Japan’s delicate surge of top-tier Chinese workers – Asia Times

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The Japanese landscape is changing regarding Foreign movement. Toyo Keizai, a business magazine, recently covered the sensation of Taiwanese children joining in some of Tokyo’s best secondary schools.

The post series focused on Tokyo’s Bunkyo-ku, house to the University of Tokyo and some of the city’s top public schools, noting that the number of non-Japanese children living in the area has more than doubled since 2019. According to the post, Chinese made up half of the increase.

The number of Foreign residents living in Japan, which is on the rise, reached a record high of 873, 000 at the end of 2024 from 761, 600 in 2022, with a new perspective. &nbsp,

But much more important, the content of Chinese immigrants has changed dramatically over the past few years. Chinese render up 23 % of Japan’s 3.76 million international citizens, but they now make up a significant and growing portion.

Chinese workers now dominate the most highly skilled categories in the Japanese visa system, namely the” Management and Administration” ( 51.3 % in 2023, 50.3 % in 2022 ) and” Highly Qualified Professionals” ( 65.7 % in 2023, 63.9 % in 2022 ).

In contrast, there has been a steady decline in the number of Chinese citizens who are” Technical Trainee” card holders, which forbids the holder from bringing community members. More than 38, 000, or 43 % of the full, were the Chinese, who were the largest population of these employees as late as 2015, making up the majority of the full. However, by the previous year, the Chinese had dropped to fourth position, just making up 7.4 %. &nbsp,

It is no wonder that there is a corresponding increase in Chinese kids when you factor in the increase in the number of permanent people, scientific experts, and other types of long-term white-collar practitioners among Chinese people in Japan.

The Chinese are increasingly viewed as travellers, university students, and unskilled laborers who work in companies.

Foreign residents in Japan are extremely sharing the same physical spaces with “regular” Chinese people, competing for the same minimal resources such as high-quality pre-college knowledge instead of just spending money and then going home or concentrated on far-flung university campuses, farms, and factories.

Recipe for a backlash

It’s unlikely that the Chinese will like them even more because of the change in their composition in Japan. A survey survey results released in December 2024 revealed that 89 % of Japanese people have a negative outlook on China, which undoubtedly influences how they perceive the Chinese people they encounter there as well.

A quick look at the extensive coverage of China by Toyo Keizai, including those of Chinese immigrants in Japan, reveals that the majority of them are calling for the Chinese to leave and stop enriching themselves by stealing Japanese technology, despite the fact that it is statistically unrepresentative. &nbsp,

Such vitriol will only get worse with the zero-sum nature of education. The lack of elite education, as shown by the limited number of places available in Bunkyo-ku’s top elementary schools and the fierce admissions battles that face China because of their presence, which is thought to excite more deserving Japanese students, will increase grievances toward the Chinese.

The fact that the Chinese are looking for cheap public school spots rather than paying for private education that the majority of the Japanese population can’t afford will unavoidably sputter more nationalistic sentiments as Japan’s average real income continues to decline. &nbsp,

A number of factors that are beyond the control of both countries and their peoples will also contribute to the Chinese’s continued growth in population in Japan, at the risk of locals treating them with more hostility.

With Japan’s stricter visa laws and labor market conditions, Trump’s growing tendency to view Chinese STEM talent as a threat to national security will result in the displacement of many of them.

Additionally, Chinese companies’ increasing competitiveness has frequently come at the expense of Japanese pride, not to mention traditional automakers, as most recently demonstrated by its surge in electric vehicle exports. More of them will likely flood Japanese markets as the Trump tariffs create a barrier to Chinese goods.

Hedging hostility

Japan’s efforts to embrace multiculturalism in response to Japan’s long-standing issues of labor shortage, aging, and population decline are causing a problem because of the increasingly wealthy, competitive, and ubiquitous Chinese immigrants.

The government has made it clear that it intends to increase the number of highly skilled foreign workers over the coming years, but the nation may become less and less interested in having to compete for limited resources with these highly skilled workers, the majority of whom are Chinese.

The government has not yet shown a clear direction in juggling practical needs and hostile feelings. The government’s decision to begin issuing 10-year multiple-entry tourist visas to wealthy Chinese people in the late last year has sparked even more hostility toward them from Liberal Democrats, who are currently in power.

The government will need to first clarify its stance and formulate a concerted plan to address the public’s concerns while highlighting the positive contributions Chinese citizens are making to the nation for the Japanese to form more lucid opinions on the presence of China in their midst.

Although it would be unpalatable for any politician to speak out and defend the benefits of a greater foreign presence, especially from the Chinese, in a traditionally homogenous nation like Japan.

A lack of clarity among officials will only lead Japan down the same path as the West, where anti-immigrant rhetoric has risen on the assumption that the government has lost control over national borders, given the undeniable reality of an ever-increasing foreign population in the nation.

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What SE Asia does and doesn’t want from Trump – Asia Times

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US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stressed the need for Japan to increase military vigor in mild of China’s growing confidence and the looming threat of a Taiwan emergency during his first official visit to Asia.

From Manila to Hanoi, local leaders have publicly welcomed reassurances of the US’s security appearance, viewing America’s “robust, ready and reliable” approach to China – as described by Hegseth – as a needed barrier that their own militaries cannot support only.

But beneath the hushes of strategic approval is a quieter undercurrent of worry: May America’s Indo-Pacific ultimately cause the region to become unstable rather than recover equilibrium?

US protection concerns have been shown to function more as economic leverage than as corporate interests in new upheaval involving Canada, Panama, Greenland, and Yemen.

” If the US properly restores freedom of navigation ( for shipping roads around the Middle East ) at great cost, there needs to be some additional economic get extracted in profit”, wrote S. M., according to leaked Signal messages reported by various media outlets. Stephen Miller, the White House’s deputy chief of staff, is reportedly the subject of a S. M. theory.

The logic of” America First” extends beyond economics to the realm of security, as articulated by Defense Undersecretary-nominee Elbridge Colby.

America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is clear: deny China regional hegemony through forward military posturing, strengthened alliances and assertive naval operations.

That approach has appeal to many ASEAN states, of course. China’s rise, after all, hasn’t just harmed the security of trade routes; it has militarized the South China Sea and exacerbated regional asymmetries. The US’s focus on deterrence thus presents a timely hedge.

Risk of overreach

However, that deterrent logic is fragile. Consider Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical tripwire. Through continued high-profile arms deals and repeated rhetorical affirmations, President Donald Trump’s administration has encouraged Taipei.

The US State Department removed the phrase” we do not support Taiwan independence” as part of what it described as a routine update in February.

While these moves boost morale in Taiwan and draw praise in Tokyo and Manila, they simultaneously narrow China’s strategic options.

The People’s Liberation Army’s most recent live-fire demonstrations around the self-governing island highlight a sombering truth: Beijing views US actions as a prelude to a permanent separation. China is more likely to test its resolve the more the US resolute it becomes.

This feedback loop raises the specter of strategic overreach.

Tokyo established the Japan Joint Operations Command, a new body tasked with coordinating its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, in conjunction with Hegseth’s Asia tour. This is a significant step toward enhancing Japan’s ability to respond to regional emergencies and enhancing operational cooperation with US forces.

There are currently 55, 000 US soldiers stationed in Japan, 28, 500 in South Korea, and a growing rotational presence in the Philippines. Add AUKUS nuclear submarine deployments and increased intelligence-sharing under the Quad, and the region increasingly resembles a Cold War-era containment arc.

Trump’s strategy, however, lacks the broad-spectrum diplomacy that once supported credible deterrence. His strategy heavily relies on trade coercion without providing a corresponding vision for regional development. His strategy is unsupported by an effective economic program for ASEAN.

The” Liberation Day” tariffs, announced on April 2, 2025, threaten to deliver a sharp economic blow to all ASEAN states, including strategic ally Singapore, despite its Free Trade Agreement with the US and existing trade deficit, not surplus.

Cambodia is the country with the highest tariff, at 49 %, followed by Laos at 48 %, Vietnam at 46 %, and Myanmar at 44 %, despite the country’s trade with the US remaining sluggish because of current sanctions.

Thailand and Indonesia are subject to tariffs of 36 % and 32 %, respectively, while Brunei and Malaysia are each subject to tariffs of 24 %. The Philippines fares slightly better at 17 %, while both Timor-Leste and Singapore face the baseline 10 %.

Trump’s punitive trade measures come without meaningful investment or assistance, further erodering regional goodwill, in contrast to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which continues to position Beijing as the region’s leading infrastructure partner.

There is also a more in-depth historical irony at play. In Washington, Japan’s growing military assertiveness is widely seen as a success of US security leadership. However, Taiwan’s reputation as being essential to Japan’s own national security is revived by its Southeast Asian neighbors, who have bitter memories.

The echoes are obvious: In 1931, Japan justified its invasion of Manchuria in response to the staged Mukden Incident on strikingly similar grounds, shielding important interests from a perceived Chinese encroachment.

Without a meaningful reckoning with this past, Japan’s shift away from postwar pacifism, however US-encouraged, risks alienating ASEAN rather than uniting it under the American banner.

The US “doctrine of denial” is set up for theater-specific flashpoints like Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands, which poses the greatest risk of overreaching.

However, important ASEAN nations like Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia are not eager to join these permanent alliances. Southeast Asia seeks deterrence without entrapment.

Trump, however, doesn’t offer much nuance. His current zero-sum worldview, where failing to align with America is seen as siding with China, risks alienating the very middle powers whose support is essential to maintaining US power and influence in the area.

As Singapore’s Foreign Minister Dr Vivian Balakrishnan reminded Parliament at last month’s Committee of Supply debate,” We must maintain an omnidirectional balance and a constructive engagement with all partners”.

China’s charm reset

China is waging a parallel campaign to reshape perceptions and re-anchor Southeast Asia in its orbit, even as the US restores deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Long gone is China’s snarling rhetoric of “wolf warrior” diplomacy from 2017. A strategic reset is positioned in its place, surrounded by charm, trade, and respect for ASEAN centrality.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is now using the phrase “multipolar world” to advocate for Southeast Asia’s “right to choose,” echoing the language of regional autonomy.

Beijing’s statecraft appears to have shifted from confrontation to courtship. It has also strengthened its position as ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 16 consecutive years.

President Xi Jinping’s upcoming travels to Malaysia, Cambodia, and Vietnam this month reflect China’s deeper, concerted push for personal diplomacy and economic pragmatism.

Even Indonesia’s recent decision to join BRICS and strengthen digital and green cooperation with China underlines a wider regional trend: hedging against American volatility by embracing Chinese steadfastness.

China’s multilateral rhetoric, which promotes regional comprehensive economic partnerships like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and promotes minilateral initiatives like” Security Belt 2025,” gives it even more legitimacy as a partner invested in peace rather than provocation.

To be clear, China’s charm offensive has its own flaws. Take its tense relationship with the Philippines as an example. The Philippines remains a crucial node in America’s first island chain of forward defense.

Hegseth made the announcement during his recent visit to Manila that the US would use more sophisticated military capabilities for joint training, improve interoperability for “high-end operations,” and prioritize cooperation with the Philippines from the defense industry.

Manila has strengthened its security ties to Washington under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., including welcoming more US troop rotations, participating in expanded trilateral exercises with Japan and Australia, and publicly deny Chinese harassment of Filipino vessels close to the Second Thomas Shoal and other disputed sea features.

Meanwhile, China’s maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea has grown more calibrated – aggressive enough to assert red lines, yet measured enough to avoid outright conflict. However, this delicate balance act demonstrates Beijing’s soft-power reset’s limits.

China may outsource and outsource the United States ‘ infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia, but it is unable to quickly address the deep concerns it has caused as a result of its territorial assertiveness. ASEAN nations may engage with Beijing’s diplomacy, but many remain wary of its gray-zone tactics.

In essence, Southeast Asia is balancing, hedging, and gaming both Washington and Beijing. The danger lies in mistaking polite nods for alignment. Trump’s administration must be aware that regional nations favor dialogue over ultimatums and options over dominance.

American abandonment

Critics may argue that Trump’s tough talk has at least reawakened America’s strategic muscle. However, history encourages skepticism.

His first term was marked by erratic diplomacy, with his party wooing Kim Jong Un of North Korea while reneging on crucial multilateral agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement.

For all its bluster – from a Ukraine ceasefire that has failed to hold, to hostages still held by Hamas, to Houthi rebels continuing to menace shipping lanes near Yemen – Trump’s brand of deterrence so far feels more performative than institutionalized.

In fact, Indo-Pacific allies and partners are left to wonder whether US support has a time limit. In” Strategy of Denial,” US Defense Undersecretary-nominee Colby recommends putting together a cohesive coalition to combat Chinese hegemony.

But ASEAN doesn’t just want a wall. Partner who are willing to build bridges are necessary given the country’s young populations, emerging industries, growing infrastructure needs, and desire for investment, whether it be financially, technological, or developmentally.

ASEAN wants a US that can stifle China while also reassuring the area. It wants an America that upholds international rules without provoking war. It desires a US that makes investments in shared prosperity that are supported by an equilibrium-creating security architecture.

Southeast Asia, which has long been a hub for powerful rivalries, is acutely aware that diplomacy without deterrence is a risky move.

Living in permanent proximity to China, and mindful of America’s history of strategic withdrawals, the region understands that US overreach today could lead to hemispheric abandonment tomorrow.

Marcus Loh serves as the director of Temus, a Singapore-based company that offers digital transformation services, where he leads public affairs, marketing, and strategic communication.

He previously served as the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore’s President, and he is currently a member of SG Tech’s executive committee for the digital transformation chapter.

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FULRO: a war of their own in Cambodia – Asia Times

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A strange piece of information was discovered by Reuters Phnom Penh Bureau Chief Mark Dodd in the middle of August 1992. &nbsp,

There was a little army in the distant forests of northern Cambodia, according to a UNTAC Aussie Signals commander, and they had contacted the UN in search of weapons to combat the Asian.

Who the devil were these men, given that the authority of UNTAC was to destroy all foreign causes in Cambodia? They allegedly belong to a Montagnard movement that was started in the 1950s called FULRO, a European abbreviation that means the United Front for the Emancipation of Oppressed Races.

FULRO’s original intention was to establish a separate country for racial minorities like the Jarai, Rhade, Behnar, Mnong, and occasionally even the Chams. FULRO organized two mini-rebellions in the hills in 1964 and 1965 to combat the South Vietnamese, which immediately ran away.

Ten thousand FULRO individuals emigrated from Vietnam’s Central Highlands to Cambodia in 1975 after North Vietnam defeated the South. Only a few hundred were still intact seventeen years after.

Dodd scooped up the Phnom Penh hit army with a report that appeared on television on September 1, 1992, which perhaps sounded the alarm in Washington, DC because the Montagnards had worked closely with American Special Forces during the Vietnam War and had bravely fought alongside them.

Some, particularly soldiers, felt that” the Miles” were cruelly abandoned to an uncertain death when the US pulled out, and there are still many of them.

On the day of the retreat, Fulro and UNTAC engage in negotiations. 4, 1992. Photo: Supplied/Michael Hayes

Nate Thayer, a journalist for The Far Eastern Economic Review in Phnom Penh, likewise became aware of the story. Nate was residing above the Phnom Penh Post practices, which I co-founded only two months prior.

Running sources in Washington, Nate, had our telephone equipment spewing hundreds of pages, day and night, on FULRO’s record, a phone bill that ultimately rang up to US$ 8, 000.

It was so interesting as a greenhorn publisher to witness a skilled journalist scurry into drive on what was undoubtedly a very big story, despite Nate’s swearing to secrecy. In the Mondulkiri woods, Nate made the decision to join Fulrou. He inquired if I wanted to join in. How had I not avoid?

We flew to Stung Treng on the Mekong, and he spattered on the UNTAC Uruguayan Battalion’s chief for two days. Eventually, the UN agreed to let us travel with them to a frontier town to start FULRO’s future negotiations.

We flew over dense, unspoiled jungle for two hours before making a quick stop in Khao Nhiek, a city money, to land in a small clearing about 25 kilometers from the Asian borders. When we left the helicopter, I can still recall. We made it, Nate said to me as she turned round and yelled” We made it” with a big, shit-eating smiles!

Include account for Nate Thayer’s High Eastern Economic Review on FULRO.

Nate spent four days on his own, leaving Steung Treng that day without any clue about how he was going to get out. I flew up that day with the UN people.

At the time, and still are, there were lots of possibilities about FULRO. However, many of those have just been examined, dissected, and explained in a brand-new reserve by William Chickering.

The Additional National Liberation Front, Vietnam 1955-1975 is a thoroughly investigated, well-written, and exciting book. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

In 1968, Chickering, a previous US Special Forces commander who collaborated with Montagnards in the mountains, spent 16 times interviewing more than 100 people in Asia, Europe, and the US.

He sifted through numerous libraries, leaving his duplicate with a delightful footnote. He followed the true accounts of many of the important players in FULRO, like a seasoned inspector.

Chickering weaves the existence of four important FULRO members through his history, including the head, a man by the name of Y-Bham Enoul, whom he met in Phnom Penh in 1973. He records their struggles, their first training in Vietnam, and their lives.

On April 17, he places a particularly interesting emphasis on the approximately 150 FULRO men who ended up in the French Embassy seeking shelter before being forced to leave presumably for the Khmer Rouge’s murder.

I could go on and on about how much I enjoyed Chickering’s guide. Chickering’s text is a truly valuable addition to the puzzle for those of us who are deeply invested in the country’s history, particularly the wars that destroyed Vietnam and Cambodia for decades.

Chickering neglected to mention the FULRO times from 1975 to 1992 in his book. He claimed in an email to the author that he “lacked sufficient distinct knowledge to do so both effectively and courageously.” It’s possible that the octogenarian’s next useful project will be based on his strong health and joie de vivre.

For Bangkok users, William Chickering did publish his book on April 10 at 7 PM at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand. Previous Reuters Phnom Penh Bureau Chief Mark Dodd may speak as a guest.

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‘The White Lotus’ version of Thai Buddhism gets some things right – Asia Times

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The White Lotus returns to a luxurious hotel on Koh Samui, Thailand, in the new year. This comedy-drama collection that addresses rich tourists has a plotline that emphasizes foreigners visiting Thailand who are interested in learning about its Buddhist customs.

Yet though Thai churches do not provide such plans, the image depicts a young American woman who wants to enroll in a year-long yoga course at a Buddhist temple. It also incorrectly describes the Buddhist perspective of the future and depicts a church environment where many foreigners stay there for a long time, not dressed in traditional attire for temple residents – which is unusual in Thailand.

I have spent more than ten years studying Buddhism in Thailand, and I have seen how many different ways Indian Monks practice their faith. There are many genuine ways to engage greatly with Buddhism, from offering donations to little meditation retreats to ordination as a monastery, although the Thai Buddhism depicted in The White Lotus is not entirely reasonable.

Buddhist people and genocidity

Without donations, religious institutions and Buddhist temples may not exist.

In exchange for the moral coin of significance, which is thought to produce great guilt, the lay group provides priests and temples. According to some, this great fate leads to advantageous outcomes in both the present and future, such as wealth and rebirth in a wealthy family.

Some laymen may provide meals to priests as they walk on their day alms, while others may only go to the temple on the majority of Buddhist holidays. The main goal when you interact with a priest or visit a sanctuary is to earn money. Each church has payment boxes for specific needs, such as paying the electric bill, finishing restoration projects, providing schooling for young monks, and funding the health care of the religious community.

In exchange for a small contribution, people may take home blessed items like a happy candle or little necklace. A monk’s work in some temples is to wait until the people arrives to receive the offerings and grant blessings by sitting inside one of the major halls.

retreats for prayer

Churches that have meditation centers typically provide short-term yoga retreats. Individuals can also sign up for a 21-day system in the northeast of Thailand, where they will aim to spend their days in 10-15 periods of meditation and reduce any other activities, including sleep. Some companies offer 10-day resorts.

The 21-day program’s participants hope to complete the first of Thai Theravada Buddhism’s four stages of enlightenment. According to Buddhists, those who pass the first stage have “enter the stream” of enlightenment and are certain to do so in their lifetimes.

Contrary to popular belief in Western culture regarding Buddhist meditation, it is not seen as a secular practice. Buddhists in Thailand believe that meditation is a meritorious practice that aids them in both the end of the cycle of rebirth and the accumulation of merit and good karma along the way, both in this life and in the future.

Every moment is spent in mindful of every action at a meditation center, along with periods of formal sitting or walking meditation. Each meditation center has a set schedule and program that participants must follow either individually or in small groups during periods of meditation, typically dressed in white pants and a top.

Men and women’s ordination

Ordination is a significant component of the Buddhist path. Thai Buddhists frequently enter the monastery for brief periods of time, temporarily ordained as nuns or monks. The entry process is straightforward, and it typically doesn’t cause any regrets or disappointments for those who enter for life and then choose to leave the monastic life. However, if a monk was well-known for his instruction, his followers would probably be upset.

There are two levels of ordination in Theravada Buddhism, the type of Buddhism practiced in Thailand: full” bhikkhu” or novice, which describes a fully ordained male. Males under the age of 20 may only pursue novice ordination, while those over 20 can become fully ordained monks.

A male being ordained at some point in his life is frequently regarded as a rite of passage, or at least a sign of discipline and maturity. Temporary ordination is thought to be a way for men to earn merit for their parents, especially their mothers, who gave so much for their existence.

Women are typically prohibited from being ordained in Thai Buddhism, but some have received ordination in Sri Lanka, where they are permitted to practice monastic rites, and have established popular Thai communities there. These female monastic practice centers have started” bhikkhuni” (temporary ordination ) programs.

Once or twice a year, these centers offer special programs where up to 100 women at once, including foreign visitors, can ordain as novice female monks for brief periods. They also learn about receiving offerings, wearing robes, and studying Buddhist texts during this period.

Many women find this opportunity meaningful because it allows them to offer merit to their parents, which only males could have previously done.

There are 625 Thai women attempting to become ordained at https ://www.youtube .com/embed/TXdyclB9I7A?wmode=transparent&start=625.

In Thailand, a woman can also ordain temporarily or permanently as a mae chi, or precept nun. They typically dress in white, robe their hair, and adhere to the Eight Precepts, including celibacy. Although more popular than bhikkhuni in Thailand today, this type of ordination was not initiated by the Buddha. Precept nuns are thought to have been around for centuries, but the origins of the practice are not well known.

These are some typical practices that Thai Buddhists follow, frequently with the intention of achieving greater prosperity in this life and a better rebirth. According to Buddhists, these practices may also lead to their attainment of the ultimate aspiration of enlightenment.

At Rhodes College, Brooke Schedneck is an associate professor of religious studies.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the article.

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15 reasons these tariffs are a mistake – Asia Times

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Making the case for bringing companies back to the United States is not difficult to do. Additionally, it’s easy to understand why some carefully targeted tariffs, especially when combined with other industrial-policy measures, would raise this “reshoring” trend.

It’s impossible to argue for extremely large tariffs on all produced in almost every nation on earth. There are a lot of issues with the way this leadership operates. Let’s go through the way.

One: The levies apply to minerals that our nation doesn’t possess and bananas, espresso, and other products that we are unable to produce in large quantities. They didn’t greatly improve makers because they will force Americans to spend more for those items.

Two: When products are produced in several nations, low-wage production is not required to be brought back to the United States. The risk of relying on a single supplier, such as China, is eliminated. We want Americans to work in high-paying work, so we don’t have to spend money making everything around.

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Three: If organizations believe the tariffs may be temporary, they won’t encourage businesses to invest in companies. If a president is merely using tariffs to get a few “wins” in negotiating, he may talk about, then the next president may revoke them, or the same president may do so. or being skept about whether they’re negotiating leverage or continuous.

Four: Retaliatory tariffs had been predicted for US trade sectors, including crops. They will undoubtedly obtain them.

Five: The result of decades of largely free trade is that today’s manufacturing supply chains are complex and global. Parts for an iPhone usually come from 40 states. The Ford F-150 pickup truck, the best-selling American car, contains 50 % parts from at least a few nations. It will take decades to rearrange these supply chains, even if taxes encourage businesses to manufacture more parts in the US.

Six: The leader is not permitted to impose tariffs because the emergency financial powers law that Trump cited as evidence to support the tariffs.

Seven: Because of the enormous pay gap between the US and many developing nations, companies with the greatest possibility of being reshored here will be highly automated, actually with taxes. They didn’t hire many people, and those who do will require advanced skill sets and perhaps associate degrees. There are currently a lack of these employees in the US, as well as professionals.

Eight: Why do we have 10 % tariffs on nations like Australia and the United Kingdom with which the US has trade surplus?

Nine: While high and wide tariffs may be a good way to lower US trade deficits, they will also slow down or even start a crisis. Taxes reduce consumption by causing private rivals to raise prices and making imported products more costly. The US trade deficit has decreased over the past six decades when economic growth slowed and increased when the market grew faster, according to analyst Richard Katz.

Ten:” Cooperative” taxes aren’t calculated by dividing business deficits with a nation by imports from it before halfing the solution. Products are the subject of mutual tariffs, no business deficits. Two nations have perfect reciprocal tariff agreements, but one may also have a sizable trade deficit with the other.

Eleven: It’s strange to leave Russia off the listing while imposing tariffs on US friends. Russia, which had a trade surplus of$ 2.5 billion on$ 3.5 billion in total trade last year, did not receive tariffs from the administration.

Twelve: A time does not produce a fad, but the administration only used the most recent year’s trade-deficit and transfer data to calculate the tariff levels. The price ranges may have appeared very different, some higher and some lower, if multi-year statistics had been used.

Thirteen: These levies violate US duty as a member of the World Trade Organization and international trade agreements with Canada and Mexico, South Korea, Australia, and other nations. This limits our nation’s ability to subject when other nations violate international agreements and regulations.

Fourteen: The loss of trust in the United States as a result of this tariff increase will have negative effects. Europeans will be less receptive to US investments and more receptive to other reserve currencies.

15: Which nations do you believe will industry more and have closer ties with if other nations are forced to do so with the US? Yes, China.

I agree with the desire to produce more goods in the US. These taxes are certainly the best way to go about doing it.

Urban Lehner, a former long-time Asia editor and writer for the Wall Street Journal, is DTN/The Progressive Farmer’s editor emeritus.

This post, which was originally published on April 8 by the latter news business and is now being republished by Asia Times with authority, is titled” Copyright 2025 DTN/The Progressive Farmer.” All trademarks are reserved. Follow&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, on&nbsp, X @urbanize&nbsp,

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Palau deports Chinese criminals, reinforces Indo-Pacific security – Asia Times

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In the last three months, the Pacific island country of Palau has executed a master class in how to quietly, professionally and effectively rid itself of serious national security threats – including striking a powerful blow against some major Chinese bad guys (and gals). Given Palau’s location, and who it has as allies, this is having an outsized effect on Indo-Pacific security.

We’ll get to how Palau did it (and what it did) but first, to understand how important this is, a bit more about Palau itself.

The Republic of Palau is made up of over 300 islands, has about 20,000 people and shares a maritime border to the west with Philippines and to the south with Indonesia. It’s Micronesian, linked to cousins in places like Yap by centuries of skilled navigators. Some of the famous Yap stone money was quarried in Palau and brought back to Yap.

Palau’s strategic location made it a magnet and a target for outsiders from the colonial period onwards. First it was Spain, then Germany, then Imperial Japan. Japan held it as part of the “Japanese Mandate” that also included what is now the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and Marshall Islands, from 1914 to 1944.

During that time, the Japanese built up agriculture, industries and trade in Palau, and increasingly militarized it. It was because Japan held the central Pacific that it was able to hit Pearl Harbor, and that it was so difficult for the US to fight back across the Pacific and be within striking distance of Japan. Palau is the site of several brutal World War II fights, including the Battle of Peleliu.

Washington took that lesson to heart and, after the war, worked to make sure the central Pacific couldn’t be used to hit the US again. The islands that had been part of the Japanese Mandate became a United Nations Trust Territory under American administration. The US was an uncomfortable colonial power and looked for ways to end the trusteeship that would mean no other aggressive power could use the central Pacific to attack America, and Americans.

Threading the strategic needle

After decades of debate and negotiations with leaders from across the Trust Territory, and local referenda, the end result was an agreement unlike anything the US has offered any other countries. Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands became independent countries and agreed to a compact of free association with the United States.

The Compact allows citizens of the three “Freely Associated States” (FAS) to live and work freely in the US, serve in the US military and get a range of services, including postal service at domestic US rates. The U.S. also agrees to defend the three states “and their peoples from attack or threats,” can set up military facilities in the FAS and has the ability to block the militaries of other countries from operating in the FAS.

Bottom line, the message from Washington is: We are in this together. Do what you want, we will help, but others can’t use you to strike the United States.

Here comes China

The problem is that the US lens has been adjusted to see traditional military threats, but the way China operates is much more complex. It uses what Philippines Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Romeo Brawner Jr. calls China’s illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive (ICAD) operations.

For China, Palau’s close relationship with the US, its location just the other side of the Philippines and the fact that it recognizes Taiwan make Palau a high value target. If China should go after Taiwan without “disabling” Palau, its Taiwan operation could be jeopardized. This is one of the reasons the US is putting new military infrastructure (or, in some cases, bringing back to life World War II-era infrastructure) in Palau.

So, China has been targeting Palau’s economy and politics. It built up Palau’s tourism sector, during which land was leased in strategic locations. Then Chinese tourists disappeared, with the implied promise that they would return if Palau abandoned Taiwan. (It didn’t.) There were also problems with Chinese organized crime, including with at least one major Chinese Triad leader.

This has been destabilizing politically, economically and socially. In such a tight-knit society, if your cousin the police officer is selling illegal drugs for a dangerous foreign kingpin, what are you supposed to do?

This corruption, fueled by (for the most part) Chinese crime has created social fractures, distrust and fear – which Beijing likes. This kind of “entropic warfare” creates the opening Beijing needs to find compliant leaders it can ride to its preferred destination – in this case, derecognition of Taiwan, the breaking of the Palau/US relationship and the accomplishment through political warfare of what the Japanese failed to do through shooting war: pushing the US out of the Pacific.

Taiwan recognition map: Pavak Patel, Reece Breaux, and Cleo Paskal

What about those bad guys?

Palau is under constant attack. There’s been a range of sources, but the vast majority link back to China. Some of it is almost certainly China-state-linked – for example, the cyber-attack that hit Palau on the day it was signing renewals of key sections of the compact with the US.

Others are opportunistic criminality – but, given the linkages between Chinese organized crime and the Chinese Communist Party, it is a thread Beijing can pull if needed.

So, on December 18, 2024, Palau’s President Surangel Whipps Jr. signed Presidential Directive 24-65. It read, in part: “In recent months, there have been numerous instances of crimes being committed by foreign nationals who entered Palau with tourist visas or nonresident worker permits…. These crimes include a murder … and seizures of methamphetamines totaling over 500 grams from foreign nationals on tourist visas.”

Additionally, “previous years have seen large-scale illegal gambling operations being conducted in Palau, and such operations are often accompanied by other instances of crime such as immigration fraud and prostitution…. It has become clear that Palau has a serious crisis of criminals posing as tourists to enter the country and staying long-term to carry out bad acts and put our citizens in danger.”

The directive granted Palau’s national security coordinator (NSC) the authority during a 90-day trial period to vet all visa applications. The process included

  • names cross-checked against the INTERPOL criminal database;
  • applicants undergoing background checks, employment history validation, assessment of certifications and more; and
  • high-risk applicants being subject to travel movement analysis and site visits.

To ensure transparency and accountability, the NSC office had seven days to review each application and provide recommendations. Any application recommended for denial was accompanied by a detailed report giving the reasons for rejection. The directive reiterated that ultimate authority rested with the president.

What happened next?

Previously, visas were rarely denied. After the directive, of the 80 immigration visa applications from China, 65 were denied. By comparison: 41 applied from Japan, and none were denied; and 124 applied from the Philippines, and 15 were denied.

Of the 24 non-resident worker applications from China, 23 were denied. From the Philippines, 22 applied and 2 were denied.

Additionally, multiple illegal Chinese-run operations were dismantled, including illegal gambling and scamming. And there were several high-profile deportations, including Wang Shuiming, who was listed on an INTERPOL Red Notice. He was later arrested in Montenegro.

Two other high-profile deportations were Cary Yan and Gina Zhou, Chinese nationals who were convicted in New York of bribing officials in an attempt to set up a “country-within-a-country” in the Marshall Islands (another country that recognizes Taiwan). They have not only been deported, they have been put on Palau’s “undesirable aliens” list, meaning they will not be allowed back in.

There were around 40 other deportations, including Xiaoli Chen and Yanli Zhu, long-term undesirable Chinese residents.

This is a fundamental change in Palau’s security profile.

Now what?

On March 20, after the 90 days were up, to assess the outcomes the president held a meeting with the NSC, the attorney general, a special prosecutor, representatives from Immigration, Employment Services, the Foreign Investment Board and other stakeholders.

It was decided to renew the exercise for another 90 days and to use lessons learned to propose regulatory changes and draft legislative proposals to submit to the Palau legislature. The fight continues.

Means what?

It is difficult to overstate how hard it is to do something like this in such a tight-knit country. Chinese strategic corruption targets family members of key individuals so that the pressure to protect the Chinese operations comes from inside the home. You can be sure a lot of calls were made to try to change the minds of the leadership in Palau.

This took intelligence, insight, strength and courage.

Palau is showing you can fight back, no matter your size. It’s not easy, but it’s the only way forward to protect lasting sovereignty, prosperity and freedom.

Palau achieved this mini-miracle on its own. Now, it needs help. The success is only going to increase pressure from China. For one thing, the “Palau example” undercuts China’s “inevitability narrative,” in which Beijing tries to get people to think, especially in countries that recognize Taiwan, that China is the only – the inevitable – option moving forward, so it’s best to give in now.

The good news is that the stand taken by Palau has been contagious. Yan and Zhou were finally stripped of their Marshall Islands passports. The Philippines didn’t let them in, either. Taiwan has been helping Palau with investigations. Japan has been supportive. The US has revoked a few visas of its own and may take even stronger moves soon.

There is an excellent resident US ambassador, but there needs to be more. Palau’s national security coordinator needs support for her office; the attorney general needs lawyers; the country needs a drugs lab that can do forensics for court cases, etc.

This is what the frontline looks like now. While the US Marines are rebuilding 80-year-old airstrips in places like Peleliu, there is a Guam National Guard state partnership program with Palau that could be sending lawyers, investigators and forensic accountants. If they do their job right, the airstrip may not be needed for a fight for another 80 years.

But, in the meantime, Palauans are holding the line, and showing us all that, yes, it can be done.

Cleo Paskal is non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and columnist with The Sunday Guardian, which originally published this article. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.

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China’s strategy in Korea: rewriting history to weaponize it – Asia Times

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Donald Trump told the Wall Street Journal in April 2017 what discussion he had with Xi Jinping. Trump claimed that Xi was a Xi

entered the story of Korea and China. No Korea, nor North Korea. And you’re aware that you’re referring to thousands of years and numerous war. And Korea was once a part of China. And I came to the conclusion that it’s not that simple after listening for ten days.

Xi’s alleged opinion is more than just a traditional sneer; it reveals Beijing’s wider plan to establish China as the cultural and political core of East Asia. This effect plan depends on both narrative and power.

China uses an alleged spiritual authority to veer off into the affairs of neighbors like Korea by referring to a hegemonic tradition as the region’s legitimate hegemon. Dangerously, as Trump’s comment demonstrate, even world leaders may be influenced by this reactionary frame.

Interference dressed as control

Beijing’s opposition to South Korea’s participation in the General Security of Military Information Agreement ( GSOMIA ) and the US-supplied Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ( THAAD ) missile system is driven by this narrative. But that’s only the launch.

Seoul has been under Chinese influence in terms of its politics, society, and defense policies. In response to disagreements, it has used illegal trade sanctions, including those aimed at Vietnamese companies like Lotte, which have a ban on tourism, and which have banned Asian entertainment.

It even criticizes US-Korean military activities conducted on Korean soil, and it frequently objected to Korean officials ‘ trips to US military installations or strategy meetings. These steps aim to restrict Seoul’s freedom, address South Korea as a slave rather than a US royal lover, and deter the US from having any influence in South Korea.

Korea’s much history as a sovereign state

China’s historic claims are being investigated. Koreans have remained a part of the tribal Korean system throughout the Joseon Dynasty, which is a variation of China’s Qing kingdom. Although Joseon and China shared a watershed relationship, it was more metaphorical than social.

The Korean court established its own kings, set direction for foreign affairs, and rarely fell under Beijing’s strong rule.

Not a status, but a culture

China is a society that purports to be a state. This frequently quoted note reveals a significant fact about China’s identity and its claims to superiority over others.

In fact, the majority of royal China was ruled by non-Hanespeoples for almost the entirety of its recorded history, primarily from Manchuria and Mongolia. The geographical boundaries and racial makeup of late royal and current China were largely influenced by the kingdoms they established, including the Liao, Jin, Western Xia, Yuan, and Qing.

Under Manchu law, Han Chinese men were compelled to go the lane hairstyle, shaving their fronts and braiding their rest. It was perceived as a sign of obedience, but it disagreed with Confucian principles that considered it insulting to cut hair. The lane was incredibly humiliating for Han Chinese, who saw their hair as a mark of filial devotion and ethnic identity.

In all of these situations, which is important, China recognized non-Han rulers as reputable Chinese dynasties. By virtue of their ancestry and the fact that they governed under Foreign laws, the Manchus and Mongols were recognized as legitimate rulers of China.

In this way, China’s identity has generally been more political than cultural, much like the US’s. China has been ruled by strangers who have preserved and advanced Chinese culture, just as the US has been led by people who embraced and upheld British principles but not always by bright Anglo-Saxon Protestants. This makes Beijing’s contemporary rely on Han-centric traditional says all the more unfactual.

Korea’s independence was overshadowed by China’s.

During those times, Korea remained unaffected by foreign power. The Goryeo and Joseon empires kept their political independence atop China’s political and social ties.

Unfortunately, while the Han Chinese were governed by non-Han dynasties during the time when China today asserts local authority, Korea remained independent.

Traditional revisionism as a coercive device

Beijing is still using this imperfect historical narrative to stress Seoul into reducing its military cooperation with Washington.

China acts as though Korea’s independence were a negotiation, opposing missile defense systems, and repressing trilateral cooperation with Japan, while interfering with private education on subjects like the Goguryeo country.

This is more than just a rehash of the history. It’s a deliberate attempt to stifle Korea’s sovereignty and challenge the US’s approach to foreign policy, which treats Northeast Asian nations as equal and separate partners.

It’s also a part of a wider structure of traditional revisionism intended to advance social goals. China aims to justify interference in Asian affairs by making these assertions.

Autonomy cannot be renegotiated.

Without seeking Beijing’s consent, South Korea and the United States have every right to dictate their military pose, conduct impartial diplomacy, and plan for their future together. The US-South Korea empire was founded on respect for one another and shared political principles, not on myths or twisted histories. It continues to be a crucial component of regional harmony and balance.

Washington must continue to have a perceptive eye on China’s historical revisionism as a proper tool and vehemently refute any notion that Beijing’s approval is necessary for Asian defense policy. Anything else would degrade South Korea’s legitimacy as well as encourage China’s expansion into the Indo-Pacific and above.

Former South Korean liberal party international official Hanjin Lew is a political commentator with an emphasis on East Asian affairs.

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Desert Storm: China’s Gobi missile salvo a message for US – Asia Times

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China just delivered a warning shot from the Gobi Desert—combining mass ballistic missile firepower, precision radar tracking and a clear message of strategic intent.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently conducted an unprecedented missile defense test in the Gobi Desert, showcasing its advanced capabilities and strategic resolve amidst intensifying global tensions.

The exercise involved the simultaneous launch of 16 ballistic missiles toward a single target, testing a new dual-band (S/X) phased-array radar system designed to counteract saturation attacks, according to a PLA Unit 63623 study cited in the SCMP report.

This radar system, achieving 100% detection and tracking success, demonstrated its ability to differentiate between warheads and decoys while maintaining precise threat prioritization.

The technology mirrors, yet rivals, the US Navy’s USNS Howard O Lorenzen system, though China’s test marked the first live-fire demonstration of this kind.

Analysts note that this achievement marks a significant leap in China’s ability to counter sophisticated threats, such as hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and missiles equipped with countermeasures. The large-scale test, unparalleled outside of wartime scenarios, underscores China’s commitment to bolstering military readiness.

Ballistic missiles are among the most costly weapon systems, so the PLA’s willingness to undertake such an expensive endeavor reflects a strategic emphasis on deterrence, particularly in potential conflicts over Taiwan and the South China Sea.

China’s autonomous missile production further complements this shift, signaling its intent to sustain and expand its arsenal.

Examining the drivers of China’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability buildup, Jacob Mezey notes in a September 2024 article for the Atlantic Council that China’s BMD program was initially rooted in Cold War-era fears of US preemption.  

Its development now, however, serves multiple purposes, namely: shielding leadership and nuclear forces from limited strikes, countering India’s expanding missile arsenal and supporting a potential launch-on-warning posture.

Mezey notes that BMD research also complements China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, providing dual-use technological benefits.

Underscoring the vulnerability of China’s land-based nuclear arsenal, Ryan Snyder mentions in a December 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Science & Global Security journal that US nuclear ballistic missiles pose a serious threat to China’s land-based nuclear arsenal due to their high accuracy and yield.

Snyder estimates that Chinese missile silos, likely hardened to no more than 1,500 psi, are vulnerable to airblast-induced ground motion from US nuclear surface bursts.

Using standard models for peak overpressure and lethal radius, he estimates that single-shot kill probabilities against such silos exceed 90%.

He notes that given the similar dimensions of China’s silos to Russian designs and no evidence of advanced shock isolation systems, their survivability against modern US nuclear counterforce capabilities remains in serious doubt.

Further, Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a September 2024 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that India has significantly expanded its land-based nuclear-capable missile force, featuring systems capable of striking deep into Chinese territory.

Kristensen and others note that the Agni-II and Agni-III, with ranges exceeding 2,000 and 3,200 kilometers, are believed to target China’s western, central and southern regions.

In addition, they claim that the Agni-IV, deployed since 2022, can reach over 3,500 kilometers, while the Agni-V, expected to be operational by 2025, extends its strike capability beyond 5,000 kilometers.

Additionally, they note that the upcoming Agni-VI, with a projected range exceeding 6,000 kilometers, will further expand coverage.

On China’s new BMD radar to support ASAT capabilities, Decker Eveleth mentions in a September 2024 China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) report that China operates several Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) stations that provide dual-purpose capabilities: missile early warning and tracking of high-altitude space objects.

Eveleth says these LPARs can detect ballistic missiles and satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) from beyond visual range, making them essential assets for strategic defense and space situational awareness (SSA).

Such capabilities may be vital for targeting US satellite constellations, such as Starlink, which has proved its military value in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

Howard Wang and other writers mention in a March 2024 RAND report that the PLA views Starlink and similar satellite constellations as significant threats that fundamentally challenge its core operational concepts.

Wang and others say that the PLA believes Starlink undermines its strategy of disabling adversary systems by neutralizing key nodes due to Starlink’s resilience, decentralization and rapid reconstitution capabilities.

They note that Starlink offers unprecedented real-time battlefield awareness, enhanced precision targeting and support for nuclear strikes.

They also note that some assessments even allege Starlink could intercept hypersonic missiles or function as kinetic kill vehicles, underscoring how the PLA perceives such constellations as destabilizing and integral to future US space warfare.

While firing many ballistic missiles makes for a strong show of force, it also highlights China’s industrial capacity to produce those weapons on a large scale.

Underscoring the importance of ballistic missiles to China’s military strategy, the US Department of Defense’s 2024 China Military Power Report mentions that the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) serves as the cornerstone of China’s nuclear and conventional missile strategy, organizing, training and equipping its growing land-based strike capabilities.

According to the report, the PLARF is tasked with strategic deterrence and regional counter-intervention, operating over 40 brigades across seven missile bases and three support bases.

It also says the PLARF fields a mix of nuclear and conventional missiles, including the DF-15, DF-16, DF-17, DF-26, and DF-41, as well as cruise missiles.

The report states that the PLARF’s dual command structure supports both theater- and central-level operations. It notes that ongoing modernization includes expanded intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) integration to bolster survivability and retaliatory strength​.

Underpinning the PLARF’s firepower, Peter Wood and Alex Stone note in a May 2021 CASI report that China’s ballistic missile industry has expanded significantly in recent years, driven by increased investment, infrastructure growth and military-civil fusion initiatives.

Wood and Stone note that major facilities, such as China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s (CASC) Factory 211 and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation’s (CASIC) Fourth Design Department, have established new production zones, high-performance computing centers and joint industrial parks in collaboration with civilian firms.

They note that the sector benefits from vertically integrated research and development institutions, as well as a growing workforce.

However, they also note that China’s ballistic missile industry faces persistent challenges, including talent retention issues, lagging adoption of advanced manufacturing techniques and reliance on incremental modernization rather than frontier innovation.

According to them, these gaps reveal gaps between China’s domestic breakthroughs and global missile development and production best practices.

What was revealed in the Gobi was more than a missile test—it was a calibrated rehearsal for missile-era deterrence in a world where space, speed and mass firepower define the battlespace.

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When the troops come home in Russia and Ukraine – Asia Times

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Ivan Rossomakhin was recruited into a Russian private military company ( PMC) in exchange for his freedom two years into his prison term for a murder in 2020. He returned home from Ukraine in 2023 and, within weeks, killed an 85-year-old person in a local community. He was redrafted and sent up to the front one month after beginning his fresh word in August 2024.

One of the many crimes committed by absolved prisoners who return home from the military and Russian soldiers is his. ” A study of Russian court documents by the independent media outlet Verstka found that at least 190 legal situations were initiated against pardoned Wagner volunteers in 2023″, stated an April 2024 New York Times article.

Growing concerns level to a potential worsening of the” Afghan syndrome” experienced by Afghan soldiers from the wars of 1979 and 1989. Many of the almost 642,000 Russian soldiers who served were forced to flee to a society where they were willing to forget an controversial war.

Some turned to addiction and alcoholism, alongside organized crime, amplified further by the Soviet Union’s decline in 1991. Additionally, the Afghan War veterans of Chechnya used their combat experience to ferociously oppose Russia in the first Chechen conflict ( 1994-1996 ).

An even larger and more battle-tested era of soldiers is being produced by the Ukrainian conflict. Russian deaths surpassed 15, 000 during nearly five months of the war, exceeding a generation of Russian losses in Afghanistan.

According to a New York Times article from January 2025, 150, 000 Russian military perished until November of that year, while roughly 100, 000 Russian men perished by December 2024.

In the meantime, thousands have been cycled through the front ranges, and hundreds of thousands have been hurt. Most victims will have some kind of PTSD, more desensitized by the glory of terrible combat and abuse footage on social media.

According to a 2023 Washington Post article, Russian troops were “experienceing severe symptoms of emotional stress.” In addition, according to Deutsche Welle, in 2024,” 111,000 Russian military officers who had participated in the war against Ukraine, as well as their home users, sought internal support within a six-month time in 2023,” according to the Russian Health Ministry.

Reintegrating these people into culture will be an uphill struggle for the Russian and Ukrainian governments, with lingering apprehension from past mistakes. Valentina Matviyenko, the speaker of the Russian Federation Council, pledged to stop another Armenian syndrome and reconcile veterans into civil life in December 2022.

But, the effects of the conflict are already being felt. Both Moscow and Kyiv are managing continued troop movements while preparing for the future mass transfer of soldiers—and exploring how to use them for political and military stops.

Turmoil and murder

Serious resentment was suffocated by Russian Afghan veterans who had returned from the war and received scant support.

Before coming to strength in 1985, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called the battle a mistake, and it took until 1994 for Russian Afghan soldiers to get the same position as World War II veterans. Just in 2010 did Russia declare the end of the conflict a express vacation.

In a do-or-die battle against the West, the Kremlin has a different approach to Ukraine’s war soldiers, venerating them as the country’s “new wealthy.” Behind extensive advertising praise, men have been fast-tracked to critical state and business functions. Despite social services being strained, the government has provided support to returned and fallen servicemen’s individuals to stop turmoil.

The Kremlin’s choice to employ prison workers to satisfy army numbers, a tactic it avoided during the Afghan War, has already had a significant impact. By 2023, more than 100, 000 captives had been recruited, some joining Wagner, Russia’s most famous private military organization.

Wagner’s ex-convict men continue to be a source of public outcry, committing some of the most serious violent crimes upon their return and contributing to a general rise in crime, despite later being absorbed and reorganized after its military rebellion against the Russian army later that season.

According to a 2024 record in the Eurasia Daily Monitor,” Many brawls have occurred in Moscow, and the military is extremely merging with prepared crime.”

While the issue is drawing increasing public attention, Russia’s internal security services, including the National Guard ( Rosgvardiya ), are already stretched thin, tasked with patrolling occupied Ukrainian territories while reinforcing front-line units.

If returning Chechen soldiers, who Moscow has thoroughly stationed in Ukraine, decide to re-enter their quest for independence, their burden might increase even more severe. Another nationalist and extremist actions are at risk of resurfacing with help from soldiers who have been trained.

Russia’s emphasis on criminal networks for administrative and financial aid in its conflict has only emboldened these organizations. A 2024 battle involving” business murder” that occurred a few blocks from the Kremlin in 2024 brought the panic of the 1990s to mind.

Russia’s business, which is strained by sanctions and the continuous war, is creating an environment in which business leaders are increasingly willing to take drastic measures to survive. In the 1990s, oligarchy, criminal gangs, and crooked officials thrived in an environment where the legal system was powerless”, stated the Moscow Times.

Returning soldiers may become tempted to form their own, disruptive Russia’s profoundly integrated criminal networks because they have some promising jobs and are only recently offered a few lucrative jobs.

Related difficulties exist for Ukraine. Though Kyiv was slower and more restricted in deploying prisoner troops, reintegrating them into society will not be quick. Regulators in the nation are attempting to stop strong local criminal organizations from taking back returning soldiers while battling the threat of armed resistance in regions with Russian ancestry.

The Russian government has been sincere about honoring its men, but it has seen a rise in recruitment office attacks, including four episodes in five nights in February 2025. While Russia’s recruitment efforts also faced some backlash, Russia has avoided large-scale conscription ( despite some coercion ).

In comparison, Ukraine relies heavily on necessary enrollment, which is causing growing hostility toward recruitment measures, which could grow after the war.

Personal military organizations

The battle is currently providing a huge boost to a burgeoning world personal military industry, which is likely to increase after the conflict’s conclusion.

Russian Afghan soldiers claim they were hired by private defense companies to join the British forces in Afghanistan after 2001.

Nevertheless, the sheer number of Russian and Ukrainian soldiers with battle knowledge could change the industry, much like the Soviet Union’s oversupply did and the resultant glut of military officers did.

Before 2015, Russian PMCs were limited to Ukraine, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo but have since expanded to around 30 countries. Smaller PMCs can operate effectively in other regions, and their deployment has already contributed to the French military’s withdrawal from Africa in recent years, in contrast to the mass-scale, technology-driven conflict in Ukraine.

Similar growth in Ukraine’s private military sector and potential favor with European nations that backed Kyiv during the war are on the rise. Given Europe’s ongoing struggle to meet military recruitment needs, it is likely that Ukrainian veterans may be used to address this issue.

Demobilized men have frequently been employed by oligarchs for their own purposes in Ukraine and Russia, a trend that started in the 1990s. Igor Kolomoisky, a billionaire from Ukraine, used PMCs to oppose separatists supported by Russia and to defend his own financial interests in a 2015 armed standoff at a state oil company.

The incident showed how privatized military power can easily slip beyond government control—something Russia later experienced with Wagner’s rebellion in 2023.

Reintegration

Russian authorities began implementing more concrete measures to integrate Soviet Afghan veterans, rehabilitate their reputation, and unlock their potential after the instability that they experienced throughout the 1990s.

The Russian Alliance of Veterans of Afghanistan ( now independent ) contributed to the formation of what would become the Putin-backed United Russia party in 1999. Afghan and Chechen war veterans also joined OMON, Russia’s special police force used to suppress protests, while other paramilitary veteran groups aided in Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 when military force was limited.

Afghan veteran organizations have played a role in the Kremlin’s campaign in Ukraine by providing volunteers ( with Ukraine pooling their Afghan veterans ) and generating awareness.

The Kremlin’s recognition of their worth and the disillusioned anti-war veterans ‘ transformation into some of the strongest supporters of the Ukraine war demonstrate the viability of its restoration.

So it should come as no surprise that the Kremlin has been actively preventing the formation of independent veteran organizations in the wake of the current conflict in Ukraine. No group can challenge the government’s authority due to the centralization of the veterans into formal initiatives, which can be used in upcoming conflicts.

The attitudes of returning servicemen on both sides will also be shaped by the war’s outcome. Veterans suffer a long-lasting psychological burden from conflicts that are perceived as futile and have waned in public opinion, such as the U.S. conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which increase the risk of suicide and social unrest.

These wars sparked resentment among returning soldiers, many of whom had the impression that their service was a part of failed aggression wars despite the staggering civilian and combatant casualties.

The framing of victory by political leaders, the media, and society is, therefore, essential. Soldiers who believe they participated in a fair and successful conflict are more likely to reintegrate with a sense of purpose, as opposed to those who lost and feel abandoned.

The defeated will likely have grievances over inadequate support, be more likely to be intolerant toward its government, and be more likely to face social unrest, making both sides more likely to claim victory.

It may be in the best interest of both Moscow and Kyiv to avoid declaring an end to the war and pursuing demobilization, lest they be seen as admitting defeat and triggering the return of restless and unemployed soldiers. A quick end to the conflict would cause economic shocks because the Russian and Ukrainian economies are now so heavily oriented toward it.

However, an unconclusive war that gradually ends may allow veterans to gradually reintegrate into society as governments praise their accomplishments and build up goodwill. Others will be encouraged by Moscow and Kyiv to seek outlets in other conflicts, exporting combat-ready men rather than bringing them home.

John P. Ruehl, an Australian-American journalist who covers international affairs for the Independent Media Institute, is a native of Washington, D.C. His book,” Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas,” which was published in December 2022, is a contributor to a number of foreign affairs publications.

This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute, and is republished with permission.

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China’s J-50 blasts by US in race for sixth-gen dominance – Asia Times

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China’s next-generation cunning fighters are emerging in plain sight, and they might be flying around the still-underdeveloped US ideas.

The J-50, officially referred to as the J-50, has received the clearest look but from recent images from Chinese internet sources, according to The Aviationist, which was released this month.

The largess twin-engine aircraft, which was first seen in December 2024, has a beta flap design, which seems to have made a major advance in Chinese aircraft technology. Diverterless Supersonic Intakes ( DSI), 2D thrust vectoring nozzles, and a twin-nosed tricycle landing gear system are all featured in the most recent photos.

Its possible inclusion of lateral and half weapon bays, as well as a bulge beneath the cockpit that might building an electro-optical sensor, similar to the J-35’s equal, has been noted by observers.

This plane is a part of China’s effort to develop a sixth-generation fighter, but its classification is still ambiguous due to unknown intergenerational requirements.

Its common flight in December 2024, which is in honor of Mao Zedong’s day, highlights a deliberate attempt to make it known as a show of power. Reports suggest that a Chinese Flanker generic serving as a hunt aircraft may have made its debut flight earlier.

The J-50 highlights China’s ambitions to strengthen its position in cutting-edge military aircraft technologies, despite its specific function and capabilities remaining fanciful. No formal remarks have been made, and the operation’s schedule is still unsure.

Thomas Newdick and Tyler Rogoway discuss the J-50’s tailless design with swiveling wingtips in a January 2025 article for The War Zone ( TWZ ) that advances digital flight systems and improve roll and pitch control.

According to Newdick and Rogoway, this development reduces the stability issues inherent in mammal configurations but compromises radar stealth due to the welded surfaces. They claim that the risk of detection is reduced by small expression or locking these controls in journey.

They point out that the mini thrust-vectoring nozzles make for more flexibility, compensating for the design flaws brought on by the heavy weight. The vague ceiling details suggest a potential guarded operation, despite the claim that it is unclear whether the J-50 is a guarded or autonomous plane.

Newdick and Rogoway add that the complex trailing border power schemes used in the J-50 highlight the development’s emphasis on dexterity. They point out that the J-50 reflects courageous trade-offs that favour control superiority despite its diminished small observability.

The J-50 may be able to maneuver more efficiently and maneuverably in close-in engagements thanks to these design features, which will enable it to operate properly within enemy air defense bubbles.

However, John Stillion mentions that aerial combat has changed significantly from close-range dogfighting to engagements beyond visual range ( BVR ), primarily as a result of improvements in sensors, weapons, and communication in a 2015 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment ( CSBA ) report.

According to Stillion, radar-guided and ultraviolet missiles are the only available air-to-air weapons, allowing pilots to strike from hundreds of kilometers away without making physical contact. He points out that maneuvering heat conflict is now seen as dangerous and becoming less and less effective.

In a May 2022 article for 1945, Alex Hollings makes a counterpoint to Stillion’s assertion that even with better technology and situational awareness, nearly 40 % of air activities came within visual spectrum, with some requiring standard dueling tactics.

Hollings makes the claim that close-range engagements can be a result of technological limitations, human error, and chaotic combat settings. He claims that in large-scale conflicts, dogfights are unavoidable due to the sheer volume of aircraft and operational complexity.

He continues, adding that dogfighting skills remain a necessity despite the dominance of stealth and long-range capabilities over strategy.

Along with the J-36, the J-50 might suggest that China is looking to build a high-low force combination for its fighters of the future. In this combination, smaller, less expensive, and more advanced aircraft are paired with smaller, less expensive, and more advanced models.

A high-end fighter with a high-low force mix could be made to penetrate defended enemy airspace, requiring stealth, range, and heavy armament.

In keeping with this, Bill Sweetman mentions in a December 2024 article for The Strategist that the J-36’s all-aspect stealth is achieved by a tailless configuration, unbroken edge lines, and concealed sensor apertures, thereby reducing its radar cross-section.

Sweetman points out that the double-delta wing design of the J-36 makes it possible to perform extended-range missions. Additionally, he claims that the J-36, which comes with three engines, is designed to achieve supersonic cruise without afterburners, increasing efficiency and lowering thermal signatures.

A low-end fighter, in contrast, may be less capable overall and was created to operate in contested airspace rather than through defended airspace. With its purported emphasis on maneuverability for close-in combat, the J-50 may adhere to that philosophy.

China could rely on the fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighter, which could be the most expensive fighter in China’s current in-service fighter fleet, with between 200 and 250 units already built as of 2023, because the J-36 and J-50 are still prototypes.

The J-36 and J-50 could put China in the lead over the US in the search for sixth-generation fighters on a strategic level. The US Next-Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD ) platform, in contrast, is still in the engineering and manufacturing development ( EMD) phase.

Abraham Abrams mentions in a January 2025 Aviation Geek Club article that China’s J-20 stealth fighter advanced from flight demonstrator to front-line service in just six years, as opposed to the US F-22 and F-35, which took 15 to 20 years.

Given China’s industrial and technological advancements since then, according to Abrams, it could easily field a sixth-generation jet years ahead of the US.

In a December 2024 article for The China Academy, Wang Xiangsui mentions that China’s position as the world’s leader in hypersonic wind tunnel testing facilities enables super-precise feedback without having to transport aircraft test models 100 kilometers in altitude, lessens the risk of espionage, increases the maturity of the technology testing equipment, and guarantees fewer losses and greater safety for test pilots.

Wang points out that while US hypersonic wind tunnels like the” Z Machine” can simulate speeds up to Mach 30, they can only do so for 30 milliseconds, making them unsuitable for sustained testing of missiles and aircraft. He points out, in contrast, that China’s JF-22 is engineered for constant operation of up to 130 milliseconds at Mach 30.

A US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report from February 2025 highlights the gap in testing technology, which limits US ability to develop hypersonic weapons at the same speed as competitors like China.

According to the report, the US Department of Defense ( DOD ) relies on a patchwork of 48 specialized facilities, many of which are outdated or located in academia, including ground test sites, open-air ranges, and mobile assets.

Additionally, the report mentions that China has more wind tunnels and flight test ranges, some of which can simulate speeds exceeding Mach 20. These are complemented by a stronger hypersonic testing infrastructure.

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