Trump’s China policies will take collateral toll on Europe – Asia Times

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Donald Trump’s political success has been met, at least publicly, with indifference in China.

However, a second Trump management does not have to be worse for China than the Biden administration. Whether Trump decides to end his campaign for reconciliation or stays in favor of separation will determine little.

When Biden came to power, Chinese officials hoped that China-US ties would increase and move away from Trump’s trade conflict and isolation. But Biden levied further tariffs on Chinese imports and, most notably, placed far tighter export controls on US systems.

Regardless of whether a Democrat or Republican is in the White House, China came to the realization that US-China proper contest is still ongoing.

For four primary motives, the new Trump administration may offer China some benefits. Second, the Chinese leadership is aware of Trump’s tendency to be unpredictable and to make bold moves.

When then-Chinese Vice Premier Liu He reached the so-called Stage One trade agreement with Trump, exactly that happened in December 2019.

In exchange for US$ 600 billion in Chinese goods from the US and preferred access to the Chinese industry for US businesses, especially in the financial industry, the bargain lifted at least some US tariffs on Chinese products.

Next, Trump’s isolationist plan benefits China in that classic US allies, including the European Union, will probably want to look elsewhere for financial support.

This might lead to a Chinese-like relationship. Just after the Phase One deal was signed, negotiations between China and the EU on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment ( CAI ) accelerated.

Finally, Trump has stated openly that he intends to end the conflict in Ukraine once he assumes office. A quick fix is bound to provide some – perhaps some – of Russia’s calls, which in turn may be net-positive for China.

In the event of a Taiwanese war or blockade, a US administration’s abandonment of Ukraine will destroy the Chinese government’s belief that the US will help it.

Lastly and more frequently, Trump’s win may make it easier for Taiwanese leaders to spread the tale of America’s decline and the decadence of its democracy.

China’s leverage over the Global South has increased considerably since Israel’s defense assault on Gaza and, more recently, Lebanon. That utilize was built in part on great could generated by China’s long-standing efforts, including the Belt and Road Initiative and BRICS.

Trump is anticipated to cooperate with global partners with fewer incentives and a more contextual strategy than the Biden administration. This, in turn, may force the Global South yet closer to China.

Trump’s returning, however, may have a significant impact on China’s economy. Trump has pledged to impose an additional 60 % of taxes on Chinese goods entering the US and, in general, to encourage more decoupling from China.

As a result of changes to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ( CFIUS), an interagency committee that examines the implications of foreign investments in the US for national security, Chinese investment in the US decreased during Trump’s first term.

As a result of Trump’s threat to delist numerous Taiwanese companies from US stock markets, many of them were prevented from raising money there. People-to-people markets were likewise made more difficult, especially for individuals of the tough science.

For his next name, Trump has given every indication that technology, economic and people-to-people decoupling can be expected to continue.

In light of this dire circumstances, China’s leaders will have little space to protest Trump’s taxes and will likely choose to strike a bargain as soon as possible.

China will need to offer significantly more than it did in 2019 to get a” Stage Two” deal, both in terms of the volume of imports it agrees to and by giving US companies a competitive edge in many more fields.

Europe may be the bigger loser in this situation because of the US’s significant competition for its imports to China. There are many more examples, but aircraft is just one.

Of course, Trump’s procedures may have a direct effect on the EU, which could be larger than they are on China. Europe’s situation could become even more difficult as a result of a fresh US-China trade and investment agreement.

Trump’s best chance of achieving a minute trade deal would be if the EU kept pushing for decoupling from China.

There will be less distraction of Chinese trade toward the US in a scenario of US-China rapprochement, despite the obvious adverse effects of decoupling on farther fragmentation of international trade.

Alicia Garcia-Herrero&nbsp, is&nbsp, general analyst for Asia Pacific at Natixis and senior research fellow at Bruegel.

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From war to governance in resistance-liberated areas of Myanmar – Asia Times

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With your kind permission, this post originally appeared on Pacific Forum. Read the original around.

Myanmar’s ongoing armed struggle against the military junta, or State Administration Council ( SAC ), has seen significant territorial gains by ethnic armed organizations ( EAOs ) and People’s Defense Forces ( PDFs ). These newly emerging lands “liberated” by opposition forces underscore the government’s weakening placement in governance.

Following two months of fighting, the Arakan Army ( AA )’s seizure of a strategic junta hilltop base in Mae Taung near the Western Military Command headquarters in Ann Township of Rakhine State, along with the joint forces of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA ) and PDFs ‘ capture of the crucial Pinlebu township in Sagaing Region, offers renewed hope to those who are restraining military rule.

However, these extraordinary martial victories and regional victories present new difficulties for the resistance groups in terms of how to govern these newly liberated regions and how to establish new governance structures in the face of diversity, inclusivity, and lack of experience.

New possibilities and challenges&nbsp,

Establishing practical governments in these freed areas is crucial for maintaining balance and bolstering the broader opposition movement, even though Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement celebrates the release of junta-controlled territories. Setting up leadership buildings is a new and challenging task for some EAOs and Files.

In Chin State, members of the Chin National Front and Chinland Defense Forces guide the formation of local governments using a “bottom-up strategy” reflecting cultural practices, involving tribal elders in the decision-making approach at the town, sub-township, and community levels.

However, some places follow military-established limitations, resulting in scattered leadership models. Internal conflicts in the Chin criticism, which has gained more common support than the Interim Chin National Consultative Council, further complicating things. Establishing practical state governance and essential public services are the immediate challenges facing these organizations.

Sagaing’s weight management adds a third layer of complexity. Region, a crucial battleground in northern Myanmar, has seen Files take control of remote places. In these locations, Women’s Administrative Bodies, supported by local communities and welfare groups, along with Pa Ka Ha, which mostly functions as regional security militias, have emerged as key management actors.

These systems arrange the provision of education, health care, and righteousness, often in partnership with striking civil servants involved in the legal disobedience activity. Sagaing’s PDFs also created taxation systems that collected money through checkpoints along intercity roads. While this practice has faced criticism for a lack of transparency, local governance has become more coordinated over time, with revenue supporting health care, education, and defense.

In other regions of Myanmar, things have changed. Working with the Karenni Army in Karenni ( Kayah ) State, the Arakan Army ( AA ) and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force ( Kayah ) State expand their administrative reach as they establish new frontiers. Meanwhile, the Kachin Independence Army and Karen National Liberation Army are expanding governance systems into liberated territories in Kachin, Karen, Bago, and Sagaing.

In Shan State, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army ( MNDAA ) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ) are also establishing local governance structures within their territories.

In Myanmar’s liberated areas, including those with deep ethnic diversity, establishing inclusive and accountable governance is a significant challenge. Because many of these regions’ ethnic tensions have existed for a long time, it is crucial that new governance structures reflect the needs and rights of all ethnic groups.

For instance, the Arakan Army ( AA )’s past treatment of the Rohingya community in Rakhine State has drawn significant criticism. Fears that the AA’s leadership may marginalize them have been fueled by reports of anti-Rohingya rhetoric and alleged attacks on Rohingya civilians.

Despite these concerns, some initiatives spearheaded by the AA’s political branch, the United League of Arakan, point to potential change. In Rakhine State, the ULA has begun to work with its administrative structures to include Rohingya representation.

Although this is a welcome step toward inclusivity, it is still important to ensure that these efforts result in meaningful participation and the protection of the rights of the Rohingya community in AA-administered areas. The AA’s ability to transition from the “armed resistance organization” to a more accountable governing body is crucial for the achievement of the” Arakan Dream.”

In other regions, there are encouraging examples of inclusivity and accountability. In order to promote inclusive governance, particularly in the education and health sectors, the KNU and KIO have long worked with civil society.

Both operate non-state educational systems that emphasize mother tongue instruction while pursuing inclusion of other racial and ethnic groups in heterogeneous communities and providing essential healthcare services there. Recently, the KIO supported the establishment of private schools for minority groups within its territory, demonstrating a commitment to diverse governance.

However, the road to fully inclusive governance remains challenging, particularly in areas where ethnic tensions have persisted for decades. Resistance leaders must ensure that these systems serve both the diverse populations they govern and as new governance structures continue to form.

Role for the United States

The US has a unique opportunity to build trust with the pro-democracy movement as a result of the establishment of local and state governments in Myanmar’s liberated regions.

While the BURMA Act of 2022 allowed for non-lethal support to resistance actors, further concrete action is needed. The newly formed Congressional Burma Caucus, co-chaired by Bill Huizenga (R-Michigan ) and Betty McCollum (D-Minnesota ), is positioned to rally bipartisan support in addressing Myanmar’s crisis.

With US support, these emerging governments could become more professional and stable, making them more able to satisfy their citizens ‘ needs and promote inclusive, democratic governance.

In addition to the crucial services that many EAOs and PDFs are already providing to varying degrees, this could include support for strengthening governance structures in areas like education, health care, justice, and land rights.

Congress ‘ leaders can increase the demand for more US aid, including by creating a steering group to decide how to allocate roughly US$ 1 billion in frozen Myanmar assets held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York since the coup.

This funding could support resistance governance efforts in education, health care, and justice in liberated areas, helping stabilize these regions. By offering technical assistance and engaging with resistance actors and local civil society, the US can promote transparency, inclusivity, and accountability in these new governance structures, reinforcing its commitment to Myanmar’s democratic future.

Path to inclusive governance

As Myanmar’s resistance forces continue to liberate territory from military regime’s control, they face the monumental task of building governance systems that are inclusive, accountable and functional.

The NUG and various EAOs are determined to establish a new autonomous state/local governments, which will have a significant impact on the development of Myanmar’s federal system. However, this effort remains incomplete without the participation of some major EAOs, including the AA, TNLA, MNDAA, among others.

They will need to be considered in any negotiations involving the creation of a new federal democratic republic in Myanmar because they control a sizable portion of the country. The current dispersion of the resistance forces highlights the difficulties awaiting in the development of a common political framework and the need for a political pact between these various groups through meaningful dialogue.

By providing technical assistance and advice, the US has the opportunity to help lay the groundwork for a future democratic Myanmar. However, the path to a new federal democratic Myanmar will require cooperation among all resistance actors, the resolution of ethnic tensions, and a commitment to inclusive governance.

Myanmar’s resistance forces can only hope to see the country’s future as a democracy when they address these issues.

Aung Thura Ko Ko ( aung@pacforum .org ) is a resident Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum and an East-West Center affiliate scholar. The University of Oxford awarded him the Master of Public Policy.

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Why Africa keeps employing Russia’s bad boy mercenaries – Asia Times

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Russian troops, like the Wagner team, have an awful status. Multiple European outlets have reported on their defense ineffectiveness, their dismal human rights report, and their predatory nature.

For instance, in July 2024, the Wagner Group faced a military defeat in northern Mali. It lost lots of soldiers, including a senior captain and a well-known Russian military critic.

Since 2014, many studies have linked Russian troops to killings, sexual assault and crimes against humanity. Additionally, it appears that Russian soldiers are most motivated to seize control of natural resources like minerals by exploiting their hosts.

In the past five years, Russian mercenaries have been invited by an increasing number of American nations despite their bad popularity and selfish interests. Up to 200 Russian forces were reportedly deployed in Equatorial Guinea in August 2024 to guard the president and train political soldiers.

Standard alliances with the West are undermined by the Russian troops, who provide security services. The Russians have left behind defense installations because French and American troops have been forced to retreat or be expelled.

The problem we, as safety scientists, ask is: in view of these disadvantages, why do countries nevertheless use Belarusian soldiers?

Using the Central African Republic as an example, we attempted to respond. To assess Wagner’s performance, or efficacy, we studied the Central African Republic’s civil war and compared the French military intervention ( 2013-2016 ) to the Wagner intervention ( 2021-2024 ).

We found that in the short term, the Wagner action was more powerful for the country’s government than the European intervention. However, we contend that it posed longer-term challenges. Wagner’s long-term impact possible adds to instability, undermining green development and security.

Military performance

Usually, about 20 sub-Saharan states have depended on France and other European supporters for military assistance. In the last three years, however, Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have turned to the Wagner Group or other Russian mercenaries ( such as Africa Corps ) for security assistance.

To understand the appeal, one may seem to reports of their effectiveness. These provide a mingled outlook. Some scientists believe it to be effective because it effectively accomplishes military missions.

However, it is also linked to a rise in fight intensity and regular harm to civilians. Academicians and experts view mercenaries as weakening forces, frequently escalating violence without resolving root causes of security issues.

These trends are challenged by our analysis of Wagner’s performance in the Civil War of the Central African Republic ( CAR ).

Since self-reliance, CAR has experienced numerous uprisings and instability. The present phase of the fight began in 2013, when President François Bozizé was ousted by the Séléka, a Muslim insurgent partnership, sparking a civil war.

This religious violence between Séléka and Christian armies, known as the anti-Balaka, led the United Nations to release the Minusca security mission, with help from a French-led power, Operation Sangaris.

Sangaris succeeded in securing specific regions, but it struggled to impose its own rule across the country. Following the French operation, which ended in 2016, some of Sangaris ‘ accomplishments were undermined by the rebels. In 2018 Auto management pivoted to Russia, inviting the Wagner Group to deliver training and safety features.

For their support the Wagner Group gained state concessions, taking a hold over natural resources ( mostly in rebel-held territory ).

By 2020, the Russian troops were established in the country and became the primary security services, leading the country’s combat work. The state expanded its place there at the time, causing the rebels to retreat into remote areas.

Our research assesses numerous metrics, like regional power, reduced human casualty count, and indicators for state sovereignty. Wagner’s action appeared to have had better results for the ruling military coup than the European intervention.

Wagner was able to function more risk- and collateral-friendlyly due to its higher tolerance for risk. More place was restored, and rebels were brought to the table more quickly than the French.

Our research, which draws from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data on the issue, revealed that soldiers and civilians had higher mortality rates during the French activity Sangaris. Rebels gained more territory and the government recaptured less territory, compared with the Wagner intervention.

Figure 1: Military situation conflict map 2017, 2021, 2024

Wagner’s actions in the Central African Republic contrast poorly with Wagner’s current criticism of mercenaries as ineffective and unstable.

According to our assessment, Wagner allowed the regime to survive, protected the nation’s most highly populated and valuable regions, and secured economic and geopolitical assets.

Economic exploitation

Economically, the Russian mercenaries have been portrayed as exploitative.

Wagner demands economic concessions, particularly control over gold mining operations, in return for military support. This strategy allows it to sustain operations. However, it prevents African nations from having the resources they require for national development.

Wagner’s operational model undermines Central African Republic’s prospects for long-term stability and self-sufficiency. According to experts, Wagner’s profit from CAR’s mining and forest operations ranges between US$ 1 billion and US$ 2 billion.

Yet we suggest that, at least in the client’s eyes, the deal is a bargain. In Central African Republic, the economic concessions were for resources located in rebel-held territory. Territories and resources that the government could not use to support its political rivals.

Despite their crimes and human rights violations, the Russians enjoy a relative backing from the country’s urban population. Wagner’s supporters reportedly come from urban areas because it has improved security significantly since its inception as a rebel-held country.

However, in rural areas, especially near mining zones, Wagner’s brutal tactics drive displacement and instil fear. Wagner’s military and economic activities appear to be disassociated by the locals.

Wagner and Russian authorities engage in propaganda campaigns, promoting Wagner’s image through local media, sponsoring cultural events and producing pro-Wagner films.

Despite its negative reputation abroad, Wagner was portrayed as a stabilizing force by these efforts. Russia is viewed positively in the region, according to popular surveys.

Moreover, in Central African Republic, Wagner empowered the ethnic group associated with the leadership, providing them with arms and training.

Countering Wagner

Wagner appeals to regimes in sub-Saharan Africa because it can demonstrate its ability to provide security without the political restraints of Western forces. This preference is in line with the wider trend among African states to form non-Western partnerships. Growing economic ties with China and security ties with Russia demonstrate this.

The stakes are high. Russia is reshaping the definition of modern colonialism and redefining the boundaries of conflict. The abuses of mercenary organizations can lead to local unrest and conflict.

Wagner’s model cannot be sustained indefinitely. It’s crucial to comprehend and assess the appeal of mercenary groups to both the elite and the local populations in order to combat them. African nations are not merely pawns in a larger geopolitical game, so it’s also important to remember that. They have agency.

In order to combat mercenary groups in Africa, a nuanced approach is required. Instead of relying solely on broad condemnation, international organizations and western nations must take into account local perceptions and the mercenaries ‘ perceived effectiveness in specific circumstances.

To lessen the appeal of mercenary groups, practical solutions must address security needs and combine military support with effective, quick-developing initiatives.

Wagner’s abuses are highlighted by labeling it a criminal or terrorist organization, but this approach does not address the factors that motivate African states to join such forces.

Ori Swed is assistant professor of sociology, anthropology, and social work, Texas Tech University and Alessandro Arduino is affiliate lecturer, King’s College London

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Can Trump and Kim Jong Un pick up where they left off? – Asia Times

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North Korean media have been&nbsp, filled&nbsp, with debate about what Donald Trump’s returning to power in the United States may mean for the Korean Peninsula.

The possibility that Trump did renew his romantic ties with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un will top the list as a result of a deal that failed at the Hanoi Summit in later February 2019.

Trump himself made speculative notes while campaigning. ” It’s good to get along when someone has a lot of atomic weapons or otherwise”, Trump&nbsp, said&nbsp, about Kim in July. ” He’d like to see me again, too​. I think he misses me​, if you want to hear the truth”.

The president-elect is expected to want to go back to the talks at some point, according to senior officials, including former Trump presidency officials who were present during his first term.

” It’s not a day one issue, probably not even a year one issue, but]Trump ] will certainly seek to re-engage with Kim Jong Un”, former Trump senior defense official Randall Schriver&nbsp, said on November 21 at the Hudson Institute.

According to Schriver, talks may “have diverse contours than the first term, as well as the two summits in Singapore and Hanoi.” Trump may possibly make an offer to talk about a range of topics, including financial aid and the Korean War, which was a topic that was important in the first discussions.

The bottom line, however, is Trump’s own conviction that he came tantalizingly close to declaring he had forged serenity in Korea. ” President Trump was n’t happy that he did n’t get a deal”, said Schriver, who thinks the president-elect understands that the nuclear issue is an extraordinarily difficult one on which” to pry them away with diplomacy”.

Trump “is not repetitive and he is not constrained by convention”, Stephen Biegun, former assistant secretary of state and particular member for North Korea, &nbsp, told&nbsp, the Korea Society lately.

” To the contrary, he is the guy who says,’ Are you kidding me? This war ended more than 70 years before, and we still have 30, 000 forces on the Vietnamese island? What illiterates have overseen our North Korean plan for the past 70 times? There is a sure protagonist common feeling in that study”.

Some experts see Trump’s statement that Alex Wong, who was a member of the Northern Asian negotiating team during the first management, had become his deputy national security advisor as proof of his desire to resume politics with Pyongyang.

” At multiple levels, this supports the thesis that Trump is hot to trot with Kim” ,&nbsp, said&nbsp, a former senior US intelligence analyst with deep experience on North Korea. ” And, for better or worse, Pyongyang did read it that way”.

Both the North Korean government and the South Korean government, who were important participants in the negotiations conducted during the first administration, appear willing to return to that desk whatever the president may choose. ” It will be a very unique active than in the first term”, says Schriver, who was a part of the negotiating group for both Trump-Kim conferences.

The teachings of Hanoi

The location of the conversations that ended in 2019 will undoubtedly be the starting point for a new diplomatic exercise. Negotiations between the US and North Korea aimed to utilize the vague nuclear promise made the previous year at the Singapore Summit, but it eventually failed.

The North Koreans” thought the President was hungry for a bargain and they were going to save that for the leader-level meeting”, Biegun&nbsp, told&nbsp, the Arms Control Association in a 2021 meeting.

Trump arrived in Hanoi preoccupied with the domestic political climate, which was reflected in his impeachment proceedings and the pending evidence of Michael Cohen, his former prosecutor, in Congress. According to past National Security Advisor John Bolton ‘s&nbsp, withering narrative, Trump was continually watching Fox News.

Bolton and others were pressured by Trump to not reach a” small deal” in order to prepare for the deals, contending that it would violate both the American Constitution and those of its allies, including Japan.

Kim made an offer to end the notorious nuclear complex’s closure in Yongbyon in exchange for lifting all of the UN Security Council’s financial sanctions, which essentially cover all of the most important trade and aid limitations.

The US team understood that this constituted a  de facto , the elimination of all successful sanctions, and did not include any key facilities besides Yongbyon that would permit the continuation of the radioactive program. As has been recently&nbsp, confirmed, this included a significant enrichment flower at Kangson.

Trump tried to contract, suggesting Kim take a significantly lesser reduction in sanctions, and therefore proposed eliminating North Korea’s long-range missile program, which may reach the continental United States, leaving alive shorter-range missiles that target South Korea and Japan.

” This was, beyond doubt, the worst time of the meeting”, Bolton wrote in his&nbsp, narrative. ” If Kim Jong Un had said well that, they might have had a bargain, disastrously for America. Luckily, he was n’t cutting, saying he was getting everything, omitting any mention of the restrictions being lifted”.

Attempts to revive talks failed, including&nbsp, an unexpected summit&nbsp, a few months afterward, in June 2019, at the Demilitarized Zone.

Pointing fingers at Seoul

Was Trump and Kim resume Hanoi’s failed deals-making?

The shift in Seoul’s government has made a significant difference. Moon Jae-in’s liberal management had a significant influence on the engagement’s success, changing its tactics frequently when it stalled, and shaping the North Koreans ‘ dealing plan.

In fact, US negotiators criticized the Moon leadership for misinterpreting Trump’s willingness to reach the offer Kim proposed and for influencing its decision-making.

Evans Revere, a veteran of long-term diplomatic relations with North Korea, claims that Kim’s trust in Hanoi “was the result of the liberal ROK administration’s efforts to persuade Kim that the US would take this deal.”

Kim’s shame in Hanoi was caused by the false perception of success Seoul gave the North Koreans. Kim Jong Un’s anger on the return journey and venting his anger toward the ROK is unfathomable.

However, if Trump returns to the table in the near future, he will find a South Korean government that wo n’t encourage talks with North Korea. Relations between the two Koreas are at a lower level because the traditional leadership in Seoul has taken a harsh attitude toward North Korea.

In two years, nevertheless, there could be a change of government in Korea, shifting power back to the liberals.

According to Biegun, President Trump’s protagonist view that we need to solve this issue aligns with the conventional liberal view that concessions to North Korea are necessary to end the Korean Peninsula’s conflict and bring peace and reconciliation, according to Biegun. ” There will be an configuration it”.

Kim Is No Waiting for Trump

Kim’s lack of motivation to pursue this grand bargain may be the biggest problem to a successful Hanoi agreement. ” This is a Kim Jong Un that is in a different place”, Schriver told the Hudson Institute. ” He’s got more sophisticated features now”.

More considerably, he has the support of Putin and Russia and retains close ties to China. At the time of the conferences in Singapore and Hanoi, China and Russia were generally also enforcing the global sanctions regime. Both organizations have lifted Kim’s regime’s financial pressures and slowed any further UN sanctions.

” Weapons are now part of the government’s DNA and the North Koreans are making regular, impressive progress towards their goal of becoming a full-fledged nuclear energy”, argues Revere. ” The only’ deal’ that they&nbsp, might&nbsp, be prepared to discuss is one in which they would sit down with the US’ as one nuclear power with another ‘&nbsp, to discuss’ arms control.'”

Kim’s strength was demonstrated by the dispatch of more than 10,000 North Korean troops to the Ukrainian war front in recent significant speeches following the US election.

In a lengthy&nbsp, address&nbsp, delivered to army commanders on November 18, Kim linked the war in Europe to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and urged preparation for conflict. According to Kim,” The US-led military alliance is expanding its reach to Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and the spearhead of its aggression is being directed at our country, which is the closest country to the United States and has had the longest hostile relationship with it,” the alliance’s leader said.

In a&nbsp, speech&nbsp, delivered some days later at an arms expo in Pyongyang, Kim provided his “lessons of Hanoi”, offering only the co-existence of two nuclear states. Kim remarked,” We already tried everything in the bilateral negotiations with the United States, and what we ultimately believed was not the superpower’s will to coexist with us, but its unwaveringly aggressive and hostile policy toward the DPRK.”

In a&nbsp, study &nbsp, published recently by the Middlebury Institute’s Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Siegfried Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Robert Carlin, a former intelligence specialist and negotiator with North Korea, offered this conclusion:

” The North’s new policy will not be in question at this point,” said one source. No mistake should be made: what we’ve seen since January 2022 is n’t Pyongyang’s “healing” strategy. It’s a tactical tactic. It has been a fundamental change from the previous 30 years, a result of a leadership decision made by Kim Jong Un that will have long-term effects on both the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. That does n’t mean Pyongyang wo n’t re-engage with the United States, but it almost certainly will when it does, it will almost certainly open a door to a completely different room.

What would bring Kim back to the table for talks? A veteran North Korean intelligence analyst claims that “he is willing to surrender from Trump.” ” But he is not going to concede anything. He does n’t have to. It is the Americans who have to make the concessions”.

What might that entail? Simple acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state, formalized in some kind of arms control agreement, may no longer be enough. Trump already had a demand for US troop withdrawal from South Korea on his agenda at the conclusion of his first term. The former intelligence officer told me,” If Kim can get those troops out of there, he will be perfectly content.” ” That is why it is so dangerous”.

For now, as Kim&nbsp, wrote&nbsp, to Trump in the last of his “beautiful” letters, sent on August 5, 2019,” We are in a different situation and we are not in a hurry”.

At Stanford University, Daniel Sneider is a non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America and a lecturer on East Asian and international policy issues. This article was originally published by KEI’s The Peninsula, and it is now available for resale with permission.

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Chancay megaport magnifies China’s presence in South America – Asia Times

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The fresh deep-water port at Chancay, northeast of Lima, is open for business, signaling the start of a new era of effective, high-capacity transport between China and Peru, with a link to Brazil across the Andes. The US military and corporate managers are being driven out of their comfort zone by this, but they have nothing to sell and no way to stop it.

However, Caltrain, the rail services operating between San Jose and San Francisco, has sold its ancient diesel trains to the city of Lima. Caltrain itself has gone electronic.

On November 14, Xi Jinping, president of China, Xi Jinping and President Dina Boluarte of Peru attended the seaport’s opening meeting via video connection from the Lima Government Palace. Xi was also there to attend the annual APEC ( Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ) summit meetings, which began the following day.

The Chancay initiative, which Xi described as” the beginning stage for the creation of a new maritime-land passageway between China and Latin America and the connection of the Great Inca Trail,” was wax poetry.

Built by COSCO ( China Ocean Shipping Company ) and Peruvian mining company Volcan over the past three years, Chancay port has a maximum depth of 17.8 meters, deeper than Peru’s main port of Callao. The largest vessel boats in the world will be able to control them thanks to this.

Financed by Taiwanese businesses, with total funding exceeding$ 3.5 billion, Chancay is 60%-owned by COSCO. More than 8, 000 careers are expected to be created. Annual income is projected to reach$ 4.5 billion.

Starting at 1 million TEUs ( twenty-foot equivalent units ), the port’s annual throughput is scheduled to rise to 3.5 million TEUs when all the facilities are completed, making it the premier deep-water port on the west coast of South America.

In addition to the port, a warehousing, business, and industrial park will benefit both foreign investors and overspending in the crowded Lima-Callao area. According to reports, BYD is interested in setting up an automobile assembly grow it.

By eliminating trans-shipment via Manzanilla, Mexico, or Long Beach, California, Chancay may decrease travel time to and from China by more than a fourth, from 35 to 23 time, while reducing overall shipping costs by an estimated 20 %. Chancay is more than 4, 500 km from Manzanilla and more than 6, 600 km from Long Beach.

The Chancay port is fully automated, with Huawei’s 5G wireless control equipment, driverless electric container trucks, and unmanned cranes manufactured by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries ( also known as ZPMC). The bulk of the equipment is imported from China. BYD pickups are used by engineers to circle the port.

The port is connected to the north-south Pan American Highway, which passes through Cuzco, Porto Velho in the upper Amazon basin, and Sao Paulo and Porto de Santos on the Atlantic coast, and then travels to Brazil via the southern interoceanic highway.

In a new era, Xi claims,” We are witnessing the establishment of a new land-maritime corridor between Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.”

With this megaproject, Boluarte stated,” We are beginning a transformation that will strategically project us in the Asia Pacific region while consolidating our position as a top-notch technological and industrial logistics hub.”

This bothers the Americans. Chancay was built by the Chinese in what they refer to as their “back yard” and is also technologically advanced than any US seaport. From their perspective, it could turn out to be a strategic nightmare.

General Laura J. Richardson, until recently head of the US Southern Command, has warned that the Chinese navy might use Chancay at some time in the future. The risks to Peru are “at multiple levels,” according to professor Evan Ellis of the US Army War College. The Chinese are reaping the benefits of their abundant resources and geographic position, but risk number one is that they do not.

COSCO has the exclusive right to run Chancay for 30 years thanks to the Peruvian government. Although Peru’s minister of transportation claims that Chinese capital will be the same as American or British capital, Ellis calls this “previously unthinkable and against the very essence of Peru’s assertion of sovereignty over its own ports.”

In any case, Peru acquires a port that it is unable to construct on its own, which should result in significant increases in trade with China and Brazil. Additionally, goods are anticipated to be transported to Chancay by Ecuadorian and Chilean vessels for later shipment to Asia. Additionally, the Panama Canal would be bypassed by a proposed Brazil-Peru Transcontinental Railway that would travel to Chancay.

China is already Peru’s largest trading partner, ranking first in both exports and imports, and Chancay should expand its lead. The US ranks second, with Canada, India, South Korea, Japan, Chile, Spain, the Netherlands and Brazil well behind individually but ahead of the US in the aggregate. In 2023, Peru’s exports to China were 2.5 times its exports to the US.

Fruit were on board the first ship to travel from Chancay to China. Other Peruvian exports, including fish products, iron ore and copper, plus agricultural products from Brazil, will follow. Imports from China include autos and tires, computers and other electronic equipment, clothing and toys. How will this benefit Peru and its neighbors? It is the US that might not benefit.

Peru is a member of the CPTPP ( Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership ), the free trade agreement put together after the US withdrew from the original TPP ( Trans-Pacific Partnership ) in 2017. The other members of the CPTPP are Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Australia, New Zealand and, in the Americas, Chile, Mexico and Canada.

During Xi’s visit, Peru’s free trade agreement with China was strengthened. As a result, Peru’s foreign minister told Reuters, trade between the two countries should expand by at least 50 %. Xi was accompanied to Lima by 400 Chinese business representatives. Like most of the Asia-Pacific, Peru is committed to expanding international trade and investment, while the US retreats into protectionism.

If, as some Chinese commentators and US trade hawks fear, Chancay is used to dodge tariffs by assembling or refining Chinese goods for onward shipment to the US, then the US has a free trade agreement with Peru, which incoming president Donald Trump might override. There is no reason to believe that Peru would be any different from the US, which has already done this to Mexico. However, focusing on it detracts from Chancay’s significance and purpose.

Even if it had wanted to, the US could n’t have built Chancay. It simply does not have the required expertise. The International Longshoremen’s Association ( ILA ) is fighting tooth and nail to keep it that way because none of the world’s most advanced ports are located in the US.

As reported by The Wall Street Journal, ILA President Harold Daggett and Executive Vice President ( and son ) Dennis Daggett told the union’s rank and file in September that” the ILA does not support any kind of automation, including semi-automation”.

The Yangshan Deep-Water Port in Hangzhou Bay south of Shanghai is ranked first by the World Bank’s” The Container Port Performance Index 2023: A Comparable Assessment of Performance Based on Vessel Time in Port,” which is based on this perspective. The Port of Salalah in Oman, the Port of Cartagena in Colombia, and many other ports outside the US also come first. The most efficient US port, the Port of Charleston, South Carolina, ranks 53rd.

The US government views the automated ZPMC cranes as a cyber threat in particular. Last February, as reported by Material Handling &amp, Logistics, Rear Admiral John Vann, head of the Coast Guard cyber command, noted that Chinese ship-to-shore cranes “account for nearly 80 % of cranes at US ports. By design, these cranes may be controlled, serviced and programmed from remote locations”.

Why were there so many Chinese crane installations before he pointed out that Admiral Zain and others are concerned about the cranes being shut off during the war, paralyzing the US economy? Almost needless to say, the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, called this paranoia.

The Biden Administration made plans to spend more than$ 20 billion on port security, including replacing Chinese cranes with American-made cranes by Japanese shipbuilding and engineering firm Mitsui E&amp, S.

Efficient, computerized remote control is, of course, key to building a fully automated port. Huawei noted that it optimizes loading and unloading and manages each piece of equipment while lowering costs and reducing energy by referring to the Smart Port Solution it created with China Mobile and the Port of Tianjin.

The Chinese are bringing this to South America, and the US would like to, but probably cannot, prevent it. The US is, however, doing its bit for Peru.

For less than$ 6 million, Caltrain announced on November 15 that it had sold 90 passenger cars and 19 diesel locomotives to the Lima municipality. The retired trains, according to the article,” will enable thousands of riders to benefit from a new regional commuter rail line that significantly reduces automobile traffic and greenhouse gas emissions.” &nbsp,

Michelle Bouchard, the executive director of Caltrain, traveled to Lima to celebrate this agreement at the APEC summit. Back in California, Caltrain was already operating what it calls a” 100 % renewable, zero-emission service with high-performance, state-of-the-art electric trains”.

The retired but still useful railroad cars, which Caltrain Chair Dev Davis describes as “hold a special place in the heart of train enthusiasts,” appear to be for sale in Lima. Still, the juxtaposition with Chancay is unfortunate.

Follow this writer on&nbsp, X: @ScottFo83517667

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How Trump plans to seize the power of the purse from Congress – Asia Times

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This content was originally published by ProPublica, a Pulitzer Prize-winning analytical newspaper.

Donald Trump has a bold plan to cut a number of federal service as he enters his second term. Trump and his supporters intend to challenge an obscure legal theory that states that presidents have broad authority to deny funding from programs they oppose rather than relying on his side’s control of Congress to reduce the budget.

” We can essentially drown off the money”, Trump said in a 2023 plan picture. It was undeniable that the leader had the legal authority to halt unneeded spending for 200 times under our system of government.

His plan, known as “impoundment”, threatens to inspire a big fight over the boundaries of the government’s power over the finances. The professional branch’s responsibility is to effectively distribute the funds, whereas the Constitution grants Congress the ultimate authority to do so. However, Trump and his experts claim that if he opposes or thinks they waste money, he can unilaterally disregard Congress ‘ spending decisions and “impound” resources.

Trump’s models on the funds are part of his administration’s larger strategy to consolidate since much energy in the professional tree as possible. He pressed for the Senate to go into corner this month to assign his government without any supervision. Republicans in charge of the room have so far declined to do so. His key experts have spelled out plans to bring independent organizations, such as the Department of Justice, under democratic control.

If Trump were to veto congressionally authorized programs, it would almost certainly spark a battle in the courts and Congress, according to experts, and it would ultimately affect the foundation of Congress.

Eloise Pasachoff, a Georgetown Law teacher who has written about the national finances and appropriations process, said,” It’s an effort to take the full power of the purse apart from Congress,”” but that’s just not the legal design.” The president is not permitted to “pull out the things he does n’t want” and “go into the budget” slowly.

Trump’s claim to have impoundment power is in contravention of a Nixon-era law that forbids presidents from cutting spending and a number of federal court decisions that forbid presidents from repressing spending without the consent of Congress.

Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, the newly established non-governmental Department of Government Efficiency, announced in an op-ed published on Wednesday that they planned to reduce federal spending and fire civil servants. Some of their efforts could result in Trump taking his first Supreme Court appearance under the post-Watergate Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, which requires the president to spend money that only the people who vote vote to receive it. The law allows exceptions, such as when the executive branch can spend less money to accomplish Congress ‘ objectives, but not as a means for the president to sabotage initiatives he opposes.

Trump and his supporters have been leaking their plans for a hostile budgeting process for months. In his campaign video, Trump criticized the 1974 law as” not a very good act” and said,” Bringing back impoundment will give us a crucial tool to obliterate the Deep State.”

Musk and Ramaswamy have seized that mantle, writing,” We believe the current Supreme Court would likely side with him on this question”.

Thanks to former Trump administration employees who continue to be his close allies, the once-obscure debate over impoundment is in high demand in MAGA circles. Russell Vought, Trump’s former budget director, and Mark Paoletta, who served under Vought as the Office of Management and Budget general counsel, have worked to popularize the idea from the Trump-aligned think tank Vought founded, the Center for Renewing America.

On Friday, Trump announced he had picked Vought to lead OMB again. In a statement, Trump said,” Russ knows exactly how to end the Weaponized Government and bring about the return of self-government to the people.”

Vought was also a prominent figure in Project 2025, which was highly contested. Vought boasted in private remarks to a gathering of MAGA luminaries that ProPublica identified as having assembled a” shadow” Office of Legal Counsel so that Trump is fully prepared for his agenda on day one.

According to Vought,” I do n’t want President Trump to lose a moment of time in legal, doable, or moral debates in the Oval Office.”

Vought and Trump spokespeople did not respond to requests for comment.

Trump’s potential to swob inordinate control of federal funds is not just about reducing the size of the federal government, a long-standing conservative goal. Additionally, it aggravates existing concerns about his vengeance promises.

A similar power grab led to his first impeachment. Trump pressured President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to launch a corruption investigation into Joe Biden and his family while holding up nearly$ 400 million in military aid to Ukraine during his first term. In the end, the US Government Accountability Office determined that his deeds were in violation of the Impoundment Control Act.

Pasachoff predicted that the incoming Trump administration would attempt to accomplish the impoundment goals without choosing a fight with such a high profile.

According to Bobby Kogan, a former OMB adviser under Biden and senior director of federal budget policy at the left-leaning think tank American Progress, Trump used piecemeal methods to withhold federal funding in order to punish his perceived enemies. Trump delayed or refrained from signing disaster declarations that would have opened up federal aid because neither state had voted for him after the devastating wildfires in California and Washington. He focused on so-called sanctuary cities by limiting local law enforcement’s capacity to support mass deportation efforts. In the end, the policy was withheld by the Biden administration.

According to Trump and his supporters, Thomas Jefferson was the first to impound the president’s long history.

According to Zachary Price, a professor at the University of California College of the Law in San Francisco, the military and instances where presidents were expressly permitted to use discretion are the most prominent historical examples. For instance, Jefferson made the decision to not use the money that the law authorized him to use to fund” a sum not exceeding fifty thousand dollars” to fund gunboats, which authorized him to do so.

President Richard Nixon took impoundment to a new extreme, wielding the concept to gut billions of dollars from programs he simply opposed, such as highway improvements, water treatment, drug rehabilitation and disaster relief for farmers. Both the courts and Congress overwhelmingly opposed him. In the end, the Supreme Court and more than a half-dozen federal judges decided that Nixon had no authority to cut specific programs under the appropriations bills.

Vought and his allies argue the limits Congress placed in 1974 are unconstitutional, saying a clause in the Constitution obligating the president to “faithfully execute” the law also implies his power to forbid its enforcement. Trump likes to say that Article II, where this clause is located, grants him” the right to do whatever I want as president.”

The Supreme Court has never directly questioned constitutionality in regards to impoundment. But it threw water on that reasoning in an 1838 case, Kendall v US, about a federal debt payment.

” To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible”, the justices wrote.

During his cutting spree, Nixon’s own Justice Department argued roughly the same.

In a 1969 legal memo, Nixon later appointed the Office of Legal Counsel, William Rehnquist, warned that” we must come to the conclusion that the existence of such a broad power is supported by neither reason nor precedent.”

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Most Ukrainians now support negotiated peace with Russia: polls – Asia Times

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Ukraine’s conflict is at a crucial turning point. The use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow weapons from Western-provided Kyiv has been authorized. As soon as the request for permission was granted, it carried out attacks on Russian military installations in the Bryansk and Kursk parts. Moscow’s response to the strikes has been ]… ]

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Will Trump renegotiate AUKUS or simply walk away? – Asia Times

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Given that the United States is Australia’s most important defense alliance, it is only natural to consider what Donald Trump’s return to power will mean for Asian defense policy, particularly the AUKUS contract. Judging by the initial comments by one of the most senior members of Australia’s government, there certainly appears ]… ]

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Philippines: Marcos-Duterte feud puts China in the heated middle – Asia Times

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Ferdinand Marcos Jr., president of the Philippines, has plenty of reasons to be optimistic about his social hopes as the year approaches. On one hand, his allies continue to top pre-election surveys, indicating a potential landslide victory for pro-administration candidates in next year’s midterm elections, broadly seen as a referendum on Marcos Jr’s popularity ]… ]

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Strong dollar paradox trolling Donald Trump – Asia Times

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The economy’s march since Donald Trump’s election defeat on November 5 is destined to have a run-in with the US president-elect himself, and quickly. Trump’s programs to implement massive tariffs on products entering the US while lowering local taxes are the underlying cause of the greenback’s boom. That’s why, in the days after the election, the dollar ]… ]

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