Australia’s missile wish dogged by China deterrence doubts – Asia Times
After China conducted extraordinary circumnavigation exercises near major American cities, including live-fire battle games off its southeast coast in the Tasman Sea, Australia is making plans to increase its missile arsenal.
China’s maneuvers, which tested its ability to maintain “actual fight notice position,” slowed provincial air traffic while highlighting its growing marine assertiveness and ability to project power near to American soil.
According to a report released this month by Reuters, Australia is putting more effort into being military ready to fight China with the purchase of long-range anti-ship weapons for its troops.
Australia is reportedly evaluating two missile systems, including the Precision Strike Missile ( PSM) from Norway’s Kongsberg and the Naval Strike Missile ( NSM) from Lockheed Martin, by late 2025.
The PrSM has a 500-kilometer range and can be launched from mobile launchers using High Mobility Artillery Rocket System ( HIMARS ) mobile launchers. The variety will expand beyond 1, 000 kilometers as a result of the Increment 4 improve being developed. 42 HIMARS rockets are slated for activity by Australia by 2026-27.
The program is in line with Australia’s wider plan to address what authorities have called the “greatest corporate doubt” since World War II. Australia intends to invest US$ 46 billion in long-range reach capability, targeting systems, and missile production over the next ten years. Defense experts claim that land-based smart missile systems provide cost-effective and versatile deterrence.
China’s round of Australia in February 2025 may raise questions about Canberra’s 2024 National Defense Strategy, which emphasizes an “impactful prediction” doctrine with a focus on long-range hit capabilities to hinder threats and safeguard national security.
The Australian Defence Force ( ADF) is being reorganized into a cohesive, focused force capable of transferring military power beyond its borders, according to the strategy. The technique has a long-range ship and land-based projectile systems at its core.
But, long-range attacks from Australia’s ships and on land are already insufficient. Australia tested-fired the US Tomahawk boat weapon with a 2, 500-kilometer range from the HMAS Brisbane battleship in December 2024, and it has since announced plans to purchase 200 of these weapons.
The Tomahawk is a formidable weapon, but Marcus Hellyer contends in an article for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute ( ASPI ) in February 2021 that Australia won’t have enough ships to carry the number of missiles needed in a conflict with China.
Hellyer points out that only 48 vertical launch systems (VLS ) cells are present on Australia’s three Hobart class destroyers, which are smaller than the 96 aboard the US Arleigh Burke destroyer and the 112 on China’s Type 055 cruiser. He points out that there won’t be any services until 2030 for the six upcoming Hunter course frigates, which will only include 32 VLS.
Lesley Seebeck argues in an ASPI article from January 2023 that both the NSM and the current-generation PrSM, both with comparatively little ranges of up to 500 km, are better-suited for region denial than deterrent.
She also contends that Australia’s protection sector may get up until ten years to produce enough long-range missiles to deterrence at US$ 3 million for each NSM and US$ 3 million per PrSM, and that it may not be responsible to rely on them for deterrent.
Thermoelectric points out that it is unclear how Australia’s math about what it might deduce compares to what it might hinder. She argues that it is inappropriate to associate neglect with deterrent because the former is a military-related issue and the latter is political.
She contends that Canberra has not given the ADF much thought to determining which targets to keep in check in order to deter a potential adversary in contrast to what Canberra might hold in doubt. She also mentions that any Australian missiles that might hinder a possible adversary would most likely be deeply inside the enemy’s territory.
While Australia has F-35A stealth fighters in place that could be used for piercing long-range attacks, including those against China, Harrison Kass makes reference in a March 2024 article for The National Interest ( TNI ) that the F-35A, which can only travel 1, 600 kilometers, lacks sufficient range for such a role.
Australia’s F-35As properly rely on containers that are prone to China’s long-range weapons to approach the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait. It might also consider using forward foundations in a companion nation like the Philippines, which are within easy reach of the majority of Chinese missiles.
A few American F-35As with long-range weapons may just cause pimple damage to a nation the size of China. Additionally, given China’s arsenal of missiles, it has the potential to retaliate against Australia much more strongly than the latter does.
Additionally, it is unlikely for any Asian leader to accept disrespectful attacks against China by a third party, such as the US or Australia, unless there is an unusual chance of an assault on its major islands. That is, it is improbable that any president of the Philippines may permit such attacks from its place and run the risk of making neighboring China a long-term interlocutor.
In line with that, Marigold Black and Austin Wyatt contend in a RAND criticism from March 2023 that Australia’s effective forecast theory may be based on a false presumption because it is not properly monitoring local independence relationships.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ ( ASEAN ) long-standing neutrality, which is rooted in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation ( TAC ), refutes this assumption, according to Black and Wyatt.
They claim that ASEAN independence may impair Australia’s security plans, including by denying overflight privileges and limiting its use. For example, Graham Jenkins claims in a 2022 article for the Joint Force Quarterly that Indonesia has adopted a painful nationalist place on its airspace as evidenced by its refusal to sign up for local open stars systems.
In line with the Philippines, Jenkins points out that Indonesia’s status on overflight rights may be influenced by its concern that China might retaliate if the US and Australia were to permit US and Australian military activities.
Additionally, Black and Wyatt point out that trust is undermined by Australia’s lack of complex collaboration with local partners, as demonstrated by AUKUS’s secrecy. They claim that this strategic error could lead to a” proper shock” if neutrality störens Australia’s defense strategy, underscoring the need for meaningful engagement rather than electricity projection.