Snubbed by Nobel, Japan’s AI pioneers being written out of history – Asia Times

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The news of the artificial intelligence analysts John Hopfield and Geoffrey Hinton as this year’s Nobel laureates in science spurred festivity and confusion over the position of AI in science and society. In Japan, however, another sense dominates: stress.

“Japanese experts should also have won, ” an editorial in the Asahi Shimbun paper proclaimed. Congratulating Hopfield and Hinton, the Japanese Neural Network Society added clearly: “We must not neglect the part played by pioneer Chinese experts in erecting the bases of neural network study. ”

Neural systems are at the center of modern AI. They are designs for equipment to learn independently through buildings that, if usually just casually, are inspired by the human mind.

So who are these innovative Japanese Artificial experts?

Shun’ichi Amari

Shun’ichi Amari. Photo: YouTube

In 1967, Shun’ichi Amari proposed a method of dynamic design classification, which enables neural networks to self-adjust the way they categorize habits through exposure to repeated training cases. Amari’s research anticipated a similar method known as “backpropagation, ” one of Hinton’s key contributions to the field.

In 1972, Amari outlined a learning algorithm ( a set of rules for carrying out a particular task ) that was mathematically equivalent to Hopfield’s 1982 paper cited by the Nobel on associative memory, which allowed neural networks to recognize patterns despite partial or corrupted inputs.

Kunihiko Fukushima

The North American researchers were working separately from groups in Japan, coming to their conclusions independently.

Later, in 1979, Kunihiko Fukushima created the world’s first multilayer convolutional neural network. This technology has been the backbone of the recent boom in deep learning, an AI approach that has given rise to neural networks that learn without supervision, through more complex architectures.

If this year’s Nobel was for “foundational discoveries and inventions that enable machine learning with artificial neural networks, ” why not award Amari and Fukushima?

One-sided perspectives

The AI community itself has been debating this question. There are cogent arguments as to why Hopfield and Hinton better fit the Nobel “physics ” category, and why national balance mattered – given that the peace prize went to Japan’s Nihon Hidankyō, a Japan A-bomb survivors ’ group.

Toshiyuki Mimaki, right, co-chairperson of the Nihon Hidankyo, speaks at a press conference in Hiroshima. Photo: Yomiuri Shimbun

Why, then, should we still be worried?

The answer lies in the risks of historical one-sidededness. Our standard account of artificial neural networks is a North Atlantic-based – and, overwhelmingly, North American – history. AI experienced a period of rapid development in the 1950s and 1960s.

By 1970, it entered an “A I Winter, ” during which research stagnated. Winter finally changed to spring in the 1980s, through the likes of Hopfield and Hinton. The latter researcher’s links to Google and OpenAI are said to have fed into the current boom in AI based on neural networks.

And yet, it was precisely during this alleged “winter ” that Finnish, Japanese and Ukrainian researchers – among others – established the foundations of deep learning. Integrating these developments into our histories of AI is essential as society confronts this transformative technology. We must expand what we mean when we talk about AI in ways different from the current vision offered by Silicon Valley.

For the past year, Yasuhiro Okazawa from Kyoto University, Masahiro Maejima from the National Museum of Nature and Science, Tokyo and I have led an oral history project centered on Kunihiko Fukushima and the lab at NHK where he developed the Neocognitron, a visual pattern recognition system that became the basis for convolutional neural networks.

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NHK is Japan’s public broadcaster, equivalent to the BBC. Much to our surprise, we discovered that the context from which Fukushima’s research emerged had roots in psychological and physiological studies of television audiences. This led NHK to create, in 1965, a laboratory for the “bionics of vision. ” Here, television engineers could contribute toward advancing knowledge of human psychology and physiology ( how living organisms function ).

Indeed, Fukushima saw his own work as dedicated to understanding biological organisms rather than AI in the strict sense. Neural networks were conceived as “simulations ” of how visual information processing might work in the brain, and thought to help advance physiological research. The Neocognitron specifically aimed to help settle debates about whether complex sensory stimuli corresponded to the activation of one particular neuron ( nerve cell ) in the brain, or to a pattern of activation distributed across a population of neurons.

Human approaches

The engineer Takayuki Itō, who worked under Fukushima, characterized his mentor’s approach as a “human science. ” But during the 1960s, American researchers abandoned artificial neural networks based on human models. They cared more about applying statistical methods to large data sets, rather than patient study of the brain’s complexities. In this way, emulating human cognition became merely a casual metaphor.

When Fukushima visited the US in 1968, he found few researchers who were sympathetic to his human brain-centred approach to AI, and many mistook his work for “medical engineering. ” His lack of interest in upscaling the Neocognitron with bigger data sets eventually placed him at odds with NHK’s increasing demand for applied AI-based technologies, leading to his resignation in 1988.

For Fukushima, developing neural networks was never about their practical use in society, for instance, in replacing human labor and for decision making. Rather, they represented an attempt to grasp what made advanced vertebrates like humans unique, and in this way make engineering more human.

Indeed, as Takayuki Itō noted in one of our interviews, this “human science ” approach may lend itself to a closer embrace of diversity. Although Fukushima himself did not pursue this path, Itō’s work since the late 1990s has focused on “accessibility ” in relation to the cognitive traits of the elderly and disabled. This work also recognizes types of intelligence different from mainstream AI research.

Fukushima today keeps a measured distance from machine learning. “My position, ” he says, “was always to learn from the brain. ” Compared with Fukushima, AI researchers outside Japan took short cuts. The more that mainstream AI research leaves the human brain behind, the more it yields technologies that are difficult to understand and control. If it ’s shorn of its roots in biological processes, we can no longer explain why AI works and how it makes decisions. This is known as the “black box ” problem.

Would a return to a “human science ” approach solve some of these problems? Probably not by itself, because the genie is out of the bottle. But amid global concerns about superintelligent AI resulting in the end of humanity, we should consider a global history replete with alternative understandings of AI. The latter is a history sadly left uncelebrated by this year’s Nobel prize in physics.

Hansun Hsiung is an assistant professor at the School of Modern Languages and Cultures, Durham University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Trump’s back: East Asian allies must adapt to the MAGA world – Asia Times

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When Donald Trump secured his returning to the White House – not only in the state-by-state Electoral College matter but also, if just, in the common ballot count – America’s East Asian allies were rattled not only by the results itself but by the signified seismic shifts forward. Having experienced the storm of Trump’s first career, Japan and South Korea knew all too well the shifts his second term may bring.

Their fears are clearly placed. The president-elect’s previous and current remarks glimpse at a more honest and uncertain method to the area than he took in his first term.

In an October meeting, Trump described South Korea as a “money system, ” asserting, “We saved them during the Korean War and protected them for years, but we got everything in return. ” Trump was alluding to the fact that Seoul may bear a considerably larger percentage of its own security problem. In May, Time magazine reported that Trump suggested the US may withdraw its troops from South Korea if the land may refuse to provide more support for those soldiers ’ goal.

South Korea is not alone. During his first name, Trump usually accused Japan of free-riding on American security guarantees, insisting that Tokyo pay more for the US bases in Japan that number some 54,000 US army. In an interview in 2019, Trump grumbled over the lack of cooperation in the diplomatic relationship, saying, “If Japan is attacked, we may struggle World War II I…. But if we are attacked, Japan does n’t have to aid us at all. ” It’s even been reported that Trump at one place mused over pulling out of the post-war security treaty with Japan.

Beyond the security realm, Trump has openly proposed slapping tariffs of between 10 % and 20 % on most imports ( even from close East Asian allies ) and 60 % on goods imported from China. The president-elect has also strongly criticized the Biden Administration’s Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act, raising the possibility of delaying these plans on which export-driven firms in East Asia have come to depend since their passing in 2022.

While President Biden and the leaders of Japan and South Korea have taken steps to “Trump-proof” existing security and economic frameworks, policymakers understand well that many of these measures could easily be altered or even reversed at Trump’s discretion.

Amid such uncertain prospects, American allies in the Far East must recognize that while Trump may leave after a four-year tenure, MAGA ideology is here to stay. Trump’s historic return to the Oval Office, along with Republican control of both houses of Congress, is a mandate bestowed by the American voters. It’s a mandate for fundamental change, as many Americans are fed up with Washington itself and are seeking an exit from the traditional political landscape.

To that end, if Trump delivers on his rhetoric, he will usher the nation into an era of “strategic engagement. ” The US would operate strictly in line with core MAGA principles, scrutinizing every decision — be it domestic or international — through the lens of its potential to further America’s national interests. Indeed, Trump’s series of unconventional cabinet picks reflects his resolve to finish what he failed to in his first term.

Early signs of this shift are already becoming evident to U. S. partners in East Asia. In a rather surprising move, Trump declined requests for pre-inauguration meetings from South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, opting instead to meet Argentinian President Javier Milei. The decision likely signals a realignment in US diplomatic priorities. Japan and South Korea – long considered bulwarks to America’s Asia-Pacific strategy – may now occupy diminished roles in Washington ’s broader agenda.

The question is how the two East Asian democratic states, now confronting new realities, should navigate the MAGA world order to their advantage. The answer is that officials in Seoul and Tokyo must reassess and recalibrate their strategies toward Washington and the region.

First, values-driven diplomacy, the staple of the rules-based international order, is unlikely to resonate with the new president. While the Biden administration helped elevate the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relationship to the status of a quasi-alliance and fostered close coordination with its partners on pressing issues, this kind of broad, working-level ideological consistency may soon be a thing of the past.

On the other side of the Eurasian landmass, Trump has threatened to leave NATO if the alliance members don’t pay their fair share for Europe’s defense. Similar upheavals can be expected in East Asia. Besides pushing for greater burden-sharing, Trump could, for instance, insist that Seoul and Tokyo cover the cost of trilateral military drills or else risk discontinuing the exercise altogether. He may also seek to downgrade the Quad partnership or withdraw from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.  

But love him or hate him, Trump is, at his core, a dealmaker — one who rarely sees the world as a zero-sum game. When a deal is on the table and America stands to gain, Trump is unlikely to walk away. For Japan and South Korea, this means negotiators must approach him not as traditional diplomats but as savvy businessmen. They must not only highlight the values underpinning their policies but also frame them as clear contributions to advancing Trump’s MAGA agenda.

Second, Trump’s return offers Japan and South Korea an opportunity to further overhaul and expand their military capabilities. The lessons from NATO’s struggles in times of crisis — marked by ill-preparedness and over-reliance on US military support — should serve as a cautionary tale. More resilient and self-sufficient armed forces are demanded to manage an increasingly unstable regional environment. A good starting point would be to increase military budgets and continue revitalizing defense industries.

Along these lines, the reviving discussions among South Korean politicians over potentially acquiring nuclear weapons or developing nuclear latency are both timely and necessary. Similarly, in Japan, the newly elected prime minister has floated the idea of an Asian version of NATO and potentially revisiting the country ’s long-standing three non-nuclear principles. Of course, this is not to suggest that these ideas are entirely realistic or that the American military presence will no longer be welcomed. However, discussions about Japan and South Korea charting a path forward free from external constraints as sovereign states are long overdue.

Finally, Japan and South Korea should leverage Trump’s unorthodox diplomatic style as a template for rekindling ties with Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang. While both East Asian democracies should continue to champion and defend liberal democracy when possible, the threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia are unlikely to dissipate anytime soon. Moreover, the geopolitical disposition makes it impossible for the two countries to fully decouple or detach from what Washington dubs the “new axis of evil. ”

With the war in Ukraine edging closer to becoming a proxy conflict between the two Koreas, South Korea has ample reasons to reopen serious dialogues with the so-called Axis countries. As for Japan, the government there has yet to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea and Russia, with the latter of which Japan remains embroiled in a territorial dispute. Reaching out to unpalatable neighbors would also be an opportunity for Japan and South Korea to restore diplomacy on the North Korean abduction issue, which has stalled for far too long due in part to over-dependence on Washington.

Whether Japan and South Korea share political rapport or common values with these or other nations is irrelevant. What matters is finding a modus vivendi in a rapidly changing, geopolitically flattening world. Besides, if Trump, who seems to have an affinity for strongmen, seeks to engage in one-on-one dialogues with the authoritarians of East Asia, Japan and South Korea could find themselves caught off guard. By then, it may be too late to initiate a meaningful exchange.

America’s confidantes in East Asia will be in for a bumpy ride for sure. But as long as they adapt and navigate wisely, the turbulence of MAGA could be turned into tailwinds of opportunity.

Kenji Yoshida is a translator and a Seoul-based correspondent for JAPAN Forward.

Jason Morgan is a historian and an associate professor at Reitaku University.

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What Hezbollah ceasefire means for Israel, Lebanon, Biden, Trump – Asia Times

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Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hezbollah entered a 60-day peace on November 26, a shift aimed at reducing conflicts in the region more than a year into a multifront issue.

Under the terms of the deal, Israel may eventually withdraw its troops from Lebanon, and Hezbollah had entirely remove north of the Litani River. However, the Lebanese Army had “deploy and taking control over their own country, ” US President Joe Biden said, adding that the United States, France and other friends have pledged to support the offer.

But what does the deal think for the parties involved and potential prospects for a more lasting cessation of hostilities? The Conversation US turned to Asher Kaufman, an analyst on Lebanon and border wars in the Middle East, to discuss why they reached a peace now and what it means going ahead.

Why is the ceasefire offer happening today?

The schedule of this peace is the result of a consolidation of passions among the authorities in Israel, Hezbollah itself and that of its main partner, Iran– but all for various reasons.

For the Jewish state, local problems are at play. First off, the Israel Defense Forces ( IDF) are exhausted after more than a year of war. This is especially true for Jewish conscripts, a growing number of whom are not turning up for work. The Jewish general government, too, is tired of discord, and a lot favors a stalemate with Hezbollah.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also has domestic concerns in his state to contend with. He is facing pressure from the judgement coalition’s ultra-Orthodox partners to bring up rules exempting ultra-Orthodox Immigrants from the military draft.

Reducing the need for effective personnel by quieting the top with Lebanon will aid in that respect. The liberal and national-religious sectors of the world who do assist in the IDF and who are upset with the possibility of a conventional draft-exemption regulation for ultra-Orthodox men may be more likely to eat this pill if the war with Hezbollah is over.

From the Jewish army’s view, the war in Lebanon is coming to a level of diminishing returns. It has succeeded in weakening Hezbollah’s military position but has been unable to brush the violent party out completely.

This also components into Hezbollah’s considering. The team has been severely crippled in Lebanon; the conflict has eroded its defense functions. Unlike its earlier position – reiterated time and again over the past month by its now-dead president, Hassan Nasrallah – that a peace would only be possible if second it is reached between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran are now ready to vowed the two sides. This leaves Hamas in a far weaker position as they are now left without the support of Iran’s main proxy “axis of resistance ” group. Drawing Hezbollah, and other aligned groups in the region, into direct confrontation with Israel had been Hamas’s hope when it launched its attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

Hezbollah and Lebanon’s other political factions also have strong domestic pressures to contend with. Lebanon has more than 1 million refugees as a result of the conflict – the vast majority of them Shia, the branch of Islam that Hezbollah is drawn from. The conditions in Lebanon have increased the risk of sectarian fighting between Shia and others factions in the country. For Hezbollah leaders, the time may seem right to cut their losses and prepare to regroup as a political and military body.

Iran, too, is seeking to rehabilitate Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon as soon as possible. The deal comes as Tehran is bracing for a US administration that could have a more hawkish position on Iran and its proxies in the region, of which Hezbollah is the most significant. With a new Iranian president, and a new US administration, a ceasefire between Iran’s main proxy and Israel may be a first step to Tehran building a constructive dialogue with a Trump White House.

What is the role of the US in the ceasefire?

What is interesting for me is that despite the very clear position of the US in favoring Israel during the past year of conflict, it still functions as an effective mediator. It is thanks to the US that there is a ceasefire – and it comes despite the fact that Washington is far from neutral in this conflict, being a chief ally of Israel and its main provider of weapons.

But the Lebanese government and Hezbollah see a US role, too. And this is not new. The United States was the mediator in the 2022 landmark agreement that, for the first time, set out the maritime boundaries between Israel and Lebanon.

The ceasefire deal benefits both the outgoing and incoming U. S. administrations. For President Joe Biden, it would represent a diplomatic success after a year in which the US has failed to mediate any breakthrough in the conflict in Gaza, and it is an opportunity for Biden to finish his presidency on a positive foreign policy note. From the perspective of Trump, the ceasefire in Lebanon will represent one less problem for him to face.

What might be the consequences for Lebanon and Israel?

Lebanon has the most at stake in this ceasefire holding. The country was already in a perilous economic situation before the war, and months of fighting has only worsened the structural, economic and political crises in the country. It is as dire as it can get.

Further, the war has reignited sectarian tension in Lebanon – talk of a return to civil war in the country is not far-fetched.

But there is uncertainty over how the ceasefire will affect the various rival factions in Lebanese society. Hezbollah has been weakened and may well now look for a way to reassert its strength in Lebanon’s politics. The main question is how the other factions and parties respond to that.

With a weak Hezbollah, other factions may challenge the militant organization in ways they have n’t before. Before it was decimated by Israel, there were no rival groups in a position to challenge Hezbollah in Lebanon. But that has all changed: Hezbollah’s military power has been degraded and Nasrallah, the group ’s leader, killed. And Nasrallah was not just the face and brains of Hezbollah, he was also the group ’s most important link to Iran.

There is concern among some Lebanon experts that the gap left by a weakened Hezbollah may see a struggle for power and further strife in the country. And I believe there should be no illusions that Hezbollah will try to reassert itself as a domestic force.

Complicating matters is the fact that any realignment of political forces in Lebanon comes amid a political vacuum. There has been a caretaker government – and no president – for two years now since Hezbollah conditioned the appointment of a new president with the candidate being an ally of the group. Now, Lebanese politicians would need to agree on a new president who in turn would appoint a new prime minister and government. It remains to be seen how this will unfold with a weakened Hezbollah.

For Israel, the ceasefire will provide an opportunity to reconstruct parts of the north that have been devastated by Hezbollah missiles and a possible return of the 60,000 Israelis who fled northern areas close to the Lebanon border. It will also allow the Israel Defense Forces to regroup, refresh and focus their resources in Gaza, rather than fighting on two fronts.

Could the ceasefire lead to a permanent peace deal?

I don’t see any permanent peace deal on the horizon, given the fact that the fundamental political goals of Israel, Hezbollah and Iran have not changed and that the Israel-Palestine conflict continues to fester.

But I am hopeful that the ceasefire could lead to calm and stability between Israel and Lebanon for the foreseeable future. The details of the ceasefire agreement are not very different from U. N. Resolution 1701, which ended the last major war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. That agreement brought relative calm to the region for 18 years, even if Hezbollah, supported by Iran, used these years to build up its military capability and prepare for a potential ground invasion of northern Israel.

In my view, there is a possibility for greater stability this time around given the fact that the ceasefire agreement also stipulates that, if and when it becomes permanent, the deal would serve as a basis for negotiations over the demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon territorial boundary. This would not be an easy task, particularly in the area of Shebaa Farms and the village of Ghajar. But with goodwill and good intentions, even difficult border disputes could be resolved.

Asher Kaufman is a professor of history and peace studies at the University of Notre Dame.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Germany closing factories at home, opening them in China – Asia Times

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Germany’s biggest technological people are moving away from home to more positive circumstances in China as a result of its domestic energy guidelines and economic environment. Germany’s environment is increasingly hostile to business growth due to rising energy costs, high green energy subsidies, and strict regulations.

As a result, some of Germany’s most established companies are downsizing at house, shedding tens of work, while investing heavily in China. This change underlines the tremendous impact of existing policies on Germany’s professional scenery, with long-term implications for the local market and employment.

Here, Asia Times examines the main aspects and the businesses that are changing their business models worldwide.

Higher energy costs in Germany: The result of ideological laws

Germany’s energy policies have caused business energy prices to rise to amounts that are among the highest in the world, behind only the UK and the UK. Actually this high cost level, which has already reached unparalleled levels, cannot be sustained because the average cost for industrial users may have reached about US$ 250 per MWh by 2023.

Germany’s rely on renewable energy sources such as wind and solar, combined with the pulling out of nuclear energy, has increased the government’s reliance on imports and caused significant price fluctuation, eventually putting stress on both business and citizens. Due to rising costs, some businesses are considering reducing their businesses in Germany and starting new ones, especially in China.

Consumption of industrial strength has decreased by more than 16 % in the last two decades.

In 2023, power consumption in Germany’s business sector fell to 3, 282 petajoules, a decrease of 7.8 % compared to 2022. This drop followed an already significant reduction in 2022, when industrial energy use fell by 9.1 % year-on-year to 3, 558 petajoules. Taken together, these cuts represent an overall increases in industrial energy usage of about 16.3 % over the two-year time.

Graphic: Asia Times

Energy source in Germany: Increased trade dependence

German domestic energy production has also changed, with renewable energy sources generating a record 61 % of the country’s energy mix in the first half of 2024. In the first quarter of 2024, Germany’s reliance on foreign energy sources to complement its varying renewable production has increased by 23 % in this period.

Businesses that require steady, affordable electricity are at risk because of the variability of the supply of renewable energy, combined with rising home prices. Germany’s continued emphasis on solar is also expected to increase buy dependency, more discouraging companies from expanding internally.

Large subsidies for solar

In 2024 only, Germany will deliver 20 billion dollars in subsidies to alternative energy producers. Despite quickly falling market prices, these payments guarantee that solar energy suppliers receive set-assigned minimum prices.

The state budget has been burdened greatly by this centrally planned program, which allows the government to pay clean energy suppliers when wholesale prices drop.

In fact, the original budget for subsidies in 2024 was 10.6 billion euros ( US$ 21 billion ), but as energy prices have fallen, the projected need has doubled. Given the government’s commitment to follow the debt brake, these increasing subsidies are putting more pressure on the budget and making negotiations more difficult.

The Nord Stream pipelines and lost Russian gas played a significant role in Germany’s professional decrease.

Germany’s power landscape has been severely affected by the withdrawal of Russian gas imports, which has severely impacted its industrial base and increased energy costs. Russian natural gas was a core of Germany’s power source, providing reliable and affordable energy for years. However, this crucial strength link was cut short by the political effects of the Ukraine war and the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage in September 2022.

The problems rendered Nord Stream 1 entirely useless, and one of the two pipes of Nord Stream 2 was even damaged. Just one part of Nord Stream 2 is still in use and functional. If Germany was willing to engage with Russia politically and economically, President Vladimir Putin just reaffirmed that this operational pipeline was resume sales right away.

Putin and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently spoke in conversation, emphasizing that restarting oil travels through Nord Stream 2 was” a matter of pressing a box,” indicating that Russia was willing to provide fuel if Germany cooperated.

German gas had to be replaced by much more expensive liquefied natural gas ( LNG ) imports, primarily from the United States, after Russia’s abrupt loss of oil. These raised prices have undermined Germany’s international business competitiveness.

Putin’s suggestion to restart the last Nord Stream 2 pipeline highlights the corporate sway Russia also has over Europe’s energy source. By offering a possible crutch to Germany’s ailing business, Putin aims to control Germany’s social position on the Ukraine conflict. Germany has abstained from responding to the proposal despite the potential economic benefits of a resumed gas imports.

Falling domestic investment in Germany

Domestic investment has decreased significantly as a result of rising energy costs and regulatory challenges. Private gross fixed capital formation is about 10 % below pre-covid levels.

The situation is even worse for industrial production: Since 2021, Germany’s production level has fallen by more than 9 %. The decline has been even sharper in energy-intensive industries. In those areas, production levels have fallen by more than 18 % in less than two years, which indicates serious issues in industries that are heavily reliant on affordable energy.

Graphic: Asia Times

This decline may have had an impact on the cost structure of these industries because of rising energy costs and the ongoing shift toward renewable energy sources. The trend suggests potential deindustrialization pressures, particularly in sectors that are unable to adjust to rising operating costs.

Many businesses are cutting jobs at home while expanding in China as a result of Germany’s unsustainable cost environment.

The biggest German businesses are investing in China instead of reducing their workforce there.

    Volkswagen: Facing potential job cuts of up to 30, 000 in Germany, Volkswagen has made significant investments in China, including 2.5 billion euros ($ 2.6 billion ) to expand EV production in Hefei and a further 700 million euros in EV technology partnership with Xpeng.
  • Bosch: Announced plans to cut 7, 000 jobs in Germany as it increases investment in China’s e-mobility and automated driving sectors.
  • SAP: &nbsp, Plans to cut 9, 000 to 10, 000 jobs in Germany while reallocating resources to high-growth markets abroad.

As German businesses are putting more and more money under the belt, these cuts are a part of a wider trend. The Association of the Bavarian Economy (vbw ) estimates that the automotive sector in Bavaria alone could lose 106, 000 jobs by 2040, highlighting the far-reaching consequences of Germany’s industrial challenges.

Hildegard Müller, president of the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA ), warns that up to 190, 000 jobs across the sector could be at risk by 2035, reflecting the risks associated with Germany’s deindustrialization.

In response to these developments, Scholz’s government has initiated urgent talks with industry leaders. Industry experts contend that these discussions lack the long-term strategic vision required to address fundamental issues like high costs, regulatory pressures, and labor costs. Without significant structural reforms, the German automotive sector risks a further decline in global competitiveness.

Soaring German investment in China: Record levels

German companies continue to place record levels of investment in the nation despite pressure from German government officials and the EU to reduce their dependence on China. In recent years, German investment in China has increased to unheard levels, primarily in the chemicals and automotive industries.

In the first half of 2024 alone, German foreign direct investment ( FDI) in China reached 7.3 billion euros, surpassing the 6.5 billion euro total for the whole of 2023. German automakers and Germany are increasingly influencing Chinese foreign direct investment, accounting for 57 % of total EU investment in China in the first half of 2024, 62 % in 2023, and a record 71 % in 2022.

Key investment projects:

  • Volkswagen: In addition to its 2.5 billion euro investment in Hefei, Volkswagen has increased its joint venture stake in JAC Motor from 50 % to 75 %. This move underlines Volkswagen’s long-term commitment to local vehicle production in China, a market crucial to its growth in electric vehicles.
  • BMW: BMW’s investment in Shenyang not only expands its production, but also its research and development capabilities, aligning with local demand and avoiding the high energy costs in Germany.
  • BASF: The chemical company’s 10 billion euro plant in Guangdong is another example of large-scale localization. By operating in China, BASF lowers German regulations and energy costs while satisfying China’s growing demand for advanced chemical products, particularly in the automotive industry.

These initiatives are based on a localized production approach that helps businesses avoid the difficulties and costs of exporting from Germany and meet Chinese market demands.

Germany’s lead in expanding greenfield investments in the EU

The second quarter of 2024 saw the highest quarterly level to date for greenfield investment by the EU reach a record 3. 6 billion euros. German automakers have been a significant contributor to this growth, accounting for roughly half of all EU investments in China since 2022.

While average quarterly M&amp, A activity declines by 30 % between 2022 and the first half of 2024, greenfield investments by EU firms have steadily increased, with Germany’s automotive and chemicals sectors leading this trend.

Between 2022 and the first half of 2024, 65 % of all EU FDI in China will come from Germany, up from 48 % between 2019 and 2021. The top five European investors in China in 2023 were German companies, underlining Germany’s key role in EU-China investment.

Countries like France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, for example, will contribute only 7-8 % of EU FDI during this time, while the remaining 23 EU Member States will contribute only 12 % of that percentage.

Localizing supply chains and reducing geopolitical risks

German businesses are also restructuring their supply chains to reduce risk as a result of rising energy prices and regulatory uncertainty. Companies have been prompted to localize their operations in key markets as a result of events like the Covid-19 pandemic and the Suez Canal disruption, which have highlighted the fragility of global supply chains. German businesses are responding by increasing direct production in China, which reduces both the cost and the risk of global supply chain disruptions.

According to Friedolin Strack of the Federation of German Industries ( BDI), businesses in China are increasingly “reorganizing their supply chains regionally.” In a world where Chinese EV manufacturers are gaining market share, German automakers like Volkswagen and BMW are focusing on localizing their EV supply chains to stay competitive. German businesses are reducing costs by investing in localized production as well as protecting themselves from global uncertainties.

reducing German exports to China through local production

In the first seven months of 2024, Germany and China’s bilateral trade decreased by 5.7 % as a result of the transition to localized production. German exports to China fell by 11.7 % year-on-year, as companies increasingly serve Chinese consumers directly through local production.

German automakers, which are producing cars directly in China rather than exporting them, are especially attracted to this decline in exports. As less of German-made goods are exported abroad while localized production in China is growing, this could have an impact on Germany’s trade balance.

China’s unique advantages for German companies

While the German government and the European Commission advocate diversification away from China, alternative markets lack China’s infrastructure, market scale and cost efficiency. Countries such as Vietnam and Thailand, while considered as diversification options, cannot match China’s industrial networks, skilled workforce and market size.

Since 2022, more than 50 % of all EU investment in China has come from German companies, mainly in the automotive and chemical sectors. Major projects, such as Volkswagen’s partnership with Xpeng and BASF’s production facility, underline Germany’s strategic focus on China as a key market for long-term growth and competitiveness.

Domestic policy and global competition fueled a strategic reorientation

German companies ‘ decision to restrict domestic investment and expand in China is a stark reflection of Germany’s current energy policy and regulatory pressures. High costs, variable energy supply and regulatory challenges have made Germany a difficult environment for large-scale industrial investment, while China offers stability, cost-efficiency and market growth potential.

These trends suggest that domestic structural issues must be addressed as Germany attempts to maintain its industrial base. Without reforms to lower energy costs and reduce regulatory burdens, the shift of German investment to China is likely to continue, with long-term implications for Germany’s trade balance, industrial output and economic resilience. Even the EU tariffs wo n’t play a significant role.

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Russia’s grand geo-economic plan a step closer in Afghanistan – Asia Times

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Sergei Shoigu, a director of the Russian Security Council, traveled to Afghanistan this week to promote Moscow’s” Greater Eurasian Partnership,” a great strategic plan to create new trade routes and administrative alliances in Asia.

Russia has prioritized GRP because of the US’s and the West’s unprecedented sanctions against Russia in 2022 following its invasion of Ukraine, which some people view as Russia’s “pivot to Asia” scheme.

Since then, Russia has revived the previously stalled International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ) between itself and India via Iran, with branch corridors through Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ), an Eurasian political, economic, and security and defense organization established by Russia and China in 2001, has also been pushed for a larger regional role.

These are pertinent to Afghanistan both through its trade with India via the INSTC and as a SCO spectator. Central, South, and West Asia are at their intersections, and Afghanistan is effectively located there.

Shoigu’s top goal is to increase military-technical assistance with the ruling Taliban so that it can defeat ISIS-K, a militant group that has a presence in Afghanistan and has previously attacked Russia.

In order to better coordinate their efforts to contain local security risks like ISIS-K, Shoigu has pledged that Russia will replace the Taliban from its record of terrorist organizations.

In reverse, Russia is expected to stimulate the SCO to integrate more carefully with Afghanistan, including probably through more intelligence-sharing and future anti-terrorist activities.

Afghanistan’s strategic location also facilitates South Asian power and trade. The Taliban must stabilize private security, strengthen ties with Pakistan, and hope that Pakistan and India’s frequently strained relations will improve in order for that strategy to be viable.

Recent years have seen significant improvement in Russian-Pakistani ties, with considerable progress also being made in recent months. Later in September, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk visited Pakistan for two days, and Moscow hosted the first-ever Russian-Pakistani Trade and Investment Forum.

On the SCO Summit in Tashkent in September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif,” The goal is to provide pipeline gas from Russia to Pakistan. This is achievable as&nbsp, also, in&nbsp, see of&nbsp, the&nbsp, truth that some equipment is already in&nbsp, location in&nbsp, Russia, Kazakhstan and&nbsp, Uzbekistan”.

This potential Russian network may potentially even extend to India if Afghan-Pakistani relationships improve in tandem with Afghan-Pakistani relations.

Even without headway on Putin’s proposed network, Russia could possibly turn Afghanistan into a local oil gateway, as the Taliban envisages, according to a Reuters statement.

Nooruddin Azizi, the acting Afghan secretary of industry and trade, made the report based on what Nooruddin Azizi, the country’s oil-producing nation, said to Sputnik in August 2022 about Kabul’s want to trade its vast mineral reserves.

( In 2010, the US assessed that Afghanistan has nearly US$ 1 trillion worth of untapped minerals, including lithium. )

So, it appears as though the pieces are all in place for Russia to exchange oil for minerals from Afghanistan, transform the country into a local fuel hub, and then assist in mediating an Afghan-Pakistani dispute to facilitate its oil exports to Pakistan and lay the democratic foundation for the construction of a pipeline.

On the business before, a memorandum of understanding ( MoU) to create a travel corridor between Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan was signed in August 2023.

This corridor, which is tentatively referred to as the Central Eurasian Corridor ( CEC ) or the SCO Corridor due to its geographic location and institutional association, was referenced in the MoU signed between Pakistan and Russia during Overchuk’s visit in late September.

These legal grounds can expedite plans to build a Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan ( PAKAFUZ) railway. The CEC/SCO Corridor, with PAKAFUZ as its base, can even eventually grow to India dependent on increased ties with Pakistan.

Shoigu traveled to Afghanistan to learn more about closer military-technical cooperation in battling ISIS-K in response to Russia’s pending end of the Taliban’s designation as a terrorist organization.

Russia’s ambitious plans for integrating Afghanistan into its GEP through the construction of a transregional transport corridor with complementary energy infrastructure require this cooperation.

Russia may provide mediation for Pakistan and India’s long-running Kashmir dispute if requested, and this new corridor might encourage them to do so.

In turn, Pakistan could profit from facilitating trade between India and Russia in Central Asia and Afghanistan, while Pakistani trade with all three countries could be facilitated through Pakistan.

By enhancing the role that South Asia, particularly Pakistan and India, play in its balancing act, it will help Russia avoid becoming too dependent on China.

From the incoming Trump administration’s perspective, this would advance the returning president’s stated goal of “un-uniting” Russia and China, though some US officials might seek to obstruct this gambit.

With these possibilities in mind, Shoigu’s trip to Kabul can, therefore, be seen as part of a major power play designed to further Russia’s grand strategic goal of becoming a leading Asian nation.

These plans could be hampered, of course, if ISIS-K is not quickly defeated, and even that could take some time. But improved Russian-Afghan ties could shift the region’s geopolitical and geo-economic balance if even just part of Moscow’s plans come to fruition.

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Trump’s China policies will take collateral toll on Europe – Asia Times

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Donald Trump’s political success has been met, at least publicly, with indifference in China.

However, a second Trump management does not have to be worse for China than the Biden administration. Whether Trump decides to end his campaign for reconciliation or stays in favor of separation will determine little.

When Biden came to power, Chinese officials hoped that China-US ties would increase and move away from Trump’s trade conflict and isolation. But Biden levied further tariffs on Chinese imports and, most notably, placed far tighter export controls on US systems.

Regardless of whether a Democrat or Republican is in the White House, China came to the realization that US-China proper contest is still ongoing.

For four primary motives, the new Trump administration may offer China some benefits. Second, the Chinese leadership is aware of Trump’s tendency to be unpredictable and to make bold moves.

When then-Chinese Vice Premier Liu He reached the so-called Stage One trade agreement with Trump, exactly that happened in December 2019.

In exchange for US$ 600 billion in Chinese goods from the US and preferred access to the Chinese industry for US businesses, especially in the financial industry, the bargain lifted at least some US tariffs on Chinese products.

Next, Trump’s isolationist plan benefits China in that classic US allies, including the European Union, will probably want to look elsewhere for financial support.

This might lead to a Chinese-like relationship. Just after the Phase One deal was signed, negotiations between China and the EU on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment ( CAI ) accelerated.

Finally, Trump has stated openly that he intends to end the conflict in Ukraine once he assumes office. A quick fix is bound to provide some – perhaps some – of Russia’s calls, which in turn may be net-positive for China.

In the event of a Taiwanese war or blockade, a US administration’s abandonment of Ukraine will destroy the Chinese government’s belief that the US will help it.

Lastly and more frequently, Trump’s win may make it easier for Taiwanese leaders to spread the tale of America’s decline and the decadence of its democracy.

China’s leverage over the Global South has increased considerably since Israel’s defense assault on Gaza and, more recently, Lebanon. That utilize was built in part on great could generated by China’s long-standing efforts, including the Belt and Road Initiative and BRICS.

Trump is anticipated to cooperate with global partners with fewer incentives and a more contextual strategy than the Biden administration. This, in turn, may force the Global South yet closer to China.

Trump’s returning, however, may have a significant impact on China’s economy. Trump has pledged to impose an additional 60 % of taxes on Chinese goods entering the US and, in general, to encourage more decoupling from China.

As a result of changes to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ( CFIUS), an interagency committee that examines the implications of foreign investments in the US for national security, Chinese investment in the US decreased during Trump’s first term.

As a result of Trump’s threat to delist numerous Taiwanese companies from US stock markets, many of them were prevented from raising money there. People-to-people markets were likewise made more difficult, especially for individuals of the tough science.

For his next name, Trump has given every indication that technology, economic and people-to-people decoupling can be expected to continue.

In light of this dire circumstances, China’s leaders will have little space to protest Trump’s taxes and will likely choose to strike a bargain as soon as possible.

China will need to offer significantly more than it did in 2019 to get a” Stage Two” deal, both in terms of the volume of imports it agrees to and by giving US companies a competitive edge in many more fields.

Europe may be the bigger loser in this situation because of the US’s significant competition for its imports to China. There are many more examples, but aircraft is just one.

Of course, Trump’s procedures may have a direct effect on the EU, which could be larger than they are on China. Europe’s situation could become even more difficult as a result of a fresh US-China trade and investment agreement.

Trump’s best chance of achieving a minute trade deal would be if the EU kept pushing for decoupling from China.

There will be less distraction of Chinese trade toward the US in a scenario of US-China rapprochement, despite the obvious adverse effects of decoupling on farther fragmentation of international trade.

Alicia Garcia-Herrero&nbsp, is&nbsp, general analyst for Asia Pacific at Natixis and senior research fellow at Bruegel.

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From war to governance in resistance-liberated areas of Myanmar – Asia Times

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With your kind permission, this post originally appeared on Pacific Forum. Read the original around.

Myanmar’s ongoing armed struggle against the military junta, or State Administration Council ( SAC ), has seen significant territorial gains by ethnic armed organizations ( EAOs ) and People’s Defense Forces ( PDFs ). These newly emerging lands “liberated” by opposition forces underscore the government’s weakening placement in governance.

Following two months of fighting, the Arakan Army ( AA )’s seizure of a strategic junta hilltop base in Mae Taung near the Western Military Command headquarters in Ann Township of Rakhine State, along with the joint forces of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA ) and PDFs ‘ capture of the crucial Pinlebu township in Sagaing Region, offers renewed hope to those who are restraining military rule.

However, these extraordinary martial victories and regional victories present new difficulties for the resistance groups in terms of how to govern these newly liberated regions and how to establish new governance structures in the face of diversity, inclusivity, and lack of experience.

New possibilities and challenges&nbsp,

Establishing practical governments in these freed areas is crucial for maintaining balance and bolstering the broader opposition movement, even though Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement celebrates the release of junta-controlled territories. Setting up leadership buildings is a new and challenging task for some EAOs and Files.

In Chin State, members of the Chin National Front and Chinland Defense Forces guide the formation of local governments using a “bottom-up strategy” reflecting cultural practices, involving tribal elders in the decision-making approach at the town, sub-township, and community levels.

However, some places follow military-established limitations, resulting in scattered leadership models. Internal conflicts in the Chin criticism, which has gained more common support than the Interim Chin National Consultative Council, further complicating things. Establishing practical state governance and essential public services are the immediate challenges facing these organizations.

Sagaing’s weight management adds a third layer of complexity. Region, a crucial battleground in northern Myanmar, has seen Files take control of remote places. In these locations, Women’s Administrative Bodies, supported by local communities and welfare groups, along with Pa Ka Ha, which mostly functions as regional security militias, have emerged as key management actors.

These systems arrange the provision of education, health care, and righteousness, often in partnership with striking civil servants involved in the legal disobedience activity. Sagaing’s PDFs also created taxation systems that collected money through checkpoints along intercity roads. While this practice has faced criticism for a lack of transparency, local governance has become more coordinated over time, with revenue supporting health care, education, and defense.

In other regions of Myanmar, things have changed. Working with the Karenni Army in Karenni ( Kayah ) State, the Arakan Army ( AA ) and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force ( Kayah ) State expand their administrative reach as they establish new frontiers. Meanwhile, the Kachin Independence Army and Karen National Liberation Army are expanding governance systems into liberated territories in Kachin, Karen, Bago, and Sagaing.

In Shan State, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army ( MNDAA ) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ) are also establishing local governance structures within their territories.

In Myanmar’s liberated areas, including those with deep ethnic diversity, establishing inclusive and accountable governance is a significant challenge. Because many of these regions’ ethnic tensions have existed for a long time, it is crucial that new governance structures reflect the needs and rights of all ethnic groups.

For instance, the Arakan Army ( AA )’s past treatment of the Rohingya community in Rakhine State has drawn significant criticism. Fears that the AA’s leadership may marginalize them have been fueled by reports of anti-Rohingya rhetoric and alleged attacks on Rohingya civilians.

Despite these concerns, some initiatives spearheaded by the AA’s political branch, the United League of Arakan, point to potential change. In Rakhine State, the ULA has begun to work with its administrative structures to include Rohingya representation.

Although this is a welcome step toward inclusivity, it is still important to ensure that these efforts result in meaningful participation and the protection of the rights of the Rohingya community in AA-administered areas. The AA’s ability to transition from the “armed resistance organization” to a more accountable governing body is crucial for the achievement of the” Arakan Dream.”

In other regions, there are encouraging examples of inclusivity and accountability. In order to promote inclusive governance, particularly in the education and health sectors, the KNU and KIO have long worked with civil society.

Both operate non-state educational systems that emphasize mother tongue instruction while pursuing inclusion of other racial and ethnic groups in heterogeneous communities and providing essential healthcare services there. Recently, the KIO supported the establishment of private schools for minority groups within its territory, demonstrating a commitment to diverse governance.

However, the road to fully inclusive governance remains challenging, particularly in areas where ethnic tensions have persisted for decades. Resistance leaders must ensure that these systems serve both the diverse populations they govern and as new governance structures continue to form.

Role for the United States

The US has a unique opportunity to build trust with the pro-democracy movement as a result of the establishment of local and state governments in Myanmar’s liberated regions.

While the BURMA Act of 2022 allowed for non-lethal support to resistance actors, further concrete action is needed. The newly formed Congressional Burma Caucus, co-chaired by Bill Huizenga (R-Michigan ) and Betty McCollum (D-Minnesota ), is positioned to rally bipartisan support in addressing Myanmar’s crisis.

With US support, these emerging governments could become more professional and stable, making them more able to satisfy their citizens ‘ needs and promote inclusive, democratic governance.

In addition to the crucial services that many EAOs and PDFs are already providing to varying degrees, this could include support for strengthening governance structures in areas like education, health care, justice, and land rights.

Congress ‘ leaders can increase the demand for more US aid, including by creating a steering group to decide how to allocate roughly US$ 1 billion in frozen Myanmar assets held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York since the coup.

This funding could support resistance governance efforts in education, health care, and justice in liberated areas, helping stabilize these regions. By offering technical assistance and engaging with resistance actors and local civil society, the US can promote transparency, inclusivity, and accountability in these new governance structures, reinforcing its commitment to Myanmar’s democratic future.

Path to inclusive governance

As Myanmar’s resistance forces continue to liberate territory from military regime’s control, they face the monumental task of building governance systems that are inclusive, accountable and functional.

The NUG and various EAOs are determined to establish a new autonomous state/local governments, which will have a significant impact on the development of Myanmar’s federal system. However, this effort remains incomplete without the participation of some major EAOs, including the AA, TNLA, MNDAA, among others.

They will need to be considered in any negotiations involving the creation of a new federal democratic republic in Myanmar because they control a sizable portion of the country. The current dispersion of the resistance forces highlights the difficulties awaiting in the development of a common political framework and the need for a political pact between these various groups through meaningful dialogue.

By providing technical assistance and advice, the US has the opportunity to help lay the groundwork for a future democratic Myanmar. However, the path to a new federal democratic Myanmar will require cooperation among all resistance actors, the resolution of ethnic tensions, and a commitment to inclusive governance.

Myanmar’s resistance forces can only hope to see the country’s future as a democracy when they address these issues.

Aung Thura Ko Ko ( aung@pacforum .org ) is a resident Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum and an East-West Center affiliate scholar. The University of Oxford awarded him the Master of Public Policy.

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Why Africa keeps employing Russia’s bad boy mercenaries – Asia Times

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Russian troops, like the Wagner team, have an awful status. Multiple European outlets have reported on their defense ineffectiveness, their dismal human rights report, and their predatory nature.

For instance, in July 2024, the Wagner Group faced a military defeat in northern Mali. It lost lots of soldiers, including a senior captain and a well-known Russian military critic.

Since 2014, many studies have linked Russian troops to killings, sexual assault and crimes against humanity. Additionally, it appears that Russian soldiers are most motivated to seize control of natural resources like minerals by exploiting their hosts.

In the past five years, Russian mercenaries have been invited by an increasing number of American nations despite their bad popularity and selfish interests. Up to 200 Russian forces were reportedly deployed in Equatorial Guinea in August 2024 to guard the president and train political soldiers.

Standard alliances with the West are undermined by the Russian troops, who provide security services. The Russians have left behind defense installations because French and American troops have been forced to retreat or be expelled.

The problem we, as safety scientists, ask is: in view of these disadvantages, why do countries nevertheless use Belarusian soldiers?

Using the Central African Republic as an example, we attempted to respond. To assess Wagner’s performance, or efficacy, we studied the Central African Republic’s civil war and compared the French military intervention ( 2013-2016 ) to the Wagner intervention ( 2021-2024 ).

We found that in the short term, the Wagner action was more powerful for the country’s government than the European intervention. However, we contend that it posed longer-term challenges. Wagner’s long-term impact possible adds to instability, undermining green development and security.

Military performance

Usually, about 20 sub-Saharan states have depended on France and other European supporters for military assistance. In the last three years, however, Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have turned to the Wagner Group or other Russian mercenaries ( such as Africa Corps ) for security assistance.

To understand the appeal, one may seem to reports of their effectiveness. These provide a mingled outlook. Some scientists believe it to be effective because it effectively accomplishes military missions.

However, it is also linked to a rise in fight intensity and regular harm to civilians. Academicians and experts view mercenaries as weakening forces, frequently escalating violence without resolving root causes of security issues.

These trends are challenged by our analysis of Wagner’s performance in the Civil War of the Central African Republic ( CAR ).

Since self-reliance, CAR has experienced numerous uprisings and instability. The present phase of the fight began in 2013, when President François Bozizé was ousted by the Séléka, a Muslim insurgent partnership, sparking a civil war.

This religious violence between Séléka and Christian armies, known as the anti-Balaka, led the United Nations to release the Minusca security mission, with help from a French-led power, Operation Sangaris.

Sangaris succeeded in securing specific regions, but it struggled to impose its own rule across the country. Following the French operation, which ended in 2016, some of Sangaris ‘ accomplishments were undermined by the rebels. In 2018 Auto management pivoted to Russia, inviting the Wagner Group to deliver training and safety features.

For their support the Wagner Group gained state concessions, taking a hold over natural resources ( mostly in rebel-held territory ).

By 2020, the Russian troops were established in the country and became the primary security services, leading the country’s combat work. The state expanded its place there at the time, causing the rebels to retreat into remote areas.

Our research assesses numerous metrics, like regional power, reduced human casualty count, and indicators for state sovereignty. Wagner’s action appeared to have had better results for the ruling military coup than the European intervention.

Wagner was able to function more risk- and collateral-friendlyly due to its higher tolerance for risk. More place was restored, and rebels were brought to the table more quickly than the French.

Our research, which draws from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data on the issue, revealed that soldiers and civilians had higher mortality rates during the French activity Sangaris. Rebels gained more territory and the government recaptured less territory, compared with the Wagner intervention.

Figure 1: Military situation conflict map 2017, 2021, 2024

Wagner’s actions in the Central African Republic contrast poorly with Wagner’s current criticism of mercenaries as ineffective and unstable.

According to our assessment, Wagner allowed the regime to survive, protected the nation’s most highly populated and valuable regions, and secured economic and geopolitical assets.

Economic exploitation

Economically, the Russian mercenaries have been portrayed as exploitative.

Wagner demands economic concessions, particularly control over gold mining operations, in return for military support. This strategy allows it to sustain operations. However, it prevents African nations from having the resources they require for national development.

Wagner’s operational model undermines Central African Republic’s prospects for long-term stability and self-sufficiency. According to experts, Wagner’s profit from CAR’s mining and forest operations ranges between US$ 1 billion and US$ 2 billion.

Yet we suggest that, at least in the client’s eyes, the deal is a bargain. In Central African Republic, the economic concessions were for resources located in rebel-held territory. Territories and resources that the government could not use to support its political rivals.

Despite their crimes and human rights violations, the Russians enjoy a relative backing from the country’s urban population. Wagner’s supporters reportedly come from urban areas because it has improved security significantly since its inception as a rebel-held country.

However, in rural areas, especially near mining zones, Wagner’s brutal tactics drive displacement and instil fear. Wagner’s military and economic activities appear to be disassociated by the locals.

Wagner and Russian authorities engage in propaganda campaigns, promoting Wagner’s image through local media, sponsoring cultural events and producing pro-Wagner films.

Despite its negative reputation abroad, Wagner was portrayed as a stabilizing force by these efforts. Russia is viewed positively in the region, according to popular surveys.

Moreover, in Central African Republic, Wagner empowered the ethnic group associated with the leadership, providing them with arms and training.

Countering Wagner

Wagner appeals to regimes in sub-Saharan Africa because it can demonstrate its ability to provide security without the political restraints of Western forces. This preference is in line with the wider trend among African states to form non-Western partnerships. Growing economic ties with China and security ties with Russia demonstrate this.

The stakes are high. Russia is reshaping the definition of modern colonialism and redefining the boundaries of conflict. The abuses of mercenary organizations can lead to local unrest and conflict.

Wagner’s model cannot be sustained indefinitely. It’s crucial to comprehend and assess the appeal of mercenary groups to both the elite and the local populations in order to combat them. African nations are not merely pawns in a larger geopolitical game, so it’s also important to remember that. They have agency.

In order to combat mercenary groups in Africa, a nuanced approach is required. Instead of relying solely on broad condemnation, international organizations and western nations must take into account local perceptions and the mercenaries ‘ perceived effectiveness in specific circumstances.

To lessen the appeal of mercenary groups, practical solutions must address security needs and combine military support with effective, quick-developing initiatives.

Wagner’s abuses are highlighted by labeling it a criminal or terrorist organization, but this approach does not address the factors that motivate African states to join such forces.

Ori Swed is assistant professor of sociology, anthropology, and social work, Texas Tech University and Alessandro Arduino is affiliate lecturer, King’s College London

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Can Trump and Kim Jong Un pick up where they left off? – Asia Times

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North Korean media have been&nbsp, filled&nbsp, with debate about what Donald Trump’s returning to power in the United States may mean for the Korean Peninsula.

The possibility that Trump did renew his romantic ties with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un will top the list as a result of a deal that failed at the Hanoi Summit in later February 2019.

Trump himself made speculative notes while campaigning. ” It’s good to get along when someone has a lot of atomic weapons or otherwise”, Trump&nbsp, said&nbsp, about Kim in July. ” He’d like to see me again, too​. I think he misses me​, if you want to hear the truth”.

The president-elect is expected to want to go back to the talks at some point, according to senior officials, including former Trump presidency officials who were present during his first term.

” It’s not a day one issue, probably not even a year one issue, but]Trump ] will certainly seek to re-engage with Kim Jong Un”, former Trump senior defense official Randall Schriver&nbsp, said on November 21 at the Hudson Institute.

According to Schriver, talks may “have diverse contours than the first term, as well as the two summits in Singapore and Hanoi.” Trump may possibly make an offer to talk about a range of topics, including financial aid and the Korean War, which was a topic that was important in the first discussions.

The bottom line, however, is Trump’s own conviction that he came tantalizingly close to declaring he had forged serenity in Korea. ” President Trump was n’t happy that he did n’t get a deal”, said Schriver, who thinks the president-elect understands that the nuclear issue is an extraordinarily difficult one on which” to pry them away with diplomacy”.

Trump “is not repetitive and he is not constrained by convention”, Stephen Biegun, former assistant secretary of state and particular member for North Korea, &nbsp, told&nbsp, the Korea Society lately.

” To the contrary, he is the guy who says,’ Are you kidding me? This war ended more than 70 years before, and we still have 30, 000 forces on the Vietnamese island? What illiterates have overseen our North Korean plan for the past 70 times? There is a sure protagonist common feeling in that study”.

Some experts see Trump’s statement that Alex Wong, who was a member of the Northern Asian negotiating team during the first management, had become his deputy national security advisor as proof of his desire to resume politics with Pyongyang.

” At multiple levels, this supports the thesis that Trump is hot to trot with Kim” ,&nbsp, said&nbsp, a former senior US intelligence analyst with deep experience on North Korea. ” And, for better or worse, Pyongyang did read it that way”.

Both the North Korean government and the South Korean government, who were important participants in the negotiations conducted during the first administration, appear willing to return to that desk whatever the president may choose. ” It will be a very unique active than in the first term”, says Schriver, who was a part of the negotiating group for both Trump-Kim conferences.

The teachings of Hanoi

The location of the conversations that ended in 2019 will undoubtedly be the starting point for a new diplomatic exercise. Negotiations between the US and North Korea aimed to utilize the vague nuclear promise made the previous year at the Singapore Summit, but it eventually failed.

The North Koreans” thought the President was hungry for a bargain and they were going to save that for the leader-level meeting”, Biegun&nbsp, told&nbsp, the Arms Control Association in a 2021 meeting.

Trump arrived in Hanoi preoccupied with the domestic political climate, which was reflected in his impeachment proceedings and the pending evidence of Michael Cohen, his former prosecutor, in Congress. According to past National Security Advisor John Bolton ‘s&nbsp, withering narrative, Trump was continually watching Fox News.

Bolton and others were pressured by Trump to not reach a” small deal” in order to prepare for the deals, contending that it would violate both the American Constitution and those of its allies, including Japan.

Kim made an offer to end the notorious nuclear complex’s closure in Yongbyon in exchange for lifting all of the UN Security Council’s financial sanctions, which essentially cover all of the most important trade and aid limitations.

The US team understood that this constituted a  de facto , the elimination of all successful sanctions, and did not include any key facilities besides Yongbyon that would permit the continuation of the radioactive program. As has been recently&nbsp, confirmed, this included a significant enrichment flower at Kangson.

Trump tried to contract, suggesting Kim take a significantly lesser reduction in sanctions, and therefore proposed eliminating North Korea’s long-range missile program, which may reach the continental United States, leaving alive shorter-range missiles that target South Korea and Japan.

” This was, beyond doubt, the worst time of the meeting”, Bolton wrote in his&nbsp, narrative. ” If Kim Jong Un had said well that, they might have had a bargain, disastrously for America. Luckily, he was n’t cutting, saying he was getting everything, omitting any mention of the restrictions being lifted”.

Attempts to revive talks failed, including&nbsp, an unexpected summit&nbsp, a few months afterward, in June 2019, at the Demilitarized Zone.

Pointing fingers at Seoul

Was Trump and Kim resume Hanoi’s failed deals-making?

The shift in Seoul’s government has made a significant difference. Moon Jae-in’s liberal management had a significant influence on the engagement’s success, changing its tactics frequently when it stalled, and shaping the North Koreans ‘ dealing plan.

In fact, US negotiators criticized the Moon leadership for misinterpreting Trump’s willingness to reach the offer Kim proposed and for influencing its decision-making.

Evans Revere, a veteran of long-term diplomatic relations with North Korea, claims that Kim’s trust in Hanoi “was the result of the liberal ROK administration’s efforts to persuade Kim that the US would take this deal.”

Kim’s shame in Hanoi was caused by the false perception of success Seoul gave the North Koreans. Kim Jong Un’s anger on the return journey and venting his anger toward the ROK is unfathomable.

However, if Trump returns to the table in the near future, he will find a South Korean government that wo n’t encourage talks with North Korea. Relations between the two Koreas are at a lower level because the traditional leadership in Seoul has taken a harsh attitude toward North Korea.

In two years, nevertheless, there could be a change of government in Korea, shifting power back to the liberals.

According to Biegun, President Trump’s protagonist view that we need to solve this issue aligns with the conventional liberal view that concessions to North Korea are necessary to end the Korean Peninsula’s conflict and bring peace and reconciliation, according to Biegun. ” There will be an configuration it”.

Kim Is No Waiting for Trump

Kim’s lack of motivation to pursue this grand bargain may be the biggest problem to a successful Hanoi agreement. ” This is a Kim Jong Un that is in a different place”, Schriver told the Hudson Institute. ” He’s got more sophisticated features now”.

More considerably, he has the support of Putin and Russia and retains close ties to China. At the time of the conferences in Singapore and Hanoi, China and Russia were generally also enforcing the global sanctions regime. Both organizations have lifted Kim’s regime’s financial pressures and slowed any further UN sanctions.

” Weapons are now part of the government’s DNA and the North Koreans are making regular, impressive progress towards their goal of becoming a full-fledged nuclear energy”, argues Revere. ” The only’ deal’ that they&nbsp, might&nbsp, be prepared to discuss is one in which they would sit down with the US’ as one nuclear power with another ‘&nbsp, to discuss’ arms control.'”

Kim’s strength was demonstrated by the dispatch of more than 10,000 North Korean troops to the Ukrainian war front in recent significant speeches following the US election.

In a lengthy&nbsp, address&nbsp, delivered to army commanders on November 18, Kim linked the war in Europe to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and urged preparation for conflict. According to Kim,” The US-led military alliance is expanding its reach to Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and the spearhead of its aggression is being directed at our country, which is the closest country to the United States and has had the longest hostile relationship with it,” the alliance’s leader said.

In a&nbsp, speech&nbsp, delivered some days later at an arms expo in Pyongyang, Kim provided his “lessons of Hanoi”, offering only the co-existence of two nuclear states. Kim remarked,” We already tried everything in the bilateral negotiations with the United States, and what we ultimately believed was not the superpower’s will to coexist with us, but its unwaveringly aggressive and hostile policy toward the DPRK.”

In a&nbsp, study &nbsp, published recently by the Middlebury Institute’s Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Siegfried Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Robert Carlin, a former intelligence specialist and negotiator with North Korea, offered this conclusion:

” The North’s new policy will not be in question at this point,” said one source. No mistake should be made: what we’ve seen since January 2022 is n’t Pyongyang’s “healing” strategy. It’s a tactical tactic. It has been a fundamental change from the previous 30 years, a result of a leadership decision made by Kim Jong Un that will have long-term effects on both the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. That does n’t mean Pyongyang wo n’t re-engage with the United States, but it almost certainly will when it does, it will almost certainly open a door to a completely different room.

What would bring Kim back to the table for talks? A veteran North Korean intelligence analyst claims that “he is willing to surrender from Trump.” ” But he is not going to concede anything. He does n’t have to. It is the Americans who have to make the concessions”.

What might that entail? Simple acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state, formalized in some kind of arms control agreement, may no longer be enough. Trump already had a demand for US troop withdrawal from South Korea on his agenda at the conclusion of his first term. The former intelligence officer told me,” If Kim can get those troops out of there, he will be perfectly content.” ” That is why it is so dangerous”.

For now, as Kim&nbsp, wrote&nbsp, to Trump in the last of his “beautiful” letters, sent on August 5, 2019,” We are in a different situation and we are not in a hurry”.

At Stanford University, Daniel Sneider is a non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America and a lecturer on East Asian and international policy issues. This article was originally published by KEI’s The Peninsula, and it is now available for resale with permission.

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Chancay megaport magnifies China’s presence in South America – Asia Times

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The fresh deep-water port at Chancay, northeast of Lima, is open for business, signaling the start of a new era of effective, high-capacity transport between China and Peru, with a link to Brazil across the Andes. The US military and corporate managers are being driven out of their comfort zone by this, but they have nothing to sell and no way to stop it.

However, Caltrain, the rail services operating between San Jose and San Francisco, has sold its ancient diesel trains to the city of Lima. Caltrain itself has gone electronic.

On November 14, Xi Jinping, president of China, Xi Jinping and President Dina Boluarte of Peru attended the seaport’s opening meeting via video connection from the Lima Government Palace. Xi was also there to attend the annual APEC ( Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ) summit meetings, which began the following day.

The Chancay initiative, which Xi described as” the beginning stage for the creation of a new maritime-land passageway between China and Latin America and the connection of the Great Inca Trail,” was wax poetry.

Built by COSCO ( China Ocean Shipping Company ) and Peruvian mining company Volcan over the past three years, Chancay port has a maximum depth of 17.8 meters, deeper than Peru’s main port of Callao. The largest vessel boats in the world will be able to control them thanks to this.

Financed by Taiwanese businesses, with total funding exceeding$ 3.5 billion, Chancay is 60%-owned by COSCO. More than 8, 000 careers are expected to be created. Annual income is projected to reach$ 4.5 billion.

Starting at 1 million TEUs ( twenty-foot equivalent units ), the port’s annual throughput is scheduled to rise to 3.5 million TEUs when all the facilities are completed, making it the premier deep-water port on the west coast of South America.

In addition to the port, a warehousing, business, and industrial park will benefit both foreign investors and overspending in the crowded Lima-Callao area. According to reports, BYD is interested in setting up an automobile assembly grow it.

By eliminating trans-shipment via Manzanilla, Mexico, or Long Beach, California, Chancay may decrease travel time to and from China by more than a fourth, from 35 to 23 time, while reducing overall shipping costs by an estimated 20 %. Chancay is more than 4, 500 km from Manzanilla and more than 6, 600 km from Long Beach.

The Chancay port is fully automated, with Huawei’s 5G wireless control equipment, driverless electric container trucks, and unmanned cranes manufactured by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries ( also known as ZPMC). The bulk of the equipment is imported from China. BYD pickups are used by engineers to circle the port.

The port is connected to the north-south Pan American Highway, which passes through Cuzco, Porto Velho in the upper Amazon basin, and Sao Paulo and Porto de Santos on the Atlantic coast, and then travels to Brazil via the southern interoceanic highway.

In a new era, Xi claims,” We are witnessing the establishment of a new land-maritime corridor between Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.”

With this megaproject, Boluarte stated,” We are beginning a transformation that will strategically project us in the Asia Pacific region while consolidating our position as a top-notch technological and industrial logistics hub.”

This bothers the Americans. Chancay was built by the Chinese in what they refer to as their “back yard” and is also technologically advanced than any US seaport. From their perspective, it could turn out to be a strategic nightmare.

General Laura J. Richardson, until recently head of the US Southern Command, has warned that the Chinese navy might use Chancay at some time in the future. The risks to Peru are “at multiple levels,” according to professor Evan Ellis of the US Army War College. The Chinese are reaping the benefits of their abundant resources and geographic position, but risk number one is that they do not.

COSCO has the exclusive right to run Chancay for 30 years thanks to the Peruvian government. Although Peru’s minister of transportation claims that Chinese capital will be the same as American or British capital, Ellis calls this “previously unthinkable and against the very essence of Peru’s assertion of sovereignty over its own ports.”

In any case, Peru acquires a port that it is unable to construct on its own, which should result in significant increases in trade with China and Brazil. Additionally, goods are anticipated to be transported to Chancay by Ecuadorian and Chilean vessels for later shipment to Asia. Additionally, the Panama Canal would be bypassed by a proposed Brazil-Peru Transcontinental Railway that would travel to Chancay.

China is already Peru’s largest trading partner, ranking first in both exports and imports, and Chancay should expand its lead. The US ranks second, with Canada, India, South Korea, Japan, Chile, Spain, the Netherlands and Brazil well behind individually but ahead of the US in the aggregate. In 2023, Peru’s exports to China were 2.5 times its exports to the US.

Fruit were on board the first ship to travel from Chancay to China. Other Peruvian exports, including fish products, iron ore and copper, plus agricultural products from Brazil, will follow. Imports from China include autos and tires, computers and other electronic equipment, clothing and toys. How will this benefit Peru and its neighbors? It is the US that might not benefit.

Peru is a member of the CPTPP ( Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership ), the free trade agreement put together after the US withdrew from the original TPP ( Trans-Pacific Partnership ) in 2017. The other members of the CPTPP are Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Australia, New Zealand and, in the Americas, Chile, Mexico and Canada.

During Xi’s visit, Peru’s free trade agreement with China was strengthened. As a result, Peru’s foreign minister told Reuters, trade between the two countries should expand by at least 50 %. Xi was accompanied to Lima by 400 Chinese business representatives. Like most of the Asia-Pacific, Peru is committed to expanding international trade and investment, while the US retreats into protectionism.

If, as some Chinese commentators and US trade hawks fear, Chancay is used to dodge tariffs by assembling or refining Chinese goods for onward shipment to the US, then the US has a free trade agreement with Peru, which incoming president Donald Trump might override. There is no reason to believe that Peru would be any different from the US, which has already done this to Mexico. However, focusing on it detracts from Chancay’s significance and purpose.

Even if it had wanted to, the US could n’t have built Chancay. It simply does not have the required expertise. The International Longshoremen’s Association ( ILA ) is fighting tooth and nail to keep it that way because none of the world’s most advanced ports are located in the US.

As reported by The Wall Street Journal, ILA President Harold Daggett and Executive Vice President ( and son ) Dennis Daggett told the union’s rank and file in September that” the ILA does not support any kind of automation, including semi-automation”.

The Yangshan Deep-Water Port in Hangzhou Bay south of Shanghai is ranked first by the World Bank’s” The Container Port Performance Index 2023: A Comparable Assessment of Performance Based on Vessel Time in Port,” which is based on this perspective. The Port of Salalah in Oman, the Port of Cartagena in Colombia, and many other ports outside the US also come first. The most efficient US port, the Port of Charleston, South Carolina, ranks 53rd.

The US government views the automated ZPMC cranes as a cyber threat in particular. Last February, as reported by Material Handling &amp, Logistics, Rear Admiral John Vann, head of the Coast Guard cyber command, noted that Chinese ship-to-shore cranes “account for nearly 80 % of cranes at US ports. By design, these cranes may be controlled, serviced and programmed from remote locations”.

Why were there so many Chinese crane installations before he pointed out that Admiral Zain and others are concerned about the cranes being shut off during the war, paralyzing the US economy? Almost needless to say, the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, called this paranoia.

The Biden Administration made plans to spend more than$ 20 billion on port security, including replacing Chinese cranes with American-made cranes by Japanese shipbuilding and engineering firm Mitsui E&amp, S.

Efficient, computerized remote control is, of course, key to building a fully automated port. Huawei noted that it optimizes loading and unloading and manages each piece of equipment while lowering costs and reducing energy by referring to the Smart Port Solution it created with China Mobile and the Port of Tianjin.

The Chinese are bringing this to South America, and the US would like to, but probably cannot, prevent it. The US is, however, doing its bit for Peru.

For less than$ 6 million, Caltrain announced on November 15 that it had sold 90 passenger cars and 19 diesel locomotives to the Lima municipality. The retired trains, according to the article,” will enable thousands of riders to benefit from a new regional commuter rail line that significantly reduces automobile traffic and greenhouse gas emissions.” &nbsp,

Michelle Bouchard, the executive director of Caltrain, traveled to Lima to celebrate this agreement at the APEC summit. Back in California, Caltrain was already operating what it calls a” 100 % renewable, zero-emission service with high-performance, state-of-the-art electric trains”.

The retired but still useful railroad cars, which Caltrain Chair Dev Davis describes as “hold a special place in the heart of train enthusiasts,” appear to be for sale in Lima. Still, the juxtaposition with Chancay is unfortunate.

Follow this writer on&nbsp, X: @ScottFo83517667

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