Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ puts Asia in its line of fire – Asia Times

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As Donald Trump shocks stock markets from New York to Singapore with widening risks of new levies, officials in Washington might want to examine what really happened in Seoul.

Over the weekend, South Korea, China and Japan met for their first high-level financial speech in five times. The style: beefing up local business as Trump’s White House supersizes its tariffs program.

The countries ‘ industry officials pledged to” carefully cooperate for a complete and high-level” process to create a three-way free trade agreement centered on “regional and international trade”.

In other words, Trump’s dumping of fresh grenades at the international trading program– and the resulting chaos in markets– has officials in Seoul and Tokyo but spooked that they’re talking. Truly talking, despite historic enmities.

People in Tokyo, however, are turning to Beijing as they realize the US, when Japan’s most trusted partner, is no longer the alliance it thought. Seoul, also, which has had a very up-and-down partnership with China during the Xi Jinping time.

This trilateral work probably wouldn’t be happening if Trump stuck with Plan A: a “grand deal” trade deal with China that creates a ginormous Group of Two market and gives Trump the financial legacy he so eagerly craves.

The plunge in global shares ahead of Trump’s” Liberation Day” reciprocal tariffs announcement on April 2 is garnering attention of the kind that the Trump 1.0 presidency would not have liked. Something Trump really does care about is the stock market.

So far, Trump 2.0 has displayed a greater pain threshold with regard to falling equities. Hence his recent comments about there being a “period of transition” for his tariff regime to make America’s economy great again.

As Trump said last month:” There’ll be a little disturbance, but we’re OK with that”. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent argues the world’s biggest economy needs a “detox” to wean it off dependence on public spending.

Last month, Bessent said Washington’s reciprocal levies will target the “dirty 15” that maintain substantial and chronic trade barriers with the US. Though Bessent didn’t specify which 15, suffice to say China is among them.

Commerce Department data show that as of the end of 2024, the US has the highest goods deficits with China, the European Union, Mexico, Vietnam, Ireland, Germany, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Canada, India, Thailand, Italy, Switzerland, Malaysia, Indonesia, France, Austria and Sweden.

But the fallout for Asian markets more broadly will come into sharper relief on Trump’s” Liberation Day”. Given the mixed signals from Trump, and how often he’s changed his mind about who’s in the collateral damage zone and why, Asia can’t be sure if Trump will wake up on April 3 and say “never mind” or instead add even more tariffs.

It’s the not knowing that has Asia on a cliff’s edge. This extends to what strategy the Trump team might be employing this week, as opposed to next or the one after.

Trump’s mixed-signal tariffs on China are a case in point. Team Trump seemed to think the mere threat of taxes on Chinese goods, touted as high as 60 % on the 2024 campaign trail, would shock Xi’s Communist Party into submission.

And that Beijing would draw up an extensive list of preemptive concessions to make” Tariff Man” Trump happy. Instead, Xi’s team made it clear they were looking forward to seeing Trump’s concession list. Having called Trump’s bluff, the White House quickly pivoted to tariffs — now at 20 %.

Yet Team Xi has stood firm. No clear concessions, no efforts to compliment Trump or signal China might cave. This lack of fealty is putting China in harm’s way as Trump’s revenge machine turns its way.

The bigger question is whether China bears the brunt of Trump’s bruised ego. Rather than bowing to Trump’s provocations, leaders from Canada to Mexico to Denmark have pushed back. Greenland is clapping back at Trump World’s designs on the island. Officials in Panama are rolling their eyes.

Enter Vladimir Putin for the coup de grâce. A few weeks ago, Trump was certain he’d scored the Russia-Ukraine ceasefire that eluded Joe Biden. Now, Putin is proving right the geopolitical wags who warned that he’s playing Trump. Not to mention depriving Trump of the Nobel Peace Prize he craves.

Trump is now “pissed off” that Putin is dashing ceasefire hopes and is threatening 50 % tariffs on nations that buy Russian oil. But mostly, Trump is miffed Putin exposed his art-of-the-deal schtick to be more myth than reality.

As so many world leaders brush Trump off, might the bullseye on China become even bigger in the weeks ahead? The impulse could be to go even harder at showing China who’s the boss.

That would put Asia writ large in harm’s way. Since the 1980s, Trump, then a New York real estate mogul, has blamed the region for stealing US jobs and prosperity in the most sinister terms. Back then, Japan was at the center of Trumpian ire.

At&nbsp, the&nbsp, time, Trump the businessman was a regular on daytime talk shows complaining about how Japan had” systematically&nbsp, sucked&nbsp, the&nbsp, blood&nbsp, out of America –&nbsp, sucked&nbsp, the&nbsp, blood&nbsp, out! They have gotten away with murder. They have ended up winning&nbsp, the&nbsp, war”.

Today, China inhabits the bogeyman role. It’s more complicated, though, given Trump’s oft-articulated affection for Xi. On January 23, for example, Trump said,” I like President Xi very much. I’ve always liked him”. Trump added that he’s “always had a great relationship” with China’s strongest leader since Mao Zedong.

Yet Trump and Xi seem on a collision course as the former realizes the latter isn’t the junior partner he envisioned. This raises the odds Trump might supersize the revenge tour that Asia has been dreading all year, including levies of 60 % or more on Made in China goods.

Wall Street, too. Along with increased tariffs, investors are trying to factor in the global fallout from Trump’s spending cuts and the risk of a US recession. At the same time, there are concerns about a bubble in artificial intelligence stocks, seen in recent big declines in the tech-heavy Nasdaq 100 benchmark.

One concern is that hundreds of billions of dollars flowing into data center infrastructure are outpacing the need for such facilities. That’s pulling the rug out from under shares in chipmaker&nbsp, Nvidia Corp&nbsp, and companies from Broadcom Inc to Microsoft Corp to Amazon.com&nbsp, to Alphabet Inc&nbsp, to Meta Platforms.

But the real fallout could be on the outlook for Asia’s$ 41 trillion economy, and how it reverberates back on America. Trump’s tariffs threaten to deal a generational blow to the region’s development.

” Asia-Pacific economies are bracing for details of wide-ranging US tariffs”, says Helen Besier, an economist at Moody’s Analytics. ” The Trump administration has investigated the country’s trade relationships and appears bent on hiking tariffs to neutralize any duties, policies or practices that it believes create an uneven playing field. Beyond the direct impact on targeted countries, the toll will multiply. Much of this region’s trade is about components that come together as finished products destined for the US”.

Though China is standing its ground versus Trump, 2025 is proving to be an increasingly challenging year.

This week brought news of a slight improvement in manufacturing activity, as evidenced by China’s official purchasing managers ‘ index. The Manufacturing PMI quickened to&nbsp, 50.5 in March, its best performance in 12 months.

Even so, notes Carlos&nbsp, Casanova, senior Asia economist at Union Bancaire Privee,” support measures remain essential to sustain recovery in the first half of 2025″.

This may include the People’s Bank of China easing monetary policy again. That’s particularly possible as deflation pressures continue to bedevil officials in Beijing.

Julian Evans-Pritchard, head of China economics at Capital Economics, says the PMI data suggest “infrastructure spending is ramping up again and that exports have so far remained resilient in the face of US tariffs”. Yet, he adds, China’s economy likely grew noticeably slower in the first three months of 2025 than the last three of 2024.

Xi and Premier Li Qiang have pledged to step up fiscal policy moves to achieve this year’s growth target of&nbsp, “around 5 %”. Thus far, the priorities have been on giant trade-in programs for consumer goods to boost household spending and increased debt issuance to support the beleaguered housing sector.

For 2025, Beijing upped its budget deficit to around 4 % of gross domestic product ( GDP ), up from 3 % last year. It’s a rare increase as Team Xi works to counter Trump’s tariffs.

” The budget does allow for fiscal support to be stepped up further over the coming months”, Evans-Pritchard says, though US tariffs” will start to weigh on exports before long”.

Higher US tariffs on Chinese exports are also expected to hit domestic manufacturers in the coming months.

” The manufacturing sector faces downside risk in the second quarter as the external demand weakens, driven by the tariffs and the economic slowdown in the US”, says economist Zhiwei Zhang, president of Pinpoint Asset Management. ” The big question is how much export growth will decline, and how quickly the fiscal spending will pick up to offset weaker exports”.

Fighting these downside risks is pivotal to Xi making good on his pledge to create more than 12 million new urban jobs in 2025. Trump’s trade war, though, is generating unprecedented headwinds everywhere, including the globe’s biggest stock bourses.

The fallout could see Asia’s consumers and investors pulling back in ways that crimp US growth, too. And three of Asia’s four biggest economies striking a grand bargain trade deal with Trump Nation nowhere in sight.

Follow William Pesek on X at&nbsp, @WilliamPesek

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Rash AI deregulation puts financial markets at high risk – Asia Times

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As Canada moves toward stronger AI regulation with the proposed Artificial Intelligence and Data Act ( AIDA ), its southern neighbor appears to be taking the opposite approach.

AIDA, piece of Bill C-27, aims to establish a regulatory framework to strengthen AI transparency, accountability and monitoring in Canada, although some researchers have argued it doesn’t go far enough.

Nevertheless, United States President Donald Trump is pushing for AI restructuring. In January, Trump signed an executive order aimed at eliminating any perceived regulatory impediments to” American AI development”. The executive order replaced past president Joe Biden’s due executive order on AI.

Importantly, the US was also one of two countries — along with the UK — that didn’t signal a worldwide declaration in February to ensure AI is “open, inclusive, open, honest, safe, protected and trustworthy”.

Eliminating Artificial protection leaves economic institutions vulnerable. This risk can improve confusion and, in a worst-case situation, increase the risk of widespread decline.

The power of AI in economic areas

AI’s ability in financial areas is obvious. It can increase administrative efficiency, perform real-time risk assessments, generate higher earnings and forecast forecast financial change.

My research has found that AI-driven machine learning models hardly only beat standard techniques in identifying financial statement scams, but also in detecting abnormalities quickly and effectively. In other words, AI does find evidence of economic mismanagement before they spiral into a crisis.

In another investigation, my co-researcher and I found that AI models like artificial neural networks and classification and regression trees may identify economic distress with amazing accuracy.

Artificial neural networks are brain-inspired algorithms. Similar to how our brain sends messages through neurons to perform actions, these neural networks process information through layers of interconnected “artificial neurons”, learning patterns from data to make predictions.

Similarly, classification and regression trees are decision-making models that divide data into branches based on important features to identify outcomes.

Our artificial neural networks models predicted financial distress among Toronto Stock Exchange-listed companies with a staggering 98 % accuracy. This suggests AI’s immense potential in providing early warning signals that could help avert financial downturns before they start.

However, while AI can simplify manual processes and lower financial risks, it can also introduce vulnerabilities that, if left unchecked, could pose significant threats to economic stability.

The risks of deregulation

Trump’s push for deregulation could result in Wall Street and other major financial institutions gaining significant power over AI-driven decision-making tools with little to no oversight.

When profit-driven AI models operate without the appropriate ethical boundaries, the consequences could be severe. Unchecked algorithms, especially in credit evaluation and trading, could worsen economic inequality and generate systematic financial risks that traditional regulatory frameworks cannot detect.

Algorithms trained on biased or incomplete data may reinforce discriminatory lending practices. In lending, for instance, biased AI algorithms can deny loans to marginalized groups, widening wealth and inequality gaps.

In addition, AI-powered trading bots, which are capable of executing rapid transactions, could trigger flash crashes in seconds, disrupting financial markets before regulators have time to respond.

The flash crash of 2010 is a prime example where high-frequency trading algorithms aggressively reacted to market signals causing the Dow Jones Industrial Average to drop by 998.5 points in a matter of minutes.

Furthermore, unregulated AI-driven risk models might overlook economic warning signals, resulting in substantial errors in monetary control and fiscal policy.

Striking a balance between innovation and safety depends on the ability for regulators and policymakers to reduce AI hazards. While considering the financial crisis of 2008, many risk models — earlier forms of AI — were wrong to anticipate a national housing market crash, which led regulators and financial institutions astray and exacerbated the crisis.

Blueprint for financial stability

My research underscores the importance of integrating machine learning methods within strong regulatory systems to improve financial oversight, fraud detection and prevention.

Durable and reasonable regulatory frameworks are required to turn AI from a potential disruptor into a stabilizing force. By implementing policies that prioritize transparency and accountability, policymakers can maximize the advantages of AI while lowering the risks associated with it.

A federally regulated AI oversight body in the US could serve as an arbitrator, just like Canada’s Digital Charter Implementation Act of 2022 proposes the establishment of an AI and Data Commissioner.

Operating with checks and balances inherent to democratic structures would ensure fairness in financial algorithms and stop biased lending policies and concealed market manipulation.

Financial institutions would be required to open the “black box” of AI-driven alternatives by mandating transparency through explainable AI standards — guidelines that are aimed at making AI systems ‘ outputs more understandable and transparent to humans.

Machine learning’s predictive capabilities could help regulators identify financial crises in real time using early warning signs — similar to the model developed by my co-researcher and me in our study.

However, this vision doesn’t end at national borders. Globally, the International Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Board could establish AI ethical standards to curb cross-border financial misconduct.

Crisis prevention or catalyst?

Will AI still be the key to foresee and stop the next economic crisis, or will the lack of regulatory oversight cause a financial disaster? As financial institutions continue to adopt AI-driven models, the absence of strong regulatory guardrails raises pressing concerns.

Without proper safeguards in place, AI is not just a tool for economic prediction — it could become an unpredictable force capable of accelerating the next financial crisis.

The stakes are high. Policymakers must act swiftly to regulate the increasing impact of AI before deregulation opens the path for an economic disaster.

Without decisive action, the rapid adoption of AI in finance could outpace regulatory efforts, leaving economies vulnerable to unforeseen risks and potentially setting the stage for another global financial crisis.

Sana Ramzan is assistant professor in Business, University Canada West

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Trump is redefining, not abandoning, American soft power – Asia Times

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For years, the United States projected global influence through what foreign policy experts call” soft power” – the ability to form world politics through social appeal, political engagement and intellectual interest rather than military power.

Under President Donald Trump’s administration, this traditional approach to international relationships is undergoing a basic change.

Critics decry the move as withdrawal of American administration. They’re missing the point. What we’re witnessing isn’t a foolish destroying of American influence but more a necessary recalibration for a universe where the old rules no longer use.

The standard soft energy model lacked clear indicators in today’s competitive world landscape. While previous administrations invested heavily in abstract notions of kindness and long-term control, Trump recognized that in a world where China and Russia wield economic liquidity to grow their spheres of influence, America needed a approach prioritizing substantial returns over intellectual appeal.

This approach has manifested in several high-profile decisions: withdrawing from agreements like the Paris Climate Accord and the Iran nuclear deal, questioning the value proposition of NATO ( in today’s form ), and reconsidering America’s role in international organizations.

These movements signaled that US agreements may be subject to practical national passions rather than abstract principles of international security.

Take, for example, Trump’s critique of the World Health Organization ( WHO ), the United Nations ‘ global public health agency. While his amounts weren’t perfect ( according to various fact-checking publications ), his fundamental analysis was correct.

Based on WHO estimates, American combined assessed and voluntary contributions to the WHO’s 2024-2025 resources is US$ 706 million, compared to$ 184 million for China.

Whatever the measures, it is hard for British citizens to understand how the country’s second largest economy with a considerably larger community pays only 26 % of what the US contributes to the WHO.

Trump’s critics have characterized these decisions as America retreating from global leadership. In reality, they represent a strategic pivot toward a more transactional form of influence.

Trump recognizes that foreign aid can be restructured to serve a more immediate geopolitical purpose, aligning with his broader” America First” doctrine. Aid and alliances are now treated as business arrangements with expectations of immediate returns – a sharp departure from past administrations that justified foreign assistance primarily as instruments for building goodwill and sowing benign influence.

Having deconstructed the old model, the challenge now is how to complete the redefinition of American soft power for this new era. Four key areas demand particular attention:

First, America must transition from viewing foreign aid as charity to embracing strategic economic engagement. China’s Belt and Road Initiative demonstrates how infrastructure projects can build influence while ensuring recipient nations see tangible benefits from alignment with a major power.

America should develop its own model of partnership that yields mutual advantages. It is not clear the US International Development Finance Corporation ( DFC) is the vehicle to do this, thus Trump’s desire to create an American sovereign wealth fund.

Second, the US faces global threats on three key fronts: military, economic and technological. The Trump team has been extremely clear on the first two threats. The technological front can sometimes fall under the radar but is vital to success on all other fronts.

It is imperative that US technological leadership becomes a cornerstone of America’s global influence strategy. As digital connectivity reshapes international relations, US dominance in technology, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity offers powerful leverage to shape global norms and standards in ways that reflect democratic values.

Third, America needs resilient, flexible alliances rather than outdated treaty frameworks. The limitations of institutions like the UN and NATO have become increasingly apparent with the UN hamstrung by the Security Council and NATO struggling to balance the interests of all members ranging from Turkey to France.

The EU itself continually has a love-hate relationship with different members from Italy to Hungary. Interest-based coalitions that reflect contemporary geopolitical realities will prove more effective than rigid multilateral structures designed for a bygone era.

Finally, America must compete more effectively in the global information space. Nations are now shaping their own images through state-controlled media and digital diplomacy. The US must rethink how it communicates its values and interests to global audiences.

Abandoning platforms like Voice of America without replacement strategies surrenders the battlefield of ideas at a critical moment when America’s enemies will spend richly to ensure their narratives gain global traction.

While podcasts and new streams of communications dominate in the West, a large swathe of the world’s population still turns on the television, listens to the radio and picks up a newspaper for world news. To abandon those information spaces would be counterintuitive to American diplomacy.

Critics say Trump’s tenure is irreparably damaging traditional US soft power, the reality is it is exposing the need to modernize America’s approach to global influence.

Whether through economic incentives, technological leadership or reimagined alliances, America’s ability to attract and influence must evolve alongside an evolving geopolitical landscape.

The challenge for the Trump team and beyond is to reconstruct American soft power with a clearer strategy—one that recognizes both the limitations of past approaches and the opportunities of a new era.

Kurt Davis Jr is a Millennium Fellow at the Atlantic Council and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He advises private, public and state-owned companies and their boards as well as creditors across the globe on a range of transactions.

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US Navy’s latest frigate drifting into familiar troubled waters – Asia Times

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The US Navy’s newest fleet system is sailing directly into the same wind that sank its final two big shipping efforts: rising costs, style chaos and shrinking credibility.

Last month, the US Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) reported that despite repeated assurances of lessons learned from the troubled Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Zumwalt-class ( DDG 1000 ) destroyer programs, the US Navy’s Constellation-class frigate ( FFG 62 ) is repeating the same acquisition missteps.

In all three scenarios, the US Navy committed to deliver design before achieving firm designs, resulting in trickling delays, soaring costs and diminished capabilities, according to the GAO’s latest findings.

Like the LCS, the Constellation-class ship began building with an exaggerated style implementation day, after revealed to be only 70 %, not 88 %. This led to a three-year wait for the prospect send and a US$ 3.4 billion devotion to inadequate models.

Like DDG 1000, where juvenile technologies and fragile requirements raised unit costs tenfold, the frigate now faces complex risks from untested propulsion and machinery control systems.

Further, the frigate’s modifications have eroded its advertised commonality with the Italian parent design, undermining the program’s original risk-reduction rationale and prompting it to sacrifice speed in compensation for weight growth — a trend that parallels the LCS and Zumwalt’s ultimate delivery of less than promised.

The GAO stresses that history will continue to repeat itself until the US Navy abandons its flawed acquisition playbook and adopts leading commercial ship design practices, such as completing functional designs before construction, which jeopardizes the fleet’s readiness and credibility.

The Constellation class was envisioned as a general-purpose naval combatant, akin to the 1970s Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. A December 2024 US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report notes that the class intentionally avoids introducing new, unproven technologies and relies instead on systems already deployed across the US Navy to reduce costs.

The CRS report mentions the Aegis Combat System and Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar as pre-existing systems to be used in the Constellation class, distinguishing it from the LCS, which struggled with immature systems, such as its propulsion system and multi-mission modules.

Emphasizing the need to replace the LCS, Andrew Latham argues in a February 2025 article for 1945 that even with missile upgrades, the type would be little more than a liability in a possible Pacific conflict due to a weak hull, a lack of long-range weapons, and limited endurance to contribute in a fight against China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy ( PLAN ) blue-water fleet consisting of frigates, destroyers and cruisers.

However, a May 2024 GAO report notes that the Constellation-class frigate’s design has experienced unplanned weight growth exceeding 10 % of the initial estimates due to incomplete design information and underestimations when adapting the foreign parent design to US Navy requirements.

The report mentions that growth has raised concerns about the frigate’s ability to meet its speed requirements, leading the US Navy to consider reducing the ship’s speed as a potential solution.

However, in a November 2024 article for 1945, Robert Farley notes that extra weight could make it difficult for the Constellation class to keep pace with US carriers and destroyers, and may also complicate future upgrades.

A CRS report from last month describes the operational roles of the Constellation-class frigates. The ships are designed as multi-mission platforms capable of anti-air, anti-surface, antisubmarine and electromagnetic warfare, enabling them to operate independently or as integral units within carrier strike groups, surface action groups ( SAG ) or allied naval formations.

The report states that the US Navy plans to conduct an iterative procurement of at least 20 ships, with additional ships anticipated under the long-range shipbuilding plan. Once production stabilizes, the phased delivery of these frigates will incrementally provide operational commanders with adaptable assets for both blue-water and littoral missions.

However, US shipbuilding capabilities are insufficient for the Constellation-class program’s requirements.

A January 2025 US CRS report explicitly links design instability and delays with operational-level uncertainty for fleet planning. It highlights that the FFG-62 lead ship is now facing an approximate 36-month delay, more than double the initial delay reported, due to design workforce limitations and incomplete design work before construction.

The report notes that this is part of a broader pattern across multiple shipbuilding programs, creating what it refers to as an “extraordinary situation” unseen since World War II.

According to the report, these delays and the US Navy’s inability to meet projected procurement rates undermine the access of combatant commanders to expected assets and complicate force generation planning.

Despite these challenges, the US Navy’s persistence in pursuing the Constellation class underscores the need to reconstitute its surface force to counter China’s growing naval presence and power in the Pacific.

Underscoring this point, the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) 2024 China Military Power Report states that the PLAN is the world’s largest navy, comprising 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants.

In contrast to the Constellation class, which is still under construction, Eric Wertheim mentions in a Proceedings article from last month that China has commissioned the Luohe, the first Jiangkai III-class ( Type 054B ) frigate, signifying a notable advancement in the PLAN’s capabilities.

Wertheim notes that the frigate, built at Hudong Zhonghua Shipbuilding in Shanghai, boasts enhanced stealth, firepower and technology compared to its predecessor, the Jiangkai II class.

He says that the Type 054B, equipped with a 32-cell vertical-launch system (VLS), advanced active electronically scanned array ( AESA ) radar, and expanded antisubmarine warfare capabilities, positions China for diversified naval operations.

He notes that the Luohe has been assigned to the PLAN North Sea Fleet while additional ships are in production, underscoring a strategic emphasis on modernizing China’s naval forces.

In contrast, the Constellation class may risk becoming a symbol of US shipbuilding dysfunction and decline.

Alistair MacDonald mentions in a Wall Street Journal ( WSJ) article last month that the US Navy faces a critical challenge in shipbuilding as delays and cost overruns persist, undermining its strategic position amid intensifying global competition.

To underscore the point, MacDonald says that the Constellation-class frigate, the first of a new frigate class intended to address fleet deficiencies, remains years behind schedule and over budget despite efforts to accelerate production by adopting a proven Italian design.

He says that while US allies favor purchasing advanced American fighter jets and missile systems, American warships struggle to compete internationally due to high expenses and outdated infrastructure.

MacDonald emphasizes that with China producing naval vessels at a superior pace and cost efficiency, the US must confront systemic inefficiencies in shipbuilding to restore naval dominance.

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If negotiations among Russia, Ukraine, US collapse, what’s next? – Asia Times

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It may be that the US-Russia and US-Ukraine discussions are going off the rails.

However the US is anxious for Europe to get over responsibility for supporting Ukraine as Washington turns to the Middle East and Pacific areas. The Europeans therefore will need to determine if they are ready, willing and able to make up the difference.

One method for them is to try to secure eastern Ukraine, figuring the Russians may be effective south of the Dnieper, But that concept is certainly a cake walk and may cause a wider conflict. Washington will have to make up its mind on what is following regarding Ukraine.

President Trump is complaining that the Russians are dragging out discussions on a thorough peace, and he is threatening Russia with new power restrictions. The main function of the hazard from Trump is that states that buy Russian oil may be cut off from business with the US. This includes India and China.

US total goods trade with China was an estimated$ 582.4 billion in 2024. US goods exports to China in 2024 were$ 143.5 billion.

In 2023-24, the US was the largest trading partner of India with$ 119.71 billion bilateral trade in goods ($ 77.51 billion worth of exports,$ 42.19 billion of imports, with$ 35.31 billion trade surplus ).

President Trump said he intended to speak to Russian President Putin immediately ( the precise timing of a phone call never revealed ).

Both Ukraine and Russia are trying to position themselves as best they can before any ceasefire begins ( if one actually occurs ).

Russia has several military activities in Ukraine covering regions from Kursk on down through Luhansk and Donetsk, including Zaphorize and, perhaps, Kherson. The Russians have even signaled their involvement in Odesa which they claim is a Belarusian capital.

In all regions except one, Ukraine is trying to hold onto place and reduce Russian advances. CNN has described Ukraine’s military as “on their rear foot”, meaning those troops are losing surface.

The one exception is the Belgorod area. Belgorod is Soviet territory west of Kursk. The city of Belgorod and surrounding settlements have been subjected to Russian artillery and aircraft problems for decades. Today, however, the Russians have launched attacks and made some important success on Russian country.

The true goal of the Russian attacks is vague. Some observers think the idea is to push Russia to redeploy troops to the Belgorod country, taking the stress off of Ukrainian threats abroad, as in areas such as Pokrovsk.

May by ISW

Reliving Russian pressure was also part of the idea behind the Kursk salient, along with Ukraine having a territorial bargaining chip in a forthcoming possible negotiation ( land for land ). But that is not the whole story. Ukraine hoped to capture the nuclear power plant in Kursk, offsetting Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

The Russians were able to block Ukraine’s army from getting that far and, over seven months, began to roll up Ukraine’s attack. Today Ukraine’s forces are almost completely out of Kursk, and the Russians have crossed the border into Ukrainian territory in Sumy.

It is too soon to predict the outcome in Belgorod. Two villages, Popovka and Demidovka, have come under multiple Ukrainian attacks. Ukraine continues to beef up its assault forces, the latest the redeployment to Belgorod of the 17th Heavy Mechanized Brigade, suggesting that Ukraine thinks it can be successful.

Regional governor Vyacheslav Gladkov says that in all Ukraine has attacked more than 20 villages. There is no word yet on losses on either side.

Ukraine might get a temporary morale boost if it can hold onto some of the villages it is attacking, but for how long no one can yet say.

Meanwhile, France and the UK, and possibly some others, are working on a new idea on injecting European forces into the conflict in support of Ukraine. The latest is for Europe ( or at least those who will support the venture ) to send both air and naval forces to Ukraine.

Reports say that a mission is being dispatched to Ukraine to decide where to position such forces if they are sent. Combat aircraft would be vulnerable anywhere near eastern Ukraine, considering Russia’s layered air defenses. Similarly, naval forces have few options outside of Odesa, and Odesa is exposed to Russian missile attacks.

Putin has agreed to a Black Sea deal, but that would collapse if the UK and France move naval forces to ostensibly protect Ukraine. Both France and the UK have aircraft carriers, but whether they would risk such assets so close to Russia is open to considerable doubt.

It may be that the UK and France, perhaps even with the backdoor support of the United States, want to protect western Ukraine should the Russians overrun the Ukrainian army and collapse the Kiev government.

To do this both France and the UK would need support from Poland, and Polish authorities have not shown much enthusiasm for getting involved.

If the negotiations on a Ukraine-Russia deal go off the rails, as seems more and more likely, then the fallback” security guarantee” for part of Ukraine could be an option for Europe if Europe actually believes it is threatened by Russian land armies.

But air force and naval assets are only a temporary hack for the Europeans. They would have to put boots on the ground in western Ukraine. Europe does not have deployable forces in sufficient numbers ( nor do they have stockpiles of weapons ) to be any more than a tripwire, and the Europeans would have to expect pushback from the Russians– who may decide to attack staging areas and supply depots in Poland and Romania.

The Charles De Gaulle aircraft carrier.

Depending on how the war evolves, and how much force the Russians are prepared to bring to the conflict, Russia could achieve its territorial and local political goals in a relatively short time. The territorial goals are already spelled out by Russia. The political goal is to force NATO out of Ukraine and change the Ukrainian government to one friendly to Russia.

Some say Russia cannot sustain the war, that its economy is a shambles, and that pulling in more conscripts to fight is politically difficult because the conflict has dragged out. If that is true, Russia is without an exit strategy other than for its political and military institutions to collapse. That is a recurring theme in NATO circles, but is it because NATO does not want to lose or do people in those circles really believe the scenario?

An important question is what steps the Trump administration is willing to take if the so-called peace process stalls or collapses. Sanctions won’t change the military situation, and might backfire on a US economy and stock market already in panic.

Furthermore, the administration is trying to fry too many eggs in foreign policy at the same time and that can lead to mistakes and blunders. If the reports on Pentagon plans are right, the administration wants to contain China, not so much Russia.

It is at least possible, given the limits of the US arsenal and the deployment of US forces, that Washington will be inclined to turn Ukraine over to Europe. The White House dream of huge deals with Russia aimed at sidelining the Russian-China partnership mostly has evaporated.

As matters now stand, soon Washington will have to make some hard decisions.

Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter&nbsp, Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.

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Trump’s step back abroad has triggered an atomic race in East Asia – Asia Times

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US friends in Asia fear losing their radioactive umbrella because US President Donald Trump suggested some international withdrawal. Without the awning, as seen with Ukraine, a government’s liberation is in danger. It starts a new spread.

Washington is tempted to retreat from some foreign pledges and is willing to do its plan without much discussion or consensus with the allies. There are different objectives in the partnerships.

Facing the Northern Korean nuclear danger, the majority of South Koreans apparently want the weapon. Japan, threatened by North Korea and scared by China, may quickly acquire a nuclear security. At that point, actually Vietnam or Indonesia may comprehend plutonium features. And why not the Philippines or Thailand? India and Pakistan now possess a magnificent stockpile.

The big question is Taiwan: did the area produce to Beijing or create its weapons?

China would be in a minefield. It’d be the goal of this army and in a violent circle – the more weapons it companies, the more explosives its neighbors will store. It’d be extraordinary with unimaginable consequences.

The atmosphere in Asia is more difficult than in Europe, where two powerful US-backed systems, NATO and the Union, have held the peninsula along for years. Asia has thinner international organizations and intergovernmental agreements with the US.

Countries in the region usually don’t believe China or each other. If America steps up, everything will fall apart. China is not willing to offer free safety offers to anyone, replacing American people, and its assures could not be welcomed.

Eastern options

A plan could be for Korea and Japan to question France and the UK to expand their radioactive umbrella to Asia. A similar arrangement is under concern in Europe, where France and the UK may extend their national safety across the peninsula. This may enhance the transatlantic split, as the UK plus EU may produce greater room for maneuvering out of Wahington’s programs.

Besides, a Franco-British reach over Eurasia’s east side could spark fresh, not necessarily positive, global political and military dynamics. Alternatively, there could be greater political and military coordination among America’s allies, even with the US taking a step back.

The UK ( with Keir Starmer ), France ( with Emmanuel Macron ), Germany ( with Friedrich Merz ), and Japan ( with Fumio Kishida ), are possibly weaving the fabric of something new that other countries could join. In World War II, the US wanted to stay out of the fight, but then Churchill, with words and actions, helped to convince Roosevelt to change his mind.

China, America’s primary concern and preoccupation, could turn the situation by tackling it head-on. Beijing should force Pyongyang to forfeit its nuclear arsenal. It should press Russia to disarm partially, and it should shelve its rearmament plans. It would defuse the arms race.

It’d be challenging, but it’d be essential to start working on it.

It could also dissuade the US from leaving the region and persuade it to engage in a genuine negotiation on the RMB’s full convertibility, the complete opening of China’s internal market, and Beijing’s territorial claims.

US world

Underpinning this scenario is perhaps a reality that’s perceived vaguely in Beijing and taken for granted ( thus similarly unclear ) in Washington. America is not a country but a world order, just as Rome ceased to be a city when it cemented its empire around the Mediterranean.

This empire is not based solely on military might as was that of the Mongols. It has a sophisticated architecture comprising many elements besides strength: culture, rule of law, history, economic and financial prestige. If the US tries to withdraw, not only will the world order collapse but the United States will crumble, too. There’s no way back from “imperial America” other than suicide.

Naturally, the US feels immense strain after decades of vast responsibilities. Thus, many political and economic aspects must be renegotiated, but invading Greenland destroys the world order and the American nation.

It might superficially look like an opportunity for China to take up the US slack. However, Beijing could have far more problems than it currently faces, or it could face negotiating a broad deal with the US.

In all this, too many elements are up in the air, and the role of the Vatican as a disarmed yet knowledgeable and disenchanted mediator could be invaluable.

Many players would need to leave their present trajectory and comfort zone to turn the present undercurrents around. The US should rethink its direction and renegotiate its commitments. It’d be safer and less expensive than to gamble a global security overhaul. Perhaps Trump is pursuing this, but the public hears a different message.

Therefore, Asian and, thus, global nuclear proliferation is the likely scenario. The old Cold War set the terms of the previous arms race– it was run between two blocs. Now, alliances are unraveling, and every country could be basically on its own. This race would be different, more challenging, and full of unexpected incidents.

Everyone needs to step back and keep a cool head to avert a military tsunami.

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Forget K-dramas: Korea’s political crisis is the real drama – Asia Times

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The 2006 US funny” Stranger Than Fiction” follows IRS auditor Harold ( Will Ferrell ), who realizes he’s a figure in a writer’s work. As he learns that the author plans to kill him off in the close, Harold races to fight her in actual life – and she eventually rewrites the history to let him live.

Much like bewildered Harold as he realizes what fate is in store for him, many international observers are finding themselves increasingly baffled by the social environment in South Korea, where real seems stranger than fiction.

A leading Seoul news, Chosun Ilbo, published an engaging content on March 28, 2025. It features a dialogue between a Chosun Ilbo reporter and a foreign columnist who has been covering Korea.

At a new meeting, the blogger shared his disappointment: readers back home often complain that” Asian news is unfathomable”.

He cited some new developments:

The president abruptly declared martial law on the night of December 3, 2024, without informing case users, ruling party lawmakers, or even South Korea’s important safety ally, the US,

The leader of the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Korea ( DPK), has four prior criminal convictions and five ongoing trials, yet remains the leading presidential contender.

After passing an impeachment movement against Prime Minister Han Duck-soo on December 27, 2024, which was rejected by the Constitutional Court on March 24, 2025, the opposition group is now introducing an prosecution action against the deputy prime minister for the business, who had until recently been the speaking leader.

Visitors worldwide responded with astonishment, saying,” This doesn’t make any sense. Sometimes the reporter misunderstood the details and wrote false reports”?

The journalist himself admitted,” There are so many immoral events happening in Korea that perhaps I struggle to understand them”.

Since then, things have just grown man. After the Constitutional Court rejected the prosecution of Prime Minister Han on March 24, the opposition immediately vowed to try again. Then only four days later, on March 28, the DPK announced it would get to oust the entire case.

The ghost of judgment: Lee’s political coming at stake

Their necessity is not without reason. On March 26, DPK head Lee Jae-myung was acquitted in an election law situation, but the prosecution has previously filed an appeal. Beyond this, he remains trapped in various legal battles, including a high-profile$ 1 billion true estate incident. A judgment carrying a fine of just over one million North Korean won – or even a suspended sentence – would disqualify him from running for office for up to ten years.

However, the Constitutional Court has yet to rule on the impeachment of President Yoon. What initially seemed like a decisive outcome now appears extremely likely to be rejected as the pause continues.

Lee’s issues extend far beyond the court. He is also facing empty problem within his own group.

Two distinct tents within the DPK

South Korea’s leftist bloc has long been split between two major factions: National Liberation ( NL ) and People’s Democracy ( PD). The NL party emphasizes cultural nationalism, North-South unification under communism and an anti-US stance.

The PD party is more in range with Western-style liberalism.

Although Lee does not fit neatly into either station, the NL party evidently sees him as an army and is now boldly challenging him.

Foreign policy is another obstacle for Lee. While Lee and his party have taken symbolic steps to affirm the US-ROK alliance – including a resolution supporting the alliance and even suggesting Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize – these moves appear mostly superficial. In substance, Lee remains pro-China.

Risk of identity collapse

Lee is also pushing the Democratic Party in a direction that may alienate its base. His efforts to shift the party toward the center – or even the right – mirror a cautionary tale from Japan.

In 1994, the Japan Socialist Party shocked supporters by forming a coalition with its longtime rival, the Liberal Democratic Party. Its leader, Tomiichi Murayama, became prime minister and quickly abandoned core socialist policies, including opposition to the US-Japan Security Treaty.

The backlash was swift. By 1996, badly defeated in elections, the party had rebranded itself as the Social Democratic Party. It faded into irrelevance.

The lesson is clear: When a party abandons its ideological roots, it risks collapse. The Democratic Party of Korea, under Lee’s leadership, may now be heading down the same path.

Lee Jae-myung’s future is anything but certain. Legal jeopardy could disqualify him. Internal divisions could unseat him. And ideological drift could hollow out the movement he claims to lead.

For foreign observers, Korean politics is bewildering. But for Koreans– and their allies – it is more than just domestic turmoil. It is a test of stability in one of the world’s most volatile geopolitical regions.

Hanjin Lew is a former international spokesman for South Korean conservative parties.

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Turkey holds the key to solving multiple global crises – Asia Times

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Turkey’s state is struggling to deal with widespread protests at home ( after Istanbul’s president Ekrem Imamoglu was imprisoned ), but it is extremely successful as a major power broker in negotiations with Russia, the US, and Europe.

Turkey, which is effectively significant to almost everyone and is emerging as a smart communicator, is strategically important to almost everyone at the intersection between Asia and Europe.

Turkey has relied on a international policy that placed a premium on cooperation rather than competitors since the early 2000s. Turkey continuously improved its associations with Russia, Iran, and Syria because financial relationships were a top priority.

Turkey maintains its membership in NATO and is a big trading mate with the European Union, but it also holds important ties to Russia, Ukraine, China, and Middle Eastern nations. Turkey has demonstrated that it will function with any state that serves its interests, and it has used local conflicts to act as a quick ally when necessary.

Recep Tayyip Erdoan, the president of Turkey, has no reservations about confronting both friends and foes similarly, giving it proper flexibility at the same time.

Russian-Russian marriage is rough

Russia’s second-largest buying lover is Turkey. With over US$ 60 billion in annual deal with Moscow, Armenia continues to concentrate on Soviet banking and gas networks. When Turkey stopped supporting Chechen rebels and Russia stopped supporting the Kurdish Workers Party ( PKK), the relationship between Turkey and Russia dramatically improved in 1995.

Turkey has never been compliant with Moscow, but it has kept a working relationship with Russia ever since.

Turkey criticized Russia’s plans to establish military installations in Syria, Tartus and Khmeimim, and because it controls the airport in northern Syria, it also has the authority to obstruct Russian access. In addition, Ankara has used its military presence to thwart previous Soviet control in Idlib, in northern Syria.

Turkey’s helicopter offensive in Idlib in 2020 supported the Arab opposition and resisted Russian-backed activity in the west.

The significance of the Black Sea

Turkey has a strong advantage in the Black Sea as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. Russia aimed to have complete control over the Black Sea, yet seizing some Ukrainian ships, which would have a negative impact on global grain supply in 2022.

However, Turkey negotiated the release of millions of tonnes of corn and complied with the Montreux Convention to ensure the safety of shipping roads through the Black Sea. This arrangement from 1936 gave Turkey complete control over the delivery route between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea ( through the Bosporus Strait, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, through which hundreds of millions of tons of cargo transit each year ) through the Bosporus Strait.

Turkey also limited Russian troops into the Black Sea, which has severely limited Russian maritime power, according to the agreement.

A map of the Black Sea region.
Map provided by Shutterstock via The Talk

Turkey does not support the Russian annexation of Crimea, even though it has certainly imposed sanctions on Russia and has kept its revenue sources available. Turkey values Crimea for both corporate and historical reasons, with more than 5 million Turks claiming to be of Crimean Tatar descent.

Turkey does, however, maintain communication with Moscow ( and Erdogan and Putin are “dear friends” ). Turkey likewise supports Ukraine, providing it with Bayraktar TB2 robots, heavy machine guns, laser-guided rockets, electronic warfare techniques, armored vehicles, and safe products, complicating this “friendship.”

In the end, Turkey wants Ukraine to keep separate to prevent Russian naval presence in the Black Sea. As a result, Turkey is likely to collaborate with NATO to ensure that Ukraine is never defeated.

In order to achieve this, Turkey is willing to send troops to a post-ceasefire arrangement, provided the necessary conditions are met.

Turkey has also reduced its dependence on Russia by diversifying its power supply routes ( relying more on manufacturers from the Caucasus region and central Asia ) in the wake of the conflict in Ukraine. Turkey is in a strong position, particularly with the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean discovering oil reserves.

Through the Trans-Anatolian natural gas pipeline, Ankara aims to become an energy gateway that facilitates the transport of oil from the Caucasus, central Asia, and Russia to Europe.

Syria and Turkey

Turkey’s connection with Syria’s neighbor has also been wise and logical. In 2005, Bashar al-Assad became the first Arab leader to visit Turkey since Syria gained its independence in 1946, allowing Turkey to seek reconciliation with Syria.

However, Erdoan continued to work with him to stop Syria from entangling with Iran when it was no more appropriate for him. He occasionally hosted anti-Assad characters in Turkey, and he established a safe haven for Syrian refugees and armed fighters along its borders. He gave separatists the ultimatum to overthrow Assad in 2024.

Just as the conflict in Syria gave Turkey prospects, so too has the fight in Ukraine. The United States has strengthened its bargaining status and pressed for more concessions from Western friends. Turkey is leveraging the US’s withdrawal from NATO to encourage closer assistance with Europe.

Turkey is likewise leveraging Donald Trump’s more diplomatic stances toward Russia to strengthen its connection with the US. This is mainly due to a desire to enhance protection cooperation. Turkey relied on the US for supplies of arms, revenue, and equipment during the Cold War, but it was unable to use them without US permission.

After 1989, Turkey carved out new areas for its exports of arms and was subject to US sanctions for purchasing S-400 surface-to-air weapons from Russia in 2020. Turkey wants to purchase F-35 sonic fighter planes from the US and is hoping that the US will stop imposing sanctions on second nations that have engaged with Russia.

Whose important ally?

Turkey has made certain that the US does not view it as a young companion in the Middle East. For instance, the US offered no military support when Turkey launched activities in north Syria in 2019 and constantly fired close to US troops.

Despite having a number of different tactical objectives, the US views Turkey as a crucial alliance. Turkey also has US and NATO military bases at several of its bases, as well as US nuclear weapons ( B61 nuclear bombs ) stationed at its Incirlik Air Force Base.

Turkey wants to make an even bigger diplomatic and military presence. It has a lot of power as a G20 part, having one of the world’s 20 largest markets and having the second-largest and most effective military power in NATO after the US.

And in terms of geopolitical spinning, Turkey is now in the elite position of wanting to support them.

Natasha Lindstaedt is a professor at the University of Essex’s Department of Government.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

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Great Game On: Shining light on the contest for Central Asia – Asia Times

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The Founding Fathers advised Americans to steer clear of ensnaring relationships if they wished to keep their recently acquired Republic. This may be news to some of our legislators but not to President Donald Trump. No US senator has been leerier of the authoritarian foreign policy bequeathed to us by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt than Trump. &nbsp,

Immune to the crony passion for “democracy tower” and “forever wars”, Trump lives in the realm of reality– no intellectual pseudo-reality. &nbsp, Trump has had enough of the “values-based” international plan that, in the matter of Ukraine, perhaps have brought us closer to thermonuclear war than at any moment since the Cuban missile crisis. &nbsp,

Unlike so many of his political opponents, Trump is not oblivious to the negative effects a misrepresented foreign policy could have on ordinary citizens, people, the nation at large and, for that matter, the earth. &nbsp, &nbsp,

With that in mind, and in view of the rising necessity of Asia, Geoff Raby’s fresh book –” Great Game On: The Battle for Central Asia and Global Supremacy” – is worth reading to get a better control on the history and current state of great power dynamics in Eurasia and Central Asia. Raby served as American Ambassador to China from 2007 to 2011.

He has done a company by focusing on Central Asia in view of its significant and growing value. The region encompasses Afghanistan, Inner Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Xinjiang ( China ), and is more than 300, 000 square miles larger than the continental United States. That’s a major part of real property which the US ignores at its risk. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Raby – a largely non-ideological international policy specialist – deftly describes not only the 19th centuries Anglo-Russian” Great Game” but the evolving 21st century” New Great Game”, i. e., the great power competition for influence over Central Asia between China, Russia and, to a lesser extent, the United States. As such, he delves into the respective geopolitical ambitions of China and Russia in Eurasia over the past 100 years with a spotlight on Central Asia. &nbsp,

” The Principal Theater of Contest”

Raby argues that” Core Eurasia” – in other words, Central Asia – is” the principal theater of contest” between the great powers and that” the key pivots on the chess board are Afghanistan and Xinjiang” .&nbsp,

He has a point, but it’s also the case that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with their massive reserves of natural resources, extensive trade routes – east-west and north-south – and welcoming attitude toward the outside world represent a stable setting in which the US can expand its economic ties. ( See: Time for a US pivot to Central Asia )

To his credit, Raby eschews the moralism of so many foreign policy gurus ( who rarely get around to considering morality ). Raby, from all indications, is a proponent of the realist school of politics.

He is concerned about national self-interest, security and power relationships rather than presumed ideological imperatives as the principal drivers of inter-state relations.

Raby’s treatment of the United States ‘ presence in Central Asia is skimpy – but that is telling in itself: Washington pays Central Asia scant attention, so there’s not much to write about. That should change under Trump.

Raby provides much-needed historical context without which it is impossible to understand the competition for influence in the region. He makes insightful, thought-provoking comments on the geostrategic thinking of the great powers in light of history– for example, Mackinder’s” Heartland” theory, i. e., “whoever controlled Central Asia would be the dominant world power”.

Helpfully, the author provides the reader with maps to navigate a vast region that could easily thwart even adepts at world geography. Thus, the reader can easily find Türkmenbaşy, Kashgar and the Wakhan Corridor as well as inner Mongolia, various mountain ranges and rivers and myriad other places unknown to most people. &nbsp,

And having traveled extensively in Central Asia, Raby provides a store of anecdotes that helps demystify the inscrutability and romance of these far-off lands and peoples. &nbsp, The book is extensively researched and footnoted – a sign of the author’s sober-mindedness.

Raby claims that China has emerged” as the primary Eurasian power” in the new age of multipolarity that is upon us, an increasingly recognized reality. &nbsp,

The US, though, should take this state of affairs in stride and deal with it not through any form or degree of belligerence or aggressiveness and ditch its usual moral preachments that historically have been the stock and trade of USAID, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and other mouthpieces and instruments of liberal internationalist and globalist orthodoxy.

What Vice President JD Vance told the Munich Security Conference ( see his speech ) is also good advice for US policymakers: a little introspection is advisable. &nbsp,

Raby believes that” Great Powers can find a strategic accommodation without going to war … Options for finding strategic stability … are still worth pursuing” .&nbsp,

Nicely put – a vision that Trump’s State Department and the various Central Asian states share ( see this author’s &nbsp, Central Asian School of Diplomacy ) i. e., diplomacy is the smartest, most cost-effective way to resolve conflicts, defend national interests and avoid armed conflict. &nbsp,

Raby has recently suggested that China, for the first time in its history, feels secure along its Eurasian land frontiers and is now free to project power globally, a matter of some concern for those in the neighborhood.

Having said that, one way to address China’s resurgence, Raby suggests, might be for the West to engineer a so-called “reverse Kissinger”, i. e., entice Russia to “look West” and distance itself from China. &nbsp,

Only time will tell whether that is a real possibility, meanwhile, the West would be well-advised to understand Beijing’s geopolitical mindset and history as it confronts its growing ambitions.

Platitudes vs reality

Raby reminds the reader that the West should stop framing the Great Game as a contest between “democracy” and “autocracy” or” good guys vs bad guys” .&nbsp, Stated differently, the use of preachy, moralistic, diplomatic lingo is a non-starter. Certainly, it is a money-loser when dealing with China, Central Asia or most anyone else. Trump understands that.

Raby correctly states that” Russia’s trade with Central Asia is dwarfed by China’s” and” China has replaced Russia as Central Asia’s major source of foreign direct investment”. He sheds light on contested matters such as the “debt trap”, “debt sustainability” and the Belt &amp, Road Initiative.

But he might have pointed out that Central Asian governments are selective in their partnerships. They will not accept one-way investment deals that are perceived to have few long-term benefits for the country or, worse, inadvertently lead to geoeconomic subjugation.

To be sure, Central Asia wants win-win deals as well as free and fair trade – a mindset more in tune with Trump’s than with that of much of the American foreign policy establishment.

In case anyone missed it, Central Asian governments – whether you like them or not – want investors – whether Chinese, Indian or American – to make sensible, non-ideological cross-border long-term economic commitments to develop smart infrastructure connectivity and integration and create jobs and decent wages for families and the region’s growing populations. &nbsp, This vision is in line with Trumpian economic policy at home.

Sinostan

Without explicitly saying so, Raby does not appear to be optimistic about the US’s long-term prospects in Central Asia since China’s aim to absorb Central Asia – transform it into a veritable” Sinostan” – &nbsp, “is an advanced work in progress. But Russia and China will continue to look to each other for support in their contests with the United States and this will remain a strong point of convergence in their relationship” .&nbsp,

If true, all the more reason for the US government and business community to get in on the action in Central Asia, namely, expand trade relations and, more importantly, set up joint ventures that give US companies skin in the game. Toward this end, Trump’s State Department should grease the wheels.

If Washington doesn’t deliver soon on substance, Central Asians will continue to get the best infrastructure, logistics and mining deals ( critical metals and oil &amp, gas ) that China, Russia and others have to offer. This would be only logical if the US were to remove itself de facto from the equation.

For those eager to understand the historical and present-day ins and outs of great power competition in Central Asia, they would be well advised to read” Great Game On: The Contest for Central Asia and Global Supremacy”. This would include policymakers. &nbsp,

If American ingenuity and creativity were to be introduced into the arena shorn of hidden political and/or woke agendas and offered Central Asia attractive win-win economic arrangements, the US would stand a good chance of not only staying in the ( great ) game but prevailing.

Javier M Piedra has 40 years of international banking and finance experience and was former acting assistant administrator, Bureau for Asia, USAID ( 2018 – 21 )

Alexander B Gray is former deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff, White House National Security Council ( 2019-21 )

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How long until America Inc revolts on Trump? – Asia Times

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I don’t think Donald Trump is a quietly Russian factory that the Kremlin hired to sabotage the United States ‘ economy and influence. But incredibly, Trump’s activities are often identical from what he might do if he&nbsp, were&nbsp, a foreign agent bent on death. This review some of his most recent moves.

First, there is yet another round of tariffs, this one for the automobile industry. This time Trump is putting&nbsp, 25 % tariffs on imported cars and car parts. These taxes will disrupt the whole US auto supply chain ( the Cato Institute has &nbsp, a great explanation on how this works, if you’re curious ), because many US vehicles use foreign elements and US-made pieces are frequently assembled into full vehicles across the borders.

Prices will increase for US producers, and prices will increase for American consumers. Consistently, American automakers saw big drops in their inventory prices:

Many of Trump’s supporters, of course, think that the suffering is only temporary, that US automakers will invest more in America and finally reap the benefits of the absence of foreign competition after a adjustment.

However, stock prices are prospective because when GM and Ford experience decline, it indicates that investors anticipate that their stocks will suffer no only temporarily but also over the long run. In other words, investors are not buying the” short-term pain for long-term gain” thesis.

The supply ring may be affected by the engine taxes, which will have repercussions everywhere. The cost of automobile plan will likely increase as well. And inland industries that provide the car industry, such as British steelmakers, &nbsp, may be hurt as well:

More than 600 Iron Range workers will lose their jobs as two Minnesota operations are temporarily shut down by Cleveland-Cliffs… [N] gross taxes on imported goods from Canada, Mexico, and China are wreaking havoc in the British car market.

Trump’s taxes are harming all of the sectors that were intended to be protected.

The oil market — a long-time citadel of Republican help — may get hurt because well, because of the increased cost of cutting equipment. Tracy Alloway, from Bloomberg, is quoted as follows:

[ W]e’ve got to talk about the most recent energy survey from the Dallas Fed, whose turf covers a lot of the US oil patch. It’s definitely worth reading&nbsp, the whole thing&nbsp, but to sum it up, it’s full of private power executives complaining about how the novel Trump administration is creating enormous uncertainty for their business viz the back-and-forth on tariffs.

Oil rig counts are flat; “drill, baby, drill” is a distant memory.

Trump and his supporters simply have no idea how the industries that surround them, such as manufacturing, mining, drilling, and other ones, actually function. It’s all&nbsp, theory, no actual knowledge. Trump himself doesn’t even notice or care when reality doesn’t cooperate; instead, he simply lets the American people suffer as a result of his theory‘s failures.

Even Trump’s inner circle is beginning to feel irrational, with the exception of Peter Navarro, his economic guru. Here ‘s&nbsp, some reporting by Politico:

Even those closest to Trump have privately stated that they are unsure what the boss will do just days after his announcement of global tariffs on April 2 and have been granted anonymity because…

The issue Trump’s own advisers and Hill Republicans have is that the president doesn’t share their concern.Trump actually supports the protectionist policies being promoted by aides like Navarro, the long-term trade adviser, who Republicans almost universally despise. The president also believes that his tariffs are popular with voters…

One of the people close to Trump’s inner circle of advisers said,” The president isn’t looking at it like they are.” For him, if the economy is weak, then fine, the economy is weak because the president truly believes that it will rebound and that the nations will give in because they can’t withstand the pressure from the U.S. S”.

No 1, the president is not running for reelection, this person continued,” so where this may have been a political concern in his first term, it is no longer a political concern.” … And no 2, we’re likely to lose the House in the midterms.

The auto tariff move — which comes in advance of another huge wave of tariffs that’s expected to be&nbsp, announced on April 2&nbsp, — will only add to a growing attitude of economic pessimism. Following the announcement, the overall stock market&nbsp decreased. Sentiment is falling both among the wealthy and the poor:

Source: Heather Long

Crucially, this isn’t just “vibes”; Americans ‘ expectations for their own financial situation are now, close to the lows of 2022, when post-pandemic inflation was causing real incomes to decline:

Source: Heather Long

It’s not just that people expect tariffs to put them out of a job or put pressure on their wages. They also believe that, despite the decline of aggregate demand, the tariffs will lead to higher inflation. 5-year inflation expectations are rising, and survey-based expectations are rising:

And expectations might just be following reality here. The most recent inflation figures  appear to be quite alarming:

And here’s a table with a number of different inflation indicators, all of which increased by more than 3 % when taken only over the course of the first few months since Trump’s election:

Source: &nbsp, Jason Furman

What is Trump’s strategy for this? According to the Politico article, he basically has no plans to run for president because he is not running for president and his wacky theory and Peter Navarro, his one trusted economic advisor, are telling him that the long-term effects will be positive.

That’s one possibility. Another is that he will turn to the playbook that quasi-authoritarian leaders typically employ when threatened by inflation: price controls. It appeared that Biden might attempt to use price controls to stifle inflation on the&nbsp during the Biden administration, according to the advice of the Warrrenite progressives. But to his credit, he never did. Trump is currently making the same noises:

Trump warned the CEOs of some of the nation’s top automakers early this month that they better not raise car prices because of tariffs. Some of the executives were left rattled and worried that they would be punished if they raised prices, according to people with knowledge of the call.

Trump’s “warnings” and commands carry a lot more weight than Biden’s, because Trump is a lot more willing to use executive power to&nbsp, punish individual companies&nbsp, he doesn’t like. Real price controls would put the nation in danger of a catastrophic downward spiral of inflation, hoarding, “anti-hoarding,” and shortages.

All of this is, of course, set against a world of crass moves on a global scale. Trump continues to&nbsp, threaten to invade and conquer Greenland, with JD Vance&nbsp, especially pressing for this move. This additional piece of evidence should come as a disappointment to those who are still desperately looking for alternatives to the Mad King theory.

The country’s business community is beginning to realize that the country has elected a Mad King, despite Trump’s apparatchiks still bellowing&nbsp, that his tariffs will reindustrialize America.

They expected a replay of the laissez-faire policies of Trump’s first term — a lot of bombastic rhetoric but few real policy changes and a lot of small, quiet deregulatory moves. Instead, they received a completely different Trump this time, one who is determined to undermine the American economy in the name of ideology.

People on the Tech Right are starting to realize something similar. Here’s my friend&nbsp, Brian Chau, who is more frank and honest than most:

The American business community hasn’t yet experienced a&nbsp, preference cascade&nbsp. Anyone who speaks out against Trump is probably preventing them from sticking their neck out because of his willingness to target and punish wealthy individuals or individuals who criticize him.

And the memory of the Biden administration’s anti-business rhetoric, and the continued&nbsp, anti-business rhetoric&nbsp, emanating from both the Warrenite and Bernie wings of the Democrats, are probably still a deterrent as well.

It will take some time before the business world will turn to the Democrats when things start to get bad. What other options will businesses have if the Mad King’s madness continues to grow and things continue to get worse?

In any case, center-left Democrats who care about winning elections should be working feverishly to welcome businesses ( and rich people ) into their big tent. I hope that the recent embrace of Abundance liberalism marks the start of the era of the class-war effort.

The more quickly that change takes place, the more stable the environment will be for America. Hopefully, the damage to US prosperity can still be limited. Trump needs to be abandoned by business, and Democrats need to make more than one move to break up the coalition. However, it’s a crucial component of the puzzle.

This article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack and is republished with kind permission. Subscriber or subscriber can sign up for Noahopinion.com.

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