Don’t be fooled by Biden and Xi talks

There were smiles for the camera, handshakes, warm words and the unveiling of a couple of agreements.

But beyond the optics of the first meeting in over a year between the leaders of the world’s two biggest economies, not an awful lot had changed: There was nothing to suggest a “reset” in US and China relations that in recent years have been rooted in suspicion and competition.

President Joe Biden hinted as much just hours after the face-to-face talks, confirming that he still considered his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, a “dictator.” Beijing hit back, with foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning telling reporters Biden’s remark was “extremely wrong and irresponsible political manipulation.”

As a scholar of US-China relations, I believe the relationship between the two countries can be best described as an “enduring rivalry” – a term used by political scientists to denote two powers that have singled each other out for intense security competition. Examples from history include India and Pakistan, France and England, and the West and the Soviet Union.

Over the past two centuries, such rivals have accounted for only 1% of the world’s international relationships but 80% of its wars. History suggests these rivalries last around 40 years and end only when one side loses the ability to compete – or when the two sides ally against a common enemy.

Neither scenario looks likely any time soon in regards to China and the US.

How enduring rivalries end

China “is a communist country … based on a form of government totally different than ours,” Biden said after his meeting with Xi.

That comment gets to the heart of why diplomacy alone cannot reset the US-China relationship. Washington and Beijing are not rivals due to any misunderstanding that can be sorted out through talks alone.

US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping greet each other as they hold their first direct meeting in a year. Picture: YouTube Screengrab

Rather, they are rivals because of the opposite reason: They understand each other only too well and have come to the conclusion that their respective world outlooks cannot be reconciled.

The same is true for many of the issues that divide the two countries – they are framed as binary win-lose scenarios. Taiwan can be governed from Taipei or Beijing, but not both. Similarly, the East China and South China seas can be international waters or Chinese territory; Russia can be crippled or supported.

For the United States, its Asian alliances are a force for stability; for China, they’re hostile encirclement. And both countries are right in their respective assessments.

Diplomacy alone is insufficient to resolve a rivalry. At best, it can help manage it.

When the US calls, who picks up?

Part of this management of the US-China rivalry involves finding areas of agreement that can be committed to.

And on November 15, Biden and Xi announced deals over curbing China’s production of the deadly drug fentanyl and the restoring of high-level, military-to-military dialogue between the two countries.

But the fentanyl announcement is very similar to the one Xi gave to then-President Donald Trump in 2019. The US administration later accused China of reneging on the agreement.

Similarly, committing to restarting high-level dialogue is one thing; following up on it is another. History is dotted with occasions when having an open line between Beijing and Washington hasn’t meant a whole lot in times of crisis.

In 2001, when a US surveillance aircraft collided with a Chinese jet over Hainan Island, Beijing didn’t pick up the phone. Likewise, during the Tiananmen Square massacre, then-President George H W Bush urgently tried to call his counterpart Deng Xiaoping but was unable to get through.

Moreover, focusing on what was agreed to in talks also highlights what wasn’t – and is unlikely to ever be – agreed to without a substantial shift in power that forces one side to concede to the other.

For example, China wants the US to stop selling arms to Taiwan. But Washington has no intention of doing this, as it knows that this will make the disputed island more vulnerable to Beijing. Washington would like China to end its military displays of strength over the Taiwan Strait; Beijing knows doing so risks seeing Taiwan drift toward independence.

American policymakers have long said what they want is China to “change” – by which it means to liberalize its system of governance. But the Chinese Communist Party knows that doing so means self-liquidation – every communist regime that has allowed space for alternative political parties has unraveled.

Which is why American attempts to engage China are often met with suspicion in China. As former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin commented, engagement and containment policies have the same aim: to end China’s socialist system.

For similar reasons, Xi has shunned attempts by the US to bring China further into the rules-based international order. The Chinese leader saw what happened when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev tried to integrate the Soviet Union into the Western order in the late 1980s – it only hastened the demise of the socialist entity.

Instead, Xi calls for a massive military buildup, the reassertion of Chinese Communist Party control and an economic policy based on self-reliance.

Actions speak louder …

The encouraging words and limited agreements hammered out in the latest meeting between Xi and Biden should also not distract from the actions that continue to push the US and China further apart.

China’s show of force in the Taiwan Strait has been sustained for three years now and shows no sign of abating. Meanwhile, Beijing’s navy continues to harass other nations in the South China Sea.

Similarly, Biden has continued the US path toward military alliances aimed at countering China’s threat. It recently entered a trilateral agreement between the US, Japan and South Korea. And that came two years after the establishment of AUKUS, a security partnership between the US, Australia and the UK that has similar aims.

The AUKUS nuclear submarine deal is making ripples across the Indo-Pacific. Image: US Embassy in China

Meanwhile, the US administration will continue to tighten the screws on China’s economy through investment restrictions. Biden is well aware that easy-flowing money from Wall Street is helping China weather choppier economic waters of late and is keen to turn off the tap.

The point of diplomacy

This isn’t to say that diplomacy and face-to-face talks are pointless. They do, in fact, serve a number of interests.

For both men involved, there is a domestic upside. For Biden, playing nice with China projects the image of a statesman – especially at a time when, due to US positions on Ukraine and the Middle East, he is facing accusations from the political left of being a “warmonger.”

And encouraging Beijing to tread softly during the US election year may blunt a potential line of attack from Republicans that the administration’s China policy is not working.

Meanwhile, Xi is able to showcase his own diplomatic skills and present China as an alternative superpower to the US and to potentially cleave the Western business community – and perhaps even major European nations – from what he would see as the US anti-China coalition.

Moreover, summits like the one in San Francisco signal that both the US and China are jointly committed to at least keep talking, helping ensure that a rocky relationship doesn’t descend into anything more belligerent – even if that doesn’t make them any friendlier.

Michael Beckley is Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Countering complaints about Biden’s China strategy

One of the most important criticisms of the Biden administration’s efforts to oppose serious challenges coming from Chinese government behavior is that the strategy is vague and dangerous because it does not sufficiently reassure China.

Such criticism is unrealistic and at odds with past US success in following similar policies against Chinese challenges.

US objectives and achievements

The Biden government’s efforts resemble the Asia-first strategies – explained below – that were used successfully by the Reagan and George W Bush administrations to curb Chinese challenges and assertiveness.

Biden’s main objectives focus on strengthening America at home and establishing power and influence abroad to change circumstances influencing Chinese interests, thereby prompting Beijing to curb its challenging behavior.

Calling for a clear end-state in these efforts is unrealistic as the process is subject to unpredictable changes over a prolonged period of acute competition.

The record this time around shows growing US achievements in strengthening against China with impressive momentum for six years. The policies have sustained backing from two very different US administrations and bipartisan majorities in Congress, along with broad approval in pubic opinion and US media.

The Biden administration has successfully completed a first stage of strengthening America at home and building power and influence abroad with a growing array of allies and partners.

The passage of the $1 trillion infrastructure bill in 2021 and two massive bills in 2022 were important in competing with China, especially in high technology.

With strong congressional backing, the administration in 2022 imposed a ban on the export of US advanced computer chip technology to China. In 2023 an Executive Order with broad congressional support proposed restricting high technology investments by US companies in China.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s strong military reaction to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 advanced US strengthening aboard.

Biden and his aides built on US-backed NATO resolve to counter Russia and its partner, China. They connected NATO with Japan and other Indo-Pacific powers like Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand.

Led by Biden, the G-7 countries and NATO showed unprecedented concern with China’s adverse impact on Asian security, including coercive behavior over South China Sea disputes and Taiwan.

The Biden administration’s success saw the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam advance ties with the United States despite risks of Chinese retaliation. The absence of traditional trade agreements giving greater access to US markets was offset as the US accommodated allies and partners using multi-billion-dollar high technology and climate change expenditures and other measures under the Indo-Pacific Economic Policy Framework.

Reagan background of US Asia-first policy toward China

What came to be called the US Asia-first policy emerged after two years during the first term of the Reagan administration. It countered Chinese efforts to leverage acute concern by US leaders in the late 1970s and early 1980s in sustaining strong Chinese backing as the United States faced powerful challenges from the Soviet Union.

Beijing repeatedly threatened to downgrade the US relationship over continued US arms sales to Taiwan and a host of other issues. Also making leading US leaders nervous, Beijing began talks with Moscow to ease tensions.

In response, US policy under the leadership of Secretary of State George Shultz (1982-1989) and backed by senior Asia policymakers Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage and Gaston Sigur reversed the heretofore top US priority of advancing closer ties with China.

Thus Washington’s previous policy, which had been followed since the Nixon administration, was tagged with the newly derogatory term “China-first policy.”

Reagan, Shultz and George Bush Sr. Photo: The Telegraph

Shultz’s predecessor Alexander Haig and Haig’s subordinates had strongly advocated the old policy of accommodating Chinese demands to ensure Beijing’s alignment with the United States against the USSR.

The new US policy leaders took advantage of a massive buildup of US military strength and stronger alignment with allies, especially Japan and NATO powers, to deal effectively with Soviet expansionism.

The new leaders downgraded China’s importance as they rebuilt strong relations with Japan and other allies and partners including Taiwan. They remained unmoved by Chinese demands. Countering longstanding Chinese pressure against the sale of fighter aircraft, they went forward with the sale and assembly in Taiwan of 130 advanced fighter aircraft.

The result was a Chinese grudging adjustment, leading to much smoother US-China relations for the rest of Reagan’s term.

George W Bush administration picks it up again

A second episode of the Asia-first policy occurred at the outset of the George W Bush administration.

Incoming administration leaders included veterans from the Reagan years like Wolfowitz and Armitage. They viewed the Clinton government as passive and intimidated by Chinese pressures that might lead to a repeat of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995-96.

Taking advantage of Clinton administration preoccupations, Chinese leaders advanced military assertiveness in the Taiwan Strait and stridently exerted pressure against US missile defense, NATO expansion and security ties with Japan.

Bush policymakers enhanced US military strength along with strengthening alliances in the Asia-Pacific as they scrapped Clinton’s approach. China recalculated, resulting in Beijing’s new “peaceful rise” approach, which gave top priority to reassuring the United States.

Authoritative Chinese experts told this interviewer that there was a genuine concern that to do otherwise would have risked a repeat of the US response to Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. Beijing stuck to the peaceful rise approach until the end of that decade, although the unsuccessful US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq tended more and more to confirm a Chinese assessment of declining US power and resolve.

Lessons for today

China is much more powerful today than it was in the 1980s and the 2000s. Nevertheless, China had profound leverage in those periods, which it employed to have its way at US expense. US strengthening and firm resolve effectively curbed Chinese assertiveness in those instances.

Against this background, the Biden administration’s impressive strengthening at home and building of power and influence abroad represents a proven approach that has strong momentum for sustained competition in the period ahead.

On the recent complaint that the United States is not sufficiently reassuring China, it is notable that US reassurance on Taiwan and other sensitive issues was infrequent in the first episode of Asia-first policy and was not much evident in the second.

Among other negative consequences, special reassurance of China risked weakening resolve in the United States and among allies and partners. The Biden government avoided such measures even when the crisis posed by China’s military actions after the Pelosi visit prompted a spike in commentators’ urging of greater accommodation of Chinese interests.

That crisis passed after a few weeks and US hardening to counter Chinese challenges intensified.

An added reason for the Biden administration to avoid special reassurance to China is the likelihood of strong criticism from Congress, threatening the bipartisan unity on China policy that has sustained a strong and unified America facing the Chinese challenges.

Past experience and current conditions argue against special reassurance of China at this time.

Robert Sutter ([email protected]), a former US national intelligence officer for East Asia and the Pacific, is a professor of practice of international affairs at George Washington University. This assessment draws from his new book: Congress and China Policy: Past Episodic, Recent Enduring Influence.

This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission.

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Pluto: How robots ‘feel’ when humans exploit them

There have been many TV shows and films inspired by the dual fear and excitement surrounding advances in artificial intelligence. But not many exhibit such masterful craft and profound humanity as the new Netflix anime miniseries Pluto.

YouTube video

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The trailer for Pluto

Pluto is adapted from a manga series of the same title (2003-2009), created by Naoki Urasawa and Takashi Nagasaki. The manga version – considered a comic masterpiece for its beautiful art and sophisticated storyline – incorporated fundamental elements from Osamu Tezuka’s celebrated manga series Astro Boy (1952-1968), including the beloved android adolescent who was the titular character.

Pluto is set in a futuristic world in which humans and robots coexist, albeit within a hierarchy in favor of humans. Robots excel in various jobs ranging from nannies and butlers to architects and detectives, but they are treated as second-class citizens.

Although robots gradually gain their own rights codified into law, they are still exploited by humans, who downplay their worth and emotional intelligence. As much as humans depend on AI, they also feel threatened by it.

An AI murder mystery

Pluto, which has both Japanese and English audio versions, follows German robot detective Gesicht (Shinshū Fuji/Jason Vande Brake) as he traces the mysterious killings of robots and humans. The world’s seven most advanced robots (including Gesicht himself) and robot-friendly humans (including his creator) are the targets of this assassination scheme.

What’s most perplexing is that the murders appear untraceable. This suggests that the killer might be a very advanced robot, challenging the belief that robots can’t ever kill humans due to their programmed constraints.

Gesicht is voiced by Jason Vande Brake in the English dub. Image: Netflix

This enigmatic case echoes the cautionary message found in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein – beware of human beings’ ambitious dreams and creations. While the story begins as a murder mystery, it evolves into a thoughtful drama about the conflicted relationships between humans and androids.

While Pluto draws on many familiar sci-fi concepts, it distinguishes itself through its meticulous character development and the depth of its micro-stories. Every character is complex, and the audience is able to get to know them and become invested in their fates. The anime’s unhurried pace also allows viewers ample time to contemplate its philosophical questions about consciousness evolution and the powerful impacts of emotions.

Despite all its brilliance, however, the series is not without flaws. It has a dated representation of gender roles, with no female character – whether human or robot – playing an important part. None of them break free from the stereotypical role of nurturing, stay-behind support for their exceptionally capable and powerful male partners.

Animation of the year

Pluto Image: Netflix

Pluto maintains a melancholic tone throughout – but despite this overarching dark ambience, it is at times romantic and moving. It exalts love, friendship and compassion without falling into sentimentality, evoking an emotional resonance reminiscent of Blade Runner (1982).

The series emphasizes that life, or the process of living, imparts character and humanity, transcending biological organs and blood. Androids may initially be devoid of complex emotions, but they develop sentience through everyday experiences and interactions with fellow robots and humans.

Robots can even learn to appreciate music, as manifested by the charismatic North No.2 (Koichi Yamadera/Patrick Seitz), who was designed for intense combat but grows weary of warfare. The narrative underscores the simultaneous beauty and danger of emotions – particularly the destructive force of wrath.

With great technological advancements and comfort, this futuristic world is still torn by war. It poses the question: “Will war ever end?” – reminding us of the conflicts and tragedies happening in the real world. The anime suggests that an end to war is unlikely as long as hatred persists.

For me, with its beautiful art and riveting narrative, Pluto stands out as one of the best Netflix productions of all time. It’s certainly the best animated work of the year.

Thi Gammon is a research associate in culture, media and creative industries edducation at King’s College London.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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US pension fund’s exit may shake Hong Kong markets

Hong Kong’s status as an international financial hub faces a new challenge as the United States’ federal pension fund has decided to exclude Hong Kong-listed shares from the benchmark indexes for its international funds.

The decision was announced by the US Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (FRTIB) on Tuesday before Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden met in San Francisco on Wednesday. In a dinner on Wednesday evening, Xi called on the US business community to boost investment in China. 

The FRTIB said it had conducted a routine review of the four benchmark indexes followed by its Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) and decided to adjust its International Stock Index Investment Fund, or I Fund, which has an asset size of US$68 billion as of the end of last month. It said it had reviewed the recommendations of its staff and Aon, its investment consultant. 

“Overall, operational complexity has increased when investing in emerging markets in recent years given a range of events such as investment restrictions on sensitive Chinese technology sectors, delisting of Chinese companies and sanctions on Russian securities due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict,” Aon said

“These types of unforeseen events can incur transaction costs and may cause performance and volatility swings,” it said.

It said any announcement of investment restrictions can cause the value of a stock to decline at a time where the investor is forced to sell. It said, given the asset size of the I Fund, the forced selling or restricted investments could incur higher than average market impact costs due to liquidity challenges.

It said it will work with its fund managers to implement the transition from the current index (MSCI Europe, Australasia and Far East (EAFE) Index) to the next index (MSCI All Country World (ACWI) ex USA ex China ex Hong Kong Investable Market Index (IMI)) in 2024. It said the next index is expected to outperform the current one on a risk-adjusted basis over the long term.

Assets in Hong Kong

The MSCI ACWI IMI ex USA ex China ex Hong Kong, launched in June this year, provides exposure to 5,621 large-, mid-, and small-cap stocks in 21 developed markets and 23 emerging markets. 

The MSCI EAFE Index currently provides exposure to 798 large- and mid-cap stocks in 21 developed markets. Hong Kong stocks represent about 3.3% of the index’s assets, according to the geographical breakdown of a similar MSCI index. 

If the I fund is closely tracking the MSCI EAFE Index, it should have allocated US$2.2 billion of its assets into Hong Kong markets.

Simon Lee, a US-based Hong Kong commentator, noted that the asset size of the I Fund’s assets in Hong Kong is not enormous, comparatively speaking. But he predicted the fund’s departure will still hurt the city’s stock markets. 

“In general, the US now sees China as a risk, not an opportunity, and it does not treat Hong Kong as an independent economy from mainland China,” Lee said. “As the TSP is representative, its departure from Hong Kong may make some state-level pension funds follow suit.” 

He said the TSP’s departure will fuel capital outflows in Hong Kong and hurt the city’s status as an international financial hub. 

A Shanghai-based columnist says in an article that shares of 29 Hong Kong-listed firms, including AIA Group Ltd, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd, CK Hutchison Holdings and Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd, will face downward pressure when the TSP’s fund managers dispose of them next year. 

The Hang Seng Index, a benchmark of the Hong Kong stock markets, has fallen 13.4% so far this year. The Shanghai Composite Index, which tracks the A-share markets, has dropped by only 2%.

Trump’s decision

In November 2017, the FRTIB decided to let its I Fund follow the MSCI ACWI IMI ex USA, instead of MSCI EAFE Index, as a way to enter the A-share markets. 

As of July 31, 2019, China received the third-most investment on a per-nation basis within the MSCI ACWI IMI ex USA at 7.56% of the index’s assets. 

In August 2019, US Senators Marco Rubio and Jeanne Shaheen told FRTIB Chairman Michael Kennedy in a letter that some of the US federal government employees’ money mightd have been invested in Chinese firms that pose national security, human rights and financial disclosure risks. 

The FRTIB was ordered to stop investing in A-shares by the Trump administration in May 2020.

As of the end of March in 2020, the TSP had US$557 billion of assets while its I Fund had US$41 billion.

The Economic Daily, a state-owned newspaper, said in a commentary in 2020 that the negative impact on the A-share markets of the TSP’s exit was negligible. 

Citing an estimation of the Bocom Schroders Asset Management Co Ltd, it said all US pension funds totaled US$30 trillion but the US federal government only controlled US$1.9 trillion of that while the remaining was owned by state governments and the private sector. 

It added that no more than US$15 billion of US pension funds had been allocated to the Greater China region and most of it was in Hong Kong.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry in May 2020 criticized the US government for blocking American investors from entering China’s markets and politicizing the matter in the name of national security. It said such a move would hurt US investors’ interest.

‘Butterfly effect’

In the first 10 months of this year, the average daily turnover of Hong Kong’s stock market was HK$106.6 billion (US$13.7 billion). Market capitalization amounted to HK$30.8 trillion (US$3.95 trillion) at the end of last month.

Some analysts said the I Fund’s US$2.2 billion investments in Hong Kong is negligible as it is only about 16% of the market’s daily turnover and 0.06% of its market capitalization. 

However, they are worried that if more institutional investors are leaving Hong Kong, it will create a “butterfly effect” that may lead to a market crash. 

In October 2022, the Teacher Retirement System of Texas, managing a US$184 billion public pension fund, cut its China target allocation to 1.5% from 3% of its assets. 

In April this year, Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP), Canada’s third largest pension fund, reportedly closed down its China equity investment team based in Hong Kong.

On Wednesday, lawmakers passed a bill to lower the stamp duty for stock trading to 0.1% from 0.13%, hoping to make the bourse more competitive.

Read: BlackRock, MSCI probed for investments in China

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

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Hamas not the first to use human shields to wage war

The Israeli military said on November 15, 2023, that it had found weapons and a Hamas command center at Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, after sending troops into the medical facility.

Shifa has become the epicenter of Israel’s ground invasion into Gaza, as the Israeli military says that Hamas has strategically placed its fighters and weapons in a broad tunnel system that connects to the hospital, and that Hamas is using hospital workers and patients as human shields.

The US says its intelligence shows that Hamas, as The New York Times wrote, “has been using hospitals in Gaza, including Al-Shifa, as command centers and ammunitions depots.” Hamas has denied the allegations.

The hospital complex now houses about 700 patients, 400 health workers and 3,000 Palestinians who are displaced from their homes, according to United Nations figures.

This is far from the first time that a military group has allegedly used civilians to shield themselves and their weapons, says Benjamin Jensen, a war strategy expert from American University School of International Service who served 20 years in the military.

Jensen explained that civilians often become pawns in war when one side does not have a military advantage against a stronger adversary – and looks for other ways to weaken their opponent.

1. What purpose does using civilians to shield fighters serve in a conflict?

Using places and things civilians need, like hospitals, as a means to fight a war is considered a weapon of the weak. It is a way to use another side’s values against it.

I think it is clear that Hamas has – in this war and historically – tried to embed themselves and weapons in places civilians live or visit, in order to make it more difficult for the Israelis to target them.

One question in war is, “How do I raise the cost that my adversary has to incur in order to attack me?” Your goal is to gain a relative advantage at the lowest possible cost to yourself, and with the lowest possible benefit for your adversary.

And in this case, the costs to Israel are damage to its reputation and legitimacy, among some people, because of the civilians it is killing in Gaza while targeting Hamas.

2. Are fighters hiding behind or among civilians a new way of waging a war?

Using civilians to further a military advantage is not a new phenomenon.

We still have this ridiculous image of war looking like people lined up in neat rows, meeting each other in defined fields of battle. But that flies in the face of the actual history of warfare historically, and especially in the 21st century.

In the Japanese attack on the British stronghold of Singapore in 1942, during World War II, for example, one of the key features of Japan’s approach was to bomb people’s water sources, in order to more rapidly compel the British surrender.

We’ve seen adversaries in multiple modern conflicts hide behind or among civilians. It’s sad, because it means the only truth in war is that there will be tragedy, and civilians will pay the heaviest price.

3. Where else has this happened?

Even if you go back to the Vietnam War, you can find examples of the Viet Cong sometimes using the same routes or vehicles that were used for aid delivery to civilians. Wars dating back to the Bosnian civil war in the early 1990s are really where you start to see more examples of fighters trying to shield themselves with civilians or with UN peacekeepers, as happened in Bosnia.

We’ve seen the Taliban in Afghanistan hiding in civilians’ homes and in hospitals, as well as storing weapons in mosques. The Taliban were very good at being fluid and moving in and out of civilian areas that would make it difficult to strike them.

The battle of Mosul, between the Islamic State group and the Iraqi government from 2016 through 2017, was another example of this. The Islamic State fighters herded an estimated 100,000 civilians together and used them as civilian shields.

Even in the case of the Ukraine war, Russian President Vladimir Putin has openly declared war on the entire society of Ukraine. But it’s possible that some of Russia’s strikes against hospitals in Ukraine happened because Russian intelligence received information that Ukraine may or may not have been moving soldiers or items in and out of the hospital.

4. Do civilians sometimes willingly play the role of human shields?

It varies. Based on my experience, do I think it’s possible that the lead hospital administrators in Gaza know the full landscape of the labyrinth of tunnels underneath? No. Do I think one or two officials or a couple of janitors or part-time workers do? Yes. Do I also think that it’s possible that most people in a war zone are just trying to survive and they look the other way? Yes.

There’s this weird phenomenon for civilians in situations like this, in which they often know something’s going on. But also if you’re smart enough, you might not ask anything. Hamas was known to mistreat Palestinians before this war started.

A woman with a headscarf holds a small baby and sits amid a large pile of rubble.
A Palestinian woman holds her baby at her home destroyed by Israeli air strikes in a central area of the Gaza Strip on November 15, 2023. Photo: NurPhoto via Getty Images / Majdi Fathi / The Conversation

5. How does Hamas allegedly using civilian shields complicate this war?

The answer depends on what your military is trying to achieve. If your idea is that you have to move faster than your adversary, then you are willing to probably assume a higher risk of civilian casualties and lose the information war – meaning the war of people’s public opinion – in order to rapidly destroy your adversary.

But with Hamas locating themselves alongside important places like hospitals, Hamas has actually made Israel fight them in places Israel wouldn’t want to target them, because of the potential loss of civilian life. And in doing so, look at how fast Israel lost momentum in its information war. Israel is taking a huge amount of criticism for its killing of civilians as it goes after Hamas.

Despite what some protesters are saying, I can say that the Israeli military does care about civilian casualties. Israel still is a democracy. And they respect, even if not to the exact standards that many people would like to see, the laws of war – certainly more than Hamas does. For example, Israel limits how it targets military strikes.

And even with that, the information blowback against Israel is real. I fought for 20 years. It’s hard to get images of infants killed and hurt in this war out of your head. Social media accelerates the circulation of images that pull on our emotions and make it difficult to have objective conversations about the conflict.

Benjamin Jensen is Professor of Strategic Studies, Marine Corps University; Scholar-in-Residence, American University School of International Service

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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The grand strategy shaping Australia’s new worldview

The term “grand strategy” may perplex, but many employ the technique even if not naming it such. Most governments seek to build and then apply national power in their attempts to establish sought-after relationships with other states.

Grand strategies are whole-of-government, involving diplomaticinformational, military and economic power. They are of most use to states with limited power that need to focus scarce resources on their most important concerns.

The grand strategy methodology is a useful framework with which to consider Australia and its contemporary international policies and activities as a middle power

Like other small and middle powers, grand strategy informs Australia’s statecraftthe application of diverse forms of national power. Grand strategy also involves building particular forms of national power in a manner appropriate to achieving the desired objectives.

Australia has developed a balance of power grand strategy that will be of a scale “sufficient…to deter aggression and coercion” and generate “a strategic equilibrium.” Such a grand strategy assumes that others can be stopped from achieving their ambitions by being as, or more, powerful than them.

Power is gained by building up military and economic might, by forming collective defense alliances with others, or by doing both. This grand strategy is clearly focused at the great power level and implicitly at China.

The balance of power grand strategy is steadily being implemented. 

Diplomatically, AUKUS is strengthening the US alliance and UK partnership. Internally, Canberra is hardening societal resilience by criminalizing foreign interference, blocking specific foreign telecom firms, toughening foreign investment laws, strengthening critical infrastructure regulations and countering misinformation and disinformation actions.

In addition to the AUKUS submarines, Australia is buying new long-range strike missiles, getting anti-ship missiles for the army, upgrading northern defense bases and developing offensive cyber capabilities.

Building economic power actions include the National Reconstruction Fund which provides targeted investments in defense capability, advanced manufacturing and critical technologies.

The AUKUS nuclear submarine deal is making ripples across the Indo-Pacific. Image: US Embassy in China

Looking beyond the great powers, Australia has also devised an engagement strategy focused on middle and smaller powers. This grand strategy involves working with others to achieve common goals.

Australia will work with Southeast Asia and the Pacific “to enhance our collective security and prosperity.” Supporting regional states to be more resilient to outside pressures aligns with a balance-of-power grand strategy.

In recent years Australia reached numerous bilateral and multilateral economic agreements with Indonesia, the Pacific IslandsIndia, Japan and South Korea.

Australia also aims for greater trade and investment with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the two sides have deepened ties with the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and its associated Aus4ASEAN Futures Initiative.

The initiative includes financing smart cities, digitization, technology innovation, digital skills training and a scholarship program in the areas of maritime, connectivity, economic development and sustainable development goals.

The two grand strategies are “mutually reinforcing.” Having different strategies to achieve different outcomes is necessary as a single grand strategy cannot achieve all a state seeks and combining them has proven problematic.

The balance of power grand strategy will not solve the problem of a possible great power war. Instead, the strategic equilibrium must be maintained indefinitely until the risk of major war fades. 

Australia has little control over what the great powers do, meaning its grand strategy must maintain a high level of defense expenditure and industry as well as a focus on major high-technology wars.

Australia is effectively trapping itself within a narrow range of possible domestic and foreign policy options. On the other hand, a great power war in the region is critically important to avoid. Reduced autonomy in the international system may be a price worth paying.

The engagement grand strategy brings its own complications. Australia’s new trade and investment strategy with Southeast Asia needs a whole-of-nation effort. 

It calls for better Southeast Asia literacy across Australia’s business, government, education and community sectors, proposing sectoral business missions to the region, more capable business chambers, deeper SME links with the region and more professional exchanges and internships. 

It also calls for Australia to be a substantial regional investor using monies from its corporations, capital markets, national savings and superannuation funds.

Ultimately, grand strategies must generally gain domestic approval to be successfully implemented. It’s not simply a national government endeavor. Instead, Canberra needs to persuade Australians of the merits of the two grand strategies by building legitimacy and crafting a strategic narrative that encourages buy-in.

strategic narrative can provide an interpretive structure to make sense of these challenges and emerging issues. Such narratives should appeal to both people’s rational and emotional cognition.

The two grand strategies set out a path, even if their success is uncertain. More definite, is that over time they will impact all Australians.

Peter Layton is a visiting fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and the author of Grand Strategy.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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An avenue for ‘recoupling’ US and China

The establishment of the US-China economic and financial working groups in September 2023 marked a noteworthy pivot in the often volatile relations between Washington and Beijing. 

Amid the escalating tensions of what is widely recognized as “great power rivalry,” these working groups have the potential to foster greater stability between the world’s two largest economic superpowers.

In recent years, “decoupling” has become a buzzword that symbolizes the United States and China’s intent to disentangle their economies. The establishment of the working groups challenges this notion to an extent. 

While certain dynamics of the ongoing trade war and the pandemic may have hinted at a move towards reduced interdependence, complete economic decoupling is likely to harm both the United States and China. 

Astute policymakers on both sides are wary of the risks associated with decoupling. The reality remains that bilateral economic ties are characterized by intrinsic interdependence.

Trade between the United States and China has remained substantial. As of August 2023, the total value of the US trade in goods with China exceeded US$369 billion. China has also been one of the largest foreign creditors to the US government, holding $821 billion worth of US Treasury bonds in July 2023.

The working groups will serve as a forum for bilateral policy exchange. Under the guidance of high-ranking officials from both countries, they offer a structured channel for sustained dialogue, promising several benefits.

Supported by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and China’s Vice Premier He Lifeng, along with regular meetings at the vice-ministerial level, these working groups are well-prepared for consistent and high-level interactions. Such continuity ensures that discussions can move beyond superficial exchanges and delve into more substantive policy matters.

In the intricate realm of international relations, transparency – or a lack thereof – can be a significant destabilizing factor. The US-China working groups, by promoting frank dialogue on macroeconomic and fiscal trajectories, can mitigate uncertainties that might otherwise inflame tensions.

Direct communication is one of the most effective tools in preventing misunderstandings. These working groups offer an opportunity for both nations to clarify their positions, objectives and concerns directly without the distortion of third-party interpretations.

The US-China working groups have the potential to act as a fulcrum for stabilizing economic ties. Regular interactions at the bureaucratic level can build a foundation of trust, which is often missing in high-stakes diplomatic negotiations.

Balancing optimism with realism is crucial. While the inception of the working groups is a laudable stride towards de-escalating tensions, it is not a silver bullet for all bilateral challenges.

During the initial meeting of the financial working group, differences emerged, notably in the discussion of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s quota-based lending resources. The United States advocated for an increase in IMF quota-based lending resources without changing its shareholding structure, while China showed reluctance to support this proposal without an increase in its IMF shares.

Secretary Yellen expressed optimism for an “equi-proportional” quota increase, where each member country’s contribution to an increase in quotas is proportional to their current IMF shareholdings. This divergence reflects broader disagreements between the United States and China on financial and economic ​cooperation.

The working groups may face challenges in addressing structural trade imbalances, as the capital account can drive the current account and low-cost Chinese goods continue to retain their global competitiveness. In the domain of high-tech competition, security imperatives will continue to drive intense rivalry. 

The US government may sustain pressure on the Chinese government, as indicated by Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo during her Beijing visit when she said the United States will not compromise or negotiate in matters of national security.

At the same time, Beijing’s increased industrial policies and domestic content requirements might impede US businesses from penetrating the Chinese market, potentially exacerbating technological contestations.

Given the overarching significance of the US-China relationship on the global stage, their choices can recalibrate global markets, influence worldwide innovation and redraw the geopolitical cartography for generations. 

As global stakeholders keenly monitor the evolving US-China interplay, the working groups, while not a panacea to address fundamental problems between these two great powers illuminate the potential for rivalry and collaboration to coexist. The working groups also demonstrate that astute diplomacy can foster mutual respect and understanding.

Such platforms for dialogue are not only beneficial but crucial for US-China relations, especially in the context of their great power rivalry.

Yuhan Zhang is a scholar based at UC Berkeley specializing in China’s political economy. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at the G20 Center of Beijing Foreign Studies University’s International Business School.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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US, China at critical odds on future of military AI

Amid rising tensions over Taiwan, a looming nuclear arms race and tit-for-tat espionage allegations, the US and China have agreed to crucial talks on the future use of artificial intelligence (AI) in sensitive military areas.

US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping affirmed the need for bilateral government talks to address the risks associated with using advanced AI systems in sensitive military functions at this week’s Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco. But it was not clear from post-meeting statements that the two sides are anywhere near making a joint declaration.

The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported citing anonymous sources that Biden and Xi were set to pledge a ban on using AI in nuclear weapons command and control (C2) and autonomous weapons such as drones. The report said that the US and China are concerned about the potential for unregulated AI to fuel and escalate conflicts.

Oriana Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, said in the SCMP report that one of the first agreements the two sides should strike is to avoid automating nuclear C2 systems with AI.

Mastro pointed out that humans currently handle decision-making and launch procedures, although she said there are discussions underway about having AI automate parts of these processes. She was doubtful, however, that Biden and Xi would agree to AI-related nuclear arms control talks.

Breaking Defense reported that while the specifics of Biden and Xi’s AI-military talks were not publicly disclosed, with both sides releasing bare-bones press releases, there is a clear movement towards establishing norms on the military use of AI, particularly in autonomous weapons.

However, Breaking Defense said that neither side is likely to accept any ban limiting their freedom of action to deploy AI in their militaries.

Breaking Defense points out that US law prevents the President from making such a commitment without the approval of Congress and that China is seeking an expanded dialogue on AI rather than an agreement.

US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s talks on military AI were not publicly disclosed. Picture: YouTube Screengrab

The same report says that while the US has been steadily building momentum to shape global AI norms, more than guidelines and political declarations are needed. Breaking Defense argues that the US should support clear and strong legal instruments that restrict the use of AI in autonomous weapons systems.

It also notes that China is thus far not following the US’s lead. Instead, Breaking Defense argues that China’s diplomatic strategy aims to counterbalance and rival the US in setting future AI standards, particularly in the military sphere.

While AI is a revolutionary technology, it also brings vulnerabilities. In a January 2022 Modern War Institute article, Nick Starck and other writers mention risks such as poisoning, evasion, reverse engineering and inference attacks.

Starck and other writers note that AI poisoning can occur due to adversaries altering training data, which can be countered by implementing rigorous data curation and governance policies.

They say that adversaries can use evasion techniques such as changing inputs to exploit the AI’s learned patterns, which can be prevented by evaluation tools and keeping humans in the loop.

They mention that adversaries can reverse-engineer AI by extracting its learned patterns, enabling them to predict or avoid responses, which can be stopped by strict accountability and access limitations.

In addition, Stark and others say that adversaries aim to deduce the data used for AI training in an inference attack, with that risk manageable by policy decisions regarding sensitive data.

Apart from those risks, the US may face a technological disadvantage with China as a near-peer competitor and a pacing challenge in AI technology.

The September 2022 Mid-Decade Challenges to National Competitiveness report by the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) notes that the US has lost its edge in technology manufacturing, as much of high-end chip manufacturing is done in East Asia close to China. It says the US is now reliant on supply chains that are vulnerable to control by China.

The report also says that the US tech ecosystem overlooked geopolitical rivalries and the impact of tech advancements, leading to decreased US manufacturing capabilities. Consequently, the report says the US has strategic vulnerabilities due to a declining technology manufacturing base and a lack of proactive movements in technologies like AI.

In terms of policymaking, the report mentions that the US has been typically reactive instead of proactive in response to technological advancements, leading to strategic disadvantages. Those have been seen in America’s struggles to rebuild its microelectronics industry and prevent Chinese dominance in global 5G infrastructure.

It also points out that commercial priorities drive the US tech agenda due to the absence of a national effort equivalent to a modern “moonshot” and a decline in government-funded research and development (R&D) programs.

China takes a similar view regarding the military advantages and risks of AI. In an August 2020 Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) report, Ryan Fedasiuk mentions that Chinese experts believe AI will enhance military capabilities through machine learning in tracking forces, lowering deployment costs and improving detection, targeting, and strikes against military targets.

China sees AI as crucial to its military modernization. Image: Twitter Screengrab

At the same time, Fedasiuk claims that Chinese experts are worried that AI advancements in the military sphere could threaten strategic stability and reduce China’s defensive capabilities vis-a-vis the US.

He mentions Chinese experts’ tendency to overestimate the US military’s AI capabilities, leading to a push for increased investment in AI in China, akin to an arms race.

He mentions significant challenges to China’s AI development such as insufficient data collection, a lack of technical expertise and availability of advanced computing resources, and concerns about the leak and spread of its own AI advancements to the US.

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Why antisemitism is surging in China

During the conflict between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, many nations have tried to maintain a neutral stance by not explicitly supporting either side. But despite attempts at balanced commentaries at the top of business and politics, there has been evidence of rising antisemitism in many countries. One of these has been China.

This has come as a surprise. Since 2010, China’s political and economic ties with Israel have grown substantially. This includes a dramatic increase in Chinese tourism to Israel, academic links and investment in Israeli science and technology from large Chinese companies such as Baidu, Alibaba and Ping An.

Israel is also important to the Belt and Road Initiative, the massive Chinese overseas investment scheme that has funded construction in the Israeli port of Haifa.

But now – at a government level – there is friction between Beijing and Jerusalem over China’s refusal to condemn Hamas’s actions and formally declare it to be a terrorist organization. Israel is also angry and dismayed at what it perceives as Beijing’s inaction over a rise in online antisemitism in Chinese cyberspace.

But this growth of antisemitism is not connected to China’s official position on the war between Hamas and Israel, which is entirely consistent with China’s international relations under Xi. Beijing has tended to avoid formally taking sides in conflicts, instead preferring to play the “honest broker” – albeit offering solutions that differ to those of the West.

Examples include China’s immediate invitation to the new Taliban rulers in Afghanistan to visit China and talk about the country’s involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative after the US withdrawal in 2021. Likewise, China’s emphasis upon impartiality over the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and its proposal of a 12-point peace plan.

But in the Israel-Palestine situation, China took a very pro-Palestinian position from the late 1940s to the 1980s. Since then, it has continued to favor a two-state solution despite its warmer relations with Israel from 2010.

Western and Asian antisemitism compared

Antisemitism in China and East Asia is different to how it is generally understood in Europe. In Europe, antisemitism is a unique discourse of hatred against Jewish people. It draws upon a long history of persecution and was heavily embedded within Christianity, culminating in the Holocaust.

Jewish people were “othered” as troublemakers and disrupters. Antisemitic tropes further positioned them as plotting world domination and engaging in cultist practices.

In contrast in East Asia, Jews and Israel have tended to be attached to a positive image of Western modernity and achievement. This results in a widespread form of positive stereotyping known as “philosemitism.”

Philosemitism, the opposite of antisemitism, is the attachment of desirable and admirable characteristics to Jewish people and Israel. Chinese philosemitism includes positive notions of Jewish political governance, national identity, moral refinement, advanced civilization and a will to survive.

Israel and China have complex but cordial relations. Image: Twitter

These beliefs go back to the arrival of Jewish traders and investors in China in the 19th century. Today, such beliefs are transferred to a collective quality admired in Jews and the state of Israel. This culminates in an embodied image of heightened intelligence, wealth and a strong focus upon the family, with Israel being regarded as brave and innovative.

Philosemitism has been able to prosper in East Asia and operates as a convenient platform for Israeli international relations. It’s a form of soft power that is often referenced (and welcomed) by both Israeli and East Asian political actors in high-level diplomatic interactions.

Falling out of friendship

But stereotypes can very quickly switch between xenophilia and xenophobia as a result of sudden changes in the wider context. The antisemitism we see in China now is largely an inversion of philosemitism. This change was triggered when philosemitic stereotypes began to be threatening rather than useful to Chinese nationalism.

Specifically, the current Gaza conflict affirmed Israel’s connection to the US. This positioned the country as part of a perceived Western “plot” to undermine China and promote US dominance. To many in China, Israel and Jewish people became part of a cluster of behaviors and beliefs associated with conspiratorial discourse about a threatening Western axis.

This links to other nationalist conspiratorial beliefs in China, attached to issues as diverse as constructing Covid-19 as part of a US plot against China, and the Russia-Ukraine war being a US-instigated conflict designed to threaten China and Russia. In cyberspace, these have easily become mixed up with older, European-style antisemitic tropes, and grown substantially.

Conspiracies tend to become more salient during times of increased social instability, with their appeal connected to an individual’s perceived lack of control. These sorts of discussion have risen in Chinese cyberspace during a time when the country’s economy is potentially undergoing a downturn – a situation uncomfortably similar to the rise of antisemitism in 1920s and 1930s Europe during the Great Depression.

While the Chinese internet is tightly controlled, issues discussed online tend only to be addressed if they are in some way threatening the authority of the Chinese Communist Party, or could potentially cause social unrest.

With very few Jewish people to directly persecute, antisemitism does not pose an immediate threat to Chinese society. The wider conspiratorial discourses it is part of are also generally in support of nationalist ideology. For both of these reasons, the Chinese state has not intervened to prevent this antisemitism.

It’s important to rethink how we understand antisemitism in the Asian context. In the West, it is typically seen as a unique discourse of hatred in Europe rather than a form of racial stereotyping, as it is in Asia. The latter reflects a general lack of awareness about the dangers of positive stereotypes and how easily these can be upended.

Together with other scholars, I have warned that encouraging philosemitic discourse in East Asia is dangerous. So, the “surge” in antisemitism in Chinese cyberspace hasn’t come as a surprise to those of us who study this phenomenon in Asia.

Jewish stereotypes have been growing over the past decade in China, but largely as philosemitism, so were not seen as a concern. This is now changing.

Mary Jane Ainslie is Associate Professor in Film and Media, University of Nottingham

Disclosure: Dr. Mary Jane Ainslie has received funding from the Vidal Sassoon international Center for the Study of Antisemitism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Zhejiang Philosophy and Social Sciences Programme.

She is affiliated with the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) and the Max and Tessie Zelikovitz Centre for Jewish Studies at Carleton University. 

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Myanmar’s military junta in death spiral decline

Myint Swe, the acting president of Myanmar’s military government, has warned that the country “will be split into various parts” after his armed forces suffered huge territorial losses to resistance fighters recently. His response was to call on Myanmar’s people to support his military forces, a call that is likely, based on previous experience, to fall mainly on deaf ears.

Far from sharing the military government’s fears of shrinking territorial control, it’s likely that most among Myanmar’s 55 million people will celebrate the army’s territorial losses. Junta misreads like this are not new – after they seized power in February 2021, the coup leaders indicated surprise when the coup met with widespread outrage and sustained public protest and resistance.

To quell opposition, military bosses have adopted a strategy of arbitrary arrest and extreme violence. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners estimates 19,675 people are currently jailed – a figure that increases almost daily. Peaceful protests are met with army snipers and shoot-to-kill orders.

Myanmar’s military routinely responds to armed resistance by collectively punishing nearby civilian populations. This has included devastating airstrikes on civilian targets and scorched-earth “clearance operation” campaigns that have killed thousands of people and displaced more than 700,000 more. Rather than cowing the populace, junta violence continues to spur nationwide resistance.

Map of Myanmar showing states.
Myanmar is a patchwork of different states and ethnic groups. Hintha/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

Since September 2021, the National Unity Government (NUG), a shadow government in exile, has authorized a “defensive war” against the state military, pushing for the creation of militias targeting the junta and its economic base. NUG militias have increasingly coordinated with Myanmar’s dozens of ethnic armed groups, many of which have already been fighting the Tatmadaw (the junta’s military) for decades.

Now, every time government troops leave their barracks they face potential attack, causing them to increasingly lean on air power, but further limiting their ability to maintain effective control on the ground. Economic and territorial losses have steadily accumulated.

This is important because the Tatmadaw’s legitimacy depends on its ability to hold the country together. The controversial 2008 military-drafted constitution refers to “non-disintegration” of Myanmar a dozen times, including as a duty of the defense forces. This was a key justification for the 1962 military coup that ushered in five decades of military rule.

During the immediate post-independence period (1948-1962), Myanmar’s civilian government struggled to maintain territorial control, at times controlling little more than major urban centers. The situation is similar now, except that today it is the Tatmadaw that is unable to maintain control beyond urban centers and military barracks. This will hit junta morale badly and inspire further resistance.

Myanmar military cracks down on peaceful protesters in Taunggy, Shan state. Photo: Shutterstock via The Conversation / R. Bociaga

The junta’s recent reversal in Shan State, its most significant territorial loss, came at the hands of three ethnic-based armed groups, the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. These three groups now coordinate their activities as the Brotherhood Alliance.

They inflicted heavy losses on junta forces in early November, overrunning dozens of military posts and killing the commander of the 99th Light Infantry Division, a unit known internationally for its genocidal campaign against the Rohingya community.

The Brotherhood Alliance also captured the main overland route from Mandalay to China, a key economic corridor.

China’s role

Brotherhood Alliance members are themselves territorially ambitious but rely on China for arms so it is unlikely an operation in China’s hinterland could have occurred without China’s acquiescence.

Allowing this operation to go ahead is a strong statement by a Chinese government frustrated with the junta’s inaction on online scam centers in Shan state where thousands of trafficked Chinese and other foreigners have been forced to work in slave-like conditions.

China’s strategic ambiguity is unsurprising. China was far from enthusiastic about the 2021 coup. China’s ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, told journalists at the time a coup was, “absolutely not what China wants to see.”

While traditionally a key international ally of the junta, China’s leadership had a very close relationship with Myanmar’s ousted de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and maintains close ties with many of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups.

Now, strategic reversals, nationwide territorial losses and economic decline mean momentum has strongly shifted away from Myanmar’s junta. China’s leadership may have read the situation better than most, recognizing the junta may now be in a death spiral.

Others have been less shrewd. Russia has displaced China as the junta’s biggest arms supplier, accounting for US$406 million of Myanmar’s arms imports since the coup and crucially providing aviation fuel in exchange for funds, access to Bay of Bengal port facilities, and regional relevance.

Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing recently welcomed Russia’s navy for joint maneuvers, describing Vladimir Putin in glowing terms as a “leader of the world who is creating stability on the international arena.”

For Putin, this may soon be embarrassingly unwelcome praise. By linking itself so closely with a declining junta, Russia guarantees its Myanmar influence and regional relevance will not outlast military rule.

Post-junta planning

The NUG idealizes a post-junta Myanmar unified under its leadership with Suu Kyi returned to power. But for many ethnic armed groups – who will feel they, rather than the NUG, inflicted the strongest blows on the junta and now control significant territory – that is not likely their preferred outcome.

They will seek guarantees about key demands around federalism and minority rights that were not satisfactorily addressed when Suu Kyi was last in power.

The junta appears on a clear path to defeat, but this will not be immediate. Meanwhile, the state’s military forces commonly respond to reversals with shocking violence, so bringing junta rule to a speedy end must be prioritized.

Protesters hold posters with the image of detained civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi during a demonstration against the military coup in Naypyidaw on February 28, 2021. Photo: AFP / Stringer

Myanmar’s population and neighboring states will also not want the country, post-junta, to descend into the same sort of fractured instability as in the immediate post-independence period.

Myanmar’s neighbors, ASEAN, and Western powers who have talked tough on human rights in Myanmar, including the US, UK and EU, must now take steps to ensure the post-junta future plays out peacefully with all resistance groups included in decisions about Myanmar’s future.

The transitional period after the removal of the military will require a commitment from international actors to ensure the stability of the country, perhaps like the Cambodian UNTAC process in the 1990s.

Rather than being again caught on the hop by events in Myanmar, ASEAN and the UN should begin preparations to manage the transition to a post-junta Myanmar that now appears increasingly likely.

Ronan Lee is Vice-Chancellor Independent Research Fellow, Institute for Media and Creative Industries, Loughborough University London, Loughborough University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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