Questioning China’s ability to actually fight – Asia Times
China’s government may be modernizing quickly, but its ability to fight on the front lines in a possible battle with the US and its allies may be hampered by deep-rooted architectural flaws, political power, and a lack of battle experience.
Last month, the RAND Corporation think tank released a report questioning the combat readiness of China’s People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) despite its breakneck modernization.
RAND contends that while the PLA boasts world-class weapons and the largest navy in the world, it prioritizes upholding Chinese Communist Party (CCP ) rule over actually preparing for war.
The report makes attention to structural issues, such as promotions based on merit over loyalty, intellectual training over combat realism, and unified decision-making that prevents battlefield adaptability.
RAND uses the Russo-Ukrainian War, which is ongoing, and the Sino-Vietnamese War from 1979 to compare the PLA’s development to historic examples of military might failing to ensure battlefield success. The document suggests China’s military reforms remain sluggish and imperfect, emphasizing deterrence and social control over functional effectiveness.
A split RAND statement examines the PLA’s double issue of demographic change and development. The PLA has a considerably larger children pool than the US, despite China’s declining population raising long-term issues. However, efforts to get wealthy talent are hampered by poor selection incentives, insecure service conditions, and competitors from the private market.
Social restrictions, such as military company’s low social status and a conscription-based unit, further aggravate China’s military development. Despite significant assets, the PLA struggles to match Chinese President Xi Jinping’s perception for a world-class war. RAND suggests that China may need to reevaluate its military theory and power structure if recruitment issues persist.
While RAND criticizes the PLA’s unified command structure, Chinese military doctrine emphasizes philosophical cohesion and social oversight, which the Constitution views as a plus as a plus.
Payton Rawson explains that China’s two command structure in the PLA combines military and political management to maintain State control in a November 2023 article for The Strategist.
According to Rawson, the structure includes a party committee, political commissar, and political organizations to support party leadership, stop corruption, and ensure alignment.
He points out that the advantages include a stronger political base, a lower chance of military coups, and a unified command that coordinates military actions with party objectives. However, he notes that this system may hinder decision-making speed and innovation.
However, emphasizing the PLA’s dual command system’s perceived shortcomings, lack of combat experience and recruitment problems risks underestimating China’s military modernization.
The PLA compensates using advanced simulators, provides realistic Blue Force ( BLUFOR ) opposition in training scenarios and integrates AI into military decision-making processes.
Despite these advancements, using technology as a substitute for combat experience could only lead the PLA so far, as simulations can never fully recreate a combat zone. AI is no substitute for human judgment as it lacks self-awareness and accountability. The institutions and processes that make up the PLA must be used to convert that experience into operational and strategic advantages.
Those challenges may stymie the development of a professional non-commissioned officer (NCO ) corps, which provides experienced, independent lower-level leadership in Western militaries.
In response, China is developing a “made-to-order” NCO corps focusing on technical skills essential for the PLA. It offers a stable career path and invites young people with the appropriate qualifications to enroll in the program. China’s military may train NCOs with technical expertise, but whether they can lead under fire is another question.
China has also hired outside talent, notably former NATO fighter pilots, to train its air force. These former NATO service members can still teach their Chinese counterparts sensitive tactics, techniques, and procedures ( TTP ) despite not piloting the most recent Western combat aircraft.
They still think like their active-duty counterparts and may help refine Chinese pilots ‘ on-the-fly decision-making skills and mission planning.
China uses cognitive and information warfare to achieve “victory without gun smoke,” in addition to using technology, focusing on technical skills, and employing outside talent.
Josh Baughman describes how China’s cognitive warfare strategy focuses on controlling perception and decision-making in a January 2023 article for the China Aerospace Studies Institute ( CASI) to avert direct military hostilities.
Baughman points out that China’s cognitive warfare strategy works both during and during wartime, utilizing psychological flaws like fear and misinformation to undermine the resolve of its allies. He says it integrates military, political, economic, and technological tools, using AI and social media to shape narratives and public perception.
He points out that China prefers to win conflicts through psychological means rather than purely military force by controlling events and defining events.
However, China’s cognitive warfare may have a limited effect on a population inoculated against such, as shown by the results of Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential elections, where state and civil society actors worked effectively to “pre-bunk” and discredit such efforts.
Additionally, Koichiro Takagi mentions that the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War supports kinetic combat arms like airpower, infantry, artillery, and armor in a July 2022 War on the Rocks commentary. Takagi also contends that decisive physical battles determine wars, not just cognitive positioning or positioning of forces.
While cognitive warfare shapes adversary perceptions, its limitations in actual conflict underscore the PLA’s reliance on external military observations, such as the Russo-Ukrainian War, for operational insights.
Being able to observe others ‘ trials and errors without being directly involved in a conflict, allows China to learn from them. This approach can result in mature, ready-to-absorb TTPs and operational and strategic lessons that could be contextualized according to China’s unique requirements.
M. Taylor Fravel mentions that China’s assessment of the Russo-Ukrainian War teaches important military lessons for a potential Taiwan conflict in an October 2023 article for The Washington Quarterly.
First, Fravel says Russia’s failure to achieve a swift victory underscores the difficulties of large-scale operations, especially in complex joint-force engagements like an amphibious assault on Taiwan.
Second, he notes that Russia’s battlefield failures reveal the dangers of centralized command and rigid leadership structures, pushing China to refine decision-making flexibility.
Third, Fravel says Ukraine’s resilience suggests Taiwan may not capitulate easily, forcing China to prepare for prolonged conflict.
Fourth, Fravel points out that the US’s involvement in Russian intelligence cooperation and coalition-building raises doubts about a similarly retaliatory military exercise, which might give China a sense of strategic surprise.
Lastly, he says Western sanctions on Russia reveal China’s economic vulnerabilities, incentivizing efforts to insulate its economy.
Despite its high-tech ambitions, China’s military remains unproven in actual combat. If war comes, it won’t be China’s gadgets determining the outcome—but rather the soldiers controlling them.
