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In a report on the Indo-Pacific Tilt, the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee stated that there would be greater technology and security benefits if Japan joined its Strand B, or Pillar 2, cooperation in the development of advanced military technologies and increased interoperability between AUKUS members’ armed forces.

The committee’s report calls for the United Kingdom to propose to Australia and the United States that Japan, along with South Korea, participate in an AUKUS technical defense cooperation agreement focused solely on Strand B activities.

Strand B designates cooperation in advanced technology areas, including undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, advanced cyber, hypersonic weapons, electronic warfare, innovation and information sharing.

These advanced capabilities are critical in reinforcing the integrated deterrence capabilities of the United States’ Indo-Pacific allies, including Japan.

Since Japan already has a defense cooperation framework for joint research and development with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, there is a foundation for AUKUS-Japan cooperation. But cooperation based on the current frameworks is project-based, with an emphasis on basic technologies rather than a list of priority capabilities, unlike AUKUS. 

For example, most of the joint research with the United States involves technologies directly related to equipment, such as next-generation amphibious technology and modular hybrid electric drive vehicle systems. Based on this background, Japan could considerably benefit from participating in AUKUS Pillar 2.

The Japanese government stated in the National Defense Strategy 2022 that leveraging cutting-edge technologies for defense has become critical. Japan, which has high technological capabilities, needs to cooperate with its allies and mobilize their technological capabilities to prepare for a long-term race for technological leadership. 

Because advantages in critical and emerging technologies covered by Pillar 2 of AUKUS will directly translate into military advantages, having access to these technologies will deter potential adversaries in the Indo-Pacific.

Given Japan’s declining economic power, its future science and technology investment will likely also decline. Japan can acquire critical and emerging technologies more efficiently by closely collaborating with allies and partners. Cooperation through an expanded AUKUS Pillar 2 agreement would allow its members to complement each other’s capability gaps and leverage economies of scale.

Most importantly, it will promote the internationalization of Japan’s defense industry. For a long time, the Japanese defense industry’s only client was the Japanese Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces.

But they are undergoing major changes, relaxing the restrictions on defense equipment transfer and promoting exports. Strengthening ties between the defense industries of Japan and AUKUS members is a good opportunity to improve the Japanese industry’s competitiveness. 

In Japan, investment in critical and emerging technologies has been driven by civilian usage. In 2020, defense-related procurement from domestic manufacturers made up less than 1% of Japan’s total industrial production value.

The Japanese defense industry must become more internationally oriented. Although joint research and development takes time, the expanded AUKUS group can create an opportunity for Japanese defense manufacturers to learn the marketing and sales know-how of defense equipment from AUKUS partners.

But before it can join AUKUS, there are challenges Japan needs to overcome. The most critical issue is the lack of an adequate security clearance system. 

The Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, the only existing law on information security in Japan, limits the scope of information that can be classified as state secrets to four areas: diplomacy, defense, prevention of espionage, and prevention of terrorism. 

It does not cover information in economic and technological fields, and without a security clearance system in these areas, Japanese manufacturers will struggle to access classified information in joint developments. Japan needs a security clearance system before it joins AUKUS.

Additionally, Japan is striving to become a major arms exporter like the United States and the United Kingdom, so there are concerns about potential conflicts of interest. The heart of AUKUS is reminiscent of Japan’s efforts to sell its conventionally-powered submarines in 2015. 

But considering the lead time to acquire effective deterrence capabilities in the critical theatre of the Indo-Pacific, this is not the time for commercial clashes. Japan should accept the division of labor within the extended AUKUS framework.

Given the military-oriented nature of AUKUS, Japan joining AUKUS would signal to China that it is part of the “integrated deterrence” network the United States promotes.

Considering that China, Japan, and South Korea are working together to revitalize the dialogue channel through the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit, policymakers in Tokyo may feel that the timing is inappropriate.

But the security environment in East Asia is more dire than ever, and technology implementation takes years, especially the critical and emerging technologies that define future victories. The United States has also expressed a positive attitude toward the expansion of AUKUS’ Pillar 2 membership. 

Japan cannot afford to delay its efforts to strengthen its defense industrial base with these technologies. Now is the time to accelerate discussions on Japan’s participation in AUKUS.

Rena Sasaki is a PhD student at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University and a Fellow of the Pacific Forum’s Next Generation Young Leaders Program.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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China’s rapid advancements in submarine technology and detection capabilities are challenging the US’s long-established dominance in undersea warfare and posing a threat to its crucial submarine operations in the Pacific.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that recent developments indicate a narrowing gap in submarine capabilities between the two rivals, with significant implications for US military planning including for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

In one example, a new Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine was recently observed with a pump-jet propulsion system, a noise-reducing technology previously seen only on the latest US submarines, the WSJ reports says.

Satellite images have also revealed larger hull sections at China’s submarine manufacturing base at Huludao, suggesting increased production capabilities.

The WSJ says that China has enhanced its ability to detect enemy submarines, constructing an underwater sensor network known as the “Underwater Great Wall” in strategic regions like the South China Sea and near Guam.

The report suggests that the sonar network, improved patrol aircraft and helicopters equipped to collect sonar information have significantly bolstered China’s submarine detection capabilities.

The US has responded by deploying more naval resources to the Pacific and increasing coordination with allies. However, experts have argued that the US needs new strategies and resources to address China’s evolving undersea threat.

In particular, they mention the need for more patrol aircraft and attack submarines to track and potentially target quieter Chinese submarines.

WSJ says the changing undersea dynamics are relevant to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. It notes that US submarines would be crucial and potentially decisive in such a scenario, but improved Chinese capabilities could complicate and undermine their operations.

At the same time, the US faces challenges in maintaining its current fleet size due to retirements and low production rates, highlighting the need for strategic adjustments in the face of a more capable Chinese submarine force.

Aside from pump jet propulsion and increased submarine production capability, Asia Times has reported on China’s recent submarine technology advancements.

Asia Times reported in September that Chinese researchers have developed a groundbreaking terahertz-based submarine detection technology, marking a significant advance in underwater warfare capabilities. The technology has the potential to challenge significantly US submarine operations.

The new detection device operates in the terahertz frequency range between microwave and infrared radiation and can identify minute surface vibrations, as small as 10 nanometers, created by low-frequency sound sources in the open sea.

These vibrations can locate submarines and gather intelligence for analyzing noise signatures to determine a submarine’s model. The technology, which could be incorporated into underwater drones, represents a considerable leap in identifying and potentially countering stealthy US submarine operations.

Furthermore, Asia Times reported in August that Chinese researchers have used computer modeling to identify the tiny bubbles produced by nuclear submarines, which previously went nearly undetected.

They discovered that the extremely low frequency (ELF) signals generated by these bubbles are much stronger than the sensitivities of current advanced magnetic anomaly detectors.

These bubbles form due to shifts in kinetic and potential energy as a submarine cruises, leading to turbulence and an electromagnetic signature through the magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) effect.

Non-acoustic detection techniques have been known for decades but are only now becoming practical due to advancements in computing power. Improving sensor resolution, processing power and machine autonomy will expand the range of detectable signals, enabling the distinction of previously indistinguishable signals.

Russia may also boost China’s submarine technology, with China possibly building its next-generation submarines with the help of Russian technical expertise.

In October, Asia Times reported on China’s possible collaboration with Russia in building its Type 096 nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), which is expected to be operational within the decade.

The Type 096 may benefit from Russian technological assistance, particularly in enhancing its stealth capabilities. The Type 096 is anticipated to match state-of-the-art Russian submarines in stealth, sensors and weaponry, significantly complicating US and allied efforts to monitor and track China’s submarines in Pacific theaters.

The Type 096’s development may be influenced by Russia’s advanced submarine technology, especially in areas like quieting and nuclear propulsion.

Russia assisted previously with China’s Type 093 nuclear attack submarine (SSN), which makes it plausible that the Type 096 will be no exception.

The collaboration can be part of the “no limits” strategic partnership between the two nations, with China benefiting from Russia’s expertise and Russia depending more on China due to Western sanctions.

The partnership may also extend to the supply of highly enriched uranium from Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom to China. This uranium could be used for nuclear weapons or as fuel for China’s nuclear submarines.

Submarines are poised to be the capital ships of a potential US-China conflict over Taiwan. In a March 2023 article for the US Naval Institute, Mike Sweeney mentions that submarines, rather than aircraft carriers, will dominate future naval warfare.

Sweeney says surface vessels would be too vulnerable against land-based aircraft, anti-ship missiles and submarines, thus making undersea warfare more pivotal.

Regarding China’s underwater warfare capabilities, he argues that China’s naval modernization has yet to catch up with the US in nuclear submarine technology. He argues that China’s antisubmarine warfare capabilities have historically been underinvested in.

He says China still needs to enhance its undersea warfare capabilities to become a global naval power. At the same time, Sweeney acknowledges that the US Navy’s submarine forces face limitations in the Pacific due to numerical constraints, maintenance cycles, and global commitments.

He notes a shift towards funding Columbia-class SSBNs could potentially impact the availability of other submarine types such as the Virginia-class SSN and the unique capabilities of Ohio-class cruise missile nuclear submarines (SSGN).

He suggests that to improve US undersea warfare capabilities vis-a-vis China, the US Navy should consider diverting some Columbia-class SSBNs to conventional roles or introduce SSGN derivatives earlier than scheduled.

Sweeney notes that the transition to submarine-based naval power is necessary for maintaining US superiority in the current strategic landscape, similar to the US Navy’s past shift in emphasis from battleships to aircraft carriers.

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Myanmar’s military is still reeling from the surprise Operation 1027 insurgent attacks in northern Shan state that overran over 140 bases, captured large caches of weapons and raised potent new questions about the State Administration Council (SAC) coup regime’s survival.

But is the SAC’s extraordinary setback driving it to use banned chemical weapons against the three main insurgent groups, known collectively as The Brotherhood, which spearheaded the lightning attacks and the military claims threaten to break up the nation?  

On November 19, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army insurgent group released a public statement alleging that following its takeover of the Myanmar army’s Sakham Thit base in Namkham township, “junta forces dropped a poisonous chemical bomb on the TNLA soldiers.”

The TNLA’s statement further alleges that the SAC “committed a similar attack on November 4 by dropping a poisonous bomb upon Mong Kyat camp in Lashio township.”

According to the armed group statement, “although there were no any (sic) cuts or wounds on the victims’ bodies, some of the TNLA soldiers suffered from (1) dizziness, (2) breathlessness, (3) nausea, (4) extreme agitation and fatigue, (5) low blood oxygen levels etc. The (TNLA) health department…is providing necessary medical treatments to those comrades.”

No deaths have been reported in the alleged chemical attacks, and to date there has been no independent substantiation of the group’s claims.

The Myanmar Now independent news outlet interviewed one Ta’ang soldier who claimed, “(t)he bomb went off with a hiss and released a gas. I fainted after inhaling the gas. I can’t even remember who carried me from the frontline to the hospital. I still feel light-headed when I move too much.”

These are serious allegations and the TNLA’s claims must be addressed by the international community. SAC spokesperson Major-General Zaw Min Tun characteristically dismissed the claims, but he hasn’t uttered an honest syllable since the coup and would hardly admit to a potential war crime now.

However, there have been multiple allegations of the Myanmar military using chemical weapons against ethnic insurgents in the past. In the 1980s there were claims that Myanmar crop-dusting aircraft were spraying ethnic Shan villagers with 2,4-D defoliant, half the compound of the deadly Agent Orange that was supplied to then-Burma through a US  counter-narcotics program.

 A General Accounting Office (GAO) report in 1989 “could not accurately assess the program’s safety”, but research by American human rights activists and writer Edith Mirante and her Project Maje convincingly documented misuse of the chemical.

During the fall of the insurgent Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) base at Kawmura along the Thailand-Myanmar border in late 1994, convincing allegations of chemical weapons use were made but not substantiated, with a likelihood that white phosphorous was used along with high explosive (HE) rounds.

In alleged chemical weapons attacks against ethnic Karen positions in February 1995, the authoritative Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) concluded from multiple interviews with soldiers, none of whom died, that “(i)t still appears likely that the ‘liquid’ shells and the white phosphorus shells were one and the same, because although white phosphorus is a solid, several sources confirm that it can appear like a liquid after the shell has exploded and is burning.”

Other possibilities, such as the use of smoke rounds or misuse of potassium cyanide, which the then-State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) military regime used to poison ethnic Karen water supplies or a potentially toxic snake curry the soldiers had consumed that day, were dismissed.

White phosphorous, which burns when exposed to air and is often used to range targets, is not explicitly banned under international law but its use is highly restricted and there have been calls for its use to be totally banned.

In 2005, a Myanmar army attack against Karenni Army/Karenni National Progressive Party (KA/KNPP) insurgents close to the Thai border with Mae Hong Son allegedly used some form of chemical agent. Several KA soldiers were taken ill with respiratory illness and treated in Thai hospitals, though none died.

While it seems likely that some unusual artillery rounds were used, despite a number of investigations, it was never confirmed. The original source for the allegations, London-based conservative Christian activist Benedict Rogers for Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), strains credibility.

One explanation is possibly that a mixture of factors, of soldiers hiding in bunkers and breathing in dust, cordite from weapons fire, smoke rounds to mask Myanmar army movements and possible white phosphorous use could produce the combination for respiratory conditions, but not always the blistering that comes with chemical weapons use.

During the renewed conflict in Kachin state from 2011, multiple reports of chemical weapons were raised in 2012 and early 2013 of troops firing hand-held weapons armed with some form of chemical weapons, which came from the reliable Free Burma Rangers (FBR) group, and aircraft dropping chemical munitions confirmed by multiple local aid groups.

However, a mysterious yellow powder that appeared in multiple locations tested inconclusively by human rights groups.

And, of course, there was the use of munitions against protestors at the Letpadan copper mine in central Monywa in late November 2012, in which dozens of protestors, including Buddhist monks, were horrifically burned as police violently dispersed the protest camp.

One independent report claimed that white phosphorous was used. But a government investigation, led by now imprisoned National League for Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, claimed only smoke grenades that may have contained “phosphorous” were used and controversially recommended the mine project continue.

The first priority for the current chemical weapon allegations is to establish without doubt that the TNLA’s claims are true. That obviously requires testing by a credible, independent third party in a laboratory. Those tests should ideally include the involvement of credible and trustworthy actors, possibly the United Nations.

Any investigation should be cognizant of past mistakes and treat chemical weapons claims with caution. Myanmar expert and scholar Andrew Selth has analyzed multiple claims of chemical and biological weapons manufacture and use by the Myanmar military over the years and so far found little hard evidence to substantiate the allegations.

Secondly, as the conflict looks set to continue for the foreseeable future, international donors to Myanmar should consider the creation of an acoustic sound ranging system in war zones that is able to determine the use of artillery and potentially airpower strikes, especially on civilian sites protected under international humanitarian law (IHL).

There is currently an inchoate ecosystem of human rights reporting and evidence preservation and much confusion over what constitutes necessary real-time reporting and advocacy and longer-term investigations to collect evidence.

There is usually a time lag where international groups take several days, at times weeks, to determine if incidents of abuse that have already been well established soon after they took place did indeed actually happen.

The Global Witness rights group “examines photos” and through geotagging determines ten days later if alleged incidents happened at the exact map reference that local Myanmar media outlets had reported on the day of the incident.

Previous reports of chemical weapons use have often been counter-productive: all the accusations drowned the actual determination of possible use.

Thirdly, observers must resist the temptation to see the use of chemical weapons, if proven, as a sign of the SAC’s desperation. A regime that uses medieval arson techniques against civilian housing, burns down the town of Thantlang multiple times and drops fuel-air explosives on children at an office opening in Sagaing is undoubtedly capable of using chemical weapons. Its brutality is fueled by sadism, not desperation.

The more salient compulsion of the SAC in the coming weeks is less desperation than a thirst for retribution, punishing civilians in northern Shan state as it attempts to retake lost territory and further blocking badly needed humanitarian assistance to over 50,000 people displaced following Operation 1027.

Finally, the TNLA’s chemical weapon allegations should be used as an opportunity to urge all anti-SAC military and political forces to make a public commitment to avoid the use of banned weapons themselves.  

That should include a commitment by the ethnic armed organizations’ political wings and the anti-coup National Unity Government to adhere to the Convention on Chemical Weapons (CCW), which Myanmar signed in 1993 and finally ratified in 2015.

If the SAC did use chemical weapons to bomb the TNLA, it must be proven beyond a doubt and tallied as yet another serious crime of savagery by a failing regime that will ultimately be punished after the war.

David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues on Myanmar

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Taiwan’s two largest opposition parties were unable to form an alliance over the weekend due to competing interpretations of public opinion polls, casting a new cloud of uncertainty over January’s crucial presidential election. 

The opposition camp is perceived to be more friendly toward mainland China while the ruling, nationalistic Democratic Progressive Party is seen as more antagonistic toward Beijing.

With the push of former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou, Kuomintang (KMT)’s Hou Yu-ih and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP)’s Ko Wen-je agreed on November 15 to join political hands and allow opinion polls to determine who should lead their joint election campaign. 

The ticket would be either a “Ko-Hou team”, meaning Ko would lead in the campaign, or alternatively a “Hou-Ko team.”

On November 18, the Ko-Hou team beat the Hou-Ko team in five out of the six polls conducted by media firms as well as the two parties. However, Ko had previously agreed to a special arrangement that has complicated the result.

He had said he would be willing to be the vice presidential candidate, rather than president, if the Ko-Hou team could not secure a 3% premium in ratings over the Hou-Ko team, with the assumption of a “plus or minus 1.5%” statistical error in the polls. He accepted the arrangement as he wanted to contribute to the formation of an opposition alliance.

Under that special statistical arrangement, the Ko-Hou team and the Hou-Ko team could be interpreted to have won three polls each, allowing Ko not to concede defeat. 

But the KMT insisted that there is a “plus or minus 3%” statistical error in each poll and thus Ko can only claim victory in polls in which the Ko-Hou team has a 6% premium in ratings over the Hou-Ko team. This rule means the Hou-Ko team won five out of the six polls.

Ko said on November 18 that there is still enough time to do one more round of polls before the end of the nomination period, which will end at 5 pm on November 24. On November 19, he said he would continue his original plan to represent the TPP to run in the presidential election. 

KMT chairman Eric Chu said his party remains open to the idea of establishing an alliance with the TPP but Ko must make a decision by November 22. 

3% statistical error

Former KMT lawmaker Tsai Yuen-cheng said it’s embarrassing that his party had tried to distort the definition of “3% premium” when most people, including KMT legislator Fai Hung-tai, who reportedly has a PhD in statistics, knew that a 3% statistical error could only mean “plus or minus 1.5%.”

He said now a Hou-Ko team is ruined while the KMT can by now only choose to form a Ko-Hou team. He noted some polls showed that DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te, Ko and Hou are on course to win 6 million, 4.5 million and 3.5 million votes respectively, handing the election to the DPP, if the opposition camp cannot agree to form an alliance. 

He suggested if Hou does not accept the junior position on a united opposition ticket, the KMT may not survive over the next four years. 

Some Taiwanese commentators said the KMT-TPP’s fundamental conflict is rooted in past Legislative Yuan elections.

They said some of Ko’s supporters feel it is unfair that he serve as Hou’s deputy as he is slightly more popular in polls. They said the KMT and TPP also have conflicts over the negotiation of legislative seats. 

Adding to the intrigue, Ko held a one-hour meeting with Foxconn founder Terry Gou, who has gathered more than 900,000 signatures from public nominees to run in the election, at the latter’s home on Sunday evening. Gou must receive at least 300,000 signatures from voters to be nominated as he lacks any political party’s support.

Huang Shih-hsiu, a spokesperson of Gou’s campaign office, said Monday that the Taiwanese tech entrepreneur is open to discussions about forming a Gou-Ko team or a Ko-Gou team. Huang said a team could be formed “whenever Ko nods his head.” 

Public polls showed that a Ko-Gou team would not likely beat the DPP’s Lai-led ticket. But a KMT-TPP alliance could win about 44-45% of the vote to beat the DPP, which is currently running at around 36-38%. 

Beijing is now closely monitoring whether the so-called blue and white camps, which represent the KMT and the TPP, respectively, can form an alliance. 

Independence ticket

Lai said Monday that Hsiao Bi-khim, who had just resigned from her position as Taiwanese Representative to the United States on the same day, would be his vice president candidate. 

Hsiao was born in Japan in 1971. Her late father was a Taiwanese pastor and her mother is an American. In 2002, Hsiao served as a member of the Legislative Yuan from 2002 to 2008 and from 2012 to 2020. She then became the Taiwanese representative to the US from 2020 to 2023.

Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu on Monday praised Hsiao as an excellent diplomat while her contributions to the self-governing island were well-recognized by the public.

Mao Ning, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, declined to comment on Lai’s pick of Hsiao as vice president because it is not a foreign affairs-related issue. 

Chu Fenglian, a spokesperson of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), said last week that both Hsiao and Lai are promoters of “Taiwan independence” and that they won’t help to improve cross-strait relations. 

In the past, Lai and Hsiao said they wanted to maintain the “status quo” in the Taiwan Straits, meaning Taiwan would continue to self-govern.

They asserted Taiwan should be allowed to join international organizations such as the World Health Organization, strengthen its defenses and sign trade deals with other nations. 

Read: Beijing ploy helps instead of hurting Gou campaign

 Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

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