Taiwan partnership priorities for the next US president – Asia Times

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This content was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with authority.

The new US president’s top priority for Taiwan will be to communicate clearly and quickly about progress in the partnership to prevent provocations from the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ), as in previous transitions, despite concerns of backsliding.

After Joe Biden won the election four years ago, this author&nbsp, wrote&nbsp, that” the Trump and Tsai administrations have repaired the US-Taiwan connection, and the question is whether Biden’s leadership will slow gains in the&nbsp, solid relationship”.

In my opinion,” there probably wo n’t be a significant rollback of progress returning to weaker engagement.” That positive expectation has frequently been met. However, drawing on his special authority as leader and as a former legislator who had voted for the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, P. L. 96-8, Biden declared constantly that the&nbsp, US government would support &nbsp, to defend Taiwan.

But both present applicants show signs of stepping back, with Kamala&nbsp, Harris&nbsp, refusing to “get into suppositions” and Donald&nbsp, Trump&nbsp, saying that” Taiwan may compensate us for security”. The winner of their contest should have to support President Biden’s open declaration as one of their top priorities.

Concerns, consistency, and changes

Since 1979, every president has cited the Taiwan Relations Act, which is bipartisan. On Capitol Hill, Congressional oversight of the president centers on the act and its&nbsp, legislative intent&nbsp, for creative ambiguity to enable the bilateral, non-diplomatic relationship in spite of the&nbsp, United States ‘ “one China” policy.

Nonetheless, common approaches also have included the George W Bush and Barrack Obama administrations ‘&nbsp, freezes&nbsp, of congressional notifications of arms sales.

There have been modifications that have altered the approach. For example, Biden’s State Department re-imposed unnecessary restrictions on contacts by itself and the rest of the Executive Branch with Taiwan that then-Secretary of State&nbsp, Mike Pompeo&nbsp, had removed completely.

Moreover, the next president could re-ignite a debate about cooperation with the PRC. Instead, it would be prudent to continue the bipartisan, realistic re-assessment of PRC threats. Biden ‘s&nbsp, National Security Strategy&nbsp, of 2022 points to the PRC as” the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it” —in line with Trump’s changes. Similarly, Congress has bipartisan re-assessments, particularly that conducted by the&nbsp, Select Committee&nbsp, on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.

Further, the strategic environment has worsened in the last four years. Factors include the PRC’s increasing aggressiveness toward Taiwan and the Philippines, Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine since 2022 and Israel’s conflicts since 2023, as well as the Beijing-Moscow strategic axis tightening in cahoots against Washington and its allies.

While not the only reason, arming Ukraine has exacerbated delays in delivering weapons to Taiwan worth$ 18.7 billion, as Sen. &nbsp, Josh Hawley&nbsp, (R-Missouri ) wrote in December 2022 to the Department of State. State has acknowledged the problem, continuing to ask to work with industry to end administrative and production delays, and fix supply chains&nbsp, at the US-Taiwan&nbsp, Defense Industry Conference&nbsp, in September 2024.

Realism, urgency, and cultures

At the same time, Taiwan has been forced to make serious and urgent military reforms for asymmetric defense, &nbsp, longer conscription, and more resources as a result of the conflict in Ukraine.

US presidential support needs to remain in alignment with Republic of China ( Taiwan ) President Lai Ching-te’s realism and reforms of Taiwan’s problematic diplomatic and military cultures, especially given&nbsp, gaps between US and Taiwanese military cultures.

Strategy, security, and stability

Top leadership is needed for a US strategy. Briefly, what are specific priorities no matter who is the president? The president will have to lead US and allied actions to impose costs on the PRC for its&nbsp, destabilizing&nbsp, behavior, including the Joint Sword series of military exercises. Expediting&nbsp, weapons deliveries&nbsp, is a well-known priority, particularly for&nbsp, new F-16V fighters&nbsp, that this author first proposed in 2017.

But major arms acquisitions are not sufficient. Taiwan requires more munitions, training (especially for fighter pilots ), and interoperability with the US. Building on Taiwan’s willingness to acquire asymmetric capabilities, as urged by both the Trump and Biden Administrations, is one of its top priorities.

Advice in modernizing&nbsp, operational concepts&nbsp, for joint, decentralized warfighting will build on Taiwan’s defense reforms and training by US Joint Training Teams (JTTs ), military services, and National Guards. The president will support cooperation in unmanned aircraft systems ( UAS ) and counter-UAS capability.

Taiwan will be encouraged by the new president to increase its defense budget so that it can at least meet its 3 % GDP goal. Bilateral talks about cost-effective spending will need to resolve differences about Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Submarine ( IDS ) program, planned to cost almost&nbsp,$ 9 billion &nbsp, for seven vessels after the first prototype.

A new area of cooperation between allies and partners is the defense industrial resilience. The US under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment presided over the first meeting of the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience ( PIPIR ) in Honolulu in October 2024. Taiwan’s vice minister of defense for armaments, &nbsp, General Hsu Yen-Pu, attended, after talking with US officials and industry at the Defense Industry Conference.

Increasing Washington-Taipei cooperation between coast guards is a complementary priority, particularly to counter Beijing’s provocations in “gray zone” coercion.

As Ukraine’s civilian resistance demonstrates to Taiwan, a priority is to strengthen its&nbsp, whole-of-society resilience&nbsp, ( as the Atlantic Council recommends, for example ). Lai has broadened defense and resilience beyond Taiwan’s military to the society, a development with US support. His National Security Council ( NSC ) has led coordination for resilience, explaining to this author in June 2024. Taiwan’s new realism is seen in its&nbsp, Zero Day&nbsp, drama ( publicized in July ).

Building up this whole-of-society resilience will need to include critical infrastructure protection, defense against cyber attacks, and stockpiles, including phone and internet connections and supplies of energy sources, food, medicines, and water. Without power or phones, Taiwan’s citizens require real-world experiences and exercises.

Moreover, Taiwan’s sensitive subject that would benefit from the US presidential experience is continuity of government amid the PRC’s threats of “decapitation” by targeting the leadership and command centers. Taiwan needs to solve its problem of having only a short bench of publicly named officials for&nbsp, presidential succession&nbsp, and thus for the commander-in-chief. Although Taiwan’s president and vice president should not be in the same place, they should still appear together.

Reinforcing priorities

The president will decide on Lai’s” stopover” on the way to visit Taiwan’s diplomatic partners, consistent with established practice. He or she will build on Biden’s leadership in growing multilateral support for Taiwan, such as by the&nbsp, Group of 7&nbsp, and the Global Cooperation and Training Framework ( GCTF ) involving the US, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, and Canada.

The president will be compelled to disarm that political conflict by effectively refuting the UN General Assembly’s gaslighting manipulation of Resolution 2758&nbsp because the PRC never explicitly stated that Taiwan belongs to the PRC’s jurisdiction.

The president’s leadership will be important for a bilateral agreement to&nbsp, eliminate double taxation, including for investments in the key semi-conductor sector. Another priority will be agreements in the&nbsp, US-Taiwan Initiative&nbsp, on 21st Century Trade.

By sending a Cabinet-ranking official to Taipei, the new president will need to regain credibility and consistency. Since 1992, Biden has failed to permit such visits in accordance with the law.

In sum, such presidential priorities will strategically strengthen&nbsp, integrated deterrence&nbsp, across military and non-military domains. Reinforcing that deterrence, the partnership will improve democratic Taiwan’s economic and societal resilience, and international inclusion and legitimacy.

Shirley Kan is a senior adjunct fellow of the Pacific Forum, a founding member of the Advisory Board of the Global Taiwan Institute ( GTI), a member of the Advisory Council of the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue, and a freelancer with the US Congress at the Congressional Research Service ( CRS ).

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Indonesia-Russia naval exercises more surface than substance – Asia Times

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On Monday ( November 4), Indonesia held its first-ever diplomatic naval exercise with Russia. Three Russian ships and a support vessel were present, and the drills were scheduled to last from November 4 to November 8.

The activities, known as Orruda 2024, have been interpreted in some quarters as Indonesia’s new leader, Prabowo Subianto, tilting the Southeast Asian nation aside geopolitically from the US and its supporters and toward Russia and apparently China.

However, there is a general discussion in Jakarta regarding the exercise, with some claiming that it is simply a response to Russia’s growing security ties to the US and its supporters.

To be sure, there is no denying that President Prabowo, who assumed department on October 20, is strong on cultivating warm relations with Russia, a long-time company of Indonesian hands.

In July, when Prabowo was president-elect but also serving as defence minister, he traveled to Moscow and met with President Vladimir Putin. Prabowo praised Russia as a “great buddy” of Indonesia during the journey and expressed political optimism that ties between the two countries would continue to improve.

On October 25, Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono announced Indonesia’s desire to join BRICS while attending the expanding bloc’s summit in Kazan, Russia – a clear break from the past Joko Widodo administration’s non-committal position.

There was no denying that Sugiono received the best education because she is a close friend of Prabowo. So, Prabowo’s first big foreign policy walk as national head was Russia-friendly.

Importantly, Indonesia and China have begun debate about the possibility of conducting diplomatic joint military exercises, which could be groundbreaking since they have not been held for nearly a decade.

Indonesia suspended them in 2015 as a result of the two countries ‘ ongoing conflict over the North Natuna Sea, which are Indonesian territorial waters that fall under China’s nine-dash range state to almost all of the South China Sea. These preliminary actions may irritate Americans and allies, but in their wider context they are less serious.

For one, despite the standard branding, this year’s drills are not the first day Indonesia has held a naval exercise with Russia. The international Komodo Exercise, held four times since 2014 and most just in 2023, included Russia from the outset alongside the US, Japan and China, among others. Holding a smaller bilateral training with Russia may be a significant growth, but it’s rarely a step modify.

However, while serving protection minister, Prabowo oversaw the continuous expansion of Indonesia’s protection ties with the US and its allies. In August, Indonesia signed a new security pact with Australia, hailed by the latter as the most important safety contract in the two neighbors ‘ story, with Prabowo shepherding the agreement on Indonesia’s side.

Super Garuda Shield, an annual martial training involving Indonesia and the US plus aligned capabilities, grew in size and difficulty under Prabowo’s view. This time, the practice ran for a fortnight from August 26 to September 26 and involved some 5, 500 forces from Indonesia, the US, Japan, Singapore, the UK, Australia, Canada, France, Brazil, Brunei, India, South Korea, New Zealand and Thailand.

By contrast, the Orruda 2024 naval exercise being conducted with Russia right now is obviously smaller in size, lasting only four times and involving only a few hundred soldiers overall.

As one expert, who preferred to remain unnamed, frankly put it:” It’s kind of a pitiful practice if you compare it with Garuda Shield. This is similar to the shift you give a man after consuming a delicious meal at Garuda Shield.

Fauzan Malufti, a security analyst and part of JATOSINT, which provides open-source knowledge on Indonesia’s defense, was less contemptuous.

” Given the number of warships and the exercise materials, I do n’t think it’s merely symbolic”, he said. But, Malufti agreed that if compared to activities with American forces, Orruda was evidently much smaller and less complicated.

Zooming out, Prabowo’s willingness to amuse hot ties with Russia and possibly boost military assistance can be viewed as part of Indonesia’s classic choice for non-bloc positioning.

In terms of security, reaching out to Russia and China might serve as a signal that Indonesia’s close ties to the US do not indicate that it has abandoned its space for political maneuvering.

According to Fitriani Bintang Timur, a senior researcher at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute,” I privately think Prabowo would like to emulate India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who positioned India as a member of the Quad while also meeting with Putin.”

She cited Prabowo’s unanticipated request for a peace deal with Ukraine at the Shangri-La summit in Singapore in 2023 as evidence of his desire to establish Indonesia as a dominant middle-class on the global stage.

However, Prabowo’s well-known preference for foreign plan, his desire to cut an important figure on the global stage, and his unpredictability may be what are driving a foreign policy that is attention-grabbing but does not actually signify a course change.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank’s deputy executive producer, Shafiah Muhibat, acknowledged that some members of Indonesia’s foreign policy community were surprised by moves like joining the BRICS but unsure of their true significance.

Jokowi is known for his ability to attract attention, but he also enjoys being on the international stage, she said. Whether these may add up to a clear and specific proper perspective, though, is still uncertain, Shafiah said, suggesting the situation may be clearer over the next year.

For the time being, this year’s marine practice seems more important for Russia than Indonesia, according to Radityo Dharmaputra, a teacher and specialist in Indonesia-Russia connections at Airlangga University.

Russia can demonstrate that, despite American attempts to isolate it diplomatically, it still has strong diplomatic relations with an important middle power, he said.

The exercises have the potential to grow even further. Russia, I believe, also understands that Prabowo wants a global stage to showcase his abilities. If Russia gives that, and the West overly criticizes Prabowo, he will lean to Russia more”, Dharmaputra predicted.

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Oz axes Lockheed military satellites, leaving a hole in the sky – Asia Times

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In a significant blow to Australia’s defense capabilities, the federal government is canceling what would have been the nation’s largest-ever space project: an A$ 7 billion ( US$ 4.6 billion ) military satellite communications system.

Today ( 4 November ), a press release confirmed the decision. The Albanese state gave the green light to the ambitious programme only 18 months prior.

Despite its proper importance, sources from the defense industry who were quoted by The American newspaper claimed that inadequate funding was given to begin the program. According to the ABC, “defense industry statistics believe there are cheaper alternatives accessible.”

The program’s cancellation would represent a significant change for a system that was intended to make Australia’s defense communications safer at a time when the landscape of cyber threats has been continuously changing.

The rise and fall of JP9102

The optimistic telescope initiative is known as JP9102. Following a dynamic delicate process that included big players like Airbus, Northrop Grumman, and Optus, it was awarded to US defence company Lockheed Martin in April 2023.

The task aimed to release some huge military-grade satellites. It would also involve some ground stations, fresh dish communications operations centers, and a key management system. Taken up, this may create a stable communications system for Australia’s war.

Currently, the Australian Defense Force ( ADF) uses a complex network of up to 89 different” capabilities” ( military assets ) that rely on satellite communications.

The complete security and protection that JP9102 promised are lacking in this current system. Without it, Australian military communications might be exposed to computer and electronic battle attacks.

The Department of Defense statements in its statement that its” recent satellite communications features support the organization’s quick needs.”

What is military spacecraft deliver?

An “uncrackable information system” across the ADF was intended as a result of the proposed satellite system, according to authorities.

These high-tech satellites would have provided safe communications for ground forces, naval vessels, and fighter jets throughout the great Indo-Pacific region.

Unlike business satellites, military satellites incorporate advanced crypto and anti-jamming skills. They are thus much more resistant to cyberattacks and digital war.

Military satellites are vulnerable to complex cyberattacks from both position and non-state players.

China and Russia are commonly recognized as having advanced features in this area. They are capable of intercepting connections, compromising satellite signals, and even threatening to overthrow satellite systems. Additionally, North Korea has demonstrated expanding capabilities in cyberwarfare, especially in sign jamming.

During their businesses in Crimea in 2014, Russian troops reportedly slowed and hampered satellite connections. More recently, hackers impaired dozens of satellite computers that were a part of the Viasat satellite system, causing problems to both military and civilian contacts across Europe at the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Iran has been accused of entangling GPS and dish channels in the commercial market. This demonstrates how even countries with less developed military might be able to cause serious risks to satellite contacts.

JP9102 was considered a “bleeding-edge systems job”. Ideas for machine learning capabilities to improve dexterity and responsiveness were included. The potential for potential scientific advancements was highlighted by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in a previous review of the project:

If the JP9102 satellites are based on open-architecture style or software-based systems, they may benefit from upcoming on-orbit cleaning technologies that could increase their usefulness and capacity over time.

A budget real

The main lesson is that the budget reality of Australia and its defense ambitions are growing.

The choice to revoke JP9102 highlights the difficult balance between the need to secure Australia’s military communications and the costs associated with doing so as regional tensions continue to rise and computer threats progress.

In a place that is increasingly contested, Australia must figure out how to secure its military communications. A major potential space in Australia’s military communications approach will need to be filled by the withdrawal of JP9102.

Defense designers will probably need to look for other solutions. These may include partnering with business satellite companies or joining allied military dish networks like the United States.

David Tuffley is top professor in applied morality &amp, security, Griffith University

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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‘America First’ would become ‘Trump first’ in a second term – Asia Times

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SINGAPORE – With America’s election day roughly below, governments and businesses across Asia are preparing for the next US presidency. Some experts believe that Trump 2.0 may follow the Biden-Harris administration, making him the equivalent of Trump 1.0.

True, a triumph for Kamala Harris may entail a continuation of the customary US strategy for working with partners and friends to best enhance the US national interest, with the exception of President Donald Trump’s first name.

Some people think Trump’s” America First” international policy, which looks at the world through a narrow bilateral camera, will continue with his administration’s plan to run the Oval Office.

After surviving the first one, Bilahari Kausikan, past permanent director of Singapore’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, predicts that nations in the region would be well prepared for a second Trump name.

” The Trump administration was n’t all bad. Real, his walking away from the TPP was a surprise that also reverberates, but we adapted through the CPTPP and RCEP”, he wrote, referring to local trade agreements. ” The universe did not end. And it was in our best interests to see some of the items Trump did to reaffirm America’s authority.

” President]Barack ] Obama made prettier speeches, but President Trump understood— perhaps instinctively — hard power better”, he added.

True, Trump’s America First strategy did own triumphs, in large part because his supervision had talented and efficient officials, political appointees and job officials working to implement his policies.

However, it’s unlikely that a second Trump expression would bring that same expertise and experience to his defense.

Issues of devotion

One swears an oath of business when they enter the US government to” support and defend the United States Constitution.” &nbsp, During Trump’s first term, some of his officials took that vow really.

Chief of Staff John Kelly, Defense Secretary Mark Esper, and Vice President Mike Pence were a few notable cases.

Additionally, dedicated job state officials supported the application of Trump’s policies and made them successful and in line with US rules, even if they did not personally disagree with some of them.

In a second Trump expression, for officials – social and career – will be mostly lost. When discussing how a second Trump administration may be staffed, Howard Lutnick, Trump 2024 change group co-chair, said potential officials will only be tapped&nbsp, if they prove “loyalty” to the previous president.

This probably means that the people who were in charge of the first Trump administration’s accomplishments, like as reviving the Quad collaboration in 2017 to combat China militarily and politely in the Indo-Pacific region and launching Trump’s trade war in response to Beijing’s actions, will no longer be there.

RINOs — Republicans in Name Only — will not be tolerated under a Trump 2.0 leadership. Making fealty to Trump a prerequisite for democratic appointments will undoubtedly lower the caliber of his presidency because no one party has a stranglehold over the poor choices of political appointees.

Trump received additional authority to appoint himself in the final few months of his first term, many of whom are responsible for international policy and national security. He did this in order to end what he deemed the” Deep State.”

Trump appears to see his administration as a group of democratic bureaucrats and officials blocking his ability to impose state policies as dedicated job public servants who collaborated with political appointees to best achieve each president’s policy goals in accordance with US law.

He gave the” Deep State” an order to demolish it, giving him the authority to appoint loyalists instead of career officials. Joe Biden, the president’s successor, rescinded the order right after taking office, but Trump had probably resume it as one of his first acts as professional.

The destruction work under Trump 2.0 is already being carried out. While legally a non-profit, non-partisan institute, The America First Policy Institute ( AFPI ) is led and staffed by officials in Trump’s first term and serves as his government-in-waiting.

This author has had five sessions with AFPI reps. In my relationships, its workers have been available to dialogue with US company society representatives. I found many of them intelligent, dedicated and well-prepared, and I have no fear they may be effective if in state.

AFPI’s plan book says,” Agencies should be free to remove workers for any non-discriminatory cause, with no additional appeals”. That means that political appointees was fire civil servants for a wide range of reasons, including for disobeying Trump if they believed his actions to be unlawful or illegal, or for expressing opposition to federal policies, such as climate change denial.

Diplomatic and national security personnel will be in high demand for policy if Trump wins a second term, which means he wo n’t be hands-on with managing foreign affairs.

The code will get” who gets the assets to handle problems in the region,” according to Mike McCurry, a press secretary for President Bill Clinton who also worked for the State Department.

” The vocation foreign company officials and civil workers I worked with at State were systematically committed to adhering to administrative guidelines and laws. The US’s ability to accomplish its foreign policy objectives may be affected by their loss, according to McCurry.

” For the political appointees, I am guessing that those who might be qualified are going to be absent, and those who get jobs may be significantly qualified, and it will get them a year or two to have an effect, but they will”, he added.

Enter the” Shallow State.”

Kurt Tong, a former occupation foreign company commander who served as US ambassador to APEC and US consul-general to Hong Kong, told this author,” I find stress about the existence of a’ Deep State’ of skilled and hard-working people working for America as a person who has invested more than 40 years in understanding Asia and thinking about what is best for the region, including 30 years specifically charged with promoting US interests there.

” Do we want a’ Shallow State’ in Washington? Why would that be beneficial? According to him, it appears that the” Deep State” has effectively served political figures from both parties.

Many people anticipate an exodus of the career officials required to develop and implement policy effectively if Trump wins. If so, they will take with them decades of experience and relationships.

This will reduce regional officials ‘ years of involvement in developing relationships with their Washington, DC counterparts, who have previously transitioned from administration to administration, as well as erode their expertise in policy-making and implementation.

Elections have consequences. If Trump wins a second term, he should have the right to carry out an America First policy as he sees fit as chief executive.

However, an” Trump First” policy developed and carried out by those who are loyal to the president first and foremost, and not by the counsel and guidance of career foreign service officials in the room. Leaders and policymakers in Asia may soon have to grapple and contend with this new US reality.

Since 2003, Steven R. Okun has been employed in Singapore as the CEO of APAC Advisors. He was the US Department of Transportation’s deputy general counsel prior to the Clinton administration.

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China boxed out of high-NA lithography race to 1nm chips – Asia Times

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As the competition to 1-nanometer cards gains momentum, Taiwan’s TSMC is likely to be the next chip-making company after Intel to get the most cutting-edge printing application in the semiconductor industry.

According to a Nikkei Asia report, the world’s leading integrated circuit ( IC ) foundry will install ASML’s new high-NA extreme ultra-violet ( EUV) lithography system at its R&amp, D center in Hsinchu, Taiwan, by the end of this year.

That’s about three months later than industry publications had anticipated, but not significantly more than American Intel, which installed its second high-NA printing system in Oregon in April and its subsequent in August.

Initially, Samsung Electronics plans to purchase its second high-NA program. The Netherlands ‘ ASML is the only company using the EUV printing techniques to create Apis at 7nm and smaller approach nodes.

High-NA lithography systems, also known as EXE systems, likewise use EUV light but employ a new optical system that increases the numerical aperture ( NA ) from 0.33 to 0.55. That reduces the crucial component, or the smallest have the system is print, by 1.7 times and increases the transistor density on a chip by 2.9 times.

According to ASML, the “ability of an visual system to collect and focus light” is measured by the number of n.

According to reports, TSMC aims to start using high-NA lithography at the 1.4nm node ( 14A, A for angstrom ) in 2028 or later, or at 1nm ( 10A ) in 2030 or later. By the end of 2025, it intends to use the EUV printing methods that are already in use for the 2nm process.

That is perhaps true, since it will take a long time to develop and evaluate high-NA EUV effectively in commercial production.

The engineering is also very expensive, with one report claiming that the system costs at least$ 350 million, or about half the cost of conventional EUV equipment. Probably, as product demand rises, that figure will decrease.

While TSMC integrates high-NA EUV into its technology enhance strategy, Intel is using it as part of CEO Pat Gelsinger’s extreme catch-up method, which to date has been dogged by upsetting yields, restructuring charges, lots of red ink and offshoring to TSMC down to 3nm.

Intel’s share price has dropped more than 50 % so far this year, while TSMC’s is up more than 70 %.

High NA EUV tools are anticipated to play a significant role in the development of advanced chips and the production of next-generation processors, according to Intel. Intel Foundry, the first company to move into High NA EUV, will be able to deliver unheard precision and scalability in chip manufacturing, enabling the business to create chips with the most cutting-edge features and capabilities that are necessary for advancing AI and other emerging technologies.

That is, if everything goes according to plan. In particular, Intel anticipates developing and manufacturing advanced chips using both 0.33NA EUV and 0.55NA EUV, starting with Intel 18A’s product proof points in 2025 and continuing to Intel 14A’s production. Intel’s approach will optimize advanced process technology for cost and performance”.

It may, and Intel’s restructuring program is, by most accounts, making progress, but the words “or later” should probably be appended to its timeline.

As for China, at least for now, this is not a contest in which it can compete. Due to US sanctions, it is unable to purchase EUV systems, and the previous generation of ArF ( Argon Flouride ) immersion Deep Ultra-Violet ( DUV) systems it has been able to acquire have a capped 5nm.

Recent reports indicate that Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment Co ( SMEE ) &nbsp’s ( SMEE ) &nbsp ) &nbsp ) &nbsp is commercially viable down to 65nm, but that its effort to create an ArF immersion system capable of producing ICs at the 28nm process node takes longer than originally planned.

In contrast, it took ASML 10 years of R& D and six years to complete the first high-NA EUV lithography system, which took ASML six years to complete before it was able to ship its first high-NA EUV lithography system.

( For a compact history of IC lithography, see” China’s lithography gains a glass half full, not half empty. )

Without the imposition of US sanctions, China might not have developed its own lithography equipment. South Korea, home to Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, two of the world’s leading producers of memory ICs, has n’t developed its own lithography equipment. Japan’s Nikon, unable to compete with ASML, does not make EUV systems. Canon never even tried.

China has also been encouraged by the sanctions ‘ efforts to develop silicon photonics, a technology that processes and transmits sizable amounts of data without using EUV lithography.

Designers and manufacturers of ICs, AI systems and telecommunications equipment, including Nvidia, AMD, Intel, TSMC, IBM, Cisco Systems, NTT, Huawei and other Chinese companies and laboratories, have been working on the technology for many years.

The US House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP ) finally caught the attention of silicon photonics this year.

In a letter to Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo on October 27, committee chairman John Moolenaar ( Republican-Missouri ) and ranking member Raja Krishnamoorthi ( Democrat-Illinois ) warned that photonics technology could allow China to overtake the US&nbsp in semiconductors and instructed her to take action to stop it.

Quoting Matthew Reynolds, author of” Controlling Light: Is Silicon Photonics an Emerging Front in US-China Tech Competition? “, the congressmen wrote:

Silicon photonic technology can” create large-scale computing systems with higher bandwidth and improved energy efficiency that go beyond the physical limitations of traditional electronic chips” when combined with electronics in semiconductors.

Some experts think that photonic chips can increase computational speed by 1000 times more than current electronic chip designs.

Silicon photonics has the potential to upend the semiconductor industry and redefine battlelines in the US’ technological conflict with the PRC, making the October 7, 2022, &nbsp, export control regulations irrelevant and creating a crucial chokepoint for upcoming semiconductor supply chains.

To ensure continued American leadership in crucial and emerging technologies like silicon photonics, the US government should examine the tools at its disposal to assess both how to stop US investment and know-how from supporting our adversaries and encourage domestic innovation.

The committee did its homework, noting that photonics was included in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan ( 2021-2025 ) as a technology that national laboratories should be built, and that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping had described it as” a high-tech industry where our country has the conditions to achieve breakthroughs ahead of others.

Silicon photonics is being funded by Chinese businesses and research institutes in the billions of dollars. Additionally, in defiance of US sanctions, Nanjing Electronic Devices Institute researchers discovered that photonics is a disruptive technology with enormous military potential. Both Huawei and Nanjing Electronic Devices Institute are listed on the Entity List, with a presumption of denial of license for unauthorized military end-use.

Thus, Silicon Photonic developments could enable China to stay competitive in AI without using TSMC’s high-NA EUV lithography services, which Nvidia, AMD, and other Western competitors do not. In any case, it appears that the US government is once more behind the curve in terms of technology.

Follow this writer on&nbsp, X: @ScottFo83517667

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China claims its radars closing in on US stealth fighters – Asia Times

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As tensions rise in the South China Sea and Taiwan, China’s most recent calculations reveal a US cunning jet risk because its scanners may find F-22s and F-35s at close range.

According to South China Morning Post (SCMP), Chinese military researchers from the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) National Defense University’s College of Joint Operations and Beijing’s State Key Laboratory of Intelligent Game have recently conducted computer simulations to evaluate the effectiveness of stealth fighter jets against China’s air defense systems.

SCMP says that the models, presented at the 36th China Simulation Conference in October, revealed that cunning soldiers like the F-22 and F-35 may be detected from 180 meters away by China’s land-based scanners, compromising their ability to conduct accuracy ground problems.

According to the SCMP statement, the modeling was of a US attack coming from Japan on Shanghai. The statement notes that the F-35’s “beast style” allows for longer-range weapon assaults but sacrifices secrecy, making it visible from 450 km away.

The study, led by project expert Cao Wei, used an algorithm to convert sensor data into monitoring runs and warning days, which suggests the results may be conservative given the number of transponders used. It notes that the results are brought on by the increased US implementation of F-22s in Japan, which shows how China is more interested in preventing cunning challenges.

China has invested considerably in F-22 and F-35 recognition skills. For example, SCMP reported last month that Chinese scientists have created a cost-effective detector to use signals from the BeiDou transportation satellite system to monitor and detect stealth aircraft like the F-22.

This cutting-edge radar, which was described in a recent peer-reviewed article in the Journal of the National University of Defense Technology, uses a single receiving antenna and a unique algorithm to identify stealth targets without generating detectable signals.

The radar’s design, led by Wen Yuanyuan from the National Key Laboratory of Space Microwave Communication, simplifies deployment and reduces costs, making anti-stealth technology more accessible globally. If BeiDou is jammed to ensure continuous operation, the radars are said to be able to switch to other satellite signals like GPS, Galileo, or GLONASS.

In any US and allied response to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, stealth aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 are expected to play a crucial role.

In a December 2022 Warrior Maven article, Kris Osborn says that the US plans to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan with an array of F-22 and F-35 fighters, leveraging their air superiority and precision strike capabilities. By securing airspace control over the Taiwan Strait, Osborn notes that these jets, which are designed for quick response, would neutralize Chinese forces.

He notes that this air dominance, combined with forward-deployed US Navy assets and allied forces, would aim to destroy approaching Chinese amphibious forces. He adds that the F-35s, operating from US Marine Corps ( USMC) America-class assault ships, would offer versatility with both vertical-takeoff capabilities and forward-deployed presence.

Osborne assesses that despite China’s recent advancements, including Type 075 amphibious ships and quasi-stealth J-20 and J-31 fighters, it lacks sufficient fifth-generation aircraft numbers to match US and allied firepower.

Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine reported in October 2023 that while China has built around 180-220 J-20 stealth fighters, surpassing the 187 F-22s the US maintains, Asia Times reported last month that the US currently has 680 operational F-35s, with plans to acquire 1, 800 more.

However, US F-35 production struggles with spiraling costs in upgrading increasingly difficult-to-maintain F-22s and ramping up F-35 production.

At the operational level, US stealth aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35 would be instrumental in defeating China’s anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD ) strategy.

In a 2021 Air &amp, Space Forces Power journal article, Tom Lawrence mentions that China has established a robust A2/AD environment, mainly through advanced air defense systems, stealth-capable destroyers and missile capabilities.

Lawrence points out that the US leverages stealth aircraft, notably the F-22 and F-35, for their low observability, allowing them to penetrate heavily defended zones and execute precision strikes.

He claims that when enemy cyber or anti-satellite attacks disrupt traditional C2 systems, emphasis is placed on distributed command and control ( C2 ), which enables decentralized units to operate autonomously.

Lawrence notes that this approach aligns with new operational doctrines, such as Joint All-Domain Command and Control ( JADC2 ), which aims to integrate US and allied land, sea, air and space assets for multi-domain responses.

He argues that the integration of autonomous unmanned combat aircraft (UCAV ) with manned fighters indicates a shift toward collaborative, network-enabled warfare, while stealth fighters play a crucial role in achieving tactical surprise and establishing air superiority.

At the strategic level, F-22s and F-35s are vital for the US’s conventional deterrence posture in the Pacific. Stars and Stripes reported in June 2022 that Admiral John Aquilino, the former head of the US Indo-Pacific Command ( INDOPACOM), emphasized the need for these cutting-edge aircraft to remain permanently stationed west of the International Date Line.

This deployment is seen as crucial for countering China’s extensive military buildup, including advancements in naval, missile, cyber and space capabilities.

Stars and Stripes says that the US has already stationed F-35Bs at USMC Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, and deployed F-35Cs on aircraft carriers, but the US Air Force’s F-22s and F-35s have only been deployed temporarily.

Aquilino advocates for a permanent deployment, according to the report, to improve deterrence and maintain regional stability.

However, while China may not be able to match US airpower, it can attempt to destroy US aircraft on the ground in a pre-emptive strike for a Taiwan invasion.

China’s pervasive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ( ISR ) and all-domain long-range offensive capabilities, such as the DF-26″ Guam Killer” missile, put dispersed US facilities, air assets and naval forces at risk.

Numerous US Congress representatives pointed out the vulnerability of US bases and aircraft in the Pacific in a letter from May 2024 to the US Navy and US Air Force, which highlights what they perceive to be a crucial defense gap.

According to the letter, China’s extensive strike capabilities threaten all US installations in the Indo-Pacific, including those in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, which are crucial. It notes that US air and missile defenses may be overwhelmed, exposing critical assets.

The letter also criticizes the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) delay in implementing “passive defenses”, such as hardened shelters and force dispersal. It points out that while China has added only 22 fortified shelters in the last ten years, the US has already built over 400.

It points out that due to this disparity, US aircraft and bases are vulnerable, with 90 % of US aircraft losses occurring on-the-ground during war games.

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How Chinese media see Trump vs Harris on election eve – Asia Times

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According to Chinese media reports, the outcome of this Tuesday’s US national election will determine whether Washington’s scheme on China continues as it has always done under a Kamala Harris administration or careens in new, unfamiliar directions under a Donald Trump 2.0 management.

Foreign observers and pundits are of the general consensus that Harris would be more predictable because her Democratic Party is more influenced by worldview and policy consistency. Trump is viewed as unexpected, but many people think he might be more willing to negotiate if a deal would deliver real financial benefits for the US in line with his” America First” perspective.

” If Harris is elected, she will usually continue the Biden administration’s China strategy”, Shiu Sin-por, chairman of the New Paradigm Foundation Company Limited, a pro-Beijing think container established in 2007, said in an article published on October 31. ” Even if there is any revision, the scale will remain limited. The upcoming trend of Sino-US ties may be clear”.

Democrats and Republicans, according to him, are more interested in philosophy and think that China’s increase will continue to challenge the values of the US and the West’s current world order, but both Democrats and Republicans view China as the country’s best adversary. &nbsp,

Shiu claims that if Harris wins, the US will continue to work to thwart the expansion of China’s military and high-tech companies and other key economic sectors.

” But if Trump wins, the changes in the United States ‘ China policy may become greater and harder to predict”, he says. Trump will likely employ some effective means of attracting foreign corporations to the US, including taxes and reward programs.

It is less good that China and the Harris leadership will agree on something, according to China’s view. Trump is a very wise merchant who is willing to negotiate with China, according to Shiu. ” Of course, We should not reject Trump’s volatile, weak-principled and extreme heroes”.

According to Shiu, US relations with the EU, Japan, and Taiwan may even change if Trump wins, when Trump wants friends to support his” Make America Great Again” approach to reindustrialize the US. &nbsp,

60 % taxes loom large&nbsp,

Trump started a trade war with China in 2018 by imposing a 25 % tax on a range of Chinese products. Beijing had previously believed that Washington would halt the taxes and de-escalate the tech war in the name of improved diplomatic relations after US President Joe Biden took office in January 2021.

However, the Biden administration increased both by enacting new export control laws to stop China from importing expensive chips and chip-making equipment from the US and by imposing new tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles ( EVs ). Additionally, it persuaded the Union to even impose tariffs on Chinese EVs and continued to sell weapons to Taiwan. &nbsp,

Some Chinese experts predict that under Trump, who has pledged to establish a 60 % tax on all imported Chinese goods, a novel, contentious round of trade war may erupt. Some experts did point out that China might not be the main target of the fresh taxes. &nbsp, &nbsp,

China has previously conducted a thorough analysis and is considering the formation of the BRICS payment method to lessen the negative effects of the US involvement price cut, according to a Shanxi-based columnist’s article on November 2 under the heading” If Trump wins, who will be the biggest sufferer”?

” De-financialization” is China’s national policy to reduce embracing activities and asset bubbles in the country. ” If Trump takes office, the US will prevent aiding Ukraine while the Russia-Ukraine war did not maintain”, he says. Russia will get from this and become more recognized internationally.

He anticipates that a Trump 2.0 management” could start a trade war with the EU, deter National investment in India, and compel allies like South Korea and Japan to make more of a contribution to the US’s defense strategy in Asia.”

If Trump re-enters the White House, the country’s pattern may undergo significant changes. But this may not be a negative thing, as long as we are well-prepared”, the Chinese blogger writes. &nbsp,

Fundamental problems

Other experts speculate that Harris and Trump may have completely different strategies for resolving upcoming US-China problems.

On the outside of a conference in Shenzhen on October 13th, Cheng Li, the founding chairman of the Centre on Contemporary China and the World at the University of Hong Kong, told the media that “if Harris is elected, the US’s China procedures will be comparatively more repetitive,” while maintaining that position.

If Trump wins, Sino-US relationships will become more uncertain, Li predicted, because he typically makes decisions based on business benefits and specific interactions with state leaders. &nbsp,

Li, a student of former and now-deceased US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, made an assessment based on his observation that the two countries ‘ national powers are at odds with one another, which he described as unheard of in contemporary geopolitics.

He said the two countries ‘ architectural problems, caused by their differences in social networks, economic concepts and beliefs, will remain for years to come. He urged both nations to know that neither side could defeat humanity without wreaking havoc.

Read: China’s Skydio limits sound the alarm for US power supply ring

Observe Jeff Pao on X: &nbsp, @jeffpao3

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S Korea’s crucial quest to break tungsten ties with China – Asia Times

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The Sangdong metal plant in South Korea holds one of the nation’s largest single-mine metal resources. The plant is scheduled to begin operations next month after closing in the early 1990s largely due to cheaper Chinese titanium flooding global markets and undermining South Korea’s price competitiveness.

Following Canadian company Almonty Industries ‘ 2015 merger of the Sangdong mining rights, this restoration follows. The organization established a company, Almonty Korea Tungsten Corporation, to move the miners operation, which resurrected the latent webpage. Domestically, this work has been welcomed by local residents, hoping that the mine’s revival may revive the group facing local drop.

Globally, following a&nbsp, visit&nbsp, by US government experts this past summer, the plant is anticipated to safely provide tungsten abroad—primarily to the United States—although China remains the dominant global provider.

Given the government’s extensive dependence on Chinese metal, concerns arise in Seoul as the planet looks beyond China to find metal for manufacturing, including both for chips and batteries as well as weapons.

Sangdong Mine and the US-South Korea Tungsten Agreement

Sangdong is a small village in Yeongwol County in South Korea’s Gangwon Province. It houses the Sangdong metal me, which contains an estimated&nbsp, 7.9 million tonnes&nbsp, of proven and possible resources and boasts the nation’s highest levels of metal.

Almonty&nbsp, claims&nbsp, that the plant may run for” 100-plus times”, comparing Sangdong to its “equal size” me in Portugal, which has been running for 136 centuries and is expected to continue for another 50 to 60 years. The Sangdong mine used to contribute to&nbsp, over half of the country’s exports&nbsp, as one of the largest tungsten producers on the planet.

However, the mine shut down in 1994, mainly due to an influx of cheaper tungsten from China, which&nbsp, resumed exporting to the non-communist world&nbsp, following its&nbsp, economic reforms. &nbsp, Consequently, Sangdong—once the heart of South Korea’s industrialization, generating tungsten dollars —has become nearly a ghost town, with its population dwindling to around 1, 000 residents, one of the least populated towns in the country.

The mine was originally owned by the South Korean state enterprise, Korea Tungsten Mining Company (KTMC), founded in 1952 during the Korean War. Its establishment came after the US-South Korea tungsten agreement, which was signed the same year, as the metal started to become a “pivotal strategic mineral in the 20th century.”

According to a&nbsp, study &nbsp, on South Korea’s tungsten exports and the bilateral tungsten agreement, the United States classified tungsten as a strategic material for weapons production during World War II and sought alternative sources after China’s Communist Revolution, turning to South Korea.

During the Korean War, efforts to export Korean tungsten to the US grew more rapid, which sparked South Korea’s “tungsten mania” and prompted the US Department of the Interior ( DOI ) to send US experts to work with the South Korean government to stockpile tungsten from the Sangdong mine.

The United States&nbsp, agreed to&nbsp, “purchase all the tungsten offered by the ROK” and pay US$ 65 a ton for the first two years, with the contract lasting five years or until 15, 000 short tons of tungsten had been purchased. This agreement established a stable market for Korean tungsten exports and ensured steady and exclusive tungsten supplies for the US during the war.

However, a sharp drop in global tungsten prices, coupled with South Korea’s early meeting of the production target, led to the agreement’s conclusion. The Korean government&nbsp, pushed hard&nbsp, to continue the deal to maintain a steady revenue, which was crucial for its post-war recovery, but the contract was not renewed.

After decades of industry setbacks, influenced by unstable global tungsten prices and, notably, China’s aggressive pricing and exports, KTMC was &nbsp, privatized in 1994&nbsp, under the Kim Yong-sam administration’s policy to divest state-owned enterprises, becoming the first company in the country to undergo this transition.

The company was sold to the South Korean Geopyung Group, but it went&nbsp, bankrupt&nbsp, in 1998 during the Asian Financial Crisis. Before Canadian tungsten mining and processing company Almonty Industries acquired the business in 2015, the ownership of the Sangdong mine had been changed several times.

As of July 2024, the company has invested nearly&nbsp, 130 billion won ( approximately US$ 94 million ) into the mine’s redevelopment.

Reducing Reliance on Chinese Critical Minerals&nbsp,

Tungsten is&nbsp, most notably used in&nbsp, semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, automobiles, weapons, and industrial cutting machines due to its exceptional hardness and high energy density.

According to the&nbsp, US Geological Survey data, China accounted for over 80 percent of the world’s tungsten production in 2023, reaching 63, 000 metric tons, followed by Vietnam, the second-largest producer, with 3, 500 metric tons. In response to China’s dominance in tungsten production and export, the US DOI&nbsp, designated&nbsp, tungsten as a critical mineral in 2018.

On the legislative front, the Restoring Essential Energy and Security Holdings Onshore for Rare Earths Act of 2022, or the&nbsp, REEshore Act of 2022, was introduced to reduce US dependence on foreign sources, particularly China, for critical minerals like tungsten.

By 2026, the law requires the DOD and DOI to establish a strategic reserve of rare earth metals that have been processed or refined in China in sensitive US Department of Defense ( DOD ) systems. This May, the DOD issued a&nbsp, final rule&nbsp, restricting the acquisition of certain metals and magnets, including tungsten, from China, along with Iran, Russia, and North Korea, effective January 2027.

On tariffs, the United States Trade Representative ( USTR ) announced its plans to impose a&nbsp, 25 % tariff&nbsp, on Chinese minerals, including tungsten, stating that” the concentration of critical minerals mining and refining capacity in China leaves our]US] supply chains vulnerable and puts our]US] national security and clean energy goals at risk”.

Given China’s history of using critical mineral exports as a tactical tool—most recently with export controls on&nbsp, germanium and gallium&nbsp, effective August 2023, followed by&nbsp, antimony starting September 2024—global efforts to diversify critical mineral supply chains, including tungsten, have become increasingly urgent.

In February 2023, Seoul announced a&nbsp, strategic mineral procurement strategy, which selected 33 critical minerals, including tungsten,” for management with regard to economic security” with the goal of “mitigating its reliance on imports from a select few countries”.

In diplomatic relations, Seoul’s commitment to critical minerals was highlighted by the launch of the Korea-Africa Critical Minerals Dialogue during the first&nbsp, Korea-Africa Summit, focusing on cooperation between Korea’s advanced technology and Africa’s mineral resources.

South Korea also signed a&nbsp, memorandum of understanding&nbsp, ( MOU) with Canada to strengthen critical mineral supply chains, aiming to reduce reliance on China by leveraging Canada’s mineral wealth and South Korea’s manufacturing capabilities.

In addition, Seoul assumed the&nbsp, chairmanship&nbsp, of the US-led Minerals Security Partnership ( MSP), and at its first MSP meeting as chair in September, &nbsp, Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul spotlighted the Mahenge Graphite Project in Tanzania, for which Korea leads the Working Group.

South Korea’s Autonomy over Tungsten &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

South Korea is confronted by the unfortunate reality of having limited control over a large number of locally mined, high-quality tungsten reserves in spite of this. As the&nbsp, world’s largest tungsten consumer per capita, South Korea ‘s&nbsp, 95 % &nbsp, reliance on Chinese tungsten imports has been a persistent issue.

There are concerns in Seoul that the foreign ownership and operation of the Sangdong mine, which was once the nation’s greatest asset, underscores potential limitations on Korea’s autonomy over its mineral resources. Almonty intends to first allocate 45 % of its annual output to the US market and likely set aside the remaining 55 % for South Korea, which indicates a positive shift for South Korea to significantly reduce its dependence on China.

These concerns about tungsten autonomy and ownership are closely related to broader concerns about economic sovereignty and national security, especially given Seoul’s position as a semiconductor and battery manufacturing powerhouse, combined with the upcoming US presidential election and its potential impact on global trade.

Such concerns clearly demonstrate the need for long-term investment in domestic mineral resource development, extending beyond immediate profitability considerations. This includes constructing processing facilities, such as the Almonty and Yeongwol County MOU signed this year, known as the&nbsp, tungsten oxide plant.

This development is particularly noteworthy because, in 2022 and 2023, Russia and North Korea were ranked as the third and fourth-largest tungsten producers, which presents a challenge for the United States and its key allies, particularly South Korea.

In the face of the growing US-China competition, tungsten is once more crucial for securing technological advancements and strengthening security initiatives, just as it was crucial during World War II, reflecting the geopolitical dynamics of that time. In today’s changing environment, the question of Korea’s ability to exercise control and maintain a stable supply chain for this crucial metal is receiving renewed scrutiny.

Haeyoon Kim is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute. &nbsp, The views expressed here are the author’s alone. Republished with permission, read the original here.

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Who’s afraid of the big bad bond market? – Asia Times

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When interest levels were being cut in the US, a funny thing happened: they ended up being higher.

The US Federal Reserve lowered its benchmark interest rate by half a percentage point in September, &nbsp, raising expectations&nbsp, that another levels may soon start coming along. Otherwise, the US Treasury’s two-year and 10-year information and the common 30-year lease rate have all risen by half a percentage point or more.

What happened? The Fed has limited authority over interest rates, which is the quick reply. The bond market, when well, has a lot to say about rates—the longer-term charges in particular, although no entirely.

The relationship economy’s” say” is a simple representation of supply and demand. The key is to comprehend that bond yields and prices move in the opposite direction: one moves off and the other moves down.

The 30-year mortgage interest rate is one of several other bond market-based rates that was coming down before the Federal Reserve slashed its benchmark rate on Sept. 18 but went up after it. (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis chart)
The 30-year loan attention rate is one of several different bond market-based levels that were decreasing before the Federal Reserve cut its benchmark rate on September 18 but increased after it. Graph: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

For example: If I buy for US$ 100 a bond that yields 5 %, I will receive$ 5 a year in interest. Let’s say I’m selling the bond to you and you only pay$ 90 because the demand is subdued and the supply is strong. You currently receive$ 5 in interest per year, but because you paid$ 90, your yield is 5.55 %. ( If, instead, you had to pay$ 105 for the bond, your yield would be 4.76 %. )

What’s happening, therefore, is that while the Fed is now trying to push prices down, ties are selling off and that’s driving costs higher. The question is: Why is the connection business negative?

There are at least two possible solutions.

Some experts blame what they’re calling the” Trump trade”. Although the surveys are a tossup, the industry think Trump is going to win the presidency. They also believe that a second Trump term will aggravate the trend toward higher inflation and worsen the already bad national debt.

Understand that the markets do n’t have a political agenda. Bond investors may be mistaken about the effects of a Trump success, as well as the success itself, but their predictions do n’t represent anti-Trump discrimination.

Their purchasing and selling of securities is based on what they think will happen in terms of prices. Lenders apprehension about being reimbursed in undervalued currency. Both candidates have pledged to provide tax breaks and freebies that will help with inflation, but academics believe Trump has already made those promises.

The business serves as the other justification for the ties selling off. The Fed’s September 18 price cut reflected an market that was scarcely creating 100, 000 new tasks a month. Some economists were predicting another half-point split at the Fed’s November meet.

But in early October the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported a 254, 000 increase in work in September, well above the 12-month regular, and Census revised some of the earlier times forward. Meanwhile, the inflation rate in September continued its downward march toward the Fed’s 2 % target but did n’t drop as much as analysts expected.

With those studies, a half-point November split by the Fed looked less good. One Fed official also expressed his willingness to avoid a split in November.

The November 1 report that only 12, 000 additional jobs were reported for October seems likely to be dismissed as being distorted by significant storms and the Boeing attack.

Financial businesses are forward-looking, they anticipate activities. In anticipation of the Fed’s September cut, owners had bought securities, which drove bond yields over. In light of the studies showing a stronger market and worse-than-expected prices in September, owners ‘ anticipation changed. If the Fed was n’t going to lower rates as much or as fast as expected, markets had to adjust.

It’s possible, of course, that the true answer is some mix of the Trump deal and expectations of future Fed price movements. The expectations solution is more normal. You’d have to wonder why then if shareholders were selling bonds out of concern for higher imbalances and prices. Bond traders have ignored decades of multi-trillion-dollar national budget deficits.

If those shortfalls are then causing bond traders to feel uneasy, it would represent a return of those who were known as the “bond vigilantes.” Bond investors ‘ concerns about federal spending three decades ago led to 10-year note yields falling from 5.2 % annually to 8 %.

Years later, the administration also managed to generate a budget surplus by working with Congress on plans to control spending. That it had to be pushed by the markets to do so caused a Clinton consultant, James Carville, to say – reportedly – that, if he could be reincarnated as anyone, it would be the relationship industry so he could scare everyone.

For farmers, ranchers and another business loans, the big question is where interest rates are going from below. The most probable course for them to take is, in my opinion, to fall, perhaps more quietly than analysts had predicted in September.

The US economy is robust, according to The Economist, and inflation is essentially under command. The present level of interest rates is much higher than current economic situations warrant, and if the economy continues to grow at this rate, which is very unlikely and if a rebound in inflation is possible but not specially unlikely.

If I’m correct about the economy, the Fed will continue to cut interest rates, perhaps just quarter-point cuts, and perhaps not at every meeting, but it will be closer to 3 % than 5 % over the long run.

The industry will eventually fall in line as the Fed moves in that direction, particularly if whoever wins the presidency is prevented from carrying out their most inflationary campaign promises by Congress, the relationship market, or a return to common sense.

Urban Lehner, a former Wall Street Journal Asia journalist and editor, is DTN/The Progressive Farmer’s editor emeritus. &nbsp, This&nbsp, content, &nbsp, actually published by DTN on November 1, and now&nbsp, republished by Asia Times with authority, is © Copyright 2024 DTN, LLC. All rights reserved. &nbsp, &nbsp, Follow&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, on X @urbanize

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How will the war in Lebanon end? – Asia Times

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How else will the war end, begging the question,” How long will it last if Hezbollah and Israel do n’t reach a ceasefire?”

Earlier in the week, the Israeli army had declared its mission accomplished and removed protective barriers it had set up against Hezbollah’s Anti-Tank Guided Missiles ( ATGM ) in Israel’s northernmost towns, near the Lebanese border.

The techniques signaled Israel’s assurance that its strategy to mitigate the Iran-backed army’s threat was going as planned. But Hezbollah’s high-trajectory fireplace continued. Israel, in consequence, has been fighting two wars against the Iran-backed Syrian army.

The first war, now seemingly over, was particular to Israeli communities that live within of 5, 500 meters ( 3.4 miles ) from the border, the range of Hezbollah’s hand-held ATGMs. Another threat was posed by the frontier itself.

Israelis lost trust in safety railings like the one that kept them from Lebanon after Hamas massacred 1,200 Israelis on October 7, 2023.

Hezbollah’s ATGMs and the uncertain border gate forced the movement of over 60, 000 Jewish settlers. Israel wanted to regenerate its north, but it did it the fastest because of the relatively small size of its military, which made it wait until it had defeated Hamas ‘ danger in the north.

Israel launched a ground operation on October 1 to clear Palestinian territory both underground and above ground from Hezbollah. Since then, the Jewish state has pushed up three meters inside Lebanon, neutralizing Hezbollah’s ATGM danger, and has lost close to 70 soldiers.

The Hebrew state will assuredly hold Palestinian territory until further notice in order to prevent this threat and given the absence of a trustworthy Lebanese government that you manage its side of the border.

If Beirut complains against activity, Jerusalem may provide the Syrian a business: Disband Hezbollah and input into a security arrangement, then consider your land again. Until finally, Israel will have to keep this country as a buffer zone — a no-man’s property.

Israel is fighting another battle with Hezbollah, one in which the Iran-backed military uses high-trajectory fire to beat somewhere in Israel. In reply, Israel has been hitting weapon hoard stores and eliminating Hezbollah’s chain of command.

Additionally, Iran’s proxy militias are prohibited from receiving supplies shipping via land and air to the Beirut airport under an arms sanctions.

To claim Israel success, Hezbollah and Hamas have frequently set two indicators: Israel’s ability to eliminate the militias ‘ leaders, and its failure to stop high-trajectory fireplace on Israel. A political arrangement on the terms of the militia was added by Hezbollah, which promised Israel that it would not be able to reunite its citizens with their north cities.

Hamas furthermore added a second measurement: Without concessions on hard-earned surveillance efforts, Israel may not be able to release the roughly 100 victims that the Palestinians kidnapped on October 7th. But since October 7, 2023, Israel has managed to essentially crush the “victory” indicators of both Hezbollah and Hamas. Both armies ‘ command has been destroyed by it.

In Gaza, Israel has even managed to reduce the high-trajectory fire hazard. Estimates suggest that, since October 7, Hamas has fired over 20, 000 missiles on Israel. By August 2024, but, Hamas had depleted its reserves. Its launch ceased to be frequent.

Hezbollah’s weapon stockpile was little bigger, estimated at 150, 000 before the war. By October 2024, Hezbollah’s property had apparently fallen to 27, 000. If Hezbollah maintains its normal regular launch of 100 projectiles, its missiles will last until early July, after which the army’s great missile fire withers away.

Hezbollah’s very existence may become useless if it is unable to launch missiles or shoot across the border at Israel.

Israel will either continue to monitor and restrict the supply of weapons to Hezbollah and Hamas while maintaining a buffer zone between Lebanon and Gaza, or it will need to establish concerned governments that remove the weapons from the hands of their armies.

Syrian and Palestinian citizens can rely heavily on international and Arab capitals to support and guide them from surviving on militias to demanding trustworthy governments. However, the Syrian and Palestinians must initially demand and demand for a result. After all, one can only lead a horse to the valley, but can never make it drink.

Hezbollah and Hamas seem to be unaware that the status quo has changed as a result of Israel’s defense victories and the deaths of their communities. The militants appear to believe they can turn the clock back to October 6, 2023, a classic example of “resistance” hopeful thinking that has hampered serenity and sparked war throughout the past decade.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain works for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies ( FDD ) as a researcher.

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