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With only a few hours until the vote, pundits and the general public are checking the results in public opinion polls for any first indications.

We’ve had plenty of elections and months of campaigning. However, there are still very few convincing lessons aside from the disgruntling phrase used by election experts all over the country this year: “it’s too close to call.”

But, why is this happening? And what should we produce of the results?

Polling is n’t predictive

Both strategies have at different periods promoted positive and conflicting voting results. The issue is that no one seems to know which elections to think.

A new Des Moines Register surveys conducted on Sunday, led by renowned researcher Ann Selzer, revealed Kamala Harris with a shock three-point guide over Donald Trump in Iowa, giving Harris ‘ anxious campaign an unexpected increase.

Within days, a” private” Trump campaign letter dismissed Selzer’s numbers. Trump himself tweeted favorable polls from AtlasIntel that show him to be in the lead in all seven jump state.

Although there have been some notable falls in some important states, especially in Wisconsin in 2016 and 2020, polling averages have tended to be fairly accurate estimates of public view in new processes.

Other than what we now know, Americans are incredibly divided over their options, there is very little that can be learned from the latest swing state profits, which are all within the margin of error.

Part of the reason why is that elections are not predicted. They provide a gauge of the general opinion at the time of the ballot, allowing for accurate predictions about who might get a subsequent election.

However, their ability to predict electoral winners is limited by margins of error, which are considerably higher than what is generally understood, as well as frequently razor-thin last vote tallies in key states and the winner-takes-all character of the electoral college.

Polling errors are unpredictable in size and direction, especially because they frequently do n’t match up across the country and historically do n’t favor one party over another.

Little loses have outsized effect

Theoretically, accurate election voting is made more challenging in the United States by great non-response rates and non-compulsory voting ( which requires weighting responses based on expected good voters ).

In 2016, and 2020, polling issues were a major cause of these hypotheses ‘ problems. Surveys in 2016 reportedly underestimated Trump’s assistance by failing to control the amount of knowledge in their samples.

This meant they missed his support among light, non-college-educated voters who helped propel him to success in the Midwest.

However, polling averages were generally accurate going into the election day, despite the fact that 2016 is remembered as a catastrophic loss of opinion polling because it appeared to have failed to predict a Trump triumph.

National surveys were among the most reliable in the last 80 years, only slightly overestimating Clinton’s popular vote margin.

Across the ten closest state in the 2016 election, Trump was underestimated on ordinary by simply 1.4 %. Loses in a handful of important states such as Wisconsin, while substantial, had an enormous impact on the final outcome.

The profits were such that Trump could win the election in what most analysts had predicted would be an undeniable triumph if all the electoral errors were removed.

The polls were to blame for failing to make it clear that the unthinkable was actually very plausible, despite the margins of error making it clear that there was a high statistical likelihood of a different outcome, rather than scientific errors and poor media reporting.

Polls were much wider off the mark in 2020 but avoided the same level of public scrutiny given they correctly ( if narrowly ) “predicted” a Biden victory.

Have experts fixed past shortcomings?

A standard error in Trump’s prefer of less than 0.8 % in the seven essential swing states, based on polling averages in 2024, may mean he won the electoral college comfortably with a 312–226 margin.

Similarly, a standard shift of less than three percentage points in Harris ‘ favour may offer an extremely uneven 319–219 win for the Democrats.

The key question is whether experts ‘ weak methods, which underrated Trump’s support in 2016 and 2020, have been sufficiently corrected.

Changes to some surveys include a rise in the use of hybrid sampling techniques ( mixing both online and phone calls ) and a weight of previous seats.

However, using such techniques could be exaggerating the consequences of past errors and now underestimating Harris ‘ support because they did n’t properly sample them.

Until the votes are counted and the winner declared, there is no certain way of knowing.

Polls ca n’t do everything

Given that it is an effort to glean the opinions of hundreds of millions of people, polling continues to be extremely accurate. However, it is incorrect to assume that poll is reliable or reliable.

There is no point trying to read the tea leaves other than the general public’s perceptions that polling catches, which is because of the vagaries of voting and, most importantly, the vicissitudes of the US democratic system.

The outcome might actually come down to a small number of votes, or it might result in a lopsided electoral college success. Either way, do n’t blame the polls.

Samuel Garrett is exploration affiliate, United States Studies Center, University of Sydney

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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In its base, there are over 9.7 million people living in Seoul, one of the world’s most densely populated towns, and there are 26 million people in the greater metropolitan area. Unavoidable damage may result from a nuclear explosion in the city’s center, making it a desert of destruction and despair.

By examining the fire effects mile by kilometer, we can get a glimpse of the people, climate, and infrastructural toll this catastrophe may impose.

When a atomic bomb bursts, its destructive energy is measured in terms of a fire, a flash, extreme heat and dangerous rays. The distance from the blast’s centre, or “ground zero,” is essentially what affects the population and infrastructure.

Let’s suppose the blast of a 1-megaton atomic bomb in northern Seoul, around Gwanghwamun Square, for picture. The injury may be broken up into certain areas that extend beyond ground zero. ( Maps: https ://www.mapz.com/ )

0–1 Kilometer: Earth zero and complete annihilation

Within the first mile diameter of the blast, the disaster is complete. Anything within this diameter may be completely vaporized by the fireball, which has temperatures higher than the sun’s surface. Houses, cars, and facilities would cease to exist, reduced to dust and ashes. The heat and energy would instantly kill nearly 100 % of the people.

In a matter of seconds, Gwanghwamun Square, along with ancient websites like Gyeongbokgung Palace and the big government buildings in Jongno-gu, may disappear. In less than a minute, the wave did radiate upwards, traveling faster than the speed of audio. By the power of the fire, anything that is not vaporized by the heat, such as reinforced concrete buildings, may be crushed.

1–2 Kilometers: Firestorm and extreme fire area

Beyond 1 mile, but nevertheless within a 2-kilometer diameter, the damage remains considerable. The intense heat would spread quickly, igniting common fires all over the area, causing a firestorm, even though the fireball’s core would not extend this way. The dense urban landscape, which may cause a lot of key Seoul to become a sea of flames, may fuel these fires.

Buildings would suffer significant damage or collapse entirely. Institutions made of glass, steel and concrete would still be greatly compromised, while most residential and commercial properties, such as those in neighborhoods like Myeongdong and Insadong, would crumble completely. Anyone living in this area would suffer horrifying injuries as a result of the pressure wave’s impact, which would break windows and give dangerous glass shards flying at high speeds.

2–5 Kilometers: Serious energy and blast damage

Although some buildings might still be standing, the explosion’s effects would still be fatal at a distance of 2 to 5 meters from ground zero. Survivors may be exposed to intense levels of radiation, known as the first rays, which is released in the first moment following detonation. In this region, the majority of people may pass away quickly and painfully in just an afternoon due to the exposure.

Significant structural damage may be done to neighborhoods like Itaewon, Yongsan, and the famous Dongdaemun business area. The extreme heat would also cause fires to burst across the city, and the majority of buildings would be destroyed or seriously damaged. People would still be thrown through the air and hurled into debris by the shockwave, which would also cause dangerous or important injuries. Roads and transport infrastructure do collapse, leaving the area impossible.

5–10 Kilometers: Moderate to severe destruction area

In the 5- to 10-kilometer circle, the effects of the storm and radiation undermine significantly, but the destruction remains severe. At this range, classic areas such as Gangnam, Yeouido, and the outer margins of Yongsan-gu do experience significant harm. The fire wave would destroy windows, decline weaker houses, and burn flammable materials. Several high-rises in Seoul’s tightly packed urban areas could half collapse, and fires may continue to spread.

Radiation exposure would still be risky in this situation, but it might not be fatal for those who are sheltered or home. There are more than 3, 200 weapon homes in Seoul. The majority of them are not prepared because there are radioactive homes, and some have been found to be ill maintained.

The US Command Post Theater Air Naval Ground Operations ( CP Tango ) complex, which is deep underground in an undisclosed location in the Seoul capital region, is protected by numerous blast-proof doors and serves as the main command center for military operations launched against North Korea in the event of hostilities. It has &nbsp, food and supplies for two weeks for up to 500 South Korean and US military.

If you’re the same as me, you’re definitely never invited. You can find out&nbsp, where to go&nbsp, here ( good luck ). Those of us who were exposed to the outdoors may experience severe burns and radiation sickness within days. Survivors may struggle to find medical aid, as clinics, clinics, and emergency services may become overwhelmed or destroyed.

10–20 Kilometers: Gentle injury and consequences zone

At a distance of 10 to 20 kilometers, while the most harmful effects of the fire and flash would be reduced, this place would face widespread system damage, along with publicity to radioactive fallout.

The southern sections of Seoul, including districts like Jamsil and pieces of Songpa-gu, may experience broken panels, damaged buildings and flames, although some buildings may be sitting. As aftermath, radioactive particles thrown into the environment by the explosion, may start to fall, putting survivors at risk of rays sickness.

Depending on the weather patterns at the time, nuclear fallout may cover the area. In addition to flames, this fallout may contaminate the air, water, and ground, making the area unsafe for weeks or even months. Long-term health problems like cancers and genetic abnormalities in individuals would be the result of global exposure. The risk of death may be great for the population in this area, especially those who had no shelter right away after the explosion.

20–30 Kilometers: Secondary damage and consequences

In the 20- to 30-kilometer circle, the physical harm to facilities would be less serious, but radioactive fallout would be a major concern. Incheon and Suwon, as well as other cities and regions beyond the Seoul town limits, did start to experience the dangerous effects of aftermath. Fallout particles, carried by storm currents, may sit over large areas, leading to long-term rays exposure.

While many buildings would remain intact, services such as electricity, water supply and communications would be severely disrupted, leaving survivors without access to basic necessities. Due to the extensive destruction and high radiation levels closer to ground zero, emergency response teams would not be able to reach these areas.

Long-term consequences

The explosion would only serve as the start of the city’s problems. Seoul would continue to experience rain for days, polluting the environment, and leaving vast swaths of the city uninhabitable for decades. Cancers and radiation sickness were among the serious health risks faced by those who managed to avoid the initial destruction.

Beyond the human cost, Seoul’s destruction would have a significant impact on both the economy and politics. South Korea, a global economic hub, would experience a catastrophic collapse of its economy, affecting industries such as technology, automotive manufacturing and shipping. There would be immediate disruptions to the global supply chain, which would cause global economic unrest.

One of the most vibrant cities in the world would completely collapse if a single nuclear bomb went off in central Seoul. Survivors would have to deal with the agonizing realities of radiation sickness, environmental destruction, and societal collapse, with a death toll of millions. The thing is, they rarely come as singles. A nuclear attack on Seoul would use a number of weapons, including artillery, chemical weapons, and biological weapons. When the shit hits the fan, ai n’t no one in this place escaping.

The once-thriving capital of South Korea would be reduced to a barren wasteland, forever changed by a single, catastrophic decision. North Korea would cease to exist as a functioning state, and historians would use the phrase” Pyrrhic victory” to explain its significance. It serves as a clear reminder of the unimaginable destruction caused by nuclear weapons and the need for continued efforts to achieve world peace and nuclear disarmament.

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This piece was composed after reading Annie Jacobsen’s incredibly frightening book&nbsp, Nuclear War: A Scenario. She details the impact of a nuclear war through time with a harrowing first twenty-four minutes, next twenty-four minutes, the final twenty-four minutes, and then the next twenty-four months. She starts the text with a prologue:

A 1-megaton thermonuclear weapon detonation begins with a flash of light and heat that is so great that the average person ca n’t even comprehend it. One hundred and eighty million degrees Fahrenheit is four or five times the temperature at the Earth’s core.

Every line that follows is just as powerful. Anyone who believes that using nuclear weapons would make them safer or more secure should read the book. Read the book and one question pops up: Why&nbsp, is&nbsp, there a nuclear weapons debate in Seoul?

Jeffrey Robertson is an academic, consultant and writer focusing on foreign affairs, diplomacy and the Korean Peninsula. &nbsp, This article was originally published on his Substack, Diplomatic Seoul, and is republished with permission. &nbsp, Read more here.

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A central issue looms heavily over the conflict in Myanmar as heavy monsoon rains transition to the year-end cold time: is day on the side of federal-democratic forces fighting the military coup government of the State Administration Council ( SAC)? Or, rephrased, does the extraordinary military momentum achieved by those causes over the last year been maintained in the year to arrive?

There are no clear answers to the question in either development now given the interplay of numerous domestic and external factors, some of which are” known unknowns” and others are “unknown unknowns.” But two overarching realities that before long will eventually – and possibly quickly – effect the war are already in full view.

The first is that coordinated activities by well-organized cultural makes organized as regiments and brigades with clear lines of command were carried out in the borderlands of Shan, Kachin, and Rakhine states, where the annual 1027 campaign started on October 27, 2023.

They were even able to absorb a amount of casualties not publicly revealed but which in particular engagements, notably the month-long struggle for Lashio town in Shan state and cruelly protracted sieges around army strongpoints in Rakhine state, certainly cost thousands of lives.

A much less skilled or well-organized group of ethnically majority Bamar Peoples Defense Forces ( PDFs ) will fight the war in the upcoming year primarily in the central country of Myanmar.

Indeed, this shift has already begun with PDF forces moving within rocket range of Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city, while in neighboring Sagaing region PDFs loyal to the shadow National Unity Government ( NUG) and supported by the long-running ethnic forces of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA ) overran the strategically important town of Pinlebu on October 8.

Window of opportunity

The second stark fact now shaping the issue is that the SAC government is gearing up to fight for its success. The regime has undoubtedly been shaken to the core by the unprecedented blows to manpower, materiel, and morale of the past year.

But notwithstanding gung-ho opposition commentary predicting retreat without end and possible regime collapse, there is little evidence to suggest that the discipline and cohesion that has underpinned the military for seven decades has evaporated in a single year.

Despite this, advancements on the battlefield are already being made faster as a regrouping process that will likely only increase in the coming year is being made.

Against the backdrop of ramped-up diplomatic, material and advisory support from Russia and China, the military continues to push ahead with a conscription drive that is now in its sixth iteration. It was started in April, and it has reportedly dragged over 20 000 new recruits into the army’s already stale ranks.

How effectively this desperately needed infusion of manpower translates into battlefield capability remains to be tested. And that test will be challenging to measure given that newly trained draftees are being deployed to strengthen battalions already deployed in the field rather than forming new units that might fail and fail at the first opportunity.

But as Joseph Stalin famously noted of technically inferior Soviet tank power thrown against the German panzers of World War II, “quantity has a quality of its own”. History demonstrated that the conceited Soviet dictator was right.

At the tactical level, the army’s new directorate for unmanned aerial warfare is boosting the impact of the SAC’s largely unchallenged airpower. The directorate already receives Chinese material support thanks to an initiative launched earlier this year to expedite the introduction of drones to front-line battalions.

Russian expertise derived from the war in Ukraine is also almost certainly playing into a drone war in which opposition forces no longer dominate Myanmar’s battlespaces.

Despite the fact that these and other improvements to the SAC’s sagging capabilities are likely to gain popularity over the upcoming year, it is still safe to say that none has yet attained a critical mass that alone or in combination could give a decisive advantage over an enthralled resistance.

In the national heartland, often demoralized regime garrisons remain bunkered in mainly defensive mode. And where in the borderlands, the army plans significant counteroffensives in the upcoming weeks, a lack of manpower, mechanized mobility, and combined-arms experience all prevent dramatic, if not even significant, rebounds. &nbsp,

A more likely scenario is that army advances stifle grinding attrition battles that further reduce both manpower and morale. That scenario is already frustrating regime counterthrusts around the approaches to Mandalay, in Nawnghkio township on the Shan plateau to the east of the city and in Madaya on the Ayeyarwady River to the north.

China’s ambitious plan to end the conflict in the north by closing its borders on munitions, medicine, and fuel shipments that had previously reached the opposition tripartite Brotherhood Alliance and KIA in Kachin state is still in its early stages.

Even assuming a 2, 200-kilometer border can be effectively and indefinitely sealed – an improbable scenario – the impact of the embargo on front-line opposition forces will be mitigated over the coming months by the vast quantities of munitions captured from the Myanmar Army during Operation 1027.

In addition, it’s still to be seen whether Chinese threats and scolding can effectively stifle the lively commercial instincts of the United Wa State Army ( UWSA ), the well-stocked and ostensibly neutral faction that has long profited from its role as a back-room quartermaster for ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar.

Against this backdrop, the current balance of forces leaves open a clear window of opportunity for the opposition to exploit the momentum gained in the year of Operation 1027 and press home its advantage before a still-stumbling enemy has the opportunity to regain its balance.

It’s difficult to predict how long that window will remain open. But it is almost certainly safe to predict that Myanmar’s loose federal-democratic alliance, severely challenged by a lack of external material and diplomatic support, does not have another three or four years to put in place the prerequisites for a military victory. It has one or at most two, which is more likely.

Regular forces

The opposition in the Myanmar heartland, the center of conflict in 2025, will need to use locally based PDFs as foundations to establish regular units, without which concentrations of Myanmar Army forces cannot be defeated. &nbsp,

A resistance to the idea of regular forces organized into battalions and brigades and exercising command-and-control at both district and regional levels would suggest that the war must continue if it is to not stall.

Raised spontaneously for local defense and hit-and-run attacks, PDFs are neither structured nor commanded for the coordinated mobile operations now indispensable in a conflict that the successes of 1027 and a shrinking window of opportunity have propelled into a broadly offensive phase.

The recent victory of the opposition in Pinlebu demonstrated the urgency of organizing regular forces in full force. If reports from the field are accurate, the town’s capture was undertaken by manpower from around 50 different PDFs pulled into the battle from over ten townships stretching across Sagaing region. It was the start of a 53-day campaign that had just begun in mid-August.

While a tribute to revolutionary solidarity, this” all pile in” approach to offensive operations is not a serious template for fighting a war against both a ticking clock and an army dug in across scores of towns and cities. Pinlebu’s capture was also supported by KIA regular units, which are active in northern Sagaing but whose advice and support cannot be found further south.

Similar problems with less positive outcomes have also been apparent in Mandalay region, where PDFs launched the” Myingyan District Special Operation” ( MDSO ) in mid-August. Local groups overran positions in several adjacent townships during a well-planned, albeit brief campaign before retreating in the face of regime airpower and ground forces ‘ rapid focus.

More recently, on October 21, the town of Ngan Myar Gyi, captured on August 19 as part of the MDSO, was retaken by a concerted regime operation involving ground forces, air strikes and naval bombardment from the Ayeyarwady River.

Without the direct support of major ethnic actors, PDFs lack the organizational resilience and logistical resources to withstand, let alone defeat, Myanmar Army forces.

Over the coming year, failure to draw on the best of PDF manpower and equipment and prioritize the formation of new regular battalions configured for mobile offensive operations beyond local boundaries and command structures likely risks strategic defeat over the long term.

Piecemeal reversals on the battlefield, popular exhaustion, and soon enough, the lure of SAC-sponsored “militia” status for business-minded PDFs will only be made worse by external factors. The acclaim, grudging or enthusiastic, with which an Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) -led international community will greet the travesty of SAC-staged “elections” in 2025 is only the most obvious.

building blocks for a battalion

In the dry season months ahead, it is unlikely that even newly constituted regular forces would be capable of overrunning and holding urban centers of any importance. Any assault on a major city the size of Mandalay could prove disastrous if rebel attempts to storm towns would arguably be foolish.

If properly equipped and deployed, however, regular units could prove crucially effective in maintaining the momentum of 1027 with high-profile and ideally well-coordinated attacks on the vital arteries of a severely overstretched regime.

The interdiction of crucial transportation and communication channels that gradually confine the military to urban-controlled islands would ideally be strengthened by airbase raids, ammunition production plants, and fuel convoys. &nbsp,

One of the more impressive aspects of the war is how not many people have the ability to launch serious attacks on airbases, which is directly related to the lack of local PDF capacity and strategic direction.

Virtually by default, the lead actor in addressing the challenge of forming regular forces will be the NUG, the only entity with broad enough legitimacy and some degree of authority in the Bamar heartland.

The Ministry of Defense ( MoD ) of the NUG has already provided financial and logistical support to some but not all PDFs in much of central Myanmar and has nominally renamed them “battalions” in response to persistent sniping from its critics.

In addition, several other armed Bamar actors could pivotally play a key role in creating a new force structure. One is the Bamar People’s Liberation Army ( BPLA ), a group originally based in eastern Karen state where it was trained by cadres of the ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army.

As part of the 1027 campaign, the BPLA has gained combat experience in northern Shan state over the past few years. Its leader, Maung Saung Kha, has recently repeated his intention of redeploying a claimed force of 1, 200 troops back into the Myanmar heartland.

Another potent player has emerged as the Mandalay PDF ( MDY-PDF). Since abandoning dreams of urban guerrilla warfare in Mandalay city, the group has trained and grown under the tutelage of the powerful Ta’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ) in hill-country on the borders of Mandalay region and Shan state.

The MDY-PDF, which currently has at least 3, 000 trained regulars, operates alongside the TNLA and under its command-and-control, while acknowledging the authority of the NUG.

Since July this year, it has pushed south along the east bank of the Ayeyarwady River to threaten Mandalay city and potentially extend its influence into the army-dominated flatlands south of the city where MDSO took place.

Other smaller, less frequent organizations include the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ), which is operated by the TNLA, and the All-Burma Students Democratic Front ( ABSDF), a long-standing group of several hundred troops with significant combat experience who have participated in significant battles in the Indaw and Tigyaing regions of northeast Sagaing.

Who’s command-and-control?

However, the main resistance dissent in 2025 will be less dependent on manpower than on command-and-control, and by extension, on personality and political issues that may yet shape the tragic outcome of a failed revolution. &nbsp,

The main inquiries can be easily answered: Does the MoD of the NUG have the authority, vision, and organizational acumen to take on a central role in the development of strategic operations in the country’s heartland?

Could an open-door” coalition of the willing” form a joint headquarters under NUG auspices bringing together chiefs-of-staff from key commands, Bamar and ethnic?

Will powerful ethnic armies be willing to enlist in direct command-and-control or have operational control over the ethnic Bamar PDFs that could serve as the foundation for the heartland’s elite forces?

Would the BPLA or ABSDF be willing to recognize the command authority of either the NUG or a joint HQ or, alternatively, insist on operational autonomy?

What is not in dispute is that Myanmar’s federal-democratic opposition will soon need to field regular forces for coordinated operations against the SAC in the majority Bamar heartland, where the military is most militarily firmly rooted, using building blocks that are already largely in place.

Political failure to unite around that military objective will likely lead to spreading confusion, strategic incoherence and ultimately a defeat that leaves a blood-soaked military dictatorship in place. &nbsp,

Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based analyst with Janes security and defense publications.

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I did n’t intend to write a second post about Trump and China. However, Luke Radel, a pupil journalist, inquired from the House of Representatives whether Trump and him would overturn the CHIPS Act if Trump won the election. Johnson responded by saying yes.

Johnson eventually appeared to&nbsp, move again his reply, but Trump has already&nbsp, denounced the CHIPS Act, so it’s possible that Johnson— who usually does Trump’s bidding —was telling the truth. My response to all this is: What on Earth?! Are you joking with me? ?

The CHIPS Act was &nbsp, a nonpartisan act, whose sole purpose was to maintain or restore US manufacturing capacity in the all-important semiconductor industry in the face of a large Chinese&nbsp, press for supremacy. The bill’s success has so far resulted in smaller-scale personal funding initiatives:

Original conceits that CHIPS Act projects would become entangled in regulation or labor disputes have so far proven to be unfounded. The TSMC lovely in Arizona, perhaps the highest-profile initiative funded by the rules, is now in operation and is&nbsp, achieving better quality&nbsp, than the company’s companies in Taiwan.

This announcement was immediately praised by a number of British technicians as a significant victory for the country:

It’s not just that one mill, nevertheless. After losing market share for many years, the US is now expected to regain it through the CHIPS Act:

And the bulk of these opportunities are going to red or purple state, with Arizona, Texas, Ohio, Kansas, and North Carolina&nbsp, among the participants:

The developing that the CHIPS Act is reinvigorating is helping some of the same areas that were hardest hit by the China Shock of the 2000s.

But to reiterate: Why on earth do Donald Trump and Mike Johnson revoke a bipartisan law that is stifling private investment into a crucially important, proper manufacturing sector that is mostly benefiteding purple states?

I do not know the answer to this question, but it ca n’t be good.

In my best efforts to be as open-minded with my audience as possible, I often speak out very openly about what my main concerns are. I’m somewhat concerned about climate change, we’re making major improvement against it, but&nbsp, we may go faster.

I’m somewhat concerned about US turmoil and institutional conflict, I think we’re on the path to national cure, but I think Trump did &nbsp, pause that process. I’m somewhat worried about bioweapons, about government imbalances, and about people aging.

But I am&nbsp, very&nbsp, worried about the People’s Republic of China. For one simple reason, the US steered the world’s future in the early 20th centuries: It may produce the most goods. The Axis places were overtaken by British output in World War 2.

The US had a clear benefit over the Soviet Union in terms of production, which meant that, if there was a nuclear conflict, the result of a conflict between the socialists and the free world was never in doubt.

But in the decades since the turn of the century, this irrefutable benefits vanished. In two short years, China took the US ‘ mantle as the factory of the world, zoomed past us, and always looked up:

China’s manufacturing skills inspires awe and horror. It is unmatched and unheard in the history of the world. In just a few short decades, China&nbsp, built a high-speed road network&nbsp, bigger than the whole rest of the world combined:

Now consider the potential benefits of that kind of developing for military applications. Now China is&nbsp, building ships at an incredible rate. And it has large companies pumping out high-tech weapons:

Americans may find comfort in knowing that their missiles are a little higher-tech ( even though that edge is quickly diminishing ). Current high-intensity conflicts are often short and decisive, as the Ukraine war has so brilliantly demonstrated. In general, they drag on for a while and require much more ammunition than nations have at the start of the conflict.

In other words, China’s great developing skills gives it&nbsp, increase dominance&nbsp, over the US. Xi Jinping and his commanders knows that in any battle, even if China loses the original activities, if it just keeps fighting, America may run out of arms fast. That will give America two choices: Give up, or launch nukes and be nuked in return. And this conflict might occur sooner than later:

If you’re not frightened of that, you should be.

Not even close, this capability gap is n’t being corrected by the CHIPS Act. But it’s an important first step. &nbsp, Chips are the essential input&nbsp, into all modern precision weapons, all planes, all ships, all tanks, all drones.

They are crucial for AI training and operation. They are the most important industry of all, and the majority of them are currently produced by a tiny island off the coast of China that China has pledged to conquer. That’s an incredible, gaping security vulnerability for the United States, and the CHIPS Act is an essential first step toward fixing it.

And now, Trump wants to repeal the CHIPS Act and all other industrial policies, giving us a slim chance to stand up for China.

A new Cold War is taking place between the United States and its allies right now. This is not hypothetical, it is&nbsp, the present reality&nbsp, in which we live. China is also the primary antagonist of that recent Cold War.

Not Russia, North Korea, or Iran— these are much smaller states with far weaker manufacturing capabilities, and without China, they would be no threat to the US. They are a part of a New Axis that rivals the US and all of its allies and is known as&nbsp, which makes them stand out from the rest.

If the US loses this Cold War, the long-term results will probably be very bad for Americans. China’s leaders, knowing that the US might one day rise to challenge them again, will do everything in their power to make sure this does n’t happen.

They will use every tactic in the book to divide and divide our society politically while developing a military capable of stoking our country militarily and using their economic dominance to weaken the US.

The oceans will be no barrier. Due to the People’s Republic of China being more vengeful and less generous than the USSR, we will experience the same fate as the USSR after the first Cold War.

Already, we can see the first glimmers of this strategy. China just&nbsp, put export controls on Skydio, the leading US commercial drone company. Because China makes most of the world’s batteries, this may end up crippling a substantial portion of America’s drone manufacturing capacity.

And the US may be poised to&nbsp, lose this new Cold War by default. Trump may use tariffs to weaken China’s economy or to elicit sporadic bellicose rhetoric, but he has shown no desire to grow US manufacturing to the point where it can effectively fend off Chinese rule.

Biden did start to build up US industry, and now Trump wants to cancel Biden’s efforts. Trump has also&nbsp, declared his opposition&nbsp, to the bipartisan TikTok divestment bill. Meanwhile, &nbsp, Trump constantly denigrates&nbsp, and threatens to pull out of US alliances.

This is also a way of voluntarily forfeiting Cold War 2, since China is so big that without allies like Japan, Germany, South Korea, France, the UK, and hopefully India, the US has no hope of matching it. If those allies fall and become satellite states of China and Russia, the US will be isolated, alone, and utterly outmatched. If you do n’t believe me, just look at the map because Eurasia is simply much bigger and stronger than North America.

All this is&nbsp, not&nbsp, to say that Trump is some kind of Manchurian candidate, planted by China and Russia to weaken and destroy the US. I make no such claim, of course. And yet it seems possible to predict almost everything he does in relation to China and Russia by asking,” What would China and Russia want him to do?”

Trump is the ideal stooge of hostile powers; he is so focused on defeating internal enemies that he refuses to intervene in any way to stop them. Rush Doshi&nbsp, put it well in an recent op-ed. It’s little wonder that China’s social media bot army has been&nbsp, strongly in favor of Trump&nbsp, this election cycle.

Note that I’m not saying Kamala Harris would be perfect on China policy, I have &nbsp, a few worries&nbsp, there too. However, I am aware that she will fall under the bipartisan consensus that China is a threat that needs to be confronted. And I know she’ll have advisors who take this seriously, just as Biden did — in many cases, they’ll be the same people. So I ‘m&nbsp, far&nbsp, less worried about Harris than Trump.

A second Trump presidency would be detrimental for a number of reasons. It would stress American society by amplifying the unrest of the 2010s. It would promote&nbsp, many of the country’s worst actors&nbsp, to positions of power and influence. But this is what Trump would do, and it would be the same risk.

The US would be in greater danger than anything else he would do by deliberately putting him in danger by defeiting both America’s waning manufacturing industry and its long-standing alliances. Most voters in this election are likely not focused on this issue at all. However, it’s the aspect that worries me the most.

This article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack and is republished with kind permission. Read the original&nbsp, here &nbsp, and become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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It’s fretting period once again in Japan. &nbsp, You see, Japan frets every four years when America chooses a fresh leader. &nbsp, ( Americans fret too, but that’s another story. )

Most observers believe the Japanese do like the Democratic candidate, Kamala Harris, over past president Donald Trump.

One primary purpose: &nbsp, Trump is “unpredictable” – even though you’d think that after four years of dealing with him, the Japanese had figured him out.

However, the fear Trump might ask Japan or, better said, its bureaucrats and foreign policy class to do something they do n’t want to do is unforeteable for Japan.

It should n’t come as a surprise that Tokyo may be asked to do a few things outside of its comfort zone given that the United States is responsible for protecting Japan, and certainly after 60 years of the US-Japan Alliance. &nbsp, And especially now that the threat from the People’s Republic of Chine ( PRC ), not to mention Beijing’s friends in Pyongyang and Moscow, is higher than ever.

Unregardless of who is in the White House, one of Japan’s various neuroses is the long-standing anxiety of” Japan passing”: the possibility that a new administration may strike a deal with the PRC that leaves Japan out in the cool. &nbsp, And there used to be worry of ‘ Japan bashing’ – blaming Japan for America’s deficiencies – though that is n’t heard so many these days.

And there’s the deep-rooted worry that America lacks full commitment to defend Japan. &nbsp, So the Japanese government’s regular emphasis on discussing “extended deterrence” – or in other words, America’s devotion to employ nuclear weapons to defend Japan –&nbsp, when top leaders meet.

Worry of Japan being turned down for more money for “host state help” for US troops in Japan is also on the list. &nbsp, This is Tokyo’s special care when it comes to Donald Trump. &nbsp,

But that’s also a diversion, if not absurd. &nbsp,

In the grand scheme of things, the sums he may ask for are bag change and if it helps keep the US military power on its part. &nbsp,

However, Japan might be willing to spend any funds requested for the Japan Self Defense Force ( JSDF) in order to enhance military personnel ‘ warfighting prowess, war stocks, and terms of service. &nbsp, JSDF missed recruitment targets by 50 % last year. &nbsp, Well, 50 %. &nbsp, And part of the reason is give and circumstances are bad.

May Japan be concerned about Trump?

No truly. &nbsp,

Take a look at what he accomplished during his first word. He also valued Japan, which was his best foreign policy group since the first Reagan administration.

What did he ask Japan to do that it would n’t have done in the first place, despite the worry that he was going to sabotage the US-Japan alliance and make unreasonable demands? &nbsp, Little significantly.

Regarding financial stress, what about appointing Japan to a business union boycott?

There was nothing to write home about.

Cynics might speculate that Shinzo Abe’s gifting Trump with an expensive sport vehicle and hitting the links with the president soothed points to the point where the US did n’t rely on as much as it may have, such as getting its military and culture in condition to fight a potential war. &nbsp,

Had Trump’s actions have been so disastrous?

Do n’t expect much to change much from Trump version 1 this time around.

As for Japan preferring a Harris administration– it, also, are four decades of factual data.

And perhaps a Harris version 2 is seen as a comfortable extension of the Biden administration, which has been characterized by the bonhomie of summit meetings declaring the bilateral relationship is stronger than ever and a series of scripted military exercises sending a message of bilateral commitment.

However, in the end, Japan was not actually asked to make any sort of demands.

And no economic fights are being fought, aside from Harris and Trump’s opposition to Nippon Steel’s plan to buy US Steel. &nbsp, As for that one, wait until the election is over and things might change.

But here’s something for Tokyo to consider when weighing the candidates: the new administration’s China policy.

And that really matters, given Beijing visceral intent to teach Japan a lesson.

Trump’s administration was the first to confront the PRC since Nixon visited China in 1972. &nbsp,

Beijing was backfooted. The Trump administration began to consider the PRC as a rival and was beginning to consider rebuilding the US military as well as developing alliances into warfighting alliances. Russia and North Korea’s ties to the PRC have grown to the point where Tokyo gets even more headaches.

The US military restoration? There was discussion in the Biden administration, but not enough was done.

And if Japan worries about the US commitment, consider this:

During the Biden administration, 250, 000 Americans died from fentanyl of Chinese origin.

The Biden administration’s response? &nbsp, Setting up a working group with the Chinese to discuss the problem.

If Washington simply ignores the mass murder, it will be simple to come up with an excuse not to defend Japan. &nbsp, After all, we ca n’t have nuclear war and World War Three. &nbsp, &nbsp,

The Americans will decide on their president. &nbsp,

Japan can only adjust accordingly.

No matter who prevails, Japan will do well to prepare for its own defenses, which will require much more than it has already done to date.

But the key is this: Would Tokyo prefer to have a government that Beijing dislikes? Or one that Beijing believes it can do business with ( and get its way )?

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