Visiting the world’s largest fusion reactor

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This is the second installment in Asia Times Science Editor Jonathan Tennenbaum’s series “Fusion Diary.” For an introduction to the series, readers are encouraged to start with “US abandoning its leadership in fusion energy,” by Matthew Moynihan and Alfred B Bortz. Then read part 1 of the series here. – eds

I am standing in the gallery of the control room of the Joint European Torus (JET) – the world’s largest tokamak reactor, situated in the Culham, England. Built as a cooperative project of European nations, JET has been operating for over 40 years, serving as a workhorse for international cooperation in plasma and fusion research.

In December 2021, JET achieved the latest world record for the amount of energy generated by fusion reactions under controlled conditions. During a 5 second pulse, JET produced 59 MJ of thermal energy from fusion of deuterium and tritium. Taking account of the amount of energy absorbed in heating the plasma to its 100 million degree temperature, JET came within a factor of 3 of reaching so-called scientific breakeven.

As I mentioned in the previous article there is now no reasonable doubt concerning the feasibility of generating large net energy outputs by fusion reactors of the tokamak type. A large portion of the credit goes to experiments on JET, which have produced a wealth of knowledge and experience in the course of four decades of operation.  

The JET launch countdown

I always wanted to see how a large tokamak fusion reactor is operated. With me on the gallery was JET Senior Exploitation Manager Fernanda Rimini, PhD (physics). She explained what was happening in the control room and kindly responded to my flood of questions.

JET operates in pulses (“shots”) up to about 10 seconds long. Each shot constitutes a separate experiment, and the operators generally change the parameters between shots. Typically one shot is run about every 30-40 minutes, to allow time not only to permit the reactor coils and other systems to cool down but also to analyze the data needed to make decisions about the next experiment. Sometimes the scientists ask for more time for thinking and discussion.

Each shot is preceded by a “countdown,” analogous to launching a rocket. JET is an extremely complex machine, particularly when we take account of the numerous auxiliary systems and diagnostic instruments attached to it. Not surprisingly, JET’s control room somewhat resembles the control center of a space mission.

Rimini pointed to a horseshoe-shaped central table, from which the machine is run by operators including a specialist in charge of the magnetic field coils that confine the plasma, another in charge of the vacuum systems, another in charge of the heating systems and so on. An engineer in charge oversees the whole process.

Around the desk are workstations for staff controlling diagnostic systems and monitoring the data output. Finally, a few scientists evaluate the results and make decisions about the next experiment.

The control room of the Joint European Torus (JET) fusion reactor. Photo: UK Atomic Energy Agency

Once a shot has been initiated, events inside the reactor unfold too rapidly for the human operators to intervene. Accordingly, the machine has real-time control systems that are programmed in advance. These systems steer the plasma by adjusting the currents in the magnetic coils, changing the parameters of the external heating systems and injecting tiny amounts of substances into the plasma.  

Rimini told me that the countdown to a shot lasts two minutes. First, you start all the subsystems and synchronize them. At the “zero” point of the countdown, the magnetic field coils are activated. It takes about 40 seconds for the coils to reach their full parameters. At that point gas is injected into the toroidal vacuum chamber.

What happens then? The current in the central solenoid is ramped down, and the change in magnetic field strength induces a powerful electric field inside the toroidal chamber, ripping the atoms apart into electrons and nuclei, transforming the gas into a plasma, and inducing an electric current of about 4 million amperes in the plasma. This current heats the plasma to ultra-high temperatures (so-called ohmic heating), while generating a powerful internal magnetic field.

The toroidal coils around the vacuum vessel create an additional magnetic field which, combined with the field generated by the central current, serves to confine the plasma and keep it away from walls of the reactor. The particles circulate in complicated helical trajectories. Poloidal coils, parallel to the torus, help to position the plasma inside the chamber. The auxiliary systems that use particle beams and electromagnetic waves to heat the plasma are turned on.

General scheme of coils, magnetic fields and induced plasma current in a tokamak. Graphic: Wikimedia

Controlling this whole process is a remarkable feat. Millions of amperes of current flow through the magnetic coils. During the experiment, the power consumption of the system reaches a peak of 1000 megawatts. Over half of the power comes from onsite generators that convert rotational energy, stored in the motion of two 750-ton flywheels, into a brief pulse of electric power.

Back in the control rooms, screens on the wall show measurements of the main plasma parameters. How dense is the plasma? How hot is the plasma? What is the current in the coils? How much power are we putting in from the heating systems? On the right side of the wall is a screen showing the evolution of the plasma itself, taken by fast video cameras. I was visiting just after a shot was completed and could see view a replay of the shot in slow motion.

Note, that the visible light is only a part of the electromagnetic radiation emitted by the plasma; the core region of the plasma can barely be seen here.

JET vacuum vessel. Image: Wikimedia

Breakthroughs in computer modeling

I wanted to know how well scientists have learned to control the hot plasma in JET and other tokamak reactors. Plasmas are extraordinarily complex physical systems displaying highly nonlinear behavior and a wide variety of instabilities, which can undermine the functioning of the reactor and even cause serious damage.

In the past, the shortcomings of existing mathematical models and limited computer power made it virtually impossible to simulate and predict the behavior of plasmas in tokamaks and other magnetic confinement fusion devices in a reliable fashion. Tokamak scientists learned, by decades of hard experience, how to avoid certain dangerous areas of instability.

The situation has improved radically. Superfast computers, machine learning and qualitative advances in methods of mathematical modeling of plasma processes now produce a degree of agreement between simulation and experiment that would have been unimaginable in the past.

Not least of all, the new computer codes provide the basis for real-time control of plasmas, steering them away from “bad behavior” and permitting maintenance of a desired steady state.

“There are no huge surprises,” Rimini said. “The models that we have represent the core plasma quite well.” Still, she said, “We need to understand more about what is happening at the edge of the plasma. Not because we don’t really know what happens, but because we are trying to [avoid] large perturbations and have nice little ones instead. And that’s where we are still very much in the research phase.”

The plasma ‘miracle‘

In fact, processes taking place at the “edge” of the plasma have decisive importance for the performance of tokamak reactors. How does it come about that a plasma in JET has an “edge”? One would naturally expect the density of plasma to drop off only gradually as you move out radially from the core region toward the walls of the reactor.

The answer lies in a self-organizing process, in which the plasma creates its own barrier region – the so-called “pedestal” – that prevents particles from diffusing outward, forming a relatively sharp edge layer around the plasma.

This phenomenon was discovered in 1982 by researchers working with the ASDEX experimental tokamak in Germany. It is connected with a specific plasma state (or regime), now called the “H-mode.” (“H” stands for “high confinement.”) Researchers have since learned how to “nudge” the plasma into this H-mode routinely.

In our discussion, Fernanda Rimini called the existence of the H-mode “a kind of miracle.” Operating tokamaks in this mode dramatically increases their ability to confine the plasma. Together with breakthroughs in computer modeling and the advent of high-temperature superconductors, experience with the H-mode is a major source of confidence that tokamak reactors can become economically viable sources of energy in the future.

As is usual in plasma physics, turbulence and instabilities occur – called “edge localized modes (ELMs)” – which can cause plasma to “leak out” into the surroundings. This is a huge topic in fusion today and one of the focal points of work on the JET. JET scientists have developed special diagnostic systems to study the edge and “pedestal” region of the plasma.

Interestingly, the strategy is not to suppress the ELMs completely but, rather, to control them in such a way that a small amount of plasma can move out of the bulk of the plasma into the so-called divertor region, where impurities and helium nuclei (the “ash”) produced by the fusion reactions are removed.

In this way one can keep the core plasma “clean.” Rimini remarked that we don’t want large perturbations, only “nice little ones”.

Yes, fusion does produce some radioactivity

Moving on, I raised the issue of radioactivity in connection with operation of fusion power plants.

The first generation of fusion power plants based on the tokamak design will almost certainly employ a mixture of deuterium (D) and tritium (T) as their fuel. While deuterium is a stable isotope, tritium is radioactive. Additional radioactivity arises through the absorption of neutrons, produced in the D-T reaction, by atoms in the materials in the proximity of the fusion plasma.

Fusion power plants based on D-T fuel will use significant amounts of tritium. The walls of the vacuum chamber, as well as adjacent components and materials, will be subjected for long periods to intensive neutron bombardment. Radioactivity becomes a significant issue – albeit nothing remotely comparable to the hazards posed by the long-lived radioactive isotopes produced in fission reactors.

The first issue concerns safe operation and especially the maintenance of a D-T fusion reactor. In this context, JET is providing useful experience, especially with regard to maintenance operations that have to be carried out the radioactive environment of the reactor.

JET was designed from the very beginning for all maintenance to be done by remote control. Dr. Rimini took me to see a full-scale industrial mockup of the JET reactor vessel, where I could see one of the two 12-meter-long, remotely-operated boom systems, which are introduced through entry ports during shut-down periods. The booms are articulated in such a way that they can reach all locations inside the toroidal vacuum chamber, through snake-like motions.

Readers can see an impressive video here.

Full-scale industrial mockup of JET vacuum chamber. Photo: UK Atomic Energy Authority

I could also view operators training on these systems. Their situation is a far cry from that of traditional mechanical “hot cell” manipulators where the operator stands just outside the cell, separated by a protective window.

In the case of JET (as in future fusion plants) the operators are situated far from the reactor, working with remote robotic arms and closed-circuit video. Most remarkable, this system provides haptic feedback – operators can “feel” objects they are handling. I saw an operator practice picking up a screw and screwing it into a hole.  

Full-scale industrial mockup of JET vacuum chamber. Photo: UK Atomic Energy Authority

Near the JET building, UKAEA has a separate facility called RACE (Remote Applications in Challenging Environments) devoted to the further development of robotic systems for various applications, including fully autonomous robots.

Most of the time JET has operated with deuterium alone, producing only a very small number of fusion reactions. But JET has twice operated for extended periods with D-T fuel. A third and final “campaign” of experiments, designated DTE3, is being prepared now. It will run for seven weeks.

Fernanda Rimini told me that the focus of DTE3 is not to go for a new record in fusion reactions, but rather to develop plasma science, materials science, and “neutronics.”

Lessons for the future of fusion power

The latter field, which deals with the effect of neutrons on various materials, has enormous importance for future tokamak power plants. Firstly, exposure to a heavy flux of neutrons degrades materials in the reactor, and frequent replacement can be a major cost factor. A second important issue for future reactors is the effect of neutron bombardment on the performance of the superconducting coils.

A third major issue, as I shall discuss below, is how to deal with the radioactivity produced by the absorption of neutrons by the reactor vessel and surrounding components.

A main aim of the 36 planned DTE3 experiments is to investigate the impact of neutrons on in-vessel materials, electronic components and data acquisition systems. In addition, it is essential to ascertain the amount of radioactive tritium absorbed by the walls of the vacuum vessel, and to develop improved methods for reducing the heat load on reactor components, especially the divertors.

According to the plan, JET will be decommissioned after the completion of DTE3. This process, to be carried out under the auspices of the UKAEA , will provide many valuable lessons and experience for the future large-scale application of fusion energy, as well as data relevant to estimating the complete life-cycle cost of fusion power plants.

The entire JET facility, including the reactor system with all its components and auxiliary facilities, will have to be taken apart or demolished. The resulting material  – a significant portion of which will be radioactive – must be safely disposed of and the site cleared.

Unlike nuclear fission, the D-T fusion reaction itself produces no radioactive waste; the reaction products are the stable element helium-4 plus a neutron. Nearly all the neutrons are absorbed into materials and the remaining “free” neutrons decay within a few minutes.

The “radioactive waste” from the fusion reactor consists of reactor materials that have become radioactive as a result of neutron absorption, plus a small amount of radioactive tritium (half-life 12.4 years) which has been absorbed into reactor materials in the course of operation.

Ideally, provided certain chemical elements can be avoided in the composition of the materials from which the reactor is built, future D-T fusion power plants will produce only low-level waste, which does not necessitate permanent underground deposition.

Fortunately, there is significant leeway in the choice of materials in the design of fusion reactors. But it may well prove to be impossible or impractical to avoid at least a small amount of intermediate-level waste, which will require long-term storage. A short overview of these issues by the UK Committee on Radioactive Waste Management can be found here.

As far as low-level fusion waste is concerned, a number of options are being explored including recycling for commercial use in the nuclear industry and other areas.

A big advantage of fusion waste is that it consists of relatively few radioactive elements, whereas fission generates a large number of isotopes scattered across the periodic table. On the other hand, large-scale use of fusion power plants will generate low-level waste in very substantial amounts. The reuse of materials and sites is thus an important consideration.  

In the case of JET, which will have operated with D-T fuel only for periods in the range of several weeks, the level of radioactivity will be much smaller than in future power plants. Nevertheless, practically all steps of the on-site decommissioning will have to be carried out by remote control and robotic systems.

That includes dismantling of the reactor and all its auxiliary equipment, processing for removal of absorbed tritium (detritiation), cutting and sorting, waste treatment and transfer of radioactive and non-radioactive materials into containers for storage and transport.

In 2022 the UKAEA launched a new program called the “JET Decommissioning and Repurposing (JDR) program.” JDR is already begun to solicit industrial partners.

I should remind the reader that the spherical tokamak design, which the UK Atomic Energy Authority has cleverly adopted as the mainstay of its magnetic confinement fusion program, differs greatly from JET as well as from the giant ITER reactor under construction. (ITER is in many ways a scale-up of JET.)

Nevertheless, the knowledge, experience and technology generated by the JET project have been an essential input to the UK program. I think it is fair to say that JET has been one of the most successful fusion experiments so far.

NEXT: The spherical tokamak story

Jonathan Tennenbaum, PhD (mathematics), is a former editor of FUSION magazine and has written on a wide variety of topics in science and technology, including several books on nuclear energy.

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US-Gulf reset in a shifting global order

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In an era marked by shifting global dynamics, the United States finds itself navigating the choppy waters of China’s ascendance and countering Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Against this backdrop, leaders in the Persian Gulf region and beyond are forging their own paths, with a pronounced emphasis on economic diplomacy, political de-escalation, and diverse strategic alignments.

The invitation by the BRICS grouping in late August to integrate six new members into the bloc underlines the challenges confronting the US in adapting to these changes, particularly in the Middle East.

Though some countries have yet to respond to the invitation formally, it’s likely that all – the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Argentina – will join Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa as BRICS members in January. 

Most of the realignments in the Middle East and the Gulf are rooted in the region’s quest for foreign-policy diversification. This urge can be traced to the rise of Asian economies two decades ago, and more significantly, to the American “pivot to Asia” during the administration of president Barack Obama.

The growing perception that the US is distancing itself or wavering in its commitment as the region’s primary security anchor has ignited a search for new policy frameworks.

As the Gulf region experiences rapid economic growth, national policies are diverging from American interests, even as both regions maintain carefully measured alignments in security matters.

While the sudden and chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2020 played a crucial role in pushing Middle Eastern countries to look beyond Washington, at least three other US-led actions have shaped the region’s new outlook. 

Diversion from US policy

First, many Gulf and Middle Eastern states were reluctant to support the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, concerned that it would fuel Iran’s regional expansion in a post-Saddam Baghdad. True to those fears, the following years of instability allowed the rise of Tehran-supported militias and parties in Iraq that often became hostile to the Arab Gulf states. 

Second, while some in the region advised against Washington backing the removal of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in 2011, their concerns went unheeded. The Middle East has grappled with the ramifications of extreme Islamic politics ever since.

Finally, despite regional opposition to the nuclear deal with Iran, the US signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. Its subsequent reversal – and a yet-to-be-completed revision of the reversal – have further muddled perceptions of the United States’ intentions in the region. 

These events undermined American credibility. As a result, regional players took matters into their own hands in Yemen, which further strained their relationship with Washington. Most recently, Houthi drone attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE between 2019 and 2022 further tested the region’s US partnership. 

It is yet to be seen to what extent the fighting between Israel and Hamas will further affect the US position in the Middle East, particularly if there is an escalation drawing in Iran’s other proxy militias in the region.

After spending $8 trillion in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the “war on terror,” the US has now spent some $75 billion to help Ukraine counter Russian aggression, with promises of additional support. Much of the Middle East, which has sought to remain neutral on Ukraine, is biding its time and looking to maximize the benefits that a global realignment could have for middle powers.

Trade diversification

China, meanwhile, has been quietly capitalizing on economic opportunities in the Middle East.

Supported by partnerships in energy, trade, technology, and investment, China’s dealings with the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries reached US$233 billion in 2021, a significant increase from $134 billion a decade earlier. In comparison, US trade with the GCC was estimated at about $60 billion in 2019, down from about $100 billion in 2011.

The energy and trade volume between GCC states and their Asian counterparts – including India, South Korea, Japan, and the Southeast Asian group – significantly outweigh their dealings with the US. This relationship between leading oil producers and consumers in Asia has influenced the GCC’s foreign policy and security strategies.

Trade isn’t the only indicator alliances are shifting. The region’s strategic perspective also diverges from that of Washington. While defense and security ties with the West remain crucial, endeavors this year to mend relations with regional adversaries, such as Iran, signal a shift in focus toward prioritizing economic diplomacy. This evolved approach speaks to the region’s enhanced strategic autonomy.

Many countries in the Middle East now boast stronger economies and more robust military capabilities than in the past. While the region is far from being fully self-sufficient, it’s gradually diversifying its partnerships – and doing so on its own terms. The more Washington acknowledges this move toward strategic self-determination, the better it will align with the region’s aspirations and priorities.

At its core, the Arab Gulf region endeavors to be a realm where cooperation trumps confrontation. This spirit resonates in leaders’ preference for dialogue, diplomacy, and diversified alignments over militaristic interventions and proxy politics.

The heterogeneity of strategies within the GCC underscores the necessity for the US to recalibrate its approach. The road to rejuvenating the US-Gulf-Middle East partnership demands a nuanced understanding of the region’s worldview.

The Middle East, and particularly the GCC bloc, is not monolithic. Individual countries adopt varied strategies anchored in their unique interpretation of strategic independence.

Grasping the Middle East’s perception of global affairs, expanding initiatives like the Abraham Accords, endorsing niche collaboration frameworks such as the I2U2 (India, Israel, the UAE and the US), and broadening alliances by incorporating such as South Korea, Singapore and Japan could be initial steps in rejuvenating the region’s ties with Washington.

 As the Gulf nations chart new courses in a shifting geopolitical landscape, it’s imperative for US policymakers to recalibrate their strategies in kind.

This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.

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Major powers wary of being drawn into confrontation

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Quantitative and qualitative polarization trends David Woo and David Goldman take stock of polarization trends across economic, market, and political arenas, including Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, signs of de-escalating tensions between the United States and China, and the Ukrainian military’s manpower challenges. Military conflict risks: Regional war risk recedes David Woo analyses the results of the RIWI-Unbound Military […]

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Revived Russia-N Korea alliance heralds new Cold War

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Isolated from the international community and in urgent need of weapons and ammunition to continue its fight in Ukraine, Russia has chosen to double down on its alliance with North Korea.

Although Moscow and Pyongyang have been allies for decades, recent developments point to deepening military cooperation, which may prolong the war in Ukraine and increase provocations on the Korean peninsula.

Russia reaffirmed its intentions on October 26, when the Kremlin pledged to “continue to develop close relations in all areas” with Pyongyang. Similarly, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui warned on October 28 that North Korea’s relations with Russia will act as a “powerful strategic” element if security in the region is endangered as a result of US-led trilateral military alliance with South Korea and Japan.

The deepening of the North Korea–Russia alliance took off in July of this year when North Korean leader Kim Jong Un welcomed a Russian delegation to Pyongyang, headed by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, to mark celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice Agreement.

The visit marked the first time North Korea had welcomed a foreign delegation since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. Shoigu reportedly proposed trilateral naval exercises involving China and North Korea – a move that highlights just how far Moscow is willing to go to deepen cooperation with Pyongyang.

Although North Korea has yet to commit to such joint drills, Kim Jong Un expressed his interest in deepening ties with Moscow in a highly public manner by making a personal visit to Russia on September 12. The timing of the trip was bold, given recent moves by the United States to strengthen trilateral deterrence efforts against the North with South Korea and Japan.

The United States also has been accusing North Korea of supplying arms to Russia for its war in Ukraine and threatened serious consequences if Kim strikes an arms deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin. But the North Korean and Russian leaders seem undeterred.

Putin expressed his intention to help North Korea build satellites and develop its space program. He also aims to discuss further cooperation on a broad range of topics with Kim Jong Un. Although no official agreement was made public, the two leaders likely concluded a win-win deal.

The fruits of the summit seem to be materializing already. An October report indicated “a dramatic and unprecedented level of freight railcar traffic” at North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility on the North Korea-Russia border. According to the report, “the dramatic increase in rail traffic likely indicates North Korea’s supply of arms and munitions to Russia.”

Claimed Noth Korean solid-fuel missile launch. Photo: Yonhap

In exchange for the weapons, Russia may offer advanced military technology to help North Korea develop and expand its military capabilities.

For example, technology for the refinement of solid-fuel missiles and nuclear-powered submarines could be included in a list of North Korean requests. Ordinary North Koreans are also hoping to receive food aid from Russia.

Besides the material goods Kim may receive from Putin, the North Korean leader’s visit to Russia also served to show the world that the hermit kingdom is not as isolated as many may think. North Korea is part of its own trilateral bloc including Russia and China in opposition to the US–South Korea–Japan trilateral alliance.

The deepening ties with Moscow also serve Pyongyang’s interests in reducing its overwhelming dependence on China for aid and trade.

China is in a tricky position as it seeks to maintain North Korea as a buffer state to counter the United States while also wanting to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula and prevent the escalation of tensions. To this end, North Korea’s denuclearization would also be in Beijing’s interests as, arguably, it would call into question the need for US troops to remain in South Korea.

China faces a challenging balancing act. Russia providing North Korea with advanced military technologies would result in a more dangerous weapons program. This would likely lead to greater tensions close to China’s border. But North Korean support for Russia in Ukraine could prevent Moscow from suffering utter defeat, which would serve China’s interests by containing US power.

Given China’s strong influence, North Korea and Russia are unlikely to engage in actions that would directly hurt Chinese interests. Both North Korea and Russia will likely maintain close communication with China over the course of their deepening bilateral ties. Days after Kim left Russia, Putin hosted China’s top diplomat Wang Yi.

Putin also visited China on October 17. The news coincides with the Kremlin’s call for closer policy coordination between Moscow and Beijing to counter Western aims at the”‘double containment of Russia and China.”

With Russia, China and North Korea united against a US-led world order, Cold War-era blocs are becoming increasingly solidified. The revival of these blocs is raising tensions across continents from Europe to Asia.

Gabriela Bernal is a PhD candidate at the University of North Korean Studies, Seoul.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum. It is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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How AUKUS Plus could reshape the Indo-Pacific

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The idea of “AUKUS Plus” has re-emerged after the UK Foreign Affairs Committee issued a 2023 report saying the United Kingdom should extend cooperation “to partners such as Japan and South Korea” as part of AUKUS “Strand B” – or “Pillar Two.”

This strand focuses on military technology cooperation with close allies on cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, quantum and undersea innovations, hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, electronic warfare capabilities and further information sharing.

While “Pillar One” – which is concerned with nuclear-powered submarine building – remains exclusive to AUKUS’ core of Australia, United Kingdom and the United States, the possibility of Pillar Two cooperation has opened public discussion about partnership enlargement. Neither such cooperation nor enlargement will materialize anytime soon unless there is an abrupt shift in the Indo-Pacific’s balance of power.

Still, the United Kingdom’s statement illustrates the evolution of its Indo-Pacific strategy “Tilt.” Tilt indicates the United Kingdom’s renewed commitment to the Indo-Pacific, and its aim to garner regional support for UK involvement and to shape a regional balance of power in its favor. More importantly, this move plays a role in shaping the direction of regional coalition-building efforts.

The United Kingdom understands that the possibility of AUKUS membership expansion is still in its initial stages, with the report recommending that the UK government “[propose]” the idea to the United States and Australia. There are challenges to overcome before the proposal is considered seriously among the core three.

There is yet to be consensus about the expansion. Australia, the initiator of the security coalition, has previously alluded to membership expansion in Pillar Two, but eventually dismissed the idea. Former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison stated in March 2023 that the inclusion of Japan would be “premature” and that AUKUS should prioritize institutional consolidation.

For his part, US National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell touched on the idea of including other countries in Pillar Two of AUKUS. Yet he remained ambiguous about timing and stated that it should be done under the condition that a potential member shows a substantive contribution to AUKUS.

It is still not clear whether AUKUS is the best platform to expand cooperation with Japan, South Korea and others. The United States, Japan and South Korea have gained political momentum and further strengthened their trilateral cooperation, as illustrated in the 2023 joint statement “The Spirit of Camp David.” Their strategic cooperation now includes supply chain resilience, artificial intelligence and quantum computing — which resonates with Pillar Two of AUKUS.

Given the existence of these platforms, there is no real urgency for AUKUS and the US–Japan–South Korea trilateral cooperation to converge. For now, the United States is well-positioned to become a hub to coordinate the two trilateral frameworks and guide them toward future cooperation.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on a stroll during the recent Camp David Summit. Image: EAF

The expansion of AUKUS might be perceived as a unified diplomatic front against China. Of course, there is no question that the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom have taken a firm stance against China’s assertive behavior in the Indo-Pacific region and its threat to the existing international order.

Japan remains cautious but has clearly expressed serious concerns about China’s strategic posture, which it considers “unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge” to its security and the existing international order. South Korea, under the Yoon administration, has also shown its strategic interest in engaging with AUKUS. Hence, the creation of AUKUS Plus is gaining diplomatic momentum.

That said, Japan and South Korea, being geographically close to and having substantial economic interactions with China, need to carefully manage their relationship with AUKUS. At least in the short term, they must provide a convincing rationale for any shifts toward AUKUS to avoid unnecessarily deteriorating their relations with China.

A history of recurring remarks pushing for AUKUS membership expansion suggests that, regardless of the United Kingdom’s strategic intentions, these statements function as a foreign policy signal for coalition-building. For example, there were domestic political changes in South Korea in 2022 and such statements allowed AUKUS members to gauge South Korea’s new strategic posture.

The statements can check for any changes in member states’ political desire for the creation of AUKUS Plus. This is particularly helpful since the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond continues to evolve.

The United States and the United Kingdom are distracted because of existing and emerging regional crises, such as in Ukraine and Israel. These may push them to facilitate larger coalition-building efforts.

Such statements stir public discourse within and outside the three core members, shedding light on various country-specific perspectives on AUKUS, including its benefits, costs and concerns. Japan has expressed interest in joining AUKUS Pillar Two efforts, yet any collaboration over nuclear-powered submarines would likely face public pushback because of sensitivities to nuclear-related norms.

In the rapidly changing global strategic environment, coalition-building is the key to shaping the existing and emerging regional order. This process takes a long time and foreign policy signaling becomes imperative in policy coordination and strategic collaboration. 

In this context, the United Kingdom’s proposal to partner with other nations should be encouraged in the future.

Kei Koga is Head of Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme and Associate Professor at the School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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US action for regulating AI is world’s strongest

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On Monday (October 30), US President Joe Biden released a wide-ranging and ambitious executive order on artificial intelligence (AI) – catapulting the US to the front of conversations about regulating AI.

In doing so, the US is leapfrogging over other states in the race to rule over AI. Europe previously led the way with its AI Act, which was passed by the European Parliament in June 2023 but won’t take full effect until 2025.

The presidential executive order is a grab bag of initiatives for regulating AI – some of them good and others seemingly rather half-baked. It aims to address harms ranging from the immediate, such as AI-generated deepfakes, through to intermediate harms such as job losses, to longer-term harms such as the much-disputed existential threat AI may pose to humans.

Biden’s ambitious plan

The US Congress has been slow to pass significant regulation of big tech companies. This presidential executive order is likely both an attempt to sidestep an often deadlocked Congress, as well as to kick-start action. For example, the order calls upon Congress to pass bipartisan data privacy legislation.

The executive order will reportedly be implemented over the next three months to one year. It covers eight areas:

  • safety and security standards for AI
  • privacy protections
  • equity and civil rights
  • consumer rights
  • jobs
  • innovation and competition
  • international leadership
  • AI governance.

On the one hand, the order covers many concerns raised by academics and the public. For example, one of its directives is to issue official guidance on how AI-generated content may be watermarked to reduce the risk from deepfakes.

It also requires companies developing AI models to prove they are safe before they can be rolled out for wider use. President Biden said that means

Companies must tell the government about the large scale AI systems they’re developing and share rigorous independent test results to prove they pose no national security or safety risk to the American people.

AI’s potentially disastrous use in warfare

At the same time, the order fails to address a number of pressing issues. For instance, it doesn’t directly address how to deal with killer AI robots, a vexing topic that was under discussion over the past two weeks at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

This concern shouldn’t be ignored. The Pentagon is developing swarms of low-cost autonomous drones as part of its recently announced Replicator program. Similarly, Ukraine has developed homegrown AI-powered attack drones that can identify and attack Russian forces without human intervention.

President Joe Biden has plans to regulate AI. Photo: Jim Lo Scalzo / EPA via The Conversation

Could we end up in a world where machines decide who lives or dies? The executive order merely asks for the military to use AI ethically, but doesn’t stipulate what that means.

And what about protecting elections from AI-powered weapons of mass persuasion? A number of outlets have reported on how the recent election in Slovakia may have been influenced by deepfakes. Many experts, myself included, are also concerned about the misuse of AI in the upcoming US presidential election.

Unless strict controls are implemented, we risk living in an age where nothing you see or hear online can be trusted. If this sounds like an exaggeration, consider that the US Republican Party has already released a campaign ad that appears to have been generated entirely by AI.

Missed opportunities

Many of the initiatives in the executive order could and should be replicated elsewhere, including Australia. We too should, as the order requires, provide guidance to landlords, government programs and government contractors on how to ensure AI algorithms aren’t being used to discriminate against individuals.

We should also, as the order requires, address algorithmic discrimination in the criminal justice system where AI is increasingly being used in high-stakes settings, including for sentencing, parole and probation, pre-trial release and detention, risk assessments, surveillance and predictive policing, to name a few.

AI has controversially been used for such applications in Australia, too, such as in the Suspect Targeting Management Plan used to monitor youths in New South Wales.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the executive order is that which addresses the potential harms of the most powerful so-called “frontier” AI models. Some experts believe these models – which are being developed by companies such as Open AI, Google and Anthropic – pose an existential threat to humanity.

Others, including myself, believe such concerns are overblown and might distract from more immediate harms, such as misinformation and inequity, that are already hurting society.

Biden’s order invokes extraordinary war powers (specifically the 1950 Defense Production Act introduced during the Korean War) to require companies to notify the federal government when training such frontier models. It also requires they share the results of “red-team” safety tests, wherein internal hackers use attacks to probe a software for bugs and vulnerabilities.

I would say it’s going to be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to police the development of frontier models. The above directives won’t stop companies from developing such models overseas, where the US government has limited power. The open-source community can also develop them in a distributed fashion – one that makes the tech world “borderless.”

The impact of the executive order will likely have the greatest impact on the government itself, and how it goes about using AI, rather than businesses.

Nevertheless, it’s a welcome piece of action. The UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s AI Safety Summit, taking place over the next two days, now looks to be somewhat of a diplomatic talk fest in comparison.

It does make one envious of the presidential power to get things done.

Toby Walsh is a professor of artificial intelligence and research group leader at UNSW Sydney.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Japan can’t afford to let the yen go much lower

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Japan’s exchange rate environment made a big turnaround in 2022 when the yen began to depreciate sharply. When it exceeded 145 yen against the US dollar by September 2022, and then 150 yen in October, the Ministry of Finance conducted two rounds of foreign exchange interventions.

Partly due to a decline in long-term interest rates in the United States from November 2022, the exchange rate returned to below 140 yen. The response from the Bank of Japan (BoJ) also contributed to the appreciation, leading to the yen reaching 130 against the US dollar by early 2023. But the yen is still considered undervalued compared to Japan’s economic fundamentals, which are around 100 to 110 yen.

The extreme depreciation of the yen resumed from May 2023. Since early 2022, the yen has declined by an average of about 20% against major currencies. Against the US dollar, the yen depreciated by around 30%.

This is partly attributable to the BoJ’s monetary easing policy, namely yield curve control, that was adopted in 2016. This sets short-term interest rates at negative 0.1% and aims for 0% for 10-year long-term interest rates. For the 10-year interest rate, a small fluctuation range has been permitted.

While the United States and Europe are shifting to interest rate hikes to curb inflation, the BoJ has maintained yield curve control. The widening of the interest rate differential has led to a sharp depreciation of the yen. 

Market participants widely believe that the BoJ raised the fluctuation range of the 10-year interest rate from plus or minus 0.25% to plus or minus 0.5% in December 2022.

Under the new leadership of Governor Kazuo Ueda, the BoJ further raised the fluctuation range of long-term interest rates to 1% in July. But unlike in 2022, they left 0.5% as a reference. This meant that fluctuations of up to 1% can be tolerated, but the BoJ will try not to let the long-term interest rates deviate significantly from 0.5%.

Bank of Japan Governor Kazuo Ueda faces a QE dilemma. Image: Twitter / Screengrab

Investors found this policy difficult to understand. It was unclear whether the central bank wanted to maintain a low-interest policy to increase domestic demand to achieve the 2% inflation target or raise interest rates to alleviate excessive depreciation of the yen.

The depreciation of the yen progressed even after the policy adjustment. By leaving the reference rate at 0.5%, the exchange rate market judged there was little intention for the central bank to raise interest rates significantly, leading to foreign exchange transactions where people felt reassured to sell yen and buy high-interest dollars.

US monetary policy has greatly influenced the interest rate differential. The US economy is stronger than expected, with a tight labor market. Inflation stands at 3.7%, but excluding energy and food is still above 4%. To ensure inflation decreases toward the 2% target, there is a possibility of a further rate hike or maintaining current high interest rates (5.25 to 5.5%).

The sharp depreciation of the yen is causing import prices to soar, keeping Japan’s inflation well above the 2% target. The BoJ revised the inflation rate for the 2023 fiscal year from 1.8% to 2.5%. The current inflation rate is in the 3% range, with food prices accounting for 70% of this inflation. This is eroding the purchasing power of consumers, leading to a decline in real consumption.

Even with the yen’s depreciation, Japan’s trade deficit continues and export quantities have not increased. Industrial production and corporate investment remain sluggish. While the government’s revenue is increasing due to inflation-induced income and consumption taxes, this is essentially a tax hike. Wage growth has not caught up with the rate of inflation.

Japan’s services sector is enjoying an increase in foreign demand — driven by the yen’s depreciation. Hotels are full and tourist spots are overflowing. Another 10% of Japan’s inflation arises from rising hotel fees, thanks to the tourism boom. 

With the rising cost of construction materials and foreign demand for real estate, house prices have also increased. It is also a good time to buy Japanese stocks, which has contributed to good stock market performance in 2023.

The BoJ’s challenges are enormous. How to correct the extreme depreciation of the yen – without causing significant damage to markets, while also committing to a 2% inflation target — is an unprecedented challenge. 

The yen is depreciating fast against the US dollar. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP

Markets widely anticipate the BoJ’s monetary policy normalization, including removing the negative interest rate policy and the yield curve control 10-year target within the next two years. Given rising government and corporate debt, a rapid interest rate hike is likely to cause significant stress to the economy. 

The BoJ needs to improve communication with the market and the public about its future monetary stance. It needs to explain how to achieve the 2 % inflation target in the long run, when interest rates become more flexible and possibly higher. 

Adopting an inflation target range, such as 1-3%, rather than sticking to a single 2% numerical target could be another option.

Sayuri Shirai is Professor at Keio University and a former policy board member of the Bank of Japan.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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PBOC in a liquidity dilemma of crucial proportions

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Any staffers at People’s Bank of China headquarters planning a vacation in the last two months of 2023 are almost surely hitting the “cancellation” button.

No major monetary authority is likely to be busier than Beijing’s between now and January 1 than the one Pan Gongsheng leads as governor. In the last 24 hours alone, the PBOC made headlines by, first, signaling a fresh liquidity surge to halt a jump in money market rates and then doing the opposite by draining about US$15 billion from money markets.

It dramatizes the ways in which the PBOC is caught between Federal Reserve rate hikes in Washington, Bank of Japan dovishness in Tokyo and credit market volatility everywhere else.

Add in China’s economic downshift, capital fleeing Shanghai and Shenzhen stocks, and enduring investor concerns about regulatory uncertainty in Beijing and it’s easy to see why holiday plans are likely being canceled at PBOC central.

Pan’s balancing act is made more precarious by the fact neither US Fed Chairman Jerome Powell nor BOJ Governor Kazuo Ueda knows where the next two-to-six months will take their respective monetary policies.

The US economy continues to surprise to the upside, growing at a barn-burning 4.9% annualized pace in the third quarter. Wages in Japan continue to underwhelm, taking BOJ tapering off the table.

The PBOC’s balancing act at home is getting dicier, too. At the same time, the yuan is under downward pressure, PBOC officials are trying to limit stimulus so that progress in reducing leverage and unproductive lending isn’t squandered. Yet there’s also a need to prop up a slumping economy and channel liquidity to troubled property developers.

Now, there’s an added test for Pan’s leadership team: President Xi Jinping’s new push to reduce debt risks plaguing local governments in order to increase economic dynamism around the nation.

At a twice-a-decade policy meeting of the Central Financial Work Conference this week, attended by Xi, officials unveiled plans for a long-term mechanism to clean up municipal balance sheets.

Naturally, it will fall to the PBOC to grease the skids via liquidity as local governments dispose of bad debts. The enterprise will echo the role the BOJ played in the early 2000s to facilitate the discarding of toxic loans undermining what was then Asia’s biggest economy.

PBOC Governor Pan Gongsheng has markets dissecting his every move. Image: BBC Screengrab

Resolving local government debt troubles, made worse by an explosion of local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), is vital to stabilizing China’s $61 trillion financial sector at a time when China Inc is already grappling with cratering real estate markets.

The idea, argues state-run Xinhua News, is to “optimize the debt structure of central and local governments” to improve the quality of national growth.

“This phrase suggests the central government may take up more funding responsibilities and leverage up further while local governments de-leverage and de-risk by resolving implicit debt problems,” says economist Maggie Wei at Goldman Sachs.

Lan Wang, an analyst at Fitch Ratings, says that “moving to diffuse refinancing strains” among LGFVs “could provide some potential for capex expansion under selected local governments,” bolstering Chinese growth.

Overall, Wang says, “property fallout continues.” Fitch, she adds, “recently downgraded several of the largest surviving homebuilders that are still rated in the investment-grade categories, underscoring the lack of stabilization.”

The local government debt plan coincides with Premier Li Qiang’s efforts to repair the property sector. So far, authorities have resisted calls for giant public bailouts of the kind Beijing resorted to in the past. Yet there are signs Xi and Li are becoming more open to easing regulatory pressure on a sector that has previously generated as much as 30% of gross domestic product.

In recent days, Communist Party leaders “vowed to meet the reasonable financing needs from developers,” says economist Larry Hu at Macquarie Bank. But, he adds, “it’s noteworthy that the conference didn’t mention the mantra ‘housing is for living, not for speculation.’” In other words, he notes, “this time around, the focus is to keep regulatory pressure to prevent the emergence of new risks, instead of launching another de-risking campaign.”

Even so, the extreme interconnectivity between property markets and local government finances means this week’s policy shift could be a major one for China’s macro performance in 2024 and beyond.

In the view of Bloomberg Intelligence economist David Qu, this “could turn out to be a monumental event for the financial sector. A debt-laden property sector that’s threatening to rock the financial system adds urgency to the agenda.”

The same goes for the urgency at PBOC headquarters to keep the financial peace. Pan’s team has more work to do as rising US yields and elevated global inflation generate intensifying headwinds.

“China’s structural economic downturn will continue,” says Raymond Yeung, an economist at ANZ Bank. Recent “data improvement doesn’t represent a turnaround in fundamental challenges, such as worsening demographics, a lack of productivity improvement and trade tension.”

It helps that Xi and Li are boosting fiscal stimulus, albeit modestly. Last week, Beijing announced a 1 trillion yuan ($137 billion) sovereign debt package for construction projects and that the national budget deficit would be allowed to widen to the largest in three decades.

New fiscal package will aim to revive construction. Image: Twitter

“Beijing’s rare budget expansion marks a critical step in reflation,” says Robin Xing, economist at Morgan Stanley. “We expect growth and inflation to improve but in a subpar fashion. More stimulus and reforms are likely needed and exiting deflation could be a two-year journey.”

Zhiwei Zhang, economist at Pinpoint Asset Management, says “I take this policy as another step in the right direction. China should make its fiscal policy more supportive, given the deflationary pressure in the economy. Part of the funds raised will be utilized next year, hence this helps to boost growth outlook beyond the fourth quarter.”

Jing Liu, an economist at HSBC, adds that “this should have a positive effect for growth, though the effect may be more backloaded into next year.” Yet, notes economist Arjen van Dijkhuizen at ABN Amro, China faces “fierce headwinds” from the property sector, related debt issues and the “global growth slowdown” and from “ongoing tensions” with the US, EU and the West in general.

These and other headwinds will increase the pressure at PBOC headquarters. One is how rising global energy prices affect inflation – and the risk of Chinese stagflation. Another: sluggish demand for mainland exports. In September, shipments to the US plunged 16.4% year on year.

What’s more, “measures of foreign orders point to a more substantial decline in foreign demand than what has been reflected in the customs data so far,” says Zichun Huang at Capital Economics. “And the lagged impact of higher interest rates is likely to dampen consumer spending in major export markets over the next few quarters.”

In late October, Xi reportedly visited the PBOC, a first since he became president in 2012. It spotlighted the key role Pan’s team is playing in supporting GDP growth and financial markets. Along with the PBOC, Xi and Vice Premier He Lifeng dropped by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, which manages China’s $3 trillion of currency reserves.

Yet the PBOC faces an uphill struggle in the months ahead to overcome the myriad headwinds bearing down on China. Some are coming in from Washington, where the Fed is likely to hike rates again. Others are from Europe and Japan, where post-Covid-19 recoveries aren’t as robust as hoped.

“Whatever does emerge from Beijing over the coming months, it likely won’t be quick enough to make any meaningful difference to 2023,” says Robert Carnell, an economist at ING Bank. “At best, it should be viewed as a pain management tool for the transition to a less leveraged economy.”

The good news is that the pain management process is accelerating in ways that could put China on a firmer footing in 2024 and beyond. The bad news is that vacations are off at PBOC for the foreseeable future.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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New US nuke built for China’s large hardened targets

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The Biden administration has announced plans to develop a next-generation air-dropped nuclear gravity bomb, known as B61-13, an upgrade of existing bomb variants and a pointed response to fast-evolving security threats from near-peer adversaries China and Russia.

The decision to develop a higher-yield bomb derives at least in part from the US Department of Defense’s recent 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, which recommends the US should have additional nuclear options against certain “harder and large-area military targets.”

In a statement on the B61-13’s announcement, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb said the US “has a responsibility to continue to assess and field the capabilities we need to credibly deter and, if necessary, respond to strategic attacks and assure our allies.”

Breaking Defense reported that the B61-13 will have a yield of 360 kilotons, a much bigger blast than the B61-12’s 50 kilotons can deliver. The new variant will replicate the B61-12 in terms of safety, security and accuracy features, the report said.

Breaking Defense quotes Federation of American Scientists’ experts Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda saying the US will probably produce only around 50 B61-13s and that production will likely happen on the back end of the B61-12’s production schedule in 2025.

The report speculates that if the only change between the B61-12 and B61-13 variants is higher yield, piggybacking on the existing B61-12’s production line and moving the bomb into the field should be readily achievable.

The B61-13’s announcement may also signal a phasing-out of the costly to maintain B83 nuclear bomb amid wider ongoing efforts to consolidate older B61-3, -4, -7 and -10 nuclear gravity bomb variants. Production of the B61-13 does not mark an expansion of the US nuclear arsenal as it will use warheads from older bombs placed in new housings.

Mockup of a B61-7 nuclear bomb, the possible design basis of the newer B61-13. Photo: Bradbury Science Museum.

It was not immediately clear from reports how much the new variant would cost per unit.

The Breaking Defense report says that the B61-12 is expected to be certified for use by the F-35, F-15, F-16 and B-2, as well as Tornado aircraft in Europe.

Breaking Defense notes that the B61-7 is not designed for use by fighter jets and speculates that the B61-13 would also be restricted to bombers, namely the B-2 and, eventually, the B-21.

In describing the US nuclear threat environment, the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review explicitly mentions China as the overall pacing challenge for US defense planning and a growing factor in re-evaluating its nuclear deterrent.

It notes that China is expected to have a minimum of 1,000 nuclear-capable warheads that can be deployed by the end of the decade, according to recent reports.

This development could provide China with the ability to use nuclear weapons for coercive purposes in times of crisis or conflict, including launching military provocations against US allies and partners in the Pacific.

The document also mentions that Russia’s modern nuclear arsenal presents an enduring existential threat to the US, its allies and partners.

China and Russia are working on expanding their nuclear capabilities and also developing non-nuclear attack strategies such as cyber, space, information and advanced conventional strikes, the Nuclear Posture Review report said.

The report also predicts that the US will face two primary nuclear powers as strategic rivals and possible enemies by the 2030s, which will lead to increased pressure on stability and new challenges for arms control, deterrence, assurance and risk reduction.

However, the rationale stated for the B61-13 includes strikes on specific hardened and large-area military targets, which may signal the US is reviewing its options for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a future conflict. A tactical nuclear weapon is designed for actual battlefield use rather than strategic deterrent.

By making nuclear weapons smaller and more precise, tactical nuclear weapon use becomes more plausible, increasing the credibility of deterrence threats but also incentivizing their first-strike use. A nuclear gravity bomb, moreover, allows for tactical options not available with other delivery mechanisms such as ballistic missiles.

In a May 2021 article for Popular Mechanics, Kyle Mizokami notes that maintaining positive control over nuclear weapons until the moment of detonation is crucial for safety and flexibility in decision-making.

The new US-made B-21 bomber is built for delivering nuclear bombs. Image: US Air Force

He notes that crewed strategic bombers such as the B-2 and B-21 are ideal platforms for maximum control, as they can be sent to strike a target but may be called off if a situation or assessment suddenly changes.

The B61-13’s development may also be America’s attempt to fill a looming nuclear deterrence gap with China and Russia. At the end of the previous Cold War, the US downsized and emphasized strategic-level deterrence.

At the same time, China and Russia continuously modernized theirs, including through the development of tactical nuclear weapons to provide strategic cover and a backstop for conventional military operations.

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Israel’s ‘solutions’ bound to violate international law

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On October 30, Israeli authorities said they had killed “dozens” of Hamas fighters in the first days of their ground invasion of Gaza. Meanwhile, Gaza’s Ministry of Health has struggled to keep its website online given the lack of electricity, Internet, and attacks.

Nonetheless, at noon on Sunday, the Ministry of Health said the death toll in Gaza was now 8,005 (of wh0m 67% were women and children).

For those who doubt the numbers, the Ministry of Health has been releasing lists of the dead with their Israeli identification numbers (it is a sign of the occupation of the Palestinians of Gaza that when they are born, they must be registered not by the Palestinian Authority but by Israel).

Save the Children says more children (3,195) have been killed by Israeli bombing over these three weeks than have been killed in total across all conflict zones since 2019.

The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) said that by Sunday, 1.4 million Palestinians out of 2.3 million were internally displaced, with 671,000 taking shelter in 150 UNRWA facilities. Most of the dead by Israeli bombs and tank shells have been civilians.

The ratio of dead between combatants (few) and civilians (many) is startling, far beyond what takes place in a war (in contrast, of the 1,400 Israelis killed on October 7 by Hamas and other factions, 48.4% were soldiers).

By saying that they have killed “dozens” of Hamas militants – the purported target – and having at the same time killed thousands of Palestinians, the Israeli authorities have admitted to the world that their war has resulted in far more civilian deaths than combatant deaths.

Meanwhile, the Israeli military has sent its bulldozers to destroy homes and businesses in northern Gaza as well as in the West Bank city of Jenin. Little in this maneuver looks like a military operation, since these homes and businesses are not military institutions.

Given the history of the bulldozing of housing in the West Bank to create settlements and the “apartheid wall,” this bulldozing in Gaza and Jenin appears like a massive civilizational campaign of ethnic cleansing to create what the Israeli political class calls Greater Israel (Eretz Yisrael Hashlema).

The Israeli political class is famous for saying they want to change the “facts on the ground” so that any negotiations with the occupied Palestinians are based on those “facts” and not on “claims.”

This is what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been doing for decades through illegal settlements in the West Bank: erasing the fact of Palestinian claims on their land and establishing the right of Israelis to the entire landmass from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.

In effect, the Israeli political class appears to be using the conflict that began on October 7 as the pretext to do what it had planned to do for decades, namely, to erase Palestinians from historical Palestine and to erase the Palestinian nation as an entity.

Two-state, one-state, three-state

When Palestinian political forces agreed to a “peace process” that resulted in the Cairo Interim Agreement (1994) and the Oslo Accords (1994), it adopted what was known as the “two-state solution” to the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

The basic outline of the Oslo Accords was that a Palestinian Authority (PA) would govern the territory seized by Israel in 1967 (East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank). The Oslo Accords, argued Gaza-based Professor Haider Eid, created a “Bantustan” (such as the “African homelands” created by apartheid South Africa).

The implication of the establishment of the PA was that it would neuter actual Palestinian claims to the land (including the right of return of Palestinian refugees, established by UN Resolution 194 in 1948), and, at the same time, it would allow the Israeli state to change the “facts on the ground” by the creation of more and more illegal settlements.

Furthermore, after the Second Intifada (2000-2005), Israel cut off the “safe passage” requirement of Oslo that allowed Palestinians in East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank to travel across these zones.

By 2005, Israel had annulled the Oslo Accords, although the Palestinian political class remained bound by them as the only sliver of hope for the establishment of the state of Palestine (even if it would be a small fragment of historical Palestine).

The reality of the “two-state solution” disappeared as the settlements increased in the West Bank, as Palestinian control over East Jerusalem was increasingly absorbed by Israel, as the right to return was set aside, and as Gaza was bombed almost every year.

In that context, several important Palestinian intellectuals began to raise the question of the “one-state solution,” with one Israeli-Palestinian state based on a non-ethnic, secular, and democratic idea of citizenship.

By 2021, a majority of scholars of the region said the actual facts showed Israel to be “a one-state reality akin to apartheid.”

The idea that Israel is an apartheid state is now well established in United Nations documents and human-rights reports.

This assessment demonstrates two things: first, that Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory are already “one state,” and second, that it is an apartheid state, with the Palestinians in a second-class category.

Advocates of the “one-state solution” argue that the reality of a singular state now requires equal citizenship for all who live in Israel/Palestine. The current Israeli political class refuses to accept the idea of a democratic and secular one-state, because they are wedded to an ethno-nationalist project of a “Jewish State” that erases the possibility of full citizenship for Palestinian Christians and Muslims.

If the “two-state solution” is no longer practical, and if the “one-state solution” is blocked by the Israeli political class, then all that remains for Netanyahu and others is the “three-state solution.”

This is the solution that seeks to remove large parts of the Palestinian population from East Jerusalem, Gaza, the West Bank, and perhaps even from within Israel’s 1948 lines and send them to the three states of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.

The bulldozers coming behind the tanks in Gaza are attempting to push the Palestinian refugees (70% of them are descendants of those sent to Gaza in the Nakba, or Catastrophe of 1948) through the Rafah Crossing into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.

This “three-state solution” is precisely ethnic cleansing, a crime under international law. For decades, the Israeli political class has been willing to conduct genocidal policies – including this bombardment of Gaza – to facilitate its ethno-national, apartheid state project that requires the erasure of Palestinians and Palestine.

In 2014, in the aftermath of Israel’s Operation Protective Edge, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation into the situation in Palestine. Nothing much came of this investigation.

During this current attack on Gaza, prosecutor Karim A A Khan went to the Rafah Crossing and said Israel’s blockade of humanitarian aid into Gaza may be a crime under ICC jurisdiction. Indeed, the fact of apartheid is already a crime under the 2002 Rome Statute that created the ICC.

Both the “one-state reality akin to apartheid” and the “three-state solution” of ethnic cleansing are serious crimes that require investigation. Will Khan ask the judges of the ICC to frame arrest warrants against Prime Minister Netanyahu and his colleagues?

 This article was produced by Globetrotter, which provided it to Asia Times.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is an editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research.

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