear nonproliferation regime. Right now, we don’t have that; China and Russia are happy to help Iran and North Korea thrive under US sanctions, allowing their nuclear programs to continue.

What we have right now is a unilateral nonproliferation regime, where Chinese and Russian allies get nukes, and U.S. allies don’t. This is kind of like trying to implement gun control by giving up your guns and expecting your enemies to follow suit.

The only global nuclear nonproliferation regime that will work is one that China and Russia both buy into wholeheartedly and work to enforce. And they will only do that if they see a threat of proliferation on the opposite side of the global divide. Right now, China and Russia have no incentive to enforce nonproliferation, because they know US allies will refrain from getting nukes unilaterally and voluntarily.

If Japan and South Korea go nuclear, this immediately changes. At that point, China and Russia know that democratic countries are going to play by the same rules they are, instead of a different, more restrictive set of rules. Which means China and Russia become just as worried about nuclear proliferation as the US and West Europe are.

Right now, Japan and South Korea’s lack of nukes represents a glaring hole in the global balance of power, and an invitation to China and Russia to expand. It may seem paradoxical to think that new countries getting nukes would lead to a fundamentally more secure world, but in this case, I think the alternative is clearly worse.

Notes

1 The non-nuclear Iran, unlike North Korea, has suffered regular Israeli and US attacks. Nuclear Pakistan’s sovereignty is regarded as inviolable. And despite the popularity of “Death to Israel” chants, other Middle Eastern countries don’t seriously think about launching a major war with it, because Israel has nukes.

This article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion subscriber here.

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