Germany is the odd man out in the world economy – Asia Times

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With a one-month trial for only$ 1, you can subscribe right away and then get the special discount of just$ 99.

In terms of the global market, Germany stands out as the unexpected one.

According to David Goldman, the world views Donald Trump’s possible taxes as a greater danger than China. Germany, in particular, faces serious issues, as soaring electricity prices after the Ukraine war have crippled its energy-intensive business.

The peacefulness issue: A deciding element for Germany’s SPD

German SPD candidate Olaf Scholz and Defense Minister Boris Pistorius emerge as important figures in a potential management conflict, according to Diego Faßnacht.

Biden’s eager eleventh-hour Ukraine increase

James Davis writes about the growing hostility between Ukraine and US-provided long-range weapons being used on Russian territory. The Biden administration’s actions are widely perceived as an effort to aggravate Trump’s promised harmony agreements.

Japan watching APEC and G20 events from the bleachers

Scott Foster discusses Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s political contacts, including those involving frank exchanges with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Lima, which are intended to foster stable relationships and possible US tariffs as a new leader.

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Time for world to pivot away from the US economy – Asia Times

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Donald Trump’s win in the 2024 vote and his danger to impose taxes on all American imports highlight a significant issue for the worldwide market.

The US has won more Nobel rewards in the last five years than any other nation combined and has spent more on research and development than any other nation combined. The world is envious of its innovations and economical accomplishments. However, the rest of the world must exert every effort to avoid becoming very dependant on it.

And if Harris had prevailed, there would n’t have been much of a change.

Donald Trump’s” America first” strategy has actually been republican. The US has been largely inward-looking ever since the power independence policy of past president Barack Obama, putting an end to industrial job outsourcing.

Trump’s first policy was to take higher prices for US consumers, which would have meant imposing high tariffs on nearly every investing partner, to protect regional producers.

For example, Trump’s 2018 levies on washing machines from all over the world mean US consumers have been paying 12 % more for these items.

President Joe Biden– in certainly a more polite way– then increased some of the Trump tariffs: up to 100 % on electric vehicles, 50 % on solar cells and 25 % on batteries from China. This was a clear decision to slow down the energy move in a climate disaster to safeguard US production.

Biden launched a payment competition while agreeing to a tariff truce with Europe, which may have sparked a potentially yet worse conflict.

For example, the US Inflation Reduction Act provides$ 369 billion in incentives for sectors like renewable energy and electric cars. Additionally, the Chips Act authorized$ 52 billion to support the production of computer and semiconductor chips.

China, Europe and the rest of the world

Although this US commercial plan may have been biased toward the outside, there are still serious implications for the rest of the world. China, after years of largely export-based growth, may now deal with huge problems of business overcapacity.

The nation is now attempting to expand its trading partners and encourage more private usage.

Europe, despite a very small budget requirement, spends a lot of money in the rebate competition. Germany, a country facing sluggish growth and big doubts about its&nbsp, industrial model, is committed to matching US subsidies, offering, for instance, &nbsp, €900 million &nbsp, ($ 950 million ) to Swedish battery makers Northvolt to continue producing in the country.

All those grants are causing a negative impact to the global business and could have easily funded urgent needs like solar panel and battery-powered electricity across the entire African continent. Meanwhile, China has replaced the US and Europe as the largest buyer in Africa, following its own interest for organic sources.

Ideas may be fixed by the approaching Trump mission.

One may say that if the Biden administration had known more about the effects of an invasion and had given Kyiv modern arms before the war, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, along with the thousands of deaths that ensuing, and the energy crisis that ensued, could have been avoided.

But the responsible is mostly on Europe. Trump had a right to credit where it’s expected for his first-term warning about Germany’s proper issue of becoming too dependent on Russian gas.

By putting an end to China’s personal tax battle on Chinese technology like solar panels and electric cars, there is a clear path ahead.

Alternatively of importing record quantities of wet oil from the US, Europe would reestablish some of its original power by producing more of its own fresh energy. China could use its considerable liquidity on Russia to put an end to Ukraine’s war, and it could also learn a few things from working with Chinese companies.

The European Union may put more effort into achieving its goals, which is to sign trade agreements and use them to decrease global carbon emissions. Never just China and Europe are the subjects. After years of&nbsp, ongoing improvement&nbsp, in all main dimensions of human existence, the world is moving downward.

The number of people facing starvation is increasing, taking us back to the rates of 2008-9. War is raging in Gaza, Sudan, Myanmar, Syria, and presently Lebanon. Since 2010, there have n’t been as many civilian casualties in the world.

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For better or worse, it is doubtful that a Trump administration may change the way of lower US meddling. Additionally, it is unlikely to be a major force in the fight against climate change, trade liberalization, or tranquility.

America wo n’t help the world because it is alone.

What will happen to the US is unknown. Trump’s transfer may be largely a continuation of his previous ten years. The US economy will become less important as a result of expensive tariffs or the destruction of the organizations that contributed to its economic powerhouse status.

Americans have chosen this option, and the rest of the world must accept it. The only thing the universe can do in the interim is to learn how to collaborate more effectively without becoming overly dependent on one another.

Renaud Foucart is mature teacher in finance, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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At COP29, allies of legally non-nuclear Australia pose a problem – Asia Times

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Anthony Albanese, the prime minister of Australia, did n’t anticipate this. The American government’s refusal to sign onto the international nuclear power target of three billion by 2050 was directly criticized by two friends, the United States and the United Kingdom, at the international COP29 climate talks in Baku.

Australia was “expected” to join the nuclear squeeze, according to the original UK press release, which was funded by a multi-year Gen IV Forum nuclear research pact. Under a prior state, Australia ratified this agreement in 2016 and ratified the AUKUS protection pact in 2021 to purchase US nuclear submarines. Perhaps this is because UK politicians assumed that Australia may support the global effort to promote atomic energy.

No so. Australia has signed up for nuclear ships, but it has not attempted to do so. However, the Coalition is urging Australia to get radioactive, and Labor points out the unproven economics of radioactive in a nation with abundant sunlight and wind.

” As Australia does not have a nuclear energy industry, and nuclear power ]is ] illegal domestically, we will not be signing up to this agreement”, a government spokesperson said.

The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 ( ARPANS Act ) and the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 ( EPBC Act ) are both federal laws that prohibit nuclear power.

What exactly is this radioactive action?

The Generation IV Forum, which was founded in 2001, is intended to create models for fourth-generation nuclear reactors, and the US and UK program that Baku will announce will eventually replace Gen III styles that are already in use in many nations. More than 20 years after, there is only one prototype Gen IV furnace, which began operating in China this season. Ideas for a bigger leader seem to have been put off until now.

Since the late 1950s, the US and the UK have atomic energy. But the goal of tripling nuclear power in 25 times is outrageously impossible, certainly as far as the US and UK are concerned.

In 2023, about 9 % of the world’s energy came from the almost 400 atomic reactors producing electricity. In recent years, atomic progress has been concentrated in Asia –&nbsp, particularly China, which has 30 reactors under construction –&nbsp, followed by Russia and Eastern Europe. It would be a monumental achievement to trip up the nation’s nuclear result.

There have n’t been any commercial nuclear plants in the country built since the US completed the Vogtle plant in 2023, years behind schedule and billions over budget. A handful of ideas approved during the much-touted “nuclear enlightenment” of the early 2000s could in theory been commenced, but there is no indication of that occurring. The idea of building any considerable number of plants by the late 2030s, as is proposed in the US plan, is a dream.

At Hinkley Point, the UK is building two nuclear reactor, both significantly overdue and overbudget. A number of other tasks announced in the early 2000s have been abandoned, leaving only the Sizewell C flower, a 3.2-gigawatt electricity station proposed in England.

Although Sizewell C was formally approved in November 2022, financing issues persist. A last choice is already scheduled for early next year after being delayed by the British government on numerous occasions. By 2035, Sizewell C may be operational, assuming a favorable results. After that, there are no large-scale flowers in the pipeline.

With no large-scale atomic on the horizon, interest has switched to the idea of” little compact units”, ranging from 70 to 300MW in size. These include cut-down versions of huge reactors that were previously built in a factory and delivered to the building site. A distinctive example is the Westinghouse AP300, which is based on the AP1000 used at Vogtle.

Advocates for SMR construction suggest that they can be built in five to seven years at a lower cost per megawatt than current large models, even though no SMRs have yet been created ( or perhaps because there have n’t been any real-world tests of ambitious claims ). However, CSIRO modeling suggests that SMRs does cost more than large nuclear power plants, which are significantly more expensive than renewable energy that has been stored and transported.

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in using SMRs to energy cloud and AI systems ‘ data centres.

But a closer look suggests precaution. Large tech companies like Amazon, Google, and Microsoft have all announced plans for distribution in the first 2030s, but each one has a potential reduction of at least 1 GW.

In consequence, it’s very unlikely that they will generate more than 5GW of new power over the course of five times.

By comparison, renewables are just gaining power. In the next quarter of 2024 only, the US is expected to fit more than 40 Megawatts of utility-scale power, including 10GW of battery backup. With 330 GW of renewable energy installed or under construction, China is really tremendous.

Does n’t the AUKUS deal pave the way to nuclear power?

This year, some observers have drawn a collection between AUKUS and this radioactive news. However, this contradicts previous assertions that the nuclear energy legislation was not a result of the underwater deal.

Yet fervent opponents of nuclear weapons made a distinction between nuclear submarines and radioactive plants when the nuclear submarine agreement was first made public. As Liberal-National MP Ted O’Brien said in 2021, the AUKUS package was not related to nuclear strength:

They are two entirely different products. American law is not required to change for the nuclear-powered ships. Legally speaking, the legislature has a unique task to tackle. No lifting of the ban is necessary.

There is a lot of whimsy in the US and UK proposal to triple atomic energy, but little actually happens.

But that does n’t help the Albanese government much. Opposition Leader Peter Dutton can safely vouch for his ideas in line with the statements made by Australia’s AUKUS allies, whose party currently has a platform to create a private nuclear power industry in Australia.

Greens and another AUKUS critics are also likely to attack the state. It’s becoming exceedingly doubtful that participation in AUKUS may lock Australia into the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including reprocessing and producing nuclear energy, given the recently announced decision to store nuclear waste from the AUKUS at underwater shipyards.

Then there’s the Trump issue. All these computations may be illogical given Donald Trump’s resumption as US President. Trump’s speech is largely pro-nuclear, but he is unlikely to depart Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, which provides US state support for nuclear energy. And he will be without a doubt reversing the AUKUS deal or requesting a revision on unfavorable conditions if it starts to appear problematic.

John Quiggin is a teacher in the School of Economics, The University of Queensland.

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Japan’s exports rebound, the Middle East market topping the list – Asia Times

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Japan’s new trade achievement offers a glimmer of hope amid broader financial difficulties. In October 2024, Japan’s exports rose by 3.1 % compared with the same month a year earlier, marking a significant rebound after the sharp 1.7 % fall in September that had set a 43-month low. &nbsp,

This sudden increase exceeded economics ‘ anticipation of a 2.2 % fall, suggesting that Japan’s export-driven market is on a healing journey. &nbsp,

Despite these encouraging developments, the nation still faces a number of difficulties and dangers that may affect its 2025 monetary path. &nbsp,

For international investors, Japan offers a convincing argument for growth in some sectors as well as a nuanced set of risks, particularly in light of domestic demographic trends, domestic economic trends, and fiscal policy.

While Japan’s trade figures have improved, the broader business harmony presents a more concerning image. &nbsp,

The country’s imports also saw a modest rise of 0.4 %, defying expectations of a 0.3 % decline, pushing Japan’s trade deficit to 461.2 billion yen ($ 2.98 billion ) in October. This marks an rise from the previous month’s updated gap of 294.1 billion renminbi, and a wider difference than the 360.4 billion japanese forecasted by economists. &nbsp,

The trade deficit highlights the country’s ongoing fundamental challenges, as the nation heavily relies on exporting finished products while importing raw materials and energy, despite the increase in imports.

Japan’s strong performance in the Middle East, where exports increased by 35.4 % in October 2023, was a key positive factor in the export data. &nbsp,

Although Japan’s exports are also largely dependent on markets in Asia and North America, this suggests a possible growth of its trading partners. &nbsp,

However, Japan’s ability to respond to global demand and its ability to deal with international trade risks, especially US policies, will depend largely on the global economy’s ability to weather growing uncertainties.

Trade dangers: US procedures under Trump

The potential impact of US policies under President-elect Donald Trump is one of the biggest physical risks. If the new leadership imposes more tariffs or launches a wider trade war with China, the country’s profoundly integrated and highly reliant on imports could experience significant problems.

Japan’s business relationship with the US is crucial, particularly in sectors such as automobiles, electronics, and machine, where Japan holds a competitive edge. &nbsp,

But, Japan could experience slower export growth and higher natural materials costs if Washington adopts more interventionist policies or if US-China tensions escalate further. &nbsp,

Any additional deterioration in relations between the country’s two largest economies, particularly given Japan’s dependence on China as a major trading partner, was considerably deteriorate Japan’s supply chains and lower the need for its goods in both areas.

For international investors this, of course, creates an ambiguous setting. &nbsp,

Socioeconomic and labour market problems

Japan’s internal problems possible reduce its ability to grow economically. Japan’s aging populace and declining beginning price have been well-documented, and by 2025, these changes are expected to increase more. &nbsp,

The country’s labor is shrinking, leading to concerns over labour shortages and a rising dominance amount. As the population ages, the need for healthcare and pension solutions will increase, placing more pressure on Japan’s fiscal plans.

The Chinese government has taken some steps to help address these issues, including easing immigration regulations to encourage older staff and women to work. &nbsp,

But, to time, these methods have had limited success in reversing the demographic collapse. For owners, this means that Japan’s ability for robust private consumption and labor-driven progress is constrained. Alternatively, investors are going to look to businesses that can alleviate labor shortages, such as robotics, technology and AI, which Japan has been at the forefront of developing.

In addition to socioeconomic forces, Japan’s usage habits have been influenced by an aging population, with a growing desire for products and services tailored to older people. Sectors such as healthcare, biotech, and elder care technologies are likely to see growth, while traditional consumer goods may face stagnation as Japan’s population decreases and ages.

The BoJ’s role

In 2025, the Bank of Japan ( BoJ) will continue to play a significant role in the country’s economic landscape. &nbsp,

In an effort to encourage inflation and boost economic growth, the central bank has been using ultra-loose monetary policies for years, including massive asset purchases and negative interest rates. With Japan still struggling with low inflation and slow growth, these measures have not produced the desired outcomes.

The BoJ’s accommodative stance will likely stay in place in 2025, with low interest rates and ongoing asset purchases. &nbsp,

Japan’s financial markets could experience volatility, especially in the bond market, despite the fact that this supports short-term economic activity.

For global investors, the BoJ’s policies will have a significant impact on the yen. A weak yen generally benefits Japan’s exporters, making their products more competitive abroad.

As global investors look to 2025, Japan presents both considerable risks and significant opportunities. &nbsp,

The key will be to keep an eye on the BoJ’s monetary policy actions, including those relating to global trade policies, domestic labor market reforms, and other developments.

deVere Group was founded by Nigel Green, its CEO.

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South Korea is no patriarchy, despite 4B charges of misogyny – Asia Times

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In 2019, Naksungdae scholar and former Seoul National University doctor Rhee Young-hoon published Anti-Japan Tribalism. The book’s argument is that South Korea should examine its colonial past more nuancedly under Chinese rule. Hatred for Japan, Professor Rhee and his co-authors argue, is not a ideal foundation on which to build the modern, democratic state of South Korea.

We regret noting a phenomenon like this in recent studies about the existence of cruel South Koreans. We are uneasy about the accusations made by some North Korean women that South Korea is a “patriarchy,” because they appear to reflect a novel form of politics, which blinds both inside and outside the Korean coast to the difficulty of South Korea.

One of us, Morgan, spent a month in Gyeongsangbuk-do, in southeast South Korea, some twenty years ago. While that, he met some strong, smart, independent people. He had opened discussions with them about their opinions on any number of items, from politics and religion to history, culture, and social problems. He never understood that those people were the subjects of any sexism. To the contrary, many of the people Morgan met in Gyeongsangbuk-do and throughout South Korea were welcoming, helpful, and style. Many of them were interested in serving women’s requirements. Some were a little quiet. No one in his memory has ever had bad opinions of people as individuals. South Korea as a “patriarchy” does not match with any of Morgan’s activities in or with that state.

The other of us, Yoshida, has lived and worked in South Korea for over a century, spending the past four decades as a blogger covering the government’s social relationships, among other subjects. He has firsthand knowledge of the raging gender divide that he witnessed during the Moon Jae-in administration ( 2017-20 ) and how tensions have evolved as a result. Although anti-feminist activities have gained popularity among young Vietnamese men and gender-motivated crimes against women, these styles do not apply to all men. Also, he believes that people with radical ideologies—whether rooted in sexism or misandry—exist within both genders but make up just a small fraction of the entire North Korean people. In summary, neither of us agree with the statements made in aggressive hit articles about South Korea.

The proof given above is subjective, but much more reliable empirical data and much bigger trends verify our knowing. For instance, South Korea has gained notoriety for child bands due to their graceful dance moves and love of makeup and hairstyles, among other things. Additionally, South Korea is currently experiencing a boom in professional sports, or “women’s professional sports.” Moreover, South Korea’s demographics, in certain its low fertility, would seem to indicate that ladies control decisions about friendship with men. The “incel” sensation, although also, however, often associated with South Korean community, also hints clearly at sexual autonomy. The fact that North Korean women appear free to make such decisions does not support South Korea’s existence as a sexism in which people are ruled, even if it is claimed that North Korean women usually find them impractical as intimate partners. If anything, the “pro-natalist” laws which some in South Korea condemn as evidence of sexism are tacit admittance of feminine freedom. ( It is also jarring that those who criticize such policies seem to forget that men also of course fall under such policies ‘ purview, reproductive-biologically speaking. )

There is another, albeit indirect, discussion against the cost of sexism. Specifically, the universal military service condition in South Korea, which, far from being really common, applies only to able-bodied people. An army of mainly young males, mostly from a angry, nuclear-armed state with a propensity for foolish ICBM launches and global terrorism, stands along the border with the accusations of sexism. We make no suggestion at all that women may be forced to join the military alongside people. But in saying this, we do not think that we perpetuate a sexism. In addition, we think that the men who guard the South Korean border actually do their duty because they are n’t trying to subjugate South Korean women. To put it simply, if South Korea is a sexism, one would never know it if the lives of female soldiers and sailors were comparatively unharmed.

South Korea may never have always had the same level of progress as it does now. Before the Republic of Korea was established, the yangban class of aristcratic literati kept other women as virtual sex slaves, including kisaeng ( courtesans akin to Japanese geisha ). American service members were given comfort women by the Korean authorities, which was a state-run trafficking practice during the Korean War, which suffered horribly for the ladies. Even now, some people are still living in the vicinity of British military installations.

However, Park Geun-hye, Park Chung-hee’s daughter, is still the only adult leader in East Asia to have been elected president. It is correct that President Park Geun-hye was removed from office by female lawyers. She was not, however, the first North Korean leader to face legal repression after taking business. In facing a severe post-presidential death, Park joined a portfolio of different fell rulers, all of them males. And the latest president, Yoon Seok-yeol, is beset with difficulties caused by none other than the First Lady, his wife. Apart from the typical cutthroat politics that may befall every would-be ruler, whether male or female, South Korea seems to be filled with optimistic people who face much resistance or discrimination in the exercise of power.

We hope that the portrait of South Korea that the expanding 4B global movement may paint is much more complex in the details provided above. We believe that South Korea, which has worked hard to join the rates of contemporary governments, is disregarded and unfairly treated when compared to this extraordinary and compressing philosophy. We also believe that it violates cultural richness in an excessive way because it will never be true that all X are Y in any society. Human life is noisy, human knowledge is varied, and each individual lives his or her career as an entity, not as a copy in a flock. Instead of indicting whole nations for the actions of a terrible few, we should treat people as like.

Or more than a few. Well, in recent North Korean actions have been outrageously disrespectful to women’s dignity. We aspire that the government may learn who the crimes against women are committed and to put all possible punishment on those who violate the law. We also hope that commentators wo n’t make South Korea’s reputation look bad by insisting that such reprobates represent the entire country. They are n’t. Additionally, all South Asian women are represented by those who accuse all South Korean people of sexism.

North Korean culture is complicated. It and its citizens deserve to be treated with dignity and not to be subjected to widespread condemnation. Politics, whether democratic or sex, does not do justice to a position as rich and vibrant as modern-day South Korea.

Jason Morgan, a researcher and writer based in Chiba, Japan, is co-author of The Comfort Women Hoax: A Fake Memoir, North Korean Scouts, and Strike Teams in the Academic Swamp.

For JAPAN Forward, Kenji Yoshida is an interact journalist in Seoul and a speaker.

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Musk’s government-by-tech to show the limits of disruption – Asia Times

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Elon Musk, the world’s richest man, will take over the newly created Department of Government Efficiency alongside fellow software billionaire and former national member Vivek Ramaswamy on November 12th, according to president-elect Donald Trump’s announcement on November 12. The new office will be tasked with reining in state government, curbing federal spending, and reducing rules.

Musk has been vocal in his support of Trump’s campaign, which included probably illegal monetary “giveaways” to citizens. Although Musk is relatively new in electoral politics, technology companies and their leaders have made numerous attempts to restructure public policy and governance, ranging from housing and transportation to city planning.

By looking more closely at some of these efforts, we may be able to get a preview of what Musk’s Department of Government Performance may try to do, what government-by-tech may seem like, and what might go wrong.

Replacing public service

In 2013, Musk himself proposed a new form of public transportation called the “hyperloop” to join Los Angeles and San Francisco. And Musk’s SpaceX aims to outsource the rocket-building business to the government.

But another tech firms have had similar interests.

Uber has made a series of attempts to replace people transport. Companies like Sidewalk Labs, a subsidiary of Google’s parent company, have created” intelligent cities” that collect and analyze information about people’s behavior in order to make decisions about providing services, making attempts to replace urban infrastructure.

Perhaps an analyst suggested that public libraries may be replaced by Amazon bookstores. In fields as diverse as cover, personality identification, and education, tech firms have challenged people products.

The boundaries of disturbance

One thing some government-by-tech jobs have in common is a perception that government is inherently inefficient, and that (unregulated ) technology can offer better options.

Silicon Valley software companies have huge espoused “disruption“, the idea of overthrowing a dead standing status with technology. Unlike people agencies, the reasoning goes, companies is “move fast and break things” to discover new and more effective ways to deliver services and price.

Tech firms that adhere to this theory have undoubtedly provided service that many of us use frequently in our day-to-day lives and generated significant profits. But this does n’t mean the Silicon Valley model makes sense for public administration. In reality, the information suggests something more like the same.

A record of disappointment

Tech’s attempts to provide public companies have had mixed results.

Innisfil, Canada, switched to Uber in 2017 to replace all of its public transportation options. The result was a rise in city costs ( in Uber’s fees ), more cars traveling, and more expensive transportation for low-income residents.

After encountering concerns regarding protection and planning, Sidewalk Labs ‘ smart-city trial in Toronto was abandoned in 2021.

The software industry’s disruption has worsened existing issues, with Airbnb and other short-term rental firms playing a role in the housing crisis.

Small solutions for slim problems

Additionally, tech firms typically concentrate on a select few issues. Silicon Valley has helped us to find a car, choose a restaurant for dinner, manage quickly around a town, transfer money to our friends, and search for the best rental for our vacation.

It has provided fewer options for getting low-income cover, providing treatment for the younger, or reducing our power usage. There are significant benefits to this: technology companies want to tap wealthy buyers with disposable income to generate income.

These disparities even reflect Silicon Valley’s lack of diversity, though. Tech remains mostly white, mostly female, generally upper-middle course, typically highly educated. This affects the troubles and answers Silicon Valley finds.

The secret business will suffer from all of this. However, the government’s primary function is to look after all of its citizens, not merely owners or buyers ( or even just those who voted for it ).

The couple get a dozen services.

The issue is that Silicon Valley’s “efficiencies” and solutions may end up delivering the few at the price of the many. Some “inefficiencies” of public service arise from the truth they are designed to get as many people into accounts as possible.

Rules and protections for older people, for those with disability, for those who may not speak English as a second language, for instance, all create the need for more government and more rules.

Musk has compared the public transportation system to a “pain in the pussy” where possible serial killers must be positioned next to one another. Of course, in some places public transportation carries no such discrimination. Additionally, many people who prefer to travel by private jet ( or even Tesla ) may have no other choice but to rely on a public bus for their needs.

One of SpaceX’s aims is to reduce the cost of a trip to Mars to under US$ 1 million. This would be a extraordinary success, but it means that Musk’s imagined Mars settlement may be very wealthy. As a form of public policy, spacecraft and hyperloops are terribly insufficient.

Unromantic needs

The technology sector itself depends on existing facilities and institutions, even though the idea of disruption attempts to minimize its impact.

Uber depends on roads and vehicles, as well as the institutions that maintain them, and Airbnb depends on brick-and-mortar construction, as do Amazon and eBay, which rely on postal service and travel system.

All tech companies rely on solid, enforceable financial, property, and tax laws. These outdated institutions and infrastructures may not be attractive or even effective.

However, these so-called inefficiencies have often evolved in ways aligned with fairness, justice, and inclusivity. Silicon Valley tech companies ‘ past records do not support their positions on these issues.

Hallam Stevens is professor of interdisciplinary studies, James Cook University

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What Ukraine can now do with longer-range US missiles – Asia Times

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According to reports citing White House officials, the incoming Biden administration has given Ukraine the authority to launch a longer-range missile strike into Belarusian territory using materials from the US.

The West is concerned that Moscow, with the aid of the flow of hundreds of North Korean combatants, may be putting together a significant battle to regain control of the Kursk region of Russia.

But how large a package is the Biden choice? And had it alter Eastern Europe’s conflict’s course? For clarifications, The Conversation US contacted Benjamin Jensen, a teacher at American University and the School of Advanced Warfighting at the Marine Corps University.

What types of weapons did the US permit Ukraine to apply?

The Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, are short-range nuclear missiles that can go a lot farther than the arms earlier at Kyiv’s waste.

We are n’t talking about new technology. Since the late 1970s and 1980s, ATACMS have been around since 1986, when it first started to be produced. By the mid-1990s they were in company, being first deployed by the US in 1991 as part of Operation Desert Storm.

ATACMS have a range of about 190 miles. That distance is longer than British-supplied Storm Shadow and French-supplied Scalp cruise missiles, which have a range of 155 miles ( 249 kilometers ).

Not only do ATACMS get a bit further, they likewise travel very fast – at Mach 3, or three days the speed of sound, making them harder to catch. ATACMS may be challenging for sensor systems to detect depending on where they are fired from.

The other advantage, in this regard, is that ATACMS are no dependant on GPS setting. Different arms that depend on GPS have been successful in preventing clogging and reducing their effectiveness. But ATACMS you move to an gravity guidance system, based on gyroscopes, to avert GPS blocking tactics.

Additionally, the newly authorized missiles can have a significant cargo, which can cause a massive crater when struck.

The current issue may have a significant impact on its range, end velocity, and warhead size. This would give Ukraine the ability to launch extensive attacks on Russian soil.

In contrast, US approval of their use by Ukraine in Russia had, in theory, even make it easier for various allies to transport ATACMS to Kyiv. Nearby Poland and Romania have them, since do South Korea and Australia. The Biden administration’s approval of those institutions ‘ plans to provide the weapons to Ukraine as well.

Why was this longer-range weapons approved then?

The decision by Washington comes as North Korean fighters are increasing their troop numbers in Russia; the 10,000 North Koreans apparently in Russia are just the second wave.

This coincides with the deployment of 50 000 Russian forces near Kursk, which was crucial Belarusian territory that Ukraine seized earlier this year. In order to prepare for what might be a many bigger assault to recover the country, there have been what I would visit “probing problems” by Russia in the area over the past few weeks.

North Korean and Russian forces will need to unite before moving to the front, and they will do so in council regions further away from Russia.

The defense thinking is, if you can strike troops in those strong areas, you can really disrupt Moscow’s functional reach. And because of their size, speed, and selection, ATACMS are ideal for attacks on military assembly areas.

I would be using ATACMS to attack both assembly lines, ammunition depots, and airfields if I were to advise the Russian government.

What appears to be the wondering in Washington?

If I had to wager, I would suggest that there are still growing concerns about an increase but that the fight is transitioning.

Donald Trump, the president-elect, has indicated that he wants to negotiate the close of Ukraine’s conflict. I believe that the Biden administration’s approval of ATACMS suggests that these agreements are about trying to help Ukraine.

Alternately, the latest White House might have considered how to handle the growing pro-Moscow help of North Korea and come to the conclusion that allowing Ukraine to attack North Korean forces before sending them to the front would be a better solution. More artillery casings have been sent to Russia by Pyongyang than Ukraine, aside from forces.

These rationales are not mutually exclusive. Additionally, it appears that the Biden administration values the imperatives more than any perceived danger of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s escalating answer or the U.S. being further into the conflict.

What does this indicate about the current status of the conflict?

My checking of the conflict – and you are getting a sense of this through recent&nbsp, comments from Ukrainian President&nbsp, Volodymyr Zelensky – is that Ukraine may only have until the close of the next promotion time, that is, spring to summer 2025, to maintain its position.

This is because battle is still costing Ukraine money. Kyiv is having trouble mobilizing enough forces because Ukraine had tried to avoid using recruitment more frequently.

Not to say that Ukraine has lost all heat. But it will struggle to take more Russian-controlled province. Capturing place in Kursk was a big success, but it was a one-off, high-risk bargain. And fighting in pieces of Ukraine’s eastern occupied by Russia is proving tricky.

Is the goal here to aid Ukraine in retaining Kursk’s holdover?

According to reports about Biden’s approval of ATACMS, Washington has been telling Ukraine that Kursk is the only place the weapons can be launched.

If Trump does have the ability to push people to talk, as he says he does, that will not stop the fighting. Fighting may continue until a cease-fire is reached between the parties, and it could continue even then.

For these reasons, I think you will see Russia put whatever at Kursk, physically. In the event that Kursk becomes its biggest bargaining chip, Ukraine will do everything in its power to maintain its territorial dominance that.

Did Trump’s defeat play a role in Biden’s considering?

I really believe that the decision to grant ATACMS was more about Ukrainian real than American politics. That said, the president-elect’s reported push for conversations as a way to live the Ukraine-Russia turmoil may well have escalated the decision.

Benjamin Jensen is doctor of corporate research at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting, Scholar-in-Residence, American University School of International Service

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Note to Trump: Targeted tariffs can work, broad ones never do – Asia Times

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Taxes are back on the agenda because Trump is about to reoccupy the White House. Basically, they never left — Biden&nbsp, slapped large tariffs&nbsp, on a variety of Taiwanese products, including electric cars, cards, and other things.

But Trump is contemplating tariffs that are &nbsp, far broader in scope&nbsp, — a 60 % tariff on all Chinese-made products, and a 20 % tariff on all imports from anywhere.

There are important differences between cover levies like Trump’s and targeted tariffs like Biden’s. I’m not certain whether Trump’s business individuals, including&nbsp, Robert Lighthizer, are informed this distinction or never, but it’s important. Like the fact that&nbsp, imports do n’t subtract from GDP, it’s something that people who debate trade policy often seem not to understand.

What is the goal of levies?

First, let’s discuss about two different things you might want tariffs to perform.

One purpose of taxes is to&nbsp, lower US dependence on China&nbsp, — or on the outside world in general —&nbsp, in a particular set of essential business. For instance, if China makes all the chargers, they may just decide to cut you off whenever they want to — as&nbsp, China just did to America’s top aircraft manufacturer, Skydio.

Uavs are a key tool of modern war — perhaps&nbsp, the&nbsp, vital tool. And some robots are battery-powered. So if the US goods all its capacitors from China, it kind of puts the US at China’s kindness. Thus, we might want to use tariffs to make sure that China does n’t make all our batteries.

A second purpose of taxes is to&nbsp, lower business imbalances. The US runs a very big deal deficit, and China runs a very large trade deficit. In fact, trade is currently essentially balanced across all of the world’s nations, with the exception of the US and China. China’s trade deficit accounts for&nbsp, the vast majority of all international trade deficits, and America’s trade gap accounts for&nbsp, the vast majority of international trade imbalances:

Origin: &nbsp, Brad Setser

Many nations ‘ trade deficits with China and their trade surpluses with America result in healthy business. That does n’t mean they’re buying stuff from China, slapping a new label on it, and selling it on to America. However, what it does mean is that China is the nation’s key” country that sells more than it buys,” while America is the world’s key” state that buys more than it sells.”

Many people want to reduce those imbalances. Some people ( probably correctly ) think that because of these significant trade deficits, American manufacturers lose important markets overseas.

Others believe that global trade imbalances lead to various other economic problems — for example, Michael Pettis, who believes&nbsp, imbalances drive inequality. Still others simply view trade deficits as a “loss” and trade surpluses as a “win” .1&nbsp, Reducing America’s trade deficit was one of&nbsp, the major goals of Trump’s first term in office.

In fact, trade deficits are severely affected by both broad and targeted tariffs. But targeted tariffs&nbsp, are &nbsp, capable of reducing US dependencies in specific areas like batteries — in fact, they’re better than broad tariffs for this purpose. Let me explain.

Broad tariffs struggle to reduce trade deficits

There are actually two reasons that broad tariffs, like the ones Trump is proposing, have difficulty reducing trade deficits. The first reason is&nbsp, exchange rate adjustment.

When you trade stuff internationally, you have to&nbsp, swap currencies. As anyone who has traveled overseas knows, to buy Chinese goods, you need <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2024/11/trump-tariffs-threaten-to-torpedo-the-yuan/”>yuan. 2&nbsp, So if you’re an American, you need to swap your dollars for <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2024/11/trump-tariffs-threaten-to-torpedo-the-yuan/”>yuan in order to buy stuff from China. The exchange rate refers to the price at which dollars and <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2024/11/trump-tariffs-threaten-to-torpedo-the-yuan/”>yuan exchange each other are exchanged.

China’s demand for Chinese goods is slowed when the US imposes tariffs on it. And that reduces US demand for Chinese&nbsp, yuan, because when Americans do n’t need to buy as much Chinese stuff, they do n’t need as much yuan.

And when demand for yuan goes down, the price of yuan, in terms of dollars, goes down. This is just basic Econ 101, supply-and-demand stuff. The dollar&nbsp, appreciates&nbsp, in value and the yuan&nbsp, depreciates&nbsp, in value. This is called “exchange rate adjustment”.

The impact of the tariffs is partially offset by the exchange rate adjustment. When tariffs make the yuan get cheaper for Americans, that makes&nbsp, Chinese goods cheaper for American customers. And when tariffs make the dollar get more expensive for Chinese people, that makes&nbsp, American goods get more expensive for Chinese customers.

This does n’t completely cancel out the effect of tariffs, but it&nbsp, partially&nbsp, cancels it out. Similar to how pizza restaurants would reduce their prices in response to the government’s taxation of pizza in order to reduce the number of people who no longer eat it.

Of course in the real world, there are more than just two currencies, and more than just two countries trading with each other. However, if you examine the data, it is obvious how much Trump’s tariffs affected China during his first term.

The price of the yuan is represented by the red line in this Jeanne and Son’s ( 2023 ) chart, which shows the dollar’s value.

Source: &nbsp, Jeanne and Son ( 2023 )

You can see that when Trump put tariffs on many Chinese goods, the dollar got stronger ( in fact, it got stronger a little&nbsp, before&nbsp, the tariffs officially went into effect, because people knew the tariffs were about to go into effect ), and the yuan got weaker.

China’s tariffs were less impactful, partly because China buys relatively little from the US in the first place. According to Jeanne and Son,” the US’s tariffs implemented by the US account for about 22 % of the dollar’s appreciation and 65 % of the renminbi depreciation observed in 2018-19.”

How much of the tariffs ‘ effect is canceled out by this exchange rate movement? &nbsp, In theory, it’s possible&nbsp, for it to cancel out 100 %! Everyone who is involved in the exchange rate exchange can say” OK, tariffs made Chinese goods more expensive in America, so we’ll just say that the actual price of Chinese goods is the same, so everyone in America can just keep buying exactly the same amount as before. Good job everyone, glad we got that sorted out”.

Remember that this is not a free market; instead, the Chinese government likely intentionally devalues the yuan to prevent losing market share in export markets.

In reality, exchange rates only cancel out&nbsp, part&nbsp, of the effect of tariffs. A number of factors prevent exchange rates from fully adapting to the new tax, including the fact that most trade imbalances would be eliminated if one billion percent tariffs were applied to everything. So it’s really anempirical&nbsp, question as to how much exchange rates cancel out tariffs.

A theoretical model that Jeanne and Son use to arrive at a number range of 30 to 35 % is used. That’s a substantial decrease already, and I actually think the true number is likely to be higher, especially where China is concerned3. If all of the yuan’s movement against the dollar during this time were due to Trump’s tariffs, it would mean that&nbsp, exchange rate adjustment canceled out around 75 % &nbsp, of the tariffs ‘ effect!

And this is n’t the only factor in broad tariffs ‘ efforts to lessen trade imbalances! There’s at least one more. Broad tariffs also&nbsp, raise costs for American manufacturers, without increasing costs for Chinese manufacturers.

Take the automobile market for instance. Automobile manufacturers make a lot of steel and aluminum. Costs for American car manufacturers increase as steel and aluminum cost more. That makes them less competitive, both in the domestic market and abroad.

Steel and aluminum will be among the products that the US will impose broad tariffs on. Due to the tariffs, GM, Ford, and Tesla will have to raise the prices of their cars in order to avoid having to pay higher steel and aluminum prices.

But BYD and other Chinese car companies&nbsp, wo n’t &nbsp, have higher costs, because the tariff only applies in America. Thus, Chinese automakers will have a clear advantage over American automakers. That will lower the cost of Chinese car imports and increase the cost of American car exports.

In fact, we have good evidence that this happens. &nbsp, Lake and Liu ( 2022 ) &nbsp, study the effects of Bush-era tariffs on steel and aluminum, and found that they hurt steel-consuming industries like the auto industry:

In response to the local labor market’s dependence on steel both as an input and as a component of local production, President Bush imposed safeguard tariffs on steel in early 2002. [ W]e analyze the local labor market’s employment effects of these tariffs.

After Bush removed the tariffs, local steel employment did not significantly decline after the tariffs were removed, but local employment in the steel-consuming industries did for years. The tariffs also caused steel-intensive manufacturing facilities to leave the workforce, which suggests that plant-level fixed entry costs play a role in converting temporary shock into long-lasting outcomes.

The same effect will apply to trade balances as Lake and Liu are examining employment outcomes. Across-the-board tariffs make US-made cars and semiconductors and washing machines and refrigerators and farm equipment and robots more expensive, because they raise the cost of imported inputs like steel, aluminum, photoresist, batteries, and so on. But foreign-made products can still get cheap inputs, because they are n’t paying tariffs.

It will obviously reduce some of the impact of tariffs on trade balances by making American manufacturers pay more in price than their foreign competitors.

So between these two effects, we can expect Trump’s big “tariffs on everything” to have a disappointingly small effect on the US trade deficit — not&nbsp, zero&nbsp, effect, but less than Trump would like.

This is what happened in Trump’s first term, when the US trade deficit did n’t shrink at all4&nbsp, despite his tariffs:

Now, Trump’s tariffs did have &nbsp, some&nbsp, effect in shifting US deficits away from China, as I’ll discuss in the next section. They were a total bust, however, in terms of reducing the US’ total trade deficit with the rest of the world. It’s not difficult to understand why that was the case when we consider intermediate goods and exchange rate appreciation.

Targeted tariffs can effectively lower particular US dependencies.

Far from it, I do n’t want to suggest that tariffs are ineffective. Effectively, limiting tariffs on particular imported goods can divert the demand away from those imports.

Suppose we put a 1000 % tariff on Chinese-made computers. In 2022, the US&nbsp, bought$ 51 billion worth of computers from China&nbsp, — about 9.4 % of our total imports from China.

Imagine that we inflated the cost of Chinese computers by ten times using tariffs. Americans would no longer purchase computers from China, choosing to purchase ones made in America, Mexico, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

In fact, Mexico, Taiwan, and Vietnam are currently our biggest foreign sources of computers besides China, and along with local American factories, they’re probably perfectly capable of ramping up production to meet our needs:

Source: &nbsp, OEC. Note:” Chinese Taipei” is a fake name for Taiwan, which the OEC uses in order to avoid offending the government of China.

Now, at this point, you may say,” Well, but the Mexican-made computers and the Vietnamese-made computers will have a bunch of Chinese chips and screens in them, so we’ll still be importing stuff from China”.

And you’re absolutely right! There is no reliable way for America to determine how many Chinese components are present in the finished goods we import. Similarly, if we taxed imports of Chinese batteries, we would n’t currently be able to apply those tariffs to Chinese-made batteries contained in Mexican-made cars or Vietnamese-made phones.

But suppose we&nbsp, improved our data&nbsp, so that we&nbsp, did&nbsp, know which parts came from where. Then, using tariffs, we could completely eliminate Chinese manufacturers from our supply chains for chips, batteries, or anything else.

And broad tariffs significantly outperform targeted tariffs in terms of achieving the objective of securing particular supply chains. One reason is that targeted tariffs&nbsp, do n’t have nearly as big an effect on exchange rates&nbsp, as broad tariffs.

If you put a 1000 % tariff on Chinese computers, that only affects 9.4 % of the US demand for Chinese goods. That wo n’t significantly affect exchange rates. US demand for Chinese goods overall wo n’t fall much, but it will shift to other stuff — plastic, clothes, broadcasting equipment, machinery, or whatever.

The exchange rate will change significantly more, which will largely offset any significant impact on any particular imported good, while applying a tariff on all Chinese goods, including the plastics, clothing, broadcasting equipment, machinery, and everything else.

Additionally, targeted tariffs address the intermediate-goods issue that I previously covered. Yes, if you put a 1000 % tariff on Chinese batteries, that will hurt American EV manufacturers. However, this might be okay if you believe the battery supply chain is more strategic than the EV supply chain, perhaps because batteries also enter drones.

Targeted tariffs work like a scalpel, allowing you to cut out exactly the import types you do n’t want while keeping the less crucial items untouched. Targeted tariffs are very effective if your goal is to secure specific strategic supply chains, even though they wo n’t reduce trade deficits. Fortunately, Robert Lighthizer is probably thinking about this, as evidenced by this passage from his book, &nbsp,” No Trade is Free“:

But this means that Trump’s 20 % tariff on all imports from all countries would actually&nbsp, weaken&nbsp, the effect of his 60 % tariffs on China! If we only tax Chinese imports, we can shift demand away from China to other countries. But if we tax imports from everywhere, the dollar will appreciate, which will cancel out some of the impact of the China tariffs.

Therefore, tariffs should n’t be applied to imports from other nations if what the US wants to achieve is to reduce its bilateral trade deficit with China. Trump’s 20 % across-the-board tariff idea would n’t reduce our trade deficit meaningfully, but it would make it harder to shift our supply chain out of China.

So how&nbsp, do &nbsp, you reduce global trade imbalances?

Anyway, that’s all well and good. But suppose we really&nbsp, do &nbsp, want to reduce the US trade deficit. How do we do that? And how do we do it without kneecapping our own manufacturers?

I’ll write a lot more about this, but the short answer is to reduce trade deficits, &nbsp, you need to depreciate the US dollar. Remember that Americans are encouraged to purchase more foreign-made goods while the price of a higher dollar forces them to compete for US exports? Well, if you’re going to reduce the trade deficit, you need to counteract that somehow.

Stephen Miran of Hudson Bay Capital has &nbsp, a good post&nbsp, explaining that the real problem here is the US dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. Here, from X, is the upshot:

The truth is that the” strong dollar” is probably the root cause of America’s chronic, persistent trade deficits. A strong dollar or a strong manufacturing and export sector are the choices for US leaders. So far, we’ve always chosen the former. If Trump really wants to get rid of the US trade deficit, he’s going to have to dump this long-standing policy. But that’s a topic for another day.

Notes:

1 This attitude often goes by the name of “mercantilism”, though it’s a bit different from the original&nbsp, early modern European version.

2 Yuan is actually a nickname for China’s currency, the renminbi or RMB.

3 Personally, I think Jeanne and Son’s approach to China is incorrect because it assumes that Chinese government policies share the same goals as American government policies.

In reality, Xi Jinping cares a LOT about establishing China’s position in global manufacturing markets, so he’ll likely devalue the Chinese currency in response to US tariffs. China has the power to manage its capital account if it so desires and frequently does.

4 This is true as a percent of GDP, as shown in the chart. In dollar terms, the trade deficit&nbsp, actually got worse under Trump. In fact, these trade deficit numbers have some big problems — they do n’t measure&nbsp, value-added trade, and some of the trade they do measure is basically&nbsp, faked for tax avoidance purposes. No matter what method we use, the US trade deficit is still unaffected by Trump’s tariffs.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Path to peace in Ukraine likely to run through India – Asia Times

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Vladimir Putin’s meetings will take place in India when it leaves for the end of this year or the beginning of the time, keeping in mind New Delhi’s policy of principled independence toward the conflict in and around Ukraine.

India has always rejected the sanctions imposed by the West against Russia and has always abstained from anti-Russian commitments presented at international forums like the UN. India has called for global laws to be respected and the Ukraine war to end as soon as possible at the same time.

India has acted as a launch mechanism for American pressure on Russia, giving Moscow a great power alternative to growing overly reliant on China.

Due to the fact that India is now the second-largest consumer of subsidized Russian crude after China, bilateral trade increased to US$ 65 billion last month from$ 12 billion in 2021.

Cheaper oil has fueled India’s robust economic growth, which averaged 8.2 % last year and is on track to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2027, according to the International Monetary Fund ( IMF).

Some of India’s private financial institutions also comply with Western sanctions, which has made it challenging to transfer some of these resources, despite the Indian government’s refusal to do so. Russia has so agreed to&nbsp, invest some of&nbsp, its dollar stockpile in India, which has helped to expand and balance the two sides ‘ business.

India and Russia have also given three shipping corridor growth projects priority, none of which have reached their full potential. These include:

  • the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ) through Iran with branches across Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia,
  • the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor between those places, which is also known as the Eastern Maritime Corridor, and
  • the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic.

According to rumors that returning US President Donald Trump plans to resume his “maximum force” campaign against Iran, the INSTC is the most appealing but also the most susceptible of the three.

India has previously obtained a waiver from the US for dealing with Afghanistan at Iran’s Chabahar Port. Trump might impose more stringent sanctions on Iran, making it impossible for it to compel India to stop selling American goods, including pharmaceuticals, on Russian shelves, thereby lowering Russia’s now sizable dependence on China and raising its already high level of dependence on China.

If India’s alleged subtle technology channel is targeted, the same could happen. Given the number of China hawks in his case, that would seem to conflict with the incoming Trump administration’s great strategic goals.

Trump stated just before the election that he wanted to “un-unite” Russia and China, but he would just unintentionally do so if he places new restrictions on Russian-Indian industry to condemn Iran.

Trump added that he will give Ukraine’s battle a chance. Some observers anticipate that he will allow Russia to achieve its full range of territorial and other objectives in a ceasefire agreement, despite the uncertainty of how precisely. A suggested compromise’s words are still undetermined.

Under the American Logan Act, which criminalizes the negotiation of a dispute between the US and a foreign state by an undocumented American citizen, Trump and Russia are not permitted to communicate on a package. On January 20, agreements will start to discuss Trump’s election.

That could help India, which has close ties to Russia and the US, get started on discussions. Putin and Narendra Modi, the country’s prime minister, was talk about the possible military and economic ramifications of a bargain, including a possible Iran-Indian trade ban and/or a gradual lifting of sanctions against Russia.

India was then privately communicate these Soviet dealing points to the Trump administration, which if the president-elect’s initial term is any indication, may be specially friendly towards Modi’s government.

Dmitry Peskov, a spokeswoman for the Kremlin, confirmed on Tuesday that Putin’s trip to India will soon be announced. It may adopt Modi’s second visit to Russia in June, when he was Putin’s guest of honor at the time and had his first official meeting there in September. The officials signed nine partnerships and released a thorough joint statement at their most recent meeting over the summer.

Trump is also near to Modi, while is his nomination for director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard. Trump’s national security advisor get, Mike Waltz, is co-chair of the India conference and his nomination for secretary of state, Senator Marco Rubio, introduced the US-India Defense Cooperation Act in July.

If those figures and planets are paired up, India might be the key to bringing Ukraine to peace rather than past mediator Turkey or young ally China. Putin and Modi will likely talk about a deal with Ukraine during his upcoming trip, but details wo n’t likely be made publicly.

Putin is undoubtedly aware of Trump’s desire to “pivot” up to Asia, which necessitates a fast resolution of the Ukraine war. Putin is even aware of the crucial part India plays in controlling the European balance of power with China. &nbsp,

So, Modi is well-placed to evade US punishment for its business with Russia through Iran, which, if imposed, may lead to more Chinese influence in and over Russia. Modi may even offer pragmatical recommendations on how to reach a settlement in Ukraine that would be appropriate to Russia based on his near ties to Putin since 2014.

Putin had undoubtedly no support or encourage Trump to travel back to Asia to encircle China in a more powerful way. Instead, Putin understands Trump’s great strategic interests and may get to leverage them to Russia’s benefit.

Modi might explain to Trump how this would improve his aims in relation to China in order to achieve a compromise on Ukraine that is most likely to be appropriate to Russia.

Modi may even try to persuade Trump that an unfavorable outcome could be an escalated conflict in Ukraine ( even if it is done so so that it will then de-escalate to better terms for the US).

Russia may continue to be pushed closer to China as its growing junior partner, which was stifle the European balance of power in way that hurt US and Indian objectives.

Beyond sporadic hints at Ukraine, none of this is good to be included in the future Putin-Modi meeting or phone call, either later this year or first future. However, it’s important to appreciate the role that India plays in US and Russian great strategies, in the European balance of power and so, correctly, also in the Ukraine war.

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Europe must flex muscle in a Trump-led Ukraine peace deal – Asia Times

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Since Donald Trump won the election on November 5, there has become irrational about what his term as president will think for the Ukrainian conflict, which is now in its 1000th time.

Trump’s campaign’s claim that he would end the war in 24 hours, perhaps before taking office in January 2025, is simple to refute. However, it is obvious that Trump will use all available indicators to pressure Moscow and Kyiv into agreeing to a ceasefire and maybe a wider resolution.

Whatever happens with Trump’s dealmaking may have effects that need to be considered and prepared. From a Russian view, the implication is that the country may lose its already Russian-occupied lands, at least for the time being, and would have to give up on its ambition for NATO account. This is very distasteful for Ukraine.

Kyiv ca n’t afford a continuation of the conflict because of recent Russian advances on the front lines in both eastern Ukraine and the Kursk region in Russia, which are both held by the Ukrainians. If Trump actually implements his risk to end all martial support for Ukraine, this is especially important.

Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, made the statement on November 16 that Kyiv “must do everything to ensure that this war ends following year… through political means.”

This was primarily a smile in Trump’s way, indicating Ukraine’s willingness to engage in conceivable US-brokered counseling work. It also served as an acknowledgment that Ukraine’s long-term hopes have been dark for some time.

A map showing Russian advances in eastern Ukraine.
Over the past several months, the Russian army has been capturing territory more rapidly than ever since the invasion’s beginnings. Institute for Research on War

In light of Moscow’s continuing defense speed, there is some fear that the Soviet leader, Vladimir Putin, is eager to reach a settlement immediately. He has indicated that conversations are open, but Russia is known for holding off on talks, imposing more requirements, and simply signing agreements once it has obtained the most agreements.

Even then, significant application on the ground is almost a given, and re-escalation is good – as the Minsk Accords on Ukraine of September 2014 and February 2015&nbsp, illustrate&nbsp, only very vividly.

Third caveat: While Trump will likely be fully committed to making a deal at first, he may decide to withdraw if his and Putin’s timelines do n’t work out. This is what happened when Trump’s short-lived passion for an agreement with North Korea’s Kim Yong Un during his first word evaporated, and he simply walked away empty-handed.

However, even in this situation, some conversations broke out, most vitally without significant concern for US allies like South Korea and Japan. In the end, Trump and Kim’s disagreement turned out to be one of the catalysts for additional advancements in North Korea’s nuclear programme and closer ties with Moscow.

Western allies of Ukraine and the US had make plans for the day following Trump’s opening, regardless of whether Trump presses Ukraine into a bad deal, whether Russia withdraws from a after Trump-brokered settlement, or whether Trump abandons his efforts to end the conflict.

This means, above all, taking more responsibility for their own safety, as the Polish prime secretary, Donald Tusk, put it succinctly before the US elections. Because it is unclear what the future of relations will be between the major players, this is easier said than done. However, there are some obvious rules that can now serve as guidelines for European planning.

What ought to be the strategy of Europe?

Second, the US will no longer provide the bulk of its military aid to Ukraine. In the future, Kyiv’s Western friends will be responsible for the majority of the lifting. This will require providing long-term investment in Europe’s and Ukraine’s defense business base as well as financing the purchase of weapons and ammunition.

Next, it means getting Ukraine what it needs quickly. But, Russian requirements must be based on a credible military strategy rather than a flimsy win plan intended to retake control of all Russian-occupied areas. This became optimistic wondering at the moment Ukraine’s 2023 battle failed.

A workable strategy is required to safeguard Ukraine’s front-line locations, along with Ukrainian aircraft, at the time of a peace. This will increase the likelihood of an agreement being signed by Russia and give the possibility of steadily and effectively rebuilding areas under Kyiv’s control.

Third, any military approach to defend Ukraine will also need to be a foundation of a foreseeable European security order that effectively deters any potential Russian invasion. In upcoming negotiations, Kyiv should n’t be left alone. Ukraine would be the weakest link in negotiations involving Trump, Putin, and Zelensky only, and Western interests would likely be totally ignored.

This is not to say for a profit to the style of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany that oversaw the failed Minsk Accords. Instead, if the notion is that Europe will have to move away and be the main guarantor of Russian independence, Kyiv’s EU and NATO partners need to have some insight in negotiations.

The shock mobile phone Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, shared with Putin on November 14 is an indicator that this has been recognized.

It will be crucial to establish a communication network for Europe to make it obvious that all European lovers have a common understanding of red lines and what they would mean if the Kremlin crossed them, as well as what advantages it would have if it were to respect them.

The northern sanctions regime has a significant impact on both the consequences and the benefits, which was highlighted in a G7 leader’s statement supporting Ukraine on November 16 that reaffirmed the dedication to “imposing significant costs on Russia through sanctions.”

Europe may, therefore, also need to operate with Trump and had communication channels with his presidency. Scholz’s phone contact with Trump on November 10 was reported as a “very detailed and good conversation”, including on Ukraine.

Trump’s strategy of striking a deal with Putin to “un-un-unite” Russia and China is at conflict with German suspicion of Putin as a trustworthy companion. Possible solutions to this issue across the Atlantic can be found, but they must also include a workable and long-term solution to Ukraine.

After the most bloody military conflict on German soil since the Second World War, 1, 000 people have come to terms with the fact that everything about Europe should exist without it.

If Trump and Putin value durability and scorn failure, then the only road to getting this level across in Washington, Moscow and Kyiv is through toned pursuit of German self-interest and self-assertion.

Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham

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