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After more than a month during which Israel has relentlessly bombarded then invaded Gaza with the stated aim of destroying Hamas, Gaza’s health authorities have estimated that more than 13,000 people – mainly civilians and a distressingly high proportion of those children – have been killed.

Yet it should be remembered that it was the initial attack on Israel by Hamas fighters on October 7, killing 1,200 people – again, mainly civilians, many in the most brutal manner – that led to Israel’s invasion of Gaza.

Initially, the Israel Defence Forces issued warnings to Gazan civilians to move south. But repeated airstrikes on towns in the south of Gaza have left the population fearing that there are no safe spaces left in the enclave.

Israel continues to insist, with the backing of its allies in the West, that this military operation is aimed at rooting out Hamas. They say it is the fact that Hamas embeds itself in civilian populations that is causing so many casualties.

But recently there have been signs that some Palestinian civilians are openly challenging Hamas’s authority. Associated Press reported on November 10 that angry crowds threw stones at Hamas police in one location while in another, people huddling in a UN shelter hurled insults at Hamas officials.

Political party or terror group?

Hamas was founded in Gaza in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, an imam, and his aide Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi. This was shortly after the beginning of the first intifada – an uprising against Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories.

Initially emerging as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas later established a military wing known as the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Its primary goal was to engage in armed resistance against Israel with the aim of liberating historic Palestine.

While there is international support for Palestinian self-determination, Hamas’s aim – spelled out in its founding charter – to destroy the state of Israel has cost it legitimacy with many who would otherwise support Palestine’s cause.

The group has effectively controlled Gaza since shortly after then-Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon withdrew troops and settlers from Gaza in 2005. In elections in 2006, Hamas secured a majority of seats in the Palestinian Authority’s legislature and established a government.

This gave Hamas some legitimacy as far as the Palestinians in Gaza were concerned – at least temporarily.

Hamas’s early success has been ascribed to its provision of social services such as healthcare and welfare. Initially, it also seemed to be a valuable counterpoint to what was perceived as corruption within the incumbent Fatah party.

But Fatah and its Western backers found the election outcome to be unacceptable, leading to the removal of Hamas from power in the West Bank. This effectively denied Hamas the role in the PA that it believed it deserved.

A 2008 presidential election confirmed Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas as the head of the PA. But by this stage the split between the two parties meant that while the Fatah-dominated PA governed the West Bank, Hamas was largely unchallenged in Gaza.

Vote of no confidence

But a survey undertaken by Arab Barometer, a nonpartisan research network, between September 28 and October 8, 2023 revealed dwindling confidence in Hamas (the surveys in Gaza were completed on October 6).

Asked to identify the amount of trust they had in the Hamas authorities, 44% said they had no trust at all, while 23% said they had little trust. Significantly this lack of trust was roughly uniform across age groups with those between the ages of 18-29 and those over 30 giving similar answers.

An earlier poll taken by the Washington Institute in July 2023, moreover, found that 62% of people in Gaza supported Hamas maintaining a ceasefire with Israel and 50% agreed that: “Hamas should stop calling for Israel’s destruction, and instead accept a permanent two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.”

So, given the gulf between Hamas’s aims and style of governance, how has it kept control of the enclave of 2.2 million people for so long? It’s important to remember that there have been no elections since 2006 and the average age of people in Gaza is about 18, meaning most people have not had the chance to vote for any other leadership.

Hamas has also reportedly ruled with an iron fist. Hamas has used strict and authoritarian methods of control, applying its own interpretations of strict sharia law, enforcing gender segregation in public, controlling the media, repressing any political opposition and eliminating all mechanisms of transparency and accountability.

Numerous reports have detailed human rights abuses conducted by Hamas against Palestinian civilians, including arbitrary detention, torture, punishment beatings and the death penalty.

To be fair, a report in 2018 from Human Rights Watch found that similar human rights abuse was just as common in the West Bank under the Fatah-led PA. Hamas also stands accused of harassing journalists who criticize its government.

The catastrophic Hamas attack on October 7 which has led to the deaths of so many Palestinian civilians in Gaza has eliminated any pretence of legitimacy that Hamas may ever have had in the eyes of most of the world. Indeed, the days of Hamas may be over.

But this will only increase the urgency of finding a long-term solution for Palestine, something that seems further away than ever.

Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of Bradford

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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US President Joe Biden took to the pages of the Washington Post last week to assure the American people that continuing economic and military support to Ukraine is an investment in US security.

On October 20, US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin visited Kiev to give the Ukrainian leadership a similar assurance together with the promise of an additional US$100 million in military aid.

A day later, his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius, announced a new 1.3 billion euro ($1.4 billion) support package, focused on defensive equipment including four more IRIS-T SLM air defense systems and anti-tank mines.

This is an indication of a growing realization that Western emphasis is shifting to sustaining Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression – contrary to the insistence by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his closest political allies that victory on the battlefield is not just possible but probable. This view is now even contested in Kiev.

In an interview with The Economist, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, said: “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.” The US defense secretary echoed this view in Kiev, emphasizing that Ukraine needs to “make the right adjustments” to its strategy.

Similar doubts have been voiced in Western capitals for months. In July 2023, the then-chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley, warned that Ukraine’s counteroffensive, then in its fourth week, would be “very long” and “very, very bloody.”

Less than two weeks later, a NATO communique after its summit in Vilnius failed to provide more than the vague promise of future membership. The next day, the G7 leaders’ joint declaration of support for Ukraine noted that G7 members were launching negotiations on “bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements” to support Ukraine.

There are further sobering signs of a significant reset of Western strategy on Ukraine. An article in Time magazine painted a bleak picture of deliberations in Zelensky’s inner circle over how difficult the war will be to win.

Meanwhile, an NBC story revealed mounting Western pressure on Ukraine to consider a peace deal with Russia that would involve at least some territorial concessions.

No appetite for endless conflict

The underlying premise of this reset in Western attitudes is that the outcome of this war will ultimately not be decided for a long time.

Bilateral security guarantees – especially from the US, UK, Germany and France – would go some way in assuring Ukraine that the West would continue to have its back while kicking the thorny issue of NATO membership into the long grass.

The West could also remain rhetorically committed to Zelensky’s peace formula. And support for EU membership – likely to be a long and slow process – could also continue and assist Ukraine with both reforms and recovery.

Such an approach would anchor Ukraine more clearly in the West in ways that might be less unacceptable to Russia than NATO membership.

All of this, however, is predicated on the assumption of a stalemate on the ground, which Moscow and Kiev would need to accept. It also assumes that neither side can see a clear opportunity to either escalate militarily to victory or do enough to have the advantage should the two sides end up at the negotiation table.

Both sides would also need to have grounds to believe that they have the political will and material resources to at least sustain the status quo. They must also be able to credibly signal this to the other side.

For Ukraine, the recent G7 statement, Biden’s article in the Washington Post and Austin’s comments in Kiev all contribute to this message without contradicting Zelensky’s stance of no surrender, which still has clear majority support in Ukraine.

Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine 20 months ago. It has been a year since any significant movements on the battlefield. No major third-party peace initiatives are on the horizon that could change the calculations of the belligerents. Taken together, a status quo is emerging on the ground.

For this to become a preference for both Moscow and Kiev over futile and costly attempts of escalation, several conditions need to be met.

For Ukraine, the kind of credible bilateral security guarantees embodied in the G7 Leaders’ joint declaration of support are required. For Russia, it would mean no Ukrainian NATO membership and no significant escalation of Western support that could give Kiev the technological edge it might need to defeat Moscow on the battlefield.

Making the current stalemate sustainable would imply thinking about the situation on the ground – not so much in terms of temporary stalemate to be overcome through military escalation, but more in terms of an acceptable, if imperfect, status quo that is worth preserving.

In practical terms, this would imply no significant fighting and no further mobilizations. As such, it would also likely have an immediate and tangible effect on the lives of people on both sides of the lines of contact.

Progress in this direction will not be linear, especially given upcoming presidential elections in Russia, the US, and – possibly – Ukraine. As the election campaigns get underway, there will be periods of escalation not only along the frontline but also in rhetoric. Neither side is likely to commit in public to a ceasefire. And neither side will disown their articulated maximum demands.

Yet, beyond this, there appears to be a realization now on all sides that a stable status quo is in everybody’s interest. Moscow, Kiev and the West are likely to work towards such stabilization, pursue humanitarian issues and possibly begin negotiations on a ceasefire.

None of this is equivalent to the just and lasting peace that Ukraine and Ukrainians deserve. But it does embody the hope of ultimately achieving such a peace at the negotiation table and not on the battlefield.

Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy

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There is a famous story about the founder of modern Zionism, Theodor Herzl. As a young journalist in late-19th-century Vienna, Herzl came to believe that the solution to the problem of Jewish emancipation in Europe was the creation of a Jewish state. His ideas remained fringe across European Jewish communities until after the Holocaust, but they did raise some eyebrows with Jewish leaders. 

Upon hearing Herzl’s plans to redeem the Jewish people, the chief Rabbi of Vienna decided to visit him. When he arrived on a cold December day at Herzl’s apartment, he found a Christmas tree in the living room. Legend has it that the Rabbi simply left and never even spoke with Herzl, believing him far too assimilated to Christian customs to be a savior for the Jews. 

This story highlights the myriad counter-narratives and differing opinions within the Jewish community over political Zionism. Since the earliest days of Herzl’s plans to create a Jewish state, Jewish communities have been divided on whether Jews even needed a state in the first place.

Even today, there are almost equal numbers of Jews who live outside of Israel as there are living in the Jewish state. While many Jewish diaspora communities call themselves Zionist, the fact is that they refuse to realize the basic tenet of modern Zionist ideology and emigrate to Israel. 

Despite the deep difference inside the Jewish community over Zionism, the Israeli government and its allies have long pushed the idea that anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are two sides of the same coin. The conflation of these terms over the past month of fighting in the Gaza Strip has reached fever pitch and is contributing to a flare-up of anti-Semitism worldwide. 

Professor Avi Shlaim, one of the revisionist Israeli scholars known as the “new historians,” spoke about the differences between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism in a recent clip that went viral across the Internet. Anti-Semitism, Shlaim notes, is the hatred of Jewish people because they are Jews. Anti-Zionism is opposition either to the Zionist ideology or, more commonly, criticism of specific policies of the Israeli government.

While anti-Semitism is a grotesque form of hatred that should never be justified, anti-Zionist rhetoric tends to be evidence-based. 

The Israeli government and its supporters argue that anti-Zionism deprives the Jews of a state of their own because they are Jews. Thus anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism because it singles out the group.

This argument doesn’t hold much water, as anti-Zionists don’t say that Jews can’t have their self-determination. Instead, the issue is how Zionism has sought to exercise that self-determination in a specific place at the expense of another people’s self-determination. 

Israel’s Palestinian policy

The deep issue is how Israel deliberately conflates anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism to silence any criticism of the Israeli government or its policies of occupation vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

When the UN secretary general called for a ceasefire to protect civilians in the Gaza Strip early in the war, the Israeli representative immediately branded his position anti-Semitic. This is a clear example of how the conflation strategy is deployed to divert attention over legitimate criticism of Israeli policy. 

Israel’s aggressive PR tactics have allowed the far right to push anti-Semitic ideas without getting into trouble. For decades, far-right leaders worldwide have claimed to be pro-Israel while directly or indirectly supporting anti-Semitism at home. Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary, is one of the most vocal supporters of Israel in the European Union and also flames anti-Semitism at home. 

Elon Musk recently found himself in hot water after agreeing with anti-Semitic comments on his social-media platform X. Media watchdogs have since claimed that anti-Semitism is flourishing on the platform.

Musk says X is a place for free speech, and that’s why such rhetoric is shared. Yet, in response to high-profile advertisers fleeing his platform, Musk announced that using terms like “decolonization” and “from the river to the sea” in support of Palestinians will get you banned from X. So much for free speech. 

Musk is rushing to embrace pro-Israel positions in the hope people will overlook his alleged anti-Semitic tendencies. The very fact he can do that is a by-product of the Israeli government’s conflation of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism.

The Jewish people never elected the Israeli government to represent it worldwide. Given the varied nature of Judaism today, such an election would be impossible. Yet Israel speaks in the name of all Jews to provide cover for its policies with the Palestinians.

With rising anti-Semitism worldwide, there will need to be some sort of reckoning between Jewish communities and Israel, but such an event feels far off. 

This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.

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After a long overnight deliberation, the Israeli government approved a hostage release deal and ceasefire today with Hamas.

The main details of the agreement, brokered by Qatar, will include the gradual release of 50 to 80 Israeli women and children held in the Gaza Strip. That’s only a fraction of the 240 hostages who were abducted on October 7 during Hamas’ violent terror spree across 23 southern Israeli towns, which killed 1,200 Israelis.

In exchange, Israel has agreed to at least a four-day ceasefire, pausing its offensive maneuvers in Gaza aimed at crushing Hamas’ military and political capabilities. At least 150 Palestinian women and minors will be released from Israeli prisons in exchange, while Gazans will receive increased amounts of humanitarian aid and fuel.

The deal presented several dilemmas for the government in Jerusalem, embodying the strong tensions between the two main goals of the war: dismantling Hamas as a functioning terror organization and securing the release of as many hostages as possible.

The Israeli Defense Forces wanted to keep the pressure on Hamas on the ground. On the other hand, it was clear that fighting would have to be put on hold for the hostage deal to go ahead.

Moreover, Israelis will not like the fact the deal applies only to women and children, leaving out men and soldiers. And it also left Hamas with strong cards to play in the coming days, able to use the remaining hostages to force more ceasefires and concessions from Israel.

This is not the first time veteran Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has signed off on a sensitive prisoner swap deal. He was prime minister in 2011 when Israel released more than 1,000 prisoners in exchange for a single Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit. The released prisoners included 280 who were serving life sentences – among them the current Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar.

Protests on the Israeli streets since Hamas’ attacks on October 7 have called for prioritizing the release of hostages. These have been substantial and emotional. Families of those kidnapped have also met with Netanyahu and his partners in the current emergency government, centrists Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, who are both former Defence Force chiefs of staff and were previously part of the opposition.

The Israeli public has displayed strong and heartfelt national solidarity in response to the October 7 attacks. At the same time, no one can forget the division and vitriol that threatened to tear Israel apart just a short while ago.

Millions protested for months against the controversial judicial overhaul plan promoted by Netanyahu’s right-wing government. Coalition members fiercely attacked and ridiculed army reservists who threatened not to serve unless the reform plan was scrapped.

As long as the war continues, Netanyahu’s position appears safe. Initially, his followers claimed it is no time to deal with petty politics when the war is being fought.

Yet, soon afterward, it became clear the prime minister was refusing to take personal responsibility for what occurred on October 7, even though he was in power on and off for 16 years and failed to effectively deal with Hamas.

Many blame him for allowing Qatar to provide hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas-ruled Gaza over the years, with the money arguably helping transform it into an army on Israel’s back doorstep.

A committee of inquiry, expected to be created as soon as the fighting is over, will most likely also grill Netanyahu and his political partners for their role in exacerbating the internal strife.

These tensions within Israel, a top intelligence official warned months ago, were perceived as a weakness among Israel’s enemies and “an expression of a linear process ending with Israel’s collapse.”

No one wants elections while the fighting continues, and toppling the government now would be legally complicated. Attempts behind closed doors to find enough hands among Netanyahu’s Likud party to replace him have so far come to nothing.

Extremist Itamar Ben Gvir, head of the Jewish Power Party which is part of Netanyahu’s original right-wing coalition, voted against accepting the hostage deal. Publicly, he warned against the deal, depicting it as a grave mistake and a show of weakness. After the war, he may seek to distance himself from the Likud leader by voting down the government.

The feeling in Israel is that Netanyahu’s days in power are numbered. Yet, the veteran PM has proven time and again that it is not wise to bet against him.

Ran Porat is Affiliate Researcher, The Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation, Monash University

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Indonesians living on Rempang Island are protesting against the construction of a multibillion-dollar Chinese glass factory. To make way for the Rempang Eco-City project, 7,500 local inhabitants must move.

This Indonesian National Strategic Project (PSN), backed by a Chinese company’s US$11.5 billion investment, seeks to transform the island into a major industrial, commercial and tourism hub.

Despite living on the island for generations, the local inhabitants lack legal land ownership. The project holds potential for economic development and job creation, driven by the abundance of quartz sand resources – a vital component in glass and solar-panel manufacturing. But the situation underscores the need for transparent and inclusive decision-making processes that consider the rights and interests of local communities.

The local community has occupied the area for decades. The investigation carried out by the Indonesian Ombudsman has revealed that the old villages on Rempang Island existed long before the memorandum of understanding between the government and Chinese investors was established in 2004. The Agrarian Reform Consortium has reported that there is a problem with overlapping tenure in Rempang due to inadequate land governance.

To solve the problem of overlapping tenure, the government of Indonesia launched the One Map Policy (OMP) in 2011 after spatial data differences became known nationally in 2010 during the Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) conference. But the OMP is not functioning well because of both political and technical issues.

The OMP’s effectiveness is hindered by poor land administration and a lack of coordination among ministries. This has resulted in unclear information, making it difficult to achieve the desired outcomes. Overlapping responsibilities among multiple agencies and institutions have also caused a domestic power struggle, creating a significant obstacle to the effective implementation of the policy.

The government could establish a dedicated institution directly under the president’s supervision. This institution should be responsible for coordinating and implementing the OMP and given the necessary authority to ensure that all stakeholders work together toward the same goals.

Slow progress

But the difficulty in identifying customary forest boundaries has slowed the policy’s progress. Although the current government is making efforts to uphold the policy by recognizing the rights of local people and implementing agrarian reform, there is still a need to put in more serious efforts to pursue these initiatives, as the progress made so far is limited.

To reduce land-ownership inequalities and empower communities through redistribution, ownership, legalization, and control over land, Indonesia launched a new reform called Lands Subject to Agrarian Reform (Tanah Objek Reforma Agraria). Understood as “agrarian reform” in Presidential Regulation No 86 of 2018, this program involves land distribution and legalization to solve the insecurities and complexities of tenure structures.

The government also issued Government Regulation No 43 in 2021, which aims to address the issue of spatial inconsistencies, forest zones, permits and land rights. Before this regulation, there was no standard procedure that ministries or agencies could follow to resolve the problem of overlapping land rights.

This regulation can serve as a catalyst for the OMP, which will help to resolve overlapping spatial data. For example, when resolving a land-ownership case in a forest area, it is important to compare the year of the letter of land-ownership issuance with the designation year of the forest area.

An added complication is that the current two-dimensional maps created do not accurately represent the complex social relationships and tenurial dynamics involved. The policy could incorporate ground-truthing as a crucial step to ensure that maps accurately reflect the actual conditions on the ground.

Ground-truthing involves a process of verification and direct on-site checking. This is particularly important in Indonesia, given its diverse geography and the need to consider local communities and environmental factors.

Public consultation is also a critical component of spatial planning, and it is legally mandated by various laws, including the 2007 Law No 26 on Spatial Planning. These laws establish a framework to involve the public in the planning process and emphasize the importance of transparency and inclusivity.

The Indonesian Environmental Forum has pointed out that the development of Rempang Eco-City does not conform to national and regional spatial planning documents. Despite this, the project’s special status as a PSN allows it to be implemented without requiring it to be written into a spatial planning document.

Investment in domestic industries requires the involvement of local communities. Communities are not necessarily against investment, but they should not be forced to relocate unwillingly. It is crucial that relevant agencies conduct appropriate consultation and mediation with legitimate community representatives in compliance with Indonesian regulations.

Public participation, as required by Indonesian regulations, is often a mere formality with little substance or purpose. The effectiveness of public consultation relies on the commitment of implementing authorities and the active engagement of various stakeholders, including local communities and civil society organisations.

The main question left to be answered is whether the government can shift its focus toward greater community participation while implementing the PSN.

This article was first published by East Asia Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. It is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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