The gray area between Korean diplomacy and espionage – Asia Times

To your dismay, after studying Asian for centuries at school, you now work in a government department that records agricultural data. A Korean minister requests a meeting the week after you attend a North Korean Embassy function.

She introduces you to a partner, a Mr Kim. Another week after, Mr. Kim requests that you submit a brief essay on the most recent election to aid him in understanding local politics. He is, after all, fresh to the state. It would be a pretty kind favor for you to practice Asian. Although, it’s weird, you think: Mr Kim does n’t read the newspapers?

Therefore, Mr. Kim gives you more cash than the job was worth. This is nice, you think. A few weeks later, you’ve written little papers on regional elections, the school system and the internet – and received good money!

Therefore, Mr. Kim inquires if you’d like to write an essay on agriculture that is more in-depth. He’d spend more money, and it is what you do at job. Maybe you could provide it in Korea, he says. More money and a complimentary trip…

Close friends hacker on each other. &nbsp, It’s a history. Alliances are presented to the public as built on mutual respect and shared targets, but personal nations&nbsp, always&nbsp, emphasize their interests.

This means that in any diplomatic partnership, there rests a degree of uncertainty and hostility. Intelligence procedures are used to influence partners ‘ objectives, abilities, and techniques.

This increases confidence and provides more clarity. It allows companions to protect regional security, maintain proper benefits within the framework of cooperation and, importantly, avoid surprises. Managed maturely, knowledge acts as a type of diplomatic reassurance. This also applies to the South Korea-US marriage.

Despite the commitment to “fight tomorrow” in an “ironclad” empire, South Korea and the US routinely conduct brains operations to reduce&nbsp, rejection anxiety&nbsp, and to safe competitive advantage. Hands power during the Cold War is a good indication.

South Korea and its partners had a significant impact on US ties with international partners when the US conducted operations to check whether it was adhering to arms control agreements, while South Korea also conducted operations to break free of the restrictions it was subject to.

Of course, there are places in which South Korea and the US compete immediately. In all socioeconomic grounds, they are innate rivals. Fighting side-by-side is just as common as having the intelligence and control to out-compete the another.

Exercise frequently begins in a gray area between spy and diplomacy, as is typical in “recruiting friendlies.”

The equivalent duties that diplomats and intelligence officers perform create a gray area between politics and spy. Officials and intelligence officials gather information and try to persuade participants to help the state. For the minister, these are the first two of four large clashing types of tasks – reporting, picture, bargaining, and taking care of nationals in the network state. &nbsp,

Basically speaking, intelligence officials have the same objectives, but with various perspectives. While knowledge pays less interest to international laws and political conventions, diplomacy operates informally.

The ambiguity stems from deeds that, while performing consular duties, may also include deeds that involve intelligence- or intelligence-related actions. The slim line between political process and intelligence is challenged by this overlap. Understanding the hiring process for brokers is the easiest way to tell the difference between the two.

It’s a slim line between politics and knowledge. Image: X Screengrab

The selection procedure

Recruiting brokers is a key component of cleverness. The procedure is complicated when organizations ask people to gather and switch sensitive information.

A thorough understanding of human philosophy, strategic planning, and cautious execution are necessary for success. All states ( and people within states ) have different approaches, with repeat borne of prior effective approaches. Broadly speaking, there are four phases:

    Recognition: &nbsp, The first step in recruitment is identifying individuals who have exposure to useful information or have the power to exert influence. These targets had become government officials, military personnel, business executives or even individuals with exposure to significant networks. Intelligence agencies generally look for people with certain risks. The next step is to figure out whether these individuals have any weaknesses that do make them easier to enlist, such as financial difficulties, intellectual dissatisfaction, or personal grievances.

  1. Marriage building: &nbsp, When a potential attract is identified, the next step is to develop a relationship. It involves gently interacting with targets, finding out about their motivations, and figuring out how to persuade them to cooperate. The consultant may cause as a brother sympathizer, a potential company partner or even just a useful acquaintance. Establishing trust and eventually introducing the concept of partnership are the goals. This is frequently done in a way that is appropriate for the internal page of the target.
  2. Recruitment: &nbsp, When the moment seems right, the manager makes the ball. The process is at its most delicate phase. The method is become direct or indirect, depending on the user’s character and the connection that has been developed. The consultant may sell money, protection, or even just appeals to ego depending on the target. Challenges and extortion may be used in some circumstances, but these methods demand more thought and care.
  3. Management: &nbsp, When recruited, watchful supervision is need to make sure the broker continues providing valuable knowledge. This involves maintaining normal conversation, offering rewards or reassurances, often manipulating emotions to preserve the agent dedicated and also supporting an agent’s move into more valuable positions.

South Korea’s espionage activities demonstrate modes of&nbsp, identification, relationship-building, recruitment and management processes that are similar to those employed across all&nbsp, Five Eyes countries. The majority of cases never become public. &nbsp,

Accusations of espionage by allied states can cause diplomatic angst, cause conflict to break out, and deteriorate the alliance’s reputation. Accordingly, governments prefer to handle such matters discreetly to avoid breakdowns in cooperation, which could weaken their collective security and strategic objectives.

Suppressing reporting on spying among allies helps to&nbsp, maintain stability and trust within their relationships. It prevents unnecessary escalation and allows diplomatic channels to secretly manage issues, frequently resulting in in-the-scenes negotiations or apologies that preserve the broader relationship.

Public disclosure of spying can also undermine ongoing intelligence operations by revealing methods, sources, and vulnerabilities that a partner or third party might exploit. Allies can continue to collaborate on common goals without the detriment or repercussions of a public scandal by keeping these incidents out of the public eye.

In essence, suppression is a wise decision to strike a balance between protecting national security interests and maintaining strong, cooperative international relationships.

But we know it does go public. There are several&nbsp, well-known cases&nbsp, of South Korean espionage and a number of&nbsp, less well-known cases&nbsp, where the potential damage outweighed the perceived benefits of media exposure.

So, why does it go public? There are three broad reasons for counterintelligence agencies to make a case public: strategic ( to cover other operations ), operational ( to reduce the effectiveness of the” sending” state organization that has dispatched diplomats or spies ) or political/bureaucratic ( to satisfy broader objectives within the “host” or “receiving” state bureaucracy or political environment ).

Similarly, it is also the case that the sending state will allow an asset or agent to be compromised for broader strategic, operational or bureaucratic/political rationales.

Because of the extremely distinct nature of the individuals themselves, the source of all human intelligence collection, it’s difficult to categorize and generalize intelligence processes, practices, and cases. That raises a question: Why do individuals engage in espionage? ( Read why in the next post. )

The fact is, &nbsp, most do n’t know&nbsp, they’re engaged in espionage until it’s too late. The more effective the hiring process, the less likely it is for the agent to be aware of the hiring process. &nbsp,

A free trip and more money. But then you realize, when Mr Kim tells you he’s willing to pay more and fly you to Korea, that it’s already too late: There’s no free lunch in this world. You’re now an intelligence asset!

Jeffrey Robertson is an academic, consultant and writer focusing on foreign affairs, diplomacy and the Korean Peninsula. &nbsp, This article was originally published on his Substack newsletter, Diplomatic Seoul, and is republished with permission. &nbsp, Read more here.

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Biden got Trump out of a jam – Asia Times

Donald Trump was put out of a connect by Joe Biden. &nbsp, Trump, in his political campaign, had claimed he was immediately bring an end to the Ukraine war and push a dialogue between Kyiv and Moscow.

Joe Biden’s decision to launch ATACMS missiles on Russia has given the panel the confidence to fulfill that commitment.

The Ukrainians shot five or six ATACMS weapons at the Bryansk region of Russia, which is located about 75 miles north of the Ukrainian border, shortly after the public announcement that strikes would be permitted on November 18.

The Russians say that they destroyed 5 of the six weapons, with one weapon reach but not totally destroyed. &nbsp, That missile, according to the Russians, fell to the ground&nbsp, and exploded, but caused little harm. &nbsp, The Ukrainian say that the missile&nbsp, hit an ammunition depot and blew it up.

The Russians used their weather mechanisms, most importantly the S-400 and Pantsir. &nbsp, The S-400 has much variety, Pantsir was likely used to go after weapons that the S-400 did not catch. &nbsp, &nbsp,

ATACMS is a huge weapon. The US HIMARS launch system you just fire one ATACMS at once, which requires reloading after that. &nbsp, The weapon weighs 3, 690 weight and travels at a rate of around Mach 3 (2, 300 miles ), making it faster than regular flight soldiers. &nbsp, &nbsp,

In 2021 dollars an ATACMS missile costs$ 1.7 million, meaning that a replacement cost would be more than$ 2 million per copy. &nbsp, However, the US plans on replacing ATACMS with the Precision Strike Missile ( PrSM) which will have longer range. &nbsp, ATACMS may attain 190 miles. PrSM can travel 250 miles, which is a small price to pay because a new missile will cost more than$ 3 million per copy. &nbsp, Using AI-supported math ( just kidding ), replacing 6 missiles will cost US taxpayers$ 30 million or more.

The Biden administration uses ATACMS to thwart discussions between Ukraine and Russia, but the use of ATACMS is consciously controversial. &nbsp, Biden’s goal is to prolong the war and to make it difficult, or nearly but, for Trump to make a bargain. &nbsp, &nbsp,

How likely are ATACMS weapons to be in Ukraine? Perhaps not more than a couple of hundred, although there is no proved information.

Straight hand-left side issues are present in the current administration. &nbsp, Some in the leadership, particularly the State Department and elements in the CIA, reportedly want to change Zelensky in Ukraine with a more “democratic” head and began talks with the Russians. The management wants to worsen Trump and prolong the war. That explains the extraordinarily indifferent position taken yesterday regarding ATACMS’s usage against Russia.

However, it is well to keep in mind that the Europeans were briefed in advance about the Biden decision, which is why German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who heads a failed state, called Putin and, on the day of the common announcement of ATACMS approval, said Germany &nbsp, would hardly supply Taurus weapons to Ukraine, notwithstanding the US judgement on ATACMS.

The use of ATACMS wo n’t have a significant impact on the war, in terms of combating it. Indeed, the decision to attack targets in the Bryansk region rather than Kursk, where intense fighting is taking place, and where the administration insists North Koreans are fighting alongside Russian forces, highlights the fact that firing ATACMS has not, at least not yet, had anything to do with the conflict. &nbsp, Could the Bryansk attack be a warning to the Russians? &nbsp, Maybe, but wasting$ 30 million on a warning seems nonsensical.

The Russians, of course, have their own long-range missiles. They could be used just as easily as they are being used against targets in Ukraine, and they are. One would assume that Biden is aware of this and that he would anticipate a larger conflict and a subsequent NATO intervention in Ukraine. &nbsp, That is part of the White House calculus.

Russia’s ability to launch retaliation is uncertain at this time. There are plenty of good targets in Ukraine where the Russians could take a defensive line. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Trump’s nominated national security advisor, Mike Waltz, says that the Biden decision will not help Trump end the Ukraine war. &nbsp, Waltz&nbsp, says that he was not briefed&nbsp, by the Biden administration on the ATACMS decision, a breach of the normal protocol in which incoming officials are briefed on national security matters and often asked for their views. &nbsp, Biden and his people did neither, and on purpose.

Trump now has an excuse for allowing Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles and other weapons with the assistance of NATO technicians and intelligence assets.

Although there are still many things that could possibly go wrong after January 20th, including the collapse of the Zelensky government and the defeat of Ukraine, there are still many things that could possibly go wrong.

Without speaking with Trump, it appears as though Biden will continue to pursue his interests.  Biden’s promise of a smooth transition of government turns out to be dishonest and deceptive.

Stephen Bryen served as the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s staff director and its deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. &nbsp, This&nbsp, article was first published on his&nbsp, Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy and is republished with permission.

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The impact of Ukraine firing US missiles into Russia – Asia Times

Ukraine may be able to repel Russian forces trying to recapture Belarusian territory that Ukraine seized earlier this year by lifting US restrictions on the use of ATACMS nuclear missiles. It could also improve Ukraine’s hands forward of US President-elect Donald Trump’s appearance in the White House in January.

It may, however, be another case of too little, too soon in American support for Ukraine.

The Biden Administration lifted restrictions on Ukraine’s use of the Armed Tactical Missile Systems ( ATACMS ) missiles this week. ATACMS have a range of around 300 km. Recently, the US has told Ukraine just to use them against Russian troops on Ukrainian place.

Ukraine has been extremely frustrated over this, especially considering that it is unable to use them against Russian foundations that have launched endless missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities. According to the UN, 183 civilians were killed and 903 were hurt in the Russian strikes on Ukraine in October.

Details of the US plan alter have not been made available to the public. According to the New York Times, attacking Russian troops will only be allowed to massachusette in the Kursk area, according to the New York Times.

Graphic: AP via The Talk

More than 500 square meters of country that Ukraine had seized in a strong offensive in August are being reclaimed by Russia. According to American organizations, there are a number of thousand North Vietnamese soldiers en massed on the Russian aspect.

The ATACMS’s restrictions may be the main catalyst for the ATACMS’s suspension due to North Korea’s role. The move perhaps deter North Korea from sending more troops in addition to boosting Ukraine’s ability to maintain its grip inside Russian territory.

Concerns that the US choice may be justified by North Korea’s existence, which also eases concerns that Russia may view it as an escalation.

Cautious decision-making by the West

The US’s precaution has been primarily due to its recent concerns about increase and the possibility of a strong conflict between Russia and NATO.

This has been fuelled in part by Soviet atomic saber-rattling. Russian President Vladimir Putin upped the ante in September, warning that allowing Western arms to beat Russia may form NATO’s “direct contribution” in the battle.

Russia says, apparently without basis, that such weaponry need American personnel to man them. Russia asserts that precise targeting of the missiles does require European intelligence.

The US news this week has reacted consistently, saying it will “add more fuel to the fire” of the conflict. ATACMS have also been used against Soviet targets inside Ukrainian-owned place, most recently in Crimea, which Moscow had illegally annexed ten years ago.

Some Biden presidency sources have told the media that the country’s reluctance to allow ATACMS to attack Russia has also been influenced by its concern about retribution via damage. In recent years, Russian intelligence services have carried out a significant damage plan in Europe.

Since Russia’s massive conquest of Ukraine in 2022, people have been averse to these risks. European nations have expressed concern at every turn about straddling Putin’s alleged “red ranges.”

They first balked at supplying different types of equipment – be it vehicles, fighter jet, short-range weapons or long-range weapons. Finally, they placed restrictions on how and where to use them.

In Washington in 2023, Joe Biden ( right ) and Volodymyr Zelensky ( right ) greet the president of the United States. &nbsp, Photo: Michael Reynolds / EPA via The Talk

Does it help Ukraine?

Britain and France placed related restrictions on Ukraine’s use of SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles, which both have a 250-kilometer range, as a result of US restrictions on using ATACMS. The US decision appears likely to help the UK and France to then relax those restrictions.

Another boost to Ukraine’s army may arrive from Germany, where the Greens, Social Democrats and the criticism Christian Democrats support green-lighting supply of Taurus cruise weapons to Ukraine, which have a range of 500 meters.

Although it has been blocked by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the time, votes are then scheduled for February.

Because Russia has moved a large portion of its key ammunition, especially jet fighters, outside of its purview, Washington authorities have recently claimed that ATACMS will now only be of minimal use.

Nevertheless, some military experts think there are still numerous, possibly hundreds, of priorities within range.

These include prompt and contacts posts, logistics hubs, arms depots, weapon units and aircraft detachments. Russian businesses may find it more difficult to move equipment farther back from the front lines, stretching their supply ranges, and requiring longer wait times for air support.

Russia’s assistance has grown

It’s not all that encouraging to allow a sovereign state that has been improperly invaded to apply arms against military targets inside the aggressor’s nation.

Also, as US-based Russian professor Sergei Radchenko points out, it would be extremely difficult for Russia, which has so terribly underperformed on the field in Ukraine, to strike NATO in reply.

Given the large amount of ammunition and weapons supplied to Russia by its own followers even before North Vietnamese soldiers entered, Russian warnings about increase seem even more absurd.

Russia has received thousands of rounds of ammunition and lots of nuclear missiles from North Korea. Additionally, it is officially providing Russia with multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled howitzers.

Iran has supplied Russia with hundreds of Shahed uavs, helicopter production technology, weapons and short-range rockets.

An Egyptian Shahed-129 aircraft is displayed at a rally in Tehran, Iran. &nbsp, Photo: Ebrahim Noroozi / AP via The Talk

And China sells Russia about US$ 300 million each quarter in dual-use equipment needed for weapons manufacturing, from appliance tools to microchips. Russia might even have a shop there for producing military-grade drones.

What was Trump’s appearance mean?

In an effort to give Ukraine as much of a foothold as possible before Trump takes office, the Biden White House does ease restrictions on using ATACMS inside Russia by, for instance, allowing their use outside the Kursk place.

Some Russians worry that Trump’s quick military intervention will hurt Ukraine. However, some believe Trump may be just as good as the Biden administration, given the latter’s prudence and the need for Trump to be seen as a reliable dealmaker, rather than selling Ukraine down the river.

Some in Trump’s new team, notably incoming National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, have spoken, albeit equivocally, of using the prospect of more robust support for Ukraine as leverage in pushing Putin to negotiate.

However, the strong presence of those who have long been vocal critics of aid to Ukraine or even outright apologists for Russia must offset this optimism in his new cabinet and inner circle.

There is also a good chance that the Trump administration will rescind its decision to impose ATACMS use restrictions.

Jon Richardson is visiting fellow, Centre for European Studies, Australian National University

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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How allied are Iran and Russia really? – Asia Times

After this month, Iran and Russia are expected to signal a strategic partnership agreement in Moscow, strengthening a relationship that has been in place since the early 2000s but has occasionally been adversaries.

Although the two parties have repeatedly shortened the original arrangement, both have acknowledged the necessity to revise it to better reflect modern-day international realities.

What were now contentious ties between Moscow and Tehran have been impacted by the conflict in Ukraine, the decay of relations between Russia and the global West, and the growing US-China conflicts.

The conflict in Ukraine appears to have altered Russia’s perspective, even if it was previously cautious not to give sensitive technologies to the Islamic Republic, mainly due to potential negative West-related reactions.

Iran has become a crucial position in its political rebalancing, and Moscow has made an incessant pivot toward Asia. Moscow is exceedingly seeing Iran as a significant partner because it is a heavily sanctioned condition and crucial for Russia’s expansion into the Indian Ocean and East Africa.

The current situation is unlikely to change with Donald Trump’s election. Although it is possible to reach an agreement between Moscow and Washington, the tensions between the two countries are conspicuous nevertheless.

Russia may continue to support its ties to the Islamic Republic. The former, too, is expected to experience greater stress from the Trump presidency, driving it to get greater military and political participation with Moscow.

The potential strategic partnership treaty’s major, important details are not made publicly available. However, an examination of Iranian and Russian government official public statements reveals a number of potential areas for improved diplomatic assistance.

The strategic partnership will unavoidably highlight the opposing positions of the Western-led international order and encourage a more multilateral one. Russia and Iran both support non-Western initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ) and the BRICS.

The development of the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ), which connects Russia to Iranian ports and India, and new payment options for international currency exchange, which are both important since trade between the two nations has recently declined.

Bilateral defense and strategic assistance will be a second, much more important area, as evidenced by Iran’s alleged supply of Russian short-range ballistic missiles and military drones. Later in October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that the agreement would involve more defence <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2024/10/31/russia-says-upcoming-treaty-with-iran-includes-closer-defense-cooperation”>cooperation.

Moscow and Tehran have also made an effort to work together to address regional concerns in the South Caucasus, where they border and whose goal is to keep non-regional ( mostly Western ) players at bay.

This thinking is at the root of the 3 3 program, which Tehran and Russia simultaneously support. It is comprised of Turkey and three South Caucasus countries, notably Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, though the latter has consistently refused to participate according to Russia’s activity of 20 % of its territory.

The new Russo-Iranian contract, which will undoubtedly grow cooperation, will probably end in vain because of their complex relationship as both companions and rivals in the Middle East. A legally binding alliance with iron-clad commitments to joint protection is neither required nor desired by either side.

Alternatively, both seek expanded assistance that gives enough space for movement. In fact, the two nations ‘ combined size allows them to avoid narrowing down their individual foreign policy objectives. They have so far avoided placing a singular adversary or professional at risk because it would restrict their options for international policy.

Despite the growing defense collaboration, diplomatic conflicts persist. Iran has reported that it is awaiting the distribution of Russia’s Su-35 fighter jet, which may indicate that the country is trying to balance its relations with another Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who oppose Iran’s impact and activities there.

Another level of tension lies in local infrastructure. The Zangezur hall, a proposed transportation route connecting Armenia and Nakhichevan through Armenia’s Syunik state, which edges Iran, has just received Russian support.

Iran opposes this hall, citing both its own local influence and its challenging connection with Armenia.

Most significantly, maybe, Russia is apparently afraid to go along with Iran in its worsening conflict with Israel. Iran is well-known for its close ties to Russia, and Israel has always had a particular connection with Moscow.

In part because of its close ties to the Jewish state, Russia has also been careful about offering military aid to Iran.

The invasion of Ukraine, as well as Israel’s military activities in Gaza and Lebanon, drove major transitions in Russia’s demeanor toward Israel. Moscow has generally adopted a pro-Palestinian place, and there are more differences.

Russia is also unlikely to support Iran in any possible immediate conflict with Israel, despite this bad backdrop. Even though it is technically feasible that Russia could supply air defense and aerospace to Iran to thwart an invasion, developing experience in using them takes time ( at least three months for the S-400 air defense system ).

The Russo-Iranian partnership, rooted in common resistance to American dominance, is logical but instantly fraught with competition. Russia is skeptical of Iran’s work to expand its international relations, especially if it wants to re-engage with the West.

Also, Iranian officials view Russia’s support as partially greedy, noting Moscow’s shift in attitude regarding its nuclear program as it seeks to force the West amid the Ukraine conflict.

Iran and Russia are moving forward with a new corporate contract, which will allow for both heightened cooperation and mute conflict, despite these difficulties. The relationship may strengthen while preserving each nation’s freedom on a global scale thanks to the agreement.

Emil Avdaliani&nbsp, is a professor of global relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a Silk Road professor. Following Emil Avdaliani on X at @emilavdaliani

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Friend or foe? Southeast Asia braces for Trump 2.0 – Asia Times

BANGKOK – As Southeast Asian nations grapple with US President-elect Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant language and business war threats, the approaching party’s next trip will set the region’s trade-dependent nations on edge and its autocratic regimes at ease.

” In his first term, he]Trump ] did not exhibit interest in the promotion of democracy or human rights”, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, a former Thai foreign minister and trade representative, said in an interview. ” This trend is expected to continue.

” Administrations in Southeast Asia will feel less or no stress on this front,” sage Kantathi predicted.

Those officials, including in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, all seen as leaning toward China, can expect less clash from Washington in responding to their lack of good votes, free speech and other animal rights-related issues, which Democrat administrations like the cheerful Joe Biden state generally emphasize.

Provincial leaders reportedly change their political stances in response to Trump’s unpredictable behavior.

” Under his strongman administration, a personal connection with him has heightened price,” Kantathi said”. The advantage will be those who can accurately compliment Trump. Charm offensive abilities may be made more valuable.

The former leading minister added that “government officials who favor a transactional approach and dedication to work toward a deal harmony with the US will be seen in a good light.”

As businesses seek to relocate their operations from China to Southeast Asia in order to avoid Trump’s tariffs, Trump’s return to power could lead to a US-China trade war, according to analysts.

A first trade war salvo on a few Chinese goods, which Trump had previously won, spooked many businesses and prevented them from entering Southeast Asia and from China to avoid tariffs and quotas on “made-in-China” goods and services. Vietnam was one of the victims of that migration, but others might benefit from a larger exodus in the future.

If US President-elect Donald Trump follows his threat to radically increase tariffs on Chinese goods, Cambodia could be a major winner, according to a recent online article from the Phnom Penh-based Khmer Times. According to the statement,” US companies are already looking for alternative sources of goods to shift their production from China to the kingdom [Cambodia].”

Cambodia Chamber of Commerce vice president Lim Heng told the local publication,” We know all about the]trade ] war threat between China and America. Chinese companies will be more reliant on this threat to invest in Cambodia.

He predicted that” chinese businesses and regional businesses will invest in Cambodia and export to the US, Europe, and other countries.”

Cambodian exports of clothing, electrical goods, raw materials, and travel accessories could benefit from new US tariffs, which Trump has suggested will rise to 60 % for all goods made in China and 20 % elsewhere.

Still, regional countries will rue having to make the push-comes-to-shove choice of backing either the US or China if the world’s two biggest economies wage an all-out trade war.

Some people worry that Trump’s tariffs will put more of China’s excess goods in nearby Southeast Asian markets, putting more low-cost, competitive pressure on local manufacturers and businesses.

A Bangkok Post editorial warned on November 8 that the Thai government should be careful not to be perceived as having an unfavorably close relationship with China or acting as a hub for Chinese investors.

” We want to be loved by China. We want to be loved by America”, said Thailand’s Commerce Minister Pichai Naripthaphan in September before Trump’s election win.

However, some in Asia believe that America, which is battling hostilities and wars across the globe and that needs friends and allies, is becoming increasingly desperate.

According to Wanwichit Boonprong, a lecturer in political science at Bangkok’s Rangsit University,” Southeast Asia now has more bargaining power than before and sees that the United States will re-enter the conflict in the South China Sea.” Therefore, America’s position is not as strong as before.”

Indeed, China appears to be gaining in regional influence.

” He]Trump ] should know that in recent years, Chinese capital has had a huge influence in]Southeast Asian ] countries, both legally and illegally, and many countries are happy to accept it because of their geopolitical location that is very close to China, coupled with the fact that many countries have Chinese descent, and in terms of culture or tradition it is easy to accept being Chinese,” Wanwichit said.

For instance, during the anti-communist purges and extrajudicial killings that targeted ethnic Chinese throughout the archipelagora during the old Cold War, China was Indonesia‘s adversary.

Today, Beijing has built a Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail as part of its global Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure-building program and has poured billions into the nation’s nickel industry, a key element in the global transition to electric vehicles ( EVs ).

He should be aware that several Asian nations have increasingly sought to maintain balance between China and the US as a result of the rise of China in the [Southeast Asian ] region and what appears to be Washington’s diminished interest there. This includes Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia,” Paul Chambers, a Southeast Asian security affairs specialist at Naresuan University, said in an interview.

Regional nations that believe China exerts excessive pressure on itself for power and influence may concur with Trump’s resumption of the presidency.

” Given Trump’s demonstrated anti-China policy in his first term, his return to office in 2024 points to more economic and security benefits for countries feeling bullied by China in Asia, namely Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Japan, and South Korea,” Chambers said.

” Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia are the frontline states in the eyes of the United States as a result of China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea,” Kasit Piromya, another former Thai foreign minister, said in an interview.

Washington and Bangkok enjoy close diplomatic, economic, and, especially, military relations – all of which are expected to continue under Trump.

” If Trump offers positive inducements to the Thai military, relations will improve,” Chambers, an expert in the Thai military, said.

Thailand, a non-NATO US treaty ally, excels at balancing its relations with China and the US delicately by looking for the advantages that each superpower offers the country.

Trump’s return to the White House coincides with the US Pentagon’s hopes to sell Lockheed Martin’s F-16 warplanes to Thailand against strong competition from Sweden’s Saab-made Gripen E/F fighter aircraft.

Eight AH-6″ Little Bird combat helicopters are currently being built by US defense contractor Boeing for the Royal Thai Army, and Thai pilots will soon be trained at Yuma Proving Ground in Mesa, Arizona.

In July, a couple of Beechcraft/Textron AT-6TH Wolverine light attack aircraft were delivered from its Providence, Rhode Island-based factory to Thailand’s air force.

Possible options include arming the Wolverines with laser-guided bombs, AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missiles and other weapons. A dozen patrol boats were given to the Thai Marine Police by the US a year ago.

In October, US Ambassador to Thailand Chusak Sirinil, a minister, met with the prime minister’s office to discuss how the US is ready to work with Thailand in a number of areas, including modernizing the military, battling drugs, and strengthening economic ties. Chusak said”, Thailand remains a steadfast ally of the United States.”

Countries like Cambodia could face new scrutiny for their close financial ties with Chinese companies that have profited from the nation’s real estate, natural resources, tourism, and other industries if Trump adopts a targeted hard line against Beijing and its regional allies.

US-Cambodia relations are already strained by Washington’s criticism of Phnom Penh’s slide toward authoritarianism and human rights clampdown. Cambodia has accused the US of interfering with its internal affairs and even suggested that the country attempted to start a” color revolution” to overthrow previous Prime Minister Hun Sen’s regime.

Additionally, according to Phnom Penh’s repeated denials, the US believes that Cambodia has entered a secret pact that grants China access to its Ream Naval Base along the Gulf of Thailand.

Senate President Hun Sen, who allegedly hoped to bolster ties with Trump, optimistically posted on his Facebook page:

” Before the election, Donald Trump sent a message to the American people and around the world about loving peace, war-hating, ]and ] so-called pacifism. Trump’s victory demonstrates that Americans prefer peace over a direct conflict with Israel and Ukraine.

Since 1978, Richard Ehrlich has been a foreign correspondent for the American government in Bangkok. Excerpts from his two new nonfiction books”, Rituals. Killers. Wars. &amp, Sex. — Tibet, India, Nepal, Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka &amp, New York “and” Apocalyptic Tribes, Smugglers &amp, Freaks “are available <a href="https://asia-correspondent.tumblr.com/”>here.

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India blasts into the hypersonic missile club – Asia Times

India’s ground-breaking hypersonic missile test places it among the elite group of nations with the ability to master the next-generation of weapons, a revolutionary strike capability that will transform South Asia’s geopolitical environment.

The first long-range hypersonic missile, the country’s first, was successfully tested on the ground by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization ( DRDO ), according to Naval News this month.

The Indian Armed Forces ( IAF ) has three branches using the missile, which reportedly performed successful terminal maneuvers and had a high-speed impact.

The Long Range Land Attack Cruise Missile ( LRLACM)’s maiden flight test from a mobile articulated launcher this month follows this one.

The Indian Navy’s ( IN ) currently has the most powerful missile, the supersonic BrahMos missile, along with the subsonic LRLACM, according to a report from the Naval News.

As for the hypersonic missile’s specifications, the report states it likely features a delta-winged hypersonic glide vehicle ( HGV ), offering enhanced maneuverability compared to traditional ballistic trajectories.

The LRLACM, which was developed by the Aeronautical Development Establishment of the DRDO and is capable of being launched from both ground and maritime platforms, is anticipated to have a collection of more than 1, 000 kilometers.

It notes these innovations mark important advancements in India’s weapon capabilities, providing long-range regular hit options for the American government.

A K Sachdev mentions the rationale behind India’s fast weapons program in an article from the Indian Defense Review in July 2023 that HGVs and HCMs are praised for their extreme maneuverability, low radar visibility, and ability to evade contemporary air defenses.

Sachdev says these arms, flying at lower altitudes than nuclear missiles, reduce monitoring windows, with HCMs skimming only 200 feet above the ground, making intrusion by ground-based systems nearly impossible.

He notes their capability to deliver precision strikes against strategic targets —such as command centers, fortified bunkers, or moving naval assets —at continental ranges amplifies their utility.

He adds that fast weapons can perform both, carrying either regular or nuclear warheads, giving them more flexibility in conflict escalation scenarios and enhancing their proper appeal.

This unquestionable ability to reach defenses makes for reputable retaliation, which could deter adversaries and stop a nuclear escalation.

In a June 2022 Center for Land Warfare Studies ( CLAWS ) issue brief, Rajesh Gupta mentions that India’s main objectives are to improve security and deterrence in a nuclearized neighborhood.

Gupta highlights that these weapons, with their great speed, flexibility, and accuracy, can work as important tools in India’s broader plan of “dissuasive deterrent” against China and “punitive deterrence” against Pakistan.

He claims that India hopes to prevent future dangers from adversaries ‘ growing fast army and reduce its ability to incur significant costs in the event of an uprising.

Dissuasive punishment, also known as “deterrence by denial,” involves dissuasive punishment by demonstrating a strong desire to stop an attack from achieving desired benefits.

Punishing punishment, or “deterrence by punishment”, &nbsp, involves threatening severe punishments, like nuclear increase, to increase the cost of an attack. Instead of just providing strong defense, it emphasizes more severe penalties.

Gupta claims that HCMs and HGVs are crucial for enhancing regular and nuclear weapons and preventing high-value assets from being stolen from the enemy. He makes the case that having these weapons is necessary to safeguard strategic interests and mitigate vulnerabilities posed by sophisticated army systems.

He points out that India’s investment in fast defense systems and defense mechanisms is in line with its desire to become one of the few nations with hypersonic weapons, which would allow it to establish proper parity and effectively hinder adversaries.

Granath Vanaik mentions in a 2021 Air Power blog article how China’s development of hypersonic weapons poses a major challenge to India’s strategy of deterrence and its newly developed fast weapons development efforts.

Vanaik mentions that China’s use of the DF-ZF hypersonic glide aircraft and DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile highlights its focus on avoiding innovative missile defense systems, which has repercussions for local rivals like India.

He claims that these developments shorten India’s response times, putting up a threat to its nuclear command and control systems, and raising the risk of an escalation due to ambiguities regarding the types of warheads and the intended targets. He points out that China’s advancements could cause India to lower its nuclear arsenal or adopt more aggressive strategies, increasing the risk of an unintended escalation.

Vanaik mentions that India’s limited advancements in hypersonic technology and its incomplete nuclear triad, which could lead to a costly regional arms race, are compounded by the two countries ‘ asymmetric capabilities.

In a 2021 article in the Islamabad Policy Research Institute journal, Adil Sultan and Ifta Khursheed mention that Pakistan faces significant strategic challenges as a result of India’s advancements in hypersonic weapons.

Sultan and Khursheed say that hypersonic systems, characterized by their speed, maneuverability, and ability to evade missile defenses, could enhance India’s capacity for preemptive counterforce strikes. They point out these capabilities align with India’s Cold Start Doctrine, potentially targeting Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons and strategic missile systems.

Such developments, they say, might compel Pakistan to adapt its Full Spectrum Deterrence posture, possibly through heightened missile alert statuses, an expansion of mobile launch platforms, or the initiation of its hypersonic program.

As Vanaik, Sultan, and Khursheed caution, these responses risk exacerbating an arms race in South Asia, undermining crisis stability, and increasing the likelihood of miscalculation.

Sultan mentions that India’s purchase of hypersonic weapons is anticipated to worsen regional unrest in a National Security Journal article from December 2021. These weapons are particularly effective against mobile ground-based missile systems, such as Pakistan’s short-range ballistic missiles ( SRBMs), which are seen as critical to deterring India’s limited warfighting strategy of proactive operations.

Sultan claims that India might want to use hypersonic weapons to launch a preemptive strike on Pakistan’s SRBMs, potentially putting pressure on Pakistan’s ability to use nuclear weapons because it is likely to carry conventional warheads. He claims that this scenario could give India a chance to start a limited conventional military conflict.

Sultan states Pakistan might feel compelled to raise the level of its SRBMs’ security, increase their numbers, and increase their mobility in order to counteract the threat of a preemptive strike. According to Sultan, these actions, alongside other countermeasures, could further destabilize the strategic balance in the region.

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What game theory predicts Trump will and won’t do – Asia Times

Many people around the world are confused about what Donald Trump might do in his second term and whether some of the threats he made about foreign policy will be realized as a result of his success in the US presidential election.

The president-elect has threatened to make a number of significant policy changes after in office.

One of the most important issues with foreign policy is how the Trump administration may approach ending the conflict in Ukraine, in the opinion of some. Trump claimed that he could halt the conflict in a day. Different nations on Russia’s edges are concerned that any agreement that ends in a victory could lead to ideas for further military brutality, according to Vladimir Putin.

Also, if Trump abandons the US’s traditional support for the self-governing area of Taiwan, it may enable China into an invasion. The island’s status as a separatist state and its inclusion in China are seen by Beijing. But generally, US assistance of Taiwan has been a component in China holding up.

Mao Zedong’s failure after the civil war prevented Xi Jinping from establishing his reputation as the one who brought China together. In recent years, the Chinese leader has increased the pressure on Taiwan, and there are clear indications that he wants to advance.

However, neither Xi nor Putin is ensure that Trump did follow his own advice. How’s why.

A training from match idea, the scientific study of cooperation and competition, may be appropriate here – in particular, the scenario referred to as the” chicken game” or the “hawk-dove” game, which provides a model of conflict between two actors.

Because it follows the same reasoning as 1950s and 1960s contests between American teenagers, it is known as the” chicken activity.” They may drive their vehicles at high speeds, and the first to veer off to avoid a collision that might turn dangerous would be called” meat” and lose the game.

We can use a payoff matrix ( see below ) to explain the logic of this game. The speculative payoffs that could be produced by person A and player B are shown in this table. In each pair of result, person B’s return from their combined behavior is given first, followed by person A’s.

Paul Whiteley, &nbsp, Author provided ( no reuse )

A fall is the worst possible result for both people, so this pays a total of 0 for both. When player B swerves, player A should continue driving, with the payoffs visible in the top-right cell ( 1, 3 ). In the middle left body, player B experiences the same outcome. If both turn, the reward is 2 for each person.

Swerving is preferable to colliding, but the winner is the one who drives right at his or her backwards.

Nuclear punishment can be modelled using the hen game. In this situation, striking the player first before they can drive when they swerve is equivalent to striking them first. Needless to say, when both people launch attacks together, the result is a lot worse than the zero depicted in the structure.

The trick to winning the game is to persuade your rival to keep driving at all costs. For instance, some American teenagers would pretend to throw the steering wheel out of the car to warn their rival that they could not swerve in the middle of the road if they wanted to. This basically means that you must persuade your opponent to take that risk in order to win.

This is similar to what Trump does in some circumstances. He makes significant statements about what he will do, which might include what his rivals will do after they concede defeat.

Trump also has the advantage of unpredictability. The gap between what he says and does is significant, as Michael Wolff, the biographer of his first term in office, has detailed. Wolff said in an interview:” Donald Trump is deeply unpredictable, irrational, at times bordering on incoherent, self-obsessed in a disconcerting way, and displays all those kinds of traits that anyone would reasonably say: ‘ What’s going on here, is something wrong?'”

A couple of examples from Trump’s first term make the point that the president-elect often chooses moves that, historically, other US leaders have ruled out. Sometimes these moves are successful, in other cases, they are n’t.

In 2019, Trump made a historic visit to North Korea, the first US leader to do so. Trump made the suggestion that he was the only one who could bring about a new era of friendship between the countries at this meeting. However, he made a failed attempt to form a deal with North Korea and stop the country’s nuclear program. In this case, Trump’s unpredictability did not work.

However, his unpredictability provided another example of how the US had been longing for a solution. Trump aimed to “insult and alienate US allies” in his first term, attempting to stifle the NATO alliance.

And his threats to reduce US support helped him achieve his goal of persuading NATO member nations to increase their defense spending. He had hoped exactly that.

So, Trump’s unpredictability could be a deterrent to opponents such as Putin and Xi, as they do n’t know how he is likely to react, or when he might take offence. The US president has the potential to take this personally and even have an opinion against Putin if Trump rejects a peace agreement offered by Trump to Ukraine or accepts it after starting the war in his place.

Unpredictability and carelessness can pay off in conflict and negotiation situations, according to game theory. No one is yet to decide what Trump will do next, as a result.

Paul Whiteley is professor, Department of Government, University of Essex

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Will Trump renew ‘maximum pressure’ against Iran? – Asia Times

The US-Iran marriage may change drastically as Donald Trump enters office.

During his first term in office, Trump’s innovative international policy caused a period of increased hostility toward Iran. However, the local relationships have evolved over the past four years, and Trump’s method to Iran may change as a result.

Conflicts are running deep between the two adversaries. The US Department of Justice made federal charges public last Friday regarding what it claimed was an Egyptian plot to assassinate Trump. Abbas Araghchi, the Persian foreign minister, called the allegations “fabricated.”

Iranian officials also stated in a secret meeting with the US government last month that they would n’t attempt to kill Trump in a report for the Wall Street Journal.

May these tensions continue after Trump’s subsequent term? Or perhaps Iran and the US have a chance to rekindle their connections?

How did the’ maximum force ‘ plan work?

During his first name, Trump enacted a so-called “maximum force” scheme aimed at curbing Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East.

After the Obama administration’s negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA ), sanctions were lifted, Iran became significantly stronger.

Trump resigned from this partnership in 2018. Iran’s oil exports were again subject to severe punishment from the US, and there was an restriction. This severely impacted Iran’s market, which also caused social unrest there.

A US drone strike in January 2020 sparked tensions between the US and Iran, culminating in Qassem Soleimani’s death. Iran launched reprisals against a US military center in Iraq as a result.

In response to these mounting pressure, Iran scaled back its commitment to the Agreement. It prohibited the inspection of the country’s nuclear system and increased the amount of uranium enriched to the point of nuclear weapons.

Regional relationships have changed

Iran’s relations with Muslim states in the region have significantly changed over the past four decades.

Most considerably, Iran and its main rival, Saudi Arabia, resumed political relationships in March 2023, marking a traditional close to a long period of antagonism.

The two countries ‘ ties immediately increased to an inconceivable level of cooperation a few years ago. And as Israel’s warfare in Gaza and Lebanon have continued, Saudi Arabia has drifted apart from Israel and closer to its biggest rival, Iran.

The foreign officials of both countries met last month in Riyadh, followed by a conference this week between the Saudi Arabian army’s public chief of staff and his Iranian counterpart, despite some suspicion.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reaffirmed Israel’s right to respect Persian sovereignty and charged Israel with perpetrating” social genocide” in Gaza at a summit of local leaders in Riyadh this week. The mountain resolution also warned of the risk of Israel’s “expansion of anger” against Iran and other local places.

The most recent conflict between Iran and Israel has highlighted both countries ‘ dangerous features. A fatal, more extensive conflict between them, which might include the United States, Russia, and another players, would likely result in a conflict between them. Such a situation may include a significant impact on global security and economic conditions.

Trump’s approach towards Iran

Trump has constantly criticized US military action in his second term strategy. Additionally, he gave Iran a more amiable stance. Rejecting the idea of US-driven routine change in Tehran, he remarked:

I would like to see Iran be really successful. The only thing is, they ca n’t have a nuclear weapon.

He more expressed a wish for increased relations:” I’m not looking to be terrible to Iran, we’re going to remain polite, I hope”.

Elon Musk, the tech businessman closely allied with Trump, even met with Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations earlier this week in a charge to defuse conflicts in the next administration, The New York Times reported.

However, various studies indicate that Trump’s top experts are planning to reintroduce the “maximum force” campaign against Iran. By “going after foreign ships and investors who handle Persian oil,” it may mean reimposition of the sanctions and choking on Iran’s oil money.

It is too first to predict how Trump might approach his policy, given his unexpected nature.

Iran’s attitude toward a subsequent Trump word

By Iranian standards, Iran’s current government is reformist, whose rule would likely cover many of Trump’s subsequent term.

The administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian has vowed to restart nuclear talks and improve relationships with the West. And in contrast to previous revolutionary governments in Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who holds the highest position in the country, has a majority of its support.

Despite its martial power, Iran faces serious financial difficulties, with public frustration growing. So, Iran may seek to promote political solutions with the new Trump management, knowing any escalation could disturb the area.

In a mark of accessibility towards Trump, Iran’s vice president for strategic matters, Mohammad Javad Zarif, has urged him to review the plan of “maximum stress”, saying:” Trump may show that he is not following the wrong policies of the history”.

In the same vein, Araghchi, the foreign secretary, has sent good signs to Trump, saying:

The path ahead is also a decision. It begins with respect ]… ] Confidence-building is needed from both sides. It is not a one-way road.

He added that Iran is” NOT after nuclear weaponry.”

Iran has yet to listen to Israel’s latest direct invasion in late October. Iran may attempt to calm the situation despite having launched two primary problems on Israel this time. A peace in the Gaza and Lebanon problems is more important than reprisal against Israel, Iran’s government said in a statement released late in October.

Following a season of increased tensions, the place could experience a period of relative calm. The US would have a great chance to collaborate with Israel, Arab nations, and possibly Iran to create a more lasting local harmony arrangement.

Ali Mamouri is exploration brother of Middle East research, Deakin University

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Trump tariffs as ploy for making a big deal with China – Asia Times

As Donald Trump once suddenly assumes the role of industry, China’s leader Xi Jinping is casting himself as the manager of world trade, globalization and financial assistance.

At the height of the “new period of turbulence and change” that “is causing a significant challenge,” Xi said in Peru on Friday ( November 15 ), when national leaders were gathering for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ( APEC ) forum summit.

Notably, Xi did n’t point the finger straight at Trump. China and the new US administration are working together to keep communication, foster cooperation, and resolve conflicts for the mutual benefit of the two countries in a diplomatic conversation a day later.

And that’s, simply, specifically what one might expect of the head of a large, unstable market staring down the barrel of 60 % taxes to take down the political temperature.

What if Trump upsets and turns out to be Xi’s open and accepting rival, with the 60 % tax hazard acting as a blip in order to elicit a significant fresh bilateral trade agreement?

Trump’s challenges to restart colossal trade wars are numerous, and there are many reasons to take them seriously. In the runup to his election win on November 5, Trump talked earlier and often about making “retribution” the driving power of his presidency, which begins on January 20, 2025. The business of Xi has every reason to worry that Trump’s revenge tour will make its debut there.

But, the other side of the argument is worth exploring. Chances are high that Trump’s taxes are only “part of a bigger American plan” and “part of a deal-making method that is going on in Trump’s thinking”, says Neil Thomas, an scientist at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis. The aim, Thomas argues, is a “grand deal” business bargain between the two biggest markets.

” So”, Thomas says,” they are there for their own sake, ostensibly to advance the’ America First ‘ plan, or they are going to be treated as leverage over China to extract some kind of broader, either monetary or proper, great deal”.

People have made this argument, of lessons, including some in Trump’s inward loop. But there are factors to wish Trump 2.0 may promote the government’s interpersonal impulses over conflict.

One is that it’s difficult to imagine a contemporary president who is more interested in what people think of them than Trump. He almost seems like the type of person who wants to be remembered for the trade war that America lost during his first word, from 2017 to 2021, and for impeachments, indictments, and other things.

After all, if the objective was to change China’s financial big-picture path, claw millions of jobs back from Asia’s biggest sector and revive US manufacturing, then Trump’s win-list to date is very small.

Trump is unquestionably the least-idéal US leader in recent memory. He also is reveling&nbsp, in having won a credible coalition of working-class white, black and Latino voters in the 2024 election, beyond anything serious pollsters saw coming. If Trump wants to be remembered as the “working man’s president”, he’ll have to put real meat on the bones of such a legacy.

Economists understand how and why Trump’s first-term tariffs did n’t stop China’s growing share of global commerce. They know that China did n’t “pay” Trump’s tariffs, American companies and households did.

Trump’s ability to convince the populace that his protectionist trade policies are ineffective will be limited.

Trump may make the case that he makes a different choice, giving posterity a reason to remember him as a dealmaker with Xi, China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, to make a case for it.

Two strong and proud hawks can prevail in a war and prevail in history. Take Charles&nbsp, de Gaulle, the French president who in less than two years, from 1959 to 1961, made peace with Algeria. Few people believed that during the previous six years of bloodshed. Or what of Richard Nixon, China and Indochina?

Economist Richard Wolff at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, observes that the “very real dangers, ecological as well as geopolitical, that the world now faces encourage finding some kind of negotiated agreement on a multipolar world“.

After World War I, Wolff explains,” such goals inspired the League of Nations. After World War II, they inspired the United Nations. The realism of those objectives was then challenged. That injustice cannot be endured once more. Without World War III, might we still be able to accomplish those objectives today.

There are other avenues for cooperation, Wolff says. Why not, he asks, make a comparable deal between the US and China, bringing in the Group of Seven, the BRICS–Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa– and the Global South? ” With genuine global participation”, he notes, “might such a deal finally end empires”?

Trump is not well known as a man of history or a fan of the Bretton Woods institutions, which still constitute the world’s foundation. However, some of his advisors, who are former members of geopolitical alliances, are urging Trump to bring about economic harmony.

Trump voters would be far more rewarded by a trade deal that results in significant increases in Chinese investment in US manufacturing jobs than outdated tariffs that were removed from the 1970s and 1980s.

” As it turns out, there are reasons for both China and the US to want a grand bargain”, says Louis-Vincent Gave, an analyst at Gavekal Research. ” For Chinese policymakers, their greatest challenge is not a lack of competitiveness, nor an unproductive workforce, nor a lack of natural resources. A general lack of confidence among businesspeople and the wealthy is China’s single biggest issue right now. Domestic animal spirits would undoubtedly increase if the US-China relationship improved.

Trump’s trade war, like Biden’s various high-end semiconductor restrictions, would aim to stymie Xi’s strategy to transform China into the leading technology powerhouse – and promises to further strain relations between the” Group of Two” economies.

China’s prolonged property slump, rising local government debt, weak consumption, aging population and high youth unemployment makes the specter of crossing swords with Washington again decidedly unappealing.

Could this increase Xi’s willingness to trade? At this point, there is no clear pattern in terms of how everything is organized. Many think Trump will, in fact, go full tariffs at first, only to change course later on when the results are n’t what he and his likely trade czar, Robert Lighthizer, had hoped and envisioned. &nbsp,

For starters, China is less dependent on US markets now than it was when Trump was in office, and thus less likely to be pushed around by Trump 2.0.

” Here’s what’s different this time around: the global economic landscape has shifted dramatically in the past eight years”, says Josh Lipsky, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

” Germany’s GDP growth was 2.7 % in 2017. Today the country is teetering on the brink of a recession and mired in&nbsp, political dysfunction. China was growing at 7 % in 2017. But its GDP growth will be somewhere south of 5 % this year”, Lipsky said.

One might assume that all of this gives Trump “more leverage over both allies and adversaries in negotiations,” Lipsky continues. ” But it’s not quite so straightforward”.

For one thing, both US allies and adversaries have had access to his methods and observations of how he operates. Some people believe that because of this, his trade war threats wo n’t materialize into trade war action. The globe has seen, too, which levers they can pull in return to avert the worst outcomes.

Another reason Trump’s tariff talk may be more bluster than reality: inflation.

According to Lipsky,” the main question for policymakers was how the United States could consistently achieve 2 % inflation after years of below-target readings coming out of the global financial crisis.” Today, higher-than-wanted inflation is front and center in US and global politics, in fact, it was one of the reasons&nbsp, Trump was elected”.

The chances that the Federal Reserve will continue cutting rates, as Wall Street fully anticipates, will drop dramatically if Trump’s trade levies increase inflation. Jerome Powell, the head of the US Federal Reserve, and Donald Trump might encounter a second collision.

In 2019, for example, pressure from Trump—including threats to fire Powell in 2018—pressured the Fed to cut rates at a time when the US economy was already firing on all cylinders.

” As much as Trump believes in tariffs”, Lipsky adds, “he also is highly sensitive to market signals. Look back to 2018 and see how the markets responded negatively to his criticism of Powell at the time, which forced him to back away.

Trump has every reason to give the grand bargain trade route priority if this dance ever breaks out.

There are many causes for doubt about whether this will work, including how Trump intends to enlist China hawks in his next cabinet.

They include Marco&nbsp, Rubio as US secretary of state, Lighthizer, Trump’s former and likely future trade representative, Mike Waltz as national security adviser, Elise Stefanik as United Nations ambassador and Fox News host Pete Hegseth as secretary of defense.

A common denominator, aside from being tough on China, is providing strong support for Taiwan. According to Georgetown University professor Evan Medeiros, Trump might support Beijing’s efforts to reach a deal with the pro-Taiwan independence wing. But the issue could also scuttle any hope of a Washington-Beijing detente.

There’s a Door No 3, too, says Daniel Sneider, lecturer at Stanford University. As some analysts suggest, he points out,” Trump instead may opt for a grand bargain with Xi Jinping, one that could even include abandoning Taiwan”.

Trump, after all, has made several statements about the island economy wrecking America’s semiconductor industry, raising doubts Washington would come to Taipei’s defense in the case of a Chinese attack.

At least one thing is clear, says Ali Wyne, US-China expert at the International Crisis Group. Advisors who ( 1 ) view strategic competition with China as a global conflict, ( 2 ) urge the US to narrowly target deterring China in Asia, and ( 3 ) aim to stop bilateral economic disentanglement will likely engage in lobbying.

The most focused White House would struggle to balance these divergent objectives. And focus and discipline are n’t exactly Trump’s proven strengths.

However, Trump and Xi may choose to go that route for various reasons. Top Trump advisor Elon Musk, after all, has a giant Tesla” Gigafactory” in Shanghai that would benefit from a tamping down of trade tensions.

What might Trump and Xi ask for from the other, according to Gave’s list.

Trump’s wishlist includes a stronger yuan and a weaker US dollar, a push from Beijing to allow China to establish factories in the US, a purchase of Boeing aircraft, John Deere tractors, soybeans, and wheat to help reduce the nation’s record-setting US trade deficit, and a promise from China to keep North Korea in check.

According to Gave, Xi’s wish list includes assurances that any agreement will be successful, that the US will not collapse in the wake of China’s new tariffs, fewer semiconductor restrictions, the US Navy to stop parking aircraft carriers close to China’s territorial waters, and Washington to stop rattling the cage on Taiwan.

Is there enough to make a workable deal out there? Gave asks. Trump sees himself as a master negotiator who is master of” the art of the deal.” The market’s clear message is that any such bargain is priced at close to zero.

Yet when it comes to markets, Gave concludes,” One often&nbsp, makes the most money after a situation goes from being downright terrible to merely mediocre”.

Hence, Gave adds, if markets sense” that the US-China relationship is moving from the territory of ‘ new Cold War‘ to ‘ possible grand bargain,’ the rerating of assets— starting with Asian currencies and Chinese equities but moving on to emerging market debt in general, commodities, and cyclicals everywhere — could be epic”.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Presidential aspirant Yoo Seong-min on South Korea’s conservatism – Asia Times

President Yoon Suk Yeol’s approval rating has been declining since the People’s Party’s battle in the April public elections, fueled by his wife’s mounting crises and a weak market. The president’s approval rate was at its lowest point of 17 % in a recent Gallup poll. The Daegu-Gyeongbuk place, where Yoon’s most devoted supporters are located, is also experiencing decline in support.

Yoon and his party also struggle with physical challenges. The military actions of North Korea are getting worse every day.

The Asian Peninsula has experienced a significant rise in conflicts as a result of Pyongyang’s most recent army deployment to Ukraine. According to reports, US President Joe Biden referenced that shift in his week-end decision to allow Ukraine to launch ATACMS long-range missiles at Belarusian territory as part of Kyiv’s plan to conquer a region that is currently being fought over by North Korean troops.

Donald Trump’s returning to the White House adds another layer of richness. A minute Trump presidency, according to experts, could fundamentally alter the US position on East Asia, probably stifling several of Yoon’s signature initiatives.

In an exam, Yoo Seong-min, a four-term ex-lawmaker and analyst, shared his understanding on these issues. Since entering politics in 2000, Yoo has led two liberal parties, has run for president ( in 2017, winning the Bareun Party’s key to become its member ) and has held several key positions. He previously worked as a scientist at the Korea Development Institute for more than ten years before earning a degree in finance from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Yoo Seong-min. Photo: Kenji Yoshida

Q: On November 7, President Yoon held a media conference to listen to several controversies. What are your ideas?

A: It was profoundly unsatisfactory. At the meeting, President Yoon did not offer a sincere apologies or specific plans for improvement. He specifically failed to show a determination to completely preventing unelected officials from interfering with state affairs, as the first woman did. Nor did he propose any effective treatments. The government’s decision to omit the first lady from the future G20 and APEC conferences and impose her own restrictions on public appearances is only a temporary gesture. A permanent solution to stop her behind-the-scenes control, which might lead to severe issues later, is what the public demands.

When perceived as being free from the same normal, Koreans place a particular high worth on equality and experience a solid resentment toward the actions of those in charge—and their families. Unfortunately, both the Yoon and the Park Geun-hye administrations ( 2013-2017 ) have faced criticism for failing to uphold this ideal.

President Yoon’s acceptance is sinking below 20 % in traditional heartlands. What factors, in your opinion, are causing this drop?

Traditional voters in the Daegu-Gyeongbuk and Busan-Gyeongnam provinces, the standard bulwark of the right, are what keep the Yoon state afloat. I’ve been elected in Daegu four days, which gives me more insight than most officials. They first hoped that Yoon may correct the errors made by his father and put strict laws into place. But nothing seems to be working right now – be it the four major reforms ( pension, labor, education, and medical reform ) or economic policies.

That said, I’ve always urged that conservatives should n’t rely solely on those regions. I was the first to call out the need for liberals to appeal to older citizens, particularly those in the big cities. We can only put our desired plans into action by gaining these populations ‘ support.

As an analyst, how do you assess President Yoon’s financial plans?

I initially coined the term “innovative progress” in 2016. Enhancing secret company profitability is a key goal of innovative growth. I pledged to educate one million people in highly-demand fields like AI and modern technology at the time, but Yoon’s management seems to have largely adhered to my plan. The issue, however, is that this plan is not being implemented successfully. The management relies too heavily on the company ecosystem and its existing businesses and industries, despite its need for change.

Nevertheless, the Yoon management decided to increase health school membership by 2, 000 seats. The skills share in science and technology will become even more dwindling as a result. In Korea, the brightest high school students will unavoidably converge on health colleges, leading to a shortage of qualified graduates moving into the private sector.

President Yoon generally touts the phrase “private sector-led economic development”. However, people with a rudimentary understanding of economy knows this is simply a given in a market-driven business. A single-use sector economy cannot maintain economic growth. For instance, NASA and DARPA have played a key role in the development of sophisticated technologies that led to the third industrial revolution in the United States. These technologies are funded through government-led R&D. China follows a similar type.

In her 2013 text, The Entrepreneurial State, Dr. Mariana Mazzucato puts a lot of emphasis on this. Our government should lead the charge in pursuing investments in sectors where private firms are reluctant to take risks and report on the results to those organizations to encourage their expansion.

How about legislation on North Korea?

The focus of President Yoon’s plan toward North Korea is on using fire to combat flames. But, I think we need to include equality while maintaining our main principles. Strengthening South Korea’s security features and deterring Pyongyang’s interests are really important. At the same time, but, ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula requires continued speech and commitment, not only fight.

Additionally, the Yoon administration’s political efforts with Moscow and Beijing failed. Russia’s war attempts in Ukraine have just received aid from North Korea. It is crucial to maintain contact with Russian peers at this time, even though South Korea must continue to aid Ukraine. It is necessary to discuss nuclear weapon development with North Korea’s President Vladimir Putin in order to stop further military advancements. This, of course, does n’t require American consent.

Did President Yoon have the ability to build lasting relationships to Donald Trump as president?

Trump 2.0 will be different from both the second Trump administration and the Biden administration second. Mr. Trump views issues like protection cost-sharing generally through a financial lens because he is primarily a interpersonal person. So, President Yoon’s “value-driven politics” is unlikely to relate with him or deliver the same results as it might with additional leaders.

The” skill of the deal” is what our leader and Seoul leaders need to learn. Today, I’m not suggesting they deceive Washington. However, negotiations on problems like US military spending in South Korea and cost-sharing of protection should be taken into account. Japan and Germany face comparable circumstances, but each event has a special environment. The South Korean government may make conditions that both align with its own goals and appeal to Mr. Trump by analyzing different states ‘ approaches.

Do you see yourself returning to elections?

Of program. In the fall of 2026, I’ll work hard to be in the People’s Party political primary, with the goal of running for president again.

For JAPAN Forward, Kenji Yoshida is an interact journalist in Seoul and a speaker.

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