China’s economic recovery faces deflationary risks

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China’s consumer prices declined again in October after the last contraction in July, adding to expectations the country needs to boost its economy with new monetary and fiscal measures.

The consumer price index (CPI) fell 0.2% last month from a year earlier and dropped 0.1% from September, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) said Thursday. The decline was caused mainly by falling food prices, it said.

In July, the figure decreased 0.3% year-on-year, the first decline since February 2021. It returned to a 0.1% growth in August but was flat in September. 

“The month-on-month growth of food prices was negative 0.8% in October, compared with a 0.3% growth in September. This caused the CPI to fall last month,” Dong Lijuan, chief statistician of the City Department of the NBS, said in a statement. “This is because most regions in the country had good weather in October, resulting in a sufficient supply of agricultural products.”

Dong said prices of fresh food including eggs, pork, vegetables and aquaculture products fell after the National Day holidays, known as Golden Week, in early October. She said the falling pork prices in recent months had significantly dragged down the CPI. 

Chen Guanghua, head of the animal husbandry and veterinary bureau at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, said the sufficient supply of pigs since late September has resulted in a 2% month-on-month decline in pork prices in October.

He said pork prices, which were down 30.1% last month from a year ago, will slightly rebound over the next couple of months but fall again in early 2024.

Meanwhile, China’s producer price index (PPI), which measures the costs for goods at the factory gate, decreased 2.6% year-on-year in October, compared with a 2.5% drop in September.

The NBS said the decline in China’s PPI was due to a high base in the same period of last year and price fluctuations of international crude oil and non-ferrous metals. 

Bruce Pang, chief economist at Jones Lang Lasalle, said the latest CPI figure showed that combating persistent disinflation amid weak demand remains a challenge for Chinese policymakers. 

“An appropriate policy mix and more supportive measures are needed to prevent the economy from a downward drift in inflation expectations that could threaten business confidence and household spending,” Pang said. 

Slow economic recovery

China’s gross domestic product (GDP) showed growth figures of 4.5%, 6.3% and 4.9% in the first three quarters of this year, respectively. Some economists said the 6.3% growth in the second quarter was disappointing, as the comparison was to a low base a year earlier during Covid lockdowns in China. 

Beijing has set an economic growth target of around 5% for 2023. 

Yu Yongding, an economist and an academician of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said China is having an insufficient demand in general and needs to use expansionary fiscal and monetary measures to stimulate its consumption, investment and exports.

“It is true that the miracle double-digit growth seen in the first 30 years of China’s opening-up has ended,” Yu said in a speech at a forum organized by Caixin on Thursday. “But this does not mean that China will be unable to maintain a relatively high economic growth rate, such as a 5 to 6%.”

At this moment, Yu said, the Chinese government should increase its fiscal deficit and invest more in infrastructure projects. He said such a policy would lead to an increase in loan demand and interest rates, which can then be suppressed with a loose monetary policy. 

“The government should not be over-worried about having expansionary fiscal and monetary measures,” he said. “Many western developed countries are now facing a dilemma as they have to control inflation and avoid economic recession at the same time. We don’t have these problems. If we don’t take actions now, the windows for economic growth will be closed.”

Yu has long been a supporter of expansionary measures, which are similar to the quantitative easing in the US. He called on policymakers to gain experience from the four trillion yuan (US$549 billion) stimulus plan unveiled by then-Premier Wen Jiabao in 2008 and not be afraid of using such a measure again.

In 2008, after the US financial crisis broke out, China saw a significant drop in external demand. It then injected 4 trillion yuan of new money into the markets. However, a large part of the money entered the property markets and caused a huge asset bubble, which finally burst in 2021 and caused debt problems for many property developers, including Evergrande and Country Garden.

Due to the on-going property crisis, people tend to delay their home purchase plans. They also cut spending as they are making less money now than in the past.

In fact, the National People’s Congress on October 24 approved a motion that allows the central government to issue 1 trillion yuan of sovereign bonds and raise its budget deficit ratio from 3% to about 3.8% of GDP. 

However, some economists said the 1 trillion yuan is only enough for local governments to pay the interest on their outstanding debt. 

According to China’s Ministry of Finance, the outstanding amount of local government debt grew 15.1% to 35.06 trillion yuan at the end of last year from 30.47 trillion yuan a year earlier. 

Read: Evergrande seen likelier to fall as chairman probed

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

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When the Gaza war goes underground

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With Israeli Defence Forces now reportedly surrounding Gaza City, the most densely packed part of the Gaza Strip, their fight against Hamas has entered a new phase focused primarily on urban warfare – some of it underground.

Sappers are the soldiers who clear paths through obstacles with machines and explosives, enabling other troops to overwhelm the enemy. They also create such obstructions and lay traps and mines when trying to defend a position.

Tunnels are a sapper’s job, too. Indeed, this is where the word comes from: the ancient technique of “sapping” beneath the surface to approach an enemy position protected from their arrows, bullets or shells.

As part of their plan for defense, Hamas sappers have excavated a huge series of tactical tunnels. Some are interlinked, some isolated. Some have been dug far below where bombs can reach, some are near the surface to allow access.

Tunnels and “mouseholes” in walls also allow for undetected movement between buildings. Hamas fighters expect they can emerge from these holes to attack Israeli soldiers before disappearing again.

In addition, Hamas sappers have likely prepared many improvised explosive devices (IEDs) – some hidden in walls to detonate when armored vehicles pass by and other, larger explosives buried under roads.

Some tunnels may also be set as traps to entice Israeli soldiers to enter as they search for hostages.

Urban warfare is excruciatingly slow

As the war enters a new phase, it is pitting a grimly determined Israeli Defence Force (IDF), with the world’s best capabilities for urban warfare, against a force ready for martyrdom that has prepared for this fight for years. It will also be happening on terrain that analysts argue greatly favors the defender.

Though fighting in Gaza presents its own unique challenges, there are some lessons to be learned from the operations to eliminate Islamist fighters from the Iraqi city of Mosul and the southern Philippines city of Marawi in 2016-17.

In Mosul, a US-supported Iraqi force of about 100,000 took nine months to destroy an ISIS force of thousands in a thoroughly fortified city. The coalition lost 8,000 troops and many tanks and bulldozers to massive IEDs.

A soldier rides a bicycle past bombed-out buildings in what was the main battle area in Marawi on the southern island of Mindanao on October 25, 2017, days after the military declared the fighting against IS-inspired Muslim militants over. Philippine troops of a southern Philippine city where Islamic State supporters waged a brutal five-month battle began leaving Marawi on October 25, as a group of journalists were given the first ever press tour of the devastated city. / AFP PHOTO / TED ALJIBE
A soldier rides a bicycle past bombed-out buildings in what was the main battle area in Marawi on the southern island of Mindanao on October 25, 2017. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Ted Aljibe

Progress was equally slow in Marawi, where it took five months for Filipino forces to defeat ISIS-Maute fighters. Troops could sometimes secure only one building per day because of the constant threat of ambush from tunnels and IEDs hidden in entrances, windows and stairwells.

Three layers of challenges

Urban war presents armies with compounding challenges.

The first layer is perceptual. There is a cognitive dissonance between a liberal society’s beliefs around the need for restraint in conflict and the primordial demands of urban war with its high costs in blood, destruction and legitimacy. Armies are averse to preparing for such horror.

Second, there are tactical challenges with fighting among buildings:

  • the threat of remote attack by drones or IEDs
  • the uncertainty created by hidden adversaries
  • the extreme exposure of forces as they advance
  • the dilution of combat power as forces are channeled, isolated and dispersed among buildings, with very restricted views
  • the degrading of sensors and communications systems.

Third, and critically, the presence of civilians in urban war zones imposes moral and ethical challenges. They suffer disproportionately and catastrophically, both as immediate casualties and from displacement and disease following the destruction of cities.

Military commanders also face a proportionality dilemma when it comes to interpreting international humanitarian law. They need to balance the necessity of their actions and the survival of soldiers against causing unintended but foreseeable civilian harm.

Further complexities include:

  • the obligation of forces to provide security and logistical support to noncombatants
  • the security threat from phone and social media usage by civilians
  • civilians who are hostile, obstructive or offer unarmed resistance
  • the psychological and political burden on commanders that may distort their decision-making.

How Israel has been preparing for this moment

The IDF has previously experienced these challenges in Gaza. After Israeli occupation ended in 2005, militant attacks prompted major incursions by the army in 2008 and 2014. That fighting taught the IDF key lessons.

From a political standpoint, Israel realized the importance of winning the contest of international and domestic public opinion. From a military and operational standpoint, the IDF learned that precision air power alone could not eliminate the threat from Hamas. Well-protected armored vehicles were essential, and new capabilities were needed to counter the increasing use of tunnels by Hamas.

As a result, the IDF is uniquely well-equipped for urban operations, with the world’s best-protected tanks and armored personnel carriers.

It also has world-leading armored engineering vehicles, such as the D9 armored “Doobi” bulldozer. With the D9, houses can be demolished instead of entered, reducing the risk of ambush and IEDs. However, these bulldozers have been controversially associated with destroying homes as punishment.

The D9 will be used in the war to create safe paths through terrain that may be mined, push alternative routes through buildings and build protective berms around “secured areas” to consolidate the IDF’s progress. Some of these bulldozers can even be operated by remote control.

The IDF’s Caterpillar D9R armored bulldozer. Picture: Zachi Evenor / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

Other armored engineering vehicles include the Puma minefield breacher, with the Carpet mine and IED clearing system that can detonate or disrupt hidden munitions with blasts from fuel-air explosive rockets. Engineer vehicles also carry equipment that can jam IED circuits or transmissions. Some may also have the THOR system, which uses lasers to explode IEDs.

Soldiers are also trained to find, operate in and destroy tunnels. They include elements of the Sarayet Yahalom, a special forces unit that uses specialized demolition charges, subterranean drones and robots.

The Israelis lead the world in highly classified subterranean sensing research, including the use of geospatial, acoustic, seismic, and electrical resistivity tomography (ERT) and ground-penetrating radar technologies. The IDF’s public statements suggest tunnels within 20 metres of the surface can be mapped.

The IDF tunnel sappers also have niche armored fighting vehicles. Some are fitted with the technologies mentioned above, others with drilling equipment that can bore down into tunnels to deliver devices, materials or explosives. One, the Nakpilon, uniquely has a door at the front to deploy soldiers straight into tunnel entrances.

The IDF has generally preferred to destroy tunnels from the surface rather than entering, but some Yahalom and other reconnaissance special forces train to fight below ground, alongside the Oketz dog unit, with specialized vision, breathing and communications equipment.

Given the scale of the tunnel network and the task of recovering hostages, some human reconnaissance seems unavoidable. History suggests this will be done by pairs or individuals, perhaps the Mista’arvim elite undercover units, who may operate by disguising themselves as Hamas fighters.

Given the Hamas advantage of home terrain and the advanced technology deployed by Israel, both sides will likely inflict bloody surprises on one another. The IDF has the military capability to prevail, but the human cost of the ground war and the outcome of the crucial geopolitical war of narratives remain unclear.

Charles Knight, Adjunct Lecturer in Terrorism and Assymetric Conflict and Senior Researcher in Urban Warfare (UNSW), Charles Sturt University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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US trade tensions ease, Chinese economy stabilizing ahead of Xi trip

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Quantitative and qualitative polarization trends

David Woo and David Goldman take stock of polarization trends across economic, market, and political arenas, including receding risks linked to the Gaza war, the West’s contemplation of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, and Xi Jinping’s visit to San Francisco next week.

Military conflict risks: Iranians have no appetite for regional war

David Woo analyses the results of the RIWI-Unbound Military Conflict survey, which found a further decline in the number of our Israeli and Iranian respondents, as well as Russian and Ukrainian respondents, expecting intensified military conflict involving their respective countries.

Investment themes in a polarizing world

David Woo and Scott Foster examine a range of investment options linked to themes linked to China’s overcoming of US-imposed sanctions on its technology sector, Chinese ambitions to lead the electric vehicle market (EV), reserve diversification out of the USD, and more.

Why Rheinmetall AG outperforms

Uwe Parpart and Gabriel Honrada examine the buoyant stock performance of Rheinmetall AG, Germany’s largest arms producer, which stands out for both being German and having major new products in advanced development.

Moscow plays a waiting game as rifts widen in Kiev

James Davis cites sources that suggest Putin’s advisors anticipate a decline in Western support for Ukraine and evaluate the possibility of unrest within the Ukrainian political elite amid a growing realization by Kiev’s military brass of the need for truce negotiations.

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Albanese gives ASEAN a lesson on how to handle China

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MANILA – Following his much-anticipated meeting with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping hailed a “new starting point” in bilateral relations after years of escalating tensions and a tit-for-tat trade war.

“The China-Australia relationship has embarked on the right path of improvement and development. I’m heartened to see that,” the Chinese leader said.

Xi expressed his sincere hopes that the two countries could become “trusting partners” by focusing on areas of shared concern including climate change and regional security. “The progress we have made in advancing our relationship over that time has been unquestionably very positive,” Albanese added while standing beside his Chinese counterpart.

“Trade is flowing more freely to the benefit of both countries,” he said, with bilateral trade hitting a historic high of more than US$300 billion this year. To facilitate the thaw in bilateral ties, Beijing indicated a partial lifting of de facto sanctions on Australian imports while earlier releasing an Australian citizen, Cheng Lei, a prominent journalist who was detained in 2020 on what Canberra believes were politically motivated charges.

“Australia is the first US ally to make a clear change in its attitude toward China after a fierce conflict with China since the US defined China as its No 1 strategic competitor,” declared the Global Times, China’s Communist Party-run mouthpiece newspaper.

“Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and even US allies in Europe [should] think about themselves given the ups and downs of China-Australia relations,” it added while suggesting Albanese’s policy could serve as a “model” for other US allies in the region.

Albanese’s successful visit demonstrates both the importance of proactive engagement to avoid unnecessary tensions as well as calibrated deterrence, with Canberra expected to double down on its security cooperation with the US and like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific.

It’s clear by now that Australia’s China strategy is highly relevant to Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines, which is now confronting escalating tensions with China over a whole host of geopolitical issues including hotly contested territories in the South China Sea.

Strategic reboot

Not long ago, China effectively dismissed Australia as America’s “deputy sheriff” in Asia. After a decade of warm relations, largely a legacy of prime minister Kevin Rudd’s Beijing-friendly foreign policy, Australia began to revisit its relations with Beijing in the mid-2010s.

Although the Malcolm Turnbull administration welcomed “strong and constructive ties with China,” it soon began cracking down on Beijing’s malign influence operations. The upshot was a crackdown on pro-Beijing politicians, most notably the disgraced Labour Senator Sam Dastyari, in Canberra and new legislation that aimed to curb Chinese influence as well as strategic investments in Australia.

But it was under the conservative Scott Morrison administration that Australia-China relations took a decided nosedive. Instead of establishing guardrails in bilateral relations, Canberra began fortifying military cooperation with its Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) partners and, most dramatically, ditched a multi-billion dollar submarine deal with France in favor of a nuclear-powered submarine under the AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) alliance.

The US, UK and Australia AUKUS defense alliance is a shot across China’s bow. Image: Twitter

Crucially, Canberra barred Chinese high-tech investments in critical infrastructure, most notably Chinese telecom giant Huawei’s participation in its 5G rollout, and, to Beijing’s chagrin, called for an international inquest into the origins of Covid-19 at the height of the pandemic, a move that could have finally resulted in calls for China to pay reparations.

In response, Beijing raised tariffs on Australian imports including barley, wine and coal, and placed a de facto diplomatic freeze on bilateral relations.

Once elected into office, Labor Prime Minister Anthony Albanese launched a major policy reboot, which has turned out to be not too different from how the Democratic Joe Biden administration approached his Republican predecessor Donald Trump’s antagonistic policy toward China.

On one hand, the Albanese administration signaled policy continuity by underscoring its commitment to the Quad as well as maximizing the potential of AUKUS. As Foreign Minister Penny Wong has made clear, Canberra had “actually already chosen” a side between the two superpowers and that robust military alliance with the US now enjoys “deep bipartisan support.”

Moreover, the Albanese administration also doubled down on security cooperation with like-minded Southeast Asian nations, most notably Vietnam and the Philippines, which are also at loggerheads with Beijing over disputed resources and islands in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the Albanese administration also expressed its commitment to de-escalating diplomatic tensions with China.

Geopolitical lessons

During his visit to Beijing, Albanese said that a “double balancing” act was not impossible. In particular, he said he drew on the advice of former Australian prime minister John Howard, who once wrote about his dealings with China:

“I said to [former Chinese president] Jiang Zemin that what we have to try and do is focus on areas where we agree rather than obsessing about areas where we don’t agree.” His counsel to successors was clear: “[C]ooperate where we can, [and] disagree where we must.”

During his four-day trip to Beijing, Albanese focused on establishing guardrails in bilateral ties through the relaxation of certain Chinese sanctions, which is expected to immediately boost bilateral trade by $6 billion. Albanese reassured China that Australia was against economic “decoupling” and refrained from public criticism of China in favor of gently raising areas of disagreements, including on human rights.  

At the same time, Albanese made no concessions on his country’s AUKUS alliance, deepening defense ties with India under Quad and expanded maritime security cooperation with Vietnam and the Philippines.

Nor was there any indication that Australia is interested in returning to the “good old days” of Mandarin-speaking prime minister Kevin Rudd, who saw both Australia and China as part of a broader “Asia-Pacific community.” 

Australia’s China policy is particularly relevant for Southeast Asian states such as the Philippines, whose relations with Beijing have recently hit a new nadir.

Over the past year, Manila has expanded security cooperation with the US while reconsidering and canceling certain promised but not delivered big-ticket Chinese infrastructure investments. Meanwhile, it has more proactively pushed back against China’s expanding presence in Philippine-claimed waters and more broadly across the South China Sea. 

Albanese’s successful “double-balancing act” shows the importance of proactive engagement coupled with strategic conviction. Despite the imposition of sanctions on Australian imports, Canberra’s trade with China still expanded to $300 billion in 2022. So far it seems unlikely that Beijing will impose any sanctions on Manila anytime soon.

Moreover, the Philippines, which unlike Australia has direct territorial disputes with China, can’t afford to not seek help from more powerful allies such as the US given the extreme asymmetry of military power vis-a-vis China.

A Philippine naval officer stands guard during the arrival of American missile destroyer USS Chung Hoon before US-Philippine joint naval military exercises in a file photo. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Noel Celis / Getty Images

But it is also vital for Manila to calibrate its defense cooperation with the US, especially in regard to how much, if any, access it allows US forces to Philippine bases situated near Taiwan’s southern flank under the expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) pact.

The Albanese administration has shown that if a nation holds its ground long enough, China may be willing to accept a new equilibrium in bilateral relations.

The Philippines and others in Southeast Asia could draw diplomatic inspiration from Australia’s proactive and subtle engagement with China to enhance cooperation in areas of shared concern while drawing hard lines on contested core interests. It’s arguably a balance many in the region need to strike to prevent potentially devastating conflicts.  

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X, formerly Twitter, at @Richeydarian

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What Xi should say over dinner with US CEOs

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The potential for a US-China olive branch moment will tantalize global markets over the next 10 days.

The setting is San Francisco where, first, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen will meet with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng. That rarified exchange today and tomorrow sets the stage for Xi Jinping’s arrival in the city for the November 14-17 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.

There, the hope is that Xi and US President Joe Biden meet on November 15 to re-establish president-to-president level discussions. To be sure, no one expects big breakthroughs. That’s why Beijing and Washington are looking “to intentionally keep that bar low,” says economist Jude Blanchette at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington.

Yet the meeting itself would be a tonic for Asian economies caught in the middle as the two superpowers parry and thrust on a range of touchy issues. In fact, Xi’s scheduled dinner meeting with American corporate chieftains could prove to be more pivotal for bilateral relations.

The dinner meeting will be a rare opportunity for the Chinese Communist Party leader to reassure top US CEOs that Asia’s biggest economy is still open for business and that actions his lieutenants are taking now will morph economic headwinds into tailwinds in short order.

The speed with which capital has been fleeing China suggests that Xi’s efforts to communicate that Beijing is in control of its myriad challenges are not getting through. In recent months, Xi and Premier Li Qiang have rolled out a variety of policies to stabilize a cratering property market and weak demand.

Global investors, though, aren’t getting that memo as new threats emerge atop of old. In September, investment capital outflows from China saw their biggest net decline in nearly eight years; outflows hit nearly US$12 billion in the third quarter.

This is the first time on record that foreign investment into China went negative, according to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. That speaks to the sharp deterioration in China’s perceived economic prospects and a continued collapse in confidence in its state-led model under Xi’s leadership.

There’s confusion in international circles, too, about Xi’s commitment to giving the private sector and market forces “decisive” roles in Beijing’s decision-making. That 2012 pledge was first called into question in 2015 when Xi’s government intervened aggressively to stabilize Shanghai stocks.

Questions only increased after Xi began cracking down hard on mainland tech platforms in late 2020, starting with Jack Ma’s Alibaba Group. The inquisition rapidly widened to Baidu, Didi Global, JD.com, Tencent and other top internet companies. The clampdown had some Wall Street banks debating whether China might be “uninvestable.”

Alibaba founder Jack Ma in a file photo. Image: Facebook

In the months since Li took charge of reforms in March, the government has repeatedly promised to treat private sector companies on par with state-owned enterprises and increase outreach efforts with tech firm founders.

Yet a perceived lack of follow-through is drawing complaints about “promise fatigue,” including from the head of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China.

As President Jens Eskelund told Bloomberg: the chamber has “not yet seen signs of willingness to implement structural reforms needed to address the fundamental challenges facing China and allow foreign and private companies to deliver on their potential for supporting the Chinese economy.”

The ongoing decoupling, de-risking and de-globalization trends pitting Xi’s Beijing against Biden’s Washington hardly help at a moment when US bond yields are at 17-year highs.

“Capital outflow pressures may persist in light of the unfavorable interest rate differentials,” notes economist Maggie Wei at Goldman Sachs Group Inc.

Morgan Stanley strategist Laura Wang adds that foreign outflows from China’s A-share market is in “an unprecedented stage.” Between August 7 to October 19 alone, cumulative outflows topped $22 billion. That is the largest in the history of Stock Connect, which links mainland and Hong Kong bourses.

All this raises the stakes for Xi’s dinner with top CEOs. It’s an ideal opportunity to reboot Beijing’s faltering effort to win back the foreign investment crowd. And to slow the exodus of companies diversifying supply chains away from China to reduce risks.

Goal one is allaying concerns that China’s economy is heading into a dismal 2024. Many investors worry the International Monetary Fund is looking through rose-colored glasses when it projects China will grow 4.6% in 2023 amid property sector weakness and subdued external demand for Chinese exports.

China, for example, slipped back into deflation in October. The consumer price index fell 0.2% year on year after a flat reading in September.

What’s more, “there are signs that activity has started to slow entering the fourth quarter,” says economist Carlos Casanova at Union Bancaire Privée. “That means that policymakers need to remain on high alert and continue to support the economic recovery.”

To date, he added, the People’s Bank of China “has been reluctant to deploy stimulus measures in 2023, against the backdrop of higher US rates and a strong dollar. However, we believe that another 10 basis-point rate cut and an additional 25 basis-point reserve requirement ratio cut will be necessary in December.”

China stocks and the yuan currency are down as foreign investors flee the scene. Image: Twitter

Even more important, Xi must convince executives that big supply-side disruption is coming. Bold steps to repair the property sector, increase productivity, level playing fields for entrepreneurs, recalibrate growth engines from investment to domestic demand and create bigger social safety nets are needed to head off growing “Japanification” comparisons.

Beijing is quick to dismiss talk of a Japan-like funk. “China’s current situation is vastly different from what Japan used to be in,” says Liu Shijin, a member of the PBOC’s monetary policy committee. Claims that China is falling into a “balance-sheet recession” like Japan in the 1990s are off-base, Liu claims.

China, Liu argues, still has policy scope to pivot to an innovation and consumption-led growth model that enables the government to gain control of its debt trajectory.

Trouble is, the external sector might be less hospitable to Xi’s hopes to recalibrate growth engines — reducing the rapid economic growth rates needed to win party-wide support to push through sweeping and disruptive reforms.

As the IMF notes in its latest assessment: “Over the medium term, growth is projected to gradually decline to about 3.5% by 2028 amid headwinds from weak productivity and population aging.” The IMF’s economists also warn that financial stability risks are elevated and increasing “as financial institutions have lower capital buffers and growing asset quality risks.”

Geopolitical tensions loom large, too. A September survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai cited Sino-US hostility as a major reason why foreign companies are looking for exit ramps from China to other Asian economies. In its own survey, UBS Group cited India, Japan and Vietnam as “top destinations” that are “gaining more attention.”

The good news is that Xi’s inner circle seems to be turning away from the “wolf warrior” antics of recent years.

Recent sit-downs, and those to come, “have sent out positive signals and raised the expectations of the international community on the improvement of China-US relations,” Vice President Han Zheng told Bloomberg.

“A stable and sound China-US relationship is the common expectation of all sectors in our two countries and the international community as a whole. We’re ready to strengthen communication and dialogue with the US at all levels,” Han said.

Team Biden, too, seems keen to lower the bilateral temperature. Of course, the White House’s actions must speak louder than words. Generally, those actions tend to be focused on Chinese containment.

Last month, Biden’s trade representatives again narrowed the types of semiconductors that US companies can sell to China. In doing so, it closed loopholes in existing policies with particular emphasis on limiting China’s ability to compete in supercomputing and artificial intelligence.

“The upshot is that China’s ability to reach the technological frontier in the development of large-scale AI models will be hampered by US export controls,” says Julian Evans-Pritchard, head of China economics at Capital Economics. This could have even bigger implications, he adds, since “we think AI has the potential to be a game-changer for productivity growth over the next couple decades.”

US and China are locked in a race for technological supremacy that will define the course of the 21st century. Image: Facebook

But the more important signal Xi must send to CEOs in San Francisco is that his team is getting under the Chinese economy’s hood. One law of economic gravity that Xi’s team has tried to beat these last 10 years is the idea that a developing nation must build credible and trusted markets before trillions of dollars of outside capital arrive.

In China’s case, this means increasing transparency, making local government officials more accountable, prodding companies to raise their governance games, crafting reliable surveillance mechanisms like credit rating companies and strengthening the financial architecture before the world shows up.

Too often, Xiconomics has China trying to flip the script, believing it can build a world-class financial system after waves of foreign capital arrive. And the Xi era’s efforts to communicate that a financial Big Bang is afoot continue to get lost in translation in boardrooms from New York to London to Tokyo.

The sense that Xi’s China tends to over-promise and under-deliver financial upgrade-wise was first seen in the summer of 2015, back when Shanghai shares plunged by one-third in three weeks. Beijing’s response was to treat the symptoms of the market rout, not the underlying causes.

Since then, Xi stepped up the pace of winning Chinese stocks places in top global indices, from MSCI for stocks to FTSE-Russell for bonds. Yet increases in access to yuan-denominated assets has often outpaced the reforms needed to prepare China Inc for global prime time.

Whether China can win back investors’ trust is an open question. As Chinese stocks are reminding us – as well as a yuan down 5.6% this year – there are certain laws of gravity that still apply to economies transitioning from state-driven and export-led growth to economies centered more on services, innovation and domestic consumption.

In San Francisco next week, Xi has an ideal opportunity to convince top Western decision-makers that they can indeed believe the hype about China’s prospects for 2023 and beyond. Investors of all stripes love to hear a great growth opportunity story. China has one, but Xi needs to prove he’s genuine about the narrative.

William Pesek is on X, formerly Twitter, at @WilliamPesek

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EU loud, ASEAN silent on China’s economic coercion

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In October 2023, the European Parliament approved the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) with 578 votes in favor, 24 against, and 19 nays. &nbsp,

The European Commission will look into possible cases of economic force under this legislation and report its findings to the congress. If the legislature is satisfied that force has taken place but is unable to end it diplomatically, it may get restitution from the insulting party or put in place countermeasures.

At the 2023 G7 Hiroshima Summit, where member states unveiled the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion ( CPEC ), this was also on the agenda. This mechanism will make it easier to share information and issue first warnings, allowing for the implementation of proactive measures to combat&nbsp, financial coercion, and threats.

While American policymakers have been thinking about this issue and countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, and other nations have officially objected to economic coercion, the issue has received less attention in Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asian nations have been less frequently the goals of coercive actions than nations like Australia and South Korea, which can be explained by their hedging tactics and dislike of political increase. However, this does not imply that they need to lower their troops.

Chinese borders officials immediately decided to&nbsp in September 2023, halt imports and n&bp, and turn up six tonnes of Taiwanese lobsters, forcing vendors to market their produce for a fourth of the going rate. China is the largest destination andnbsp for crab exports in Vietnam. &nbsp,

Profits have resumed, but this incident might get a reaction to Vietnam’s mid-September upgrade andnbsp of its Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the United States. Similar politically motivated restrictions have been imposed in the past on Philippine&nbsp, bananas&inbph, and Vietnamese&ndbhpH, lychees & bbch.

At the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting, which was held online as a result of the Covid- 19 pandemic, in Hanoi on September 9, 2020, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi ( C on screen ) speaks to the other countries in the region. Asia Times Files, AFP, and Nhac Nguyen

Given their susceptibility to economic pressure, especially from Beijing, complacency from South Asian states may be inappropriate. China is the largest trading partner of all Association of South East Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) members, with the exception of Laos and Brunei. It is also the biggest investment partner and nbsp of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunéi, Cambodia, and the Philippines. &nbsp,

Additionally, research has discovered a negative correlation between the per capita success of the target state and the effectiveness of Taiwanese coercion, supporting the idea that poorer nations are more susceptible to economic pressure.

Some Southeast Asian nations are also likely to experience stronger political ramifications from Chinese financial strain. China frequently focuses on districts that are crucial to the local politics of the intended states in order to impose social costs on their leaders. &nbsp,

Due to Chinese sanctions and company leaders ‘ outcry against their president’s sea activity in the South China Sea, this strategy was only partially successful there.

Southeast Asian nations ought to take proactive measures to safeguard their markets. ASEAN nations should n’t rely on the G7’s goodwill, despite the fact that its CPEC is intended to safeguard both its members and smaller economies. &nbsp,

When China outlawed the trade of American goods like coal, barley, and wine, Washington’s support was merely rhetorical. The sanctions truly had an impact on the United States because it increased its own exports of those commodities by$ 4.6 billion.

By adopting a “defensive” monetary policy, relatively weaker states can also defend themselves against financial force. For instance, steps like building up foreign exchange reserves and expanding local capital markets may stop capital flight. It is also best practice for institutions to recognize monetary coercion, support, and affected industries when they are badly targeted.

The most effective measures to prevent economic coercion will remain international because South Asian states may compete with China’s economic weight. ASEAN is unlikely to be able to replicate an organization like the ACI or an nbsp. &nbsp,

Its prescriptive nature runs counter to ASEAN’s standard style, which places a strong emphasis on consensus, non-interference, and state sovereignty. Additionally, there is still disagreement among Southeast Asian nations regarding China, and they have found it difficult to come to an understanding on policies that could hurt Beijing.

Just when parties are willing to collectively phone out and listen to financial force and discuss the costs of retribution that result from a combined response is an arrangement like the ACI effective. However, it is doubtful that ASEAN nations will jeopardize their ties with China and endanger their own markets.

In the absence of a particular anti-coercion measure, ASEAN would gain from advancing programs that guarantee the economies of its members remain empty. Says can divert their trade and investment relationships to reduce costs if they are the targets of economic force when free business operates as intended.

After China imposed supplies bans as part of the trade dispute between the two sides, Australia was able to reroute its petroleum exports. Asia Times Files / ImagineChina via AFP and LiXiaolong

This occurred when Australia found new areas for its exports, selling sanctioned&nbsp fuel to Taiwan, South Korea, and India in order to protect itself from Chinese trade restrictions.

ASEAN can assist in mobilizing support for initiatives that strengthen the resilience and interconnectedness of their markets. Policy formulation in this context may aid in fostering consensus because Asian states have historically found it simpler to agree on financial issues than strategic ones.

The long-term growth of ASEAN may be aided by advocating for a free and fair dealing program, which will also improve says ‘ financial and national security.

Max Broad is a New Colombo Plan Scholar and Research Intern at the International Institute for Strategic Studies-Asia.

This andnbsp, article, and was initially published by East Asia Forum and are being reprinted with a Creative Commons license.

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The great AI regulation race is on

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A wide range of tasks involving machines carrying out tasks with or without human intervention are referred to as artificial intelligence ( AI ). From visual identification devices and bots to photo editing software and self-driving cars, our knowledge of AI technology is largely shaped by where we encounter them.

If you think of AI, you may imagine technology firms, from established behemoths like Google, Meta, Alibaba, and Baidu to up-and-coming competitors like OpenAI and Anthropic. Governments around the world, which are determining the rules under which AI systems will work, are less obvious.

Tech-savvy regions and countries in Europe, Asia-Pacific, and North America have been enacting laws aimed at AI technology since 2016. ( Australia is falling behind and is still looking into the viability of such rules. )

Worldwide, there are now more than 1, 600 Artificial policies and strategies. The creation and management of AI in the world have been significantly influenced by the European Union, China, the US, and the UK.

In April 2021, when the EU proposed an original framework for restrictions known as the AI Act, efforts to regulate AI started to pick up speed. These guidelines seek to impose duty on companies and customers based on various risks connected to various AI technologies.

China advanced by putting forth its own AI requirements while the EU AI Act was still pending. Politicians have talked about wanting to lead the way and provide global leadership in AI management and development in Chinese press.

China has been regulating certain aspects of Artificial one after another, whereas the EU has taken a complete view. These have included conceptual AI, deep production, or “deepfake” technology, and algorithmic recommendations.

These policies and others will be included in China’s comprehensive framework for AI management. The incremental process gives regulators the flexibility to implement new policy in the face of new risks while allowing them to develop their bureaucratic know-how and governmental capacity.

A “wake-up phone”

China’s rules of AI may have served as a warning to the US. Influential senator Chuck Schumer stated in April that his nation if” never allow China to lead on technology or read the rules of the road” for AI.

The White House issued an executive order on secure, safe, and reliable AI on October 30, 2023. The purchase focuses on particular technological applications while attempting to address broader problems of capital and civil rights.

In addition to the major players, developing IT nations like Japan, Taiwan, Brazil, Italy, Sri Lanka, and India have even tried to put defensive measures in place to reduce any challenges that the widespread adoption of AI might present.

Global AI laws show a struggle against outside influences. On a political level, the US competes diplomatically and economically with China. The EU places a strong emphasis on achieving US independence and establishing its own modern sovereignty.

These regulations are perceived as favoring major former tech companies over up-and-coming competitors on a regional level. This is due to the fact that following the law is frequently costly and may require sources from smaller businesses.

Calling for AI legislation have received support from Tesla, Meta, and Alphabet. In addition, Tesla CEO Elon Musk’s xAI has merely introduced its first product, a robot called Grok, and Alphabet-owned Google has joined Amazon in investing billions in OpenAI rival Anthropic.

shared perception

Shared passions between the parties are evident in the AI Act of the EU, China’s AI requirements, and the executive order from the White House. Together, they prepared the ground for past year’s” Turing declaration,” in which 28 nations—including the US, UK, China, Australia, and a number of Union members—promised assistance on AI protection.

AI is seen as a benefit to nations or regions ‘ economic growth, regional stability, and global leadership. All areas are attempting to help AI development and innovation despite the acknowledged risks.

By one estimate, global spending on AI-centric techniques could surpass US$ 300 billion by 2026. The conceptual AI industry alone could be fair$ 1.3 trillion by 2032, according to a Bloomberg statement.

The pleasant page for the ChatGPT software from OpenAI. Photo: Leon Neal, Getty Images, and Asia Times Files

These statistics, along with discussions of alleged advantages from software companies, regional governments, and consulting firms, frequently dominate media coverage of AI. Tones of criticism are frequently ignored.

Countries use AI techniques for defense, security, and defense applications in addition to economic ones.

International conflicts were evident at the UK’s AI security conference. China endorsed the Enigma declaration made on the first day of the summit, but it was not included in the next day’s public events.

China’s cultural payment system, which has little transparency, is one area of contention. According to the EU’s AI Act, cultural scoring systems of this kind pose an intolerable risk.

China’s opportunities in AI pose a threat to US regional and economic security, particularly in the form of attacks and disinformation campaigns, according to the US.

International cooperation on conditional AI regulations is likely to be hampered by these tensions.

the restrictions of laws

Existing AI restrictions have major restrictions as well. For example, current regulations across jurisdictions do not include a clear, typical set of definitions of various types of Artificial technology.

There is concern about how useful the latest legal definitions of AI are because they are frequently very large. Rules cover a wide range of systems that pose various risks and may require various treatments because of their large range.

It is difficult to ensure exact legal compliance because many regulations lack exact definitions for danger, safety, transparency, fairness, and non-discrimination.

Additionally, local states are starting to implement their own rules within the national structures. These might solve particular issues and aid in balancing the growth and regulation of AI.

Two bills have been introduced in California to control AI job. A technique for rating, managing, and monitoring the provincial level of AI development has been put forth by Shanghai.

Yet, limiting the definition of AI technology, as China has done, raises the possibility that businesses will figure out a way to circumvent the regulations.

Nearby, national, and international organizations are developing sets of “best practices” for AI leadership, with oversight from organizations like the UN’s AI advisory panel and the US National Institute of Standards and Technology.

The current AI leadership structures from the UK, US, EU, and, to some extent, China are likely to be used as examples. Both social consensus and, more importantly, nationwide and geopolitical interests will serve as the foundation for international cooperation.

Fan Yang, doctoral research brother at the American Graduate School of Policing and Security, Charles Sturt University, and the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society, The University of Melbourne and Ausma Bernot

Under a Creative Commons license, this post has been republished from The Conversation. Read the original publication.

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Failed US diplomacy gives Israel a free vengeful hand

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The latest risk of an impending larger regional issue is that Israel has given notice that it intends to destroy Hamas employees not only in the Gaza Strip but also outside of Israel and the West Bank. Qatar and Turkey were mentioned as hosting Hamas leaders in the official statement.

According to the caution, which was issued by an Israeli military spokesman, Israel will follow its enemies worldwide if it is successful in eliminating Hamas guideline and military supplies from Gaza.

” The order is unquestionably to kill or capture all of the Hamas officials. Jonathan Conricus, a spokeswoman for the Israel Defense Forces, identified those responsible for organizing, facilitating, and carrying out the murderous murder in Israel on October7. ” Every single one of them is a dying man walking. It wo n’t be long before these Hamas leaders are either taken prisoner by Israel or put to death by it both inside and outside of Gaza.

He asserted that” all of them may give a price,” implying that Israel might continue to conduct an international manhunt of Hamas representatives even after the Gaza Strip military operation is complete.

After the 1972 Munich Olympics, during which the Black September Palestinian terror group kidnapped and killed 11 Jewish sports, like a search-and-kill activity was mounted for nearly two years. The impact of the Munich slaughter was accompanied by anger and fear among Israelis.

Israeli intelligence officials searched for and killed Black September employees worldwide for several years. The deaths of about 1,300 Israeli civilians by Hamas insurgents on October 7, 2023, have sparked calls for retaliation within Israel.

The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who spent five weeks barnstorming the area, made the IDF announcement after a series of political problems last weekend.

The major US diplomat made an effort to convince Israel to change its hardline war strategy and to persuade NATO ally Turkey and pleasant Arab governments to support American military support for Israel and acknowledge that the US even wants to defend Palestinian civilians.

During his Middle East journey, no everyone wanted to meet Blinken. BBC Screengrab photo

Evidently, Blinken’s pleas were unsuccessful in gaining assistance. It was an strange, and probably for Washington, available display of less US effect in the area. The Middle East, which is notoriously unstable, is where the crisis has hampered President Joe Biden’s foreign policy in a way he did n’t anticipate.

The Middle East area is quieter now than it has been in two years now, said Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security advisor, only eight weeks prior to the Hamas attack.

During his trip to Tel Aviv, Blinken suggested that Israel set aside regular “humanitarian delay” times to allow foods, water, and medicine to enter the Gaza Strip carefully from Egypt. Israel had already been urged by Biden to uphold global regulations for protecting civilians during combat rather than succumb to “rage.”

Blinken also reiterated Biden’s visit for the restoration of the 25-year-old” two-state option” proposal to establish a sovereign Palestine bordering Israel in order to end its protracted conflict with the Palestinians.

Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel, rejected Biden’s tranquility proposal and military advice. Except for one call to allow the return of 240 hostages held hostage by Hamas, he disregarded calling for a cease-fire. &nbsp,

Netanyahu stated on November 6 that” I made it clear that we are moving forward at full speed and that Israel rejects any momentary cease-fire that does not require the transfer of the kidnapped Israelis.”

Netanyahu continued by saying that Hamas uses Israeli civilians as “human spears” in front of Israeli military targets, endangering them. Except for sporadic lines for” an hour here, an hour it,” he did not offer a steady entry of supply routes into Gaza from Egypt that were free from bombing.

Roads that have often been declared available can be dangerous: A seaside road intended for secure Palestinian travel from north to south has come under fire from Zionist martial snipers.

Even after the present war is over, the Israeli leader foresaw that military conflict in the Gaza Strip might continue to occur frequently. Netanyahu told the American ABC News network,” I think Israel will have the overall security responsibility for an indefinite period because we’ve seen what happens when we do n’t have it.”

A two-state answer is not something Netanyahu is engaged in. Photo: Social

The two-state option, which Netanyahu has opposed throughout his political career, is never brought up. He chose not to attend Blinken’s goodbyes press conference on November 5 in an apparent attempt to avoid any unsightly show of conflict. It was the first time people may recall that a visiting US secretary of state had been treated so poorly by an Israeli prime minister.

In Amman, Jordan, Blinken met with representatives from the Arab nations that control a portion of the West Bank, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and the Palestinian Authority. They boldly expressed disagreement with Biden’s approach to the Gaza conflict.

They categorically stated that a cease-fire was required to put an end to the shooting and establish lasting peace, rejecting the nebulous “pause” phrases.

Ayman Safadi, the foreign minister of Jordan, stated that the Egyptian rulers wanted a ceasefire and conversations over the two-state remedy after meeting with Blinken. We ought to put an end to this crazy and begin conversing.

Many local governments that are friendly to the US have encountered pro-Palestinian demonstrations. The death toll in Gaza, which health officials estimate to be over 10,000, has sparked outrage. In their quotes, Gazza authorities do not separate military casualties from human deaths.

Another prevent on Blinken’s journey, Turkey, added insult to injury. Hakan Fidan, the foreign secretary, and Blinken met, but President Recep Tayyip Erdogan canceled the appointment. Turkey leaders had long been expected to meet with a visiting US secretary of state, just like they had done with Jewish prime ministers.

Blinken offered himself a solace prize at the conclusion of his journey: at least everyone appeared anxious to converse.

The fundamental of American engagement and American leadership is one of the common numerator that I’ve heard throughout this journey. &nbsp, Every nation I speak with wants us to take the initiative in our politics efforts to try to advance all of these various features of the crisis,” he said as his departure from the area on November 6. He continued,” All of this is a work in progress.”

Yet before Blinken arrived back in Washington, Washington sent political reinforcements; on November 5, US Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns visited the area. Burns has served as Biden’s political fireman, embarking on missions that may have been very contentious for his low-key consular style.

In order to reprimand Libyans for the presence of Russian private militias in the nation, Biden sent Burns to Libya this yr. Afterward, he traveled to Saudi Arabia to criticize China for mediating negotiations to resume Saudi-Iranian relations without first consulting Washington.

William Burns, the chairman of the CIA, is crucial to Biden’s Middle East diplomacy. Asia Times Files, AFP, and Saul Loeb

Burns arrived in Israel for the first time on November 5 and brought with him a strategy for how to set up an “tactical delay” in the Gaza Strip. After Israel left, he continued to Egypt and requested that President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi provide safety troops to help maintain Gaza. The troubled Sisi declined his offer.

Israel’s air and ground unpleasant in Gaza persisted unabatedly. To remove hidden Hamas rulers and units from Gaza City, the largest city in the Arab area, Israeli troops had entered. As the conflict entered its next month, Israeli authorities reported that about 100 Hamas officials had perished in the Jewish travel into Gaza.

Biden, according to deniers, may take his time with politics so that Israel can defeat Hamas. As US president have done for smaller attacks in the past, Sultan Barakat, a professor of crises studies at Qatar’s Hamad Bin Khalifa University, predicted that Biden would ultimately require that Israel ending its war, though not immediately.

He said,” The American clock is ticking, but it might be slower than usual.”

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The AI regulation battle is only just beginning

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It’s amazing that the United States has just recently released distinct rules regarding the technology given the rate of development in artificial intelligence in recent years.

President Joe Biden andnbsp issued an executive order at the end of October to guarantee” healthy, secure, and reliable artificial intelligence.” The order establishes new guidelines for AI health in general, including fresh privacy measures intended to safeguard consumers.

The executive order is a crucial step toward reasonable rules of this fast developing technology, even though Congress has not yet passed complete regulations dictating the use and development of AI.

The fact that the US did n’t already have any such AI protections on the books may surprise casual observers. The rest of the world is even further on, according to a meeting of 28 institutions for the AI Safety Summit&nbsp last week in the UK.

Attendees at the storied former spy bottom Bletchley Park were able to come to an understanding to collaborate on security research to prevent the” severe harm” that AI might cause.

The US, China, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are among the members to the &nbsp declaration, which was a rare political revolution for the UK but was brief on specifics. The US promoted its own fresh guardrails&nbsp as something that the rest of the world should emulate through the celebration.

To comprehend that AI is a crucial component of one of the most significant technological shifts humanity has ever experienced, you do n’t need to be an expert in computing.

AI has the ability to alter how we think and teach ourselves. It may alter our working practices and render some work unnecessary. To produce these results, AI systems typically gather enormous amounts of data over the empty Online. There’s a good chance that some of your data is being used to power AI platforms like ChatGPT by huge language versions. &nbsp,

AI engages in battle

This is merely the beginning of the ice. AI is now being used in Israel’s businesses in Gaza to aid in the decision-making process. According to Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate&nbsp, the military “produces trusted target quickly and accurately” using AI and another “automated” tools.

The new AI-powered resources are being used for the” first occasion to immediately give ground forces in the Gaza Strip with updated information on target to attack,” according to an unnamed senior official.

This represents a significant increase in Artificial use across the board, not just among Palestinians. As a part of Israel’s sizable and potent weapons-technology industry, the technologies being tested in Gaza will almost certainly been exported.

Simply put, various issues, from Africa to South America, could immediately use the AI techniques used to assault Israeli targets. &nbsp,

Issues with Artificial security, consumer security, and privacy are specifically addressed in Biden’s executive order. New safety assessments of new and existing AI platforms, capital and civil rights direction, and analysis on AI’s effect on the labour market are all required by the order&nbsp.

The US government will now be required to receive health exam results from some AI businesses. The Commerce Department has been asked to develop guidelines for AI hashing and a security system that you develop AI tools to help find bugs in important software.

There has been some activity in recent years, despite the fact that the US and other European nations have been slow to draft complete AI rules.

A thorough&nbsp, AI risk management framework was outlined by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology ( NIST ) this year. The professional order of the Biden administration was based on the report. Importantly, the administration has given the Commerce Department—which houses the NIST—the authority to assist with get implementation. &nbsp,

Need for conformity

Finding buy-in from top American tech companies will now be the problem. Biden’s order wo n’t accomplish much without their cooperation and a framework for punishing businesses that break the law.

There is still a ton of work to be done. Over the past 20 years, technology firms have mostly been able to grow without much supervision. The connected world of technology, where businesses have developed new goods or services outside of the US, contributes to this.

For instance, the ground-breaking AWS sky hosting systems from Amazon was created and developed significantly from American regulators at the University of Cape Town in South Africa. &nbsp,

The Biden presidency could look for more detailed laws and regulations with sincere buy-in from top businesses. Strong government involvement in tech generally carries a chance of stifling technology. However, smaller nations with understanding markets have a clear chance to intervene.

Artificial protection can be used by nations like Estonia and the UAE that have invested in their understanding markets, have little groups ( and regulatory situations ). In cities like Dubai, where foreign tech companies have established regional offices, this would have a significant impact.

These smaller nations have less red tape, so AI regulations can be rapidly passed and, perhaps more importantly, changed if they overly restrict development.

The global community cannot wait for larger nations or coalitions like the United States and the European Union to push through regulations first given the hyper-connected world of technology enhancement. Instead, regulations that meet their needs should be implemented in new markets with it economies to take into account. &nbsp,

The speed at which AI technology is developing is astounding. We do n’t have the luxury of waiting for world leaders to take action first because it is so crucial to the overall technology sector. It’s time to set an example for others, and AI laws are a great place to start.

The copyright-holding Syndication Bureau, &nbsp, provided this content.

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Luring investment a high priority for Xi’s US trip

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On November 15, the heads of state of China and the US did meet in person to discuss the trade dispute, technology bans, political issues, and Taiwan-related issues.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry announced on Wednesday that they will match on the sidelines of the APEC Summit, which will take place from November 15 to 17.

On November 14, 2022, US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping next met in Bali, Indonesia.

Major US business professionals will be invited to dinner with Xi on November 15 during his trip the following week, according to a Bloomberg report. &nbsp,

It is anticipated that Xi may take advantage of this opportunity to urge US businesses to invest in China, which has experienced capital outflows this time.

Breakfast with Xi

At a dinner meal co-hosted by the National Committee on US-China Relations and the US- China Business Council, Xi may speak as the special guest of honor. &nbsp,

To attend the event, each student must spend US$ 2,000.00. For US$ 40, 000 each, eight VIPs will be able to eat at a desk with Xi.

The most significant diplomatic relationship in the world is that between China and the US. The future of humanity will depend on how China and the US getting on, Xi said on October 9 to the bipartisan US Senate committee led by Majority Leader Chuck Schumer in Beijing.

We have a thousand motives to enhance China-US relations, but not one purpose to destroy them, he said, saying this repeatedly, including to many leaders.

In light of a decline in China’s foreign direct investment ( FDI) by 14.7 % year over year to about US$ 132.9 billion in the first nine months of this year, Xi made his remarks. &nbsp,

Since August, China’s Ministry of Commerce has stopped stating its foreign direct investment ( FDI) in dollar terms. Asia Times estimated the 14.7 % decline using the FDI in renminbi terms. &nbsp,

According to data released by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange ( SAFE ) on November 3, direct investment liabilities, a measure of FDI, were down$ 11.8 billion in the third quarter compared to US14.1 billion during the same time last year.

For the first time since 1998, the weekly number is negative, indicating that China is having trouble luring international businesses and investments.

A difficult path lies away.

According to Wang Wenbin, a spokeswoman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” the two sides have agreed to work together for the meeting between the two Presidents in San Francisco.”

He said,” In the interim, it wo n’t be easy sailing to San Francisco, and we cannot leave it to autopilot to get us there.” ” The two sides must go back to what the two President in Bali agreed upon and actually take action on it.”

Beijing believes that the US has failed to carry out the agreement reached by Xi and Biden in the Bali meeting over the previous month. The discussion was characterized by Beijing as “five hoo” and “four no- purposes.”

The “five noes” are Biden’s assurances that the US wo n’t try to start a new Cold War, alter the Chinese political system, reestablish alliances with China, support Taiwan independence, or support two Chinas or “one China on Taiwan.” The “four no-intentions” indicate that the US has no desire to engage in combat with China, to try to de-couple with it, obstruct China’s financial advancements, or to contain China. &nbsp,

Chinese officials have repeatedly stated since the Bali conference that the US has accede to China’s “reasonable problems,” or “five needs,” which include the cancellation of additional tariffs imposed on Chinese goods, sanctions against Chinese businesses, investment restrictions, device export controls, and US-imposed Xinjiang solution bans. &nbsp,

Bao Ming, a retired military officer of the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ), writes in an article that was published on Tuesday that” the US must meet several reasonable concerns and requirements of China” in order to realize the Sino-US summit in San Francisco. &nbsp,

He claims that” the US, no China, failed to keep its guarantees.”

The Biden administration has attempted to improve relations with China but has encountered robust domestic resistance, he acknowledges some real social constraints on how far BiDEN you go.

Due to intense social pressure from Republicans and perhaps Democrats, Bao claims it is difficult for Biden to change his position on business, the high-tech restrictions, Taiwan, Ukraine, or South China Sea problems. &nbsp,

He claims that in order for Biden to overcome social challenges and make China and the US’ shared interests outweigh their differences, only a significant incident event like the Pearl Harbor incident or the September 11 incident can do so.

He continues by saying that the Israeli-Palestinian issue, which has the potential to escalate into a major local battle, may present China and the US with an opportunity to begin working together.

Read: Chinese tech giants ‘ “de- risk,” but deliberately

At&nbsp, @jeffpao3 is Jeff Pao’s Twitter account.

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