Japan well on the way to chip-making’s vanguard

Developments at Rapidus and TSMC highlight Japan’s attempt to advance to the leading edge of semiconductor manufacturing. It is a comprehensive effort devoid of the financial, social and political difficulties seen in Germany, the US and China.

Rapidus, Japan’s advanced semiconductor production venture, will work on 1nm integrated circuit design with the University of Tokyo and the CEA-Leti research institute of France, according to Japanese media reports.

This should put it on a process technology development track converging with Intel.

TSMC, Taiwan’s industry-leading semiconductor foundry, is reported to be considering 3nm production in Kumamoto on Japan’s southwestern island of Kyushu. This points to step-by-step progress toward the ability to fabricate smartphone and AI processors.

By the end of this decade, these projects should give Japan some of the world’s most advanced semiconductor production facilities worldwide, filling a large gap in its manufacturing capability and greatly increasing the security of its electronics supply chain.

On October 10, French research institute CEA-Leti held its 17th annual Innovation Day in Tokyo.

At the event, CEA-Leti signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with Japan’s Leading Edge Semiconductor Technology Center (LSTC) to launch “a long-term and sustainable collaboration in different advanced semiconductor fields, including materials, devices, processes, and technology” and “jointly define long-term R&D roadmaps.”

Rapidus chairman Tetsuro (Terry) Higashi was in attendance and about 30 meetings were held between CEA-Leti representatives and other Japanese electronics companies.

On November 17, Japan’s Nikkei newspaper reported that Rapidus and CEA-Leti will collaborate on the development of process technologies from 1.4nm to 1nm. Rapidus hopes to migrate from 2nm in 2027 to 1.4nm by 2030, with production at 1nm starting soon after that.

Rapidus President Atsuyoshi Koike (left) and Chairman Tetsuro Higashi hold a news conference. Image: Facebook

CEA-Leti is one of three research institutes affiliated with CEA Tech, the technology research branch of the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission.

Leti focuses on micro- and nano-technologies applicable to computing, data processing and sensors including IC design, embedded software, silicon components, optics and photonics.

LSTC is an organization created under the auspices of Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry that conducts R&D for Rapidus.

Established in December 2022, it also includes the University of Tokyo, other Japanese universities and the nation’s Riken scientific research institute. Rapidus chairman Higashi – formerly chairman, president and CEO of Tokyo Electron – is LSTC’s executive chairman.

That same month, Rapidus signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with imec, the international nanoelectronics R&D center headquartered in Belgium, and announced a partnership with IBM to commercialize the latter’s 2nm process technology by 2027.

To this end, Rapidus has dispatched engineers to IBM’s Albany Nanotech Complex in New York and has started building a factory in Chitose, near Sapporo on Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido.

In April 2023, Rapidus joined imec’s Core Partner Program, which provides it with state-of-the-art production tools and allows it to conduct joint R&D with leading foundries, integrated semiconductor device makers, fabless IC design companies, and materials and equipment suppliers.

Other members of the program include TSMC, Sony Semiconductor, Intel, Micron, Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix, Western Digital and Qualcomm.

In June, imec announced an agreement for the installation and service of ASML’s new and most advanced high-NA EUV lithography system at its pilot line in Leuven, Belgium. This equipment is essential to the development of 2nm and 1nm IC fabrication processes.

Established in August 2022, Rapidus is supported by Kioxia (formerly Toshiba), a leading producer of NAND flash memory; Sony, the world’s top producer of image sensors; Toyota and its group semiconductor maker Denso; NTT, Japan’s leading telecom carrier; NEC, its largest telecom equipment maker; investment company Softbank; Mitsubishi UFJ, Japan’s largest bank; and the Japanese government.

On November 21, Bloomberg reported that TSMC is considering the construction of a third semiconductor factory in Japan that will use 3nm process technology, citing industry sources that requested anonymity.

The report indicates that TSMC will expand and upgrade its operations in Kumamoto for the rest of the decade.

TSMC’s first factory in Kumamoto, a joint venture with Sony and Denso, is now under construction and scheduled to start mass production in 2024 with 28nm, 22nm, 16nm and 12nm process technologies.

Taiwan’s TSMC is on an global expansion drive. Image: Twitter Screengrab / Digitimes

A second factory with 6nm capability should be completed by the end of 2026, according to the Japanese media.

No dates have been given for the third factory, but production starting in 2028 or 2029 would make sense. By then, 3nm process technology, now in production in Taiwan, will be well established. But in combination with Rapidus, it should give Japan a full range of logic foundry services down to 2nm this decade and 1nm in the 2030s.

Construction of TSMC’s first factory in Kumamoto is ahead of schedule, while its factory construction project in the US state of Arizona is said to be about a year behind schedule.

Taiwanese and Japanese work cultures are similar and Japan does not suffer from the disruptive union activism in the US.

TSMC also works with Japanese materials and equipment companies at its 3D IC packaging R&D center located in the science city of Tsukuba northeast of Tokyo. More than 20 Japanese companies are involved in the project.

In the memory IC sector, Micron Technology has announced plans to introduce EUV lithography in order to manufacture its next-generation 1-gamma DRAM at its Hiroshima factory starting in 2025.

CEO Sanjay Mehrotra notes that “Micron’s Hiroshima operations have been central to the development and production of several industry-leading technologies for memory over the past decade.” Micron currently makes its leading-edge 1-beta DRAM in Hiroshima.

Micron is the only producer of DRAM in Japan. Like Rapidus, TSMC and its partners Sony and Denso, Micron Japan receives subsidies from the Japanese government.

Together with Kioxia, which is ready to expand production of 3D NAND flash memory as the market emerges from its severe downturn, Micron provides Japan with first-rate memory IC production at high volume.

The emergence of a roadmap for the comprehensive development of Japan’s semiconductor industry stands in contrast to the situation in Germany, where the Federal Constitutional Court has ruled against the budgetary arrangements for subsidizing fab construction projects by Intel and TSMC.

What will happen to these projects is uncertain. What is certain is that Japan will keep forging ahead.

Follow this writer on Twitter: @ScottFo83517667

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New beginning or dismal end for the Belt and Road?

Not so long ago, countries were ecstatic about the potential of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a mega-infrastructure scheme launched in 2013 that would connect the world through ports, power grids, railways, roads and telecommunications networks.

Western pundits worried that BRI projects were pulling countries into China’s orbit, empowering Chinese companies and birthing a Sinocentric global order.

For many, it was obvious the road was speeding along as “evidenced” by China’s investments, loans or grants ranging from hundreds of billions to, supposedly, the low trillions of dollars.

Commentators often mixed distinct kinds of monies, classifying loans to countries like Venezuela as BRI loans, equating money invested in or lent to BRI participant countries as BRI money, or labeling projects with no connectivity features as BRI projects. China facilitated these misjudgments by not producing an authoritative BRI project list.

The BRI, initially consisting of the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative, only raised more concern as it repeatedly broke geographic boundaries, reaching into the Pacific Islands, the Arctic and even outer space.

But one current refrain is that the BRI is falling short of its goals. In fact, before the Third BRI Forum held in Beijing in October 2023, some analysts proclaimed the BRI’s downfall. One only need look at Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Zambia and perhaps Malaysia to see the dismal state of the BRI. 

Italy has opted out and Greece is allegedly no longer enthusiastic, despite the successes of Athens’ BRI-linked Piraeus port. Driven by domestic economic constraints, financial problems with BRI participants and project loans, as well as political pushback from the West, BRI investment and contracting are shrinking.

A Chinese worker carries materials for the first rail line linking China to Laos, a key part of Beijing’s Belt and Road project across the Mekong, in Luang Prabang, Laos, May 8, 2020. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Aidan Jones

Facing an uncertain future, another popular contemporary refrain is that the BRI is being rebooted. Beijing has shifted towards what analysts characterize as a “smaller, greener and more beautiful” initiative featuring solar and wind power, ICT infrastructure and ports.

As for the supposed geopolitical ambitions embodied within the BRI, the situation looks rather bleak for China with fewer heads of state attending the October 2023 BRI Forum.

It is easy to paint the current state of the BRI as off-course when it is measured against aspirations it was never likely to reach. Those analyzing the BRI have long pointed out that the complexities of infrastructure, as well as the economic and political shortcomings of numerous BRI participant countries, would adversely affect the BRI’s progress.

Domestic political changes flowing from elections, center–local divides, civil war, terrorism and public protests have time after time stunted, delayed and prevented the realization of BRI projects.

A “smaller, greener and more beautiful” BRI will come against these challenges, which will be coupled with China’s economic downturn, the financial situation of some BRI participants and European disinterest or opposition.

Many of the factors that powered the BRI in the past will continue to power it in the future. China has long been seeking greater market access, pathways to acquire natural resources and ways to improve the security of its resource and trade flows.

As well, Beijing has long searched for ways to deploy its massive foreign currency reserves, internationalize its currency, create opportunities for its companies and promote Chinese tech and standards.

These impetuses will continue to drive the BRI and one that is not necessarily small, green or beautiful. To think that green and ICT-related infrastructure projects will be small ignores reality — green energy projects can easily run into the billions of dollars and hydropower, while green in theory, is not necessarily “beautiful” or entirely non-polluting.

The Khunjerab Pass, starting point of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Photo: Asia Times
The Khunjerab Pass, starting point of the Belt and Road Initiative’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Photo: Asia Times

The BRI is not all about “push.” There remain dozens of countries such as Cambodia, Greece and Malaysia continuing to welcome traditional, large-scale BRI projects. The BRI is also much more than Africa or South Asia — the Middle East, for instance, is a place where the BRI will thrive.

The future of the BRI likely will entail a mix of big and small, green and polluting, beautiful and ugly. The key for businesspeople and policymakers is to ignore the generalizations present in many discussions about the BRI. Instead, they should undertake nuanced analyses attentive to regional and national political and economic conditions as well as sectoral dynamics.

They also need to be cautious about making decisions based on the data points of the day as opposed to larger trends that will affect their countries or companies over the medium- to long-term. Only then can policymakers and businesspeople take a smart and targeted approach in dealing with the BRI.

Jean-Marc F Blanchard is Executive Director at the Mr & Mrs S.H. Wong Center for the Study of Multinational Corporations, Palo Alto, United States.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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Lockheed Martin teases tailless next-gen fighter concept

US defense contractor Lockheed Martin has revealed a new tailless manned tactical jet concept, signaling a potential significant shift in design and strategy for the US Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) sixth-generation fighter program.

Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works, known for its cutting-edge aerospace designs, revealed the concept while acknowledging it was not a definitive design for the program, The Warzone reported, noting it has a similar wing shape and planform to previous NGAD-related posts.

The Warzone mentions features including a “stinger” tail with a 2D exhaust, similar to the F-22 Raptor, suggesting a design focus on low observability and reduced infrared signature.

The concept aircraft’s large, faceted bulges on the fuselage raise questions about their function, possibly providing internal volume without compromising performance or stealth. The Warzone notes that the design’s huge canopy is striking and hints at a two-crew configuration.

The report says that particular feature may suggest a shift towards aircraft serving as forward battle management nodes, although it could also impact fuel and payload capacity. The Warzone says the concept showcases Lockheed Martin’s broader focus on next-generation unmanned systems and innovative aerospace solutions.

While there has yet to be a consensus on sixth-generation fighters’ defining features, it will likely feature new technologies such as machine learning, artificial intelligence, modular design, directed energy weapons, virtual and augmented reality and optionally manned capability.

The NGAD is set to replace the F-22 as the US Air Force’s premier fighter aircraft by the 2030s. While the F-22 is touted as one of the most capable fighters, issues such as high costs, limited airframe numbers, aging stealth technology and increasingly unfeasible upgrades might have made designing an all-new fighter more logical than keeping the late 1990s airframe aloft.

A US Air Force F-22 Raptor at Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi, January 2021 Photo: US Air Force / Airman 1st Class Davis Donaldson

According to a June 2022 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, the NGAD might not be limited to a conventional fighter jet but could encompass various systems including manned, unmanned, optionally manned, cyber and electronic components.

The CRS report says the NGAD aims to redefine air dominance, moving away from traditional military airpower concepts and technologies. For example, the report says that the NGAD may not maneuver like a conventional fighter but could dominate airspace with directed energy weapons powered by multiple engines.

In terms of planned numbers, John Tirpak notes in a March 2023 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that the US Air Force plans to field 200 NGAD airframes alongside 1,000 Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) and request funds in the 2024 fiscal budget to finance these acquisitions.

Tirpak mentions that the number assumes two CCAs will be assigned for each NGAD and two for 300 F-35s. He says that as many as five CCAs could collaborate with each manned fighter, performing electronic warfare missions, suppressing enemy air defenses and providing air and ground protection and communications.

That force configuration belies the US approach to a perceived Chinese anti-access/area denial strategy (A2/AD) over the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.

In an article this month for Business Insider, Christopher Woody notes that China’s military has spent decades building up its air defenses, emplacing formidable defenses on land and sea, and thus posing a severe problem for US forces.

Woody notes that China has built the world’s densest and most integrated air defense system along its east coast as part of a counter-intervention strategy against the US and its allies in a potential Taiwan conflict and intends to fight under that air defense umbrella.

He mentions that China’s surface-to-air missiles (SAM) aboard its Type 055 cruisers and Type 052D destroyers are more potent than any system currently fielded in Ukraine and that the same formidable systems on land are paired with jamming and electronic warfare capabilities.

In an August 2023 RAND article, Jim Mitre and Ylber Bajraktari note that China has a variety of sensors and weapon systems that can strike US and allied forces during a potential invasion of Taiwan. Mitre and Bajraktari note that the main challenge for the US and its allies is to disrupt China’s targeting capabilities.

In line with the NGAD and CCA programs, they note that large numbers of low-cost, unmanned drones such as the CCA would confuse China’s battlespace awareness and complicate its ability to identify high-value targets such as the NGAD.

They note that drones such as the CCA can act as a force multiplier, drawing Chinese forces to incorrect locations or causing them to expend advanced missiles on false targets.

Mitre and Bajraktari say that the algorithmic optimization of decoys could alert friendly units when they are under surveillance and inform the use of physical, electronic and cyber decoys as well as cover, camouflage and other force maneuvers.

In that direction, the CCA can extend NGAD sensor ranges, acting as advanced surveillance and targeting platforms in defended airspace. At the same time, the NGAD maintains electronic silence and launches standoff munitions from outside the range of enemy air defenses while staying undetected.

A surface-to-air missile is fired from a missile launcher by the air force under the PLA Southern Theater Command during a round-the-clock air defense training exercise. Photo: eng.chinamil.com.cn / Zhang Hengping and Yuan Hai

However, in an April 2023 War on the Rocks article, Maximilian Bremer and Kelly Grieco note that an offensive air dominance strategy entailing the penetration of heavily defended airspace may weaken US deterrence due to strong Chinese air defenses and the use of non-expendable air assets while running serious escalation risks.

Instead, Bremer and Greco advocate a defense air denial strategy limiting China’s ability to gain and exploit air superiority. Such a strategy, they note, economizes force by employing sufficiently large numbers of smaller, cheaper weapons in a distributed way, aiming to survive initial air and missile strikes and then keeping airspace contested.

They mention that an air denial strategy can dissuade an adversary from launching an amphibious invasion if the defender can sustain the attrition rates.

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A Middle East guide to closing the climate gap

As the world remains focused on hostilities in Gaza, the 28th meeting of the Conference of Parties on Climate Change – COP28 – is an important reminder that cooperation is the only means to mitigate human-caused calamity.

There’s plenty of commentary surrounding the fact that a fossil-fuel producer – the United Arab Emirates – is hosting COP28 next month. But in reality, the UAE, a capital-rich and multi-aligned middle power, has the credentials to bridge the climate-change gap between the developed and developing worlds.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries manage some US$4 trillion in assets through their sovereign wealth funds. This capital, together with technological prowess, could be crucial to achieving the expectations of the “Loss and Damage Fund,” which was established after COP27 in Egypt to assist “developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.”

So far, COP27’s ambition hasn’t borne fruit. A plan to raise $100 billion a year to help poor countries address climate change, funding that was scheduled to begin flowing in 2020, has met with little success. The delay is certain to be a point of contention between donors and potential beneficiaries at COP28.

This year’s climate talks are more than a gathering for environmental groups. They hold paramount importance for Middle Eastern countries, especially oil-producing states. For these nations, the fallout from climate change extends beyond economic considerations and energy export potential, deeply affecting the lives and livelihoods of their citizens, particularly in vital sectors such as agriculture, water and electricity.

Climate change is already affecting stability across the Middle East. In Libya, after a decade-long civil war, signs of recovery – increased oil production, for instance – were upended this September when a catastrophic cyclone submerged parts of the country, disrupting crucial seaports and jeopardizing oil exports. 

Similarly, in Iraq, government inadequacies in responding to floods have led to substantial casualties and ignited violence.

Even the outbreak of Syria’s civil war in 2011 was linked to a climatic disaster. The worst drought in nearly a millennium the year before devastated the livelihoods of 800,000 people and decimated the farming sector, fueling urban migration and unrest.

The climate crisis now has become a leading concern in a region traditionally fraught with security challenges.

Effects of climate change ignite violence, fuel poverty and inequality, and encourage migration, exacerbating regional instability. Food and water scarcity, high birth rates and consumption, relocation from hot zones, and threats to an agriculture sector employing a substantial portion of the population underscore the monumental challenges posed by the climate crisis. 

This upheaval threatens not just regional stability but global stability as well.

Despite historical and ongoing animosities, Middle Eastern nations must recognize and lead efforts against the shared threat of climate change. There is significant potential for regional cooperation in knowledge-sharing, disaster response strategies, and investment in renewable energy sources.

High-level cooperation

Cooperation on climate mitigation and adaptation could also help reduce tensions between superpowers. In their long-anticipated meeting in San Francisco, US President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, agreed to resume a working group on climate cooperation and pledged a major ramp-up of renewable energy.  

The two sides also agreed to “accelerate renewable energy deployment” in their economies until the end of 2030 to speed up “the substitution for coal, oil, and gas.” They also pledged to support efforts to “triple renewable energy capacity globally by 2030.” 

The stakes at home are even higher, as cooperation on climate change and sustainability can help fight extremism and strengthen regional stability. The UAE’s growing engagement in climate mitigation in Africa exemplifies this. 

At the recent Africa Climate Summit, the UAE pledged $4.5 billion to expedite clean energy projects on the continent. Given the political upheaval and conflicts in many Muslim-majority countries in Africa, the UAE, as a proponent of moderate Islam, could play a pivotal role as a mediator and catalyst for change.

By moving beyond mere statements to substantial investments and project commitments, the UAE is in a strong position to prevent potential crises and champion stability, facilitating Africa’s sustainable growth.

With the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza still raging, the UAE has announced that it will establish three desalination plants in the Gaza Strip, producing 2.27 milli0n liters of drinking water a day, benefiting 300,000 people. Pledges like these are a reminder that beneath the carnage remain enduring challenges of water and food security, concerns that only can be addressed with long-term solutions.

The upcoming COP28 conference represents an urgent call to the international community to join forces in addressing converging threats. We must remember that stability and peace will require regional and trans-regional cooperation, even among foes. Our future hinges not just on the integrity of our borders but on the health of our shared planet. 

For lasting peace and security, all parties must prioritize cooperation over conflict, move beyond ideological and political divisions, and recognize our collective existence on an increasingly endangered planet.

This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.

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The reasonableness of the European Right

Geert Wilders’ surprise victory in last week’s Dutch elections portends an upheaval in European politics long in the offing, but provoked by two pressing events.

The first is the mass demonstrations in support of Hamas by Muslim migrants after October 7, a triumphalist assertion of power by a minority that believes that it may become the future majority.

This cast a harsh light on uncontrolled mass immigration, now Europe’s top political issue. The failure of the mainstream parties to address the continent’s most pressing problem opens a path to power for an opposition that only months ago was dismissed as a political fringe element.

The second issue is popular hostility to the Ukraine war, which Ukraine is visibly losing.

Long derided as extremist throwbacks, Europe’s right-wing parties have become the last bastion of what used to be conventional wisdom in the West. Their nationalism has more in common with Charles De Gaulle than Jean-Marie Le Pen, and their views on key issues – immigration, Russia, China, and the United States – are rational and considered.

Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who describes himself as a Christian Democrat in the style of the late German chancellor Helmut Kohl, is the standard-bearer of the new European right, but prospective leaders are emerging in several European countries.

Wilders, to be sure, has taken colorful positions on his country’s Muslim problem, proposing at one point to ban the Koran and close mosques. These are rhetorical gestures rather than statements of policy. What qualifies the European right for a position of leadership is that it offers rational policy alternatives on economic, social and security policy.

Migration, legal and illegal, is transforming the character of European society. Officially, about 7% of the populations of France, Britain and Germany are Muslim migrants, but the actual numbers are higher.

In 2017, the Pew Institute estimated that 8.8% of French residents were Muslim, and that the total would rise to 18% by 2050. More than half of all schoolchildren in the German city of Hamburg are from migrant families.

An estimated 2.3 million people emigrated to Europe in 2022. The European Commission’s estimate of 331,400 “irregular border crossings” in 2022 is almost certainly a vast underestimate; Hungary alone has turned back 270,00 prospective migrants at its border during 2023, Orban reported in a speech last week.

Refugees behind a fence on the Hungarian border with Serbia. Photo: NBC screengrab

Ukraine has been by far the largest source of immigrants to Europe during the past two years, but Europeans do not regard Ukrainians as a cultural threat. The public assertion of power by Muslim minorities after October 7, though, has radically changed public perceptions.

Wilders polled at just 10% of the vote before the October 7 Hamas massacre, but won 35% of the seats after European Muslims staged mass demonstrations in support of Hamas in most major European cities.

On October 19, Muslims in Berlin’s Neukölln district rioted, injuring 65 police officers after an Islamist Telegram channel called on its followers to “turn Neukölln into the Gaza Strip” and “burn everything,” according to the mass-circulation Bild-Zeitung.

A You.gov poll in early November reported that 59% of Germans fear a mass terror attack in their own country after the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel, which killed more than 1,000 civilians. Only 27% of Germans polled thought that terror attacks were unlikely.

A poll by the German magazine Stern published on October 18 found that 58% of Germans thought the Israeli military response in Gaza “appropriate,” against only 23% opposed.

For the most part, the right-wing parties are strong supporters of Israel. Along with Croatia and the Czech Republic, Hungary was one of only a handful of industrial countries to vote against the October UN Security Council resolution calling for a Gaza ceasefire.

A recent pro-Palestine protest in Germany. Image: LBC News screengrab / Twitter

The Gaza war and, more importantly, the upheaval among Europe’s Muslims in response to the Gaza war, drove a wedge into European society that left large numbers of voters convinced that the Muslim minority was unassimilable and even dangerous.

This contrasts sharply with the response to then-chancellor Angela Merkel’s “We can do it!” approach to absorbing about 1 million Syrian and other Muslim migrants in 2016.

Migration accounts for the sudden surge in support for Europe’s right-wing parties, but deep dissatisfaction with the stance of Europe’s mainstream parties on the Ukraine war is an important contributing factor.

Speaking at the Swiss newspaper Weltwoche’s anniversary conference last week, Hungary’s Orban summarized Europe’s problem: “America loses ground, and Europe pays the price.” He called for an independent European strategic policy.

An up-and-coming leader of the Alternative für Deutschland, Germany’s right-wing opposition, is Dr Maximilian Krah, the AfD’s lead candidate in next year’s European elections. In an interview with The American Conservative, Krah described himself as a Gaullist who wants Europe to be an important pole in a multi-polar world.

“Let’s push back against a widespread misconception on the right, that right now the US is hegemonic and that the only alternative is Chinese hegemony,” Krah told the US publications.

“China and BRICS are an anti-hegemonic coalition. So I’d say it’s this way: We either have a Pax Americana, which I believe is necessarily woke and bellicose, or we have no sole global hegemony but regional hegemons instead who rule according to their own local preferences. And I’m not even saying that this latter model is better than the former. It’s just inevitable,” Krah said.

Krah wants more European sovereignty. Image: Twitter screengrab

American hegemony in Europe will atrophy, Krah added:

How can a country that is moving away from Europe dominate it at the same time? This question poses itself very concretely in Ukraine. Obviously you see that the United States does not have the well-being of the Ukrainian population on the top of its mind. After all, we are right now sacrificing the Ukrainian youth in this moronic war: a war that could have easily been avoided. Clearly, this war is about America’s ambition to push back against Russia. It is a war for world order. And Washington has effectively taken over Kiev, which cannot do anything without American approval. The US finances Ukraine, arms it, makes strategic decisions on its behalf.

Bild-Zeitung, Germany’s largest-circulation news outlet, reported November 24 that Washington and Berlin are trying to persuade Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that Russia can’t be defeated militarily and that he will have to negotiate a solution.

What Maximilian Krah qualified as “this moronic” war will haunt Europe’s mainstream parties, who will be perceived as Washington’s puppets. As Orban told American journalist Tucker Carlson in an interview last month, “Germany’s position on the Ukraine war is proof of lack of sovereignty.”

The AfD is polling in second place at about 22% of the German vote, ahead of the Social Democrats, Greens and Free Democrats who comprise the ruling coalition. Like Wilders’ party, the AfD has had the status of a political leper. The mainstream parties have all declared that they will refuse to work with them.

As the tectonic plates of European politics shift, none of the old Shibboleths will apply.

Follow David P Goldman on X, formerly Twitter, at @davidpgoldman

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‘Walking pneumonia’ epidemic on the loose in China

A new wave of pneumonia cases hitting children and clusters of other respiratory illnesses have been detected in China’s northern regions, raising certain fears a new novel pathogen could be on the loose.

The World Health Organization said Wednesday it has requested information from the Chinese government about recent trends in the circulation of known pathogens including influenza, coronavirus, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) and mycoplasma in northern China, and the reported burden they are causing healthcare systems.

It said it is also in contact with clinicians and scientists through its existing technical partnerships and networks in China. A state-run China Daily report referred to the wave of cases as “walking pneumonia” as they often do not require hospitalization.

Zhang Lei, director of the Shanghai Maternity and Child Care Center’s health education unit, said the large-scale mycoplasma infection outbreak owes to the fact many children stayed home over the past three years during the Covid-19 pandemic and now have low levels of antibodies to ward off disease.

However, it’s unclear why China appears to be the only country facing a major mycoplasma outbreak, while the US and much of Europe have contended with flu and RSV.

The China Youth Daily, operated by the Communist Youth League of China, reported Friday that the number of patients with coughs and fevers at Beijing hospitals spiked this week, straining the healthcare system’s capacity.

The report said it now takes about eight to ten hours for people to see a doctor at Peking University First Hospital’s Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology.

Chinese health authorities have not yet announced the total number of infections in the country. They have said the epidemic was caused by a mix of known, not new, pathogens including mycoplasma, RSV, adenovirus and influenza.

The Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism of the State Council issued a notice on Friday requiring all local governments to prevent and control new coronavirus infections and other key infectious diseases.

“Since October 2023, influenza and Mycoplasma pneumoniae infection activities have gradually increased in our country,” said the epidemic control body. “It is expected that the spread of influenza will peak in winter and spring, and mycoplasma pneumoniae infection will continue to be high in some areas.”

“This winter and next spring, our country will see a lot of cross infection cases caused by multiple respiratory diseases such as Covid-19, influenza, and mycoplasma pneumoniae infections,” it added. 

“Beijing has entered a high season of respiratory infectious diseases,” said Wang Quanyi, deputy director and chief epidemiological expert at the Beijing Center for Disease Control and Prevention. “The city is currently showing a trend of multiple pathogens coexisting.”

“People who have been infected with one type of respiratory infectious disease can be infected with other types, resulting in cross infections,” Wang said. 

He said as this year’s influenza season started earlier than in previous years, it will probably end earlier. He added that the most common strain of influenza is the H3N2 subtype.

Li Yuechuan, director of the Department of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine at Tianjin Chest Hospital, said mycoplasma is a pathogen smaller than bacteria but bigger than viruses.

Li said mycoplasma-infected patients usually have a fever of around 38℃ instead of above 39℃. However, he said these patients will have more serious headaches and coughs than those who are infected with the influenza A virus. 

He added that mycoplasma infections can lead to rash, meningitis and hemolytic anemia among children.

As mycoplasma lacks a cell wall around its cell membrane, it is naturally resistant to antibiotics such as penicillin, which can bind with proteins on bacteria cell walls, according to medical experts. 

Antibiotics such as Azithromycin, which can suppress the replication of bacterial proteins, are more suitable for curing those infected by mycoplasma.

Qin Fang, a deputy director of the Department of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine at Beijing’s Emergency General Hospital, said the incubation period of mycoplasma pneumonia ranges between one to three weeks while the infectious period can last for two to three more weeks. 

She claimed that serious patients only accounted for a very small portion of the cases. 

Read: China’s economic recovery faces deflationary risks

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

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El Niño: an investment case 

This year sees the return of El Niño, a natural climate event that occurs every two to seven years. El Niño originates in the Pacific Ocean along the equator causing waters there to become much warmer than usual, which gives rise to extreme weather phenomena. 

El Niño returns at a time when the global climate crisis has reached an unprecedented peak. And it will make the crisis worse. Scientists believe that this year’s record high temperatures combined with El Niño will produce even more severe weather across the globe. 

The Asia-Pacific region, already highly vulnerable to disasters, is expected to be one of the most affected by El Niño. Even more extreme droughts and more tropical cyclones triggering flooding and landslides are expected across the region this year and into the early months of 2024, resulting in more lives being lost, damaging homes and infrastructure and leading to higher economic costs.

The prospect of this double Climate-El Niño crisis is daunting. It is however also an opportunity to accelerate actions with a view to anticipate, mitigate, and adapt to the weather events that are coming. 

Improved forecasting

The first measure to cushion the impact of El Niño is to improve forecasts to anticipate the type and severity of hazards at regional, national, and subnational levels. The expanded use of satellite and technology in all countries combined with widespread dissemination of early warnings to all population groups likely to be affected, including the most isolated ones, is feasible, low cost, and high impact. 

The Asia-Pacific region is at the forefront of innovation and digital progress, driven by governments and a dynamic private sector.

The El Niño threat presents an opportunity to use digitization and data to help both central and local governments better assess risks posed by El Niño, anticipate the damage it may cause within communities as well as to infrastructure, protect the most vulnerable population groups, and provide a more rapid and effective response to the disasters. 

Focusing on the compounding impact of El Niño on the climate crisis can improve land, water, flood, and drought management by governments and local communities. For the private sector, particularly small and micro-enterprises, heeding the El Niño threat will help protect assets and secure business continuity.

El Niño can also cause setbacks in human development, particularly in poverty and inequality reduction. This realization should make it imperative to identify the environmental and socio-economic vulnerabilities to El Niño and to address their root causes at national and local levels through policies and targeted programmes ranging from housing to social protection to improve the resilience of communities to weather-related risks. 

Risk-informed development

El Niño also makes the concept of “risk-informed development” more relevant than ever. From Nepal to Fiji, the Asia-Pacific region has made very significant strides in putting risk-informed development into practice.

Risk-informed development has been integrated into national policies for urban and rural development, yet the scope and depth of risk-informed development still varies across and within countries. Accelerating its adoption will help counter the impact of El Niño and will offer long-lasting benefits. 

This El Niño comes at a time of increased economic, social fragility, and volatility in Asia and the Pacific. The region is still recovering from the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic that have weakened growth and reversed human development progress and is also impacted by the ripple effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

Several countries have seen this exogenous impact aggravated by domestic political and social turmoil, resulting in an unbearable debt burden and a cost-of-living crisis that is affecting millions. This makes protection and adaptation to El Niño and the business case for climate actions stronger.

Plainly put, the destruction of infrastructure, the economic loss, and the financial resources for recovery are a cost to be paid. Conversely, the financial resources allocated for disaster preparedness and climate actions are worthwhile investments that should be done without delay.

Seen positively, El Niño should encourage international cooperation, particularly South-South cooperation. Many benefits are to be derived from specific exchanges of information and experience on how to anticipate and prepare for El Niño.

Such an exchange leading to replication or adaptations in planning, policies, capacity-building, and use of technology will make nations and communities more resilient to El Niño and climate change, more broadly.

Across Asia and the Pacific, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), together with other UN agencies, governments, and international and national partners is actively engaged in climate actions that will help counter El Niño’s impact on countries and their populations. 

This is part of our contribution to human development and the Sustainable Development Goals. We cannot avoid El Niño, but we can take quick effective actions to prepare and diminish its impact. 

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AI safety in the here and now

The turmoil at ChatGPT-maker OpenAI, bookended by the board of directors firing high-profile CEO Sam Altman on November 17, 2023, and rehiring him just four days later, has put a spotlight on artificial intelligence safety and concerns about the rapid development of artificial general intelligence, or AGI. AGI is loosely defined as human-level intelligence across a range of tasks.

The OpenAI board stated that Altman’s termination was for lack of candor, but speculation has centered on a rift between Altman and members of the board over concerns that OpenAI’s remarkable growth – products such as ChatGPT and Dall-E have acquired hundreds of millions of users worldwide – has hindered the company’s ability to focus on catastrophic risks posed by AGI.

OpenAI’s goal of developing AGI has become entwined with the idea of AI acquiring superintelligent capabilities and the need to safeguard against the technology being misused or going rogue. But for now, AGI and its attendant risks are speculative. Task-specific forms of AI, meanwhile, are very real, have become widespread and often fly under the radar.

As a researcher of information systems and responsible AI, I study how these everyday algorithms work – and how they can harm people.

The AI most likely to cause you harm is not some malevolent superintelligence, but the loan algorithm at your bank. Photo: AP via The Conversation / Mark Humphrey

AI plays a visible part in many people’s daily lives, from face recognition unlocking your phone to speech recognition powering your digital assistant. It also plays roles you might be vaguely aware of – for example, shaping your social media and online shopping sessions, guiding your video-watching choices and matching you with a driver in a ride-sharing service.

AI also affects your life in ways that might completely escape your notice. If you’re applying for a job, many employers use AI in the hiring process. Your bosses might be using it to identify employees who are likely to quit. I

f you’re applying for a loan, odds are your bank is using AI to decide whether to grant it. If you’re being treated for a medical condition, your healthcare providers might use it to assess your medical images. And if you know someone caught up in the criminal justice system, AI could well play a role in determining the course of their life.

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AI has become nearly ubiquitous in the hiring process.

Algorithmic harms

Many of the AI systems that fly under the radar have biases that can cause harm. For example, machine learning methods use inductive logic, which starts with a set of premises, to generalize patterns from training data.

A machine learning-based resume screening tool was found to be biased against women because the training data reflected past practices when most resumes were submitted by men.

The use of predictive methods in areas ranging from health care to child welfare could exhibit biases such as cohort bias that lead to unequal risk assessments across different groups in society. Even when legal practices prohibit discrimination based on attributes such as race and gender – for example, in consumer lending – proxy discrimination can still occur.

This happens when algorithmic decision-making models do not use characteristics that are legally protected, such as race, and instead use characteristics that are highly correlated or connected with the legally protected characteristic, like neighborhood.

Studies have found that risk-equivalent Black and Latino borrowers pay significantly higher interest rates on government-sponsored enterprise-securitized and Federal Housing Authority-insured loans than white borrowers.

Another form of bias occurs when decision-makers use an algorithm differently from how the algorithm’s designers intended. In a well-known example, a neural network learned to associate asthma with a lower risk of death from pneumonia.

This was because asthmatics with pneumonia are traditionally given more aggressive treatment that lowers their mortality risk compared to the overall population. However, if the outcome from such a neural network is used in hospital bed allocation, then those with asthma and admitted with pneumonia would be dangerously deprioritized.

Biases from algorithms can also result from complex societal feedback loops. For example, when predicting recidivism, authorities attempt to predict which people convicted of crimes are likely to commit crimes again. But the data used to train predictive algorithms is actually about who is likely to get re-arrested.

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Racial bias in algorithms is an ongoing problem.

The Biden administration’s recent executive order and enforcement efforts by federal agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission are the first steps in recognizing and safeguarding against algorithmic harms.

And though large language models, such as GPT-3 that powers ChatGPT, and multimodal large language models, such as GPT-4, are steps on the road toward artificial general intelligence, they are also algorithms people are increasingly using in school, work and daily life. It’s important to consider the biases that result from widespread use of large language models.

For example, these models could exhibit biases resulting from negative stereotyping involving gender, race or religion, as well as biases in representation of minorities and disabled people.

As these models demonstrate the ability to outperform humans on tests such as the bar exam, I believe that they require greater scrutiny to ensure that AI-augmented work conforms to standards of transparency, accuracy and source crediting, and that stakeholders have the authority to enforce such standards.

Ultimately, who wins and loses from large-scale deployment of AI may not be about rogue superintelligence, but about understanding who is vulnerable when algorithmic decision-making is ubiquitous.

Anjana Susarla is Professor of Information Systems, Michigan State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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How much is Australia profiting from the Gaza war?

Australia’s defense export program has recently come under scrutiny for its lack of transparency – particularly in relation to whether approved export permits are providing material support to Israel’s war against Hamas.

The UN special rapporteur on the Palestinian Territories has criticized the government’s lack of transparency, as have academics and politicians.

They contend the government should be publicly divulging the details of the military export permits it approves. Currently, this is not done.

To compel the government to release information about recent exports, a group of human rights organizations recently filed an application in the Federal Court. The aim: to gain access to permits for exporting defense equipment to Israel since its military operation began in early October.

Only limited details about the Department of Defense’s approved exports are routinely published.

Specific details about which manufacturers receive the permits and the nature of the exported goods, however, are not provided publicly, even when they are requested through the Freedom of Information Act. The government often cites confidentiality or the protection of business information as reasons for rejecting the requests.

Reporting provided to international bodies is also limited. For instance, Australia typically only provides the general class of equipment being exported by country for publication on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This information only relates to broad types of conventional weapons or components for weapons of mass destruction.

Some information does get released during Senate Estimates hearings. A hearing in October, for instance, revealed the government had approved 350 defense export permits to Israel in the last five years, including 50 this year. However, it did not detail what those exports were.

Australia’s international obligations

Australia is obliged to prevent the export of goods that can be used either for unlawful conduct during armed conflicts or human rights violations.

Some of these obligations come from specific treaties, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, which set out the exact requirements for exporting some types of defense items. Others come from Australia’s responsibility as a sovereign state not to contribute to another country breaching international law.

These obligations cover various things, including:

  • what specific items Australia can export, and
  • to whom it can sell military goods or “dual-use” items (meaning they have a civilian function but could also be used in military operations).

For instance, there are laws that limit exports to entities that are the subject of international sanctions, or if an entity has committed (or is suspected of committing) human rights abuses or war crimes when using the exported items.

In addition, there are separate lists of prohibited items (such as those that could be used in weapons of mass destruction), and particular types of weapons (such as chemical or biological) which are banned under other treaties.

Australia also has obligations to ensure it respects the laws of armed conflict by not actively contributing to another country breaching the laws of war under the Geneva Conventions and its protocols.

This means if another country is involved in a conflict and is observed to be systematically breaching the laws of war, Australia cannot lawfully provide material support to them.

Australia has a specific list of items called the Defense Strategic Goods List. Permits are required to allow for the export, import and distribution of goods on this list. There are also controls over the specific skills and knowledge related to making and using such items.

The list is broad – it includes everything from conventional weapons and components (like tanks or weapon sights) to dual-use objects (such as certain types of lasers or chemicals that could be weaponized).

Australia’s arms exports lack transparency. Photo: Twitter screengrab

To export an item on the list, approval is required by the minister of defense or their delegate. Among the things they have to consider are whether the goods would risk being used against Australia’s international legal obligations or to “commit or facilitate serious abuses of human rights.”

The law does not outline how much weight is put on each criterion or what kind of information is necessary to support this decision-making process.

As it stands, the main method to test this process is through Freedom of Information Act requests, which have been shown to have limited success, or through parliamentary processes, such as Senate Estimates.

The other option is to discover the information through a court case, as the application filed this month is attempting to do.

Arms control scrutiny

In Europe, arms controls are generally subject to greater public scrutiny.

The United States also publishes more information about its exports. Canada has recently implemented a process of publicly reporting the reasons that export permits are declined.

In the United Kingdom, a group filed a similar court case to the Australian one, seeking information on weapons exports to Saudi Arabia. This case ultimately failed in June.

However, it compelled the UK government to clarify its decision-making criteria regarding alleged human rights abuses and to publish more information about its weapons export decisions.

The legislation that controls the permit system is currently undergoing a required five-year review. However, the government has yet to implement the recommendations it agreed to following the 2018 review.

There has also been little public information about the progress of the updates agreed to from the last review, or what has changed so far.

Another bill was recently introduced to make some changes to these laws. However, this focused on tightening existing controls and easing restrictions with two key allies – the US and UK – to facilitate the AUKUS agreement. The lack of public transparency about export controls remains.

In light of the current geopolitical situation, Australia could demonstrate its commitment to its international legal obligations by making some additional adjustments. For example, it could allow outside parties to make submissions on weapons export permits or routinely publish more details of its approved permits.

Transparency in export controls is considered best practice by many other countries, and Australia can easily do more to align itself to this.

Lauren Sanders is Senior Research Fellow on Law and the Future of War, The University of Queensland

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Global markets eye BOJ response as inflation quickens

Japan’s economic landscape is undergoing a subtle shift as core consumer price growth picked up slightly in October, following a brief easing the previous month. 

The countrywide core Consumer Price Index (CPI), which excludes volatile fresh food costs, rose 2.9% year on year in October, government reveals, compared with the 3% expected by economists in a Reuters poll.

Core inflation had slowed to 2.8% in September from 3.1% in August, the first time it was below 3% since August 2022.

This fresh data published on Friday have sparked debate among domestic and international investors about the potential for the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to reconsider its monetary stimulus measures. 

A potential rollback of such policies could send ripples through global markets, impacting various asset classes and reshaping investor sentiment.

The most immediate impact of a BOJ monetary stimulus pullback would likely be felt in currency markets. 

Historically, changes in the BOJ’s policy stance have influenced the value of the Japanese yen. 

A reduction in monetary stimulus might result in a stronger yen, affecting Japan’s export competitiveness. Also, other major currencies, such as the US dollar, would likely experience fluctuations as global investors reassess their currency allocations in response to a strengthening yen.

Equity markets, both in Japan and globally, would react too to the prospect of a BOJ stimulus policy shift. 

Sectors sensitive to interest rates, such as financials and utilities, could experience volatility as investors reassess the impact of changing monetary conditions on corporate earnings. Conversely, export-oriented sectors in Japan may face headwinds due to a potentially stronger yen affecting international competitiveness.

Changes in monetary policy in Japan would also influence commodities and real assets. As investors seek inflation hedges, commodities like precious metals could be expected to experience heightened demand. 

In addition, real assets such as real estate and infrastructure could see increased attention as investors pivot toward tangible assets in response to evolving economic conditions.

In broader terms, the prospect of the BOJ rolling back monetary stimulus introduces an element of uncertainty into global markets, which could potentially impact risk sentiment. 

Investors may reassess their risk exposure, leading to shifts in allocations between risk-on and risk-off assets. Market volatility could increase as participants adjust their investment mix due to changing expectations for Japan’s economic trajectory.

One thing is for sure: The consequences of a BOJ stimulus shift extend well beyond Japan’s borders, making it a focal point for investors worldwide.

Nigel Green is founder and CEO of deVere Group. Follow him on Twitter @nigeljgreen.

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