Duterte trial loaded with heavy geopolitical implications – Asia Times

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Several people anticipated it. The arrest of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte for allegedly committing crimes against humanity under the auspices of the International Criminal Court ( ICC ) has shocked both the country and the entire world.

After years of democratic violence over allegations that the Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration had orchestrated tens of thousands of extrajudicial murders during his scorched-earth drug combat, the ex-leader immediately fell into a trap that led to Duterte being flown to The Hague despite its longstanding refusal to acknowledge the ICC’s control.

The former president was taken to the country’s main military base just hours after returning from Hong Kong, where Duterte was reportedly reportedly exploring potential political exile, and then flown to The Hague via Dubai on a private jet.

His supporters desperately tried to stop the arrest by applying for temporary restraining orders from local courts, but the sheer speed of the operation slammed the country’s judicial systems.

However, citing legal precedents from a number of prominent international cases, including the arrest of Ugandan warlord Dominic Ongwen, former ICC judge Raul Pangalangan has argued that the arrest was fundamentally legal, even if it was contentious.

Duterte has been accused of being responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Filipinos, some of whom were children, during anti-drug operations. The Philippines Supreme Court ruled that the ICC retained jurisdiction over crimes committed while the country was a member of the ICC between 2011 and 2018 despite the fact that he unilaterally withdrew the country from the ICC to avoid scrutiny.

Duterte will become the first Asian leader to face charges of crimes against humanity in September, making him arguably the most well-known fugitive currently in the ICC’s custody. The troubled international organization has been criticized for its ineffectiveness and alleged selectiveness in meeting out justice, but this is a significant milestone for it.

Duterte’s arrest has also raised significant geopolitical issues, including China’s alleged abandonment of a key ally and the Trump administration’s tacit silence on the subject. &nbsp,

Duterte’s arrest has a lot of meaning, but it’s difficult to overstate its significance on so many fronts. It has caused a significant political backlash in the home country, with concerns over civil unrest, particularly in Duterte’s popular island of Mindanao, where he enjoys a large following.

Imee Marcos, the late president’s sister, was one of the Senate’s leading members, who conducted a hearing last week where they interrogated and even berated officials involved in Duterte’s arrest.

A majority of Filipinos, according to a local Social Weather Stations poll, support the ICC trial. In accordance with a reputable survey conducted last month, 51 % of respondents wished that Duterte were brought to justice for the alleged role in the extrajudicial killings of thousands of drug dealers. 25 % of respondents were in disagreement, while only 14 % were still undecided.

Duterte supporters attempted to win public sympathy by highlighting his age ( soon to be 80 years old ) and alleged frailty, but the former president appeared hale and upbeat just days earlier during a rally among supporters in Hong Kong.

He acknowledged that he had been informed of a potential arrest warrant there, but in an expletive-filled speech he mocked the ICC and steadfastly rejected his legacy, saying,” If this is my fate in life, it’s OK, I’ll accept it. If I’m detained and imprisoned, I can’t do anything.

Duterte also defiantly requested an arrest from the ICC last year and, using his trademark machismo and chutzpah, threatened to physically assault the courts ‘ representatives in the event of an arrest attempt. While in power, he once threatened to feed ICC investigators to” crocodiles” if they entered the nation.

Given its earlier opposition to the ICC’s investigation and even raising questions about its jurisdiction, the Marcos Jr administration has struggled to provide a clear legal justification for its action.

It merely insisted that it was not in a position to defy international law, especially given that the Philippines rely on international law to protect its sovereign rights in sensitive matters like the South China Sea disputes with China.

In a landmark arbitration case at The Hague in 2016, the Philippines won, under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS), reaffirming the Southeast Asian nation’s exclusive economic rights in conflicting regions of the South China Sea. The Marcos Jr. administration has cited that ruling on numerous occasions to refute China’s claims to be in the country’s exclusive economic region.

However, to critics, the Marcos Jr. administration’s choice to cooperate with the ICC appeared to be politically self-serving rather than principled. After all, the former president’s arrest came shortly after the Marcos and Duterte dynasties grew in tension, and government allies impeached vice president Sara Duterte for alleged corruption and misconduct in office.

The saga has wider geopolitical implications. Even members of the ICC have challenged earlier arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose majority of ICC trials in the past were primarily focused on alleged criminals from the African continent.

Others have questioned the varying speed of the ICC’s response to alleged atrocities in various parts of the world and accused the body of” Eurocentrism.”

In a time when Donald Trump is contesting, if not abrogating, the Duterte trial gives the ICC and, more broadly speaking, the European Union ( EU) a historic chance to demonstrate their relevance as an anchor of a rules-based international order.

Beijing’s alleged abandonment of its Filipino allies also raised questions. In a famous meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the middle of 2023, Dutte and Xi had sparked controversy because Marcos Jr. and Beijing had been fighting over their differences in the South China Sea and were turning a sharp backwards in favor of the US.

According to some recent local reports, China reportedly refused to grant Duterte sanctuary, making the former president more of a liability than an asset.

Other ardent observers, however, have refuted this, arguing that Duterte’s return from Hong Kong was motivated more by hubris and concern for his troubled daughter, who could face office-selection this year. China is known for its reliability as a strategic patron.

China indirectly backed its former Filipino ally by publicly urging the ICC to stop “politicizing” the trial, but it did not say whether it had granted Duterte asylum.

” This is a significant, unexpected incident. China has taken note of the news and is closely monitoring how it develops, according to Mao Ning, a spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry, in a regular press conference shortly after the ICC’s surprise arrest.

According to Mao,” I would like to reiterate China’s consistent position that the International Criminal Court should strictly adhere to the principle of complementarity, exercise its functions and powers prudently in accordance with the law, and prevent politicization or double standards,” Mao continued, highlighting the possibility that Beijing had not been aware of the closely coordinated arrest between the ICC and Manila.

However, the Trump administration’s strategic silence on the subject is even more intriguing. Washington has consistently used punitive measures against ICC judges over the years.

However, it has remained eerie silent on Duterte’s case, likely as a result of the former Filipino president’s pro-China policies and Philippines ‘ pivotal position as an important ally in Asia. That position was hampered by Duterte but reinstated by Marcos Jr.

This week, US Defense Secretary Pete Hagseth visits Manila, underscoring the strategic partnership’s breadth and lasting significance. Duette has reportedly been largely abandoned by former allies both domestically and abroad, while the Marcos Jr administration has deftly used the country’s growing geopolitical significance to maintain support for some important Western allies on the ICC issue.

It seems that everything in today’s world seems to be driven by the geopolitical interests of individual superpowers.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @Rich Heydarian

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East-West divide over plan to replace US in NATO – Asia Times

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Four unnamed European officials were cited by The Financial Times (FT ) in a report claiming that” European military powers work on a 5- to 10-year plan to replace US in NATO.”

The Scandinavian countries, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are all cited in the document as wanting to provide this request to the US at the upcoming NATO Summit in June.

Several nations have also declined to participate in these discussions, according to FT, either out of fear that this will prompt the US to move more quickly or because they believe it won’t leave Europe.

The most significant nations on NATO’s southeast side, which all prefer to remain under the US protection umbrella, are likely the ones whose FT is referring to.

If the ruling liberal-globalists win May’s presidential election, Poland ‘s&nbsp and recent flirtations with France&nbsp could signal a full-fledged pivot, but for the time being, it serves as an attempt to rebalance ties with the US in the face of uncertainty over its future plans. It can also be seen as a&nbsp, a mistaken negotiation tactic, to maintain and grow the US military appearance.

The Baltic States have a devoted pro-American aristocracy, and they’ll simply revert to the EU if Trump unilaterally or completely removes US soldiers from their territory as part of a royal agreement with Russia.

Romania&nbsp, somewhat rebuffed&nbsp, France’s plan to expand its nuclear umbrella to the rest of the globe, which can be interpreted as placing more trust in the US than in Europe in the situation of a crisis&nbsp, with Russia&nbsp, over Moldova.

If these five nations continue to view their national interests in these methods, which would involve Poland’s ruling liberal-globalists to avoid moving to France if they are elected president ( their opponents are relatively more pro-US), then a split within NATO Europe would form.

France and Germany, who are competing with Poland and France for the title of post-conflict Europe, may find that the US will undermine their plans for influencing Central and Eastern Europe ( CEE ).

The final of which voted against the US’s Russophilic population’s wishes while the last needed the US to maintain Turkey’s sea claims at bay, NATO’s eastern flank may drop under US influence. From Estonia to Romania and potentially as far as Bulgaria and perhaps Greece.

This alleged” cordon sanitaire” could then serve the dual purposes of preserving US influence in this geostrategic region of Europe by “pivoting ( back ) to Asia” and dividing Western Europe and Russia.

Poland’s liberals might be able to fend off that scenario, but it depends on: 1 ) the CEE countries still see Russia as a threat; 2 ) they believe the US to be a more trustworthy security partner than the EU; and 3 ) the US not voluntarily ceds all of its influence in Europe.

If these factors stay the same, Western Europe might physically reshape mostly independent of CEE, which CEE nations might still appreciate because it would aid in their “deterrence” strategies.

In the unlikely event that a popular NATO-Russian conflict persists below the nuclear threshold, the CEE countries may depend on a military merged Western Europe to come to their rescue if they&nbsp doesn’t stop Russia on their own.

Russia has no intention of joining NATO, but the US’ continued military presence in the CEE may deter those anti-Russian nations from acting provocatively, and the US’ status would be ruined if it abandoned them in a heated conflict.

If FT’s statement about the first’s plans to replace the US in NATO is accurate, Europe may physically split into a effectively automatic northern half and an American-aligned eastern one with this understanding in mind.

The goal of Poland’s upcoming presidential election, which would draw attention to its overwhelming influence on shaping Europe’s potential security architecture, the subject of which is at the heart of NATO-Russian tensions, could be the only realistic way to offset that scenario.

This article was originally published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack, and it has since been republished. Subscribe to the Andrew Korybko Newsletter here.

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Why Trump’s global transformation might just succeed – Asia Times

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Donald Trump has aggressively pursued a radical overhaul of US foreign legislation since taking office in January 2025.

In early March, the State Department terminated international aid courses supporting political opposition and regime change in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, deeming them little more in the US “national attention”. After releasing 553 prisoners, Trump even overturned the Biden administration’s decision to renounce the country’s sanctions against Cuba.

The Inter-American Foundation, which had long advocated for economic and community-led growth in Latin America, wasdissolved by the government’s executive order in February.

The African Development Foundation is also slated to be eliminated under the executive order, while AFRICOM, the US military demand for Africa, could become following.

Trump’s drastic reductions also apply to organizations like the US Institute of Peace ( USIP), the US Agency for Global Media, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and US support for political prisoners around the world.

Trump’s crackdown on the foreign legislation establishment is well underway in the face of a divided criticism, a essentially loyal GOP, and key supporters in power.

In place of the US-led international order, he is embracing a harsh, America First, transactional approach to international politics centered on defense risks, economic force through tariffs and sanctions, and greater emigration policies—stripped of the common lip service to individual rights.

A more intense assault on unauthorised immigration has always been one of Trump’s top priorities. In March, a federal prosecutor “expressed doubts toward those challenging the national policy,” according to a New York Times article. His administration began moving illegal immigrants to Guantanamo Bay in the first few weeks of his name.

Then, alleged Cuban crew members are being sent to El Salvador under a confinement agreement with Trump supporter El Salvador President Nayib Bukele, while Panama, Costa Rica and Honduras have also agreed to accept third-party citizens, under the pressure of taxes being imposed and other financial measures.

Trump wants to have more control over international proper infrastructure. In a US$ 9 billion package in March, a consortium led by US company Blackrock highlighted the importance of the private business in achieving his objectives.

Foreign state-run advertising criticized the Hong Kong-based owner, and labeled the shift as “economic force”. Trump has made more and more hints at potential defense activity as Chinese companies are being removed from the Panama Canal. Trump’s idea of sending personal defense companies to Venezuela to overthrow President Nicolas Maduro came up in his first term, a practice that might come up again.

Conflicts with NATO supporters have played out publicly, undermining the transatlantic alliance that has been a vital part of the US-led global order, with Trump wielding taxes and even risks of conquest to force partners.

Trump also uses US assistance as a means of highlighting how dependent partners are on one another, such as halting intelligence-sharing and military assistance to Ukraine, one of the various pressure tactics used to entice Kyiv into talks with Russia.

Elon Musk then made a brief fessnote about ending Starlink services in Ukraine, which are essential for the country’s military communications, before backtracking. This pattern of signaling intent is common among Trump allies—before the March 14 executive order was issued to force Voice of America to shut down, Musk publicly called for its closure in February.

Trump must break away from the ingrained civil service and foreign policy bureaucracy, which he struggled with during his first term, to continue with his overhaul. Through leaks, delays, and policy adjustments, career officials, including some Republicans like John McCain, fought against his agenda.

Their efforts were complemented by the GOP’s disdain for the civil service, which has shifted increasingly left in recent decades. Before Biden rescinding the executive order in January 2021, Trump issued Schedule F, an executive order that reclassified some career positions as political appointments, making them easier to dismiss.

It’s not easy to break up a decades-old political system. Since World War II, Washington has built a vast ecosystem of NGOs, think tanks and development agencies that shape US foreign policy and diplomacy.

President George W. Bush leaned heavily on hard power with the start of the Global War on Terrorism even as his administration introduced initiatives like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief ( PEPFAR ), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the President’s Malaria Initiative ( PMI ) to maintain international goodwill while engaging in unpopular wars.

These programs were all repurposed by various administrations, given lucrative contracts, and had close ties to policymakers, along with organizations like the Peace Corps, the US Trade and Development Agency, and others mentioned above. Over time, a revolving door of agencies, contractors and policymakers has reinforced and expanded this system, consolidating funding and influence.

The United States has always been the primary beneficiary of America’s foreign assistance programs, according to USAID’s website, which has since openly stated that almost 80 % of USAID contracts and grants have been awarded to US companies.

Of the$ 48 billion in official development assistance ( ODA ), 21 % went to governments, 20 % to nonprofit organizations, 34 % to multilateral organizations, and 25 % to other countries.

Despite reaching nearly$ 80 billion in 2023 under the Biden administration, ODA still accounted for just 1.17 % of the federal budget. Trump’s efforts to undermine ODA may include reducing its spending as well as dismantling the foundational institutions that have for decades been the foundation of American foreign policy.

His purge of the civil service is much more aggressive now that he is in his second term. After labeling institutions like USIP and the Inter-American Foundation as politicized and aligned with Democratic priorities, Trump has made it harder for Democrats to justify billions of dollars for projects abroad—especially given longstanding concerns over ODA’s efficiency.

The acting deputy inspector general cited poor oversight, weak risk management, and human capital issues as examples of USAID’s” chronic, systemic weaknesses” in 2015, citing poor oversight and weak risk management.

The Carnegie Endowment discovered that both the State Department and USAID were overstretched and had little evidence of their effectiveness by the year Trump began to draw more attention to the issue. Aid often went to corrupt governments, was too small to make an impact, and failed to give Washington meaningful leverage.

USIP, which was originally developed in 1984 for conflict resolution, has received more negative reviews from its critics as a means of nation-building. Similar to this, AFRICOM, which was founded in 2007 to advance US national security interests in Africa, has focused on counterterrorism with mixed success. Aid recipients also face restrictions, often required to purchase goods and services from donor countries like the United States.

Other ODA activities, such as global media outreach, have lost their strategic edge as rival powers have undermined their effectiveness, as do more traditional approaches promoted by Democrats and seasoned foreign policy experts.

In response to competition from alternative international networks like Al Jazeera, RT, and China’s state-run media, US-backed media outlets like Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty have seen their influence diminish.

These competitors have reshaped the global information sphere, while decentralized information and social media platforms have proven more effective at reaching audiences.

In addition, China’s Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) has demonstrated the viability of direct investment in developing infrastructure, offering countries tangible advantages in exchange for concessions like port access for Chinese ships. In contrast, Israel and Russia have shown how to advance foreign policy objectives unilateral military force.

Trump views America’s lingering military and economic dominance as key tools for reasserting US power in a changing global order. His more aggressive military stance and mercantilist economic philosophy prioritize coercion over multilateralism, looking for immediate and tangible benefits in the national interest.

Trump’s strategy emphasizes swift tariffs, threats, and direct pressure to drive markets and cause immediate reactions, an approach that is unpalatable given the ingrained culture of the current foreign policy bureaucracy, unlike previous administrations that invested in steady economic and diplomatic maneuvering.

If successful in reshaping American foreign policy, Trump will force a departure from Washington’s historical promotion of free trade. Bill Clinton, Bush, and Barack Obama, former presidents, all lowered tariffs. Biden eased some with the EU, but he raised China.

Trump’s proposed tariff increases and trade wars have far-reaching effects, implying that the US may no longer be a reliable consumer market, that the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency is in doubt, and that it will also raise concerns about protecting international sea lanes.

Promoting American democracy was never a top priority until recently, but it is now a rhetorical one. While the US has long backed autocrats, Trump’s acceptance of strongman rule extends to adversaries.

His recent use of the term “dictator” for Russian President Vladimir Putin while avoiding such language for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky demonstrates a deliberate loosening of ideological restraints.

Additionally, the US has long opposed international law, with its refusal to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the International Criminal Court. Yet, it has traditionally played a central role in upholding basic global legal frameworks, with Europe often supporting its efforts.

Washington’s acceptance of border changes by Russia and Israel, which it is now shunning, reflects a growing respect for force, whether from allies or adversaries. China, Iran, and other countries are taking note, and they may soon begin to use economic and political pressure to lessen the autonomy of smaller nations.

Trump’s ongoing dismantling of the foreign policy establishment does not indicate an American retreat from global affairs but rather a radical overhaul. Washington is moving away from the post-World War II and post-Cold War neoliberal order it established and is characterized by multilateralism in favor of a more confrontational, transactional system based on unilateral strength.

The deterioration of institutions is yet another indication of the “unipolar moment” of America and a return to a more erratic and unpredictable era of global affairs.

John P Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, D. C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He contributes to a number of foreign affairs publications, and his book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas, was published in December 2022.

This article was produced by Economy for All, an Independent Media Institute initiative, and is now republished with permission.

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Trump’s firings a shot to the heart of US armed forces – Asia Times

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General Charles Q. Brown Jr. was fired as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff less than half through Brown’s four-year term in office, but President Donald Trump provided no distinct justification.

The judge activists standard of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are the only women to lead the military, and he did not provide an explanation for the equally ousting other senior military leaders, including the single women to do so in the Navy and the Coast Guard.

The US military troops ‘ commander-in-chief is the leader. However, the government has been devoted to serving the country since George Washington’s days, not a particular individual or political mission.

I was a major standard for 36 times in the US Air Force, which I am aware of. I am aware that nonpartisanship is fundamental to the government’s main goal of defending the nation even now as a teacher on history, national security, and constitutional law.

Trump’s steps may raise questions about whether or not he is trying to alter those centuries of law.

If so, all levels of military service would have to answer the question: Do they support the government’s independent function in upholding the integrity and stability of American politics, or do they follow president’s orders even if they did so in ways that crossed a constitutional or improper line?

Two men in 18th-century formal wear greet each other in a garden.
George Washington left his military fee and entered the workforce after the American Revolution. Herman Bencke via the Library of Congress

Social independence was established right away.

Washington and other US owners were well aware of the potential for a strong martial to overthrow the government or face political whims as various parties or factions controlled the president or Congress, but they spent a lot of time thinking about the function of the army and the use of military might.

A warning stories about Julius Caesar, who seized power in ancient Rome with his troops. Oliver Cromwell’s usage of his military might to kill King Charles I and establish his country was also significant.

After the American Revolution ended in 1783, Washington resigned as commander-in-chief of the Continental Army, one of his most important contributions to the apolitical history of the defense.

The person who would become the country’s first president showed his devotion to human power of a war that was founded on a commitment to the quest of life, liberty, and happiness rather than any one party, faction, or person by voluntarily giving up his military power and returning to civilian life.

The case of Washington’s work was instructive for future generations. The founders incorporated human control over the military in the US Constitution a few years after. Article II, Section 2, designates the president as the commander-in-chief of the military, while Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the authority to declare war and bank forces.

This check and balance ensures that the military continues to be impartial and submissive to the military’s elected representatives. Additionally, it establishes military leaders ‘ commitment to a principled document rather than to political whirlwinds and ebbs and flows.

Training and responding to orders

Polls consistently reveal that Americans have greater trust in the military than in any other aspect of the US government. Part of that trust comes from the military’s professional commitment to political neutrality, which includes training its personnel to uphold values like duty, honor, and integrity.

Military personnel from all branches of the military take their oath of allegiance to the Constitution seriously. All military members, officers and enlisted, swear to support and defend the Constitution at the beginning of their service, at every reenlistment, and typically during promotion ceremonies. A pledge to follow the president’s and the officers ‘ orders is also included in the enlisted oath.

This fundamental oath makes sure that if a member of the military receives orders they consider to be questionable, they won’t blindly follow those orders. They are instructed throughout their careers to get clarification during regular training sessions for officers and candidates, as well as during regular training.

They are instructed to contest those orders if necessary through their chain of command, their branch’s <a href="https://www.afinspectorgeneral.af.mil/”>inspector general, or through attorneys associated with their divisions.

Military personnel ‘ responses to questionable orders can vary depending on their ranks. Senior officers have the authority and responsibility to make sure that any orders they follow or pass down are legitimate and in accordance with the Constitution because they have extensive experience and higher levels of responsibility.

They frequently consult with legal advisors, discuss the implications with peers, and thoroughly analyze the situation before acting when navigating uncertain orders or navigating ambiguous situations.

Senior enlisted personnel and junior officers frequently find themselves in situations where they must make quick decisions based on the information at their disposal. They are taught to follow orders, but they are also encouraged to use their judgment and seek advice when they believe an order is inadmissible, including consulting with attorneys who have direct access to their cases.

The importance of the legality and constitutionality of orders is also imparted to junior enlisted personnel, who make up more than 40 % of the military force. If they believe an order is unlawful, they have the right to request clarification.

Despite this, discipline and obedience are key components of their training. This can make it difficult for them to question orders, especially in high-pressure situations.

People in camouflage uniforms raise their right hands while standing on a field in a sports stadium.
Members of the US military oath the Constitution by oath. Ethan Miller / Getty Images via The Conversation

Ultimate accountability

Senior military leaders, such as admirals and generals, colonels and Navy captains, are tasked with scrutinizing orders.

Junior officers, senior enlisted, and junior enlisted personnel rely on their leaders to navigate the complexities of politics and ensure that the orders they receive are legitimate and concentrate on national defense, not politics.

Chaos could result from senior military leaders failing to fulfill their duties. Units might end up following contradictory orders or completely disregarding orders. This can cause units to fall under the control and control of others to act independently or in accordance with politically motivated orders.

This would be a dangerous transition, making the military extremely vulnerable to enemy attacks and operational failures.

A man in civilian clothes and a man in a military uniform stand facing a row of men in military uniforms.
President Lyndon Johnson, center, and Gen. William Westmoreland make a visit to soldiers in South Vietnam in 1967. Photo courtesy of The Conversation

In US military history, this is the first time this has happened.

However, some events have attempted to cross the line. For instance, President Lyndon Johnson was determined to show American strength and resolve during the Vietnam War, famously declaring,” I will not lose in Vietnam. General William Westmoreland was under his weight for his pressure.

Westmoreland responded by making public the number of enemy combatants killed, trying to show that US efforts were reducing the size of the opposing forces. However, according to historians, this emphasis on military objectives misled soldiers, leading to confusion and conflicting orders. The cost was longer of the war and more casualties for American and Vietnamese citizens.

In the end, Westmoreland was charged with manipulating the estimates of the enemy’s troop strength to convey progress, in order to support Johnson’s political desire to avoid defeat. His decisions do not infringe directly on US law or the Constitution, but they demonstrate how political pressure can have a negative impact on military tactics and have disastrous effects.

Unbiased sources of data

Leaders also have clear obligations to the civilians elected and appointed above them in addition to the responsibility of senior military leaders to remain apolitical.

For instance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff needs factual and objective information from the president based on their experience and professional judgments regarding the military’s capabilities.

The president will miss out on the kinds of crucial insights that shape effective strategies if advisers are reluctant to open up about what is and is not possible in any given circumstance and about potential consequences, both good and bad.

Bottom line: Top military experts undermine the countless years-old system of military training and ethics when they offer advice and take actions that are politically influenced. Some customs are valuable to maintain.

Samuel C. Mahaney is the director of the Missouri S& T Policy and Armed Forces Research and Development Institute and the Missouri University of Science and Technology’s professor of history, national security, and leadership.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the article.

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Any new Trump-Kim diplomacy to be judged by results, not rhetoric – Asia Times

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The evolving political balance between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, which is unfolding in the context of continuous local conflicts and international realignments, has the potential to trigger proper adjustments in the international and security policies of vital regional players, including South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan.

As Trump signals a renewed willingness to engage with Pyongyang, regional players are closely monitoring these advancements, recognizing that any change in the US-North Korea strong could affect the balance of power, stability calculations and political alignments in Northeast Asia:

  • For South Korea, it might require revisiting its commitment to inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation with Washington.
  • If U.S.-DPRK ties increase, China may be under pressure to increase its strategic influence over North Korea.
  • Russia, currently a critical backer of Pyongyang, must weigh the implications for its own regional influence and its military-economic ties with the North.
  • In the meantime, Japan is likely to advocate for a more robust multilateral strategy that will prevent any potential bilateral agreement between Trump and Kim from ignoring its security concerns, particularly those relating to missile threats.

Thus, this diplomatic transition has the potential to have profoundly reshape regional security architectures and alliance dynamics.

As Trump expresses renewed interest in reengaging with Pyongyang, the possibility of a third U. S. DPRK summit is increasingly coming into focus.

It is crucial to examine the underlying motivations behind Trump’s strategy, assess the potential” small deal” with North Korea, and consider the significant influence that external actors have had on the development of trilateral relations, particularly Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Trump’s renewed attention to US-North Korea diplomacy, which has been fueled by increased rhetoric and his close ties to Kim Jong Un, has sparked debates about the strategic value and potential risks of rekindling diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.

Set against the backdrop of his involvement in high-stakes conflicts such as the Israel-Hamas war and the Russia-Ukraine crisis, this pivot to the Korean Peninsula appears to be more than an attempt to revisit unfinished diplomatic efforts, it reflects a deliberate strategic move within the broader context of the US-China geopolitical rivalry.

North Korea’s de facto nuclear status

Trump’s most recent explicit mention of North Korea as a “nuclear power” is a notable departure from the cautious language used by previous US administrations, which have traditionally avoided using terms that might be interpreted as ratifying Pyongyang’s nuclear status.

Although Trump’s statements fall short of formal recognition under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ( NPT )– which designates only five states as official nuclear-weapon states – they signal a pragmatic, albeit controversial, acknowledgment of North Korea’s entrenched nuclear capabilities and its growing strategic relevance.

This change in rhetoric has significant implications. It alters the underlying presumptions of any upcoming diplomatic engagement and may unintentionally restore North Korea’s nuclear standing internationally. It also risks undermining long-standing global non-proliferation norms by blurring the line between de facto and de jure nuclear powers.

Over the past ten years, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal has grown significantly both in terms of quantity and sophistication. According to estimates from independent arms control organizations, Pyongyang may have 40 to 60 nuclear warheads, but the exact number is unknown due to the regime’s opacity.

The country has conducted six nuclear tests since 2006, the most recent and powerful of which occurred in September 2017, reportedly involving a hydrogen bomb with a yield exceeding 100 kilotons.

North Korea has significantly improved its missile delivery systems, in addition to its nuclear weapons. It has successfully tested a number of ballistic missile technologies, including those that have the potential to reach the continental United States, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBMs) like the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15.

In 2022, North Korea unveiled the Hwasong-17, a massive ICBM capable of carrying multiple warheads ( MIRVs ), signaling a further leap in its strategic capabilities.

Additionally, North Korea has expanded its short- and medium-range missile arsenal by using systems like the KN-24, which are mobile, mobile, and maneuverable and are designed to evade interception and target U.S. and allies in South Korea and Japan.

The government has also been conducting research on submarine-launched ballistic missiles ( SLBMs), including the Pukguksong series, to show its intention to create a second-strike capability.

These developments underscore the reality that North Korea is no longer a fledgling nuclear aspirant but a fully armed nuclear state, in practical terms.

Trump may be trying to redefine diplomacy to revolve more around realism than idealism in order to acknowledge this fact. It raises important questions about how the US and its allies should go about avoiding nuclear weapons, deterrence, and strategic stability in a region that is increasingly influenced by the presence of a North Korea that is nuclear-armed.

Nobel dreams

Trump’s foreign policy strategy has historically incorporated strategic engagement and personal branding. His retort toward Kim may be seen as part of a wider campaign to promote peace, possibly with consideration for domestic political or international recognition objectives.

However, if substantive denuclearization objectives are compromised in favor of headline-generating summits or symbolic agreements, the long-term security costs could outweigh the short-term diplomatic gains.

Detachment of North Korea from its traditional ally, China, is a crucial component of Trump’s outreach strategy. This action is in line with his wider geopolitical goal of preventing Beijing from balancing its interests by developing alternative bilateral relationships.

Simultaneously, Russia’s expanding involvement with North Korea complicates this equation. Putin’s role as Kim’s principal military and economic partner has made Moscow an essential player in shaping Pyongyang’s calculus, especially in light of Western sanctions against Ukraine.

Trump may have indirect influence over Kim if he can negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine or increase his diplomatic leverage over Russia. Conversely, failure to secure Russian cooperation could entrench the Pyongyang-Moscow axis further, diminishing the efficacy of US diplomatic overtures.

evaluating the small deal option

The subject of the most recent rumors is the possibility of a” small deal” in which North Korea would freeze some of its nuclear programs in exchange for partial sanctions relief.

While politically attractive in the short term, such arrangements have historically yielded mixed outcomes, particularly when verification mechanisms and compliance conditions were weak or unenforceable.

Any proposed agreement must satisfy a number of crucial conditions in order for it to be effective. It ought to be

  • ensure full transparency in the declaration of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities,
  • establish robust verification procedures involving trustworthy international actors, and
  • include clearly defined consequences for non-compliance.

Most importantly, such a deal must be explicitly tied to a broader framework within the new emerging global order – one that accommodates and balances the core security interests of both sides involved.

Kim Jong Un has an indefinite term of office, which allows for a long-game approach to negotiations, in contrast to US presidents who are limited by electoral cycles. Depending on US leadership changes, North Korea has historically shown flexibility in tone and behavior. Trump’s inability to seek a third term further undermines his long-term leverage, making any agreements potentially fragile and reversible.

Kim’s track record suggests he may choose partial cooperation to get immediate concessions, but then to resign when the US leadership changes or when Russian support is assured, especially from Russia.

The actual test is awaiting.

Trump may seek to cast himself as a unique figure capable of bridging divides with adversaries, but his credibility in this endeavor will be judged not by rhetoric but by results.

Kim Jong Un, Vladimir Putin, and the rest of the world are all monitoring how Trump deals with the world’s current conflicts, particularly those in Ukraine. It’s unlikely that Pyongyang will take his proposals seriously unless he refuses to appoint them with important commitments from Moscow.

For Washington and its allies – particularly Tokyo and Seoul– the strategic focus should be not on opposing Trump’s reengagement with North Korea, but rather on actively shaping it to reflect their security interests, regional priorities, and long-term policy objectives.

Future diplomatic ties with North Korea should be based on a number of fundamental ideas. Chief among them is the understanding that if North Korea commits to concrete, verifiable steps toward denuclearization, it should receive appropriate and timely sanctions relief to address its pressing economic challenges.

Instead of being delayed until the entire denuclearization process is over, it should be gradually and in accordance with the progress made, thereby encouraging continued compliance.

At the same time, continued cooperation with China and Russia is necessary to prevent North Korea from feeling pressured to withdraw from the deal due to conflicting pressures from its key allies and security partners.

&nbsp, Furthermore, any negotiation framework must be resilient enough to endure beyond Trump’s political tenure, recognizing the historical volatility of US policy shifts between administrations.

Given that Russia is gaining more and more power over North Korea, it is crucial to watch closely and consider the effects of Trump’s changing relationship with Putin.

In the end, maintaining a sophisticated balance between credible deterrence and diplomatic engagement is essential to preserving stability and advancing denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

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​Is Europe rearming? The jury is still out – Asia Times

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Germany recently passed legislation that purports to commit €1 trillion ($ 1.08 trillion ) to the defense sector, while the EU has suggested a Rearm Europe  Plan to raise more than € 800 billion ($ 866 billion ) for defense.

On the surface, it appears as though Europe is getting ready for the next battle, but the reality is that it is actually trying to cover up its severe economic issues by investing money into its economy and building weapons. But will this approach job?

At various degrees, problems exist.

The first is financial. The idea that human factories may be converted into weapons production facilities, mainly tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, is at the center of the planning. For instance, the German company, Rheinmetall, is considering purchasing a Volkswagen factory in Osnabrück, north Germany, a facility that then faces an uncertain future.

The government of Italy has promoted a similar concept, urging Stellantis to begin producing protection equipment in its auto factories.

Stellantishttps: //www next month. reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/stellantis-italy-output-falls-475090-vehicles-2024-cars-lowest-level-since-1956-2025-01-03/ produced fewer than 500, 000 vehicles in Italy ( Fiat plus Alfa Romeo, Maserati, Lancia ) compared with 751, 000 in 2023. The bank’s lowest number in Italy since 1956 was 2024.

Chairman of Stellantis, John Elkann.

The president of Stellantis, John Elkann, objected to the government’s request to change some factories to protection production, claiming that his company was unsure that the “dead industry” would be the future of the car.

At the opening of the White Paper for European Defense, Kaja Kallas, the vice president of the European Commission, names journalists. European Commission, in pictures.

The main issue is that the economic justification for switching from high-volume creation to low-volume defense equipment makes little sense in the business world. Although it is true that some vehicles companies that produce trucks and other large equipment have cranes and lifts that could be used to build armoured vehicles, also tanks, these plants are designed for mass production rather than primarily for hand-built result.

Chrysler factory during World War II.

The US stopped most car production during World War II ( aside from the necessary vehicles for the battle ) and switched to defense manufacturing. The US production was remarkable: 297, 000 plane, 193, 000 ordnance guns, 86, 000 tank and 2 million vehicles. The US merely produces 250 fighter jets annually today. That would equal a total production of 1,250 planes in a five-year issue like World War II, which would not compare to World War II’s.

Europe currently produces no more than 50 war tanks per year. Even though that figure is pretty low, it may take years to change an car factory to tank production, so the tank production in Europe doesn’t significantly increase over the next five years. Additionally, converting a manufacturer to military hardware requires a significant redesign of an automobile factory. Although Germany’s labor unions would have a lot to say about job rates, settlement, and social advantages, less people would also be required.

In the US, Europe, Russia, or China, it is obvious that the World War II design, which called for a federal participation to fight the war, is not feasible.

It is also important to point out that the security industry in Europe is divided, its supply chains are uncertain, and, in many cases, severely cheap, and that participating companies are not known for reliability or cost usefulness. Many of these businesses have grown as a result of wings transfers to Ukraine, where they receive the highest compensation. Where will the extra projected production get, if the conflict ends, if at all?

More military equipment does require more troops and support as a result. How this will become accounted for is currently unknown. Without enlistment, the force structure of Europe won’t be easy to grow. According to some, Europe is currently experiencing a crisis in defense selection.

Both the German and Italian cases are intended to solve financial and employment issues and in some way resurrect the German and Italian economy. However, in reality, the concept looks more like a rebate program to keep plants running, but with significantly lower output.

Both nations will have to determine whether or not they can manage the grants, whether or not they will contribute to resolving the country’s economic crisis in Italy or Germany, which is currently in decline. The solution to car selling is not to manufacture weapons, as the Stellantis CEO suggested.

One wonders if a major study has examined whether it makes sense to convert existing companies to war-making in the middle of the night or even if massive grants are going to help alleviate Germany’s and other countries ‘ economic woes.

The social issue is of course.

There isn’t a discussion on the strategic objective of the investing, despite the proposed ramp-up in defense spending in Germany and by the EU’s proposed plans to benefit defense companies that can use the new funding. In reality, there is a different political divide between some EU member states. This is a significant factor in Italy’s opposition to the EU Rearm Europe program, which was opposed to the European Commission’s president, Ursula von der Leyen.

Guido Crosetto, the minister of defense of Italy,

Guido Crosetto, Italy’s defence secretary, sent an&nbsp, open text that was published in Corriere la Sera, Italy’s most read newspapers.

Crosetto argued that Western defense” cannot change NATO nor provide the same level of protection.”

He explained that without the consent of all EU members, the EU may impose a popular defense strategy for Europe.

The EU Treaty itself gives the option of a typical defense scheme, but only after a unanimous vote of the German Council, which has never occurred or is currently being discussed in any state or member state.

The EU command has been pushing for a security function outside of NATO and has long intended to take its place. The EU’s Rearm Europe strategy has been put on hold due to Italy’s resistance to these interests, at least for the moment.

Uncertainties

The overall strategy to increase protection spending lacks any resolerable strategic justification. What kinds of forces are required for Western protection? Which industries demand the most capital? Additionally, even though everyone is talking about doing so ( as they have for the past 50 years ), there is no real strategy to consolidate German defense production in any significant way.

Additionally, it’s uncertain whether the promised funds will be provided by the Bundestag or any other European legislature.

The main strength of German law is that it makes it simpler to lift defence costs without subjecting them to a constitutional ban on budget deficits greater than 0. 35 % of the GDP. According to reports, the recently passed policy includes a constitutional amendment that removes the defence spending cap.

That is a likely significant step, but with an already depressed economy and little real growth in job from new investing, it will be difficult to maintain social support for large defense budgets in Germany or elsewhere.

Germany may also try to recoup its lost business in Russia if the conflict in Ukraine is resolved. Additionally, there is the spectacular probability that Germany will once more attempt to purchase less expensive gas from Russia, even renovating existing natural gas pipes, such as Nordstream. A shift in the way European industrialists view things might be able to halt the effort to boost defence output.

State aid programs, yet those costing €1 Trillion, must become based on a clear security plan, which Europe does not have, and on an understanding of the financial consequences, which may not produce anything like what appears to be promised. The verdict on Rearm Europe is still out.

Former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent for Asia Times. This Substack newsletter, Weapons and Strategy, originally published as an original article in his Substack, is republished with permission.

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Weaker dollar, weaker everything – Asia Times

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Weaker buck, worsening all

David Goldman examines the economic factors that are responsible for stock’s steady upward trend toward a long-term specific of$ 10, 000 an ounce, citing rising global debt levels, dollar depreciation risks, and diminished charm of conventional reserve assets like US Treasuries.

Germany successfully abolishes the bill brake.

Germany’s serious transition from governmental orthodoxy is evaluated by Diego Faßnacht, who lays the groundwork for once-blocked projects involving natural and defense-focused projects as the Bundestag passes a constitutional amendment that effectively removes the bill pedal.

Trump is the target of European opposition because of Russia’s détente.

The Presidents Trump and Putin phoned on March 18 to discuss the outcome. The limited Ukraine truce makes strategic gains in Moscow, but Putin is met with resistance from hawks who oppose any ceasefire with Kiev.

Tesla drops by half while BYD hits a new high.

Scott Foster examines the rise in Chinese electric vehicle ( EV ) stocks, highlighting BYD’s dramatic advance over Tesla in both innovation and market performance. Since mid-January, BYD’s stock has increased by 50 %, while Tesla’s stock has decreased by 50 % due to recalls and quality issues.

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Pro-Beijing paper: Anti-sanctions law can block Li’s ports deal – Asia Times

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A media mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party has suggested using China’s anti-sanctions mechanism to deal with Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing’s proposed selling of his global ports, including two at the Panama Canal, to BlackRock.

In its latest article titled “Stop the transaction, avoid losing a lot to save a little,” Ta Kung Pao, a pro-Beijing newspaper, urges Li to scrap his ports deal. 

Since its first attack on Li on March 13, the newspaper has published more than 10 commentaries and news articles on the topic. While previous ones called Li a “traitor” and an unpatriotic businessman, its latest opinion piece mentions a concrete legal tool – the anti-sanctions law – for the first time.

“Both at the national and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region levels, our legal system is quite complete,” writes Wan Yunping. (The name may be a pseudonym as the author has no title and has not published any article before.)

“In response to the United States and Western sanctions in recent years, our country has accumulated rich experience in anti-sanctions and formed an effective response mechanism,” Wan says. “Both the state and the SAR have legal mechanisms to deal with so-called ‘legal transactions’ that harm national interests.”

He says those who have stressed that Li’s proposed deal is a “legitimate transaction” under the principle of freedom of contract are “too naive and senile.”

“From the operational level of commercial mergers and acquisitions, I advise relevant companies and individuals to stop delivery, avoid miscalculations and avoid losing a lot to save a little,” Wan says.

The author also says Li’s deal violates the principle of Hong Kong’s National Security Ordinance, which states that “the highest principle of the policy of ‘one country, two systems’ is to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests.” The Legislative Council passed the ordinance, drafted on the basis of Article 23 of the Basic Law, in March 2024.

“This transaction directly violates this highest principle as it will hurt China’s national security and development interests,” he says. “Violating the principle of the law is also a violation of the law.”

“Throughout the legal system, not every legal provision directly states the consequences of violation,” he adds. “However, the lack of written legal consequences does not mean the law has no legal effect.”

In August 2021, Beijing suggested extending the coverage of its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law to Hong Kong by adding it to Annex III of the Basic Law. If implemented, this law would forbid Hong Kong companies and banks from enforcing foreign sanctions against China. 

However, the National People’s Congress (NPC) standing committee finally did not discuss the suggestion after considering that it would put Hong Kong’s banks and financial institutions in a difficult position in the fight between China and the US and trigger capital flight from Hong Kong.

Some observers have said that Beijing can use the existing National Security Law and the potential implementation of the anti-sanctions law in Hong Kong to deal with Li. But Ronny Tong, a legal expert and an Executive Council member, said it’s unlikely that Beijing will intervene in the case with the National Security Law.

“The United Kingdom passed the National Security Investment Act in 2021 to scrutinize outbound and inbound investment, while the United States has also recently banned American companies from investing in China and Chinese companies from investing in the US,” Tong says in a social media post.

“The media and international community did not criticize these restrictions. But if the SAR government intervenes in a case for national security reasons, it will definitely attract overwhelming criticism and smear,” he says. “We have always dealt with things fairly and in accordance with the law. It is the difference between China and the UK-US.”

He says Li must consider whether selling his ports is in the national interest.

It is unclear whether Beijing will block Li’s ports deal with the anti-sanctions law. For that to happen, the NPC Standing Committee needs to hold a meeting before CK Hutchison and the BlackRock-Til consortium sign definitive documentation for the transaction on April 2.

Victor Li’s statement

On March 4, CK Hutchison, Li’s flagship company, announced that it had agreed to sell its entire 80% stake in Hutchison Ports – which owns, operates and develops 43 ports comprising 199 berths in 23 countries – to BlackRock for US$22.8 billion.

After this, Victor Li, the elder son of Li Ka-shing and chairman of CK Hutchison, reportedly met with a “national leader” to discuss the deal in Beijing, but he insisted on continuing the transaction. 

Bloomberg reported on March 18 that senior Chinese leaders ordered several government agencies, including the State Administration for Market Regulation, to scrutinize the deal for any potential security breaches or antitrust violations. Still, the probe would not necessarily result in any follow-up action.

“Looking ahead to 2025, there may be headwinds with supply chain disruptions anticipated in the early part of the year due to shipping lines transitioning into their new alliances, as well as ongoing geopolitical risk impacting global trade,” Victor Li says in CK Hutchison’s 2024 result announcement released on March 20.

He says that the company’s port business will continue to improve this year with moderate organic growth in Asia and the Middle East, expansion at existing terminal facilities and strengthening strategic partnerships.

Revenue from the company’s ports and related services grew 11% to HK$45.3 billion (US$5.83 billion) for the year ended December 31, 2024. The segment’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) increased 19% to HK$16.2 billion.

Pundits’ debate

In China most commentators criticized the 96-year-old Li Ka-shing for selling his global ports to BlackRock, although a few defended him.

A Fujian-based writer using the pseudonym “Xinghua Dabai” says in an article published on Wednesday that Li failed to sell 40% of Hutchison Ports to Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for about HK$150 billion in 2015 because the premium was too high.

“Many people asked why China did not buy Li’s ports in the past. It’s not that we did not want to buy,” the writer says. “A 2015 news article showed that Chinese buyers felt Li’s asking price was too high. Besides, they did not want to only hold a minority stake.”

The writer says Li’s asking price in 2015 was about 26 to 28 times the assets’ EBITDA, more than double the industry’s 10 to 12 times valuation then. He says now Li offers BlackRock 80% of his port assets for 11 to 13 times EBITDA, compared with the industry’s 9 to 10 times valuation.

He says Li deserves criticism this time because he is selling his ports to BlackRock at a lower valuation. 

“Someone might also ask why China does not buy the ports now,” he says. “Such a deal will involve antitrust probes in 12 jurisdictions, including the European Union, the US and Brazil. Obviously, the US won’t approve it if our SOEs buy Hutchison Ports.”

In an interview, Larry Lang, a Hong Kong-based Taiwanese economist, says Li should not face criticism for selling his own assets, especially when port operation is a declining sector.

Lang says Li won Britain’s trust to acquire Hutchison Whampoa in 1979 and spent decades expanding it; besides, Li is a Canadian citizen and should not be judged on his Chinese patriotism. 

Lang says that, as China has already started building ports and railways overseas in the past decade, the negative impact of Li’s deal on the country will only be temporary.

Yong Jian is a contributor to the Asia Times. He is a Chinese journalist who specializes in Chinese technology, economy and politics. 

Read: China probes Li Ka-shing’s Panama ports deal for security concerns

Read: Beijing calls Li Ka-shing a ‘traitor’ in Panama ports deal

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Why can’t US build a homegrown tech workforce? – Asia Times

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Two groups of followers of President Donald Trump just engaged in a heated argument. The H-1B card program, a program that allows US employers to employ highly qualified foreigners in special occupations, most notably in the technology sector, is at issue.

On the one hand, there are people like Steve Bannon, a former adviser to Donald Trump, who has described the H-1B programme as a” total and complete scam.” On the other hand, there are digital tycoons, such as Elon Musk, who believe that skilled foreign workers are essential for the US tech industry.

An annual maximum of novel permits that the H-1B card program can issue is imposed by the agency, which is 65, 000 per fiscal year. Additionally, there is an additional yearly limit of 20, 000 H-1B visa for highly qualified international students who have demonstrated their ability to succeed professionally in the United States.

After graduating, foreign grad students at US institutions can stay and work there under the H-1B system. Many of the STEM research I do at Rice University is carried out by foreign graduate students. The same holds true for the majority of the country’s institutions that focus on research.

As an expatriate and a professor of computer science who studies the interaction between technology and nation, I think the H-1B argument ignores some crucial issues. Why does the US rely so heavily on foreigners for its tech sector, and why is it unable to create a local tech workforce?

Intellect pole for the world

Since before World War II, the US has been a hotspot for international medical skills.

Many of the professionals who contributed to the creation of the nuclear weapon were immigrants from Europe. US laws, such as the Fulbright Program, opened up opportunities for international academic change after World War II.

International individuals ‘ efforts to attract Americans have been successful. 40 % of Americans who have received the Nobel Prize in science, medicine, or science since 2000 are immigrants.

Scientists Louis Brus, Alexei Ekimov and Moungi Bawendi appear in a triptych photo.
Louis Brus, a U.S. citizen, and Alexei Ekimov, a U.S. immigrant, Moungi Bawendi, both from France, shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2023. AP Photo

Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Google, which are all digital economy giant, were all founded by primary- or second-generation refugees. Additionally, since 2018, refugees have founded more than half of the world’s billion-dollar companies.

maximizing the student flow

As some important Trump supporters have argued, restricting the access to foreign graduate students ‘ jobs in the US may significantly reduce global graduate students ‘ enrollment.

In the US’s computer science and engineering courses, there are approximately 18, 000 individuals from abroad, or 80 % of graduate students.

The absence of foreign doctoral students would drastically lessen the ability of grad programs in science and engineering to conduct research. In US universities, graduate students are primarily responsible for the majority of study in science and engineering, closely followed by main investigators.

It should be emphasized that international students contribute significantly to the US study result.

For instance, researchers who were born outside the US played significant roles in the creation of the Pfizer and Moderna Covid-19 vaccinations. Therefore, making the US less appealing to international student learners in science and engineering did hurt US study profitability.

PhD alumni in computer science are in high demand. The lack of an sufficient home pipeline seems strange because the market requires them.

Where have kids from the US left?

Why do US science and engineering individuals need to study abroad, then? And why hasn’t America developed a sufficient network of students born in the US for its specialized workplace?

After talking with a number of colleagues, I’ve discovered that there are just not enough qualified local graduate applicants to fill the gaps in their postgraduate programs.

For instance, US computer science doctoral programs admitted 3,400 new kids in 2023, of which 63 % were foreigners.

It appears that many US undergrad computer science students are not interested enough in the postgraduate career path. But why?

Silicon Valley’s leading annual income for recent computer science graduates is reportedly US$ 115, 000. Prior to recently, Rice University’s computer engineering bachelor’s degree holders have reported that they were receiving starting annual salaries in Silicon Valley as high as$ 150, 000.

Unlike research universities, graduate students do not get a salary. They are rather given a allowance. These vary slightly from one school to the next, but they typically cost less than$ 40, 000 annually. Therefore, the opportunity cost of getting a doctorate is up to$ 100, 000 annually. And it normally takes six times to get a degree.

Therefore, some Americans don’t have the financial means to pursue a degree. A graduate education does, in fact, open up new career options for the holder, but the majority of those with bachelor’s degrees do not go beyond economics. Silicon Valley’s success depends a lot on intellectual computing research, but it is essential.

According to a 2016 analysis of the information systems areas with significant financial impact, scientific research is crucial to their growth.

Why so much?

China and the US are at odds with one another because they are both focused on industrial dominance. Therefore, maintaining its research-and-development advantage is in the country’s best attention.

Nevertheless, the US has declined to invest the necessary amount in studies. For instance, the National Science Foundation’s annual budget for computer and information science and engineering is roughly$ 1 billion. In contrast, Alphabet, the parent company of Google, has spent close to$ 50 billion on annual research and development costs for the past ten years.

Colleges are paying doctoral students but less because they can’t afford to pay more.

A man on stage speaks to an audience.
Sundar Pichai, the CEO of Alphabet, addresses a Google I/O function in Mountain View, California, on May 14, 2024. Photo courtesy of The Conversation/Jeff Chiu

The US has discovered a way to meet its scientific study needs by recruiting and admitting foreign pupils, but instead of acknowledging the existence of this issue and making efforts to address it.

The US has been able to ignore the national graduate pipeline’s inadequateness due to the steady flow of highly qualified global candidates. The US has a chance to reflect on the H-1B immigration technique as of right now, thanks to the discussion.

However, the National Science Foundation’s announcement of enormous budget cuts in Washington, DC, suggests that the federal government is about to turn an chronic issue into a crisis.

Professor of Computer Science at Rice University, Moshe Y. Vardi

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

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The still-hopeful future of sustainability – Asia Times

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There are cycles for the effectiveness of global ideas. If an idea has to overwinter politically for a while, that doesn’t mean it’s over

In today’s world, even the most enthusiastic advocates of the idea of sustainability express one fear: we have to discuss whether the era of sustainability, which started in the 1990s and came to a first global peak in 2015 with the release of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is stagnating – or even coming to an end. 

This fear is understandable. Opposition is indeed coming in the first months of 2025, both on a large and small scale. 

On a large scale, it is the US National Bank’s withdrawal from the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), as well as Donald Trump’s radical break with the Paris Climate Agreement, the US sustainability investment program Inflation Reduction Act of his predecessor Joe Biden, and his own US Environmental Protection Agency and their safeguarding programs. 

Trump has announced to turn most sustainability programs down without any compromise and to start to drill in environmentally protected areas, as he put it in his inaugural address on January 20, 2025: “We will drill, baby, drill!”

More or less simultaneously on the other side of the Atlantic big pond, it is the European Union’s softening of its announced end of the fossil fuel combustion engine, the declaration of nuclear and gas energy as sustainable energies and the outcry of business associations and enterprises about the declining competitiveness of European companies in international comparison also due to environmental regulations.

Their assertion is that in the neo-conservative to hyper-authoritarian age of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, almost only Europe and some single countries like Canada are seriously implementing them. 

On a smaller scale, there are increasing protests from local and regional communities against further regulatory steps to protect the environment and a generally noticeable weariness with the words ”sustainability” and “participation”, which, from the point of view of many citizens, have been used too inflationary over the past few years, being imposed by elites through the instruments of political correctness and wokeness.

This procedure, in the views of many, has set an “absolute truth” from above on which no dissent was possible anymore, ultimately limiting personal freedom and harming free choice by implicit and explicit pressure. 

In addition to these phenomena of satiety, there have been most recently technology offensives from the fossil mobility sector, such as the production of more efficient combustion engines, which are expected to compete with electric mobility in a more tied race over the years to come. 

Last but not least, global signature events such as the recent UN Climate Summit COP29 in November 2024 Baku, Azerbaijan, have recently also meant setbacks rather than progress for the global sustainability drive. 

For example, regarding the payment of climate compensation between the Global North and South, the core outcome was that Europe should essentially shoulder this alone because, with a few exceptions, no one else declared themselves ready for binding measures to jointly raise the required US$300 billion.

China and South Korea did not, continuing to declare themselves developing countries and not paying a cent; Russia did not, because it finances its wars from the export of fossil raw materials, on which its internal magnate power system is built; the US did not, because under the Trump 2.0 administration it is focusing more than ever on the extraction of fossil raw materials; and the Arab self-declared “future-oriented states” did not because they also still widely off oil and are less interested in social change than in “leapfrogging” technologies. 

By most of these powers, technology is increasingly seen – rather one-sidedly – as “the” solution regarding future sustainability and planetary protection, and new technologies are thus increasingly positioned in competition or even as a replacement for sustainability. 

The motto in many areas outside Europe and some affiliated nations in 2025 seems to be: We only have to wait until technology no longer causes pollution or even makes everything so clean that it is okay, which will inevitably happen sooner or later due to the inherent laws of auto-evolution of technology. Yet, in the meantime, we don’t have to do without anything and certainly not reduce growth. 

The consequence: growth stabilization or “degrowth” discussions, in essence, currently only exist in Europe, home to only 5-7% of the world’s population, and hardly anywhere else in serious and systemic ways. 

Yet also in the EU, resistance against “strong” sustainability pathways is growing with the politically conservative shift that is taking place in many European countries. Some progressive observers are therefore worriedly asking themselves: Was the sustainability idea perhaps too ambitious for our time? And is it now coming to an end with Donald Trump – or at least experiencing a historical break from which it could take years to recover? 

However, on closer inspection, these fears are due to rather simplistic, linear ideas of development and time – an approach that should actually have been obsolete for a long time. Because we know by now that ideas have risen in history; they then materialized in a certain period up to a certain form and peak, which was always context- and time-dependent.

And sooner or later, after this period, they had to reach a limit, after which they were either relativized, transformed into something else, or indeed displaced or even seemingly destroyed by opposing forces when the pendulum swings to the “other side”, which always did and does in historical cycles.

These cycles, in essence, correspond to those “hermeneutical circles” that modern philosophy describes as creative spirals consisting of the interplay between opposites. 

For some pessimists, within such pendulum movements, ideas appear as a historical phase that only lasts for a while and then disappears to make way for other ideas. In reality, however, the rise and fall of ideas occur in recurring cycles. It is a kind of circular movement of death and rebirth, figuratively speaking.

Many ideas in history that were born out of a high degree of maturity of their time, like sustainability, can have their period in which they have a strong effect. Then they can have to temporarily take a back seat, or even fail indefinitely. 

In the first case, these ideas have to “overwinter,” which they usually do on their own by retreating into niches or below the surface of public debate and prominence. Later, after the overwintering phase, they may return – mostly if they were not superficial but reflected the substance of historical evolution and development. 

This has always been the case with the more profound zeitgeist ideas. Their representatives, for example, artists, often rose to fame and were traded at high prices, only to be forgotten for decades in the following epoch and fall in price – only to be rediscovered in the subsequent era and rise again. 

The most interesting thing about this implicit law of circular decline and resurgence is that ideas disappear or are pushed into the background, but when they come back, they usually have become much stronger than they were, although they often have changed form or phrasing. 

When ideas come back, they usually also last longer and have greater stability than during their original rise. That is, after the overwintering phase, the resurrection phase can make ideas even more influential, although often more differentiated and “wise” than they were in the first place. 

It is exactly for these reasons that history must be considered as something superhuman that is made by humans, which is where its creative paradox lies. Those ideas that are historically “defeated” by superhuman laws of alternation, when they do come back – and nobody knows beforehand if, how and when exactly this occurs – often do so after metamorphoses and are therefore much more difficult to completely defeat again. 

Ideas, one could summarize, basically must go through death and resurrection, like nature in the course of the tides, to reach their destiny. It could be assumed that this is exactly what is happening – or will happen – with the sustainability idea.

The good thing about its temporary trimming could be that its ideological appropriation – the transformation of an idea into an ideology that answers everything and that one is no longer allowed to contradict, which was at least temporarily the case in Europe – is reduced. 

Then the sustainability idea can restore itself more freely and with more participants: namely as the original power of something right that needs no moralization and no ethical formalization to be right because it is felt, sensed and supported by ordinary people with emphasis simply because it makes sense. 

The recent shift in the US towards a – presumably also only temporary – anti-sustainability stance cannot change that fact. And neither can the people who are driving opposition forward, like some currently prominent politicians steering their nations away from the path-breaking sustainability pacts of 2015 (SDGs), 2016 (Paris Agreement) and 2024 (United Nations Pact for the Future). 

In our era, politics is always the balance between the individual moral feeling regarding a righteous livelihood and the collective formalization of a compromise between different ideas about it, a social pact called “democracy.” 

If today there are politicians in the White House – and elsewhere – who continue to underscore at any occasion that they are nothing more than just “dealmakers,” they thereby admit that they have nothing to do with the effort to integrate values with serving the general public, of which democracy consists. 

It is humanly foreseeable that such an attitude against the very substance of politics consciously will be replaced by “pure business logic”, as for example Donald Trump displayed in his now (in)famous public White House conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in February 2025, cannot last. 

What does all this mean if we try to sum up the teachings? It means ideas can only apply and work cyclically – even if they are right and historically at the time. If we are convinced that the sustainability idea was and remains right to achieve a better world, we should also come to the conviction that this idea will be resurrected with transformed appearance and strength in the coming years, as history never stops but continues to develop, unfold and ramify. 

All those who believe in sustainability perhaps may not sleep soundly in the Trump-Putin-Xi era, but should remain optimistic in principle. Because what we have seen over the recent years teaches us mainly four things.

First: Developments always consist of cycles and circuits, not of beginnings and ends. 

Second: An idea whose time has come remains right, regardless of ideological appropriations or rejections.

Third: Practical initiatives based on long-termism – such as the “International Decade 2024-35 of Science for Sustainable Development” – will remain in place against all odds, even if they may require constant new supporters and intellectual and solidarity-based infusions of confidence. 

And finally, fourth: Moral courage and intellectual honesty for what is right is needed not so much in easy times, but first and foremost in difficult times: in times of overwintering and metamorphosis. 

Eventually, the deeper feeling of many people today, particularly of young people around the world, should give us courage. Because there is hardly a “normal” person who doubts, in her or his honest feelings and thoughts, that we should not take better care of the planet, pollute it less and lead it into a more “natural” future protecting its unparalleled beauty, value and dignity. 

Who who still feels any connection to her or his living environment in which she or he moves, and to the people who exist in it, would doubt this in the slightest? 

In sum and looking forward, the sustainability idea is and remains right in 2025, and far beyond, because it is both consciously and, perhaps more important, instinctively shared by every person who is still connected in any way with her or his natural environment, her or his body and the destiny of both and thus of us all. 

Roland Benedikter is an internationally renowned political scientist and sociologist with specialization in global development who co-coined the term “reglobalization” since 2019 (see Ephrat Livni in The New York Times). He is co-head of the Center for Advanced Studies of Eurac Research Bolzano, Italy, UNESCO Chair in Interdisciplinary Anticipation and Global-Local Transformation and Full Member of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts.

He was a Full Member of the “Circle for the Future” of the Federal German Ministry of Education and Research Berlin advising the German Federal Government 2019-23, has co-authored two US Government White Papers on Advanced Technologies and one Report to the Club of Rome, is the author and editor of more than 30 books and more than 200 publications and on the advisory and editorial board of Harvard International Review, New Global Studies, Global-e and the Brill book series “Global Populisms.”

He teaches at Sapienza University Rome I and previously worked at Stanford, Georgetown and UC at Santa Barbara Universities. In 2024-25, he was a consulting member for the Dubai Global 50 Future Opportunities Report 2025 of the Dubai government.

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