Now is the moment for a Middle East ceasefire – Asia Times

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The recent escalation in hostilities between Israel and Iran has brought the Middle East dangerously close to a full-scale regional war, one that could swiftly draw in neighboring countries as well as the United States and its allies.

With Iran contemplating retaliation after Israel’s missile attack on October 26, the urgency for diplomatic intervention is increasingly critical.

A swift and decisive diplomatic initiative is needed not only for Iran and Israel but is also essential to prevent further regional destabilization, which if allowed to spiral, would have grave implications for global security and stability.

Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Iran retains its inherent right to self-defense in response to Israel’s actions. Iran’s leadership is aware that accepting attacks on Tehran could set a dangerous precedent, suggesting a weakening of its stance.

Israel’s strikes represent the first attacks on Iranian soil since the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. A failure to respond could undermine Iran’s image among regional allies and its domestic population.

There is concern that normalizing such incursions might erase critical “red lines,” potentially encouraging Israel to strike Tehran with the same frequency it applies to Damascus and Beirut.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei warned that Israel’s recent aggression should not be downplayed, stressing that the regime’s miscalculations about Iran’s resilience and strength will not go unchallenged.

Following his statements, President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi emphasized the need for a proportionate response, affirming Iran’s unwillingness to leave this attack unanswered.

As it did following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil, Tehran has expressed a reluctance to escalate into full-scale war with Israel, acknowledging that a well-timed ceasefire could influence its response, potentially moderating or even preventing military action.

This window for negotiation offers the United States and its Western allies a critical opportunity to support a diplomatic solution and press for a ceasefire.

For Israel, a ceasefire could represent a practical exit from the costly and complex situation. Its recent campaign has inflicted substantial losses on Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon but at the cost of innocent lives and significant military resources.

Israel has assassinated high-profile leaders, such as Yahya Sinwar of Hamas and Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah, but both groups’ forces have proven resilient and exacted notable losses on the Israeli military, which drains both resources and morale.

For example, the recent attacks on the Israeli Golani Brigade headquarters and the deaths of Colonel Ehsan Daqsa show that these groups remain formidable. Over the past month, the Israeli army has reported 90 soldiers killed and 750 wounded in Lebanon alone, along with significant losses of equipment, including Merkava tanks, military bulldozers, and advanced drones.

From October 7 to October 25, Israel’s Ministry of Defense reported the deaths of 890 soldiers and officers across its military and security services, with nearly 5,000 more wounded.

These staggering figures have led Israel’s Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to warn Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of a costly war lacking both “a compass” and “a clear goal that risks entangling both nations in a war of attrition.

The prolonged conflict has also fuelled frustration among Israeli citizens, especially the families of hostages and fallen soldiers, who have publicly voiced dissatisfaction with the government’s approach.

At a recent memorial ceremony for the October 7 attack, Israel’s prime minister faced outcries from grieving families. Some relatives shouted, “Shame on you!” while one repeatedly cried out, “My father was killed.”

Such sentiments reveal a deeper issue: the longer this conflict continues, the greater Israel’s risk of becoming entrenched in an unsustainable, open-ended war. A ceasefire offers a realistic way to break this costly cycle and avoid further casualties.

Israel’s strategy must also contend with lessons from recent history. Some hawkish advocates of a military-first approach to reshaping the Middle East like the former Mossad chief should remember the 2003 Iraq War. At that time, a swift military campaign was anticipated to establish stability, turn Iran’s influence around, and transform Iraq into an ally.

Instead, Iranian influence grew, diverting US resources with limited long-term success. Today, Hezbollah and Hamas have become similarly entrenched within their communities, not just as military powers but as essential service providers. Efforts to reduce their influence must account for this social integration, as tactical victories alone are unlikely to dismantle their regional standing.

Moreover, while some in Israel might assume that a future US administration under Donald Trump would endorse a full-scale conflict with Iran, this overlooks critical variables.

During his first term, Trump favored sanctions and rhetoric over direct military involvement. He notably refrained from a military response in several moments of high tension.

In fact, the Republican nominee has told Prime Minister Netanyahu that he wants Israel to wrap up the war in Gaza by the time he returns to office if he wins the election, as reported by the Times of Israel.

Moreover, domestic support in the US for another Middle Eastern conflict is low following the costly Iraq and Afghanistan wars, meaning that even a supportive administration might push for diplomatic solutions over direct involvement. The United States may be more inclined to back peace efforts that support its own strategic objectives rather than commit to further regional entanglement.

The US government is fully aware of the risks associated with being drawn into this conflict. Already providing significant military aid to Israel, with Brown University estimating nearly $22.76 billion allocated this past year, the US would face an immense financial burden if hostilities were to expand. Such a strain would divert resources from urgent domestic and global priorities, reinforcing the argument for a diplomatic approach.

Beyond economics, a wider Middle Eastern conflict would detract from the US’s strategic focus on containing Chinese and Russian influence in regions like the South China Sea and Eastern Europe. A prolonged Middle Eastern war could allow these powers to consolidate their interests unchallenged, underscoring the viability of a ceasefire for the US.

The escalating tensions between Israel and Iran present a pivotal moment for international diplomacy. Each involved nation faces profound and potentially irreversible consequences should this conflict continue unchecked.

For Iran, retaliation is a matter of both regional standing and self-defense, while Israel faces an unsustainable burden as it risks entanglement in an endless cycle of violence. The United States, aware of its own fiscal and strategic constraints, has a critical role to play in advocating for a ceasefire.

A timely diplomatic intervention could pave the way for de-escalation, sparing the region from further devastation and allowing for a shift toward a more stable, sustainable peace. This opportunity for resolution underscores the collective interest of diplomacy over warfare, positioning all parties for a path out of an otherwise costly and prolonged conflict.

Hossein Zeinali is an international reporter at Farhikhtegan Daily and Sadegh Emami is a member of the publication’s editorial board.

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Tariff time: Free trade skepticism deeply rooted in US history – Asia Times

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One of the more surprising developments in recent American politics has been the backlash against free trade.

As recently as a decade ago, Democrats and Republicans alike generally favored free trade. But with the 2024 presidential election just days away, both Republican Donald Trump and Democrat Kamala Harris are leaning hard on protectionism.

The Trump campaign in particular is promoting tariffs that would be difficult to imagine coming from a Republican presidential candidate just a decade ago.

This new post-neoliberal moment might seem confounding. But it hearkens back to economic policies – and political parties – from around the time of the nation’s founding, and it offers clues to our divided present.

Back in the late 18th century, the Founding Father Alexander Hamilton helped put in place a set of policies designed to encourage US industry and to promote economic development and innovation.

That arrangement, which laid the groundwork for what became known as the “American System,” emerged in part as a counterbalance to British conceptions of free trade. And the American System quickly grew as accepted economic policy as a young America developed its industrial strength.

Hamilton’s economic nationalism

In the early years of the republic, the US didn’t have much of a trade policy at all.

When the US officially achieved independence in 1783 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the Articles of Confederation – the nation’s first constitution – greatly limited the federal government’s powers, including its ability to regulate foreign trade.

These restrictions reflected the reality of 13 very different states that had been more united against the British – and their trade controls – than in support of a common vision of economic development.

The economic conditions within this loosely connected nation quickly worsened. A deepening economic crisis, rising debt, inflation, cheap British manufactured goods and rising bankruptcy soon emerged. Such changing conditions gave rise to calls for a new national economic policy.

This economic strain was an important factor leading to the drafting of the US Constitution, ratified in 1789. The Constitution gave the federal government the capacity to regulate trade with foreign countries and, for the first time, to collect taxes. Both were privileges once held exclusively by sovereign American states.

The ‘second American revolution’

A strengthened American Congress made passing a national Tariff Act one of its first tasks. When it was ratified in 1789, a national import tax replaced customs previously enacted by the states.

Perhaps indicating the magnitude of this change, supporters called it “the Second American Revolution,” passed as it was on July 4, 1789. In effect, it helped create a new conception of the American political and economic system, with a much stronger role for the state in economic matters.

Duties were levied on 30 commodities, including hemp and textiles. Perhaps foreshadowing trade policy of a future era, the Tariff Act also placed duties of 12.5% on goods imported from China and India.

The main architect of this new industrial policy was Hamilton, who released his seminal work on economic policy, Report on Manufactures, in 1791. Hamilton’s ideas were based on transforming a predominantly agricultural nation into one defined, at least in part, by growing and diversified industry.

Though often overlooked, Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures also contained a grander vision – it sought to encourage the development of American invention and ingenuity as a form of economic policy and argued for unlocking “the genius of the people” so that “the wealth of a nation may be promoted.”

To promote this spirit of national enterprise, Hamilton encouraged promoting technological progress, subsidizing research, attracting migrants, supporting a new financial system and implementing a patent system to promote invention. Such policies were in many ways an extension of previous policy enshrined in Section 8 of the Constitution.

Tariffs and their discontents

As the use of tariffs continued in the decades following Hamilton’s plan, policymakers turned increasingly protective in an attempt to more directly promote American industry. They enacted tariffs to insulate growing American industries from foreign competition, primarily from the UK.

By the early 19th century, this growing protectionist movement coalesced around the powerful Kentucky legislator Henry Clay and his Whig Party. Clay, who first referred to the American System by name, and his allies were instrumental in raising average national tariff rates to 20% in 1816.

When crisis appeared during the Panic of 1819, a collapse in cotton prices, a tightening of credit, widespread foreclosures and rising unemployment followed. In response, Clay and his allies raised tariff rates again, to 50% in 1828.

The increasing use of tariffs provoked a fierce response from some in the nation’s agricultural and slave-owning class, who objected to perceived Northern dominance and a strong federal government. One prominent Southern critic at the time referred to the 1828 tariff as the “tariff of abominations.”

Indeed, opposition to elements of the American System was one of the chief policy goals of early Democratic politicians such as Andrew Jackson, and fights over the system presaged later sectional fights leading up to the Civil War.

As an industrial revolution took root in American society in the decades that followed, tariffs remained a cornerstone of US economic policy. By the late 1850s, tariffs had become integrated into the policy of the newly formed Republican Party and an important plank of Abraham Lincoln’s economic platform.

Toward the end of the 19th century, a changing Democratic Party, supported increasingly by a strong agricultural populist movement, continued to largely oppose the tariff system, arguing it benefited powerful industrialists at the expense of the working class while offering little to counter economic crisis.

The breakup of the American System − and why it matters today

Between 1861 and 1933, tariffs were a standard tool of US economic policy. During this period, tariffs on dutiable goods often averaged 40% to 50%, especially in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. US policymakers didn’t seriously question tariffs as a form of industrial policy until the deepening of the Great Depression in the 1930s.

Following World War II, the US decisively shifted away from tariffs. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was widely blamed for deepening the Great Depression and contributing to the international conflicts of the 1930s and 1940s, effectively ending the protectionist era of U.S. industrial history.

The establishment of the Federal Reserve in 1913 provided policymakers with a novel tool – monetary policy – to deal with economic downturns. The Keynesian revolution provided still another policy response for governments to consider during periods of economic crisis: spending as fiscal stimulus to create jobs and income.

Finally, as postwar American policy embraced open global trade, American economic policy pursued more direct mechanisms to foster national innovation and entrepreneurship – effectively breaking up policy once dependent on activist trade intervention. With the elimination of tariffs, one of the great periods of American economic growth and innovation followed.

In 2024, the Republican platform has, in many ways, returned to its origins by offering tariffs as a key economic strategy. Likewise, the Democratic platform, with its skepticism of concentrated corporate power, coupled with a renewed focus on financial support for small businesses and entrepreneurship, echoes its own earlier generation.

As Americans head to the polls, it’s worth asking how current economic proposals with deep roots in the American System of old might help shape economic policy in the future.

Erik Guzik is assistant clinical professor of management, University of Montana

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Airbus, Toshiba building the hydrogen planes of the future – Asia Times

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Airbus and Toshiba will cooperate to develop superconducting technologies for future hydrogen-powered aircraft, a potential revolutionary collaboration to curb carbon emissions and improve efficiency while switching to a sustainable long-term fuel source.

Airbus UpNext, a wholly-owned subsidiary of France’s Airbus, and Japan’s Toshiba Energy Systems & Solutions Corporation, a division of the electronics conglomerate, will carry out the work as per a newly signed agreement.

Airbus UpNext’s says its mission is to identify, evaluate and develop potentially disruptive aerospace trends and concepts that could yield radical technological breakthroughs such as flying “at speeds well beyond what seems feasible today” or, in this case, a new and better approach to aerial propulsion.

Airbus UpNext says it aims “to further accelerate traditional research cycles, developing proof of concepts and completing both ground and flight testing with scale and speed.” Practically speaking, this likely means within two or three years.

Toshiba Energy Systems & Solutions Corporation is one of Japan’s leading suppliers of power generation and transmission equipment, and energy management technology.

Director Tsutomu Takeuchi says the company brings “expertise in superconducting technology for high current flow, motor drive technology for precise current control, and advanced rotating machinery technology for stable, high-speed operation” to the partnership.

The two sides signed the agreement last month at the Japan International Aerospace Exhibition 2024, which hosted more than 660 companies and other organizations at the Tokyo Big Sight exhibition center from October 16-19.

Airbus senior vice president Grzegorz Ombach, who heads the aerospace giant’s “Disruptive R&T” (Research and Technology) division, said, “Partnering with Toshiba presents a unique opportunity to push beyond the limitations of today’s partial superconducting and conventional electrical motors.”

Ombach and Takeuchi were joined by Kensuke Suzuki, executive in charge of new technology in the power systems division of Toshiba Energy Systems & Solutions Corporation, and Ludovic Ybanez, head of the Airbus Cryoprop demonstrator project.

Cryoprop was launched last May to accelerate the development of a two-megawatt superconducting electric propulsion system cooled by liquid hydrogen. The project seeks to confirm the potential of superconducting technologies for future aircraft applications in manufacturing, maintenance, operations and safety.

Any breakthrough would give Airbus the opportunity to accelerate the introduction of new products such as superconducting cables, motors, cryogenic power electronics and cryogenic cooling systems.

Toshiba, which has been conducting R&D on superconducting technology for nearly 50 years, announced a prototype two-megawatt superconductivity motor in June 2022. Its and Airbus’ projects have now converged.

The collaboration marks a hopeful start for the new Airbus Tech Hub Japan announced last May, which aims to create partnerships in Japan to promote research and innovation and build a next-generation aviation ecosystem. One of many established by Airbus, it will focus on aviation materials and automation as well as decarbonization.

The Tech Hub concept, supported by the governments of France and Japan, is more forward-looking and more likely to benefit Japan than the ill-fated Mitsubishi regional jet project, which was launched in 2007 and, after numerous delays, finally cancelled in 2023. It also marks another step for Japan away from reliance on America’s Boeing toward increased collaboration with Airbus.

Airbus is already working with Japanese aircraft and aircraft component makers Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and ShinMaywa, carbon fiber producers Toray and Teijin, and dozens of other Japanese companies.

On October 18, Airbus and Kawasaki Heavy Industries signed an MOU to study the feasibility of building hydrogen infrastructure at Kansai International Airport, Osaka International Airport and Kobe Airport.  

A new addition to the Airbus Hydrogen Hub at Airports program, it is part of a roll-out of hydrogen infrastructure at airports in Europe, the Asia-Pacific and North America.

The Airbus hydrogen network already includes some 215 airports and associated energy suppliers, ground service companies and airlines – including All Nippon Airways (ANA). It is beginning to develop the scale that would make hydrogen-powered flight economical.

Airbus wants to introduce the world’s first hydrogen-powered commercial aircraft by 2035 and has developed four design concepts to that end. Three of them—turbofan, turboprop and blended wing-body turbofan—use hydrogen combustion gas turbines and modified fuel injectors similar to the technology currently in use. The fourth uses hydrogen fuel cells to power electric motors.

Airbus also has R&D teams working on cryogenic fuel systems and hydrogen fuel tanks. Hydrogen has an energy per unit mass three times greater than that of the jet fuel currently in use, but a lower energy density by volume. That means hydrogen fuel tanks will be bulkier than existing jet fuel tanks, and thus, future hydrogen-powered aircraft will look quite different from today’s airplanes.

US aerospace rival Boeing is skeptical of the hydrogen push. Speaking at the Farnborough International Airshow in July, Boeing chief technology officer Todd Citron said that hydrogen’s low energy density by volume and high flammability present a design problem and a serious safety risk. “Is it safe and certifiable?” he asked, adding, “That’s a really big question.”

His critical comment came after the April announcement of a Boeing R&T Center in Nagoya to focus on digital model-based engineering and manufacturing, composite materials, sustainable aviation fuel and the use of hydrogen fuel cells to power aircraft.

Like Airbus, Boeing has been working on hydrogen-powered flight for several years. However, faced with a net US$6.2 billion loss last quarter, a strike that has shut down most of its production and a discounted stock issue to save its bleeding balance sheet, management’s focus is now more on restructuring and survival than innovation.

Indeed, keeping pace with Airbus on hydrogen-powered aircraft does not appear to be a Boeing priority. With its Hydrogen Hub at Airports implementation program, Airbus is getting so far ahead in the field that Boeing may never catch up. For its part, Toshiba has seemingly chosen the right partner to commercialize its superconducting motor technology in aviation markets.

Follow this writer on X: @ScottFo83517667

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Cutting-edge US counter to China’s ‘Guam killer’ missiles – Asia Times

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The US has installed a Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) in Guam, signaling heightened readiness against potential threats from China as the US integrates cutting-edge missile interceptors to fortify its Pacific stronghold.

Last month, The War Zone reported that the US Navy had installed a Mk 41 VLS for Guam’s Aegis Ashore air defense system, marking a significant upgrade to the island’s defenses. The War Zone report mentions the installation is part of broader efforts to enhance Guam’s airspace security against mainly Chinese threats.

The report notes that the Aegis Ashore system, which includes the Aegis Combat System and AN/SPY-1 radar, is designed to intercept ballistic missiles during their midcourse flight using SM-3 interceptors.

It says the modular Mk 41 launcher can accommodate other interceptors like the SM-6 and the forthcoming Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), enhancing its capability to counter hypersonic threats.

However, The War Zone suggests that the installation faces challenges due to Guam’s limited open space and mountainous terrain. The Mk 41 launcher is a crucial component of the planned Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (EIAMD) system, which aims to provide a comprehensive 360-degree defense of the island against a broad spectrum of aerial threats.

Asia Times reported in April 2024 that the US is set to enhance Guam’s missile defenses by deploying Northrop Grumman’s Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) following a successful test at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.

The IBCS, which integrates disparate sensors and weapons systems into a cohesive network, will bolster Guam’s defenses against ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons and drone threats.

The upgrade is part of a broader strategy to address vulnerabilities in the US air and missile defense kill chains, particularly against Chinese and North Korean threats.

The EIAMD missile defense system, featuring Aegis Ashore, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Typhon and Patriot systems, will form the future core of Guam’s defense.

However, in May 2023, Asia Times mentioned that integrating multiple systems may present challenges, as unlinked systems and fixed sensor-to-shooter combinations could fail against advanced missile attacks.

China and North Korea’s “Guam killer” missiles, such as the former’s DF-26 and the latter’s Hwasong 14 and 15, pose significant next-generation threats, with China potentially deploying hypersonic weapons from its naval and air forces.

Alongside kinetic missile attacks, Asia Times mentioned in October 2024 that China could potentially take advantage of vulnerabilities in the US kill chains by launching coordinated attacks from various domains, including space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum, to overcome US missile defenses.

Asia Times reported in June 2022 that the US has initiated significant construction on Tinian, a strategic island in the Western Pacific, to serve as a backup facility for its naval and air operations on Guam.

This effort, part of a broader US$20 billion initiative to enhance the US military presence in the Pacific, includes the Tinian Divert Airfield project, which features a new aircraft taxiway and parking apron and is set to be completed in October 2025.

The project aims to provide strategic, operational and exercise capabilities for US forces to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Tinian’s infrastructure will accommodate 12 tanker aircraft and support personnel, with regular military exercises planned.

Aside from Tinian, Asia Times reported in May 2021 that Palau has invited the US to build strategic ports, bases and airfields on its Pacific islands in response to China’s perceived economic bullying.

Palau’s President Surangel Whipps has recently accused China of destabilizing Palau’s economy by “weaponizing” lucrative Chinese tourism after Palau refused to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

This geopolitical tension has led Palau to seek closer military ties with the US, highlighting the high-stakes rivalry between Beijing and Washington in the Pacific.

Palau, with a population of 18,000, is strategically located in the “Second Island Chain,” which is crucial for US military interests in the region. The US has a historical defense agreement with Palau, and recent military activities have included training exercises and visits by high-ranking US defense officials.

These developments underscore the islands’ historical and ongoing strategic importance dating back to World War II. The US military strategy in the Pacific, which relies heavily on Guam, faces challenges due to the far-flung region’s limited, isolated facilities that are increasingly within the range of Chinese and North Korean missiles.

They also align with the US Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) strategy, which aims to enhance survivability and operational flexibility in increasingly contested environments.

ACE seeks to counter adversary threats to traditional airbases by increasing resilience and generating combat power from dispersed, flexible locations, complicating enemy targeting efforts.

The air strategy promotes a shift from large, centralized airbases to smaller, dispersed locations, enabling rapid movement and maneuvering of forces.

ACE leverages decentralized execution, tailored force packages, pre-positioned equipment, scalable logistics and robust communication networks for joint all-domain operations and partner-nation cooperation.

The focus is on expeditionary skills, infrastructure innovations and agile logistics to maintain combat operations. These elements ensure the US Air Force can generate airpower from multiple, unpredictable locations, complicating adversary planning and reducing vulnerability to attack.

However, James Leftwich and other writers mention in a May 2023 RAND report that the US military’s focus on efficiency has led to a highly centralized supply chain, which could make it vulnerable during high-end conflicts.

Leftwich and others emphasize that centralized decision-making outside warfighting commands leads to delays in resource allocation. They highlight the risk this poses to combat support operations, as the logistics network may struggle to quickly adapt to rapidly changing demands during a contested fight, which in turn could threaten overall mission effectiveness.

In an April 2021 Air & Space Operations Review article, Zachary Moer and other writers note that many US dispersed bases under the ACE concept lack the essential infrastructure of traditional airbases. Moer and others say this includes hardened shelters, advanced air defense systems and sophisticated maintenance facilities.

They point out that scattered military bases are susceptible to attacks without adequate protection, particularly from opponents such as China, who could exploit diplomatic, economic or physical tactics to target them. They note this could potentially undermine air operations due to a lack of proper defenses and logistical support.

In addition, Matthew Donovan mentions in a January 2022 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that US adversaries have studied its force deployment and invested heavily in pervasive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and all-domain long-range offensive capabilities that put its global footprint at risk.

While dispersal complicates targeting, Donovan argues that adversaries could still leverage pervasive surveillance technologies to detect and strike these smaller, less-fortified locations.

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Ukraine’s decentralized warfare: the battle of the common person – Asia Times

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine offers an unprecedented case study on the democratization of warfare, particularly in three critical domains: drones, cyberattacks and influence operations.

The accessibility of technology has empowered ordinary citizens to participate directly in modern warfare, reshaping how wars of the future will be fought.

Ukrainian civilians have demonstrated methods that could be followed by citizens in other countries facing similar threats. Military analysts and scholars must understand these trends to prepare for future conflicts, which are likely to incorporate similar decentralized strategies.

For example, if the United States were to engage in a conflict with China over Taiwan, civilians most likely would play active roles both in defending online and in supporting operations on the physical battlefield.

Cyber warfare: the IT Army’s pioneering role

On June 20, 2024, the IT Army of Ukraine – a decentralized group of volunteer hackers – claimed to have launched against Russia’s banking system a distributed denial-of-service attack that it described as the “largest DDoS in history.”

That attack temporarily crippled several Russian banks, causing significant financial disruptions and showcasing the effectiveness of decentralized cyber tactics.

In a hybrid warfare landscape the IT Army has become a key player, operating across both physical and cyber battlefields and redefining modern warfare.

The IT Army was initially formed in early 2022 following a call to arms by Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, who saw the potential of mobilizing civilian hackers to bolster Ukraine’s defenses.

The IT Army’s primary tactic – DDoS attacks, which flood networks with excessive traffic – is accessible and effective, democratizing cyber warfare by enabling individuals worldwide to participate without extensive technical knowledge.

The impact of the IT Army has drawn attention from Russian officials. In March 2024, Dmitry Gribkov, an aide to the Russian Security Council, warned Western nations that supporting the IT Army was akin to “opening Pandora’s box.”

Gribkov alleged that hacking experts were being trained in Ukraine and the Baltic states for cyber operations targeting Russian infrastructure, reflecting the Kremlin’s growing concerns about Ukraine’s ability to inflict pain on Russia.

The IT Army’s cyber offensive has inflicted significant and lasting damage, with economic losses estimated to exceed $1 billion. In early 2024, DDoS attacks on Russian companies doubled overall compared with the year-earlier figures.

The Russian energy sector in particular suffered a tenfold increase in such attacks, which weakened critical infrastructure supporting Russia’s war effort.

The IT Army has also collaborated with Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) to conduct synchronized DDoS attacks and drone strikes, helping knock out Russian telecom networks and CCTV systems. That reduces the visibility of Ukrainian drone operations and thereby increases their success rate.

Encouraging global participation, the IT Army utilizes social media to share tools, instructions, and targets, allowing ordinary people to contribute to cyberattacks. This open-call structure taps into a global volunteer base, including participants from Europe, the US and other regions.

These actions showcase a new type of warfare, one that merges military and civilian resistance and bridges the gap between traditional soldiers and online combatants.

Countering Russian disinformation: NAFO and civilian influence operations

The Ukrainian defense effort has also been characterized by resilience and adaptability in information warfare. The North Atlantic Fella Organization (NAFO), formed in response to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, has become a formidable force against Russian disinformation.

Using humor and memes to counter propaganda, NAFO – a leaderless, decentralized group – engages online audiences to keep the global spotlight on Ukraine and challenge Russian narratives. The group’s humorous approach, exemplified by Shiba Inu dog avatars, has proven remarkably resilient, making it difficult for Russian trolls to undermine its efforts.

A NAFO dog avatar. Image: Emerging Europe

Supporting Ukraine’s information frontlines, NAFO has been instrumental in fighting Russian trolls and countering disinformation campaigns. NAFO gained popularity by using Shiba Inu memes to mock Russian propaganda, making Russia’s accusations against them seem absurd. One ongoing joke within NAFO is that members are “real Shiba dogs employed by the CIA,” which deflects accusations while adding levity to their messaging.

Early in the invasion, NAFO’s success was clear when it forced Russia’s top diplomat in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, off X (formerly Twitter) following a heated exchange with a cartoon dog. This flexible and decentralized approach has allowed NAFO to respond quickly to changing narratives in the fast-paced realm of information warfare.

The Kremlin’s discomfort with NAFO’s influence is evident, with RT labeling NAFO as a “vast pro-Ukrainian bot army.” Even Russia’s foreign ministry spokeswoman criticized the group in July 2023. The Economist described NAFO’s approach as “a remarkably successful form of information warfare,” while Jamie Cohen, a media studies professor, characterized NAFO as “an actual tactical event against a nation-state.”

NAFO has further demonstrated its influence by helping suspend the screening of “Russians at War,” a pro-Russian documentary by ex-RT employee Anastasia Trofimova, in Canada. The group’s efforts highlighted the broader dangers of Russian influence operations and underscored NAFO’s capacity to effectively counter these narratives. In the digital age, anyone with an internet connection can join NAFO, making it an accessible and powerful counterbalance to Russian troll farms, which have been influencing global opinion since the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Volunteer-driven military tech supply chains

On the physical battlefield, Ukrainian civilians have also taken on a critical role in providing drones, which are essential to Ukraine’s defense strategy. Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Kurylenko emphasized this reliance, stating, “We’re only holding back the Russians with crowdfunded drones.” He noted that FPV (first-person view) drones, many of which are supplied by volunteers, are a crucial element preventing Russian breakthroughs on all fronts.

Demand for drones far exceeds supply, and Ukraine has depended heavily on volunteers to manage drone supply chains since the start of the invasion. Dzyga’s Paw, a fund that has supported over 100 military units, has played a key role in delivering essential tech supplies.

Former tech professionals from the fund have coordinated drone operations for Ukrainian forces, building robust tech supply chains for the military. Volunteers have also devised innovative solutions, such as using Google Meet to livestream drone footage, providing commanders with real-time battlefield intelligence.

Despite the efforts of volunteers, Ukraine still faces challenges due to limited access to Chinese-made drones. Kostyantyn Mynailenko, a commander in the Liut Brigade’s aerial reconnaissance unit, said, “The Russians have many more drones than us. They have a stable supply chain sourced directly from China, whereas we must order our Chinese drones indirectly through Europe.” This procurement gap has made Ukraine heavily reliant on volunteers to source Chinese drones for nearly two years.

The future of decentralized warfare

The Russo-Ukrainian War has vividly demonstrated the power of decentralized, civilian-driven warfare, establishing a model that will likely shape future conflicts. Through the democratization of drones, cyberattacks, and influence operations, Ukraine has mobilized ordinary citizens and volunteers, showing that advanced military capabilities can be built from the grassroots level. With crowdfunded drones, volunteer hackers, and online influence campaigns, Ukraine has effectively empowered civilians to play an active role in defense.

This new approach, blending traditional military tactics with the contributions of individual citizens and decentralized networks, has proven highly resilient and adaptable. As military analysts and strategists examine the implications, it’s clear that the integration of citizen-driven support will become an increasingly crucial component in modern warfare.

Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of “small wars” has evolved – from irregular units gathering intelligence and disrupting enemy operations, to “armed” citizens engaging in digital battles through drones, memes, and cyberattacks.

Ukraine’s experience has provided an invaluable case study for countries worldwide, showing that in a digitized world, anyone with an internet connection can contribute to the national defense. The democratization of warfare is not new, but technology has reshaped and expanded its possibilities, redefining how wars will be fought in the future.

This piece is an excerpt from a report presented by the author at the UK Parliament on October 9, on behalf of the Henry Jackson Society, titled “Military Lessons for NATO from the Russia-Ukraine War: Preparing for the Wars of Tomorrow.” The original report includes extensive footnoting to show the sourcing of facts and quotations.

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Beijing mulls buying unsold homes for 4 trillion yuan – Asia Times

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The Chinese government is said to be considering issuance in the next five years of 4 trillion yuan (US$561 billion) in special treasury bonds in order to fund the purchase of unsold homes and idle sites in an effort to reduce inventory in the markets and support property prices.

The issuance of these bonds will come on top of the previously-reported issuance of 6 trillion yuan in ultra-long special treasury bonds, which will be implemented over the next three years, Reuters reported. 

It is expected that these long-term money printing schemes will be discussed in the coming standing of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee between November 4 and 8. 

The meeting was originally scheduled for late October but it was postponed to November with some media reports saying that Beijing wants to make its final decision after the United States presidential election. 

In case the election’s winner is Republican candidate Donald Trump, who vowed to impose a 60% tariff on all Chinese goods, China may need a stronger stimulus package to maintain its economic growth for the next few years, Reuters reported, citing two unnamed sources.

Mysterious local debt figure

The news about China’s stimulus package came after Li Jianjun, vice president of the Central University of Finance and Economics and an economist, said in a public speech at the Financial Street Forum 2024 in Beijing on October 18 that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio had increased to about 103% as of the end of June this year.

Li’s comments were reported by foreign media only this week. They seemed different from Beijing’s propaganda in recent years claiming that China’s debt situation remained healthy.

Li said China’s local government financing vehicles (LGFV) loans and related shadow loans had grown to 57.16 trillion yuan as of June 30.

Since the early 2010s, local governments, property developers and LGFVs had formed an iron triangle to benefit from a decade-long property bubble, which burst in 2021 with the default of Evergrande Group.  

It is an open secret that China has so far accumulated what many foreign economists estimate to be more than 50 trillion yuan of LGFV loans. 

But it is the first time for this figure to be disclosed in an official way: The Financial Street Forum is jointly organized by the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), Xinhua News Agency and other financial regulators. Besides, the Central University of Finance and Economics, in which Li is serving, is co-sponsored by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education and the Beijing municipal government.

Li said China’s total debt, including 30 trillion yuan of central government loans and 42.23 trillion yuan of legally-issued local government loans, totaled 129 trillion yuan, which is more than China’s 2023 GDP of 126 trillion yuan. He added that the figure excludes the shadow loans guaranteed by local governments. 

He stressed that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio is now above the globally-recognized 60% representative threshold for high debt levels. 

He said more than 60% of Chinese provinces and municipalities, including Tianjin, Chongqing, Guizhou and Gansu, saw their debt-to-GDP ratios exceeded 300%. He said it is important to define clearly the role of local governments and markets and reduce governments’ influence in debt issuances.

Between the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the first land auction in Shenzhen in 1987, all land use had to be approved by the Chinese government.

Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying said in a press conference in 2018 that he had helped introduce Hong Kong’s land auction system to China and contributed to the country’s land reform and opening up. 

It was supposed to be a system in which local governments could receive fiscal revenue and manufacturers and property developers could get land resources. But most local governments ended up becoming overly reliant on land sales revenue to maintain operations.

Fareast Credit, a Shanghai-based credit rating agency, said in a research report in April 2022 that land sales revenue accounted for 41.47% of local governments’ fiscal income on average.

It said the levy of property tax would not be enough to offset the decline in local governments’ land sales revenue during a property down cycle. It said the central government should allow local governments to enjoy a bigger share in the country’s business and consumption taxes.  

300 million migrant workers

On September 21, Liu Shijin, a top economist and the former deputy president of the China State Council’s Development Research Center, said in a public event that the central government should raise 10 trillion yuan by issuing ultra-long special treasury bonds within one to two years. 

He said the central government should use the proceeds from bond issuance to buy up unsold homes from the markets in the short run and accelerate urbanization over the medium term. 

His comments, followed by the PBoC’s interest rate and reserve requirement ratio cuts, had contributed to the stock market rally in mainland China and Hong Kong between late September and early October.

Caixin reported on October 14 that the Finance Ministry planned to issue 6 trillion yuan of ultra-long special treasury bonds in the coming three years to ease the local debt crisis. 

On Tuesday, Reuters confirmed that there will be another 4 trillion yuan bond issuance to fund the purchase of unsold homes over the next five years.

Coincidentally on the same day, Liu commented about China’s stimulus package at a forum organized by Tsinghua University’s Institute for China Sustainable Urbanization. 

He said the new money from bond issuance should be spent on providing basic needs for about 300 million migrant workers, rather than subsidizing urban residents to “buy a few more pieces of bread.” 

He admitted that more than 900 million people in China are low income. He said China needs to boost its middle income population from the current 400 million to 800-900 million in the next decade in order to maintain moderate economic growth for a longer term and overcome the limitations of insufficient demand. 

Meanwhile, China’s economy also showed signs of stabilizing after Beijing announced its stimulus package.

The official manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) increased to 50.1 in October, higher than a forecast of 49.9 by economists, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. Non-manufacturing PMI rose to 50.2 in October, up from 50 in September. 

Read: Market unsatisfied with Beijing’s 6 trillion yuan stimulus

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Trump leads key swing state while Biden a drag on Harris – Asia Times

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The United States presidential election will be held next Tuesday, with results coming in Wednesday AEDT. In analyst Nate Silver’s aggregate of national polls, Democrat Kamala Harris leads Republican Donald Trump by 48.6–47.5, a slight gain for Trump since Monday, when Harris led by 48.6–47.4. Harris’ national lead peaked on October 2, when she led by 49.4–45.9.

The US president isn’t elected by the national popular vote, but by the Electoral College, in which each state receives electoral votes equal to its federal House seats (population based) and senators (always two). Almost all states award their electoral votes as winner-takes-all, and it takes 270 electoral votes to win (out of 538 total).

Relative to the national popular vote, the Electoral College is biased to Trump, with Harris needing at least a two-point popular vote win to be the narrow Electoral College favourite in Silver’s model.

In Silver’s averages, Trump has a 0.6-point lead in Pennsylvania (19 electoral votes), up from 0.3 on Monday. Trump has slightly larger leads of one to two points in North Carolina (16), Georgia (16) and Arizona (11). Harris is narrowly ahead by 0.1 point in Nevada (six) and about one point ahead in Michigan (15) and Wisconsin (ten).

If current polls are exactly right, Trump wins the Electoral College by 281–257. Not making Pennsylvania’s popular governor Josh Shapiro her running mate could be Harris’ biggest mistake.

In Silver’s model, Trump has a 54% chance to win the Electoral College, slightly higher than 53% on Monday. There’s a 29% chance that Harris wins the popular vote but loses the Electoral College. The FiveThirtyEight forecast gives Trump a 51% win probability.

Without a major event, there isn’t likely to be much change in the polls before the election, but a polling error where one candidate overperforms their polls could still occur. Silver’s model gives Trump a 22% probability of sweeping the seven swing states and Harris a 12.5% probability.

I wrote about the US election for The Poll Bludger yesterday, and also covered three Canadian provincial elections and Japan’s conservative LDP, which has governed almost continuously since 1955, losing its majority at an election last Sunday.

Biden a drag on Harris and favorability ratings

Joe Biden remains unpopular with a net -16.5 approval in the FiveThirtyEight national aggregate, with 55.8% disapproving and 39.3% approving. As Harris is the incumbent party’s candidate, an unpopular president is a key reason for Trump’s edge.

Biden’s remarks on Tuesday, in which he seemed to call Trump supporters “garbage”, resembled Hillary Clinton’s “basket of deplorables” in the 2016 presidential campaign. This won’t help Harris.

Biden is almost 82, Trump is 78 and Harris is 60. Trump’s age should be a factor in this election that favors Harris, but Silver said on October 19 that Democrats spent so much time defending Biden before he withdrew on July 21 that it’s now difficult for them to attack Trump’s age without seeming hypocritical.

Harris’ net favourability in the FiveThirtyEight national aggregate is -1.5, with 47.8% unfavorable and 46.3% favorable. Her net favourability peaked at +1 in late September. Trump’s net favourability is -8.5, with 52.1% unfavorable and 43.6% favorable; his ratings have improved a little in the last two weeks.

While Harris is more likeable than Trump, that’s not reflected in head-to-head polls. Silver said on October 23 that Trump’s campaign is promoting him as not-nice but on your side and as someone who will get things done. They argue that Harris’ campaign lacks clear policies.

Harris’ running mate Tim Walz is at +2.6 net favourable, while Trump’s running mate J D Vance is at -6.9 net favourable. In the past few weeks, Vance’s ratings have improved slightly while Walz’s have dropped back.

Congressional elections

I last wrote about the elections for the House of Representatives and Senate that will be held concurrently with the presidential election on October 14. The House has 435 single-member seats that are apportioned to states on a population basis, while there are two senators for each of the 50 states.

The House only has a two-year term, so the last House election was at the 2022 midterm elections, when Republicans won the House by 222–213 over Democrats. The FiveThirtyEight aggregate of polls of the national House race gives Democrats a 46.2–46.1 lead over Republicans, a drop for Democrats from a 47.1–45.9 Democratic lead on October 14.

Senators have six-year terms, with one-third up for election every two years. Democrats and aligned independents currently have a 51–49 Senate majority, but they are defending 23 of the 33 regular seats up, including seats in three states Trump won easily in both 2016 and 2020: West Virginia, Montana and Ohio.

West Virginia is a certain Republican gain after the retirement of former Democratic (now independent) Senator Joe Manchin at this election. Republicans have taken a 5.4-point lead in Montana in the FiveThirtyEight poll aggregate, while Democrats are just 1.6 points ahead in Ohio.

Republicans are being challenged by independent Dan Osborn in Nebraska, and he trails Republican Deb Fischer by 2.3 points. Democrats did not contest to avoid splitting the vote. In Democratic-held Wisconsin, Democrats lead by 2.1 points, while other incumbents are ahead by at least three points.

If Republicans gain West Virginia and Montana, but lose Nebraska to Osborn, and no other seats change hands, Republicans would have a 50–49 lead in the Senate. If Harris wins the presidency, Osborn would be the decisive vote as a Senate tie can be broken by the vice president, who would be Walz. This is the rosiest plausible scenario for Democrats.

The FiveThirtyEight congressional forecasts give Republicans a 53% chance of retaining control of the House, so it’s effectively a toss-up like the presidency. But Republicans have an 89% chance to gain control of the Senate.

Adrian Beaumont is election analyst (psephologist) at The Conversation; and honorary associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Why Europe should consider boots on the group in Ukraine – Asia Times

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The mantra “as long as it takes” has become the European Union’s rallying cry in support of Ukraine’s resistance against Russia. Initially, some experts predicted that Ukraine would fall within three days – yet nearly three years have passed, and Ukraine is still standing. This prolonged struggle has come at an immense human cost.

It’s clear that the decision to resist was made by the Ukrainian population, and they are grateful to the EU for its support. However, hopes that Ukraine can repel the invaders are fading, and there is no clear end in sight. “As long as it takes” for the EU translates, for Ukrainian ears, to “as many of your lives as we can afford to sacrifice.”

Ukrainians are weary, even as they hold the front line, but the West has not communicated a commitment to fully engage in stopping Russian aggression and deterring future threats. Instead, it seems focused on a policy of “de-escalation management.” This only emboldens Russia and its allies.

What is even more concerning is the absence of a coherent strategy for managing Russia. What would the EU do if the war were to magically end tomorrow? Is there a plan in place, or will EU leaders simply offer Russia a reset?

The EU has excelled in rhetoric when it comes to Ukraine but has fallen short in delivering military support. It remains reluctant to draw firm red lines for Russia as a response to attacks on European soil or to adopt a more assertive stance.

The supply of shells to Ukraine is a case in point. The EU pledged to supply 1 million rounds of ammunition by March 2024, but by January, Josep Borrell, the EU’s foreign affairs chief, admitted that the bloc would only deliver half of that on time while committing to send 1.1 million shells by the year’s end.

To address this shortfall, Czech President Petr Pavel proposed an initiative at the Munich Security Conference in February, aiming to provide 800,000 shells to Ukraine by the year’s end, sourcing ammunition globally instead of solely from EU manufacturers. By August 2024, the EU had sent Ukraine only 650,000 shells out of the promised 1 million.

Various news outlets have reported that the result is a grim picture on the front line, where for every shell fired by Ukraine, Russian forces are firing ten or more. Additionally, the EU has been reluctant to take decisive action, even in response to Russian attacks on its territory.

Recent incidents, such as a narrowly avoided plane crash in Germany attributed to suspected sabotage, reflect a troubling increase in aggressive behavior from Russian saboteurs. The only response so far has been a relatively weak sanctions framework to be used on those involved in such attacks.

A strategy for the future

The EU must adopt a proactive approach to securing peace in Ukraine, recognizing that Russia is currently unwilling to negotiate – but would also never negotiate from a position of weakness.

A clear strategy – including security guarantees for Ukraine, preferably through a pathway to NATO membership – could help put pressure on Russia and facilitate negotiations. It’s clear that bringing Ukraine into NATO might take years, but in the meantime, European countries should consider deploying troops to Ukraine as a security guarantee for this interim period.

As the Lithuanian minister of foreign affairs, Gabrielius Landsbergis, rightly said: “At the beginning of the year, Emmanuel Macron hinted at putting boots on the ground. At the end of the year, North Korea had actually done so. We are still on the back foot, reacting to escalation instead of reversing it. Macron’s ideas should now be revisited – better late than never.”

Of course, security agreements exist between Ukraine and its EU and G7 partners, but not a single country has hinted at the possibility of providing such a security guarantee as “troops on the ground” as a guarantee for peace. EU countries must consider this seriously.

And with a view to what happens after the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the EU needs at least the beginnings of an idea about what its terms would be for re-engaging with Russia. Otherwise, it risks enabling Russia to set its own terms.

The situation on the ground is dire. While the West boasts economic strength, it lacks visionary leadership and political will.

It should not allow Russia to take the lead and must adopt a clear strategy for Ukraine’s victory. Otherwise, we are heading toward the scenario described by Timothy Garton Ash in his Financial Times article advocating for Ukraine’s accession to NATO:

Consider the alternative. A defeated, divided, demoralized, depopulated Ukraine, pulsating with anger against the West and – as Zelensky hinted last week – probably seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Moscow triumphant. The rest of the world concluding that the West is a paper tiger. Xi Jinping encouraged to have a go at Taiwan. Biden and Harris going down in history as the leaders who ‘lost Ukraine’.

One could add: the EU faces disintegration, regressing to its pre-union state. Ursula von der Leyen is remembered as the leader whose “as long as it takes” policy resulted in an epic failure to secure a safer future for Europe and Ukraine. Does the West want to see itself in this way?

Viktoriia Lapa is lecturer, Institute for European Policymaking, Bocconi University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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The nations on the brink of going nuclear – Asia Times

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Following Israel’s October 26, 2024, attack on Iranian energy facilities, Iran vowed to respond with “all available tools,” sparking fears it could soon produce a nuclear weapon to pose a more credible threat.

The country’s breakout time—the period required to develop a nuclear bomb—is now estimated in weeks and Tehran could proceed with weaponization if it believes itself or its proxies are losing ground to Israel.

Iran isn’t the only nation advancing its nuclear capabilities in recent years. In 2019, the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned intermediate-range land-based missiles, citing alleged Russian violations and China’s non-involvement. The US is also modernizing its nuclear arsenal, with plans to deploy nuclear weapons in more NATO states and proposals to extend its nuclear umbrella to Taiwan.

Russia, too, has intensified its nuclear posture, expanding nuclear military drills and updating its nuclear policies on first use. In 2023, it suspended participation in the New START missile treaty, which limited US and Russian deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and stationed nuclear weapons in Belarus in 2024.

Russia and China have also deepened their nuclear cooperation, setting China on a path to rapidly expand its arsenal, as nuclear security collaboration with the US has steadily diminished over the past decade.

The breakdown of diplomacy and rising nuclear brinkmanship among major powers are heightening nuclear insecurity among themselves, but also risk spurring a new nuclear arms race. Alongside Iran, numerous countries maintain the technological infrastructure to quickly build nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation would require significant collaboration among major powers, a prospect currently out of reach.

The US detonated the first nuclear weapon in 1945, followed by the Soviet Union (1949), the UK (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). It became evident that with access to uranium and enrichment technology, nations were increasingly capable of producing nuclear weapons. Though mass production and delivery capabilities were additional hurdles, it was widely expected in the early Cold War that many states would soon join the nuclear club.

Israel developed nuclear capabilities in the 1960s, India detonated its first bomb in 1974, and South Africa built its first by 1979. Other countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Sweden, Egypt, and Switzerland, pursued their own programs.

However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1968 to curb nuclear spread, led many countries to abandon or dismantle their programs. After the end of the Cold War and under Western pressure, Iraq ended its nuclear program in 1991.

South Africa, in a historic move, voluntarily dismantled its arsenal in 1994. Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine relinquished the nuclear weapons they inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1996, securing international security assurances in exchange.

Nuclear proliferation appeared to be a waning concern, but cracks soon appeared in the non-proliferation framework. Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test in 1998, followed by North Korea in 2006, bringing the count of nuclear-armed states to nine. Since then, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, initiated in the 1980s, has been a major target of Western non-proliferation efforts.

Iran has a strong reason to persist. Ukraine’s former nuclear arsenal might have deterred Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022, while Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, who dismantled the country’s nuclear program in 2003, was overthrown by a NATO-led coalition and local forces in 2011.

If Iran achieves a functional nuclear weapon, it will lose the ability to leverage its nuclear program as a bargaining chip to extract concessions in negotiations. While a nuclear weapon will represent a new form of leverage, it would also intensify pressure from the U.S. and Israel, both of whom have engaged in a cycle of escalating, sometimes deadly, confrontations with Iran and its proxies over the past few years.

An Iranian nuclear arsenal could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Its relations with Saudi Arabia remain delicate, despite the 2023 détente brokered by China, and Saudi officials have previously indicated they would obtain their own nuclear weapon if Iran acquired them. Saudi Arabia gave significant backing to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, with the understanding that Pakistan could extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, or even supply the latter with one upon request.

Turkey, which hosts US nuclear weapons through NATO’s sharing program, signaled a policy shift in 2019 when President Erdogan criticized foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkey’s growing partnership with Russia in nuclear energy could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so.

Middle Eastern tensions are not the only force threatening non-proliferation. Japan’s renewed friction with China, North Korea, and Russia over the past decade has intensified Tokyo’s focus on nuclear readiness.

Although Japan developed a nuclear program in the 1940s, it was dismantled after World War II. Japan’s breakout period, however, remains measured in months, but public support for nuclear weapons remains low, given the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where nuclear bombings in 1945 killed more than 200,000 people.

In contrast, around 70 percent of South Koreans support developing nuclear weapons. South Korea’s nuclear program began in the 1970s but was discontinued under US pressure. However, North Korea’s successful test in 2006 and its severance of economic, political, and physical links to the South in the past decade, coupled with the abandonment of peaceful reunification in early 2024, has again raised the issue in South Korea.

Taiwan pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, which similarly ended under US pressure. Any sign of wavering US commitment to Taiwan, together with China’s growing nuclear capabilities, could prompt Taiwan to revive its efforts. Though less likely, territorial disputes in the South China Sea could also motivate countries like Vietnam and the Philippines to consider developing nuclear capabilities.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also had significant nuclear implications. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently suggested to the European Council that a nuclear arsenal might be Ukraine’s only deterrent if NATO membership is not offered. Zelensky later walked back his comments after they ignited a firestorm of controversy. Yet if Ukraine feels betrayed by its Western partners—particularly if it is forced to concede territory to Russia—it could spur some factions within Ukraine to attempt to secure nuclear capabilities.

The war has also spurred nuclear considerations across Europe. In December 2023, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer endorsed a European nuclear deterrent. A Trump re-election could amplify European concerns over US commitments to NATO, with France having increasingly proposed an independent European nuclear force in recent years.

Established nuclear powers are unlikely to welcome more countries into their ranks. But while China and Russia don’t necessarily desire this outcome, they recognize the West’s concerns are greater, with Russia doing little in the 1990s to prevent its unemployed nuclear scientists from aiding North Korea’s program.

The US has also previously been blindsided by its allies’ nuclear aspirations. US policymakers underestimated Australia’s determination to pursue a nuclear weapons program in the 1950s and 1960s, including covert attempts to obtain a weapon from the UK. Similarly, the US was initially unaware of France’s extensive support for Israel’s nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s.

Smaller countries are also capable of aiding one another’s nuclear ambitions. Argentina offered considerable support to Israel’s program, while Israel assisted South Africa’s. Saudi Arabia financed Pakistan’s nuclear development, and Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist is suspected of having aided Iran, Libya, and North Korea with their programs in the 1980s.

Conflicts involving nuclear weapons states are not without precedent. Egypt and Syria attacked nuclear-armed Israel in 1973, and Argentina faced a nuclear-armed UK in 1982. India and China have clashed over their border on several occasions, and Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression.

But conflicts featuring nuclear countries invite dangerous escalation, and the risk grows if a nation with limited conventional military power gains nuclear capabilities; lacking other means of defense or retaliation, it may be more tempted to resort to nuclear weapons as its only viable option.

The costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals are already steep. In 2023, the world’s nine nuclear-armed states spent an estimated US$91.4 billion managing their programs. But what incentive do smaller countries have to abandon nuclear ambitions entirely, especially when they observe the protection nuclear weapons offer and witness the major powers intensifying their nuclear strategies?

Obtaining the world’s most powerful weapons may be a natural ambition of military and intelligence sectors, but it hinges on the political forces in power as well. In Iran, moderates could counterbalance hardliners, while continued support for Ukraine might prevent more nationalist forces from coming to power there.

Yet an additional country obtaining a nuclear weapon could set off a cascade of others. While larger powers are currently leading the nuclear posturing, smaller countries may see an opportunity amid the disorder. The limited support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, in effect since 2021, as well as the breaking down of other international treaties, reinforces the lingering allure of nuclear arms even among non-nuclear states.

With major powers in open contention, the barriers to nuclear ambitions are already weakening, making it ever harder to dissuade smaller nations from pursuing the ultimate deterrent.

John P Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, DC, and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He is a contributor to several foreign affairs publications, and his book,“Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’”, was published in December 2022.

This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute. It is republished here with permission

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How China can revive its bruised and dwindling billionaire class – Asia Times

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Is the “smart” money still fleeing China? Whether it’s wise to leave Asia’s biggest economy is debatable. What’s not is that the mainland billionaire emigration trend continues and that their ranks have thinned by more than a third in just the last three years.

The latter dynamic, tracked by research group Hurun, spotlights how the fallout from the last few years of government crackdowns, slowing economic growth, volatile equities and property collapse is catching up with Xi Jinping’s policymakers and complicating their efforts to counter Wall Street worries that China has become “uninvestable.”

To be sure, the “avoid-China” vibe isn’t what it was, say, six months ago. As Nicholas Colas, co-founder of research firm DataTrek, notes, the recent “surprise announcement of aggressive fiscal and monetary policy action is spurring a reappraisal of the view” that Chinese equities are uninvestable.

“China’s leadership has finally acknowledged that the country’s economy needs much more monetary and fiscal stimulus if it is to achieve its growth potential over time,” Colas says.

Billionaire David Tepper has been making his own headlines by declaring it time to buy “everything” in China. And after “running around the world” in recent weeks, Kinger Lau, chief China equity strategist at Goldman Sachs, says that “for some investors who haven’t really looked at China over the past one to two years, certainly, the interest level has picked up a lot”

As Lau tells the South China Morning Post, “I’m not saying everyone is buying. But the level of interest has picked up a lot, very much consistent with the flows and positioning.” He’s among many who now see “upside” for Chinese equities.

Where this leaves China’s remaining billionaires in US dollar terms – Hurun says there are now 753 versus a peak of 1,185 in 2021 – is debatable. What’s clear, though, is that the stakes surrounding next week’s gathering of the standing committee of National People’s Congress are rising.

Rarely has there been a better opportunity for Xi’s inner circle to reassure the billionaire set at home and global funds abroad.

“The announcement of the NPC Standing Committee meeting for November 4-8 reflects Beijing’s strategic approach to the major economic policy U-turn underway,” says economist Diana Choyleva at Enodo Economics.

Choyleva noted that “by scheduling the meeting immediately after the US presidential election on November 5, the Chinese leadership has positioned itself to announce fiscal measures with full knowledge of the electoral outcome, enhancing its ability to manage market expectations and responses effectively.”

Next week’s confab will “allow Chinese policymakers to fine-tune their announcements and potentially adjust the scale or presentation of stimulus measures based on the new geopolitical context,” she says.

Choyleva notes that “a better-coordinated approach to policy announcements could actually enhance market stability. Investors should view the timing as a sign of careful planning rather than delay, particularly given the potential for more comprehensive and strategically calibrated announcements.”

Billionaires and global funds alike are craving a “well-thought-out approach” that “sets the stage for more impactful and sustainable market responses,” Choyleva says. “For investors, this timing and a more coordinated policymaking reduces uncertainty by ensuring that China’s fiscal response will be announced with full knowledge of the US political landscape, potentially leading to more stable and sustained market reactions rather than volatile short-term responses.”

The potential wildcard of a Donald Trump 2.0 presidency would be a game-changer for Asia, starting with a 60% tax on all Chinese goods that would upend Asian growth and supply chains.

Derek Holt, Bank of Nova Scotia’s head of capital markets economics, speaks for many when he warns that “Trump’s plans risk being highly destabilizing to world markets in a much more fractured world.”

Investors everywhere are bracing for a supersized US trade war in the event of a second Trump White House, including Europe. Germany’s recession is already casting a pall over European markets.

“In a worst-case scenario of a full-blown tariff war with retaliation, we estimate potential for a mid to high single-digit drag on European earnings-per-share growth,” says Barclays Plc strategist Emmanuel Cau. A “big chunk” of analysts’ worry more than 10% growth in earnings next year could disappear as trade tensions spike, he notes.

One worry is Trump’s desire to add fiscal stimulus via giant tax cuts into an economy that doesn’t need it. “The US economy doesn’t need pump-priming, it’s in excess demand and will remain there next year,” Holt notes. And while “the US needs to assert control over its borders, Trump’s extreme immigration policies would severely damage the US economy.”

Trump’s desire to weaken the US dollar also would increase inflation risks, complicating hopes the Federal Reserve might cut interest rates. Not that Vice President Kamala Harris has a great track record in global market circles, Holt notes. As a US senator in 2020, Harris was one of only a few lawmakers who voted against a revised US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement.

In Holt’s view, “it’s a matter of picking the one you think will be less damaging. As a professional economist, I have no doubt that this means voting against Donald Trump and the weak self-serving men behind him.”

Yet risks abound as the US national debt tops the US$35 trillion mark. “America’s fiscal position is living on borrowed time and the more damage that’s done now, the higher taxes will go in the future in a potentially more divided and more dangerous world,” Holt explains.

Reassuring China’s billionaires and overseas funds requires bold and transparent action by Xi’s inner circle. 

Earlier this month, Beijing cut borrowing costs, slashed banks’ reserve requirement ratios, reduced mortgage rates and unveiled market-support tools to put a floor under share prices. Beijing is telegraphing bolder fiscal stimulus steps.

Team Xi also raised the loan quota for unfinished housing projects to 4 trillion yuan (US$562 billion), nearly double the previous amount. The bump was less than markets wanted, but pledges of more come has limited big negative market reactions.

The bigger issue, though, is repairing the balance sheets of giant property developers. Success in devising a mechanism to dispose of toxic assets could go a long way toward reassuring investors.

Xi’s inner circle has surely demonstrated it knows what’s needed to turn things around and reassure its capitalist class: a clear strategy to strengthen the finances of good-quality developers; incentivizing mergers and acquisitions; improving capital markets so that consumers stop seeing property as their only investment option; creating social safety nets so that households spend more and save less.

Beijing also must allay concerns that the tech crackdowns that began in late 2020 are over and done with.

Xi has left it to Premier Li Qiang to make the case for a more dynamic, competitive and predictable China. In January, Li said that “choosing investment in the Chinese market is not a risk, but an opportunity.”

He stressed that “investing in China will bring huge returns and a better future” and described CEOs on hand as “participants, witnesses, and beneficiaries of China’s reform and opening up.”

China, Li added, “stands ready to seriously look into and solve the difficulties and problems encountered by foreign enterprises” operating in the country. “We will take active steps to address reasonable concerns of the global business community,” Li said.

The bottom line, says Fred Hu, CEO of Primavera Capital Group, is that if China “really commits to rule of law and market reforms, I do think the confidence will slowly but surely come back, then the animal spirit will be rekindled.”

One reason the clock is ticking in Xi’s reform plans is that the 10-year mark of his “Made in China 2025” scheme is fast approaching.

When he took the reins of power in 2012, Xi promised to let market forces play a “decisive” role in Beijing’s decision-making. In May 2015, Xi unveiled his ambitious plan to morph China into a high-tech Mecca for semiconductors, renewable energy, electric vehicles, biotechnology, aerospace, artificial intelligence, robotics and green infrastructure.

A decade on, progress has been more sporadic than hoped. Team Xi has often proved better at treating the symptoms of China’s economic funk, not the underlying ailment. 

It’s a lesson Japan taught the world: throwing money at an economy traumatized by plunging property values and deflationary pressures won’t work without supply-side moves to repair cracks in the economy.

Late last year, Xi introduced the buzz-phrase “new quality productive forces.” Though somewhat cryptic, Xi’s inner circle has been selling it as the answer to China’s economic future.

China wants to get its consumers to spend more and save less to keep growth near 5% year after year. That means continuing to raise incomes and building more robust social safety nets to encourage spending. It means creating deeper, trusted capital markets so the average Chinese can invest in stocks and bonds — not just real estate.

Beijing’s extreme focus on boosting consumption over the years has proved counterproductive, economists say. It leaves China susceptible to boom-and-bust cycles that require urgent attention at the expense of moving the economy upmarket. China’s heavy reliance on exports leaves the economy vulnerable to Trump-like antics.

There’s no better alternative to accelerating and broadening China’s evolution into a high-tech powerhouse, development experts say. And indications are, this is precisely the pivot Xi and Li are making as 2025 approaches.

At the NPC in March, Xi’s Communist Party said “it’s imperative to boost the endeavors to modernize the industrial system, and accelerate the development of new productive forces.” Billionaires skittish about China’s prospects couldn’t agree more. The days and weeks ahead offer Xi a ready opportunity to do just that.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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