China boxed out of high-NA lithography race to 1nm chips – Asia Times

As the competition to 1-nanometer cards gains momentum, Taiwan’s TSMC is likely to be the next chip-making company after Intel to get the most cutting-edge printing application in the semiconductor industry.

According to a Nikkei Asia report, the world’s leading integrated circuit ( IC ) foundry will install ASML’s new high-NA extreme ultra-violet ( EUV) lithography system at its R&amp, D center in Hsinchu, Taiwan, by the end of this year.

That’s about three months later than industry publications had anticipated, but not significantly more than American Intel, which installed its second high-NA printing system in Oregon in April and its subsequent in August.

Initially, Samsung Electronics plans to purchase its second high-NA program. The Netherlands ‘ ASML is the only company using the EUV printing techniques to create Apis at 7nm and smaller approach nodes.

High-NA lithography systems, also known as EXE systems, likewise use EUV light but employ a new optical system that increases the numerical aperture ( NA ) from 0.33 to 0.55. That reduces the crucial component, or the smallest have the system is print, by 1.7 times and increases the transistor density on a chip by 2.9 times.

According to ASML, the “ability of an visual system to collect and focus light” is measured by the number of n.

According to reports, TSMC aims to start using high-NA lithography at the 1.4nm node ( 14A, A for angstrom ) in 2028 or later, or at 1nm ( 10A ) in 2030 or later. By the end of 2025, it intends to use the EUV printing methods that are already in use for the 2nm process.

That is perhaps true, since it will take a long time to develop and evaluate high-NA EUV effectively in commercial production.

The engineering is also very expensive, with one report claiming that the system costs at least$ 350 million, or about half the cost of conventional EUV equipment. Probably, as product demand rises, that figure will decrease.

While TSMC integrates high-NA EUV into its technology enhance strategy, Intel is using it as part of CEO Pat Gelsinger’s extreme catch-up method, which to date has been dogged by upsetting yields, restructuring charges, lots of red ink and offshoring to TSMC down to 3nm.

Intel’s share price has dropped more than 50 % so far this year, while TSMC’s is up more than 70 %.

High NA EUV tools are anticipated to play a significant role in the development of advanced chips and the production of next-generation processors, according to Intel. Intel Foundry, the first company to move into High NA EUV, will be able to deliver unheard precision and scalability in chip manufacturing, enabling the business to create chips with the most cutting-edge features and capabilities that are necessary for advancing AI and other emerging technologies.

That is, if everything goes according to plan. In particular, Intel anticipates developing and manufacturing advanced chips using both 0.33NA EUV and 0.55NA EUV, starting with Intel 18A’s product proof points in 2025 and continuing to Intel 14A’s production. Intel’s approach will optimize advanced process technology for cost and performance”.

It may, and Intel’s restructuring program is, by most accounts, making progress, but the words “or later” should probably be appended to its timeline.

As for China, at least for now, this is not a contest in which it can compete. Due to US sanctions, it is unable to purchase EUV systems, and the previous generation of ArF ( Argon Flouride ) immersion Deep Ultra-Violet ( DUV) systems it has been able to acquire have a capped 5nm.

Recent reports indicate that Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment Co ( SMEE ) &nbsp’s ( SMEE ) &nbsp ) &nbsp ) &nbsp is commercially viable down to 65nm, but that its effort to create an ArF immersion system capable of producing ICs at the 28nm process node takes longer than originally planned.

In contrast, it took ASML 10 years of R& D and six years to complete the first high-NA EUV lithography system, which took ASML six years to complete before it was able to ship its first high-NA EUV lithography system.

( For a compact history of IC lithography, see” China’s lithography gains a glass half full, not half empty. )

Without the imposition of US sanctions, China might not have developed its own lithography equipment. South Korea, home to Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, two of the world’s leading producers of memory ICs, has n’t developed its own lithography equipment. Japan’s Nikon, unable to compete with ASML, does not make EUV systems. Canon never even tried.

China has also been encouraged by the sanctions ‘ efforts to develop silicon photonics, a technology that processes and transmits sizable amounts of data without using EUV lithography.

Designers and manufacturers of ICs, AI systems and telecommunications equipment, including Nvidia, AMD, Intel, TSMC, IBM, Cisco Systems, NTT, Huawei and other Chinese companies and laboratories, have been working on the technology for many years.

The US House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP ) finally caught the attention of silicon photonics this year.

In a letter to Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo on October 27, committee chairman John Moolenaar ( Republican-Missouri ) and ranking member Raja Krishnamoorthi ( Democrat-Illinois ) warned that photonics technology could allow China to overtake the US&nbsp in semiconductors and instructed her to take action to stop it.

Quoting Matthew Reynolds, author of” Controlling Light: Is Silicon Photonics an Emerging Front in US-China Tech Competition? “, the congressmen wrote:

Silicon photonic technology can” create large-scale computing systems with higher bandwidth and improved energy efficiency that go beyond the physical limitations of traditional electronic chips” when combined with electronics in semiconductors.

Some experts think that photonic chips can increase computational speed by 1000 times more than current electronic chip designs.

Silicon photonics has the potential to upend the semiconductor industry and redefine battlelines in the US’ technological conflict with the PRC, making the October 7, 2022, &nbsp, export control regulations irrelevant and creating a crucial chokepoint for upcoming semiconductor supply chains.

To ensure continued American leadership in crucial and emerging technologies like silicon photonics, the US government should examine the tools at its disposal to assess both how to stop US investment and know-how from supporting our adversaries and encourage domestic innovation.

The committee did its homework, noting that photonics was included in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan ( 2021-2025 ) as a technology that national laboratories should be built, and that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping had described it as” a high-tech industry where our country has the conditions to achieve breakthroughs ahead of others.

Silicon photonics is being funded by Chinese businesses and research institutes in the billions of dollars. Additionally, in defiance of US sanctions, Nanjing Electronic Devices Institute researchers discovered that photonics is a disruptive technology with enormous military potential. Both Huawei and Nanjing Electronic Devices Institute are listed on the Entity List, with a presumption of denial of license for unauthorized military end-use.

Thus, Silicon Photonic developments could enable China to stay competitive in AI without using TSMC’s high-NA EUV lithography services, which Nvidia, AMD, and other Western competitors do not. In any case, it appears that the US government is once more behind the curve in terms of technology.

Follow this writer on&nbsp, X: @ScottFo83517667

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China claims its radars closing in on US stealth fighters – Asia Times

As tensions rise in the South China Sea and Taiwan, China’s most recent calculations reveal a US cunning jet risk because its scanners may find F-22s and F-35s at close range.

According to South China Morning Post (SCMP), Chinese military researchers from the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) National Defense University’s College of Joint Operations and Beijing’s State Key Laboratory of Intelligent Game have recently conducted computer simulations to evaluate the effectiveness of stealth fighter jets against China’s air defense systems.

SCMP says that the models, presented at the 36th China Simulation Conference in October, revealed that cunning soldiers like the F-22 and F-35 may be detected from 180 meters away by China’s land-based scanners, compromising their ability to conduct accuracy ground problems.

According to the SCMP statement, the modeling was of a US attack coming from Japan on Shanghai. The statement notes that the F-35’s “beast style” allows for longer-range weapon assaults but sacrifices secrecy, making it visible from 450 km away.

The study, led by project expert Cao Wei, used an algorithm to convert sensor data into monitoring runs and warning days, which suggests the results may be conservative given the number of transponders used. It notes that the results are brought on by the increased US implementation of F-22s in Japan, which shows how China is more interested in preventing cunning challenges.

China has invested considerably in F-22 and F-35 recognition skills. For example, SCMP reported last month that Chinese scientists have created a cost-effective detector to use signals from the BeiDou transportation satellite system to monitor and detect stealth aircraft like the F-22.

This cutting-edge radar, which was described in a recent peer-reviewed article in the Journal of the National University of Defense Technology, uses a single receiving antenna and a unique algorithm to identify stealth targets without generating detectable signals.

The radar’s design, led by Wen Yuanyuan from the National Key Laboratory of Space Microwave Communication, simplifies deployment and reduces costs, making anti-stealth technology more accessible globally. If BeiDou is jammed to ensure continuous operation, the radars are said to be able to switch to other satellite signals like GPS, Galileo, or GLONASS.

In any US and allied response to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, stealth aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 are expected to play a crucial role.

In a December 2022 Warrior Maven article, Kris Osborn says that the US plans to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan with an array of F-22 and F-35 fighters, leveraging their air superiority and precision strike capabilities. By securing airspace control over the Taiwan Strait, Osborn notes that these jets, which are designed for quick response, would neutralize Chinese forces.

He notes that this air dominance, combined with forward-deployed US Navy assets and allied forces, would aim to destroy approaching Chinese amphibious forces. He adds that the F-35s, operating from US Marine Corps ( USMC) America-class assault ships, would offer versatility with both vertical-takeoff capabilities and forward-deployed presence.

Osborne assesses that despite China’s recent advancements, including Type 075 amphibious ships and quasi-stealth J-20 and J-31 fighters, it lacks sufficient fifth-generation aircraft numbers to match US and allied firepower.

Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine reported in October 2023 that while China has built around 180-220 J-20 stealth fighters, surpassing the 187 F-22s the US maintains, Asia Times reported last month that the US currently has 680 operational F-35s, with plans to acquire 1, 800 more.

However, US F-35 production struggles with spiraling costs in upgrading increasingly difficult-to-maintain F-22s and ramping up F-35 production.

At the operational level, US stealth aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35 would be instrumental in defeating China’s anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD ) strategy.

In a 2021 Air &amp, Space Forces Power journal article, Tom Lawrence mentions that China has established a robust A2/AD environment, mainly through advanced air defense systems, stealth-capable destroyers and missile capabilities.

Lawrence points out that the US leverages stealth aircraft, notably the F-22 and F-35, for their low observability, allowing them to penetrate heavily defended zones and execute precision strikes.

He claims that when enemy cyber or anti-satellite attacks disrupt traditional C2 systems, emphasis is placed on distributed command and control ( C2 ), which enables decentralized units to operate autonomously.

Lawrence notes that this approach aligns with new operational doctrines, such as Joint All-Domain Command and Control ( JADC2 ), which aims to integrate US and allied land, sea, air and space assets for multi-domain responses.

He argues that the integration of autonomous unmanned combat aircraft (UCAV ) with manned fighters indicates a shift toward collaborative, network-enabled warfare, while stealth fighters play a crucial role in achieving tactical surprise and establishing air superiority.

At the strategic level, F-22s and F-35s are vital for the US’s conventional deterrence posture in the Pacific. Stars and Stripes reported in June 2022 that Admiral John Aquilino, the former head of the US Indo-Pacific Command ( INDOPACOM), emphasized the need for these cutting-edge aircraft to remain permanently stationed west of the International Date Line.

This deployment is seen as crucial for countering China’s extensive military buildup, including advancements in naval, missile, cyber and space capabilities.

Stars and Stripes says that the US has already stationed F-35Bs at USMC Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, and deployed F-35Cs on aircraft carriers, but the US Air Force’s F-22s and F-35s have only been deployed temporarily.

Aquilino advocates for a permanent deployment, according to the report, to improve deterrence and maintain regional stability.

However, while China may not be able to match US airpower, it can attempt to destroy US aircraft on the ground in a pre-emptive strike for a Taiwan invasion.

China’s pervasive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ( ISR ) and all-domain long-range offensive capabilities, such as the DF-26″ Guam Killer” missile, put dispersed US facilities, air assets and naval forces at risk.

Numerous US Congress representatives pointed out the vulnerability of US bases and aircraft in the Pacific in a letter from May 2024 to the US Navy and US Air Force, which highlights what they perceive to be a crucial defense gap.

According to the letter, China’s extensive strike capabilities threaten all US installations in the Indo-Pacific, including those in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, which are crucial. It notes that US air and missile defenses may be overwhelmed, exposing critical assets.

The letter also criticizes the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) delay in implementing “passive defenses”, such as hardened shelters and force dispersal. It points out that while China has added only 22 fortified shelters in the last ten years, the US has already built over 400.

It points out that due to this disparity, US aircraft and bases are vulnerable, with 90 % of US aircraft losses occurring on-the-ground during war games.

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How Chinese media see Trump vs Harris on election eve – Asia Times

According to Chinese media reports, the outcome of this Tuesday’s US national election will determine whether Washington’s scheme on China continues as it has always done under a Kamala Harris administration or careens in new, unfamiliar directions under a Donald Trump 2.0 management.

Foreign observers and pundits are of the general consensus that Harris would be more predictable because her Democratic Party is more influenced by worldview and policy consistency. Trump is viewed as unexpected, but many people think he might be more willing to negotiate if a deal would deliver real financial benefits for the US in line with his” America First” perspective.

” If Harris is elected, she will usually continue the Biden administration’s China strategy”, Shiu Sin-por, chairman of the New Paradigm Foundation Company Limited, a pro-Beijing think container established in 2007, said in an article published on October 31. ” Even if there is any revision, the scale will remain limited. The upcoming trend of Sino-US ties may be clear”.

Democrats and Republicans, according to him, are more interested in philosophy and think that China’s increase will continue to challenge the values of the US and the West’s current world order, but both Democrats and Republicans view China as the country’s best adversary. &nbsp,

Shiu claims that if Harris wins, the US will continue to work to thwart the expansion of China’s military and high-tech companies and other key economic sectors.

” But if Trump wins, the changes in the United States ‘ China policy may become greater and harder to predict”, he says. Trump will likely employ some effective means of attracting foreign corporations to the US, including taxes and reward programs.

It is less good that China and the Harris leadership will agree on something, according to China’s view. Trump is a very wise merchant who is willing to negotiate with China, according to Shiu. ” Of course, We should not reject Trump’s volatile, weak-principled and extreme heroes”.

According to Shiu, US relations with the EU, Japan, and Taiwan may even change if Trump wins, when Trump wants friends to support his” Make America Great Again” approach to reindustrialize the US. &nbsp,

60 % taxes loom large&nbsp,

Trump started a trade war with China in 2018 by imposing a 25 % tax on a range of Chinese products. Beijing had previously believed that Washington would halt the taxes and de-escalate the tech war in the name of improved diplomatic relations after US President Joe Biden took office in January 2021.

However, the Biden administration increased both by enacting new export control laws to stop China from importing expensive chips and chip-making equipment from the US and by imposing new tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles ( EVs ). Additionally, it persuaded the Union to even impose tariffs on Chinese EVs and continued to sell weapons to Taiwan. &nbsp,

Some Chinese experts predict that under Trump, who has pledged to establish a 60 % tax on all imported Chinese goods, a novel, contentious round of trade war may erupt. Some experts did point out that China might not be the main target of the fresh taxes. &nbsp, &nbsp,

China has previously conducted a thorough analysis and is considering the formation of the BRICS payment method to lessen the negative effects of the US involvement price cut, according to a Shanxi-based columnist’s article on November 2 under the heading” If Trump wins, who will be the biggest sufferer”?

” De-financialization” is China’s national policy to reduce embracing activities and asset bubbles in the country. ” If Trump takes office, the US will prevent aiding Ukraine while the Russia-Ukraine war did not maintain”, he says. Russia will get from this and become more recognized internationally.

He anticipates that a Trump 2.0 management” could start a trade war with the EU, deter National investment in India, and compel allies like South Korea and Japan to make more of a contribution to the US’s defense strategy in Asia.”

If Trump re-enters the White House, the country’s pattern may undergo significant changes. But this may not be a negative thing, as long as we are well-prepared”, the Chinese blogger writes. &nbsp,

Fundamental problems

Other experts speculate that Harris and Trump may have completely different strategies for resolving upcoming US-China problems.

On the outside of a conference in Shenzhen on October 13th, Cheng Li, the founding chairman of the Centre on Contemporary China and the World at the University of Hong Kong, told the media that “if Harris is elected, the US’s China procedures will be comparatively more repetitive,” while maintaining that position.

If Trump wins, Sino-US relationships will become more uncertain, Li predicted, because he typically makes decisions based on business benefits and specific interactions with state leaders. &nbsp,

Li, a student of former and now-deceased US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, made an assessment based on his observation that the two countries ‘ national powers are at odds with one another, which he described as unheard of in contemporary geopolitics.

He said the two countries ‘ architectural problems, caused by their differences in social networks, economic concepts and beliefs, will remain for years to come. He urged both nations to know that neither side could defeat humanity without wreaking havoc.

Read: China’s Skydio limits sound the alarm for US power supply ring

Observe Jeff Pao on X: &nbsp, @jeffpao3

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S Korea’s crucial quest to break tungsten ties with China – Asia Times

The Sangdong metal plant in South Korea holds one of the nation’s largest single-mine metal resources. The plant is scheduled to begin operations next month after closing in the early 1990s largely due to cheaper Chinese titanium flooding global markets and undermining South Korea’s price competitiveness.

Following Canadian company Almonty Industries ‘ 2015 merger of the Sangdong mining rights, this restoration follows. The organization established a company, Almonty Korea Tungsten Corporation, to move the miners operation, which resurrected the latent webpage. Domestically, this work has been welcomed by local residents, hoping that the mine’s revival may revive the group facing local drop.

Globally, following a&nbsp, visit&nbsp, by US government experts this past summer, the plant is anticipated to safely provide tungsten abroad—primarily to the United States—although China remains the dominant global provider.

Given the government’s extensive dependence on Chinese metal, concerns arise in Seoul as the planet looks beyond China to find metal for manufacturing, including both for chips and batteries as well as weapons.

Sangdong Mine and the US-South Korea Tungsten Agreement

Sangdong is a small village in Yeongwol County in South Korea’s Gangwon Province. It houses the Sangdong metal me, which contains an estimated&nbsp, 7.9 million tonnes&nbsp, of proven and possible resources and boasts the nation’s highest levels of metal.

Almonty&nbsp, claims&nbsp, that the plant may run for” 100-plus times”, comparing Sangdong to its “equal size” me in Portugal, which has been running for 136 centuries and is expected to continue for another 50 to 60 years. The Sangdong mine used to contribute to&nbsp, over half of the country’s exports&nbsp, as one of the largest tungsten producers on the planet.

However, the mine shut down in 1994, mainly due to an influx of cheaper tungsten from China, which&nbsp, resumed exporting to the non-communist world&nbsp, following its&nbsp, economic reforms. &nbsp, Consequently, Sangdong—once the heart of South Korea’s industrialization, generating tungsten dollars —has become nearly a ghost town, with its population dwindling to around 1, 000 residents, one of the least populated towns in the country.

The mine was originally owned by the South Korean state enterprise, Korea Tungsten Mining Company (KTMC), founded in 1952 during the Korean War. Its establishment came after the US-South Korea tungsten agreement, which was signed the same year, as the metal started to become a “pivotal strategic mineral in the 20th century.”

According to a&nbsp, study &nbsp, on South Korea’s tungsten exports and the bilateral tungsten agreement, the United States classified tungsten as a strategic material for weapons production during World War II and sought alternative sources after China’s Communist Revolution, turning to South Korea.

During the Korean War, efforts to export Korean tungsten to the US grew more rapid, which sparked South Korea’s “tungsten mania” and prompted the US Department of the Interior ( DOI ) to send US experts to work with the South Korean government to stockpile tungsten from the Sangdong mine.

The United States&nbsp, agreed to&nbsp, “purchase all the tungsten offered by the ROK” and pay US$ 65 a ton for the first two years, with the contract lasting five years or until 15, 000 short tons of tungsten had been purchased. This agreement established a stable market for Korean tungsten exports and ensured steady and exclusive tungsten supplies for the US during the war.

However, a sharp drop in global tungsten prices, coupled with South Korea’s early meeting of the production target, led to the agreement’s conclusion. The Korean government&nbsp, pushed hard&nbsp, to continue the deal to maintain a steady revenue, which was crucial for its post-war recovery, but the contract was not renewed.

After decades of industry setbacks, influenced by unstable global tungsten prices and, notably, China’s aggressive pricing and exports, KTMC was &nbsp, privatized in 1994&nbsp, under the Kim Yong-sam administration’s policy to divest state-owned enterprises, becoming the first company in the country to undergo this transition.

The company was sold to the South Korean Geopyung Group, but it went&nbsp, bankrupt&nbsp, in 1998 during the Asian Financial Crisis. Before Canadian tungsten mining and processing company Almonty Industries acquired the business in 2015, the ownership of the Sangdong mine had been changed several times.

As of July 2024, the company has invested nearly&nbsp, 130 billion won ( approximately US$ 94 million ) into the mine’s redevelopment.

Reducing Reliance on Chinese Critical Minerals&nbsp,

Tungsten is&nbsp, most notably used in&nbsp, semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, automobiles, weapons, and industrial cutting machines due to its exceptional hardness and high energy density.

According to the&nbsp, US Geological Survey data, China accounted for over 80 percent of the world’s tungsten production in 2023, reaching 63, 000 metric tons, followed by Vietnam, the second-largest producer, with 3, 500 metric tons. In response to China’s dominance in tungsten production and export, the US DOI&nbsp, designated&nbsp, tungsten as a critical mineral in 2018.

On the legislative front, the Restoring Essential Energy and Security Holdings Onshore for Rare Earths Act of 2022, or the&nbsp, REEshore Act of 2022, was introduced to reduce US dependence on foreign sources, particularly China, for critical minerals like tungsten.

By 2026, the law requires the DOD and DOI to establish a strategic reserve of rare earth metals that have been processed or refined in China in sensitive US Department of Defense ( DOD ) systems. This May, the DOD issued a&nbsp, final rule&nbsp, restricting the acquisition of certain metals and magnets, including tungsten, from China, along with Iran, Russia, and North Korea, effective January 2027.

On tariffs, the United States Trade Representative ( USTR ) announced its plans to impose a&nbsp, 25 % tariff&nbsp, on Chinese minerals, including tungsten, stating that” the concentration of critical minerals mining and refining capacity in China leaves our]US] supply chains vulnerable and puts our]US] national security and clean energy goals at risk”.

Given China’s history of using critical mineral exports as a tactical tool—most recently with export controls on&nbsp, germanium and gallium&nbsp, effective August 2023, followed by&nbsp, antimony starting September 2024—global efforts to diversify critical mineral supply chains, including tungsten, have become increasingly urgent.

In February 2023, Seoul announced a&nbsp, strategic mineral procurement strategy, which selected 33 critical minerals, including tungsten,” for management with regard to economic security” with the goal of “mitigating its reliance on imports from a select few countries”.

In diplomatic relations, Seoul’s commitment to critical minerals was highlighted by the launch of the Korea-Africa Critical Minerals Dialogue during the first&nbsp, Korea-Africa Summit, focusing on cooperation between Korea’s advanced technology and Africa’s mineral resources.

South Korea also signed a&nbsp, memorandum of understanding&nbsp, ( MOU) with Canada to strengthen critical mineral supply chains, aiming to reduce reliance on China by leveraging Canada’s mineral wealth and South Korea’s manufacturing capabilities.

In addition, Seoul assumed the&nbsp, chairmanship&nbsp, of the US-led Minerals Security Partnership ( MSP), and at its first MSP meeting as chair in September, &nbsp, Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul spotlighted the Mahenge Graphite Project in Tanzania, for which Korea leads the Working Group.

South Korea’s Autonomy over Tungsten &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

South Korea is confronted by the unfortunate reality of having limited control over a large number of locally mined, high-quality tungsten reserves in spite of this. As the&nbsp, world’s largest tungsten consumer per capita, South Korea ‘s&nbsp, 95 % &nbsp, reliance on Chinese tungsten imports has been a persistent issue.

There are concerns in Seoul that the foreign ownership and operation of the Sangdong mine, which was once the nation’s greatest asset, underscores potential limitations on Korea’s autonomy over its mineral resources. Almonty intends to first allocate 45 % of its annual output to the US market and likely set aside the remaining 55 % for South Korea, which indicates a positive shift for South Korea to significantly reduce its dependence on China.

These concerns about tungsten autonomy and ownership are closely related to broader concerns about economic sovereignty and national security, especially given Seoul’s position as a semiconductor and battery manufacturing powerhouse, combined with the upcoming US presidential election and its potential impact on global trade.

Such concerns clearly demonstrate the need for long-term investment in domestic mineral resource development, extending beyond immediate profitability considerations. This includes constructing processing facilities, such as the Almonty and Yeongwol County MOU signed this year, known as the&nbsp, tungsten oxide plant.

This development is particularly noteworthy because, in 2022 and 2023, Russia and North Korea were ranked as the third and fourth-largest tungsten producers, which presents a challenge for the United States and its key allies, particularly South Korea.

In the face of the growing US-China competition, tungsten is once more crucial for securing technological advancements and strengthening security initiatives, just as it was crucial during World War II, reflecting the geopolitical dynamics of that time. In today’s changing environment, the question of Korea’s ability to exercise control and maintain a stable supply chain for this crucial metal is receiving renewed scrutiny.

Haeyoon Kim is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute. &nbsp, The views expressed here are the author’s alone. Republished with permission, read the original here.

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Who’s afraid of the big bad bond market? – Asia Times

When interest levels were being cut in the US, a funny thing happened: they ended up being higher.

The US Federal Reserve lowered its benchmark interest rate by half a percentage point in September, &nbsp, raising expectations&nbsp, that another levels may soon start coming along. Otherwise, the US Treasury’s two-year and 10-year information and the common 30-year lease rate have all risen by half a percentage point or more.

What happened? The Fed has limited authority over interest rates, which is the quick reply. The bond market, when well, has a lot to say about rates—the longer-term charges in particular, although no entirely.

The relationship economy’s” say” is a simple representation of supply and demand. The key is to comprehend that bond yields and prices move in the opposite direction: one moves off and the other moves down.

The 30-year mortgage interest rate is one of several other bond market-based rates that was coming down before the Federal Reserve slashed its benchmark rate on Sept. 18 but went up after it. (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis chart)
The 30-year loan attention rate is one of several different bond market-based levels that were decreasing before the Federal Reserve cut its benchmark rate on September 18 but increased after it. Graph: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

For example: If I buy for US$ 100 a bond that yields 5 %, I will receive$ 5 a year in interest. Let’s say I’m selling the bond to you and you only pay$ 90 because the demand is subdued and the supply is strong. You currently receive$ 5 in interest per year, but because you paid$ 90, your yield is 5.55 %. ( If, instead, you had to pay$ 105 for the bond, your yield would be 4.76 %. )

What’s happening, therefore, is that while the Fed is now trying to push prices down, ties are selling off and that’s driving costs higher. The question is: Why is the connection business negative?

There are at least two possible solutions.

Some experts blame what they’re calling the” Trump trade”. Although the surveys are a tossup, the industry think Trump is going to win the presidency. They also believe that a second Trump term will aggravate the trend toward higher inflation and worsen the already bad national debt.

Understand that the markets do n’t have a political agenda. Bond investors may be mistaken about the effects of a Trump success, as well as the success itself, but their predictions do n’t represent anti-Trump discrimination.

Their purchasing and selling of securities is based on what they think will happen in terms of prices. Lenders apprehension about being reimbursed in undervalued currency. Both candidates have pledged to provide tax breaks and freebies that will help with inflation, but academics believe Trump has already made those promises.

The business serves as the other justification for the ties selling off. The Fed’s September 18 price cut reflected an market that was scarcely creating 100, 000 new tasks a month. Some economists were predicting another half-point split at the Fed’s November meet.

But in early October the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported a 254, 000 increase in work in September, well above the 12-month regular, and Census revised some of the earlier times forward. Meanwhile, the inflation rate in September continued its downward march toward the Fed’s 2 % target but did n’t drop as much as analysts expected.

With those studies, a half-point November split by the Fed looked less good. One Fed official also expressed his willingness to avoid a split in November.

The November 1 report that only 12, 000 additional jobs were reported for October seems likely to be dismissed as being distorted by significant storms and the Boeing attack.

Financial businesses are forward-looking, they anticipate activities. In anticipation of the Fed’s September cut, owners had bought securities, which drove bond yields over. In light of the studies showing a stronger market and worse-than-expected prices in September, owners ‘ anticipation changed. If the Fed was n’t going to lower rates as much or as fast as expected, markets had to adjust.

It’s possible, of course, that the true answer is some mix of the Trump deal and expectations of future Fed price movements. The expectations solution is more normal. You’d have to wonder why then if shareholders were selling bonds out of concern for higher imbalances and prices. Bond traders have ignored decades of multi-trillion-dollar national budget deficits.

If those shortfalls are then causing bond traders to feel uneasy, it would represent a return of those who were known as the “bond vigilantes.” Bond investors ‘ concerns about federal spending three decades ago led to 10-year note yields falling from 5.2 % annually to 8 %.

Years later, the administration also managed to generate a budget surplus by working with Congress on plans to control spending. That it had to be pushed by the markets to do so caused a Clinton consultant, James Carville, to say – reportedly – that, if he could be reincarnated as anyone, it would be the relationship industry so he could scare everyone.

For farmers, ranchers and another business loans, the big question is where interest rates are going from below. The most probable course for them to take is, in my opinion, to fall, perhaps more quietly than analysts had predicted in September.

The US economy is robust, according to The Economist, and inflation is essentially under command. The present level of interest rates is much higher than current economic situations warrant, and if the economy continues to grow at this rate, which is very unlikely and if a rebound in inflation is possible but not specially unlikely.

If I’m correct about the economy, the Fed will continue to cut interest rates, perhaps just quarter-point cuts, and perhaps not at every meeting, but it will be closer to 3 % than 5 % over the long run.

The industry will eventually fall in line as the Fed moves in that direction, particularly if whoever wins the presidency is prevented from carrying out their most inflationary campaign promises by Congress, the relationship market, or a return to common sense.

Urban Lehner, a former Wall Street Journal Asia journalist and editor, is DTN/The Progressive Farmer’s editor emeritus. &nbsp, This&nbsp, content, &nbsp, actually published by DTN on November 1, and now&nbsp, republished by Asia Times with authority, is © Copyright 2024 DTN, LLC. All rights reserved. &nbsp, &nbsp, Follow&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, on X @urbanize

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How will the war in Lebanon end? – Asia Times

How else will the war end, begging the question,” How long will it last if Hezbollah and Israel do n’t reach a ceasefire?”

Earlier in the week, the Israeli army had declared its mission accomplished and removed protective barriers it had set up against Hezbollah’s Anti-Tank Guided Missiles ( ATGM ) in Israel’s northernmost towns, near the Lebanese border.

The techniques signaled Israel’s assurance that its strategy to mitigate the Iran-backed army’s threat was going as planned. But Hezbollah’s high-trajectory fireplace continued. Israel, in consequence, has been fighting two wars against the Iran-backed Syrian army.

The first war, now seemingly over, was particular to Israeli communities that live within of 5, 500 meters ( 3.4 miles ) from the border, the range of Hezbollah’s hand-held ATGMs. Another threat was posed by the frontier itself.

Israelis lost trust in safety railings like the one that kept them from Lebanon after Hamas massacred 1,200 Israelis on October 7, 2023.

Hezbollah’s ATGMs and the uncertain border gate forced the movement of over 60, 000 Jewish settlers. Israel wanted to regenerate its north, but it did it the fastest because of the relatively small size of its military, which made it wait until it had defeated Hamas ‘ danger in the north.

Israel launched a ground operation on October 1 to clear Palestinian territory both underground and above ground from Hezbollah. Since then, the Jewish state has pushed up three meters inside Lebanon, neutralizing Hezbollah’s ATGM danger, and has lost close to 70 soldiers.

The Hebrew state will assuredly hold Palestinian territory until further notice in order to prevent this threat and given the absence of a trustworthy Lebanese government that you manage its side of the border.

If Beirut complains against activity, Jerusalem may provide the Syrian a business: Disband Hezbollah and input into a security arrangement, then consider your land again. Until finally, Israel will have to keep this country as a buffer zone — a no-man’s property.

Israel is fighting another battle with Hezbollah, one in which the Iran-backed military uses high-trajectory fire to beat somewhere in Israel. In reply, Israel has been hitting weapon hoard stores and eliminating Hezbollah’s chain of command.

Additionally, Iran’s proxy militias are prohibited from receiving supplies shipping via land and air to the Beirut airport under an arms sanctions.

To claim Israel success, Hezbollah and Hamas have frequently set two indicators: Israel’s ability to eliminate the militias ‘ leaders, and its failure to stop high-trajectory fireplace on Israel. A political arrangement on the terms of the militia was added by Hezbollah, which promised Israel that it would not be able to reunite its citizens with their north cities.

Hamas furthermore added a second measurement: Without concessions on hard-earned surveillance efforts, Israel may not be able to release the roughly 100 victims that the Palestinians kidnapped on October 7th. But since October 7, 2023, Israel has managed to essentially crush the “victory” indicators of both Hezbollah and Hamas. Both armies ‘ command has been destroyed by it.

In Gaza, Israel has even managed to reduce the high-trajectory fire hazard. Estimates suggest that, since October 7, Hamas has fired over 20, 000 missiles on Israel. By August 2024, but, Hamas had depleted its reserves. Its launch ceased to be frequent.

Hezbollah’s weapon stockpile was little bigger, estimated at 150, 000 before the war. By October 2024, Hezbollah’s property had apparently fallen to 27, 000. If Hezbollah maintains its normal regular launch of 100 projectiles, its missiles will last until early July, after which the army’s great missile fire withers away.

Hezbollah’s very existence may become useless if it is unable to launch missiles or shoot across the border at Israel.

Israel will either continue to monitor and restrict the supply of weapons to Hezbollah and Hamas while maintaining a buffer zone between Lebanon and Gaza, or it will need to establish concerned governments that remove the weapons from the hands of their armies.

Syrian and Palestinian citizens can rely heavily on international and Arab capitals to support and guide them from surviving on militias to demanding trustworthy governments. However, the Syrian and Palestinians must initially demand and demand for a result. After all, one can only lead a horse to the valley, but can never make it drink.

Hezbollah and Hamas seem to be unaware that the status quo has changed as a result of Israel’s defense victories and the deaths of their communities. The militants appear to believe they can turn the clock back to October 6, 2023, a classic example of “resistance” hopeful thinking that has hampered serenity and sparked war throughout the past decade.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain works for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies ( FDD ) as a researcher.

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Risk markets yawn at prospect of Trump victory – Asia Times

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Risk markets yawn at prospect of Trump victory

David Goldman suggests that despite high betting odds favoring Donald Trump, market volatility remains unusually calm, indicating that investors don’t see Trump as a disruptive anti-globalist force. Joe Biden’s idealism and fiscal mismanagement have arguably done more harm to global stability.

Germany’s Volkswagen crisis deepens

Diego Faßnacht reports that Volkswagen’s crisis is deepening, underscoring broader challenges in Germany’s automotive sector. Industry insiders warn that up to 190,000 automotive jobs could be at risk by 2035 due to rising energy costs, high labor expenses, and regulatory hurdles.

Ukraine increasingly fighting a losing battle

James Davis reports a deteriorating situation for Ukrainian forces, with significant Russian advances across various sectors. Ukrainian defenses are crumbling, and recent Russian gains in Selidovo and Kurakhovo have created the risk of a large-scale encirclement of Ukrainian troops.

Voters win Japan’s general election

Scott Foster reports that the right flank of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is attempting to blame Prime Minister Shigeru Ishib for the party’s poor electoral showing even as his ascent potentially signals a new political center that emphasizes economic security and income growth.

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From Cold War 2.0 to World War 3.0 – Asia Times

When I wrote “Cold War 2.0, some 18 months ago, Vladimir Putin was deep into his invasion of Ukraine and Xi Jinping was menacing the Philippines in the South China Sea and Taiwan with gray-zone military punishment drills.

When the book was published earlier in 2024, Hamas’ attack on Israel had already triggered a major military conflict in Gaza, and the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen were disrupting global shipping through the Suez Canal by firing Iranian missiles into ships in the Red Sea.

Now, in late 2024, the Ukrainians are fighting aggressively to hold territory in Russia they took back in August, and Russia is deploying North Korean troops into this war zone.

Israel has attacked Hezbollah (another Iranian-funded proxy) in southern Lebanon, and Israel and Iran are now exchanging directly major missile offensives. Further, three times this year, China has significantly increased its military grey-zone punishment tactics against Taiwan.

All that remains is for Beijing to amplify its aggression against Taiwan to a full-on blockade, and Cold War 2.0 will have escalated into World War 3.0.

A new US president will be elected next week into this fraught geopolitical dynamic. I`m 67 years old, and this is easily the most consequential US election in my lifetime.

If Kamala Harris wins, we will see the US continue to strengthen its security alliances around the world, especially in the Pacific with Japan and South Korea, in order to push back on the four autocracies that drive Cold War 2.0 and have the world on the brink of World War 3.0: Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. If Donald Trump wins, it’s really anyone’s guess what the erratic autocrat wannabe will do.

Among the globe’s most menacing autocracies, Russia seems the biggest threat. Putin punches above his weight because, frankly, he loves to punch.

Still, the central player in the network of autocracies is China. As with so much else in the world, if you want to find the source of power, just follow the money. In effect, China’s gargantuan economy – the second largest in the world – is already bankrolling Cold War 2.0.

China is keeping the Russian economy afloat by buying huge volumes of oil and gas from Russia and in return shipping massive amounts of cars, machinery and technical components to Russia. These are essential for keeping Moscow’s war economy cranking out weapons and ammunition and keeping its domestic population from rising up against the regime.

Without China, Russia long ago would have retreated from Ukraine. Instead, with China’s help, and now with North Korean troops, Moscow continues its naked aggression against Kyiv, hoping that a more pliable US president (namely Mr Trump) will cause Ukraine to capitulate. Again, the importance of November 5 cannot be overstated.

China also bankrolls Tehran by buying nearly all of the oil that Iran exports. Iran then uses this money for, among other things, making weapons and ammunition for its proxy fighters in the Middle East, the Houthis, Hezbollah and Hamas.

Moscow then provides satellite data to the Houthis to allow them to target ships passing through the Red Sea, thereby cutting off the Suez Canal shipping route. Iran reciprocates by providing Russia with drones and ballistic missiles that then cause havoc in Ukraine.

China also buys 95 % of the exports of North Korea, again keeping alive that pariah country. North Korea has supplied millions of artillery shells to Russia for use against the Ukrainian army, and most recently, Pyongyang also ships Moscow ballistic missiles.

In return, the North Korean regime is likely getting high-end missile technology from Moscow with which Kim Jong Un’s regime can better threaten South Korea and Japan.

Still, the flywheel of the autocracies is China, and the democracies enable China’s economic power by conducting trillions of dollars of trade with China every year.

Next time you buy something “Made in China” at your local retailer, remember the critical role the consumer in the democracies plays in funding the network of autocracies, thereby allowing them to combat the democracies in the current Cold War 2.0 and the upcoming World War 3.0.

The next US president’s principal job will be stopping the flow of massive economic wealth from the democracies to China.

After a career as a technology lawyer, Takach is currently a Senior Fellow at the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto and the author of “Cold War 2.0: Artificial Intelligence in the New Battle Between Russia, China and America.”

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Is Ukraine headed toward a frozen conflict? – Asia Times

In recent months, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been pushing hard for the United States and European countries to double down on military support for his country until he can achieve his “victory plan” against Russia.

In September, Ukraine undertook a risky incursion into Russian territory for the first time, capturing a chunk of land in the Kursk region. At the same time, Ukraine renewed requests to use longer-range Western weapons to strike targets deep into Russian territory.

Driving these actions seems to be Zelensky’s desire to position Ukraine as strongly as possible before the US presidential election. Whoever wins, the new president has the potential to drastically change the shape of the war.

What would a Harris presidency mean?

If Democratic Vice President Kamala Harris wins, this would likely mean more continuity in US foreign policy and US military support for Ukraine.

A game-changer for Ukraine would be gaining membership to NATO. While Zelensky has publicly ruled out ceding territory in exchange for Russia accepting its membership in the military bloc, this is at least a conceivable possibility.

After more than two and a half years of full-scale war, polling data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology shows a steady increase in the percentage of Ukrainians willing to make some territorial concessions for peace (now at 32%). However, just over half remain opposed to any territorial concessions.

In addition, Zelensky has said joining NATO is a top priority. However, Harris has stopped short of committing to supporting Ukraine’s membership in NATO, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has flatly refused to make this a part of negotiations.

Without NATO membership for Ukraine, a Harris presidency would likely result in a protracted war of attrition with Russia.

This will only end when both Russia and Ukraine view a settlement to be preferable to continued fighting. Unfortunately, the history of conflicts shows this can take many years to occur.

What would a Trump presidency mean?

Trump claims he would be able to end the war quickly with a negotiated settlement. There’s no evidence to suggest this is feasible.

In Trump’s first presidency, his foreign policy followed a populist style. Populist diplomacy tends to disregard the existing architecture of the international system and is more centralized and personalized in approach.

As such, Trump’s diplomacy relied heavily on personal relationships with his counterparts to drive outcomes. He was also focused on achieving rapid and easy solutions to complex problems – with limited success.

If elected, Trump would likely focus on his personal relationship with Putin, as well as his somewhat rocky relationship with Zelensky, to try to push a swift and decisive conclusion to the war.

The problem is, Trump’s running mate, JD Vance, has already suggested a possible peace plan that would give Putin what he wants: the Ukrainian territory Russia already holds and a neutral Ukraine not part of NATO.

Putin would likely agree to such a deal. Claiming a large chunk of Ukrainian territory could be presented as a victory to the Russian people, who are tired of the war and unnerved by Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk. Putin desperately needs a political win.

Until a majority of Ukrainians support territorial concessions, however, it would be political suicide for Zelensky to trade “land for peace.”

Yet, Zelensky may be forced into negotiations under pressure from Trump and the threat of US military aid being cut off. Ukraine is already struggling to hold off Russian advances due to a critical shortage in military equipment. Though European military aid has remained steady since the war began, it cannot fill the gap if the US cuts off Ukraine completely.

Trump has already depicted Zelensky as “the greatest salesman of all time” and vowed to have Ukrainian military aid “settled” quickly, if elected. It’s unclear if this means pressuring Zelensky to agree to a political settlement.

Ukraine may continue to fight without US support, but Russia could capture further territory from weakened and ill-equipped Ukrainian forces.

Another possibility, floated by a former Trump adviser in recent days, is the fighting stops without a declaration of a permanent ceasefire or political settlement.

This could lead to a frozen conflict similar to the end of the Korean War, with a demilitarized zone like the one that separates North and South Korea today. This would leave Ukraine in perpetual territorial limbo with no security assurance for the future.

What does all this mean for Zelensky’s leadership?

Zelensky’s popularity increased dramatically after the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion. Since then, however, his domestic support has gradually declined. Polling shows Ukrainians’ trust in Zelensky decreased from a high of 90% directly after the invasion to 59% in September 2024.

This year, Zelensky also postponed expected presidential elections due to Ukraine being under martial law. Ukrainians supported the decision at the time, but as trust in Zelensky declines, this may shift.

Zelensky’s domestic support depends on the perception at home that he can continue to deliver on Western support in the war with Russia.

If it looks like Zelensky will compromise on Ukrainian territory in a way that is unacceptable to the Ukrainian people or can no longer deliver material support from Western allies, his popularity may drop quickly and severely.

If that happens, Zelensky may be nudged by Western allies to hold presidential elections despite the ongoing war. Some conservative US politicians have already started calling for elections. Zelensky’s political rival, former President Petro Poroshenko, has said he will run for president in the next elections, too.

Much of this depends on who wins in Washington in a week. A Harris victory will give Zelensky more time, a continued stream of aid and even the possibility of future NATO membership.

If Trump wins, Zelensky may lose his aid and international support – and perhaps even his presidency. This outcome is far more uncertain for Ukraine and undoubtedly makes the country – and Zelensky – far more nervous.

Jessica Genauer is senior lecturer in international relations, Flinders University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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China’s People’s Liberation Army weaponizing Meta’s AI – Asia Times

China’s military may have found a new weapon: a repurposed version of Meta’s open-source AI, Llama, retooled for battlefield intelligence.

Last month, Reuters reported that according to three academic papers, top Chinese research institutions linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have adapted Meta’s Llama AI model for military applications.

Reuters reports that in June, six researchers from three institutions, including two under the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, detailed their use of an early version of Meta’s Llama to create “ChatBIT,” an AI tool optimized for military intelligence and decision-making.

The report points out that despite Meta’s restrictions against military use, Llama’s open-source nature allowed for unauthorized adaptation. Meta condemned this use, emphasizing the need for open innovation while acknowledging the challenges of enforcing usage policies.

Reuters says the US Department of Defense (DOD) monitors these developments amid broader US concerns about AI’s security risks. It notes this incident highlights China’s ongoing efforts to leverage AI for military and domestic security despite international restrictions and ethical considerations.

The report says that the research highlights the challenge of preventing the unauthorized use of open-source AI models, reflecting the broader geopolitical competition in AI technology.

As to how large language models (LLM) can revolutionize military intelligence, the US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) first chief technology officer, Nand Mulchandani, said in a May 2024 interview with the Associated Press (AP) that generative AI systems can spark out-of-the-box thinking but is not precise and can be biased.

Mulchandani mentions that the CIA uses a generative AI application called Osiris to summarize and provide insights into global trends, helping analysts manage vast amounts of information.

However, he points out that despite AI’s capabilities, human judgment remains crucial in intelligence work, with AI serving as a co-pilot to boost productivity and insight.

He says that the CIA faces challenges integrating AI due to information compartmentalization and legal constraints but is committed to scaling AI technologies.

Further, in an April 2023 War on the Rocks article, Benjamin Jensen and Dan Tadross mention that LLMs can synthesize vast datasets to support planners in visualizing and describing complex problems.

Jensen and Tadross emphasize the need for military professionals to collaborate with AI developers to ensure the models reflect real-world challenges and are additive to existing workflows. They say LLMs could enhance operational art by helping planners understand the operational environment and refine courses of action.

However, Jensen and Tadross stress the importance of critical thinking and human oversight to mitigate risks like confirmation bias and AI hallucinations. Successful integration requires revisiting military epistemology and training to foster a dialogue between human intuition and machine-generated insights.

Moreover, Richard Farnell and Kira Coffey mentioned in a Belfer Center article last month that Agentic AI, a type of AI that can work through a series of tasks on its own to achieve an assigned, complex objective, can revolutionize military decision-making processes, particularly within the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP).

Farnell and Coffey point out that, unlike current LLMs that rely on individual prompts for specific tasks, Agentic AI can autonomously handle complex objectives, synthesizing a broad range of traditional and non-traditional planning factors.

They say Agentic AI allows for creating more thorough and objective courses of action (COA) and the rapid dissemination of directives, significantly reducing man-hours. They emphasize the importance of integrating Agentic AI to maintain information superiority and adapt swiftly to battlespace conditions.

Farnell and Coffey highlight the Ukraine War as proof of AI’s impact on warfare, urging the US DOD to accelerate AI adoption to stay competitive, with greater risk seen in neglecting AI’s potential than in its dangers, especially as China advances.

In line with that, William Caballero and Phillip Jenkins mention in a July 2024 paper that Russia and China leverage AI in military operations with distinct approaches emphasizing strategic influence and battlefield simulations.

Caballero and Jenkins say that China employs Baidu’s Ernie Bot, an AI model to enhance combat simulations by predicting human behavior, thus assisting military decision-making processes. They say the tool is reported to outperform comparable models in accuracy for battlefield applications, although political restrictions in certain areas limit it.

Meanwhile, Caballero and Jenkins mention that Russia utilizes AI to disseminate influence through networks such as CopyCat, a state-aligned system that uses AI-driven content generation to amplify disinformation aligned with Russian political goals.

They note that CopyCat synthesizes, translates, and manipulates legitimate news sources to produce tailored narratives on topics like the Ukraine conflict and US politics, presenting a formidable challenge for countermeasures in information warfare.

The use of AI can also redefine the logic of strategic deterrence. In a June 2024 report for the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank, Benjamin Jansen and other writers highlight how integrating AI/Machine Learning (AI/ML) could reshape strategic stability.

Jansen and others conducted simulations to explore how AI-augmented national security could affect crisis decision-making, particularly between nuclear-armed states. Their findings reveal that while AI enhances decision-making speed and precision, it does not fundamentally alter crisis response strategies, which rely on multi-faceted approaches, including diplomacy and economic measures.

However, they point out that AI introduces complexity in escalation management, as targeting rivals’ battle networks could lead to unintended, rapid escalations due to algorithmic misinterpretations. In crises, uncertainty about a rival’s AI capacity heightens escalation risks, prompting states to consider both AI-enabled and traditional responses.

Notably, Jansen and others say knowing an adversary’s AI capabilities fosters restraint, while ambiguity drives aggressive strategies.

In line with Jensen and others, Juan Pablo-Rivera and other writers discuss in a January 2024 paper the potential risks of incorporating LLM AI in military and foreign-policy decision-making, highlighting escalation risks.

Pablo-Rivera and others mention that in wargame simulations involving several AI-driven agents, researchers observed that these models often pursued actions that could exacerbate conflicts, even in neutral scenarios.

They point out that the five language models tested exhibited varying degrees of unpredictable escalation behavior, including arms-race dynamics and, in rare cases, decisions leading to nuclear action.

They note that the models tended toward deterrence-based actions and “first-strike” tactics without accounting for the non-material costs of war, leading to unexpected escalatory outcomes.

Pablo-Rivera and others say such behavior underscores the potential dangers of deploying such AI in high-stakes environments without comprehensive safeguards and raises questions about the readiness of these models for real-world application.

They recommend caution, as these escalation dynamics could lead to unintended and potentially catastrophic consequences if integrated into critical military and diplomatic decision-making processes.

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