EU spending billions more on defense won’t do much for Ukraine – Asia Times

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On March 3, US President Donald Trump paused all US military aid to Ukraine. This move was apparently triggered by a heated change a few days before between Trump, Vice President JD Vance and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office.

In response, European Union leaders have now committed to rearm Europe by mobilizing €800 billion ( about US$ 867 billion ) in defense spending.

Of the EU leaders, 26 ( excluding Hungary ) signed an agreement that peace for Ukraine must be accompanied by “robust and credible” security guarantees.

They agreed there can be no discussions on Ukraine without Ukraine’s membership. It was also agreed the EU may continue to give regular defense and non-military aid to Ukraine.

At the same time, the United Kingdom has committed to the biggest increase in military saving since the Cold War.

The EU’s united front may produce powerful threats and hinder a direct assault on EU countries.

But, for Ukraine, it will not lead to a military victory in its war with Russia. While Europe has stepped up money, this is not enough for Ukraine to fight Soviet troops now occupying about 20 % of the country.

For Ukraine, the departure of US support did greatly tension the ability to keep fighting. Ukraine will probably want to find a way to freeze the issue this year. This may mean a temporary ceasefire that does not fully lose Russian country to Russia.

A Trumpian view

The greatly different methods of the US under Trump and the EU level to a deeper philosophical break.

While the Trump administration has acted more quickly and confidently in international politics than many expected, its view is hardly surprising.

Since Trump won the US presidential election in November last month, Europe and Ukraine have known that a change in US scheme would be on the cards.

Trump’s method to Ukraine is not only about financial issues and withdrawing US military support. It is about a deeper, more substantial clash of viewpoints.

Trump ( and, it appears, his core support base ) hold a “great power politics” approach to world affairs.

This technique assumes we live in a competitive world where states are motivated to maximise profits and dominate. Results can be achieved through sanctions or rewards.

Countries with greater military or financial power” matter” more. They are expected to establish their will on weaker locations. This stance underpinned much of the imperial action of the 19th and 20th centuries.

This view expects conflict – and it expects stronger nations to “win”.

Regular with Trump’s perspective, Russia is a local authority that has the “right” to command smaller states in its village.

Trump’s method to Ukraine is not an aberration. Nor is it a short-term and unexpected measure to get the worldwide spotlight.

Trump’s view leads to the logical and consistent assumption that Russia will seek to control nations within its sphere of influence.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine represented an attempt to impose its will on a militarily weaker state that it considered to be in its lawful area of control.

The EU option

Opposed to this view, the EU is founded on the idea that nations can work together for shared profits through cooperation and compromise. This method underpins the function of what are called the Bretton Woods Institutions created in the aftermath of World War II.

This view expects cooperation rather than conflict. Socially useful and collaborative solutions are found through dialogue and negotiation.

According to this view, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is about a conflict between the values of a democratic politics and those of an oppressive authoritarian regime.

Zelensky has himself constantly framed the issue as being about a fight of values: liberty and democracy than authoritarianism and manage.

A mix of both?

Since Trump’s subsequent opening, Western leaders have presented a united front, motivated by facing a planet where US military support cannot be guaranteed.

Nevertheless, there is inner division within Western countries. Recent years have seen a sharp increase in anti-EU attitude within EU member states. The UK’s return from the EU is an example of this trend.

EU officials recently followed a course of participation with Russia, with minimal success. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, France and Germany helped resolve the Minsk Agreements. These contracts, signed in 2014 and 2015, were designed to prevent further attacks by Russian-backed parties into Ukrainian sovereign place.

This did not prevent Russia’s full-scale war of Ukraine in 2022.

In an emerging new world order, management may involve going beyond the apparent contradiction of a concentrate on defense strength or assistance. Officials may need to combine both.

Jessica Genauer is a senior lecturer on foreign connections at Flinders University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Ukraine says it wants to negotiate ‘peace framework’ in Riyadh – Asia Times

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If the US and Russia want a bargain on Ukraine, Zelensky will need to engage. That is far from specific. The outcome could be that President Trump may not be able to communicate a Ukraine arrangement with Russia and the Ukraine war will continue.

The US and Ukraine may have their&nbsp, second meeting in Riyadh&nbsp, next week to consider and weed out a “peace framework”. If something appropriate and acceptable is agreed upon, therefore President Trump will have something he can get to the Russians. If nothing is accomplished, or the “peace model” is impossible, therefore Trump is left with an unoccupied handbag and would have trouble moving forward with the Russians on Ukraine.

In any bargaining the starting position is a starting point to a bargain. It is strange that one part may determine any arrangement.

What we know is that the US wants a bargain on Ukraine to end the war. Apparently the Russians reveal that stance, although evidently they want a&nbsp, fast deal&nbsp, or none at all.

The Russians may continue the war in Ukraine, taking advantage of the strengthening of Ukraine’s troops, the&nbsp, absence of supplies&nbsp, that may arrive from Europe, and the danger that the&nbsp, US army is depleted&nbsp, and limited.

A HIMARS during a coaching practice in Okinawa, Japan, in September 2021.

One of the more negative aspects for the US has arisen from the use of British entrance line weapons in Ukraine. Over time the Russians have learned how to&nbsp, intercept some US arms, such as HIMARS and ATACMS. Do they share what they learned with their Taiwanese and Egyptian peers? Possible.

There also is information that extremely sensitive information on HIMARS and other systems was &nbsp, sold to the Chinese by an active duty US Army sergeant&nbsp, ( himself of Chinese ethnicity ). We don’t understand in any detail what was contained in the stolen details, but apparently it was quite extensive as an overall Top Secret painful travel was stolen.

China, of course, is interested in HIMARS because the US Marines are positioning HIMARS on the&nbsp, area of Yonaguni, close to Taiwan, with the objective of interdicting any Taiwanese getting army attacking Taiwan. Also, Taiwan&nbsp, is starting to get HIMARS, although sales were delayed for some time ( a wrongdoing of considerable sizes given the growing threat of invasion from China ).

What this means is that the US faces a possible hostile China that can threaten Taiwan– perhaps even Japan, which houses important US Air Force and Navy bases. It should not be overlooked that Okinawa, which has US Marine and Air Force foundations, is Chinese territory.

US M142 HIMARS MRL and a US MC-130J plane. 2022. Latvia. Photo: Latvijas Armija

Zelensky has found it necessary ( thanks to the US hands supply closure ) to seem like he is advocating a peace model, but no doubt he will insist on Russia pulling most of its troops out of Ukraine. On top of that he did like security guarantees from the United States. He calls it a” safety relationship” with the United States.

The idea that the Minerals Agreement is a walk in for a security promise is, at best, a poor reed from Ukraine’s point of view. What the Ukrainians want is US boots on the ground, anything President Trump has, so far, ruled out.

Zelensky was promoting a meeting with President Trump that would include both himself, Keir Starmer from the UK and Emanuel Macron from France. Right now it seems Washington has vetoed for a meeting, preferring a leaders meeting in Riyadh without President Trump in enrollment.

That undermines the one piece of real utilize Zelensky has, which is to use Europe and NATO against the US. Yet, what he misses is that doing so has the perverse effect of taking a wrecking ball to NATO if the US finds itself profoundly estranged from its NATO allies. There are already critical mutterings as the Trump presidency tries to&nbsp, offload its NATO responsibilities&nbsp, on Europe.

In reality the only real advantage Zelensky has is to drop on and continue to oppose significant concessions to Russia. While he has played the Europeans pretty well, US opposition to supporting Ukraine and outcry on several ideas from the UK, France and, to a lesser degree from Germany, has not yielded anything so far useful to Ukraine’s position.

It would be amazing if there were a positive outcome in Riyadh. Washington has to be alert to the fact that Zelensky agrees to one thing, but often does the reverse. Having said that, President Trump needs a package he can put on the table with Russia. Those negotiations with Russia look stalled until the US can work out a deal with Zelensky.

Meanwhile Russia continues pressing Ukraine’s army, gaining ground. If Russia forces Ukraine’s army into surrendering, the game is over. Then it is Russia’s problem figuring out what to do with a hostile population and a wrecked infrastructure.

Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter&nbsp, Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.

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A little disturbance? – Asia Times

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Subscribe now&nbsp, with a one-month trial for only$ 1, then enjoy the first year at an exclusive rate of just$ 99.

A small disturbance?

David Goldman assesses the mounting challenges of a US economic downturn, with the Atlanta Fed forecasting a 2.85 % contraction in Q2 GDP. Trump’s suggested tariffs could further undermine the market, with estimates suggesting a 5 % rise in consumer prices if foreign producers pass on half the prices.

DeepSeek going global in China

Scott Foster analyzes the growing importance of DeepSeek, China’s open-source AI design. Now integrated into at least 20 state-owned enterprises spanning power, telecoms, financing, and design, DeepSeek is also being adopted for defense applications.

The conclusion of the European debt split and Europe’s military build-up

Diego Faßnacht analyzes a traditional change in Germany and the EU’s fiscal and defence policies, marked by extraordinary loan development and military spending. &nbsp, At the EU levels, Ursula von der Leyen’s ReArm Europe strategy proposes up to €800 billion in security investment.

How the US-Ukraine split boosts Russia’s place

James Davis explores the consequences from a devastating Oval Office conference between Trump and Zelensky. With Europe able to completely remove US support, Ukraine then faces a precarious proper place as Russia prepares for further increase.

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US-Russia detente would dent de-dollarization drive – Asia Times

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The&nbsp, three-year-long NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine&nbsp, contributed to the belief that the international community had bifurcated into the West and the&nbsp, World Majority, &nbsp, between, with the results the fight determining which tent will most profoundly shape the global structural change.

This model predisposed observers to think that BRICS, which possibly represents the World Majority, is constantly coordinating de-dollarization policies in order to detach themselves from the West’s economic clutches.

That belief persists to this day despite previous October’s BRICS Summit achieving&nbsp, everything of substantial significance&nbsp, at all, including on the de-dollarization entrance, and leading members like&nbsp, India and Russia&nbsp, immediately confirming in response to&nbsp, Trump’s tariff threats&nbsp, that they’re not creating a new currency.

As it turns out, even before Trump initiated the&nbsp, nascent&nbsp, Russian–US&nbsp,” New&nbsp, Detente“, the international community wasn’t as divided over the past three years as many multipolar enthusiasts thought.

Complex&nbsp, interdependencies&nbsp, kept most of the main players together, including Russia and the West, after Russia continued selling oil, gas, and critical minerals like uranium to the West in spite of their proxy war.

Similar interdependencies account for why Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar declared in mid-November that” India has never been for de-dollarization” and then reaffirmed this position last week when he said that” we have absolutely no interest in undermining the dollar at all“.

He also said,” I don’t think there is a unified BRICS position on]de-dollarization]. I think BRICS members, and now that we have more members, have very diverse positions on this matter. So, the suggestion or the assumption that somewhere there is a united BRICS position against the dollar, I think, is not borne out by facts”.

The reason why it’s important to draw attention to his latest words is because of the global context within which they were shared as regards the nascent Russian-US” New Détente”.

Putin ‘s&nbsp, recent invitation&nbsp, to American companies to cooperate with Russia on strategic resources, including energy in the&nbsp, Arctic&nbsp, and even rare earth minerals in Donbas, will lead to Russia using more dollars in international trade if anything comes of this.

That would in turn discredit the perception identified earlier in this analysis of Russia actively de-dollarizing, which Putin himself&nbsp, always said&nbsp, that it was forced by sanctions into doing and thus wouldn’t have ordinarily happened on its own.

A thaw in tensions brought about by the US brokering an end to their Ukraine proxy war in a way that meets most of Russia’s interests would therefore naturally see Russia using the dollar again.

To be sure, it’ll still support the creation of platforms like BRICS Bridge, BRICS Clear and BRICS Pay, but these would be aimed at preventing dependence on the dollar more so than advancing de-dollarization per se. The ruble will also continue to be used as Russia’s preferred currency in conducting international trade.

Nevertheless, any breakthrough in Russian-US relations would inevitably disappoint those multipolar enthusiasts who bought into ideologically dogmatic narratives of the&nbsp, New Cold War&nbsp, and consequently believed that Russia would persistently eschew the dollar on principle.

Those who previously criticized India’s pragmatic approach towards the currency, particularly Jaishankar’s comments from mid-November, would then eat crow if Russia ultimately ends up following India’s lead.

Even if Russia is just partially returned to the dollar’s global ecosystem through the lifting of US sanctions on the dollar’s use for facilitating the strategic resource deals that Putin has proposed, then it would likely result in the rest of BRICS moderating their de-dollarization policies as well, if they even had them.

China alone might continue making the most progress in this regard, but even it too has been hesitant to go all-out, also due to its complex interdependencies with the West, including its massive US Treasury holdings.

Russia, India and China’s diverse views towards the dollar show that de-dollarization was always more of a political slogan than a pecuniary imperative, one that only Russia made tangible progress on but only because it was forced to.

They collectively form RIC, the core of BRICS, so whatever they say or do will influence comparatively smaller countries in the bloc. There’s nothing wrong with that though, neither in general nor in this context.

Comparatively smaller countries can’t make major impacts on the global economic or financial systems on their own, and in this particular context, almost all of them with few exceptions still have close trading ties with the US that necessitate them remaining within the dollar’s global ecosystem.

They couldn’t realistically de-dollarize in the way that the most dogmatic ideologues imagined without immense cost to themselves or replacing their dependence on the US dollar with the Chinese yuan.

The most pragmatic approach has always been the one pioneered by India, whereby countries strive to use their national currencies more in trade while diversifying their foreign currency baskets in order to avert dependence on any single unit.

This enables them to strengthen their sovereignty in a meaningful and realistic way without risking the ire of major players by actively dropping their currency and/or actively adopting their rival’s. It’s this balance that will come to define financial multipolarity processes in the future.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Can China keep winning without fighting? – Asia Times

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China’s international rise under President Xi Jinping reflects Sun Tzu’s process of” subduing the army without fighting”.

Alternatively of direct military discord, China relies on socioeconomic, political and industrial influence. Through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI), economic coercion and cyber operations, China has reshaped the geopolitical landscape.

However, this method is facing rising weight. The United States and its allies have increased economic dispersion and military measures.

At the same time, China’s domestic challenges, including an economic downturn and socioeconomic drop, raise questions about whether this strategy remains responsible.

As conflicts rise in the Indo-Pacific and global energy swings continue, is China keep its fall without provoking the very problems it seeks to avoid?

Sun Tzu emphasized winning through plan, fraud and emotional battle rather than brute power. Xi has embraced these suggestions, using monetary dependencies and political moving to increase impact without direct clash.

Unlike his successors, who prioritized careful economic development, Xi has taken a more aggressive approach in asserting China’s supremacy on the planet level.

Military clash with the US would certainly be costly. War may disrupt trade and economic security, the two columns of China’s rise.

Alternatively, China uses direct means to undermine adversaries while at the same time presenting itself as a peaceful world energy. This determined strategy has allowed China to avoid provoking a strong military response to its movements while steadily advancing its political objectives.

Financial development via debts diplomacy

China’s BRI is key to this method. Large equipment opportunities in Asia, Africa and Europe have created financial relationships. While China presents these tasks as mutually beneficial, they usually leave reader places financially burdened.

One notable example is Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway (SGR ). China funded the SGR linking Mombasa and Nairobi, with intentions to expand to Uganda.

However, the task faces difficulties like stalled development and reduced consumption, raising concerns about its economic sustainability and Kenya’s debt load.

This style of loan politics grants China long-term effect over essential regions. Some nations accepting Chinese opportunities now find themselves caught between financial relief and social obligations.

While these tasks bring growth, they likewise strengthen China’s political reach, so ensuring that countries remain aligned with its passions.

At the same time, China has used industry as a tool against states that challenge its laws.

When Australia called for an inspection into Covid-19’s roots, China retaliated with tariffs on American wine, wheat and fuel. South Korea faced related treatment after deploying the THAAD missile defense system by restricting commerce and trade.

However, these techniques are not flawless. Australia properly redirected its export to other businesses, while South Korea strengthened its economic relations with the US and Europe. In contrast, many governments are now diversifying business partnerships to minimize reliance on China.

While economic force has worked in the past, its success is diminishing as more nations push back against Beijing’s pressure tactics.

At the same time, China is forcefully expanding its dominance in systems, especially in 5G, artificial knowledge and security.

Huawei’s global growth in 5G and other communications has given China a crucial edge in modern facilities. But it has also raised concerns over data security and espionage, resulting in bans and restrictions in many Western nations.

China also employs cyber warfare as a key part of its strategy. It has launched disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks against adversaries, especially in Taiwan. These operations aim to weaken enemy defences and control narratives without direct confrontation.

As technology becomes an increasingly powerful tool in global conflicts, China’s ability to manipulate digital landscapes will remain a crucial element of its strategy.

Diplomatic manipulation

China has placed officials in key positions within the United Nations, the World Health Organization and other global bodies.

By influencing international policies, China ensures that global governance aligns with its interests. This allows it to shape narratives, control regulatory frameworks and sideline opposition without resorting to force.

One of Beijing’s most significant diplomatic moves has been isolating Taiwan. China pressured several nations to sever ties with Taipei while increasing military provocations in the Taiwan Strait. The combination of diplomatic pressure and psychological warfare has made Taiwan’s international standing increasingly precarious.

The US was initially slow to respond to China’s economic and diplomatic expansion. However, in recent years, Washington has ramped up efforts to curb China’s influence. It has imposed tariffs, restricted Chinese technology companies and reinforced alliances in the Indo-Pacific.

Initiatives like the QUAD alliance and the AUKUS security pact signal a coordinated effort to contain China. The US has also increased military patrols in the South China Sea and provided arms to Taiwan. These measures indicate that Washington is no longer willing to let China expand unchecked.

Despite its successes, China faces mounting challenges. Economic growth is slowing, and an aging population threatens long-term stability.

Beijing’s real estate crisis and mounting debt add to its vulnerabilities. If China’s economic power weakens, its ability to sustain global influence may also decline.

Furthermore, China’s aggressive policies have alienated key trading partners. Countries that once saw China as an economic lifeline are now exploring alternatives.

The US dollar remains dominant in global finance, limiting China’s ability to reshape the economic order. As China grapples with internal and external pressures, maintaining its current strategy is becoming increasingly difficult.

Risk of military confrontation

China’s expansionist ambitions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait could provoke a military clash with the US. While China has so far avoided direct war, its increasing military presence and confrontational tactics are heightening tensions.

The US and its allies have repeatedly warned against unilateral actions in the region. If China oversteps, it risks a conflict that could derail its long-term ambitions.

China’s leadership understands these risks. However, rising nationalism, domestic pressures and trade tensions could push Beijing toward more aggressive moves.

If China miscalculates the response of the US and its allies, it could find itself embroiled in a conflict it is not prepared to fight.

China has successfully expanded its influence so far without engaging in direct warfare. Sun Tzu’s principle of winning without fighting remains a core pillar of its approach.

However, growing global resistance, economic instability and military risks threaten the long-term sustainability of this strategy. The US and its allies are increasingly countering China’s moves.

Trade diversification, military cooperation and technological restrictions are making it harder for China to operate unchallenged. Meanwhile, internal struggles ranging from a fast-aging population to an economic slowdown may further limit China’s ability to project power.

The coming years will determine whether China can continue expanding without triggering the conflicts it seeks to avoid. While it has demonstrated that war is not the only path to dominance, sustaining this approach in a shifting global order will be its greatest challenge yet.

Tang Meng Kit is a master’s student in international relations at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies ( RSIS ) in Singapore.

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Trump trade wars making stagflation great again – Asia Times

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The 2.8 % recession in US economic development that the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta is flagging for the first quarter is dreadful news for Asia and the wider world economy.

The Atlanta Fed’s projection clashes with hotter-than-expected prices in the country’s biggest market. That, at a time when Donald Trump seems keen on imposing ever-bigger levies on US allies&nbsp, and enemy everywhere, exacerbating prices challenges.

Trump’s obvious determination to make recessions great suddenly comes as Japan also faces an inflation-rising-while-growth-slows situation. The US following suit significantly ratchets up the margins for the global financial system.

” A industry war, by definition, is a downturn impact: Higher rates and lower income”, says Torsten Sløk, chief economist at Apollo Global Management.

Jeffrey Roach, chief analyst at LPL Financial, adds that, for then, tariff-induced prices amid slower growth may send the economy extremely tight to stagflation.”

Friday’s US career record for February is broadly expected to show the degree to which US development is experiencing a rapid brake.

” Data and activities in the coming year could turn these flashes of problem into a true fire,” says Anna Wong, an scientist at Bloomberg Economics.

This year, 10-year Chinese provides rose to 1.5 % for the first time since June 2009. This comes as borrowing fees from Germany to Australia wave, also, as governments raise governmental expenditures to fight development risks.

In Tokyo, officials including Deputy Bank of Japan Governor Shinichi Uchida suggest rising yields make it less likely the central bank will hike rates as assertively as markets expect.

Yet in China’s case, America’s flirtation with stagflation complicates the outlook for 2025. In particular, China’s ability to meet this year’s recently announced 5 % GDP growth target.

As January consumer inflation comes in hot, employers have added far fewer jobs. Unemployment claims were worse than expected this week. The staffing measures in the ISM manufacturing survey, meanwhile, showed a sizable jump in prices paid.

The US falling into a 1970s-like inflationary recession is the last thing Asia needs. Trump’s tariffs will inevitably boost inflation, while uncertainty over his tariff policies will further depress investment needed to hasten growth and increase productivity.

” Perhaps the biggest risk about tariffs is a self-fulfilling slowdown due to corporate paralysis,” says Savita Subramanian, a top Bank of America equities strategist.

Subramanian adds that BofA’s trade uncertainty tracker” continues to hit new records, eclipsing 2018. But earnings transcripts reveal far fewer negative versus we ‘ve-got-this-style tariff commentary, especially among importers with the benefit of experience.”

Dominique Dwor-Frecaut, chief US economist at advisory Macro Hive, says” Trumponomics has substantial upside, political and economic, but entails substantial implementation risks. For instance, supporting stronger wage gains risks igniting a wage-price feedback loop.”

Managing these risks, Dwor-Frecaut notes”, requires strong competition policy and a strong, independent central bank. Lower energy prices would mitigate these risks by engineering real wage growth with constant nominal wages. Deportations of illegal migrants could shrink the workforce, depress consumption and trigger stagflation if migrants do not work out of fear of deportation.”

Dwor-Frecaut adds that” maintaining a ‘ good enough’ equity market performance while shrinking profit income share would require a strong growth rate. Lower energy prices would also help maintain profits and equity performance outside of the energy sector.”

This puts US Fed Chairman Jerome Powell in quite a bind. Trump is demanding lower interest rates, even as his trade policies— and plans for another giant tax cut — militate against Fed easing.

The Fed’s” helicopter money “approach to supporting US consumption is no longer a workable growth strategy. With US inflation risks spooking world markets, demand for US Treasury securities is sure to take a hit.

This directly complicates Trump’s fiscal stimulus ambitions. It also could make it harder for Xi Jinping’s economy to grow at 5 %. That target, unveiled at this week’s annual National People’s Congress, is the same as 2024’s growth goal.

It’s a sign that China’s growth model isn’t getting the traction as previously. Trump’s 20 % tariff on mainland goods has Team Xi feeling greater urgency to pivot from a longstanding investment-led growth strategy to a consumption-driven one.

On the bright side, Chinese leaders looked quite confident at this week’s” Two Sessions “meeting. At the closely-watched annual event, China adopted a” moderately easy “monetary policy posture to boost consumption. That and hoped for gains in productivity from artificial intelligence, have Xi’s men exuding optimism about China’s 2025.

China, after all, has been battening the hatches to prepare for Trump’s trade war. Still, moves to build a bigger social safety net that incentivizes spending over saving have been slow.

Overcoming tariff risks and domestic headwinds may require more stimulus than markets expect. Earlier this week, Xi’s Communist Party unveiled plans to raise its fiscal deficit to” around 4 %” of GDP, China’s biggest since 2010.

The rare rise signals a material shift in Beijing’s stance toward the severity of risks zooming its way. It’s hard not to connect the dots between this increase from 3 % of GDP last year and Trump’s escalating trade war.

In October, Chinese Minister of Finance LanFo’an said Beijing’s latitude for a deficit increase is” rather large. ” A month later, China deployed a 10 trillion yuan ( US$ 1.4 trillion ) economic support package aimed largely at helping local governments overcome debt burdens.

China’s property crisis has imperiled a significant generator of revenue for local governments. Meanwhile, Xi’s government is expected to triple the quota for special sovereign bond sales to 3 trillion yuan ($ 410 billion ) this year.

Larry Hu, chief China economist at Macquarie Bank, thinks Beijing will boost the quota for special local government bond issuance to 4.5 trillion yuan ($ 621 billion ) from 3.9 trillion yuan.

The People’s Bank of China, the central bank, has scope to ease further amid weak pricing power in Asia’s biggest economy. Especially with China suffering from deflationary forces. Fears of” Japanification “abound as China lowers its inflation target to 2 % from 3 % in 2024.

Thus far, the PBOC has been slow to add liquidity out of fear that it might send the yuan tumbling. The central bank also wants to preserve the progress Beijing has made in deleveraging the financial system in recent years.

PBOC Governor&nbsp, Pan Gongsheng&nbsp, worries that cutting rates might incentivize bad lending and borrowing decisions. A weaker yuan might trigger defaults among property developers as they find it harder to make payments on offshore debt. Already, global investors are keeping close tabs on liquidity problems at property developer China Vanke.

Putting&nbsp, yuan internationalization&nbsp, in jeopardy is another concern. For nearly a decade now, Xi’s government has been working to increase the yuan’s use in trade and finance.

Beijing has recently stepped up cooperation with the BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa— and Global South nations to pivot away from the dollar-centric world order.

Reverting back to the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the past might alarm international funds and tarnish the yuan’s chances of securing reserve-currency status.

A weaker yuan might have Japan, South Korea and other top Asian economies believing they have a green light to drive down with their currencies to maintain export competitiveness.

That would not go unnoticed by Trump’s White House, which is now threatening the biggest trade war in world history. If the White House concludes Beijing is manipulating the yuan exchange rate, &nbsp, Trump might target China with even bigger tariffs on the scale of the 60 % he frequently threatened on last year’s election campaign trail.

Japan also has cause to fear. Corporate Japan is already reeling over hints of a 25 % import tax on all foreign-made automobiles.

” Fear of&nbsp, stagflation – due to Donald Trump’s tariffs and other policies– has caused a drop in US interest rates and, thus, a sharp narrowing of the gap” with Japan, says economist Richard Katz, author of” The Contest for Japan’s Economic Future.”

Friend or foe, all in Asia are starting to feel the pain of Trump’s” America First “tariffs.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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US eyes fighter drones to contain China’s surging air power – Asia Times

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The YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A autonomous warrior prototypes mark a tectonic shift in US air combat strategy, but cost overruns, production delays and commercial constraints threaten to shop America’s push for cheap mass to counter China’s rising defense force.

This month, Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine reported that US Air Force Chief of Staff General David Allvin unveiled the government’s breakthrough warrior robots at the AFA Warfare Symposium in Aurora, Colorado.

Developed by US defense contractors General Atomics and Anduril Industries, respectively, these Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA ) are part of the Air Force’s Next-Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD ) portfolio, marking a pivotal shift toward manned-unmanned teaming in aerial combat.

The YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A, designed to function as “loyal wingmen”, may follow crewed soldiers like the F-35, enhancing air supremacy at reduced prices and within small timeframes.

Employing prototype designation codes —” Y” for prototype,” F” for fighter, and” Q” for unmanned—the announcement underscores a strategic evolution toward integrating semi-autonomous aircraft into contested environments.

Anduril hailed the growth as a revolutionary step in atmosphere superiority, emphasizing value, mass production and increased capabilities. General Atomics echoed this, noting the YFQ-42A’s important role in expanding vision powers alongside current and future plane.

Allvin framed this innovation as necessary to modernization, offering the Trump administration’s Pentagon flexible options for addressing emerging world security challenges in an extremely dangerous and powerful era.

In framing US military imperatives to quicken CCA growth, Heather Penney mentions in an October 2022 record for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies that CCAs boost combat mass, creating a more attrition-tolerant force that enables riskier yet more significant operations.

Penney says that by teaming with piloted aircraft, CCA can serve as decoys, missile sinks or electronic warfare platforms to disrupt enemy targeting and extend the survivability of human pilots.

She adds that their autonomous features, such as AI-based threat detection and adaptable movements, improve operational agility in challenging contexts while compensating for the decline of human skills during extended combat since their performance relies on software enhancements instead of lengthy pilot training.

Such attritable, semi-autonomous mass may be critical in a near-peer adversary conflict in which the US may be seriously outnumbered.

In a March 2024 article for Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine, Daniel Rice mentions that China could produce 100 J-20 airframes a year, compared to the US F-22, which the US stopped production in 2011 at just 187 irreplaceable planes.

Rice says China has stepped up production of other fighter variants, producing 100 J-16s and 40 low-end J-10 fighters annually. He contrasts that with US F-35 production, pointing out that while the US produces 135 F-35s yearly, 60 to 70 planes are sold to allies.

While the development of unmanned fighters has led some, such as Elon Musk, to question the utility of manned fighters, AI in this area still faces significant hurdles.

In a December 2024 SOFREP article, Brigadier General Doug Wickert, commander of the 412th Test Wing, mentions that fully robotized warfare is still far off, saying it could be “centuries” before AI pilots replace humans.

Wickert says these systems are far from flawless, as shown by test flights revealing inconsistencies necessitating rigorous safety measures and fallbacks for human intervention. &nbsp,

Moreover, the US may be facing debates regarding the direction of its CCA program. In a December 2024 National Defense Magazine article, Andrew Hunter, the US Air Force’s acquisition chief, highlights trade-offs between cost and capability, emphasizing user engagement and thorough analysis.

Hunter says that affordability demands sacrificing certain features, while capability enhancements require accepting higher costs. He also mentions that sustainment costs promise reductions due to limited training needs and shorter operational lifespans, but achieving balance remains crucial for future force design and industrial competition.

Apart from AI limitations and debates regarding the direction of the US CCA program, cost-death spirals and constraints of the US defense industrial base may leave much to be desired in creating the affordable mass the program promises.

Gregory Allen and Isaac Goldston mention in an August 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) think tank that the CCA program faces two significant concerns: cost escalation and production delays.

Allen and Goldston point out that CCA’s projected unit price has soared from US$ 3 million under the Low-Cost Attritable Aircraft Technology (LCAAT ) program to$ 25–30 million. That, they note is still 10 times cheaper than the NGAD.

They also say that while the CCA program aims for 1, 000 units, only 100 units are expected for delivery by 2029, which is far behind the urgent timeline suggested by intelligence assessments warning of a possible Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan by 2027.

In line with rising costs, The War Zone ( TWZ ) reported in January 2025 that cost concerns loom over the second batch of CCAs, making them 20-30 % more expensive than the first.

While TWZ mentions that US Air Force officials have resisted the idea of acquiring “exquisite” stealthy unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV ) in favor of CCAs that could be acquired in more significant numbers, affordability questions loom over major projects such as the NGAD, Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) and B-21 Raider bomber fleet.

Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall mentioned that while the CCA should not be an exquisite platform, it is difficult to see how the US Air Force could afford any combination of NGADs, CCAs and stealthy tankers.

A September 2024 US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report outlines the US defense industry’s systemic challenges. The report notes that the US defense industrial base is a highly consolidated market, where a handful of large defense contractors dominate production, thus limiting competition and innovation.

The CRS report points out that supply chain vulnerabilities—exacerbated by reliance on foreign sources for critical materials and components —raise concerns about resilience, particularly when the US is involved in great power competition with China and Russia.

In addition, the report says workforce shortages in specialized fields, long production lead times and unpredictable procurement cycles contribute to inefficiencies. It adds that regulatory complexities and acquisition policies slow the integration of emerging technologies into defense systems.

Further, this month’s report by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute says that while China continues to outproduce the US, the US is stuck in a self-perpetuating cycle of budgetary and appropriations dysfunction, eroding its advantage.

However, the report stresses that while those challenges are significant, they are not immutable. &nbsp,

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Trump ideology looking a lot like 1960s China – Asia Times

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Despite&nbsp, regular GDP growth, low prices, low poverty, and record high investment costs, Americans told pollsters in 2024 that they were deeply unhappy with how Joe Biden had handled the US market. But they elected Donald Trump, who promised to lower costs for regular Americans, make a new age of US manufacturing and home purchase, and so on.

How is that working out? Also, the Atlanta Fed now projects that the US economy will shrink at an annualized rate of 2.8 % in the first quarter of Trump’s presidency:

Origin: &nbsp, Atlanta Fed

The estimates was good until it became apparent a few days ago that Trump’s levies on Canada and Mexico had really come into effect.

Now, this is just one estimates, the actual number might be less considerably bad. The Federal Reserve’s Beige Book, a review of current financial signals, suggests that progress will&nbsp, shop out but never go bad. But it’s very clear that tariffs are the driving force behind the slowdown.

I mean…what else could it be? Bloomberg&nbsp, cites&nbsp,” Elon Musk’s cuts to the federal workforce, the clampdown on immigration, and a potential drag on business investment amid so much policy uncertainty”.

But while I’m worried that Elon’s ideological purge of the civil service will damage America’s state capacity, the amount of government spending that DOGE has cut so far is&nbsp, incredibly small, in fact, government spending has actually&nbsp, gone&nbsp, up&nbsp, slightly&nbsp, since Trump took office.

And the Atlanta Fed’s forecast for private-sector GDP in the first quarter &nbsp, fell by substantially more&nbsp, than its forecast for total GDP, government spending is actually propping up the economy, while businesses suffer.

Nor is it likely that the immigration clampdown is having much of an effect. Curbing immigration&nbsp, does have a small negative effect&nbsp, on GDP, but it takes a while to manifest, it’s unlikely that American businesses were dependent on harnessing the asylum seekers pouring over the southern border.

Policy uncertainty is almost certainly a huge factor. Uncertainty is now greater than at any point in recent American history except for the early pandemic — even higher than at the height of the 2008 financial crisis:

Source: EPU

Alex Tabarrok has &nbsp, a great post about this. What we’re seeing not just uncertainty about specific policies, but about America’s whole policy approach ( or “regime” ) going forward. That sort of radical uncertainty bites a lot harder. As a business, how the heck are you supposed to make long-term investment plans when you don’t even know what America’s basic approach to economic policy is going to look like in six months?

Policy uncertainty could be partially about DOGE, or the effects of Trump’s Ukraine betrayal on defense exports, etc. But every business that’s pulling back their investment plans is just&nbsp, screaming tariffs, tariffs, tariffs:

It’s no coincidence that American manufacturers are the ones yelling the loudest about tariffs. They’re the ones who most stand to be hurt. Tariffs on imported materials and components&nbsp, hurt American manufacturers more than they help, because they raise costs by more than they raise domestic demand for manufactured products.

This is exactly&nbsp, what’s happening right now:

US factory activity last month edged closer to stagnation as orders and employment contracted, while a gauge of prices paid for materials surged to the highest since June 2022 as tariff concerns mounted.

The Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing index slipped by 0.6 point in February to 50.3, according to data released Monday. Readings above 50 indicate growth. The group’s price measure increased 7.5 points to 62.4.

It’s just input prices, input prices, input prices:

Source: Bloomberg

And small businesses — a reliable GOP constituency — are &nbsp, going to get hurt the worst. They’re heavily reliant on imported inputs:

Source: Bloomberg

Anguished complaints&nbsp, from small businesses dependent on imported inputs are pouring in to newspapers across the country.

You can tell tariffs are going to hurt private business, because they’re crushing the stock market. As of this writing, the S&amp, P 500 has fallen 6 % over the past month:

Other stock market indices are doing just as badly or worse. The NASDAQ is&nbsp, down 8 %. American stocks are &nbsp, badly underperforming&nbsp, their European counterparts.

In fact, there ‘s&nbsp, a fun video&nbsp, where you can see the market tank in real time as Trump makes it clear that his tariffs are going into effect:

Trump&nbsp, blamed “globalists” &nbsp, for the stock price decline.

It’s not just business investment that’s suffering, either. Every component of economic activity is taking a hit from tariffs:

Source: &nbsp, Atlanta Fed

Private consumption is stagnating or falling, as you’d expect from tariffs&nbsp, making consumption more expensive&nbsp, — the Wall Street Journal has &nbsp, a good rundown&nbsp, of just a few of the things that are going to get more expensive for regular Americans ( gasoline, food, electricity, home goods ). Residential investment is stagnating or falling, because building houses requires imported inputs too.

Exports are stagnating or falling, because tariffs&nbsp, make the US dollar less competitive, and because Canada, Mexico, Europe, and China are bound to retaliate. After all, the countries that Trump is putting tariffs on are the same countries that buy the most U. S. exports:

Source: OEC

Anyway, this is all very basic economics. Tariffs are taxes. They create&nbsp, deadweight losses. Tariffs make a country’s exchange rate&nbsp, less competitive. &nbsp, Targeted tariffs against a few strategic products are &nbsp, usually not very harmful, but broad tariffs just clobber a modern economy. Never say economists didn’t warn you.

When it first became apparent that tariffs were tanking the market, Trump’s online defenders launched into a blizzard of incoherent rationalizations. Here ‘s&nbsp, just one example:

This is, of course, total nonsense. A recession lowers GDP ( and thus reduces tax revenue ) without lowering debt, making debt&nbsp, harder&nbsp, to pay off. Interest rates might go down if this were a&nbsp, demand-induced&nbsp, recession, like the Volcker recessions of the early 1980s — but a tariff recession would be a&nbsp, supply-induced&nbsp, recession, more similar to the oil shocks of the 1970s that made imports more expensive.

That will tend to create&nbsp, stagflation, forcing interest rates higher and making the debt harder to pay off. 1&nbsp, As for investment in the U. S., it will be hurt by policy uncertainty, lower consumption, and more expensive inputs.

Some Trump apparatchiks &nbsp, tried to claim&nbsp, that the data showing a good economy before Trump were fake. In fact, I do expect the administration to try to&nbsp, gut the federal agencies&nbsp, that produce America’s economic statistics, in an attempt to hide bad data from the public. ( Record grain harvests, comrade! )

But this will backfire, people know when their businesses fail, when prices at the grocery store and the gas station go up, when they&nbsp, get laid off, and when the value of their stock portfolios go down. The only thing that monkeying with the official statistics will do is to make Trump and his people less able to respond to what’s actually going on in the economy.

When it became clear that none of these hastily invented excuses were going to fly, Trump’s supporters started telling Americans that they were just going to have to endure some economic pain. Manu Raju&nbsp, reports:

Some Rs acknowledge that there could be higher prices with Trump’s Mexico and Canada tariffs but believe their constituents would be willing to stomach that to back Trump’s policies…Sen. Markwayne Mullin told me” of course” he’s worried tariffs could impact his state but argued that his constituents are willing to “do what it takes” to support the president’s policy …” Are the American people ready to get the country back on track and do what it takes to make that happen? Absolutely … It’s going to affect a lot of companies. We’re going to have to adjust some prices for it, but the president is tired of people taking advantage of our country” .…Asked if his constituents are ready to pay higher prices, Mullin said:” I think our constituents are going to do what it takes to get America back on track. We’re tired of countries taking advantage of us” .…Rep. Mark Alford of Missouri told me he thinks tariffs are “going to have an impact”, particularly on farmers…. Asked if he thinks his constituents feel the same way about shouldering some of the costs, Alford said:” I think so”.

Some touted&nbsp, the jobs making T-shirts and shoes&nbsp, that Americans could look forward to getting. Others proclaimed that&nbsp, stock declines were good, because they’d allow younger Americans to buy into the market more cheaply. None of these were particularly appealing prospects to&nbsp, Trump supporters in the business community, who already own stocks, and who are probably not that enthused about getting a job in an American sweatshop.

In one darkly hilarious moment, Trump’s Secretary of Agriculture told Americans to deal with sky-high egg prices by&nbsp, raising chickens in their back yard:

How did we go from” Make America Great Again” to” Everyone needs to become a backyard chicken farmer”? Did&nbsp, Mao Zedong&nbsp, rise from the dead and take over the U. S. A. while I wasn’t looking?

In fact, I&nbsp, do &nbsp, think something a little like that is happening. Unless Trump is being paid by America’s enemies to destroy the country’s economy— something I think is pretty unlikely — what we’re looking at here is an&nbsp, ideological project. Like Mao did in China in the 1960s, Trump is taking a baseball bat to the US economy in order to follow his deeply held ideological beliefs.

But which ideology? I wrote that&nbsp, DOGE is an ideological project, but that’s all about anti-wokeness. Trump’s ideology isn’t the same as Elon’s, he isn’t raising tariffs in order to get rid of DEI or kick trans people off of women’s sports teams. Although his motives are always a bit murky, my best guess is that this is about a different ideology. This is about&nbsp, economic self-reliance.

Many types of ideological regimes emphasize a desire for self-sufficiency. North Korea has &nbsp, juche. Stalin had&nbsp, the Iron Curtain. Juan Peron had&nbsp, Peronism&nbsp, in Argentina. Franco had his&nbsp, autarky policy. China ‘s&nbsp, Ming Dynasty&nbsp, and the&nbsp, Tokugawa shoguns&nbsp, of Japan had closed-country policies. Even Xi Jinping has emphasized&nbsp, economic self-reliance&nbsp, over rapid growth.

Trump ultimately isn’t much different. His inherent suspicion of other countries makes him want to be less dependent on them. To Trump, this goal is much more important than Americans ‘ prosperity. It’s more important than manufacturing strength or the fate of the working class. It’s a political goal whose value to Trump can’t be measured in dollars or jobs or production numbers.

This is American juche. Our own Iron Curtain. America won the Cold War, then we looked at the country that lost and decided to be more like them.

Anyway, I waited two days to write this post, because I suspected that Trump’s commitment to his policy wouldn’t be absolute, and there might be some hasty walkbacks — as there were&nbsp, a month ago.

In fact, I was partially right — Trump has now&nbsp, delayed the tariffs on Mexico&nbsp, for another month, and will also delay some tariffs that impact&nbsp, the auto industry &nbsp, specifically. ( Update: Trump has now&nbsp, paused tariffs on Canada&nbsp, too. ) Naturally, the same apparatchiks who cheered the tariffs a couple of days ago are now cheering the delay, praising Trump for the” art of the deal”.

But the more Trump uses these kind of last-minute delays and special exemptions, the less relief they’re going to create among the business community and among investors. It’s now clear that Trump’s tariffs were never a bluff, that he really means to enact as many of them as he can, and that his delaying tactics are just a way to ease America into the pain of being a poorer, more economically isolated country.

It’s only going to get worse. And the uncertainty of exactly when and whom the tariffs are going to bite simply adds to the overall climate of fear and uncertainty.

America voted for a guy they thought would deregulate the economy and fix inflation — a modern-day Reagan. Instead they got a dime-store Mao, who would be happy to impoverish his nation just to see it be less reliant on the rest of the world. I think a little buyer’s remorse is in order.

Notes:

1 Actually, &nbsp, there is a theory&nbsp, that the anticipation of future supply shocks causes negative demand shocks today, in which case inflation could temporarily go down.

This article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack under a different headline and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Elon Musk thinks the US should leave the UN – what if Trump does it? – Asia Times

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When Donald Trump’s patron and cost-cutter-in-chief Elon Musk just supported a phone for the United States to leave NATO and the United Nations, it may perhaps have been more astonishing.

But the first month of the following Trump administration have already seen important parts of the current global order undermined. Musk’s place fits a standard pattern.

Aside from the bend towards a unipolar world order, the US today refuses to acknowledge the International Criminal Court, has slashed its international aid efforts, and has withdrawn from the World Health Organization, the UN Human Rights Council and the Arab relief organization UNRWA.

With Trump’s local politicians displaying a distinct authoritarian border, the dismissal of the foundation principles and ideals of the UN comes into sharper relief. The hateful and anxious negotiating view he displayed with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky even belies a disrespect for joint and consensus-based politics.

The push to slice the federal deficit dovetails with this basic abandonment of costly international agreements. If the Trump government follows through on its obvious method of manufacturing crises to expand its agenda, finally leaving the UN fully is a logical next step.

Compromised aspirations

This is all in striking contrast to the main part the UN has traditionally played within the US-led global attempt since 1945.

Along with other organisations, the UN allowed the US to shape the global system in its own photograph and spread its home values and interests across the world. Along with NATO, the UN was designed as a global security institution to produce global stability.

In theory at least, the political and economic values of the US and other democracies enabled the construction of the postwar order. According to political scientist John Ikenberry, this was based on “multilateralism, alliance partnerships, strategic restraint, cooperative security and institutional and rule-based relationships”.

But by the 21st century, US actions had undermined many of these principles. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 bypassed the authority of the UN, causing then secretary-general Kofi Annan to declare that “from the charter point of view]the invasion ] was illegal”.

This undermined the legitimacy of the UN and America’s place within it. But it also diminished the organization as a force for maintaining international security and national sovereignty in global affairs.

The subsequent human rights violations by the US through its use of rendition, torture and detention at facilities such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib further weakened the UN’s credibility as a protector of liberal international values.

The US has also been a regular non-payer of UN fees, owing US$ 2.8 billion in early 2025. And it is one of the lowest contribtuors of military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, despite paying nearly 27 % of the overall budget.

US versus UN

Since the 1990s, several Republican politicians have argued for the US to withdraw entirely from the UN. In 1997, senator Ron Paul introduced the American Sovereignty Restoration Act, aimed at ending UN membership, expelling the UN headquarters from New York and ending US funding.

Although it received minimal support and never reached committee hearings, Paul reintroduced the act in every congressional session until his 2011 retirement. It was then taken up by other Republicans, including Paul Broun and Mike Rogers.

In December 2023, senator Mike Lee and representative Chip Roy led the introduction of the” Disengaging Entirely from the United Nations Debacle ( DEFUND ) Act”.

Roy referenced the perceived negative treatment of Israel, the promotion of China,” the propagation of climate hysteria” and the US$ 12.5 billion in annual payments. Lee added:

Americans ‘ hard-earned dollars have been funnelled into initiatives that fly in the face of our values – enabling tyrants, betraying allies and spreading bigotry.

Public polling in 2024 also showed only 52 % of Americans had a favorable view of the UN. This opposition has deeper historical roots, too.

In 1920, US isolationists blocked the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, and with it US participation in the League of Nations ( the predecessor to the United Nations ). Although the US would interact with the League of Nations until the UN’s formation in 1945, it never became an official member.

Criticism of the UN also has a bipartisan angle, with the US withdrawing funding of UNRWA in 2024 during Joe Biden’s presidency after Israel accused the agency of links to Hamas.

A diminished UN

If Trump harnesses these historical and modern forces to pull the US out of the UN, it would fundamentally – and likely irrevocably – undermine what has been a central pillar of the current international order.

It would also increase US isolationism, reduce Western influence, and legitimize alternative security bodies. These include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which the US could potentially join, especially given that Russia and India are both members.

More broadly, the reduced influence of the UN would endanger general peace and security in the international sphere, and the wider protection and promotion of human rights.

There would be greater unpredictability in global affairs, and the world would be a more dangerous place. For countries big and small, a UN without the US would force new strategic calculations and create new alliances and blocs, as the world leaps into the unknown.

Chris Ogden is an associate professor of global studies at the University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Africa responds to Trump 2.0-era new opportunities from China – Asia Times

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Since taking business, US president Donald Trump has implemented procedures that have been somewhat angry toward China. They include business limits. Most recently, a 20 % tax was added to all imports from China and innovative technological restrictions were imposed under the America First Investment Policy. This isn’t the first moment US-China conflicts have flared. Throughout history the marriage has been fraught with economic, military and philosophical problems.

China-Africa professor and analyst Lauren Johnston provides insight into how these dynamics may likewise design relations between Africa and China.

How has China responded to angry US plans?

First, China tends to have a stubborn standard answer. It expresses sorrow, next states that the US plan position is not beneficial to any region or the world economy.

Next, China makes moves internally to emphasize the interests of crucial, affected industries.

Third, China may sometimes impose punitive restrictions.

In 2018, for instance, China imposed a 25 % tariff on US soybeans, a critical animal feed source. The US Department of Agriculture had to account US grain farmers for their missing money.

Another case is how, following US tech restrictions, China took a more independent systems way. It has channeled billions into digital money. The goal is to create funding available for Chinese companies and to push modern restrictions in places of US punishment, such as semiconductors. These initiatives are backed up by incentives and tax cuts. In some cases, the Taiwanese state will engage directly in software companies.

More recently, China retaliated against the US business conflict by announcing levies on 80 US products. China is set to house 15 % levies on certain energy imports, including petroleum, natural gas and gas. An additional 10 % tariffs will be placed on 72 manufactured products including trucks, motor homes and agricultural machinery.

Agricultural industry has been difficult hit. The day the US announced a 10 % tariff on Chinese imports, China announced” an additional 15 % tariff on imported chicken, wheat, corn and cotton originating from the US”. Likewise,” maize, soybeans, pork, beef, underwater products, fruits, vegetables and dairy products may be subject to an additional 10 % tariff”.

How have these Foreign actions affected Africa?

We didn’t say for certain that China’s answer to US business tensions has directly affected its Africa plan, but there are some notable occurrences.

Less than one quarter after Trump’s returning to the White House in 2025, and shortly after the first tariffs were slapped on China’s export to the US, China announced new measures to develop China-Africa business work. The plan package aims to” develop economic and trade markets between China and Africa”.

This is the latest in a series of Chinese behavior.

In January 2018 trade conflicts began to rise after Trump imposed a first round of tariffs on all imported cleaning equipment and solar panels. These had an effect on China’s imports to the US.

Later the same year, China imposed 25 % tariffs on US soy bean imports and took steps to reduce dependence on US agricultural products. China furthermore took steps to increase business with Africa, agricultural industry in particular.

In September 2018, Beijing hosted the Forum on China and Africa Cooperation mountain, a triennial head of state meeting. It was announced that China had established up a China-Africa trade fair and develop deeper agricultural assistance. In the weeks after the conference, China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs was now acting on this. A meeting of American agricultural officials took position in Changsha, Hunan province.

Hunan province has after taken center stage in China-Africa relationships. It’s now the host of a permanent China-Africa trade exhibition hall and a larger biennial China-Africa economic and trade exhibition ( known as CAETE ).

Hunan also hosts the captain area for In-Depth China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation. The area has several initiatives designed to overcome obstacles to China-Africa trade and investment, like assistance in areas of technology and money, regulation and vocational training.

Eventually, the area is located in a bigger free-trade area that is much connected to Africa by air, water and land passageways. American agricultural exports to China go through Hunan, where local business either uses these goods or distributes them across the country to stores.

Companies in Hunan are well placed to play a key role in supporting China-Africa trade, capitalizing on the opportunities left by China-US hostilities.

Hunan’s agritech giant Longping High-Tech, for instance, is investing in Tanzanian soybean farmers.

Hunan is also home to China’s construction manufacturing and electronic transportation frontier. This includes global construction giant Sany, which produces heavy industry machinery for the construction, mining and energy sectors. China’s global electronic vehicle manufacturing BYD and its electronic railway industry are also in Hunan. They have deep and increasing interests in Africa and can also support China’s key minerals and tech race with the US.

As US-China hostility enters a new era, what are the implications for China-Africa relations?

As my new working paper sets out, African countries are, for example, responding to the new opportunities from China.

At the end of 2024, while the world waited for Trump’s second coming, various African countries made moves to strengthen economic ties with China, Hunan province especially.

In December 2024, Tanzania became the first African country to open an official investment promotion office in the China-Africa Cooperation Pilot Zone in Changaha.

In November 2024, both the China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo in Africa and the China Engineering Technology Exhibition were held in Abuja, Nigeria. Equivalent events were hosted in Kenya.

Early in 2025 in Niamey, Niger, a joint pilot cooperation zone was inaugurated. It is a direct partner of the China-Africa Pilot zone in Hunan.

As China moves away from US agricultural produce, for instance, African agricultural producers can benefit. Substitute African products and potential exports will enjoy a price boost, and elevated Chinese support.

China’s newly elevated interest in African development and market potential will bring major prospects. The question will be whether African countries are ready to grasp them, and to use that potential to foster an independent development path of their own.

Lauren Johnston is an associate professor in the China Studies Center, University of Sydney.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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