Still too early for Australia to dump Trump – Asia Times

Since taking office only two months ago, US President Donald Trump has appeared to have instantly altered America’s most dependable ties to European nations. But do we interpret the signals incorrectly?

He has suggested that the US may no longer honor its commitment to protect NATO allies that aren’t adhering to the bloc’s recommendation of spending at least 2 % of their gross domestic product ( GDP ) on defense spending, in addition to pressuring Ukraine to secure a deal to end the war.

These difficult strategies have produced some success. As Trump has urged, the EU has pledged to spend more than 2 %. And his abrupt posts regarding Ukraine have all been reversed. The debate over what this means for NATO is still ongoing, but Trump’s creativity in this next word should not be underestimated.

A senior Pentagon official is now asking Australia to increase its defense spending from 2 % to 3 % of GDP.

https://twitter.com/DefenceConnect/status/1898921759706878121?ref_src=twsrc^tfw|twcamp^tweetembed|twterm^1898921759706878121|twgr^52683ca734bba28b24df70e60eb1e46e67b8417f|twcon^s1_c10&ref_url=https://theconversation.com/cooler-heads-must-prevail-with-trump-australia-shouldnt-give-up-on-the-special-friendship-252012

No countries have been free from Trump’s tariffs, even though this accounts for a small portion of its productivity and international trade. Australia may be wise to avoid doing but, despite the fact that various nations have already decided to punish.

Does Canberra be concerned about Trump’s commitment to the wider US-Australia alliance, though?

Over Trump, personal interactions should be avoided. There is no real reason to worry about a possible alliance breakdown. A Trump uprising is unlikely because of the US and Australia’s numerous powerful, enduring, and overlapping passions.

mutually beneficial, strong relationships

Trump’s subsequent actions have stoked out loud among those who are inclined to criticize the US empire and the AUKUS agreement. Former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull has specifically warned that American officials are a” conga line of toadies” paying tribute to Trump and not being more open about their censure of his plan selections.

Others have argued that” the special connection is over” and called for a significantly more independent American foreign and defense coverage. This is excessive and ineffective.

https://twitter.com/TurnbullMalcolm/status/1899382563602661452?ref_src=twsrc^tfw|twcamp^tweetembed|twterm^1899382563602661452|twgr^52683ca734bba28b24df70e60eb1e46e67b8417f|twcon^s1_c10&ref_url=https://theconversation.com/cooler-heads-must-prevail-with-trump-australia-shouldnt-give-up-on-the-special-friendship-252012

Turnbull allegedly wants opposition head Peter Dutton and prime minister Anthony Albanese to deceive him into acting in a more aggressive way against Trump. But how would that be helpful for a person who obviously enjoys escalating conflicts?

There is a distinct have to balance Australia’s national interests with personal considerations and weigh national interests with fervor.

For its stability and well-being, Australia has a significant investment in the United States. Australia will spend A$ 368 billion ( US$ 232 billion ) on nuclear-powered submarines in the upcoming decades as a result of the AUKUS agreement alone.

Australia also has a significant investment in British security technology in the fields of space, space, air, land, and cyberspace. Australia invests more than$ 1 trillion annually in the US, making it by far its biggest investment destination abroad.

In order to strengthen US security ties in the Indo-Pacific area, the US has a demonstrated interest in expanding its presence there, which could actually enhance friendly relations between the two countries. And as security analyst Des Ball once said, Australia is a” ideal piece of real estate” to handle this increased existence.

Australia now has shared submersible facilities close to Perth, US Marine Corps services in Darwin, and shared intelligence services at Pine Gap. Soon, American B-52 aircraft will also be able to fly over Tindal Air Base with taxpayer-funded updates.

Washington is likewise greatly invested in Australia. By far the largest foreign direct investment in Australia, the US even has a business surplus with Australia.

A battle aircraft from the US Marine Corps flying over Darwin in 2022. US Department of Defense/Supplied picture

boosting local cooperation

However, Australia needs to improve its security spending because so much is changing.

Australia’s store force is no longer match for purpose, organized as it was for the geopolitical time, when one power dominated the world ( its ally, the US), was once. It needs to work fast and fast. A program promoting community and regional support would be beneficial.

However, the arguments most of the time being made by critics are consistent with some of those in the 2017 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper, which was released shortly after Trump took office. This is” Australia’s Plan B,” in my opinion. It did not criticize the US empire, but instead sought to reduce the risks posed by a more interpersonal and less predictable US authority.

However, more can be done. Australia may also seem to strengthen its political, security, and economic ties with local allies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Australia should instead of cutting back on its support to the area and provide better choices to Pacific partners, such as a “grand small” with Pacific Island states or even a Pacific union.

Additionally, additional safety and development cooperation is required with countries like Japan, India, and South Korea.

However, we may refrain from making honest commitments to a land war in Asia or Europe. The distraction of the remote, US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has just recently slowed down local defense relations.

Yes, we need to work up. Let’s face it, though, that as a part of a security power for Ukraine, we won’t be able to significantly affect things on the ground. It’s best to use outside resources to support Ukraine and to continue to focus on strengthening local relationships.

The threat of reacting too quickly

On the other hand, some people wonder if the US can still be used to plan for local long-term defense and security.

I think we are in danger of overreacting given the initial steps of a president that is eying out important adjustments. We are currently in the midst of a surprise rather than the clouds falling in.

It’s not quite, really. However, we may wait until the dust settles.

Trump’s tax threats to Canada have caused an extraordinary gap between the two neighbors.  Photo: Frank Augstein / AP via The Talk

We should also acknowledge that American influence on US conduct has limits. We have a history of being a center energy without making any big-power claims. Let’s not get ahead of ourselves in words of what this means for our connection with Washington, though we can certainly do more to defend our rights.

Trump clearly sees the world as “multipolar,” meaning a one-power universe, including the US, China, and Russia.

Evaluations between Trump’s relations with Vladimir Putin and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s military relations with Joseph Stalin are flattering to the US leader, but they aren’t as unbelievable as some critics would make out.

They show a hyper-realist and interpersonal conception of foreign policy, where, according to Thucydides,” the sturdy do what they can and the poor suffer what they must.”

While Trump makes strides in this area of foreign relationships, it is important to keep in mind how invested both the US and Australia are in one another.

The US is a national, cosmopolitan, English-speaking, New World, common law, free market, bicameral, constitutional, and generally also liberal democracy, just like Australia. Because of these ongoing overlaps, we continue to discuss” shared principles.” And these combines have influenced the interests of these two nations for generations.

The US needs Australia more than it needs Europe, according to Trump’s fresh, interpersonal and multilateral view. ( Despite Trump’s harsh words for Europe, it should be noted that the US still has more than 100, 000 US military personnel there. )

Australia’s special geography and shared past matter in the long run because they help it keep its main rival, China, from dominating East Asia and the Pacific.

Both the American public and the American government have a long history of interest. So, Australia will continue to be a Pacific lover. The best course of action is to prevent the onset of another battle in the Pacific through the deterrent effect of this unity.

The Australian National University’s Strategic and Defense Studies Centre is led by John Blaxland, doctor.

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

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China is trying to kneecap Indian manufacturing – Asia Times

The United States is working hard to stifle its position in the world market under President Donald Trump. But in the rest of the world, globalization is still proceeding steadily.

When you said “globalization” in the 2000s and the early 2010s, it was frequently simply meant “moving manufacturing to China,” but that’s now pretty much over. Inbound foreign direct investment has dropped off a cliff, and businesses are now trying to pull their cash out. Blame a combination of rising labour costs, the closing off of the Chinese domestic market, and “de-risking” over fears of battle.

However, this doesn’t think China will just shut itself off from the rest of the world and vanish. Far from it. China will change from being a&nbsp, destination&nbsp, for strong funding to being a&nbsp, source&nbsp, of funding. A whole bunch of Chinese companies are going to build factories ( and offices ) in other countries.

In reality, this is already taking place in a significant manner. Kyle Chan ( whose website I highly recommend, by the way ) has a really excellent article about this trend.

He states:

Chinese firms are racing to develop companies around the world and build new global supply chains, driven by a desire to avoid taxes and safe access to marketplaces.

Chinese businesses have been setting up factories in big target markets like the EU and Brazil. And they’ve been building flowers in” cable countries” like Mexico and Vietnam that offer access to developed industry through trade agreements. &nbsp,

Morocco, for instance, has emerged as a surprisingly common destination…due to its trade agreements with both the US and the EU…Countries across the developed world and the Global South everywhere are keen for Chinese firms to build businesses in their industry, with the promise of new tasks and new technologies.

Kyle’s excellent map demonstrates how global this boom in investment is:

Source: &nbsp, Kyle Chan

This boom in overall numbers may seem a little unintuitive. As Rhodium Group reports, a large portion of China’s official&nbsp, completed&nbsp, outbound investment is actually “phantom FDI” — Chinese companies keeping their earnings outside of China by pretending to do FDI. And when you look at FDI&nbsp and announcements, the total is still significantly below what it was in the middle of 2010:

Source: &nbsp, Rhodium Group

However, this overall decline obscures a significant shift in how much FDI China is doing, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Up until the pandemic, China’s foreign investment was focused more on acquiring foreign companies, usually in developed countries — basically, Chinese companies bought American/European/Japanese/Korean companies so that they could A) get their technology, and B) use them as local beachheads to sell stuff to rich consumers. The mid-2010s saw a significant boom.

Since 2022, however, China’s focus has shifted dramatically to “greenfield” investment — Chinese companies are building their own offices and factories overseas:

Source: &nbsp, Rhodium Group

The auto and energy sectors account for the majority of this new wave of greenfield FDI:

Source: &nbsp, Rhodium Group

Basically, the Chinese auto and battery industries are going global. In addition to his post, Kyle has written in a fantastic thread about the plans to expand BYD, China’s flagship automaker, and its most notable business.

Greenfield FDI is in many ways more of a boon to the receiving country than M&amp, A, when you build new factories and offices in a country, it creates new jobs, and often transfers new technologies, instead of just changing the ownership of an existing business. And unlike M&amp, A, greenfield FDA frequently targets developing nations because it’s typically at least partially concerned with lowering costs.

So it makes sense for developing countries around the world to be a lot more excited about the flood of Chinese investment now than back in 2016. Additionally, we should anticipate that this wave will be more resilient than the previous one because it is driven by Chinese costs and by mature Chinese businesses with long-term interests in foreign markets.

Generally speaking, &nbsp, this is how economic development is supposed to work. As economies become more expensive, countries are forced to shift production to less expensive locations. China was the cheap place to make stuff 20 years ago, now, it’s places like Vietnam, Indonesia and Morocco. Manufacturing companies frequently fly from one country to another, helping each one to become industrialized along the way like a flock of geese.

Also, it’s easier to sell products in a country if you also produce those things inside that country — transport costs are lower, you can get a better understanding of the local market, and you can more quickly respond to local changes in demand, policy, and so on. Additionally, there are currently a number of tariffs to take into account; if those products are made in Europe, they will be much friendlier to Chinese companies.

So we should generally view China’s outbound investment boom as a great thing for the world. It is assisting in industrializing developing nations like Morocco and Indonesia, as well as diversifying and modernizing the economies of middle-income nations like Brazil, Turkey, Mexico, and Thailand. Chinese-led globalization is looking like a positive alternative to America’s bizarre, ideologically-motivated retreat from the world economy.

However, there are indications that China will no longer be as welcoming and helpful as it was in the 1990s and 2000s. Kyle reports that China is trying to isolate the world’s biggest and most important developing country from its new economic world order:

Beijing is trying to influence the Chinese industry’s global expansion, including which nations they invest in and how. Beijing is encouraging Chinese companies to build plants in “friendly” countries while discouraging them from investing in others in a kind of “industrial diplomacy” .…India represents the most striking case of Beijing’s effort to shape the international behavior of Chinese firms …]A ] cross a number of industries, Beijing seems to be discouraging Chinese firms making future plans to invest in India while also limiting the flow of workers and equipment …

Beijing appears to be restricting the flow of Chinese equipment and workers to India, which would otherwise restrict Apple’s manufacturing partner Foxconn from&nbsp. Some of Foxconn’s Chinese workers in India were even told to return to China. This informal Chinese ban covers businesses that work in India, as well as other electronics manufacturers. Beijing has warned Chinese automakers to avoid investing in India.

Why is China doing this? According to Kyle, one possible cause is geopolitical spite, and China appears to be restricting investment into the Philippines, which it has a territorial dispute with. China also has a border dispute with India. And to be fair, not all of the chit is from China; some Chinese leaders have also blocked Chinese investments.

But it’s fairly obvious there’s something more strategic going on here — China doesn’t want to build up the manufacturing capabilities of its biggest potential rival.

India is now the most populous nation in the world, having overtaken China a few years ago. Its GDP is growing faster — it grew 6.5 % in 2024 and 9.2 % in 2023, significantly faster than China. And as the Wall Street Journal reported back in 2023, it’s been making a push to become a global manufacturing hub, much like China did in the 2000s:

Western companies are desperately looking for a backup to China as the world’s factory floor, a strategy widely termed” China plus one” .…India is making a concerted push to be the plus one…Only India has a labor force and an internal market comparable in size to China ‘s…Western governments see democratic India as a natural partner, and the Indian government has pushed to make the business environment more friendly than in the past …] India ] scored a coup with the decision by&nbsp, Apple&nbsp, to significantly&nbsp, expand iPhone production in India, including&nbsp, expediting the manufacturing&nbsp, of its most advanced model …

After decades of disappointment, [ India ] is making progress. Its manufactured exports were barely a tenth of China’s in 2021, but they exceeded all other emerging markets except Mexico’s and Vietnam ‘s…The biggest gains have been in electronics, where exports have tripled since 2018 to$ 23 billion… India has gone from making 9 % of the world’s smartphone handsets in 2016 to a projected 19 % this year…

Foreign direct investment into India increased by$ 42 billion annually between 2020 and 2022, which is doubling in less than a decade.

India’s electronics sector has &nbsp, especially taken off, helped by specific government incentives and by Apple’s decision to locate much of its production in the country.

India’s manufacturing sector is still hindered by some poorly designed policies, particularly those that impose tariffs on imported components, which make it difficult for India to carry out the kind of assembly work that helped China expand in the 2000s.

But the country’s infrastructure has improved by leaps and bounds, and the government has made some progress in reducing red tape. The government should increase that momentum by easing the burdensome regulations even further, promoting education and labor mobility, and shifting from protectionism to export promotion.

But the most important reason companies want to make things in India isn’t low labor costs — it’s the lure of the company’s domestic market. Establishing factories in India means opening a door to 1.5 billion people with rapid income growth.

Remember, &nbsp, scale matters in manufacturing. The lower your costs go, the more units you can ship, and the more competitive you become. It’s going to be a while before Indians can all afford the latest and best electronics and cars and appliances, but soon they’ll be able to afford unbelievably huge numbers of the pretty-good stuff. Any business that capitalizes on that demand won’t just generate tons of revenue; it’ll also lower its costs.

And unlike China, India probably won’t force out multinational companies once it has &nbsp, strip-mined them&nbsp, for their technological secrets. India offers a unique opportunity to expand its market that China has never had. Of&nbsp, course, &nbsp, companies want to put their factories there, just as soon as government policy makes it feasible to do so.

At first, multinational corporations will export their best technology to India, focusing solely on low-quality assembly work. But as Indian manufacturers master those simple tasks, they will start to climb the value chain, learning how to do more complex processes and make higher-value goods. When that happens, multinational companies will have a better sense of why they should invest in higher-tech projects in India.

Eventually the Indian companies themselves will get so good that they’ll be able to create their own brands, start doing R&amp, D for themselves, and compete on the global stage, using the advantages of scale that they get from knowing their home market better than anyone else.

This implies that multinational corporations are naturally inclined to train their future rivals. Nowhere was this effect more powerful than in China, where European, American, Japanese and Korean companies offshored production to China in the 1990s and 2000s, then found themselves competing with Chinese companies in the 2010s. Many Americans now consider that allowing this to happen was a grave tactical error.

China’s leaders probably concur with that assessment, and are determined not to make a similar error with respect to India. To take advantage of India’s cheaper labor and sizable domestic market, it would be less expensive for BYD, CATL, or Chinese electronics companies to relocate their factories to India.

But in the long run, that could risk speeding up the technological development of Indian rivals to Chinese manufacturers, as well as making India itself rich enough to challenge China on the world stage.

People in China are, undoubtedly, considering this possibility. In&nbsp, a great article&nbsp, back in 2023, Viola Zhou and Nilesh Christopher wrote about how Chinese engineers working at plants in India felt like they were training their own replacements:

Chinese engineers occasionally discussed how they were working to make their own jobs obsolete, according to Li. One day, Indians might become so adept at creating iPhones that Apple and other global brands could not operate without Chinese workers.

Three managers said some Chinese employees aren’t willing teachers because they see their Indian colleagues as competition. However, Li asserted that progress was unavoidable. ” If we didn’t come here, someone else would”, he said. This is the turning point of history. No one will be able to stop it”.

This was undoubtedly the experience of Korean and German engineers working in China in 2007 or 2012

But it’s not just that Indian&nbsp, companies&nbsp, might one day compete with Chinese ones. India and China will be the most powerful in a world where economic development is largely evenly distributed because they have by far the largest populations in the world.

So if China wants to stay much more powerful than India, it has an incentive to make sure that economic development is not evenly distributed — that the new wave of globalization skips India entirely.

China’s leaders are likely to envision a new global economy with lower-quality assembly jobs in other nations, low-income manufacturing, and a service-dependent backwater like India.

India, of course, doesn’t want this, and it has some powerful natural allies. Other highly developed nations, such as Germany, Japan, Korea, France, and others, want to stop China from establishing a future in which they will dominate the world. The best way to do that is to invest in India.

Of course, the US ought to be India’s most significant and valuable ally in this conflict. A rational and reasonable US would be trying to encourage as much investment as possible in India, and to boost India’s technological capabilities and income level as fast as possible.

However, the days of the US acting rationally and justly are over, at least for the moment. America has retreated from the world, engaged in internal struggles, and shattered by its own bizarre ideology.

So India needs to focus on partnering with the world’s other developed countries — with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Canada and the nations of Europe. It needs to maintain cordial and friendly relations with these nations, ratify free trade agreements, lower or eliminate tariffs on imported goods, expand business-friendly policies, encourage more inbound FDI, and generally integrate itself into a global bloc that includes every wealthy nation that opposes China’s rule over the world economy.

The withdrawal of the US will create headaches for India, as will China’s determination to keep Indian manufacturing down. However, India still has a lot of places where it can invest in technology and technology. And in the long run, its natural advantages will allow it to industrialize and grow rich, regardless of the forces arrayed against it.

This article was originally published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack, and it is now republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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China needs a consumer revolution to hit growth goal – Asia Times

China ’s National People’s Congress extravaganza was a fine news-bad news event for international buyers.

Great, in that Xi Jinping’s Communist Party reassured the finance world that China plans to get very micro to mend its micro problems. Poor, in that Xi’s crew really needs to deliver on its plan commitments, lest China loses yet more reliability with international investors.

On the inside, the NPC prioritized reinvigorating personal businesses, level playing fields and shrinking the part of state enterprises for growth and employment. It also vowed to move past the governmental reprisals, including on technology, that originally sent buyers for the exits.

Team Xi sent a “message to entrepreneurs, but also to local governments and regulators, that the private sector ’s important and it ’s necessary, ” says economist Neil Thomas at the Asia Society Policy Institute.

More cheerful announcement came on Friday when finance, banking, central banks and other officials announced they plan to hold a March 17 press conference to describe measures to improve consumption, a signal that sent the CSI 300 Index to its highest level so far this year.

That’s the sub. On the mega, Xi’s government has often proved more skilled at talking the talk than walking the walk on the type of architectural changes many investors crave. Very often, Xi’s reform staff has overpromised and underdelivered.

Premier Li Qiang detailed the government’s fresh policy priorities in the group ’s monthly work record. Li said the latest Enemy “underscores our commitment to meet challenges head-on and wish hard to deliver. ”

Those difficulties include Donald Trump’s escalating trade war, which is imperiling China ’s ability to export its way to 5 % GDP growth, the NPC’s stated target for 2025. So far, Trump has imposed 20 % tariffs on Chinese products; he threatened to hit a 60 % cover charge while on the campaign trail.

Adding more industrial capacity to increase exports will likely experience diminishing returns as developing nations — especially Global South nations — began throwing up their own tariffs and trade barriers on cheap Chinese goods.

“The more intense the trade war, the more aggressively Beijing will add stimulus, ” says Thomas at Asia Society. “Nonetheless, debt concerns will likely deter a stimulus ‘bazooka, ’ and direct consumer stimulus remains unlikely due to ideological opposition and implementation hurdles. ”

One new measure is an expanded US$ 41 billion trade-in program for consumers and businesses involving autos, household appliances and business equipment. China will also roll out additional subsidies for new smartphones, home renovations and healthcare costs.

Beijing plans to issue an additional 4. 4 trillion yuan in local government special-purpose bonds. The debt will finance new infrastructure, purchases of land and unsold housing, and bring government contractors up to date on overdue payments.

Officials also will issue 1. 3 trillion yuan worth of ultralong special treasury bonds to support national security projects and 500 billion yuan in special sovereign bonds to recapitalize state-owned banks.

“It’s unclear how much of a jolt this budget will provide to underlying domestic demand and reflation efforts, despite the sizable rise in the deficit, ” says Jeremy Zook, top China analyst for Fitch Ratings.

China, Li said, will “move faster ” to stimulate domestic demand, policies and measures that may be more clearly articulated at the anticipated March 17 press conference. Significantly, Li said the government plans to make domestic demand the “main engine ” of growth.

If so, that will mean tackling near-record youth unemployment, shortfalls in social benefits and welfare, extreme market volatility, a property sector in crisis and households that reflexively save much more than they spend.

Herein lies the rub, though. China must drastically pick up the pace of reform just as Trump’s tariffs begin to slam global growth prospects. Weathering the storm will require bold steps to increase competitiveness and support the nation’s fast-rising tech sector.

As Morgan Stanley economist Robin Xing notes, China ’s “policy focus is to accelerate AI adoption and autonomous driving, while making gradual progress in restructuring housing and [local government financing vehicle ] debt. ”

Yet, it remains to be seen how quickly AI might boost total factor productivity and overall competitiveness. Until then, Xi can hope his 1. 4 billion people snap to attention and start spending despite the persistent lack of social safety nets to boost household confidence.

“The daily problems facing China ’s citizenry have become severe enough that the government was forced to acknowledge them before the NPC, ” says economist Jeremy Mark at the Atlantic Council. It’s “no small admission for a communist party whose propagandists normally offer a steady diet of hubris. ”

Mack says that Li’s reference to “weak public expectations” in his work report and the decision to spotlight the importance of consumption, “were a bow to public opinion in a country where the public normally has no way of expressing itself. ”

However, Mack adds, “Xi clearly remains deeply committed to his core economic policies — a point underlined on the eve of the NPC with the publication of a speech he delivered in December. While also acknowledging ‘consumption shortcomings, ’ he made clear that the highest priority must remain more world-class enterprises and leading technologies. ”

Xi’s speech, Mack adds, “also insisted that the government’s response to China ’s economic problems had already ‘boosted the property market, stock market, market expectations, and social confidence, ’ suggesting that China ’s paramount leader is skeptical about opening the taps too much for those struggling to make ends meet. ”

This buttresses the argument that Xi is prioritizing structural upgrades over tossing money at China ’s problems.

Carlos Casanova, senior Asia economist at Union Bancaire Privee, says that achieving the 5 % growth target for 2025 presents significant challenges. Beijing acknowledges that the previous year’s target was met thanks to outsized stimulus policy actions agreed by the Politburo on September 26.

“Absent this policy pivot, growth would have been slower, ” Casanova says. “Moreover, exports accounted for one-third of GDP growth in 2024, following a rebound ahead of expected US tariffs in the fourth quarter. Without similar drivers, the government will need to focus on enhancing domestic demand to address the growth gap. ”

To Casanova’s mind, the announcements made during the NPC “did n’t provide enough visibility on this front. ” Nor did Xi and Li offer a credible path out of the deflationary rut into which China threatens to fall.

Despite Beijing’s fiscal support efforts, says Capital Economics analyst Julian Evans-Pritchard, “the degree of easing is more modest than it might appear. ”

As such, he adds, “we remain skeptical that it will be sufficient to prevent growth from slowing this year, especially given the headwinds on the external front and the lack of a more pronounced shift in government spending towards support consumption. ”

The hope, though, is that Xi’s party steps up efforts to make good on the pledges he made last November. That’s when he told a ballroom full of top CEOs that China is again open for business – and ready to work with the US. “China is willing to be a partner and friend of the United States, ” Xi told an audience that included Apple CEO Tim Cook and Tesla CEO Elon Musk.

“If we regard each other as the biggest rival, the most significant geopolitical challenge and an ever-pressing threat, it will inevitably lead to wrong policies, wrong actions and wrong results, ” Xi said. He added that “no matter how the global landscape evolves, the historical trend of peaceful coexistence between China and the United States will not change. ”

Two months later in Davos, Li said “choosing investment in the Chinese market is not a risk, but an opportunity. ” Li stressed that “investing in China will bring huge returns and a better future ” and described the CEOs on hand as “participants, witnesses and beneficiaries of China ’s reform and opening up. ”

China, Li added, “stands ready to seriously look into and solve the difficulties and problems encountered by foreign enterprises ” operating in the country. “We will take active steps to address reasonable concerns of the global business community, ” Li said.

In the years since the market chaos of 2015, China opened equity markets ever wider to overseas investors, steadily increasing quotas for foreign funds. Beijing did the same with government bonds, which have since been added to benchmarks like FTSE-Russell.

Yet access to exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen often outpaces reforms needed to prepare China Inc for global prime time. Those include increasing transparency, boosting corporate governance building reliable surveillance mechanisms like trusted, not co-opted, credit rating companies.
 
To be sure, China has often succeeded by using its own playbook. Back in 1997-98, when developing Asia crashed, China opted against devaluing the yuan. Several times since the late 1990s, traders and analysts have predicted a credit-and-debt-fueled crash. Speculators pounced. Each time, China confounded the naysayers.

Whether China can beat the odds again depends on Xi’s ability to earn investors ’ trust. As the Chinese stock rout that erased over$ 1 trillion in valuation reminded in recent years, there are certain laws of gravity that still apply to economies transitioning from state-driven and export-led growth to services, innovation and domestic consumption.
 
It’s great that Xi and Li say they’re doubling down on moves to build a more stable economic system. But investors will require more than talk to bet big on China ’s trajectory in 2025.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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US, China and Japan racing for the super-battleship lead – Asia Times

In a culture similar to the Anglo-German marine formation before World War I, the US, Japan and China are gearing up to build big, heavily armed weapon warships for a possible climactic battle at water.

Cruisers usually are the largest, most strongly armed non-carrier significant surface combatants, significantly larger and heavier than warships or frigates. They can serve as a flagship for surface action groups ( SAG ) or as a command center for fleet air defense.

While only the US and Russia currently operate ships fully classed as ships, some ships actually classed as warships have identical sizes and capabilities.

This month, Naval News reported that US defense contractor Lockheed Martin showcased a model of Japan’s advanced AEGIS System Equipped Vessel ( ASEV ) at the IDEX in Abu Dhabi.

Set to become the country’s largest stealth-guided weapon warship outside the US Zumwalt course, Japan’s ASEV may significantly improve its ballistic missile protection capabilities.

At 190 meters and over 14, 000 tons, ASEV surpasses China’s Type 055 destroyer ( classed as a cruiser by NATO ) on many measures with AN/SPY-7 AESA radar, 128 vertical launch system (VLS ) cells, Glide Phase Interceptors ( GPI ) for hypersonic threats and Tomahawk missiles.

As regional tensions rise, supply is expected by 2028, underscoring Japan’s corporate transition from land-based techniques to counter China and North Korea’s evolving challenges.

As with Japan’s ASEVs, the US Navy’s DDG ( X ) advanced guided-missile destroyer program is progressing in the concept design phase, The War Zone reported in January 2025.

The DDG ( X ) is envisioned to replace the US Navy’s aging Ticonderoga-class cruisers, which are increasingly uneconomical to maintain with their limited combat value, and the maxed-out Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, which lack space for future upgrades.

Rear Admiral Bill Daly recently emphasized a” clean-sheet imperative”, highlighting a 40-megawatt reserve power capacity for directed-energy weapons and advanced sensors supported by Zumwalt-class-derived Integrated Power Systems ( IPS).

However, escalating costs pose challenges, initial estimates of US$ 3.3 billion per ship may rise to$ 4.4 billion, delaying production until at least 2034. Despite strategies for 28 vessels, manufacturing disruptions could destroy the US Navy’s proper preparation amid heightened tensions with China.

In contrast to Japan and the US, whose next-generation destroyers are still on the drawing board, China has initiated a second production batch of Type 055 cruisers, leveraging shipyards at Dalian and Jiangnan to add to its fleet of eight ships, the South China Morning Post (SCMP ) reported in February 2025.

SCMP notes that the class, costing$ 827.4 million for each ship, features cutting-edge stealth designs, advanced radar systems and a formidable arsenal, including 112 VLS cells capable of deploying surface-to-air, anti-ship and land-attack missiles. The SCMP report also says the class integrates hypersonic and anti-submarine weaponry, enhancing its multi-role capabilities.

China’s Type 055 cruiser is designed to escort aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships and serve as command hubs for diverse naval operations.

The buildup of large surface warships in the Pacific comes as regional navies are gearing up for high-end war-at-sea scenarios, acquiring assets with critical capabilities such as air, ballistic and cruise missile defense. Growing threat perceptions are driving increased requirements for VLS cells, as seen in Chinese, US and other regional force acquisitions.

However, accommodating large VLS arrays demands significant internal space and deck area. Deployment is further complicated by technical requirements for large, high-mounted radars that can detect sea-skimming threats early.

Illustrating these missile threats, the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) 2024 China Military Power Report says that China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force ( PLARF ) has an estimated 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBM ), 500 intermediate-range ballistic missiles ( IRBM ), 1, 300 medium-range ballistic missiles ( MRBM ), 900 short-range ballistic missiles ( SRBM ) and 400 ground-launched cruise missiles ( GLC M).

Additionally, Politico reported in February 2023 that North Korea may already have enough ICBMs to overwhelm US homeland missile defenses. During an evening parade in Pyongyang, North Korea showcased 10-12 Hwasong-17 ICBMs. Politico says that if North Korea fits four warheads on each ICBM, it could overwhelm the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense ( GMD) system, which has only 44 interceptors.

Johannes Fischbach mentions in a December 2024 International Institute for Strategic Studies ( IISS) article that China has significantly narrowed the firepower gap with the US Navy, achieving over 50 % of US VLS missile cell capacity.

According to Fischbach, the People’s Liberation Army Navy ( PLAN), the world’s largest navy, now fields approximately 4, 300 VLS cells across 84 surface combatants, compared to the US Navy’s 8, 400 cells on 85 ships.

He notes this progress stems from China’s accelerated shipbuilding, including for Type 055 cruisers and Type 052D destroyers. In contrast, he says the US faces declining VLS capacity due to retiring Ticonderoga-class cruisers and slower construction of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

This narrowing firepower gap could significantly impair US surface warfare capabilities if left unabated. In a March 2023 Center for International Maritime Security ( CIMSEC ) article, Dmitry Filipoff mentions that massed fires are central to distributed warfighting, enabling concentrated combat effects through coordinated missile salvos from dispersed units.

Filipoff says this approach maximizes lethality against advanced shipboard missile defenses, which require saturation by high-volume attacks to ensure effectiveness. He emphasizes the crucial role of ship-based fires, offering unmatched magazine depth and flexibility for sustained operations, as vessels can carry and launch significant missile loads.

While effective massed fires may require large, cruiser-size warships for magazine depth, US and allied shipbuilding capabilities are lagging behind China’s. In a February 2024 Proceedings article, Jeffrey Seavy mentions that China has 46.59 % of the global shipbuilding market, South Korea has 29.24 % and Japan has 17.25 %, with the US having an insignificant 0.13 % share.

Seavy says China’s massive shipbuilding lead over the US and its allies would give it considerable advantages in a sustained naval conflict. These advantages include potentially decisive numerical superiority, increased capacity for massed ship-based fires and the ability to repair or replace damaged or destroyed warships comparatively quickly.

In the Pacific’s escalating naval arms race, missile firepower and shipbuilding capacity—not just technology—could determine who wins and who loses future crucial sea battles.

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Trump’s tariffs and the illusion of de-globalization – Asia Times

Some analysts have interpreted Trump’s interventionist position, and the United States ‘ imposition of tariffs, as financially foolish.

If the democratic motto was again that” under completely business everyone wins”, it is now logical to think that, under protectionism, people will lose. It would also suggest the close of globalization, which had come at a great financial cost for the US.

In just the past few weeks, the US-Canada tax crisis has escalated significantly. The Ontario government responded to Trump’s threats with a 25 % tariff on electricity serving the states of Minnesota, New York and Michigan, prompting Trump to announce that he would raise tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminium to 50 %.

Soon after, Ontario authorities suspended the energy level climb, and Trump has now also walked up his hostile price hike.

Similar activities are taking place on the other side of the Atlantic as also, as the European Commission has responded to US tax risks on steel imports with its own package of actions targeting a range of American products.

Trump’s tale tilt has caused tumult, and seems to work contrary to US company objectives. But, a critical look at the benefits of free business – and the US ‘ unique position in relation to it – may help us understand the rise of protectionist conversation, and the US ‘ trade war with China.

Free business serves US objectives

Economic history shows that, when the US ‘ technological development outstripped its competitors, it was able to change completely trade into an instrument that protected its personal interests. At this point it, along with its allies, began to promote free trade as vital to the development of less advanced economies.

This resulted in globalization, which was what made it possible to manufacture goods in China at lower costs, thus keeping US wages and inflation in check and increasing the profits of US companies. As long as this remained the case, free trade with China served the interests of US companies and was therefore justifiable.

However, in recent years, China has shifted its economic strategy toward producing and exporting high-tech, value-added products ( as South Korea and Taiwan have also done ). Chinese-produced mobile phones, electric cars and artificial intelligence ( AI ) have subsequently conquered the US market.

The longer this shift goes on, the more useful and legitimate tariffs and protectionism become as a way to shield the economic interests of US businesses.

How far will the US go?

Protectionist rhetoric and trade wars were already trumpeted by the first Trump administration.

However, the KOF globalisation index– which measures the global connectivity, integration and interdependence of countries – showed the same value in 2021 as it did in 2017.

While the growth experienced since 1970 ground to a halt, the index’s indicators disprove any claim that globalization receded during Trump’s first term in office.

This second term may well be different because, according to some experts, the president has learned to bypass political counterweights, to surround himself with like-minded people, and to free himself from partisan ties in order to implement his own agenda.

Others, however, question the very existence of his own agenda beyond the interests of big business, because it is precisely this alignment of interests that allows him to:

  • Impose tariffs on developed countries, and on products competing for the same markets.
  • Make political use of tariffs to threaten other countries and secure access to vital resources for the technology race ( mainly due to the US ‘ position of being the world’s largest buyer and military power ).
  • Launch a new arms race that will boost the profits of US industry.
  • Use a nationalist and anti-globalization narrative to justify the growing precariousness of the US working class. He aims to unite US citizens behind the flag, dilute their class consciousness, and offer up new scapegoats in the form of immigrants.

In reality, Trump’s agenda is unlikely to be compatible with any meaningful de-globalization process. Reversing globalization would be contrary to the interests of US capital, which needs to expand – into both new territories and sectors – to ensure its own survival.

In light of all this, why would US multinationals want to stop making huge profits in other countries? What could lead them to give up producing in territories with lower production costs, cheaper labor and a guaranteed supply of raw materials?

The dollar’s ‘ exorbitant privilege ‘

According to IMF data, in the third quarter of 2024 the US dollar still accounted for more than 57 % of total international reserves, and more than 80 % of international trade financing.

When a country’s domestic currency acts as a reserve asset or is the currency in which most international payments are made, the financing of persistent current account deficits does not carry major risks of either devaluation or currency crisis. Every year since 1982, with the sole exception of 1991, the US current account balance has been negative.

These conditions for financing its debt – which Valéry Giscardd’Estaing, Charles de Gaulle’s Minister of Economy, defined in 1964 as an “exorbitant privilege” – improve even in times of crisis. The dollar’s status as a safe haven asset ( much like gold ) means that international demand for it actually increases in times of uncertainty.

So why would the US be in favour of shifting its trade balance, thereby renouncing the privilege of issuing the international reserve currency?

The great trilemma

In his 2012 book The Globalisation Paradox, Turkish economist Dani Rodrik puts forward his theory of the” trilemma”. This theory states that democracy and national sovereignty are fundamentally incompatible with globalization.

Only those who accept the existence of this trilemma, and understand the tensions that arise from it, can then begin to pick apart one of its components. This is where Trump seems to have the upper hand.

He is playing a game of illusions, one where he publicly pretends to dynamite globalization while, behind the scenes, he stealthily dismantles the pillars of democracy.

Juan Carlos Palacios Cívico is profesor Agregado en el área de Política Económica y Desarrollo, Universitat de Barcelona

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Pakistan may hit Afghanistan for Jaffar Express terror attack – Asia Times

Pakistan is reeling after this week ‘s&nbsp, hijacking&nbsp, of the Jaffar Express by the terrorist-designated Balochistan Liberation Army ( BLA ). It’s hard to individually confirm the details given strict condition censorship, but around 400 people were taken prisoner, including soldiers traveling home on leave.

The BLA&nbsp, demanded&nbsp, the discharge of what they described as democratic prisoners, but the military staged a brave function to stop the day-long suffering otherwise. At least two dozen people were killed.

The Baloch conflict&nbsp, owes its origins&nbsp, to Balochistan ‘s&nbsp, contentious incorporation&nbsp, into Pakistan but has evolved in recent years to take on shades of “resource nationalism”.

What’s meant by this is that some citizens believe that their resource-rich place, the largest in Pakistan at almost half the government’s size, isn’t receiving its fair share of success.

The BLA and its backers also accuse Pakistan of selling the place out to China, which has invested in the Gwadar interface and a large neglected airport. Pakistan denies these claims and has always blamed&nbsp, Afghanistan&nbsp, and India for the conflict.

It, therefore, wasn’t surprising when the Foreign Office’s spokesman&nbsp, said&nbsp, on Thursday that” India has been involved in terrorism in Pakistan. In the particular attack on Jaffar Express, the terrorists had been in contact with their handlers and ring leaders in Afghanistan”. It also said the “mastermind” of the attack is in Afghanistan, without elaborating.

On Thursday, the Taliban denied any involvement in the terror attack, with foreign ministry spokesman Abdul Qahar Balkhi saying Pakistan’s claims were “baseless allegations” and that it should concentrate on its own security and domestic issues rather than making” such irresponsible remarks”.

” No members of the Baloch opposition have a presence in Afghanistan nor have they ever had, nor have, any links with Islamic Emirate”, he wrote on X, referring to the Taliban government.

Also on Thursday, the Observer Research Foundation, an influential New Delhi-based think tank, assessed,” The Taliban appear to be giving space to the Baloch as it gives them a certain leverage over Pakistan”. It suggested the Pakistan army may” carry out a scorched earth steamroller operation in Balochistan” in response to the train attack.

While the Afghan dimension is likely true owing to the Taliban sheltering the BLA and its&nbsp, new de facto TTP allies, which the group considers to be a means of&nbsp, asymmetrically restoring the balance of power&nbsp, with Pakistan, the Indian angle is questionable.

Pakistan’s accusation against India is premised on their history of proxy warfare against one another over the decades, which makes it reasonable to suspect India of backing Baloch militants against Pakistan as response to Pakistan backing Kashmiri ones against India, among others.

There’s also Pakistan’s capture of&nbsp, Kulbhushan Jadhav&nbsp, in 2016, who Islamabad accused of being an Indian spy tasked with organizing terrorist attacks in Balochistan, while India has always insisted that he’s innocent of these charges.

Taken together, they form the cornerstone upon which Pakistan’s Foreign Office put forth its latest accusation, but it’s bereft of proof and instead comes off as a deflection from the conflict’s indigenous causes.

After all, the BLA is known to receive sanctuary in Afghanistan. Even if the Taliban pleads ignorance and claims that it can’t control all of its borders, which some would argue isn’t true, then that’s also a problem for the fracturing regime.

Whichever way one looks at it, the Indian angle is therefore questionable, but Pakistan pushing it is meant to accomplish three goals.

First, it’s intended to rally Pakistanis behind the government by blaming their historical rival for this latest terrorist attack. Second, Pakistan also hopes to rally the international community – or at least some of its SCO partners like China – against India. And finally, Pakistan might&nbsp, authorize kinetic action&nbsp, in Afghanistan, but on what it will likely present as an anti-Indian rather than anti-Taliban basis.

Building upon the last point, this could resemble Russia ‘s&nbsp, special&nbsp, operation&nbsp, in the sense of how Moscow militarily intervened in Ukraine on an anti-NATO basis after accusing the bloc of exploiting Kyiv as a proxy, which Russia claimed could become a launching pad for more aggression if it wasn’t stopped.

Likewise, Pakistan might carry out comparatively smaller-scale strikes and/or incursions in Afghanistan that only target terrorist groups, but it could justify them on similar grounds.

The benefit of presenting things this way is that Pakistan can continue to claim that it has no problem with Afghanistan per se, just with how its historical Indian rival is allegedly exploiting that country as a proxy, which could become a launching pad for more aggression if it isn’t stopped.

The problem though is that this motive is much more questionable than Russia’s vis-à-vis NATO in its own special operation in Ukraine so Afghans as a whole might regard any larger-scale Pakistani kinetic action as a hostile act.

Even if Pakistan eschews such a response to this latest terrorist attack, officially tying India to what happened suggests that it has no interest in addressing the Balochistan conflict’s indigenous causes.

That’ll only lead to an even wider rift emerging between ethnic Baloches and the rest of the country, which in turn could result in more BLA sympathizers or recruits, thus intensifying the already self-sustaining cycle of instability there.

The larger the BLA’s pool of sympathizers and recruits becomes, the greater the unconventional threat Pakistan faces in Balochistan, which could embolden the&nbsp, military regime&nbsp, into doubling down on its controversial “preemptive” anti-terrorist policies like “forced disappearances“.

A more effective way to reduce the aforesaid pool is to empower responsible locals through meaningful economic and political partnerships with the state that show they have more to gain through unity than resistance.

For example, Baloch veterans could be appointed to lead new projects in their home region that would be obligated to reinvest a percentage of their proceeds into local initiatives.

These same figures and other similarly trusted ones could also be supported by the state as alternative community leaders for counteracting the influence of separatist-inclined tribal leaders. That’s easier said than done, but without it, the BLA’s pool of sympathizers and recruits will keep growing.

The combination of political radicalism and state failure is most responsible for perpetuating the Baloch conflict, not foreign forces, though the Taliban’s allowing BLA sanctuary in Afghanistan has definitely played a role.

Without adequately addressing these indigenous causes, which requires completely new thinking by the Pakistani government, outsiders will always be able to exploit the conflict. And while Pakistan may see cross-border kinetic action in Afghanistan as helpful, it won’t bring a lasting solution to the problem.

This article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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New research on crypto shows an insider group influences its value – Asia Times

United States President Donald Trump just announced the US would create a proper bitcoin supply of Bitcoin, Ether, Ripple, Solana and Cardano. This walk, he said, may render the US” the blockchain capital of the world”.

When a vocal crypto-skeptic, Trump then frames his aid as an embrace of technologies that hero independence and creativity.

But, the problem with Trump’s view is that it assumes bitcoin may lead to the reduction of financial intermediaries. By replacing faith with transparency, crypto promises to place individuals in charge of their financial transactions.

Our analysis demonstrates that this is only a limited view. In fact, bitcoin is reliant on social methods behind the technology.

Crypto-believers generally blame selfish lenders as the cause of the Great Recession in 2008. But we argue that bitcoin is not immune to these same challenges.

A U. S. Crypto Reserve may raise this critical business after years of dishonest attacks by the Biden Administration, which is why my Executive Order on Digital Assets directed the National Working Group to walk ahead on a Crypto Strategic Reserve that includes XRP, SOL, and ADA. I will make sure the U. S. is the Crypto Capital of the World. We are MAKING AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!

And, certainly, BTC and ETH, as other important Bitcoin, will be the center of the Reserve. I even love Bitcoin and Ethereum!

@RealDonald president on wisdom cultural protest 2, 2025

Replacing faith with clarity

Cryptocurrencies are a type of online income that deals on a blockchain. A cryptocurrency is a distributed ledger technology that allows users to trade pseudo-anonymously.

Public bitcoin operate on a distributed peer-to-peer system. This system provides each person a full record of transactions that is updated in real time. People can send electronic money between themselves without relying on a consolidated power.

Since each user has a full record of transactions, the system promises full transparency. But our research demonstrates that public blockchains, and the cryptocurrencies that run on them, do not actually replace trust with transparency.

Speculation, manipulation and market crashes remain very real dangers, regardless of whether the financial system is centralized or decentralized.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Cryptocurrencies rely on people

We studied the communications between the founder of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto, and the early Bitcoin community. We found the development and implementation of cryptocurrencies relies on negotiations between individuals. Who has a final say on which line of code will prevail depends on a social hierarchy dominated by insiders.

Centralization of power in the hands of insiders is still a major issue in the cryptocurrency space. This is particularly an issue for emerging cryptocurrencies like memecoins. Memecoins are a type of cryptocurrency named after internet memes or similar jokes. They draw their value entirely from speculation.

The Trump Organization recently launched memecoins$ TRUMP and$ MELANIA. The US Securities and Exchange Commission has concluded that memecoins do not qualify as securities, and therefore are outside its regulatory purview. Not only are memecoins risky, but they come with a significant risk of insider trading.

A recent case study on the memecoin$ LIBRA shows how influencers, anonymous developers and centralized exchanges facilitate market distortions, often at the expense of retail investors.

When cryptocurrencies are outside the scope of regulation, individuals behind the technology can profit from insider information. This is less of a risk with widely traded cryptocurrencies like Ether and Bitcoin, but investors should be aware that any technology is reliant on the people who design the code and regulate its changes.

Personal views towards privacy, for instance, can impact governance decisions. These beliefs can have important implications for the value and usability of any technology, cryptocurrencies included.

Talking crypto into reality

Our research suggests cryptocurrency insiders can artificially inflate the value of their coins by talking them up, effectively creating value out of nothing.

By using economic and accounting language to describe Bitcoin, the early Bitcoin community effectively turned a string of zeroes and ones into something that could be measured, valued and recognized.

Economists argue that even fiat currency is backed by a type of belief — trust in institutions. Bitcoin, too, relies on belief, but a different kind. Its value is based users ‘ collective confidence in the technology and security of the network, a phenomenon known as the network effect. As more people adopt Bitcoin, its perceived value rises, creating a self-sustaining cycle of belief and value based on market demand.

Following the announcement of the strategic crypto reserve, American stockbroker and anti-crypto advocate Peter Schiff accused Trump of manipulating the cryptocurrency market. Schiff has called for a congressional investigation into Trump and his team to determine who may have profited from the announcement, which triggered a massive increase in crypto prices.

Given the volatility of cryptocurrencies, their values are highly susceptible to herd behaviour, and public sentiment has a significant effect on cryptocurrency returns.

Where does this leave investors?

Our research and other studies like it have shown that cryptocurrency is subject to important value changes based on announcements by a small group of influential individuals.

We caution anyone interested in investing in crypto to do the homework by examining the underlying economics of a coin, getting to know the team behind it and evaluating their risk tolerance before moving forward.

With thousands of cryptocurrencies in circulation, distinguishing between a promising investment, a speculative gamble or even scams is crucial.

Despite the uncertain and unpredictable nature of digital assets, one thing is certain: the conversation around crypto is far from over.

Erica Pimentel is an assistant professor in the Smith School of Business, Queen’s University, Ontario, and Mélissa Fortin is an assistant professor at Université du Québec à Montréal ( UQAM ).

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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What Ukrainians say about readiness for ceasefire and concessions – Asia Times

A US-Ukraine authority on a peace plan has put the notion of a negotiated close to the three-year battle on the plan, and in the arms of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But even before Moscow answers, it’s very clear where the events stand. Breaking a previous stigma against negotiations involving regional concessions, the US has suggested Ukraine must lose land in any lasting deal, whereas President Volodymyr Zelensky has stated repeatedly that he will never produce sovereignty over Ukraine’s territory.

Nevertheless, Russia has demanded that Ukraine abandon its aspiration to visit NATO and take restrictions on its defense. But at present, Kyiv looks unlikely to gain the safety guarantees it seeks from the US before contemplating for words.

What is talked about less is what the Ukrainian people are willing to embrace for peace. And while any armistice will likely be dictated by guns, regional gains and tremendous power geopolitics, it will be in big part down to common Ukrainians to form what happens afterwards. An unpleasant peace perhaps be accepted by a war-weary people. But if it has small native legitimacy and understanding, peace is likely to be untenable in the long run.

We have tracked people view in Ukraine from before the battle and during the course of the issue.

It is an inadequate exercise, most poll in military Ukraine is by cellular phone and depends upon those with services who are willing to attend. Some people, especially in the government’s south and east, do not want to answer sensitive issues out of problem for themselves and family, some in held lands and Russia.

Those who do answer may provide guarded responses. Some are wary of military repression, while others are nationalistic or wish to present themselves as such to the person calling them. However, many other Ukrainian are overseas and excluded. Also, those in Russian-occupied provinces are left out of research.

However, the actions also give insight into how ideas in Ukraine have evolved since the Russian war of February 2022. These are five important findings from comparatively recent public opinion polls that are related to any upcoming peace negotiations.

1. Almost all Russians are stressed and tired of battle

Unsurprisingly, three years of a terrible battle of brutality have created great tension among a people increasingly weary of battle.

A December 2024 surveys from the respected Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, or KIIS found that nearly 9 in 10 Ukrainian experienced at least one demanding situation in the previous year. Large shares reported stressful experiences related to bombing and shelling ( 39 % ), separation from family members ( 30 % ), surviving the death of loves ones ( 26 % ) and the illness of loved ones ( 23 % ). Only 10 % said they’d experienced no stressful situations.

In a related vein, research we conducted showed that by summertime 2024, 84 % of the population had experienced violence in some form – be that physical damage at the hands of Russian forces, movement, loss of family member and companions, or witnessing problems.

And consistent with a growing number of news reports, we found that Ukrainians were deeply worried about war weariness among their fellow Ukrainians – just 10 % reported that they did not worry about war fatigue at all.

2. More Ukrainians want negotiations, but there are red lines

As the war has gone on, several polls show that Ukrainians increasingly support negotiations. The share of the population in favor of negotiations varies depending on how the question is posed.

When given the choice between two options, a Gallup Poll from late 2024 showed that 52 % preferred that “Ukraine should seek to negotiate an ending to the war as soon as possible”, whereas 38 % preferred that “Ukraine should continue fighting until it wins the war”.

Our earlier surveys from 2022 and 2024 similarly show a growing preference for negotiations, though at a lower level – from 11 % in 2022 to 31 % in 2024. In contrast to the binary Gallup question, our surveys presented respondents with different territorial compromises for a ceasefire. While about one-third wanted an immediate ceasefire, half wanted to continue fighting until all territories, including the predominately Russian-speaking Donbas region and Crimea, are brought back under Kyiv’s control.

But survey responses make clear that the country’s political independence is a red line for the public – even if defending it comes at a very high cost.

3. Ukrainians are more open to territorial concessions

In tandem with growing support for negotiations, our surveys – in line with KIIS’s own polls – show growing willingness to cede territory. And among those most worried about war fatigue and more pessimistic about continued Western support, the willingness to cede territory is higher.

That said, most Ukrainians still want Ukraine to continue fighting until the country’s territorial integrity is restored and under Kyiv’s control, including Crimea. But that majority has diminished since the beginning of the war – from 71 % in 2022 to 51 % in 2024.

When we asked in July 2024 whether people agreed with the statement:” Russia should be allowed to control the territory it has occupied since 2022″, 90 % disagreed. As such, there is very little evidence that Russia’s territorial annexations– or an agreement recognizing these, which is what Russia wants – would have any legitimacy among Ukraine’s population.

4. Ukrainians see Russia’s war goals in existential terms

Putin inspires the trust of neither Zelensky nor most Ukrainians– hence there’s a strong preference for any agreement being accompanied by security guarantees from NATO states.

Poll findings in the past month from KIIS reveal that 66 % of Ukrainians interpret Russia’s war aims as an existential threat, comprising genocide against Ukrainians and destruction of its independent statehood. And 87 % believe Russia will not stop at the territories it already occupies. Negotiating with an enemy bent on Ukraine’s destruction appears delusional to many Ukrainians.

5. Zelensky remains popular, his endorsement matters

As a defiant wartime leader, President Zelenskyy’s popularity was very high in the immediate months after the invasion. Indeed, KIIS polls from May 2022 show that 90 % of the population expressed trust in him.

This has declined as the war has endured, but it has always remained above 50 %. Recent polling measuring his approval puts it at 63 %, an increase from 2024. Indeed, the very latest KIIS polls, from February through March of this year, show a 10-point jump in his trust rating to 67 %, a finding widely viewed as rallying in the face of U. S. criticism.

Thus Zelenskyy’s endorsement of any ceasefire and settlement will matter, though ceding territory is likely to be hazardous for him politically.

Conditions for a lasting peace

While the US-Ukraine accord on a ceasefire has put the ball in Russia’s court, it is unclear whether it will be enough to bring Putin to the table. And even if it does, given past precedent it is difficult to see him arriving as a compromiser rather than a conqueror.

What does appear clear is that whatever “peace” emerges looks set to hang more on Ukraine making concessions and accepting losses.

Such a peace can be negotiated behind closed doors. But without public support in Ukraine, whether it endures on the ground is another matter.

Gerard Toal is a professor of government and international affairs at Virginia Tech, JohnO’Loughlin is a professor of geography at the University of Colorado Boulder, and Kristin M Bakke is a professor of political science and international relations at UCL.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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What to do in case Trump foreign policy is driven by simple spite – Asia Times

New shifts in US international policy – especially regarding taxes and the conflict in Ukraine – have sparked controversy over what is driving the Trump administration’s choices. Some of those selections have appeared so strange that media critics and some Western leaders have wondered out loud if the US government may now even get serving Russian objectives.

It’s more likely that US steps just reflect an aggressive quest of what the Trump administration views to be America’s objectives. Such guidelines may help repair US manufacturing and reposition its defense for potential tensions with China.

Yet past Trump national Anthony Scaramucci, then co-host of the well-known” The Rest is Elections” US radio and a bitter opposition of his former manager, has a different take. He argues the US senator isn’t – as is sometimes claimed – playing “four-dimensional games” but, instead, is acting on “whims” and “eating the game items”.

This raises the possibility that some of Trump’s plans are merely cruel rather than proper. My guide Spite, published in 2020, examines spite’s mental origins and its development and social effects in people, leaders and policy makers. It offers insights into what may now be unfolding on the world stage.

Spite describes a situation in which we act to harm another person – even at a cost to ourselves. While spiteful actions can be strategic, helping your long-term self-interest, they are often damaging to everyone in both the short and long terms. Understanding whether spite is involved in US policy decisions is crucial for the world’s ability to respond effectively.

Cooperation — working together for mutual benefit — is humanity’s superpower. We cooperate with people outside our families in a way that other species do not. After the second world war, cooperative alliances, trade agreements and global institutions fostered some degree of shared prosperity.

Yet cooperation ( I win, you win ) is just one of four basic behaviors, alongside altruism ( I lose, you win ), selfishness ( I win, you lose ) and spite ( I lose, you lose ). Trump often frames US cooperation as altruism, claiming America gives and gets nothing in return, making it unfairly exploited.

His” America first” policy embraces selfishness, treating international relations as a zero-sum game in which there can only be one winner. However, by recasting cooperation as unfair, Trump’s resulting anger may be driving him beyond selfishness into counterproductive spite.

When the US has imposed tariffs on countries, they have generally retaliated in kind with their own tariffs. The result? Everyone suffered. In Trump’s first term, US consumers bore most of the costs of tariffs, while retaliatory tariffs also reduced real incomes abroad.

Former US Labor Secretary Robert Reich, an economist, argues that Trump’s tariffs are meant” to show the world that he’s willing to harm smaller economies even at the cost of harming the United States’ very large one”. This is textbook spite.

Similarly, after tensions between Trump and the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, US actions seemed more focused on punishing Ukraine than advancing US interests. Some argue this hurt US national security as well as Ukrainian security.

The costs and benefits of spite

International relations scholars offer different views on spite. Realists see spite as a rational tool for maintaining power. They emphasise that as long as the US loses less than its rival, it makes a relative gain.

Liberals prioritize absolute gains— arguing that cooperation leads to mutual benefits, even if some gain more than others. They see spite as damaging trade and alliances that ultimately strengthen the US.

Constructivists, who argue that state actions depend on context and perceptions, emphasise that spite’s impact will vary. Spite directed against a major rival may be useful. Yet, spite against smaller allies can undermine trust and long-term cooperation.

Spiteful US tariffs may force weaker allies such as Canada into making concessions. But scholars warn that China, which has far greater economic depth, has both the will and resources to “play a dangerous game of mutual pain and destruction with the United States”.

Ultimately, constant trade wars suggest a desire to dominate and punish rather than pursue strategic self-interest, escalating conflicts instead of solving them. Research on human cooperation shows that winners don’t punish, and that losers “punish and perish”.

The psychology of spite

Spite may be be shaping US policy because Trump’s perceptions, environment and personality are encouraging spitefulness. Spite often results from feeling treated unfairly. The US president has manufactured a sense of unfairness and repeatedly asserts that allies are treating the US “very, very unfairly“.

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As China grows, the world is becoming more competitive. Research suggests that increased competition encourages spite. And, in an era of strongman politics, leaders may seek dominance. Spite is one way to dominate others.

Possessing the dark triad of personality traits — psychopathy, narcissism and Machiavellianism — increases your risk of being spiteful. Researchers have argued that Trump scores highly on such traits ( although, if true, this is not necessarily bad as narcissism has been linked to some elements of presidential success ).

Spitefulness is more common in people who struggle to control their emotions. Trump has been accused of temper tantrums. Even one of his own attorneys is said to have deemed Trump “incapable of testifying because he could not control himself, his emotions”.

Spite isn’t always bad. It can force fairness, boost competitive performance and is linked to creativity. But when spite destroys cooperation – humanity’s superpower – it becomes human kryptonite.

How to prevent spite from shaping policy

To stop spite influencing foreign policy, it’s necessary to address its triggers. This means challenging perceptions of unfairness. Leaders must emphasize the mutual benefits of cooperation. The trust on which cooperation is based must also be rebuilt.

There is also a need to resist dominance-seeking. In hunter-gatherer societies, those who seek dominance are often restrained by the group. International institutions, as well as checks and balances in the US system, need to prevent reckless dominance-seeking from escalating. Reactions to spite must be firm but measured, rather than risking a race to the bottom.

Overall, America’s apparent use of spite to unnecessarily reduce the living standards of its adversaries as well as some allies and even its own citizens is deeply troubling. Yet, were the US to refuse to wield spite against its adversaries it would risk allowing a new global power – one potentially hostile to liberal democracy and human rights – to shape the world order.

Aristotle argued that the virtuous person gets angry for the right reasons, at the right time, in the right way. America must learn to do the same.

Simon McCarthy-Jones is an associate professor in clinical psychology and neuropsychology at Trinity College Dublin.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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The end of capitalism – or the end of civilization? – Asia Times

Beware of exponential articles. But in this case, I’m frightened, as Ulrike Herrmann’s highly readable book The End of Socialism makes clear, the choice between neoliberalism and culture really does seem to be either/or – and the end will likely come a lot sooner than we thought.

Anyone who isn’t alarmed about the rapid and well-documented decline in the global environment, upon which we and our atypically comfortable lifestyles depend, really hasn’t been paying attention. You may not enjoy reading a book like this, but you really should read it – if only for your children’s sake.

The End of Capitalism appeared in Germany a couple of years ago, but it has lost none of its relevance or urgency. On the contrary, with Donald Trump in the White House promising to “drill, baby drill“, it could hardly be more timely.

The majority of potential readers are likely to disagree with Herrmann’s central claim that” climate protection will only be possible if we abolish capitalism”.

This is unsurprising. We have known nothing other than capitalism in the West for several hundred years. Attempts to do things differently in other parts of the world, such as the Soviet Union, generally did not go well socially or, more importantly, environmentally.

One of the reasons it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism, as philosopher Fredric Jameson famously claimed, is that people everywhere like the abundance of stuff that capitalism has been instrumental in producing.

Living standards, especially in the West, but also in China, India and elsewhere, have risen unimaginably in a remarkably short space of time. It is not surprising that the beneficiaries have generally been pleased about this unprecedented change in their material circumstances.

Ulrike Herrmann argues that’ climate protection will only be possible if we abolish capitalism’. Scribe Publishing

True, contemporary capitalism is characterised by a growing gulf between the richest and the poorest, both within and between countries. This is an awkward problem for” communist” China, but one that Australians and especially Americans seem relatively unconcerned about. Herrmann, too, is surprisingly relaxed about it. She argues that” capitalism made democracy possible – and it can be democratically controlled”.

This idea is currently being subjected to a searching real-time examination, as the Trump administration systematically eviscerates and transforms America’s system of governance to a point where sober and serious analysts consider it to be headed toward authoritarianism.

Herrmann does not consider such a possibility, but she does provide a clear explanation of the rise of capitalism and the social and technological forces that have made it the most transformative force in human history.

More hyperbole? Lots of people have given up on organised religion, but not many have renounced consumerism. Unlikely as such a renunciation might seem, Herrmann argues that endless consumption is something we will have to give up if the environment is to remain habitable.

The argument is simple and has been around since the Club of Rome published The Limits to Growth, half a century ago: a system that is predicated on ever expanding growth is incompatible with a world of finite resources, especially if one of those resources is a functioning natural environment.

Lots of people have spent the intervening 50 years pointing out why the authors of that book were wrong. It is likely they will be queuing up to tell Herrmann she is wrong, too – especially when she argues that” ‘ green growth’ does not exist”.

The unpalatable options

We have been repeatedly assured that technology will come to the rescue. But Herrmann contends that” we no longer have the time to wait for possible technological breakthroughs. We must act immediately if we are to avert climate collapse”.

The seemingly irreconcilable problems, she argues, are highlighted in the cost of removing carbon from the atmosphere and storing it somewhere. Despite all the hype, such technology has yet to be viably demonstrated at scale. This means “humanity will be forced to move away from fossil fuels and towards green energy”.

Unfortunately for the likes of Peter Dutton, Herrmann is scathing about the prospects for nuclear power. There is some debate about precise figures, but the German experience, which is central to the book’s main arguments, suggests that even when Germany had 19 commercially run reactors, they could only provide around 13 % of total energy consumed.

Herrmann points out that” the nuclear energy sector is the only branch of industry in which costs consistently rise”. Reactors are, consequently, not viable without government subsidies.

Before admirers of green energy and especially “green growth” start feeling smug, it is important to note that Herrmann is equally sceptical about wind and solar. She claims that, between them, they provide less than 10 % of Germany’s energy needs and won’t be of much use in periods of dunkelflaute: the “dark doldrums” when the sun doesn’t shine ( much ) and the wind doesn’t blow.

In 2024, however, after the publication of the German edition of Herrmann’s book, Germany generated 59 % of its electricity from renewables, including 31.9 % from wind and 14.7 % from solar.

Nevertheless, energy storage is expensive and difficult, and the transition to green solutions is fraught. One example: it takes 35 kilograms of scarce minerals to make a traditional petrol driven car and 210 kilograms to make an electric one. Manufacturing the batteries for them generates a further 15–20 tonnes of carbon dioxide.

As a result, “our planet is being ransacked ]… ] Around one-third of all raw material consumption since 1900 took place in the short time between 2002 and 2015”.

The manufacture of electric vehicles requires large amounts of scarce minerals. Photo: Es sarawuth / Shutterstock

This is why Herrmann argues that simply moving to green energy sources will not be sufficient, either to guarantee current needs or to adequately reduce our collective impact on the environment.

It is not only the automotive sector that will have to shrink. One of the industries that will be difficult to reform, much less shrink, is aviation. Over a single year, 90 % of the world’s population will not fly at all and 1 % will account for half of the global aviation emissions.

This mirrors the grotesque levels of inequality in global wealth distribution. It means the rich will have to join the poor in” saying goodbye to flying”.

Other examples of politically unpalatable sacrifices are given throughout the book. And the message is clear:

The challenges will grow, and the funds ]to address them ] will shrink. Consumption must fall, which immediately begs the question of who should cut back and by how much. Distribution conflicts will be inevitable.

Given that “technology will not enable us to produce enough green energy sufficiently cheaply to fuel ‘ green growth ‘ ] … ] the only remaining option is green shrinkage: fewer new buildings, fewer cars, fewer chemical products”.

This is a message that no policymaker anywhere in the world, democrat or autocrat, will want to hear. It is not just the rich industrialised countries that are wedded to the idea of economic expansion.

Many developing countries would like nothing better than to join their wealthy counterparts. So would the people of the Global South, which is why so many of them risk their lives to flee hopeless poverty.

In any given year, 1 % of people are responsible for half of global aviation emissions. Photo: Muratart / Shutterstock via The Conversation

Improbable precedents

Unlikely as the necessary reforms are to be realized, Herrmann suggests that wartime Britain offers a model of what can be achieved if the dangers are sufficiently immediate and existential.

She points out that “rationing was so popular in Britain because everyone had exactly the same entitlement”– though no doubt the legendary” spirit of the Blitz” also had something to do with spending nights cowering in underground stations with hundreds of strangers while people dropped bombs on you.

This is not a flippant point. Without a dramatic change of consciousness on the part of “ordinary” people generally, and policymakers in particular, it is impossible to imagine the sorts of sacrifices that seem necessary to achieve the” shrinkage” being considered, much less enacted as “necessary prohibitions”.

Given that any actions would also need to have a global, rather than just a national rationale, a radical change of collective direction also seems improbable, to put it delicately, especially if it involves something resembling central planning.

And yet Herrmann argues that there is no choice other than radical and seemingly unimaginable change if we are to survive in anything like a civilized condition:

There is no alternative for the industrialised countries. Either they end growth voluntarily, or the era of growth will end violently, when everything that forms the basis of our way of life has been destroyed.

For what it’s worth, I agree. I am not a climate scientist, but I recognize that there is an intellectual division of labor that is a central component of modernity. None of us is capable of knowing everything about the increasingly complex world in which we live.

But if something like 99 % of climate scientists agree on the causes and likely consequences of climate change, I am happy to take their word for it. What possible basis could I have to disagree?

Herrmann may not be right about everything, but she is right about enough to cause any open-minded reader to think seriously about what the future looks like, especially for younger generations who will have to deal with the decisions we make – or don’t make – today.

This is hardly a novel insight. But it is striking that, for all our real understanding about the nature of the unprecedented challenge we collectively face, there is still an equally remarkable unwillingness or inability to act.

Like many before her, Herrmann thinks that salvation could come from “below”, because “parties do not lead their voters, they follow them”. But given what is currently happening in the United States and elsewhere, the durability of democracy itself is uncertain.

In a world where democracy is already in retreat, the environmental emergencies that will inevitably increase without meaningful action could make authoritarian responses even more likely.

Still, what do I care? I’m a baby boomer with no kids. I live in one of the wealthiest, safest places on Earth. In Western Australia, we don’t even care about the rest of the country, let alone the rest of the world.

Local politicians are planning to make an even bigger contribution to destroying the planet than we already do, because Woodside Energy wants to speed up the approval process for the controversial North West Shelf project. Good to know who’s running the state, at least.

It might have been useful if Herrmann had given a bit more attention to the politics of self-absorption or the slightly optimism-inducing literature on “degrowth“.

These are minor criticisms of what is a significant contribution to the literature on the climate crisis, though I fear The End of Capitalism may only be read by an already sympathetic audience.

This remains a seemingly insurmountable obstacle faced by would-be reformers. I know it is considered de rigueur to strike an optimistic note when concluding discussions of this sort, but it is not easy, and may be dishonest.

There is no doubt that unmitigated climate change and environmental degradation will transform our lives and the political systems that circumscribe them. By the time they do, it may be too late to do anything useful, other than keep a lid on social breakdown.

It won’t necessarily be the end of the world, but it may be the end of any human civilization worthy of the name.

Mark Beeson is adjunct professor, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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