History shows US security guarantees seldom last – Asia Times

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Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, argues that any US-organized peace agreement would have to be accompanied by” security guarantees” from the US to prevent Russia from resuming its offensive in the future.

However, Donald Trump has so far said the US will never commit to sending troops to Ukraine if Russia doesn’t have by any such deal.

Another way of assuring a safety ensure would be for Ukraine to be allowed to add Nato. As a Nato member, Ukraine may be protected by Article 5 which states that if one part is attacked, people will arrive to its assistance. But Trump has also ruled out this opportunity.

The US senator claims the proposed US-Ukraine minerals offer will substitute the US for its costs in support of Ukraine to day, and that the associated existence of US personnel on Ukrainian territory may hinder Russia from a new invasion.

But for such a promise to be effective, Russia has believe in it. This seems unlikely given that in the last few months, Trump has appeared to blame Zelensky for the invasion of his own country, called him” a tyrant” for no holding elections in war, and insisted that Vladimir Putin wants tranquility while Zelensky does not.

But have US security guarantees worked in the past to provide the protection that Zelensky is looking for? The history of this kind of protection deal is worth interrogating for answers.

1973 Paris Peace Accords

After years of involvement by US forces in the Vietnam war ( 1965-1975 ), the 1973 Paris Peace Accords allowed President Richard Nixon to present himself as a peacemaker in a conflict which most Americans had come to see as unwinnable.

The war had pitted South Vietnam and its US ally against communist North Vietnam, backed by China and Russia. The accords endangered South Vietnamese security by permitting North Vietnam’s forces to remain on the south’s territory after a ceasefire.

The US said it would continue to provide adequate military support to permit South Vietnam to continue the struggle – and critically, Nixon promised the South Vietnamese president, Nguyen Van Thieu, that should the North Vietnamese communists mount another general offensive, the US would return to South Vietnam, with massive air power.

But, when the communists launched their 1975 offensive, Nixon’s guarantee proved worthless. Forced out of office by the Watergate scandal ( which showed Republicans connected to Nixon’s re-election campaign had raided offices of the Democratic National Committee ), Nixon was succeeded by his vice-president, Gerald Ford, who announced on April 25 1975 that” the Vietnam War is finished as far as America is concerned”.

An ignominious withdrawal of the remnants of US support from the then capital of South Vietnam, Saigon, occurred a few days later, and the South Vietnamese were left to their fate.

Like Zelensky, President Thieu protested these arrangements. On his resignation in 1975, he said:

At the time, there was collusion between the communists and the United States with a view to reaching the agreement of 26 October 1972 … I had enough courage to tell Secretary of State Kissinger at the time…’ You want to sell the interests and lives of the South Vietnamese. As for me, a Vietnamese, I cannot do so.’

However, Thieu had to accept these agreements for fear of the total withdrawal of US support – just as Zelensky, however intense his resistance, may also have to.

2020 Doha agreement

More recently, the 2020 Doha agreement, negotiated between Trump’s first administration and the Taliban, fulfilled the US president’s desire to pull the US military out of Afghanistan.

As in Vietnam and Ukraine, the US negotiated this agreement without the participation of its ally, the Afghan government.

The Taliban promised not to support terrorist groups on Afghan territory, and to engage in intra-Afghan negotiations. But when the Taliban went back on the first of these conditions, the US did not halt the withdrawal of its forces. Reports suggest the Trump administration had undermined the morale of the Afghan army and telegraphed the date of US withdrawal from the country.

The Taliban needed only to wait for Nato and US forces to start withdrawing in May 2021 before continuing its campaign to take back power. The US government clearly wanted to get out of Afghanistan whatever happened to its ally. By mid-August, the Afghan government had collapsed and the Taliban had retaken Kabul.

When the Afghan armed forces collapsed, there were still Nato and US personnel in Kabul. Their chaotic withdrawal could then only occur with the permission of the Taliban.

Putin need only bide his time?

Drawing on this knowledge of what happened in Afghanistan, mood music from the Trump administration might suggest to Putin in 2025 that he need only bide his time until US rejection of its erstwhile ally renders Ukraine’s defence untenable.

National policies change, especially in democracies, and such changes have consequences.

Since 1945, American presidents have understood themselves to be “leaders of the free world”. But Trump sees this only as shorthand for foreign exploitation of American generosity, which is how he regards US expenditure in support of Ukraine.

Under such circumstances, US allies might be less likely to rely on American promises and guarantees than they were in the 1970s during the Vietnam war.

The history of US security guarantees in Vietnam and Afghanistan should give Zelensky, and all US allies, pause when considering their value this time around.

Ian Horwood is senior lecturer in history, York St John University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Japan braces for Trump’s worst as yen takes trade war fire – Asia Times

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Self-awareness isn’t usually a solid suit among major Bank of Japan authorities.

Consider Haruhiko Kuroda, possibly the most internationally known governor the BOJ has had in its 143-year background. His popularity stems from a 2013-2023 campaign to end recession, one that supersized the BOJ’s balance plate to twice the size of Japan’s US$ 4.7 trillion business.

The resulting dip in the renminbi propped up Japan Inc. But now it risks running short of the Donald Trump 2.0 president in ways complicating Tokyo’s 2025. Now, Trump is sending facetious shots Japan’s method.

That has Kuroda playing security for his leader at BOJ, Kazuo Ueda. Japan, Kuroda says, must restore “any mistake” in Washington that it’s consciously weakening the yen to increase exports.

” In truth, the Chinese government has been making great efforts to prevent the renminbi from weakening”, Kuroda told local press, pointing to moves to raise interest rates and even engage in forex markets.

The BOJ, Kuroda stressed, “is not consciously guiding the renminbi lower with monetary policy. If there’s any mistake on that place, it needs to be addressed”.

What really must be addressed, nevertheless, is Tokyo’s knowledge of how its policies are going over worldwide.

Denial doesn’t change the fact that the most constant policy over the last 13 institutions has been an undervalued renminbi. Or that a key cause the BOJ has been holding costs at, or near, zero since 1999 is to protect companies facing increasing opposition across Asia.

Spin doesn’t shift Japan’s position as the globe’s major creditor nation. Twenty-six years of zero prices gave fall to the so-called “yen-carry trade“. Over time, traders got into the habit of borrowing profitably in yen to fund bet on higher-yielding property everyday.

This approach has kept upright everything from Argentine bill to South African supplies to American real estate to the New Zealand dollar to compounds on New York exchanges to cryptocurrencies.

That’s why the yen’s recent surge pulled the floor out from under markets around the globe. When the yen zigs sharply, markets have long tended to zag.

As such, the BOJ’s move on July 31 last year to raise rates to the highest level since 2008 shook world markets. The same happened in January this year, when the BOJ hiked rates a second time to 0.50 %.

Arif Husain, head of fixed income at T Rowe Price, speaks for many when he calls the yen-carry trade the” San Andreas fault of finance”.

There’s growing doubt, though, that the BOJ will keep tapping the monetary brakes as US President Trump layers on ever more tariffs, including threatening to tax Japan’s all-important auto industry.

The worry is that higher borrowing costs would exacerbate headwinds caused by Trump’s 20 % tariffs on China, levies on steel and aluminum and “reciprocal tariffs” to come.

Yet Japanese inflation is running a bit hotter than the BOJ would like. In January, Japanese inflation jumped 4 % year on year, the highest in two years. That’s double the BOJ’s inflation target. It’s also a rate that’s exceeding average wage growth.

It’s not the environment that Japan wants heading into an escalating trade war. Japan’s fourth-quarter growth was weaker than expected. The government’s second estimate of gross domestic product ( GDP ) showed output rose just 0.6 % quarter over quarter, down from the initial&nbsp, 0.7 %.

” The revisions broadly align with our expectations and confirm the picture of an economy struggling against weak domestic demand”, says Stefan Angrick, head of Japan Moody’s Analytics.

It means” Japan’s economy is, at best, treading water”, Angrick says. Fourth-quarter data, he adds, “masks an economy struggling to get out of first gear. Consumption is going sideways as pay gains have trailed inflation for the better part of three years. Sticky inflation and lackluster pay growth will push real wage gains further into the distance and, with it, an improvement in domestic consumption”.

What’s more, Angrick says,” the deteriorating trade outlook means Japan can’t count on exports to save the day. Media reports released Tuesday confirm new US tariffs on steel and aluminum won’t spare Japan”.

Takeshi&nbsp, Yamaguchi, chief Japan economist at Morgan Stanley MUFG, says that” we expect the BoJ to stay on hold at the March 18-19 monetary policy meeting”.

Others were less put off by Japan’s GDP showing. To Sonal Desai, chief investment officer at Franklin Templeton Fixed Income, recent data” supports the view that rates will face heightened upward pressure as monetary policy tightens. The BOJ is likely to hike at least twice more this year, &nbsp, but we are tilting to three”. Desai expected short-term rates to top 1 % this year.

There’s also an argument that delaying rate hikes might enrage Trump as the yen remains weaker than it might otherwise be. Earlier this month, Trump claimed he warned the leaders of Japan and China they mustn’t continue to weaken their currencies.

” You can’t do it because it’s unfair to us”, Trump complained. ” It’s very hard for us to make tractors, Caterpillar here, when Japan, China and other places are killing their currency, meaning driving it down”.

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is no doubt alarmed to hear Trump lump Japan with China as currency manipulators. But his Liberal Democratic Party, and the BOJ under Kuroda’s leadership, set the stage for the coming clash with the most mercantilist US leader in at least 125 years.

Kuroda, of course, was hired by then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to turbocharge the BOJ’s quantitative easing policies. Abe’s 2012-2020 premiership sought to end deflation via a sharply weaker exchange rate. Abe chose Kuroda in part because of his handiwork as a senior Ministry of Finance official in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

In 2013, Abe decided the BOJ should &nbsp, take the lead in revitalizing Asia’s second-biggest economy. Hiring Kuroda was his big economic gamble _ an aggressive assault on the deflationary forces that had weakened&nbsp, Japan’s financial foundations over the previous 15&nbsp, years.

Kuroda didn’t disappoint. He hoarded more than half of all outstanding government securities, a buying binge that all but halted regular bond trading. He gorged on stocks via&nbsp, exchange-traded funds, making the BOJ by far the biggest holder of Nikkei 225 and Topix index shares.

As part of&nbsp, its&nbsp, campaign to drive the&nbsp, yen &nbsp, down 30 %, the Kuroda-led BOJ branched out into other asset markets, too. By late 2018, the BOJ’s balance sheet surpassed Japan’s GDP, a first for a Group of Seven nation.

This milestone is a reminder that for all the focus on the US Federal Reserve’s ultraloose policies in Washington after the 2008 global financial crisis, the BOJ&nbsp, has &nbsp, been far more aggressive relative to GDP. And&nbsp, now, as even Kuroda admits, detrimental to&nbsp, Japan’s economic development.

In his waning days as BOJ head, Kuroda signaled an about-face in his views on the link between&nbsp, exchange&nbsp, rates&nbsp, and healthy growth. He came to realize, at long last, that the costs of devaluation outweigh the benefits.

” The&nbsp, yen’s depreciation might have an increasing negative impact on household income through price rises”, Kuroda told business leaders in late 2022.

Worse than that: the boost from weak&nbsp, exchange&nbsp, rates&nbsp, these last&nbsp, 26&nbsp, years&nbsp, removed the urgency for disruptive&nbsp, structural reforms. &nbsp,

That’s particularly true of Abe, who came to power pledging to loosen labor markets, catalyze innovation, reduce bureaucracy, increase productivity and empower women.

And now, an undervalued yen has Trump lumping Japan in with top American rival China. Tokyo got away with its beggar-thy-neighbor tactics during the Trump 1.0 era from 2017 to 2021 in part because Abe sucked up to Trump, and in part because Trump was linearly focused on China.

The Trump 2.0 White House, though, is targeting US allies even more assertively than supposed foes China, Russia or North Korea. That’s been quite a surprise for Canada, France, Germany and other top economies. And it has Japan fearing the worst to come.

On Monday, Japanese Trade Minister Yoji Muto met in Washington with US officials seeking waivers on Trump’s tariffs, particularly on autos and steel. To no avail, according to reports.

” The talk of tariffs is, in a lot of ways, worse than the implementation of them”, says David Bahnsen, chief investment officer at the Bahnsen Group. ” The tariff talk, reversal, speculation, and chaos only fosters uncertainty”.

Bahnsen adds that,” I don’t believe the administration knows how the tariff situation will play out, but if I were a betting man, I would say that it will persist long enough to do damage to economic activity for at least a quarter or two, and ultimately result in a deal with different countries that make everyone wonder why we went through all the fuss”.

Sam Stovall, chief investment strategist at CFRA Research, notes that “how long this period of investor caution persists depends on how quickly it will take the global trade clouds, and the resulting threat of recession, to dissipate”.

Look no further than Super Mario maker Nintendo, whose stock is plunging along with other Japanese video game stocks on worries that Trump’s antics will boost prices in the US.

In fact, global investors broadly are “reducing their positions in Japanese stocks”, including the “most attractive stocks” that they have so far held on to.

If Kuroda, Ueda or Ishiba think Tokyo is going to escape Trump’s wrath, then they’re the ones “misunderstanding” where Japan finds itself as 2025 unfolds.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Deathenomics to drive the new AI world order – Asia Times

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The analyst Paul Samuelson noted that the Second World War was the “economists battle”. The US came to realize that financial planning, the part of the Federal Reserve and participation of the civilian field were important in times of war.

What the part of geoeconomics, and also technology, signs now is the full triumph of” total participation”. That is, that lack and financial success become the de facto motorists of foreign and domestic plan. The climax of this discovery is the glory of Donald Trump’s “realpolitik”.

The 19th-century progressive perspective of “non-zero-sum” “quid pro quo” was the Adam Smith thought that the benefits of business led to economic and social benefits for all involved.

But, the increasing participation of assets ( both natural and human ) led to the idea, put forth by Hirschmann in 1945]1], of the “zero-sum” notion of winners and losers.

The path of occasions of WW2 made progressive free trade rhetoric redundant. The prevalent desire was what economics call “mercantilism”.

This was the plan that increases in prosperity imply greater power – to the expense of the other. So, politics and geoeconomics became intertwined.

The importance in capitalism is the function of one or two “hegemonic” powers. So, in the 20th centuries this was assured for the US through the expulsion of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1972. The emancipation of the issuance of silver to dollars set in motion a fresh ideology for the US.

The universe had changed for a few cents more. The fiat money of the money had replaced metal. Hegemony is policed through, for instance, world payment methods, restrictions, etc. Mercantilism is again in vogue. We can see it in Donald Trump’s isolationism and China’s sweet money creating Chinese dominance in Asia.

The application of geoeconomics, and the need to create ideology leads to obvious conflict. This is endemic to the” next revolution”, that of technology. The Industrial Revolution began the process of participation of the standing supply of the earth’s sources, that of natural materials and manpower.

The shift towards technology and AI, however, means that workers as the primary factor in capital creation does been overtaken by technology and automation.

This does heap pressure on the rate of return on investment and profits. Today, the post-war arrangement with work led to business organizations, the welfare state, etc. This was a bad “zero-sum” results for money.

What the new world today offers is a maxim way of capital and source accumulation. All governments have successfully abandoned liberal democracy and emerge on a sliding scale of authoritarianism: the most successful type for the execution of” Deathenomics”.

This, ironically, is certainly a value assessment on whether democracy is right or wrong– it is a de facto history of history.

The new world order rests on the diminishing value of work as seen in its classic style. Robotics and AI will change individual workers. In truth, in the not-so-distant potential, human beings may be external to world economies.

Imagine the cost benefits of a mechanical workforce. According to Techcrunch:

Broadly speaking, technology benefited from the crisis. Staffing shortages led to an flood in assets and a kind of reformation in business technology. More recently, an explosion of curiosity in conceptual AI has more accelerated the market and the drive toward “general-purpose” computers. ]2 ]

In this brave new world, Elon Musk estimates there will be need for 20 billion computers. Considering a one-off cost of US$ 20, 000-30, 000 per product, this is a win-win for money.

But what of labour? Whilst first robots would be the labor of factories and automated processes, the prospect will leave work in all areas such as administration, financial, nurses and also agriculture.

The issue with Macroeconomic’ Deathenomics ‘ is that it will eventually eradicate the consumer. The employee was typically a customer. What extended developed capitalism was the regular re-creation of buyer demand, what Marxists call the “fetishization” of the market characterized by countless needs.

The future of this innovative world will mean a dichotomy between tech/machine-owning leaders and a glut proletariat poor. In a world where surplus value of the worker is eliminated, value is replaced by machines. Human beings will thus become dependent on the state for sustenance.

The trajectory, already underway, will be a massive increase in indolent populations without work. National economies will be effectively irrelevant to the majority.

The new economy will be oriented towards war in a competition for tech resources, raw materials and minerals. Disputes as to extraction and rights will lead to war and a Keynesian cycle of demand. War and economy will become intertwined in” Deathenomics”.

In Russia, a dead son is worth a$ 130, 000 payment. According to a BBC report this is called” coffin money”, it is enough to transform family lives from poverty]3]. Widows of dead husbands have developed a vogue for expensive hair dryers.

Putin has instituted a program called” Time for Heroes”, wherein returning soldiers are fast-tracked into governing and business positions. Keynesian war is one of the few remaining growth areas.

National security spending in the US has increased 50 % since 2000. The problem with military defense spending, whose logic is now exported to the Europeans in a panic about security, is that resources are drained from any other economic areas.

It creates a dependence by workers on defense industries. It creates short-term profit booms for defense stocks. It means the US spending beyond 5 % of GDP on the military.

Yet some analysts, such as those at the Rand think tank, have criticized this US dominant position in an increasingly multi-polar world]4]. They maintain there is a need to abandon the Cold War mentality.

Yet that assessment forgets the nature of the military economy. For example, contractors are not focussed on production capacities or R&amp, D. Their main concern is return of profit. Hence the majority of this profit is not reinvested or orientated to efficiency but given to shareholders.

A 2023 Pentagon study showed an increase of cash to shareholders of 73 % ]5]. Therefore, state money is funneled directly into the defense shareholdings of the wealthy. This is what Milton Friedman called” shareholder capitalism”. The emphasis is on shareholder returns.

This is a problem for some sectors, however. Hence privatization of health and defense will orientate capital to private wealth. Weaponized economies negatively effect other parts of the economy. In fact, there is no boost to other sectors of the economy as seen by the decline of the manufacturing sector in the US.

Therefore, defense spending works as a short, but not long-term, boost to the elite economy. The other side of the coin is the compounding delusion that military spending is the only way to conduct geopolitics. ( US interest payments on its national debt in 2024 will be greater than the Pentagon’s budget. )

The new world era of Deathenomics requires the total accumulation of resources, both material and human, to an endless circle of war. The new times require governments to act as private businesses. The state and civil society become one. Leaders must be dressed in suits. And, of course, war is an extension of business.

Notes:

]1 ] Hirschman, Albert. 1945. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. University of California Press

]2 ] https ://techcrunch.com/2024/07/23/elon-musk-sets-2026-optimus-sale-date-heres-where-other-humanoid-robots-stand/

]3 ] https ://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3ct5mv5

]4 ] David A. Ochmanek, Anna M. Dowd, Stephen J. Flanagan, et al., Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U. S. and Allied Military Power and Influence https ://www.rand .org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2555-1.html.

]5 ] U. S. Government, Department of Defense,” Contract Finance Study Report”, ( Washington, D. C.: DOD, 2023 ) 18, https ://www.acq.osd .mil/asda/dpc/pcf/docs/finance-study/FINAL Defense Contract Finance Study Report 4.6.23.pdf#page=18.

Brian Patrick Bolger studied politics and economics at the London School of Economics. He has taught political philosophy and applied linguistics at universities in the UK and Czech Republic. &nbsp, He is an adviser to several think tanks and corporations on geopolitical issues.

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Taliban’s fractured regime teeters toward collapse – Asia Times

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Since its return to power in 2021, Afghanistan’s Taliban have struggled to enhance their rebel movement into a functioning state. Beneath an outward show of unity, the conservative government is plagued by deep-rooted disunity, economic incompetence and growing common dissatisfaction.

According to researcher Mabin Biek, writing for The Cipher in an article titled” Taliban’s Internal Power Struggle: A Program on the Brink”, the team’s greatest philosophical threat may not be another international action but rather its own internal injuries.

If left unchecked, these units could expand the Taliban’s collapse and fall Afghanistan into yet another continuous problems.

One of the most pressing problems facing the Taliban government is its inability to maintain unity among various groups. Under the management of Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, the activity has become more centralized around his Noorzai cultural center. That cultural preference is known to possess alienated another major Taliban leaders.

Unlike the later Mullah Omar, who commanded broad admiration and united disparate parties, Akhundzada has struggled to achieve the same level of power. Instead, his apparently rigorous management style has deepened the identity-based problem lines that run through the Taliban’s rates.

Important figures like Mullah Yaqoob and Mullah Baradar each control their own electricity bases in the Taliban, giving rise to various centers of influence that are clashing over policy and resources.

These tensions are heightened by ethnic and tribal affiliations, which have become more pronounced now that the Taliban are attempting to govern in a united fashion rather than fight a geographically dispersed insurgency.

The unity once shown during the Doha talks that brought about an end of the war has since largely dissipated and has been replaced by jockeying for power within the movement’s upper echelons.

Compounding these leadership struggles is the Taliban’s poor economic management. Afghanistan’s economy was already fragile and heavily reliant on foreign aid and remittances before the Taliban’s takeover.

Now, with limited sources of legitimate funding, the regime relies heavily on revenues from mining operations often controlled by influential figures such as Haji Bashir Noorzai and from heavy taxation of ordinary citizens.

The result is an ever-widening gap between the elite and the general Afghan public. Inflation continues to rise as the local afghani currency’s depreciation in January, driven in part by the suspension of USAID, has made basic goods, including food, more expensive.

In a ham-fisted attempt at capital controls, the regime in January banned the transfer of more than US$ 5, 000 through airports and$ 500 over land borders.

In February, a dispute over border construction led to the closure of the Torkham crossing with Pakistan, disrupting the flow of goods, mainly food items, and leaving 5, 000 trucks stranded at the border.

Simultaneously, the Taliban’s hardline policies, especially their restrictions on women’s rights, have stifled the prospect of foreign investment or robust external economic partnerships. Western and other international donors remain wary of working with a regime that refuses to moderate its stance, further straining an already dire economic situation.

Another factor fueling the Taliban’s instability is its refusal to relax strict social and political controls. Despite repeated calls from international organizations and neighboring countries, the group has tightened restrictions on civil liberties, media freedoms and women’s education.

These measures have effectively isolated Afghanistan from the global community, making it virtually impossible for the Taliban to gain diplomatic recognition or access vital outside financial resources.

Potential partners such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) states have shown limited willingness to engage with a government that is widely viewed as regressive.

Even countries that historically maintained ties with the Taliban are hesitant to offer more than minimal support, fearful of an international backlash and wary of association with the regime’s extremist policies.

Recent developments in Washington reflect growing international concern over how external funding might be propping up the Taliban. Republican Senator Tim Sheedy has spearheaded the” No Taxpayer Funding for Terrorists Act”, which aims to prevent American federal aid from reaching Afghanistan.

Citing reports that weekly shipments of approximately US$ 40 million have been directed to the country’s central bank, US lawmakers fear that these funds could be funneled to extremist elements, effectively or de facto fuelling terrorist activities.

Former Secretary of State Antony Blinken acknowledged that, in some instances, advanced American weaponry has ended up in the Taliban’s hands. Such revelations have intensified calls under the Trump 2.0 administration for decisive action to cut off financial resources that terror-prone insurgent factions could exploit.

The proposed US legislation enjoys bipartisan support, reflecting a shared goal of ensuring no US taxpayer money ends up bolstering the Taliban or affiliated extremist groups.

While external factors such as reduced foreign aid add strain, the Taliban’s primary challenges stem from within. Persistent factionalism, failure to deliver essential public services and harsh social policies are all undermining the regime’s legitimacy and room to maneuver.

At the same time, opposition groups, both domestic and exiled, are finding fertile ground to organize as dissatisfaction with the Taliban mounts.

Extremist rivals like the Islamic State are exploiting the Taliban’s weaknesses to expand their influence. Regional neighbors, worried about spillover effects, may also covertly support alternative power centers or resistance movements.

If the Taliban cannot adopt more inclusive policies, stabilize the economy and address growing public grievances, it may soon face a perfect storm that pushes its fractured regime to the brink of collapse.

For a country that has endured decades of conflict, another failure in governance is a grim prospect. Ultimately, the Taliban’s future hinges on whether they can reform from within before its fractured rule implodes and plunges Afghanistan into another cycle of violence and turmoil.

Muhammad Burhan is a research analyst at Quaid e Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan.

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Opposition builds to Germany’s trillion-dollar debt plan – Asia Times

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Editor’s Note: &nbsp, Germany stands on the point of historic changes in economic policy. This year, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats proposed a constitutional amendment that could efficiently close the loan brakes, Germany’s constitutional limit on authorities debt expansion.

The likely incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz wants to force the constitutional change before the new Bundestag ( parliament ) elected on February 23 takes office. If he succeeds, Germany does get on a trillion dollars of new loan. These innovations raise questions about political validity and Germany’s macroeconomic stability.

The bill brakes, enshrined in the European constitution in 2009, was designed to maintain governmental control at both federal and state levels and reduce excessive national debt. However, the CDU/CSU ( Christian Democrats ) and SPD ( Social Democrats ) now propose to exempt defense spending in excess of 1 % of GDP from the debt brake, and establish a” special fund” of 500 billion euros for infrastructure. The controversy stems from Merz’s attempt to force a legal change in the weak bird Bundestag.

The AfD, which emerged as the largest opposition party with more than 20 % of the voting in the national election, strongly opposes this move. It plans to file a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. Jan Wenzel Schmidt, the group’s finance official, discussed the consequences for Germany’s economic security and politics in an appointment.

CDU president Merz strongly defended the debt brake before the election, merely to invert course immediately afterwards. This raises significant fears about the reliability of the approaching governing coalition.

The loan brake discussion extends beyond Germany. The European Union even plans to relax its fiscal laws, allowing member states greater borrowing freedom. This change has now led to a loss of confidence in financial markets, with German government bonds suffering their worst cost reduction ever during the previous week.

The coming weeks could be decisive in shaping Germany’s future fiscal policy. The CDU/CSU and SPD alone lack the necessary constitutional majority in the old parliament and will require support from the Greens. Will the debt brake remain, or will it be loosened in favor of increased government spending?

In an interview with Asia Times, Jan Wenzel Schmidt discusses the political and economic ramifications of these developments and the AfD’s planned response.

Asia Times: Good day, Mr Schmidt. The CDU, CSU, and SPD—initially thought to require Green Party support, but now possibly not—are set to propose a constitutional amendment this week that would effectively end the debt brake. As early as next week, the Bundestag is expected to vote on additional debt of up to one trillion euros, theoretically without any upper limit.

This is occurring just weeks after the federal election and under the old Bundestag, despite the fact that the newly elected Bundestag could already be convened. As the finance spokesman of the largest opposition party, how do you respond to this?

Jan Wenzel Schmidt: What we are witnessing is deeply concerning. On the one hand, voters can once again see that they have been deceived by the CDU, particularly Friedrich Merz. On the other hand, we must ask why the old Bundestag is being convened instead of the newly elected one.

The reason is clear: they fear that the AfD and the Left Party might block this initiative, as the required majority might no longer exist. Now, with the Greens ‘ recent statements, it appears that even the old Bundestag may struggle to pass this measure.

But at its core, this is a question of democracy. A new Bundestag has been elected, and it is not the purview of the Bundestag president to reconvene the old one. That is why we, as the AfD parliamentary group, have decided to file a motion against this with the Federal Constitutional Court. We will take all possible measures to prevent this undemocratic maneuver.

Asia Times: So, the whole &nbsp, AfD parliamentary delegation will take legal action against this initiative?

Jan Wenzel Schmidt: Yes, we have already prepared a formal complaint for the Federal Constitutional Court.

Asia Times: Friedrich Merz, widely seen as the likely future chancellor—though now less certain—vigorously defended the debt brake before the election, only to abandon it less than 24 hours after the polls closed. The planned increase in debt, exceeding two full annual federal budgets, is so vast that these measures can hardly be considered mere exceptions to the debt brake. Columnist Hans-Ulrich Jörges has described this as the greatest election fraud he has ever witnessed, attributing it to sheer arrogance. Do you believe Germany is about to be governed by a leader without principles?

Jan Wenzel Schmidt: It must be said unequivocally: Friedrich Merz does not keep his word. This is not new. When we look at the coalition negotiations, it is clear that he is pursuing a much softer stance on asylum and border enforcement alongside the SPD. So, Friedrich Merz is lying, and the CDU is lying. It’s the same pattern every time—before the election, they make grand promises, and afterward, they break them.

This explains why the CDU performed so poorly in eastern Germany, while in the west, where some residual trust in the party remained, it remained the largest party. Hopefully, that remaining trust is now gone. The CDU cares only about securing government positions and the chancellorship, with no real concern for policy outcomes.

The new debt plans could lead to severe economic consequences—not just for Germany, but for the CDU itself. How these funds will be allocated remains unclear. While it is said they are for infrastructure and defense, no specific spending plans exist. As a budget policymaker, I cannot support such a vague approach. Debt should always be tied to specific expenditures.

Without such clear constraints, leftist forces could divert these funds into NGOs or radical organizations, ultimately working against the CD U’s interests. We have already seen this happen, and it will happen again. That is the core issue. The CDU has once again deceived voters, and I hope the public sees this clearly now.

Asia Times: In practice, the CDU originally planned structural reforms before the election. But now, with changes to the debt brake on the table, we still do not know the final outcome. The Greens have announced they will not support the proposal, likely as a negotiating tactic to demand more concessions.

So, Friedrich Merz first allowed himself to be blackmailed by the SPD and may now have to negotiate further with the Greens. As you say, billions could be spent on almost anything, not just on defense and infrastructure as mainstream media claims.

Jan Wenzel Schmidt: The Greens have already stated they will not agree unless additional funds are allocated for climate protection. So, they are saying,” We’ll support this if money is set aside for our causes”. They likely also want more funding for their NGOs.

If this sum is approved by the old Bundestag, then Friedrich Merz and the CDU will no longer even be needed in future negotiations. The remaining coalition of SPD and Greens could continue governing without them since the funds would have already been secured—thanks to the CDU.

This raises the question of whether CDU politicians truly want to align themselves with extreme leftists and climate activists, or whether they will finally pursue policies based on reason and work with democratic forces. There are alternative majorities in the new Bundestag, for example, with us. We are, of course, ready to cooperate with the CDU in the interest of our country and our people.

Asia Times: Yes, you are referring to the so-called “firewall” in Germany—the policy of refusing any cooperation with the AfD, including forming a coalition. There was already a majority in the German Bundestag before, and after the recent federal election, that majority has grown even larger. This is precisely why the old Bundestag is being used to push through certain initiatives before the new Bundestag is convened.

But let’s discuss the substantive issue. It is widely acknowledged that Germany is not particularly well-prepared militarily and that its infrastructure is increasingly deteriorating. Wouldn’t all parties agree that these problems must be addressed? What would the AfD do, and how would it finance these issues?

Jan Wenzel Schmidt: The problem is not that we lack revenue or necessarily need new debt. No, we have a spending problem. A large portion of funds are being misallocated. &nbsp, For instance, many social benefits are being misused. We have child benefit recipients who don’t even live in Germany but simply withdraw the money abroad.

We also have an enormous number of welfare recipients and an ongoing influx into our social systems. We are spending far too much money on immigrants —on people who do not integrate into this country and, in some cases, pose a threat to internal security, which in turn leads to additional costs to our healthcare system and beyond.

The government allows all of this to happen because it follows a left-wing ideological agenda. But we reject this. We believe that spending must be cut, especially where funds are being wasted. Once these cuts are made, resources will be available for more meaningful expenditures—such as funding a properly equipped Bundeswehr, but one that actually serves its intended purpose: the national defense of Germany, rather than acting as an international intervention force for foreign interests.

On the other hand, it is absolutely crucial for us to get the economy back on track, reduce taxes and financial burdens, and cut bureaucracy. I believe these are key priorities that must be addressed. We must end ideological policies, including in energy policy. That means returning to rational energy sources, such as nuclear power, gas and coal energy, instead of being guided by ideology.

Asia Times: You have covered a wide range of topics. But I believe the central issue you’ve highlighted is social insurance, social contributions, and overall social costs in Germany.

Looking at the numbers: Germany now spends more than 30 % of its GDP on the social sector. In 1990, it was only 23 %. Theoretically, if Germany returned to the 1990 level, it could redirect 8 % of GDP to defense.

Currently, we are talking about an increase in defense spending from 1.3 % to 2 %, which is supposedly only possible through additional debt. So, are you suggesting massive reductions in social spending based on the arguments you just presented?

Jan Wenzel Schmidt: Among other things, yes. There are also many other areas where spending could be cut. Many subsidies are based purely on ideology, and we would certainly eliminate those. Bureaucracy reduction is another major cost factor.

Additionally, we must consider that politicians and civil servants do not pay into the regular pension and health insurance systems—this is a huge cost burden. These issues must and can be addressed.

We want to maintain the existence of private health insurance, but the system must be properly structured and cannot be financed solely through an ever-growing tax burden.

Asia Times: Germany is facing massive demographic challenges within its social security system. Pensions, healthcare, and elderly care are widely seen as unsustainable in their current form. The CDU, CSU, and SPD have already created additional budgetary flexibility of around 80 billion euros beyond the constitutional amendment debate.

Is increasing debt the only way to address the funding gap in social security, or do you propose alternative solutions?

Jan Wenzel Schmidt: There are alternatives. The money exists—it’s just being misallocated. We spend billions annually on asylum policies and social benefits for people who contribute nothing to our system. Instead of reducing this burden, the government continues to expand it.

This problem has been known for over 30 years. We have been aware of Germany’s negative demographic shift, yet no action has been taken. Immigration does not solve this issue, the real solution is effective family policies.

We advocate a family-splitting tax model, offering tax advantages to working families. This would encourage family growth and help address demographic decline.

Regarding pensions, we know that as the baby boomer generation retires, there will be a temporary funding shortfall lasting around 15 years. However, this can be managed through strategic spending cuts, economic growth, and better family policies.

The establishment parties refuse to take these necessary steps. Instead, they rely on new debt, which can never be repaid because future generations will be too small, and because Germany’s productivity is declining.

This short-sighted approach is doomed to fail, yet it typifies the decision-making of politicians like Friedrich Merz.

Neither the CDU nor the SPD is willing to take these necessary steps. Instead, they rely on new debt. However, this new debt can never be repaid because the next generation will not exist in sufficient numbers, and Germany’s productivity is declining rather than increasing.

This entire concept is doomed to fail. This is typical of the establishment parties: they make short-term decisions to avoid immediate problems, leaving the long-term consequences to future governments. This is precisely how Friedrich Merz operates.

Asia Times: So, the AfD sees no need to change the debt brake in the constitution and will therefore vote against any amendments? Or are there alternative considerations?

Jan Wenzel Schmidt: No, as of now, we will vote against it. I see no developments that could convince us to change our stance.

Asia Times: Debt accumulation isn’t just a German issue. The European Union wants to relax its fiscal rules and grant member states greater flexibility to take on more debt. European bonds have sold off massively over the past week.

In fact, German government bonds experienced their worst trading day since German reunification in 1990 on the day after the effective end of the debt brake was announced.

Many observers expect that the ECB will soon step in to finance the increasing debt, just as it did during the Euro crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. How does the AfD view this development, and what measures would the party take to counter it?

Jan Wenzel Schmidt: We see this as a serious danger—in fact, one of the original reasons for the founding of the AfD was to oppose the creation of a European debt union.

We are heading straight into a system of shared liabilities, where the German people and German wealth will ultimately be used to guarantee the debts of other European member states.

This will weaken Germany’s credit rating and, at the same time, cause the Euro system to collapse because monetary stability cannot be maintained with unlimited borrowing. We are already experiencing high inflation. In part this is due to sanctions against Russia, but the primary cause is the ECB’s low interest rate policies, which have now been reintroduced.

The central bank is continuously lowering interest rates, and with the new debt accumulation policies, we can expect further stabilization measures from the ECB, which will drive inflation even higher.

In the end, the biggest losers will be the taxpayers, particularly in Germany, because we have a progressive tax system. As inflation increases, gross wages rise, but at the same time, workers are pushed into higher tax brackets, meaning they pay more taxes.

So, the state benefits, while the people pay multiple times over—trapped in an ever-deepening debt spiral.

Asia Times: What options does the AfD see to prevent the ECB from continuing on this path?

Jan Wenzel Schmidt: We must build alliances at the European level and secure majorities in Brussels to counter this policy. I believe we are on the right track.

The European elections have shown that the AfD has gained strength, and we have grown even stronger in the Bundestag elections.

Other parties that share our views have also gained ground—parties that oppose debt mutualization and support a Europe of sovereign nations, rather than a centralized European superstate dictated by Brussels.

That is why I firmly believe that these patriotic movements will be able to halt this development and return European politics to serving its people. by doing so, we will also stabilize Europe and restore its original principles.

We do not want to leave the EU, but we want to reform it. We don’t need bans on plastic straws—we need a common economic area and customs union that enables us to trade freely and operate in a stable manner. I believe all nations will benefit from this. That was the original purpose of European integration.

Asia Times: That is a long-term political strategy, requiring shifts in parliamentary majorities and potential treaty changes.

But in the short term, is there a legal pathway to challenge these policies?

We have seen in the past that the ECB has repeatedly reinterpreted its role, expanding its mandate without democratic oversight. For example, we saw the ECB incorporate climate policies into its financial strategy.

During the Covid-19 pandemic and the Eurozone crisis, the ECB made unilateral decisions to justify its interventions. We have also seen long legal battles at the German Constitutional Court regarding previous ECB actions. Now, if the ECB were to justify further intervention based on defense spending, would you expect new legal challenges?

Jan Wenzel Schmidt: I am absolutely certain that our legal experts within the party and the AfD parliamentary group are closely monitoring these developments and will take action.

We have demonstrated in the past that we are willing to take legal action and have pursued cases all the way to the highest legal levels. We will continue this approach, because it is our duty—both to our voters and to the German people. As the strongest opposition party in Germany, we will not back down.

Asia Times: Thank you very much, Mr. Schmidt, for this interview.

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N Korea’s nuclear sub engulfed in a sea of doubt – Asia Times

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North Korea’s opening of its first nuclear-powered underwater scars a bold step in its military ambitions, but suspicion but its real capabilities is now floating to the surface.

This month, multiple media resources reported that North Korea has unveiled its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN), signaling a significant improvement in its military features amid speculation of Russian help.

State media released photos of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un inspecting the vehicle, which researchers estimate to be between 6, 000 and 8, 000 loads and capable of carrying up to 10 nuclear-loaded weapons.

If operational, the nuclear ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN ) would enhance North Korea’s second-strike capability, allowing it to launch missiles from undetectable underwater positions.

While North Korea has tested submarine-launched ballistic missiles ( SLBM ) since 2016, these were previously launched from a single-tube, 2, 000-ton test submarine. The new vehicle may affect the proper balance, especially if North Korea perfects nuclear locomotion technology.

But, full operational capacity may take years, with a possible exam release within two decades. The publication follows North Korea’s intensified speech against US-South Korea military training and coincides with Kim’s long-standing objective to upgrade North Korea’s maritime forces.

The US remains dedicated to North Korea’s nuclear, while South Korea monitors possible Russian industrial payments that may expand North Korea’s nuclear submarine interests.

As with many of North Korea’s military progress, these claims may be taken with a grain of salt, given the paucity of data about its military and Pyongyang’s tendency to exaggerate its features for advertising functions.

In a September 2023 content for the Korean Institute for National Reunification (KINU), Hong Min says North Korea may do a double record in building its sea-based nuclear barrier. According to the writer, North Korea’s first line of effort is the construction of nuclear-armed submarines, while its second is building nuclear-powered submarines.

In line with its first line of effort, North Korea unveiled the Hero Kim Kun Ok “tactical nuclear submarine” in September 2023. According to Beyond Parallel, it is a refurbished Soviet Romeo-class conventional ballistic missile submarine ( SSB ).

Beyond Parallel says the submarine’s unveiling aligns with North Korea’s SLBM program, with its newer Pukguksong-3, Pukguksong-4, Pukguksong-5 and an unnamed SLBM unveiled in April 2022 too big to fit its current Gorae-class SSB.

According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), as of August 2024, North Korea had one Gorae-class SSB. NTI notes that the submarine is limited by its reliance on diesel engines and lack of air-independent propulsion ( AIP ) systems. Its range is capped at 2, 778 kilometers—sufficient to hold targets in South Korea and Japan at risk but insufficient to threaten the US mainland.

However, Min says that remodeling Soviet-era submarines, as in the Hero Kim Kun Ok and Gorae-class SSBs ‘ case, could introduce structural and engineering problems, which could take significant time and resources to correct, rendering these efforts impractical for North Korea.

Further, in a 2017 article in the Strategy journal, Oh Soon-Kun mentions that North Korea’s Gorae SSBs will face significant command and control challenges and combat service support as they operate further from their home bases. Oh also says that the Gorae SSB, a variant of the Soviet Golf-class SSB, has high noise levels, making it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare ( ASW) operations.

Given those limitations, Oh says North Korea could limit its SSBs to operations close to its shore bases, following a Soviet-style bastion strategy. However, he mentions that the approach limits their deterrent value by precluding forward operations.

Alternatively, he states that North Korea could attempt to infiltrate its SSBs into the Sea of Japan, risking detection and destruction by South Korea, the US, and Japan’s ASW capabilities.

As for North Korea’s second line of effort, Thomas Newdick mentions in an October 2024 article for The War Zone ( TWZ ) that nuclear propulsion would give North Korea a credible second-strike capability, ensuring unlimited underwater endurance and possibly reduced acoustic signature.

However, Newdick points out that North Korea’s ability to build a nuclear-powered submarine is questionable. He notes that building submarine reactors is challenging to master, given their demanding integration and power generation requirements.

Despite those challenges, in an October 2024 Heritage Foundation report, Robert Peters mentions that North Korea has been seeking nuclear submarine propulsion technology for over a decade, with US officials speculating that Russia may have provided North Korea with such in exchange for supporting its Ukraine war effort with soldiers and materiel.

While Alex Luck notes in TWZ that a North Korean nuclear-powered submarine is not an unexpected development, the technical challenges of building such a submarine are daunting.

Luck says North Korea hasn’t developed a suitable reactor design, but it may focus on building “hybrid” submarines, combining nuclear and conventional propulsion, as seen in the sole 1980s Project 651E Juliett-class cruise missile submarine ( SSG).

Including a small auxiliary nuclear reactor in its Romeo and Golf-class retrofits could help North Korea simultaneously achieve its two lines of effort in building an underwater nuclear deterrent. A small auxiliary nuclear reactor could offset the range limitations of North Korea’s Hero Kim Kun Ok and Gorae-class SSBs and increase their submerged endurance.

However, taking Project 651E as a precedent, this approach was less than successful, achieving only a sustained speed of six knots underwater for 11, 200 kilometers. This poor performance made chemical-based AIP technology, such as fuel cells and lithium-ion batteries, more practical. The Project 651E reactor was disposed of in 2005. &nbsp,

Sukjoon Yoon mentions in an October 2023 article for the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies ( RSIS ) in Singapore that North Korea’s submarine force will likely depend on quantity over quality to match US and South Korean forces.

According to the US Defense Intelligence Agency’s ( DIA ) 2021 North Korea Military Power report, North Korea has about 70 conventional submarines, but they are of older design and limited endurance. &nbsp,

Yoon argues that since North Korea’s nuclear submarine projects seem half-baked, the best response for South Korea is to put diplomatic pressure on the former and Russia. However, he says that South Korea’s popular media prefers a military response, noting that the country has already built the sophisticated KSS-II I SSB, which could have nuclear propulsion.

Yoon mentions that South Korea’s KSS-II I submarines could perform an “anti-exit” strategy against North Korea’s SSBs, preventing them from leaving their bases and going out to sea. However, he says that South Korea constructing a nuclear-powered submarine is still a big request for the US.

Cautioning about North Korea’s submarine developments, Yoon says that while the country’s efforts may be odd and flawed, the Kim regime’s determination to acquire weapons that can threaten South Korea, Japan and the US should not be underestimated and should be addressed urgently.

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Faction led by North’s old pal rises in major South Korean party – Asia Times

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Seated beside Lee Jae-myung at a dinner on February 27, Im Jong-seok said to Lee,” I intend to support and promote those who boldly compete with you and try to surpass you”. With this statement, Im officially distanced himself from Lee, signaling a possible change in the group’s internal dynamics.

Im Jong-seok is a skilled politician with strong roots in South Korea’s radical left activities. He first gained notoriety as a pupil activist in the 1980s, advocating for reconciliation with North Korea.

Im played a vital role in facilitating other advocate Im Su-gyong’s illicit attend to North Korea in 1989 for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Kids in Pyongyang. At the time, he was the head of the National Council of Student Representatives, the similar institution to which Im Su-gyong belonged.

After her returning to South Korea, both were arrested and imprisoned for violating the National Security Act.

Im remained steadfast in his political views as the years passed and he attracted social support. Serving as the national chief of staff under Moon Jae-in solidified his position within the pro-Moon sect of the DPK.

Lee Jae-myung’s consolidation of power

Lee Jae-myung, since ascending to the management of the DPK in August 2022, has consistently consolidated his strength, often sidelining critics and detractors within the group. His management style has led to a common understanding of the DPK as a “one-man group”.

During the election processes for votes, many notable characters, including those aligned with the pro-Moon party, were excluded or marginalized. Importantly, in February 2024, Im Jong-seok was denied the DPK election for Seoul’s Jung-Seongdong city, a district long considered his stronghold. This move was widely interpreted as an attempt by Lee to remove possible rivals and strengthen his grip on the group.

Rising political rivalry

The DPK is already experiencing heightened political tensions, mostly between backers of Lee Jae-myung and those aligned with the pro-Moon party, led by Im Jong-seok. Im has been outspoken in his condemnation of Lee’s management style and policy way. He officially refuted Lee’s try to reinvent the group’s ideological stance as center-left, asserting that such changes” may be made immediately by one individual, even if he is the head”.

This inner conflict has led to common problems, raising fears about the group’s unity and its ability to effectively problem the ruling group. If President Yoon Suk Yeol were to be impeached, the law requires a presidential poll to be held within 60 days.

Moon Jae-in’s control

Former President Moon Jae-in continues to exert a powerful, albeit direct, control over the DPK. While he has maintained a relatively small public status since leaving office, his support for the pro-Moon party remains visible.

As Moon’s former chief of staff, Im Jong-seok is commonly regarded as a key figure in this party. The position between Moon and Im suggests a proper work to counter Lee Jae-myung’s supremacy within the celebration. This powerful reinforces the deepening factionalism within the DPK and suggestions at possible shifts in its administration and policy guidelines in the near future.

Yoon Suk Yeol’s transfer

In a horizontal growth, South Korea’s social landscape was jolted by the recent launch of charged President Yoon Suk Yeol from confinement. A court decision deemed his arrest illegal, leading to his release.

This development adds another layer of complexity to South Korea’s political scenario, especially with the Constitutional Court expected to decide in coming days whether to overturn Yoon’s impeachment and order him reinstated or kick him out of office permanently.

Legal challenges facing Lee Jae-myung

Concurrently, Lee Jae-myung is facing multiple criminal trials – seven cases with 11 charges. Court rulings are expected soon and, depending on the sentencing, he could be barred from holding public office for up to ten years. This would prevent him from running in the next presidential election. Such an outcome would significantly reshape the DPK’s leadership dynamics and could pave the way for the pro-Moon faction to regain prominence within the party.

Potential shift in DPK’s power dynamics

If Lee Jae-myung becomes legally incapacitated, the DPK’s power structure is likely to shift back toward the pro-Moon faction. Im Jong-seok, with the backing of former President Moon Jae-in, is well-positioned to ascend within the party ranks. This transition could lead to a reorientation of the party’s policies and strategies, particularly in light of the broader political upheavals stemming from Yoon Suk Yeol’s situation.

South Korea’s political landscape is undergoing significant transformations. The Democratic Party of Korea faces internal factionalism, legal challenges to its current leadership, and the potential resurgence of the pro-Moon faction. These developments, coupled with the uncertainty surrounding Yoon Suk Yeol’s future, suggest a period of volatility and realignment in South Korean politics.

Hanjin Lew is a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs and a former international spokesman for South Korean conservative parties.

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Time for East Asia to prepare for Trump shakedowns  – Asia Times

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” What happens in Ukraine now may occur in East Asia tomorrow”. This range from therefore Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s statement in June 2022 at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue of defence ministers in Singapore has just become alarmingly accurate, but for fresh reasons. His notice was about a regional war. Yesterday’s reality is that the treachery of Ukraine only exhibited by President Donald Trump was easily happen even in East Asia.

Trump’s followers may say that he is just trying to bring serenity at the end of three years of a dangerous conflict. However, while seeking peace sounds noble, what he is also doing is seeking a bargain with the country that made the invasion, in effect rewarding it for its aggression, and at the same time he is acting like a gangster boss toward the victim, Ukraine, demanding it hand over large amounts of its mineral rights in return for prior military and financial support.

This has exhibited two key traits of Trump and the” Make America Great Repeatedly” routine that he has created. The first is that he sees politics in a very conventional way, with country and offers to get thrashed out between the tremendous powers and their leaders, rather than in international forums of any kind. The second is that he defines power as leverage, and believes that leverage can and should be used especially against weaker countries. This is geopolitics as shake-down.

In East Asia, there is a superpower for him to bargain with, and there are plenty of candidates for the shake-down treatment. Nonetheless, we must also consider the counter-argument, the case for believing that what is happening to Ukraine will not happen in East Asia. This is based on two very rational points.

One is that, unlike in Europe, East and South-East Asian countries have generally based their relationship with the United States on interests, rather than values – so that, although Trump’s America clearly holds a different view of values ( on subjects such as human rights, democracy, justice and sovereignty ) than his predecessors, America’s interests remain the same. So why should dramatic change or shocks happen?

Like him or not, from this point of view Trump should be manageable.

The second idea, which serves to reinforce the first, is that most Republicans around Trump and in his administration believe that China represents the biggest worldwide threat to American power and security, and consider the contest with China to be the one on which the Trump administration needs to concentrate.

Indeed, some of these China hawks have argued against continued military support for Ukraine on the grounds that America needs to focus all its resources and attention on China. Trump himself has not tended to make that argument, but he has certainly sounded like he believes in being tough on China. Among his threats to impose import tariffs, the only one so far implemented has been an extra 10 % tariff on goods from China.

If these two points hold true, then the potential East Asian targets for a Trump shake-down – which are Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea and Japan – can relax. In the confrontation with China, even Trump’s America will need the support of its traditional Asian allies.

Let us hope that this proves to be the case. But hope, or “wishful thinking” as it might better be termed, is not a good strategy. The evidence from Europe, and from America’s neighbors Canada and Mexico, is that no one is immune from the Trump treatment. And, even more worryingly, Trump’s appetite for grand bargains with countries that he deems to be America’s fellow superpowers seems now to be even stronger than in his first term in office, in 2017-21.

Some of those who are looking for grand strategic intent behind Trump’s sudden overtures to Vladimir Putin have tried to rationalize this by arguing he might be trying to do a reverse Nixon-Kissinger. Those statesmen’s overtures to Mao Xedong in 1972 served to separate China from the Soviet Union, so perhaps Trump’s plan is to seduce Russia away from China, so as to increase America’s chances of suppressing the Chinese threat?

Perhaps. But this historical parallel does not look strong: China in 1972 had already split away from the Soviet Union, but in 2025 Russia and China remain closely aligned, still in the” strategic partnership without limits” that Putin and Xi Jinping signed up to on February 4, &nbsp, 2022, just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Whatever deal America might now do with Russia, it stretches credulity to think it could be large or profound enough to break Russia’s ties with China. Putin is evil but certainly not stupid and would not trust Trump sufficiently to sacrifice the ties with China and North Korea that he has built up.

This means that, although the potential dangers for East and Southeast Asia may not be as great as for Ukraine and Europe, they cannot be ignored.

Unlikely is it may seem to normal geopolitical strategists, President Trump is perfectly capable of believing that some sort of grand bargain with Xi Jinping could be achievable, and if the price of that were to be throwing allies under the metaphorical bus, he is capable of paying that price.

The China hawks around him would argue strongly against any such bargain. But some close advisers, most notably Elon Musk with his big Chinese Tesla car business, might prove much more pro-China. It would be foolish right now to place confident bets on how this balance might turn out.

The bigger and more immediate danger, however, is of Trump repeating his gangster-like shake-down behavior in East Asia.

Taiwan is the most obvious target, given the many false statements he has made in the past about how Taiwan” stole” the semiconductor business from America. Its dependence on American military protection against China makes it very vulnerable.

The same is true of the Philippines, whose navy is engaged in a daily struggle with Chinese coastguards and naval ships in the South China Sea. China might well seek to test Trump soon by taking even more aggressive action against the Philippines.

South Korea and Japan both know from his first term that they too are vulnerable.

The right way to respond is, first, to make sure that American political figures of all kinds are fully aware of the contribution that Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and South Korea make to America’s military posture in the region, and to show that the contribution is only going to increase.

And second, sad to say, countries need to plan retaliations against potential threats from Trump, in conjunction with regional allies, so as to convince him that they are not going to be easily bullied. You can hope for the best, but it is important to prepare for the worst.

Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist, Bill Emmott is currently chairman of the&nbsp, Japan Society of the UK, the&nbsp, International Institute for Strategic Studies&nbsp, and the&nbsp, International Trade Institute.

Previously published on his Substack, Bill Emmott’s Global View, this is the English original of an article published in Japanese and English by the Mainichi Shimbun. It is republished here with kind permission.

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Give Ukraine’s war a chance – Asia Times

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The US does find peace in Ukraine to keep resources, convince Russia to crack with Beijing, rely on China and prevent escalation. But for Russia, this battle is a novel Afghanistan. ( In the 1980s, the USSR collapsed due to the military effort. ). With an market valued at just a small fraction of the US and EU economies combined, warfare is a monetary disaster for Moscow– whereas it’s moderately considerable for Washington or Brussels.

China either helps Russia ( and bankrupts itself, too ) or takes advantage of Russia, thereby increasing tensions with Russia. Either decision is uncomfortable. Russians do love the Chinese earning from a conflict that hollows them.

So, if the US wants to focus on China, there is no need to look at the other side of the European peninsula, it’s currently happening. The war in Ukraine keeps Beijing on tenterhooks, without Ukraine, and without a break with Russia (unlikely to happen ), China relaxes. Escalation is a threat, but hastening to shut the conflict doesn’t stop it, it exacerbates the problem by showing possible weaknesses or pressure points.

Also, Ukrainians and Europeans don’t want to end the war like this. To jump it means solving a Russian issue and opening bigger Ukrainian and Western problems. The USA loses on every side of the deal. It would be worth it if Russia or China wanted to negotiate, and if Ukrainians and the Union were pushing to give up. But they aren’t.

For President Donald Trump, the method out can be clear, he may say the truth: that Russia isn’t sincere in its negotiations, that the shock has been good to push the EU on a rapid rearmament track, and that he’s willing to compromise if others are ready, too.

Image: Flickr

The reality, almost

In a famous essay, philosopher of war Edward Luttwak clearly argued:” An uncomfortable truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a wonderful virtue: It may resolve social conflicts and lead to peace. This does happen when all combatants become exhausted or when one wins quickly. Either way, the key is that the battle must remain until a resolution is reached. War brings serenity just after passing a culminating cycle of violence. Expectations of military victory may subside for lodging to become more attractive than more combat”.

To end the war is also a spiritual vital, and not only the Church but somebody may beg for it. Certainly, Ukraine and Europe want to end the war, but “how to stop it” can make a change, particularly at this stage.

Ukraine wants harmony but with promises that Russia won’t come back stronger than ever in five or ten years than previously. Russia may not want harmony —it wants things it does boast of as a success.

We haven’t reached the” culminating step of murder”. There aren’t evidence of an earlier lawsuit unless the US makes pushes the edge it supports to give up. It may pull it, push it, but if the drive is too hard, it can fail to no good finish. Nevertheless, as we saw, there may be perks for the US if the battle continues.

The EU does have its responsibility for the costs of war, Trump is best. And the US does lend all its social assistance to the EU and Ukraine. But, switching off security devices without adequate conversations with friends and without being able to put them in series opens the can of worms we see today: Europeans want a defense equipment unhooked from Washington.

From that, the possibility of a European political union and an army deployed against the other side of the Atlantic becomes not incredible. It’s not just the EU, the UK, Turkey, and even Canada are warming to the idea. This train is leaving the station. America should rush to stop it.

In the medium and long term, it is a much bigger trouble than even the collapse of Russia or an escalation. It could lead to the creation of an actual new political gravity center challenging the present international order. Some in China have been playing for decades with the idea of having Europe as an independent pole against the US. It might be happening now.

Perhaps it’s time to take a breath and consider a change of course. Or, better, let events follow their natural course without pushing too hard. As Taoists would say 顺其自然, follow things as they are. Besides, if America takes a step back and regroups with its allies, Russia could start reconsidering and rethinking its approach.

Francesco Sisci is director of Appia Institute, which originally published this article. It is republished with permission.

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China’s ‘two sessions’ all about rebuffing Trump – Asia Times

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China’s most important annual gathering, the so-called Lianghui ( 两会 ), will end on March 11 after over a week of National People’s Congress ( NPC ) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference ( CPPCC ) meetings.

One of the key goals of the so-called” two classes” is to arrive at crucial financial targets for the year ahead.

This time, Premier Li Qiang guaranteed that the Chinese economy may be adaptable to US President Donald Trump’s protectionist plans, including the 20 % cover taxes imposed on Chinese products since the latter took office on January 20.

Significantly, Li kept in place last year’s 5 % gross domestic product ( GDP ) target, which China just barely achieved even while racking up a huge US$ 1 trillion trade surplus.

Three plan modifications have been significant, particularly expansionary and eased economic policies, a determination to keeping prices low and a ramping up of manufacturing capability.

The first aims to increase the official fiscal deficit from 3 % to 4 % of GDP, the largest ever on record, while also easing monetary policy through imminent interest rate cuts. To be sure, this is not a substantially sudden shift in policy since the change in tone began in September last month.

But as has been the situation so far, no bazooka-style trigger should be expected since any large fiscal expansion would pile on more common loan, which has already reached 100 % of GDP.

The second change announced by Li is the lowering of the government’s inflation target from 3 % to 2 %. This shift appears to indicate that China is ready to accept negative forces since lower rates, especially for shipped goods, may help China trade its approach to 5 % GDP development.

Export price trends were negative in 2024 and so far in 2025. In February, meanwhile, consumer prices suddenly turned negative (-0.7 % ), following producer prices.

While pushing prices down to compete overseas carries risks ( Japan in the 1990s, for example ), Trump’s additional 20 % tariffs on China and the ongoing weakness of the US dollar leaves China scant room to maneuver.

Li’s third important policy message was de facto confirmation that China will continue to ramp up manufacturing capacity as a growth engine. In other words, China has no intention of addressing “overcapacity” criticisms by reducing factory supply.

Considering the announced fiscal deficit increase does not seem to be directed at boosting consumption but rather to supporting debt restructuring of local governments, domestic consumption is not expected to improve substantially in 2025. &nbsp,

This is all the more likely the case while labor markets remain weak and disposable incomes stagnant. Against this domestic backdrop, China will need to ramp up exports even more than in 2024 amid headwinds from a weaker US dollar and higher US tariffs.

This is potentially worrisome news for the rest of the world, as China seeks new markets for its low-cost goods, putting new price pressure on indigenous industries.

Beyond trade channels, Western companies operating in China are poised to face even stronger competition amid strong deflationary pressures, which will inevitably continue to erode profits.

The second main way for China to rebuff Trump’s tariffs is through more technological self-reliance. Trump’s Stargate technology investment program, announced at US$ 500 billion with OpenAI and Softbank in attendance, is being closely watched in Beijing and, so far, the reaction seems clear. &nbsp,

Firstly, Chinese AI platform Deepseek’s revelation in late January has sparked a recovery in Chinese tech and other stocks, both in the mainland and in Hong Kong. Some of China’s best-known tech companies have seen strong rebounds in their share prices.

Given the crucial importance President Xi Jinping attaches to China’s self-reliance in technology, the Lianghui has held several discussions on providing different types of support for critical indigenous technologies, particularly in regard to AI.

Two new policies were announced at the Lianghui, namely the establishment of a 1 trillion yuan ($ 138 billion ) national venture capital guidance fund aimed at strengthening AI, quantum technology, hydrogen energy and energy storage.

The second measure relates to the easing of existing constraints on initial public offerings ( IPOs ) for loss-making companies in key sectors like AI. In the future, they will be allowed easier access to public capital markets.

All in all, China’s leadership has used the Lianghui to respond to Trump’s threats and actions, both in terms of cushioning the blow of new US tariffs and through moves to reduce China’s technological dependence on the US through more indigenous activity.

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