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China’s leader Xi Jinping will meet President Biden Nov. 15 in San Francisco with four high cards in his hand. Policy advisers close to Xi express an unprecedented kind of confidence in China’s strategic position. 

First, the collapse of Ukraine’s offensive against Russian forces and its commander’s admission that the war is a “stalemate” is a setback for America’s strategic position and a gain for China, which has doubled its exports to Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. 

Second, the US tech war on China has flopped, as Chinese AI firms buy fast Huawei processers in place of chips from Nvidia and other US producers.

Third, the Gaza war provoked by Hamas on October 7 gives China a free option to act as the de facto leader of the Global South in opposition to Israel, an American ally. China now exports more to the Muslim world than it does to the United States.

And fourth, the US military wants to avoid confrontation with China in the Northwest Pacific region as well as its home waters in the South China Sea, where the PLA’s thousands of surface-to-ship missiles and nearly 1,000 fourth- and fifth-generation warplanes give China an overwhelming home-theater advantage in firepower.

Mutual fear of war

In the background of the Biden-Xi summit is a fear – shared by both sides – that a US-China confrontation could lead to war.

Henry Kissinger told the Economist last May: “We’re in the classic pre-World War 1 situation where neither side has much margin of political concession and in which any disturbance of the equilibrium can lead to catastrophic consequences.”

A prominent advisor to China’s Communist Party, Renmin University Professor Jin Canrong, told “The Observer” on November 9, “The world today has entered an era of great struggle: the old order dominated by the West. It is disintegrating, but the new order has not yet been established.” Jin compared the world situation to China’s bloody Warring States period (475 BCE to 221 BCE). 

A major concern on the American side is the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal to a projected 1,000 warheads by 2030, from just 220 in 2020. A November 10 commentary in Foreign Affairs warns, “Chinese analysts are worried that the United States has lowered its threshold for nuclear use – including allowing for limited first use in a Taiwan conflict – and that the US military is acquiring new capabilities that could be used to destroy or significantly degrade China’s nuclear forces.”

Newsom shows how to pull back

A foretaste of the Biden-Xi discussions came from the October 25 Beijing visit of California Governor Gavin Newsom, the likeliest 2024 Democratic presidential candidate should Biden withdraw for health reasons or in response to Congressional investigations of his personal and family finances. A widely-circulated scenario for the upcoming presidential race foresees Newsom replacing an ailing Biden at the top of the Democratic ticket.

Significantly, Newsom has been quoted as saying that he had “expressed my support for the One-China policy … as well as our desire not to see independence” of Taiwan. Newsome spoke of “renewing our friendship and re-engaging [on] foundational and fundamental issues that will determine our collective faith in the future.”

Newsom’s clear rejection of Taiwanese independence contrasts with Biden’s earlier statements that although the US is “not encouraging their being independent,” independence is “their decision.” Biden had also declared that the US has a “commitment” to defend Taiwan, drawing protests from China’s Foreign Ministry. Biden is likely to sound more reassuring – that is, more like Newsom – in San Francisco.

PLA might, assertiveness grow

The growing assertiveness of China’s navy and air force in the South China Sea also worries the US military. China in effect dared the United States to get into a scrap by suspending the hotline between the militaries of the two nations. Last month a Pentagon official complained complained that Chinese warplanes had conducted 200 risky maneuvers near US aircraft since 2021.

The conventional arm of the PLA Rocket Force “is the largest ground-based missile force in the world, with over 2,200 conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles and with enough anti-ship missiles to attack every US surface combatant vessel in the South China Sea with enough firepower to overcome each ship’s missile defense,” Major Christopher J. Mihal wrote in 2021 in a US Army journal.

Chips war boomerangs

America’s restrictions on high-end chip exports to China failed to prevent Huawei Technologies from offering a new smartphone as well as Artificial Intelligence processors with performance comparable to or close to what’s achieved by the products of Nvidia and other US designers. On November 7, Reuters reported that the Chinese Internet giant Baidu had ordered 1,600 of Huawei’s 910B Ascend AI chips, reportedly on par with the Nvidia A100 Graphics Processing Unit, the most popular AI processor.

Nvidia, meanwhile, has offered a new set of chips for the Chinese market scaled down to conform to new Commerce Department restrictions announced last month. As Semianalysis, a consulting firm, reported on November 9, “To our surprise Nvidia still found a way to ship high-performance GPUs into China with their upcoming H20, L20, and L2 GPUs. Nvidia already has product samples for these GPUs and they will go into mass production within the next month, yet again showing their supply chain mastery.”

Exploiting the Gaza crisis

With its leading economic presence in the Muslim world, China sees the Gaza war as a rallying point for sentiment against the United States and its allies. “The voice of the Global South has become louder and louder, the Arab world in the Middle East is moving toward reconciliation, and the voice of the Third World continues to grow on the international stage,” wrote Jin Canrong in the cited ”Observer” piece on November 9. “China can be seen in these landmark events, and these countries have increasingly high expectations and calls for China.”

Significantly, Jin included Israel as part of the core of Western countries:

Everyone keeps talking about the West, but what exactly does the West mean? The West refers to three big countries and four small countries. The three big countries are the United States, Europe, and Japan, and the four small countries are Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel. They are a small, closed circle that other countries cannot enter. There is a group of right-wing intellectuals in China who still dream of joining the West. Even if they demolish the Forbidden City and build the White House in its place, they will not be able to get in. If they go in, they will be servants guarding the palace, like Japan and South Korea.

Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been a consistent American ally, buying most of its military hardware from the US and jointly developing a variety of weapons systems, but it has not acted as a core member of the Western alliance. Unlike New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, Israel does not belong to the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing group. And it refused to provide lethal aid to Ukraine.

Israel and China: what might have been

Israel and China, moreover, both have problems with Muslim terrorism and have held informal discussions on possible cooperation – none of which have led to practical agreements.

In 2019, I attended a closed-door seminar with prominent Chinese and Israeli security specialists, under Chatham House rules (speakers cannot be identified). A prominent Chinese policy advisor asked the Israelis to help China explain its policy towards the Muslim Uyghur minority in Xinjiang province to the American government.

A former top Israeli official responded

Will Israel help China with the US? We have experience in this regard. It’s no longer a secret. The Egyptian ambassador to Washington said publicly that Egypt could not have gotten through the last four years of the Obama administration without the support of Israel. We helped with Congress and the White House. The success of [Egyptian president] El-Sisi against the Muslim Brotherhood was important. But if we help China, we have to ask, why? You expect us to defend your policy toward Uyghurs. Will you defend our policy vs Hamas? No. Why should we defend you? Change your policy first. You can’t expect Israel to do anything when you are condemning Israel.

The Chinese spokesperson protested that China has 20 million Muslims whom it doesn’t want to provoke by voting with Israel at the United Nations, not to mention more than 50 Muslim embassies.

The ranking Israeli in the room retorted that the Indian President, Modi “has more Muslims than you do, and he voted with the US at the UN! India changed policy. It has good relations with Iran, which we don’t like. States like China as well as India are big enough to do what they want. It amazes me that, unlike India, a strong country like China is still explaining that they are too weak to vote against the 57 Muslim countries in the UN. It doesn’t hold water after the experience of India.”

The Chinese advisor responded: “I have witnessed great changes taking place in the US. It is not as tolerant as before. China has become more confident, sometimes overconfident. We face difficult domestic issues. China is turning left domestically, and the US is becoming more conservative.

“Domestic politics have taken a different direction,” he continued, referring to the Trump Administration’s tariffs on Chinese imports. But the Chinese advisor added, “Israel will play a positive role because Israel has a great relationship with the US. Chinese people admire Israel and the Israeli people. Most Chinese people have a good impression. We also have a large Muslim population, and they are pro-Arab. This is a fact.”

China’s darker view

The above are extracts from my verbatim notes on the conversation. This was a rough-and-tumble negotiation, but not a hostile one. China’s tone has changed markedly since then, with a sharply hostile tone towards Israel across all Chinese media.

China’s perception of American intentions has changed in the meantime. In his November 9 “Observer” interview, Jin Canrong added,

Although the world order is chaotic everywhere, the most dangerous element by far is the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Ukraine is an agent and puppet of the United States. American politicians and media have publicly called the Russia-Ukraine conflict a “Proxy War.” There are 193 United Nations member states and more than 200 countries and regions on the planet, but the ones that truly have strategic independence and the ability to destroy each other are China, the United States, and Russia, two of which are in a state of military confrontation.

Sadly, Jin’s harsh words about the US role in the Ukraine war are justified. Regime change in Russia through a sequence of color revolutions on its border has been an obsessive theme of neo-conservative policy since Washington backed the 2004 “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. 

China and the Global South

China sees an opportunity to push back against the United States and is drawing on its heightened standing in the Global South to undermine American geopolitical influence. Since the cited conversation in 2019, China’s exports to the Global South have roughly doubled

Washington has few cards to play, and Biden is likely to respond to his weakened position by back-pedaling on Taiwan.

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The leader of the Russian republic of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, recently authorized police to shoot to kill pro-Palestinian protesters who might take to the streets of Chechnya. The orders came in the wake of an antisemitic riot that broke out on Oct. 29, 2023, in the neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan.

It is not that Kadyrov doesn’t support the Palestinian cause; he does. Rather, the order demonstrates that he has a tight grip on the previously rebellious republic and is able to exert his omnipotent power – a power that extends far beyond the borders of Chechnya, a predominantly Muslim republic in the North Caucasus.

Kadyrov is both feared and venerated throughout Russia, and even more so since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since then, his power and influence have increased significantly within the Russian political sphere. This is due to his contributions to the war effort, including the recruitment of volunteers.

At the same time, he continually flouts the rule of law. In September 2023, for example, Kadyrov posted a video to his Telegram channel showing his 15-year-old son, Adam, beating Nikita Zhuravel, a 19-year-old imprisoned for allegedly burning the Quran in front of a mosque.

Kadyrov praised Adam for possessing the “adult ideals of honor, dignity and defense of his religion.” Russian federal authorities did not condemn the beating of the defenseless prisoner.

How did the leader of a small North Caucasian republic become such a feared figure in Russia?

As scholars of Russian history and Chechen politics, we argue that Kadyrov’s power and political legitimacy are based on brute force, lack of accountability, a personal relationship with Putin and the use of Islam for political gain.

Ruthless rise to power

Ramzan Kadyrov’s late father, Akhmat Kadyrov, was a mufti, or Islamic legal scholar, in Chechnya in the 1990s. He and his son Ramzan were also staunch supporters of Chechen independence.

However, Akhmat Kadyrov’s political and religious disagreement with the Chechen pro-independence government after the first Chechen war from 1994 to 1996 drew him into the orbit of Vladimir Putin.

Shortly after the beginning of the second Chechen war, which lasted from 1999 to 2009, Putin – who increased his power and popularity due to his aggressive role in the conflict – installed Akhmat as the leader of the republic.

When Akhmat was assassinated in 2004, Ramzan was 27 years old – three years too young to legally assume the role as leader in Chechnya. He used these years to consolidate his power and ensure his political ascension. To achieve this, he worked on eliminating his political rivals, including those who were once close to his father. Some were silenced, while others were exiled or murdered.

Ramzan was appointed to lead the republic in 2007 when he turned 30. At that time, Russia was conducting a counterterrorism operation in Chechnya using its federal forces. Kadyrov worked diligently to take control of all security-related matters in the republic and eventually succeeded in building a formidable armed force devoted to him personally.

This highly professional paramilitary force, colloquially known as the “Kadyrovtsy,” is formally integrated into the interior ministry and national guard.

These troops serve as a private army that suppresses dissent within the republic and eliminates Kadyrov’s opponents beyond its borders. Members of Kadyrov’s inner circle have been linked to assassinations of the Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, journalist Anna Politkovskaya, human rights activist Natalya Estemirova and others. Kadyrov has denied any involvement.

Kadyrovtsy also fought in the Syrian civil war as part of Russia’s military support for Syrian president Bashar Assad. They have been present in Ukraine since the start of hostilities in the Donbas region in 2014 and assumed a larger role following the 2022 invasion. This has boosted Kadyrov’s position within the closest circle of Putin’s supporters.

Zealous Putin loyalist

Putin’s ascendance to power in 1999 marked the beginning of the end of the Chechen struggle for independence. Under Putin’s rule, however, Kadyrov and his associates have achieved an unprecedented level of autonomy in the increasingly centralized Russian state.

This autonomy is largely due to the personal relationship between Putin and Kadyrov. Soon after Akhmat Kadyrov’s death, Ramzan famously arrived at the Kremlin wearing a tracksuit, and Putin sincerely comforted the grief-stricken young man. That meeting laid the foundation for a strong patron-client relationship based on Kadyrov’s personal devotion to Putin and the two leaders’ mutual dependence.

In return for Kadyrov’s zealous loyalty and his largely successful efforts in suppressing the North Caucasian insurgency, Putin ceded nearly complete control of Chechnya. He also provided large economic subsidies to Chechnya, enabling Kadyrov to rebuild the republic destroyed by two wars. In the process, Kadyrov became a very wealthy man himself and enriched his close associates.

Kadyrov grew up in a religious family that adhered to the North Caucasian traditional form of Islam called Sufism. Under Kadyrov, Sufism in Chechnya flourished and became the only acceptable form of Islam.

Within Chechnya, Kadyrov uses religion to galvanize supporters and demonstrate his political power. He promotes Islamic values by building mosques and religious schools. He also dictates religious public conduct for the population, including a strict dress code.

This public re-Islamization of the region after a long period of secular communist rule is convenient for Putin as well. It enables the Russian president to demonstrate respect for Islam and gain trust within the Muslim world.

Kadyrov, meanwhile, also uses Islam to boost his profile on the international stage and bolster his political standing in Russia. On Oct. 25, 2023, during Israel’s bombardment of Gaza in the wake of Hamas’ attack on Israel, he expressed his full support for the Palestinian struggle and offered to send his “units” for a peacekeeping mission.

Kadyrov also argues that Chechen units in Ukraine are participating in a holy jihad against the “Western Satanist ideology.” He regularly posts videos from Chechen mosques where attendants pray for victory in Ukraine and liberation of the Palestinians.

‘I am the boss!’

Kadyrov has managed to construct an increasingly hierarchical and oppressive political system, one that revolves around the cult of personality of his late father and Ramzan himself. He presides over Chechnya – which waged two wars against Russia in the past 30 years in pursuit of independence – with impunity.

“I am the boss! I am at the steering wheel!” Kadyrov boldly proclaimed in 2011, a mere four years after Putin installed him as the republic’s president. Since then, he has repeatedly defied human rights and the rule of law. His supporters have engaged in abductions, torture and extortion of money from the Chechen population.

Russian law seems powerless to hold Kadyrov accountable, a fact the Chechen strongman underscored in 2015. In response to a covert operation by the Russian police in Chechnya, Kadyrov ordered Chechen law enforcement to shoot anyone – even federal forces – who entered the republic without prior notice.

In addition to his near-absolute power within Chechnya, Kadyrov wields unprecedented authority in Russia at large. Chechen security forces operate with apparent impunity, kidnapping people from across the Russian Federation. Victims include members of the LGBTQ community, whom Kadyrov deems “nonhuman” and “devils.”

At a time of rising instability within Russia, which is entangled in the disastrous war in Ukraine, Kadyrov maintains his strong grip on power in his republic. While other regional leaders are temporary managers, regularly replaced from Moscow, Kadyrov’s power is deeply entrenched.

Kadyrov sees any public display of discontent as a challenge to his authority, and he is ready to brutally suppress it, as he threatens to do with any pro-Palestinian protests. While he remains loyal to Putin, he has his own agenda and cannot afford to be seen as weak.

His outrageous public breaches of the law, as well as societal and political norms, present a unique challenge – and, at times, liability – for the Putinist political system, of which Kadyrov is a pillar.

Anya Free is Faculty Associate of History, Arizona State University and Marat Iliyasov is Visiting Scholar at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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The stunning Blitzkrieg of Operation 1027 in northern Shan state over the past two weeks will possibly go down as the most pivotal and daring feat of arms in Myanmar’s many decades of civil war.

In the early hours of October 27, combined forces of multiple ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and a handful of allies attacked Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) installations along the border with China and down the main highway linking Mandalay, Lashio and Muse.

The key border posts of Chin Swe Haw and Mong Ko were seized along with 80 military and police bases. More than 120 military bases have since been overrun and sizeable amounts of arms and ammunition seized, including reportedly a number of 14.5 heavy machine guns (HMGs) that can be operated in an anti-aircraft capacity, vital for countering MAF helicopter gunships and fighter jet attacks.

The operation was planned and spearheaded by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the ethnic Kokang Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA), along with allies the Bama Peoples Liberation Army (BPLA), the reformed Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Mandalay People’s Defense Force (MNDF).

Planning such an operation with so many moving parts, players and logistical challenges and achieving the element of surprise makes 1027 an equal parts battlefield and wider psychological victory against the State Administration Council (SAC) junta.

The Brotherhood issued one of its ubiquitous statements (in Burmese and English) outlining the motivations for the operation.

“Our primary objective in launching this operation are multi-faceted and driven by the collective desire to safeguard the lives of civilians, assert our right to self-defense, maintain control over our territory, and respond resolutely to ongoing artillery and attacks and airstrikes… we are dedicated to eradicating the oppressive military dictatorship, a shared aspiration of the entire Myanmar population… (and) combating the widespread online gambling fraud that has plagued Myanmar.”

It is too early to assemble a clear picture of the multidimensional operation. The MAF is still sending resupply columns to the theater of operations, which the TNLA and MPDF are reportedly ambushing on the main road around Kyaukme close to Mandalay Region. Heavy use of air power and artillery, including Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), are harassing the alliance forces but ultimately ground troops must retake territory.

Does the MAF have the foot soldiers to retake over 100 bases, which assuming they existed prior to 1027 still hold some importance to the military? Resistance attacks in Karenni and Karen states, as well as major attacks in Sagaing Region including the capture of Kawlin by the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) allied PDFs contribute to the cascade of bad battlefield news for the SAC.

Reaching for a mono-causal explanation for 1027 is misleading. It was not simply predicated on pleasing the Chinese and clearing call scam center dungeons full of foreign national captives. And it was not just a turf war over control of border casinos, a ridiculously reductionist argument that discards the intersections of the Brotherhood’s multiple motivations.

It was also not simply an attack on a long-term enemy as part of a 14-year-long conflict: the three main groups “came up together”, nurtured initially by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and over the past several years by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Nor was it predicated on taking tactical advantage of the SAC’s broader nationwide weaknesses fighting EAOs and PDFs in multiple locations in the Anya theater.

And what it manifestly was not is an offensive designed to buttress the National Unity Government (NUG) and establish some belated bona fides for the anti-coup “Spring Revolution” it claims to represent. It was all of these factors and much more.

The Brotherhood issued another statement on October 31 urging members of the MAGF and their allied Border Guard Forces (BGFs) and Pyithu Sit (People’s Militia) forces to surrender, following the surrender of Infantry Battalion 143 (IB143) in Kunlong Township.

“(1) We pledge to ensure the preservation of every surrendered soldier’s life, safety and dignity. (2) We are committed to preventing any form of torture or arrest. (3) We will exert our utmost effort to facilitate the swift reunification of surrendered soldiers with their families and relatives” along with pledging financial support and medical care,” the Brotherhood statement said.  

The SAC National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) met on November 8 to discuss 1027, and it quickly turned into a verbose and embittered history lesson from SAC chairman and Commander in Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. All the blame was heaped onto the MNDAA, as befitting a long-term nemesis, and their motivations for drug dealing, seizing control of the border town of Laukkai and its “153 hotels.”

Min Aung Hlaing described the unfolding operation: “MNDAA made preparations in the Wa region and its main strengths were deployed to attack Chinshwehaw via Namtit Bridge on October 27. In the morning, they passed Namtit Creek and deployed excessive strength to attack Chinshwehaw… MNDAA used a large number of drones and dropped bombs in attacks… TNLA interrupted the communication route to Hsenwi and disturbed Lashio with firing. They interrupted the Mandalay-Lashio communication route near Nawnghkio.”

These are stunning top-level admissions of military intelligence failure and tactical incompetence. Possibly the most telling remark was at the end of the meeting: “President U Myint Swe said that if the government does not effectively manage the incidents happening in the border region, the country will be split into various parts.”

It’s too late for that. Inescapable from this narrative is one of protracted failure on the part of Min Aung Hlaing. It was he who commanded the operation against MNDAA founder Pheung Kya-shin in 2009, breaking a cease-fire. The MNDAA later regrouped and reengaged and in 2015 the Myanmar army lost several hundred troops in renewed fighting with the rebel group.

There has been routine armed conflict between the MAF and the Brotherhood since. Having led a campaign against insurgents 14 years ago only to see these three EAOs grow in considerable size and prowess in multiple states across Myanmar and to further nurture post-coup combatants such as the BPLA, PLA and MPDF is a legacy of MAF incompetence.

It must have been amusing for the Brotherhood to travel to the Mong La enclave on the Chinese border in early June to meet the SAC’s National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPCN) for “peace talks”: “friendly and cordially discussed matters in connexion (sic) with…working together for the peace and development of the Union, trust-building with ethnic armed organizations.”

The painstaking planning for 1027 must have been far advanced by then. The attendance at these “talks” had the sincerity of a sneer, like monotone karaoke with a detested business rival: only self-deceiving Western diplomats gave them any credibility. Operation 1027 serves as the terminal rebuke to the by now utterly discredited pre-coup peace processes.

Secretive machinations by Switzerland and Finland to generate negotiations between micro-EAOs and the SAC are doomed to fail, not least because the former is exhuming the totally discredited Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) as the vehicle to deliver humanitarian assistance.

The NUG rightly condemned these efforts as illegitimate: “These acts will not be recognized and accepted because they are actions aimed at prolonging the reign of the military dictatorship.”

The growing humanitarian crisis of the conflict as a result of Operation 1027 must be addressed. Some 30-40,000 civilians have been displaced in multiple locations while an unknown number have been killed. 

International aid donors should respond with increased cash transfers to local aid workers in Lashio and elsewhere, including for Ta’ang, Shan and faith-based groups. To harbor any promise in the JMC as a vehicle for emergency aid delivery over support to local civil society groups would be an affront to humanitarian principles as much as common decency.

In light of recent fighting, these foreign-led attempts to broker a deal with the SAC leadership are simply jettisoning neutrality to artificially inflate a dictatorship.

The Brotherhood and their allies have dramatically underscored a reality evident to anyone looking honestly at the situation: the SAC is finished, and while the ending may be uncertain, the complex of armed actors ushering in ultimate victory is not simply under the NUG. Any future “peace” process must reflect that and planning for that complexity must start seriously now.

By any military management measure, Min Aung Hlaing will go down as the most clearly inept war commander in MAF history. He can huff and he can puff in front of his fellow generals, but it’s clear to most that Operation 1027 is blowing the SAC’s house down.

David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues in Myanmar

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With the war in Gaza reverberating around the world, it is hard to hear anything above the noise. Yet an interview with Ukraine’s commander-in-chief last week came through loud and clear, sparking both an internal crisis in Kiev and an international debate on the future of the conflict.

General Valery Zaluzhny is the man leading the Ukrainian war against Russia’s invasion. For him to voice publicly that the fighting had reached a stalemate was astonishing, even shocking. Yet that was his conclusion: “Just like in the First World War we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” he said. “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”

It was a surprising admission, which unsurprisingly brought an immediate rebuke from Ukraine’s political leadership. “This is not a stalemate,” said President Volodymyr Zelensky, clearly concerned by the characterization and its impact on Western support.

It was also a rather obvious statement about the current situation. That the Ukraine war is at a stalemate has been clear for weeks, yet it has taken the Gaza war to make that reality clear.

Ukraine’s spring counteroffensive was meant to be a military storm that would finally shift the tide of battle. From the beginning it was plagued by a lack of equipment, and when it finally got started in the summer, it spluttered rather than shocked.

Before the counteroffensive began in June, Ukraine had managed to regain territory from the Russians, mainly around Kharkiv in the east and Kherson in the south.

But since the operation got under way, progress has been slow-going. Across the almost 1,000 kilometers of heavily fortified front line, there has been practically no change. Zoom out from the map of the vast territory occupied by Russian forces, and the areas Ukraine has regained are mere specks.

The New York Times estimated last month that the total area retaken by Kiev across this entire year of fighting is smaller than the capital Kiev itself. That’s a lot of pain for little gain.

Heavy costs

This lack of movement has dispirited Ukrainians and their supporters. Allies have paid an enormous price for backing Ukraine through two bloody years and one freezing winter. The US and European countries have given around US$80 billion each in military and financial assistance. At least five countries, including Denmark and Norway, have given the equivalent of 1% of their annual GDP, just to keep Ukraine fed and fighting.

Across the world, the fallout from the Ukraine war has been astonishing, with disrupted supply chains causing a spike in prices, a lack of food and political unrest.

The Global South was placated by the argument from the West that the Ukraine invasion represented a fundamental change in the rules of the global order, and some pain was necessary to rectify it. Then came Gaza, and as Palestinian casualties mounted and Western leaders struggled to even pronounce “ceasefire,” the exceptions to global rules offered to Western allies became clear.

But it isn’t clear the Gaza war is the reason for the Ukrainian stalemate. Instead, the sheer focus from Western politicians on Zelensky shielded Ukraine’s leadership from the flagging campaign. Zelensky’s energetic diplomacy meant that most weeks saw him address one event or another, visiting or being visited by Western politicians. The reality of the war was lost in a whirlwind of cameras and soundbites.

Now, with Gaza taking up the world’s political attention, the lack of front pages about the Ukraine war somehow makes the reality starker. When the politics was in constant flux, it was easy to ignore the frozen battle lines. Now, it is harder to ignore, hence why the splits within Ukraine have become clearer.

There are signs that Western allies are beginning to search for a way out.

Reports in US media, based on anonymous sources, have suggested the topic of peace negotiations has been broached with Ukraine at the highest level.

For now, the official line continues to be that the West, and especially the United States, will stand by Ukraine as long as the country needs help. In reality, though, Washington has priorities of its own, and a contentious and fractious election cycle is looming next year, at which President Joe Biden’s handling of the Ukraine conflict will be an important part of the debate.

That makes Biden himself one of the weakest links in the diplomatic chain that leads to a Ukrainian settlement. He has now staked his personal reputation on two deeply controversial wars, neither of which shows any sign of ending soon.

Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin will be happy to see Biden’s likely opponent Donald Trump return to the presidency – which means there is almost no chance that Russia will negotiate while the US election campaigns are in full swing. Far better to keep the front lines frozen and let Biden take the blame.

If there is no reason for Moscow to end the conflict, then the battle lines could be frozen for at least the next year.

Zelensky has staked his political life on being an uncompromising wartime leader. As it becomes clear Ukraine’s army cannot deliver victory – when even the head of the army says so – it won’t be long before Ukraine’s allies look to put their faith not in a wartime leader, but in someone who can deliver peace, possibly at any cost.

This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.

Faisal Al Yafai is currently writing a book on the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. Follow him on X @FaisalAlYafai.

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The lopsidedness was stark: 120 countries voted in favor of a resolution before the United Nations on October 26, 2023, calling for a “humanitarian truce” in the war in Gaza. A mere 14 countries voted against it.

But the numbers tell only half the story; equally significant was the way the votes fell. Those voting against the resolution included the United States and four members of the European Union. Meanwhile, about 45 members abstained – including 15 members of the EU, plus the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan.

Seldom has the isolation of the West been so apparent.

As a scholar who has written on the rise of the Global South – countries mainly, but not exclusively, in the Southern Hemisphere that are sometimes described as “developing,” “less developed” or “underdeveloped” – what strikes me is the degree to which this major fault line between the political North and South has risen again to the fore. It reflects long-in-the-making forces in world affairs.

While the leaders of countries like the US, the UK and Germany have been among the most strident supporters of Israel during the crisis, the same is not true for non-Western nations.

Key rising powers from the Global South have been among the most adamant nations outside the Arab world in their criticism of this unwavering Western support of Israel.

Indonesia and Turkey – both with large Muslim populations – have been heavily critical of Israel’s bombing campaign in Gaza, a response to 1,400 Israelis being killed by Hamas militants on October 7.

But they have been joined by the leaders of Brazil, South Africa and other Global South nations in taking a firm stand. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil went so far as to label the campaign in Gaza a “genocide” – a comment echoed by South Africa’s government when, on November 6, 2023, it recalled its ambassador to Israel in protest.

While the US has used the word genocide in relation to Russia’s action in Ukraine, the Biden administration has pointedly said the term doesn’t apply to current events in Gaza.

Global South’s coming of age

The international reaction to the war in Gaza reflects a deeper, long-standing trend in world politics that has seen the fracturing of the established US-dominated, rules-based order. The growing influence of China and the fallout from the war in Ukraine – in which many Global South countries have remained neutral – has upended international relations.

Many analysts point to an emerging multipolar world in which members of the Global South have, as I have written, forged a new active nonaligment path.

And 2023 has been the year that has seen the coming of age of this more assertive Global South.

Some of this is structural. In August, Johannesburg hosted a summit of the BRICS group – a bloc that consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – during which 21 countries from across the Global South applied to join. Six were invited to do so: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – and they will formally join in January 2024.

This 11-strong BRICS+ group will represent 46% of the world’s population and 38% of the world’s gross domestic product. In contrast, the Group of Seven leading economies, or G7, represents less than 10% of the world’s population and 30% of the global economy.

On November 7, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with his G7 counterparts in an attempt to forge a consensus on how to deal with the crisis in the Middle East. Speaking in Japan, he urged that the Western-dominated G7 speak with “one clear voice” on the Middle East crisis.

The question is, can the BRICS+ – and more generally the Global South – do likewise given that it includes an array of countries with very different political and economic systems?

Latin America’s pushback

The reaction to the Israel-Hamas violence suggests to me that the Global South is able to speak with, if not one voice, at least a chorus that is not discordant.

Historically, many African and Asian nations have tended to support the Palestinian cause – Indonesia does not even recognize the state of Israel.

But perhaps more surprising has been the strong reaction in Latin America to Israel’s actions in Gaza.

In short order, Bolivia broke diplomatic relations with Israel, and Chile and Colombia called their ambassadors from Jerusalem for consultations – an established diplomatic tool to indicate disapproval of a country’s conduct.

Brazil, in its capacity as then chair of the United Nations Security Council, introduced the resolution supporting a cease-fire in Gaza. Mexico’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Alicia Buenrostro, called for the “occupying power” of Israel to cease its claim to the Palestinian territories.

Western denialism

The question is: If the Global South is speaking this way on the issue, is the West listening? The voting patterns of Western representatives at the UN suggest the answer is “no.”

In turn, this only adds to the general discontent across the developing world with the current structure of the UN Security Council and its lack of representativeness.

The fact that no country from Africa or Latin America is among the permanent members that enjoy veto power – compared with Western Europe, which is represented by both France and the UK – has long been a source of irritation in the Global South.

So, too, is the perceived “double standard” being applied by the West to conflicts around the world. Whereas in Ukraine much is made of the humanitarian suffering being inflicted on the Ukrainian people, the same does not seem to apply to what is happening in Gaza, where Palestinian health authorities report more than 10,000 people have been killed in less than a month, 40% of them children.

More generally, there appears to be a degree of denial in the West over the tectonic shift in world order toward a more assertive Global South.

Western commentators and analysts from think tanks in London and Washington even contend that the very term “Global South” should not be used – with much of the criticism against the term directed at its alleged imprecision, but also because it would contribute to greater international polarization.

Yet, the term was never meant to be geographical. Rather, it is a geopolitical and geohistorical one – and one that is coming into its own with great verve as the Global South provides an alternative voice to the West, first over the conflict in Ukraine and now over Gaza. And no amount of Western denialism will be able to block it.

Jorge Heine is the interim director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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