Bolen C (Page 23)

President-elect Donald Trump has reaffirmed that once he takes office, he plans to declare a national emergency and use the military on American streets to accomplish his promises to round up and deport millions of undocumented migrants.

Many experts’ concerns about this program have included the facts that immigrants contribute enormous value to the US economy and mass deportation would hurt food production, housing construction and other crucial industries. Other scholars have analyzed how deportation traumatizes families.

I have an additional concern about a renewed focus on deportation as someone who has studied US domestic militias for more than 15 years: Some militia units may see it as their duty to assist with such efforts. In fact, local police may even deputize certain militias to help them deport immigrants.

Anti-government, but supporting national defense

Militias are generally wary of the government. They’ve even been known to use violence against politicians and other government representatives, including police. I have found in my research that the militias’ disdain for the federal government is especially strong because they believe it is too big and corrupt and takes too much of their income through taxation.

But militia members’ negative beliefs about immigration and self-declared mission to protect the country could lead them to join a national mass-deportation effort. My research finds that militia members generally believe the falsehoods that undocumented migrants are a threat to public safety.

For some, my research finds, this perception is rooted in xenophobia and racism. Other militia members misunderstand what is required to obtain US citizenship: They believe that anyone who enters the country illegally is, by definition, a criminal and has therefore already proven their intention to not follow the laws and generally be a good American.

This is not true, because migrants may seek asylum regardless of their immigration status for up to a year after entering the country.

Members with both sets of motives believe that undocumented migrants are taking jobs away from more deserving citizens and are generally receiving unearned benefits from being in the country. Trump’s promises to crack down on immigration appeal to militia members of both types.

Militia members also believe that one of the few legitimate functions of the federal government as outlined by the Constitution is national defense. In that sense, those who believe migrants are an urgent threat could see the military’s involvement in a mass-deportation operation as consistent with a duty to defend the nation.

Most scholars agree that even if it were technically legal, domestic deployment of the military would be an alarming threat to democracy.

Active participation

Some militia units in border states have been engaged in deportation efforts for a long time. They typically patrol the border, sometimes detain migrants and regularly call the US Border Patrol to report their findings.

Border Patrol agents have historically expressed skepticism and concerns about militia involvement with border monitoring due to the unverifiable skills and motives of civilian support.

Some state, county and local police also do immigration enforcement, and in recent years they have seemed to become more open to civilian assistance.

Some local police agencies, particularly sheriffs, are already asking for civilian assistance managing perceived problems with migrants. Others have hosted anti-immigration events with militias who patrol the border under an effective, if not formal, deputization of their actions.

Militias may also be called on directly. In the past, Trump has directly addressed militias. The most cited example is his instruction in a September 29, 2020, presidential debate, directing the Proud Boys to “stand back and stand by.” People had similar interpretations of his comments in advance of the January 6, 2021, insurrection.

But I have long believed these appeals started much earlier. In 2018 Trump pardoned the men who inspired the Bundy family occupation and standoff at the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon. I believe that was an early attempt to garner support from people in militia circles.

[embedded content]

A volatile combination

The military has already been getting involved in immigration enforcement in unprecedented ways.

In early 2024, Texas Governor Greg Abbott claimed the US Border Patrol was not protecting his state from an “invasion” from would-be immigrants. He deployed his state’s National Guard to an area of the border, blocking the Border Patrol from working in that section. That blockade continues.

In a second term, Trump has little incentive to restrain his rhetoric or his actions. The Supreme Court has ruled that presidents have broad immunity from criminal prosecution for actions taken while in office.

Even if he does not directly appeal to private citizens to control the border or detain people whom they believe to be undocumented migrants, his official presence and hard-line stance on immigration may be enough to provide legitimacy to vigilante action.

In November 2024, two militia members were convicted of a variety of federal offenses, including conspiracy to murder federal agents, for a plot to kill Border Patrol agents whom the men believed were failing to adequately protect the border from crossing migrants.

Not all militia members support mass deportation, especially if it involves unconstitutionally deploying military forces on US soil. That’s clear from my research.

“The military is the military, and law enforcement is law enforcement,” one militia member replied when I asked some of my long-term contacts for their perspectives on Trump’s declaration to use the military. “They are separate for a reason.”

This man believes undocumented migrants pose dangers – but thinks shifting the military’s role would be even more harmful. Not all militia members are so circumspect.

Amy Cooter is director of research, academic development and innovation at the Center on Terrorism, Extremism and Counterterrorism, Middlebury

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

China’s rapid economic growth, accompanied by an equally swift expansion of its military over the past 30 years, has elevated it from a regional power to a global powerhouse.

The 2023 US Department of Defense Annual Report titled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” acknowledged China as the only competitor with the capacity to reshape the international order, cementing its status as a superpower.

At the heart of China’s strategy for national rejuvenation lies the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to expand global transportation and trade linkages essential for its sustained growth and development. This strategy is intertwined with China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) concept, ensuring that economic advancements can simultaneously bolster its military capacity, creating dual-purpose applications.

Among the six economic corridors under the BRI, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor—later rebranded as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)—is pivotal. CMEC links China’s Yunnan province to the Chinese-built Kyaukphyu deep-sea port in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, providing direct access to the Bay of Bengal.

This corridor is a cornerstone of China’s efforts to overcome the “Malacca Dilemma,” ensuring secure energy supplies and the steady flow of natural resources vital for its economic stability. CMEC also aligns with China’s “String of Pearls” strategy—a network of logistic support points in the Indian Ocean—and complements its “Two-Ocean” strategy.

Given this, it is imperative for China to maintain Myanmar within its sphere of influence to keep CMEC operational, regardless of who governs the country. However, recent developments suggest that China may be placing its bets on the wrong horse.

History of hedging

Historically, China has hedged its influence in Myanmar by simultaneously supporting the Myanmar military (MM) and various ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) along its border.

For decades these EROs have fought MM for greater autonomy and at times China has brokered ceasefire agreements between them all just to maintain a stable trading environment and to safeguard its investments in the region.

Initially, following the Myanmar military’s coup in 2021, China refrained from openly backing the junta (State Administrative Council – SAC). However, as Myanmar’s Spring Revolution gained momentum and battlefield dynamics shifted, China’s position evolved.

The emergence of People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) across the country forced Myanmar’s military to stretch its troops thin, simultaneously battling multiple EROs and PDFs.

The turning point came during Operation 1027, where the military lost significant territory in northern Shan state to the EROs. Simultaneously, the Arakan Army (AA) gained substantial ground in Rakhine state, surrounding the strategic Kyaukphyu port. In Kachin state, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) achieved unprecedented success against the military.

Faced with these developments, China adjusted its approach and began openly supporting the military regime. This shift was marked by Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyidaw in August 2024 and culminated in junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to China in November 2024—his first since the coup.

China has also pressured border-sharing EROs, such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), by closing border gates and disrupting trade, urging them to avoid collaborating with PDFs or National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel exile government.

Additionally, China agreed to deploy private security forces to protect its economic investments in Myanmar, akin to other mercenary groups like the Wagner Group.

Risks of backing the junta

China’s support for the SAC could backfire in the long run. The Myanmar military regime is teetering on collapse—it’s only a matter of time. EROs that don’t share borders with China, such as the AA, Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), and Chin groups, remain beyond China’s direct influence.

Even border-sharing EROs like the TNLA and MNDAA have continued fighting the military despite ceasefire agreements. This persistence stems from the military’s repeated failure to honor agreements, eroding trust.

Furthermore, EROs recognize that true autonomy and security are unattainable under any Myanmar military regime. Many see their best chance in a federal democratic Myanmar.

Unofficial reports suggest that EROs and the NUG may have reached a consensus on this vision, even if geopolitical sensitivities have delayed a formal announcement.

The SAC is deeply unpopular among Myanmar’s citizens. Beyond its illegitimacy, life under its rule has become increasingly unbearable due to economic hardships. For the first time in 60 years, the Myanmar military is despised even by the Bamar ethnic majority in central Myanmar.

NUG a better bet

In contrast, the NUG has taken a pragmatic approach to China, publicly committing to safeguard Chinese investments through its 10-point “Position on China” released on January 1, 2024.

Aligning with the NUG, which enjoys widespread domestic support, would not only stabilize Myanmar but also create a conducive environment for trade and investment, bolstering China’s BRI objectives. Moreover, such a move would earn China goodwill from ASEAN countries, which largely shun the SAC.

Min Aung Hlaing is an unreliable ally for China. He has previously courted Russia to counterbalance China’s influence, only to return to Beijing when Moscow couldn’t meet his needs. He has also covertly encouraged ultranationalists to stage anti-China protests in Myanmar, highlighting his duplicitous nature.

The Myanmar military, as an institution, harbors historical animosity toward China due to its battles against Chinese-backed Burmese Communist Party troops in the 1970s and 1980s.

Strategic opportunity

With the prospect of a hawkish US administration under Donald Trump, China would benefit from cultivating broader international alliances. Aligning with the NUG, which possesses greater legitimacy than the SAC, could enhance China’s global image and reputation.

China’s ambition for national rejuvenation and modernization by its centenary in 2049 demands long-term strategies over short term solutions. History demonstrates that regimes like the SAC, which lack popular support, are ultimately unsustainable.

China would do well to heed the adage, “He that lies down with dogs rises with fleas.” By recalibrating its stance on Myanmar, however, China has a rare opportunity to earn the goodwill of the Myanmar people at a pivotal moment—and at a bargain price.

Now is the time for China to act decisively. By distancing itself from the failing junta and embracing the NUG, China can secure its better global standing as well as a more stable and prosperous future for both itself and Myanmar. 

For China, to borrow Voltaire’s timeless wisdom: “With great power comes great responsibility.”  

Than N Oo is a Myanmar analyst and activist

Continue Reading

A ceasefire deal came into effect between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah in the early hours of November 26, bringing two months of hostilities in Lebanon to an end. The country’s main roads have since then been jammed as people rush back to what remains of their homes in the south.

The outgoing US president, Joe Biden, said the agreement is “designed to be a permanent cessation of hostilities.” He added: “What is left of Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations will not be allowed — will — I emphasize — will not be allowed to threaten the security of Israel again.” But what are the prospects of the deal actually holding?

Hezbollah continues to claim that it defeated the Israeli military in Lebanon and says its forces will ensure that the IDF adheres to the ceasefire. Israel, in a similar fashion, has claimed the right to respond to violations and has warned Lebanese citizens that they should stay away from frontline areas for now.

Hours before the deal came into effect, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said: “If Hezbollah violates the agreement and tries to arm itself, we will attack. If it tries to rebuild terrorist infrastructure near the border, we will attack. If it launches a rocket, if it digs a tunnel, if it brings in a truck carrying rockets, we will attack.” Indeed, Israeli tanks opened fire on “suspects” arriving with vehicles in a number of areas in southern Lebanon on Thursday.

But, while fragile, the truce may well last. John Strawson, an expert in Middle Eastern politics at the University of East London, says Israel’s military has inflicted immense damage on the group’s military organization. The fact that Hezbollah has entered a ceasefire with Israel at all, he argues, highlights its diminished capacity to take the fight to Israel.

Vanessa Newby of Leiden University in the Netherlands and Chiara Ruffa of Sciences Po in France have examined the specific details of the ceasefire deal. They explain that, despite superficially resembling previous arrangements in southern Lebanon, the new ceasefire agreement contains some critical differences.

Israel has managed to obtain a “letter of guarantee” from the US, recognizing Israeli freedom of action on Lebanese soil in the event of any attempt to strengthen Hezbollah. And eight NATO states (Canada, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US) will be involved in a new initiative that aims to reinforce the capacity and mobility of the Lebanese armed forces.

Newby and Ruffa write that the new ceasefire agreement promises a precarious peace in region, while simultaneously drawing Nato countries more deeply into the conflict.

This is not a view shared by Marika Sosnowski, a legal expert who studies the terms of ceasefires at the University of Melbourne in Australia. She argues that the terms of the ceasefire provide no details on what will happen at the end of the 60-day period.

And limiting Hezbollah’s ability to rearm during the ceasefire by, for example, demanding the closure of weapons production facilities in southern Lebanon could even expand the conflict.

Sosnowski explains that, since the start of the ceasefire, Israel has targeted sites on Lebanon’s border with Syria. This is a route that Hezbollah’s main backer, Iran, uses to channel weapons to the group.

Irrespective of whether the ceasefire in Lebanon holds, Strawson says that Netanyahu’s major achievement with the deal has been detaching the war in Gaza from the Lebanese front. Hamas may now have to accept the new reality that it is on its own, which leaves Netanyahu’s options in Gaza more open. He has already said the ceasefire will enable Israel to focus its efforts on Hamas fighters there.

Support for Israel’s actions in Gaza has dropped off over the course of the war. Palestinian health officials say the death toll has now surpassed 44,000, with over 100,000 more wounded. Around 90% of the population have been displaced, and hundreds of thousands of people are living in tent camps with little food, water or basic services.

Palestinian officials and rights groups have consistently accused Israeli forces of war crimes and crimes against humanity, a view that is shared by judges at the International Criminal Court (ICC). Following a long delay, the court last week issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, his former defense minister, Yoav Gallant, and Hamas military commander, Mohammed Deif.

The judges “found reasonable grounds to believe that they bear criminal responsibility … for the war crime of intentionally directing an attack against the civilian population”.

The decision marks the first time a leader of a Western country has been charged by the ICC. But, according to Catherine Gegout of the University of Nottingham, there is little chance that Netanyahu will appear at the Hague.

Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, who are also wanted for war crimes, have managed to evade the court’s grasp – despite traveling to states that are party to the ICC.

When peace will come to the Middle East, and what it will take to achieve it, remains anyone’s guess.

The fighting in Gaza over the past 12 months has already caused an immense amount of damage. The IDF has reduced much of the Gaza Strip to rubble, with nearly three-quarters of buildings in Gaza City estimated to have been damaged or destroyed. This has, unfortunately, included many of the enclave’s heritage sites.

Researchers Michael Fradley, Bill Finlayson and Andrew Peterson of Oxford and Bradford Universities have been developing a comprehensive inventory of these sites across Gaza. The war has, by their own assessment, damaged around 50% of them, with many structures nearly demolished.

This conflict will not eradicate the rich heritage of Gaza, they write. These buildings have been repeatedly restored and rebuilt over more than a century since the area was first devastated by modern warfare. And they will be again.

Sam Phelps is commissioning editor, International Affairs, The Conversation

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Earlier this month, China declared new “baselines” around Scarborough Shoal, a large coral atoll topped by a handful of rocks barely above sea level in the South China Sea. By doing so, China reaffirmed its sovereignty claim over what has become a global flashpoint in the disputed waters.

This was a pre-calculated response to the Philippines’ enactment of new maritime laws two days earlier that aimed to safeguard its own claims over the reef and other contested parts of the sea.

This legal tit-for-tat is a continuation of the ongoing sovereignty and maritime dispute between China and the Philippines (and others) in a vital ocean area through which one-third of global trade travels.

The Philippines rejected China’s declaration as a violation of its “long-established sovereignty over the shoal.” Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said:

What we see is an increasing demand by Beijing for us to concede our sovereign rights in the area.

As the tensions continue to worsen over these claims, there is an ever-increasing risk of an at-sea conflict between the two countries.

What is the Scarborough Reef?

Scarborough Shoal is called Huangyan Dao in Chinese and Bajo de Masinloc by the Philippines. It is located in the northeast of the South China Sea, about 116 nautical miles (215 kilometers) west of the Philippine island of Luzon and 448 nautical miles (830 kilometers) south of the Chinese mainland.

At high tide, it is reduced to a few tiny islets, the tallest of which is just 3 meters above the water. However, at low tide, it is the largest coral atoll in the South China Sea.

China asserts sovereignty over all of the waters, islands, rocks and other features in the South China Sea, as well as unspecified “historic rights” within its claimed nine-dash line. This includes Scarborough Shoal.

In recent years, the reef has been the scene of repeated clashes between China and the Philippines. Since 2012, China has blocked Filipino fishing vessels from accessing the valuable lagoon here. This prompted the Philippines to take China to international arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2013.

Three years later, an arbitration tribunal ruled that China has no historic rights to maritime areas where this would conflict with UNCLOS. The tribunal also concluded China had “unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal.”

China refused to participate in the arbitration case and has strongly rejected its ruling as being “null and void” and having “no binding force”.

What did China do this month?

China declared the exact location of the base points of its territorial claim around Scarborough Shoal with geographical coordinates (longitude and latitude), joined up by straight lines.

The declaration of so-called “baselines” is standard practice for countries that want to claim maritime zones along their coasts. Baselines provide the starting point for measuring these zones.

A country’s “territorial sea” is measured from this baseline outward to as far as 12 nautical miles (22km). Under the UNCLOS treaty, a country then has full sovereignty rights over this zone, covering the seabed, water, airspace and any resources located there.

Countries want their baselines to be as far out to sea as possible so they can maximize the ocean areas over which they can reap economic benefits and enforce their own laws.

China is no exception. Along with other countries (especially in Asia), it draws the most generous baselines of all – straight baselines. These can connect distant headlands or other coastal outcrops with a simple straight line, or even enclose nearshore islands.

China is especially fond of straight baselines. In 1996, it drew them along most of its mainland coast and around the Paracel Islands, a disputed archipelago in the South China Sea. China defined additional straight baselines this March in the Gulf of Tonkin up to its land border with Vietnam.

China says these actions comply with UNCLOS. However, its use of straight baselines around Scarborough Shoal conflicts with international law. This is because UNCLOS provides a specific rule for baselines around reefs, which China did not follow.

Based on our review of satellite imagery, however, China has only advanced the outer limit of its territorial sea by a few hundred meters in two directions. This is because its straight baselines largely hug the edge of the reef.

These new baselines around Scarborough Reef are, therefore, fairly conservative and enclose a dramatically smaller area than the US had feared. China’s declaration signals that it may have abandoned its much larger “offshore archipelago” claim to what it calls the Zhongsha Islands.

China has long asserted that Scarborough Shoal is part of this larger island group, which includes the Macclesfield Bank, a totally underwater feature 180 nautical miles (333 kilometers) to the west. This led to concern that Beijing might draw a baseline around this entire island group, claiming all the waters within exclusively for its use.

The South China Sea arbitration tribunal ruled that international law prohibits such claims. There will be a collective sigh of relief among many countries that China decided to make a much smaller claim over Scarborough Reef.

Significance and future steps?

However, China’s clarification of its baselines around the reef signals it may be more assertive in its law enforcement here.

The China Coast Guard has said it will step up patrols in the South China Sea to “firmly uphold order, protect the local ecosystem and biological resources and safeguard national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights.”

Given the long history of clashes related to fishing access around Scarborough Reef, this sets the scene for more confrontation.

And what about the biggest prize of all in the South China Sea – the Spratly Islands?

We can now expect China to continue its long, straight baselines march to this island group to the south. The Spratlys are an archipelago of more than 150 small islands, reefs, and atolls spread out over around 240,000 square kilometers of lucrative fishing grounds.

They are claimed by China, the Philippines, and several other countries. These countries can expect to protest any attempted encirclement of the Spratly Islands by new Chinese baselines.

Yucong Wang is lecturer at the University of Newcastle; Clive Schofield is professor at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, and Warwick Gullett is professor of law, University of Wollongong

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire not only achieves Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s minimal goals of driving the Shiite Muslim militia away from Israel’s northern border and severely weakening its military capabilities but also shows its chief backer and enabler, Iran, to be a floundering paper tiger.

The truce has distanced Hezbollah from its self-declared alliance with Hamas, the Palestinian movement that triggered the war when it invaded and rampaged through southern Israel on October 7, 2023. Hamas, which has been battered by a year of intense Israeli bombing and an ongoing ground offensive, now has no ally to relieve the pressure.  

In short, Lebanon’s role in the Gaza war is likely over and provides Netanyahu with a win, to use current American political parlance. At a minimum, if the ceasefire holds, Hezbollah’s exit from the field of battle provides a buffer zone within Lebanon, as the militia is forced north of the country’s Litani River.

That line was laid out via a United Nations resolution to end the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, though its eviction had never been enforced.

There are possible benefits for Israel beyond the Litani exclusion zone, at least for the immediate future. Besides limiting Hezbollah’s military value to the so-called Axis of Resistance that includes Hamas, Iraqi militias and Houthi rebels in Yemen, the accord showed Iran’s deterrent threat to be less than advertised.

In late September, Iran admitted as much. As Israel blasted southern Lebanon and Beirut with air strikes, killed field commanders and assassinated leading officials – notably supreme religious leader Hassan Nasrallah – Iran announced it would not send soldiers to help its Axis allies.

“There is no need to send extra or volunteer forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” said foreign ministry spokesman Nasser Kanani. The Lebanese and Palestinian fighters “have the capability and strength to defend themselves against the aggression,” he added.

Iran also informed the United States, which stationed warships off the Lebanese coast, in advance that it was about to retaliate against Israel in the brief missile exchange the two sides conducted.

The ceasefire breaks the active “military links between Hezbollah and Hamas—as the former had previously committed to keep attacking Israel until there was a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip,” said Jonathan Panikoff,  Middle East security expert at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank.

It means that “Tehran has seen its deterrence decline,” Panikoff said. “Iran is probably quietly supportive of the deal, concerned that pushing Hezbollah and the Lebanese government to oppose it would risk continuing Israeli strikes.”

But will the ceasefire be enough for Netanyahu, given his concern about Iran and its nuclear program? Perhaps not.

“That threat has always been my top priority and is even more so today, when you hear Iran’s leaders state over and over again their intention to obtain nuclear weapons,” the Israeli prime minister said in a televised victory speech on Tuesday. “For me, removing that threat is the most important mission to ensure the existence and future of the State of Israel.”

Israel had already signaled that Iran’s nuclear program was in its sights. Earlier in November, Israel’s defense ministry announced that on October 26 it had hit key air defense targets that had been guarding a major Iranian nuclear facility.

The raids eliminated the last three Russian-provided surface-to-air S-300 air defense rockets in Iran’s possession.

US President Joe Biden, now a lame duck with Donald Trump’s re-election earlier this month, characterized the ceasefire as a step toward “a vision for the future of a Middle East where it is at peace.”

He aimed a mild rebuke at Netanyahu over Israel’s lack of a day-after peace plan to end years of conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians. “Israel has been bold on the battlefield,” Biden said. “Now Israel must be bold to create a coherent strategy that will secure Israel’s long-term safety and advance peace.”

The strategy must include “a future where Palestinians have a state of their own.” That may be beyond the outgoing president’s reach, however. Long before and during this war, Netanyahu rejected the so-called “two-state solution” to the Palestinian conflict.

Biden had spent weeks trying to arrange Israel-Palestinian ceasefire talks but failed. On that score, Netanyahu has indicated that Israel must stay in parts of a demilitarized Gaza Strip for an indefinite period. Beleaguered Hamas has demanded Israel leave the territory as part of any ceasefire accord.

So the Gaza war rumbles on, as does a parallel lower-intensity battle in the West Bank. On Wednesday, Israeli intelligence officials said it uncovered a cache of weapons it said Iran had smuggled into the West Bank while Israeli soldiers carried out raids, which have become habitual in towns and villages nominally under the authority of the Palestinian National Authority.

The PNA is based in the city of Ramallah and has been silent on the Lebanon ceasefire.

It’s likely the next chapter will fall to Trump. Israeli settlers, whose ever-growing West Bank communities have made an actual land-for-peace deal all but impossible, are hoping that Trump’s January 20 arrival to power will open the way to some sort of annexation of the territory.

“We have high hopes. We’re even buoyant to a certain extent,” said Yisrael Medad, a settler activist who supports Israeli absorption of the West Bank. He thinks Trump’s support among religious Evangelicals in the US might sway him; he views Israel as a Biblical/historical inheritance. “Even if the Byzantines, the Romans, the Mameluks and Ottomans ruled it, it was our land,” Medad said in a Reuters interview.

Trump has displayed no inclination toward reviving the two-state formula, which had its heyday as a proposal more than four decades ago. Trump’s only comment on the Gaza war has been to advise Netanyahu to end it quickly.

During his previous 2017-2021 term, Trump formulated the so-called Abraham Accords based on the idea that the best way to stabilize the Middle East was to persuade Arab countries to make peace with Israel and put aside the Palestinian issue for a while.

In 2020, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, both Persian Gulf mini-states fearful of Iranian military power, signed the accord. Morocco later joined. By 2023, with Biden in the White House, Saudi Arabia appeared to be ready join, partly in exchange for US military weaponry and possible defense agreements in case war with Iran broke out. The Gaza war shelved Saudi Arabia’s potential entry into the accord.

Earlier this month, Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, accused Israel of committing “collective genocide” in Gaza and said Israel must “respect the sovereignty” of Iran and “not to violate its lands.”

However, analysts were not persuaded that bin Salman’s words reflected a rejection of the Abraham Accords. Once the fever of the Gaza war ends, he would likely recognize Israel, they suggested.

His harsh words, rather, reflected both public anger in Saudi Arabia over the Gaza bloodletting and bin Salman’s predilection for playing multiple sides in international gamesmanship.

Bin Salman, for instance, declined Biden’s request to pump more crude oil and thus reduce US energy costs, yet his country also purchases 80% of its weapons from the US and has been negotiating a security deal with Washington to go into effect once the Gaza war ends.

The only hang-up is an old one: Bin Salman is insisting that such an accord accompany steps toward a revival of the dormant two-state solution.

Continue Reading

On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump’s incoming Republican administration threatened to impose a 25 % tariff on all products from Canada and Mexico.

Mexico has made hints at retribution, while Canada says it will continue to work with the US on business issues. The tariffs would have a devastating impact on both the US and Canadian economies, both of which are greatly dependent on US business.

In fact, the two focused governments would be forced to impose tariffs that targeted American goods, leading to economic chaos in all three countries.

Do these tariffs been legal?

” Are these taxes legitimate”? is a straightforward inquiry. Simply put, no.

In a normally exponential, randomly capitalized post on his Truth Social system, Trump writes that he will implement” a 25 % Price on ALL merchandise coming into the United States, and its crazy Open Borders. This tariff will continue in effect until Fentanyl and all other improper immigrants stop this country’s invasion,”!

Under American pressure, Canada, Mexico, and the United States negotiated a clause in the North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) replacement that states that it does n’t” ca n’t stop any of the three countries from taking any measures it think is necessary for the protection of its own essential security interests.”

However, it would be absurd to attempt to summon that provision on such an obvious justification. According to economist Paul Krugman, the US Department of Commerce’s regulations forbid the use of the tariffs to compel other nations into activity because they must be tied to a specific industry.

But, no. The tariffs would n’t be acceptable. However, the problem itself is totally irrelevant.

It assumes that the democratic norms and rule of law that have governed North American politicians for more than 80 times still apply. Five years ago, the issue may have made sense. Today, it’s the wrong question to ask.

Shattered marriage

Trump threatened tariffs in his first name to tarnish Mexico and Canada on business and immigration, including the absurd claim that Canadian aluminium imports represented a threat to national security. Up then, we may also think that Trumpism was an outlier.

For the time being, Canada was appropriate. Threatened with taxes, French officers responded in kind.

From this perspective, the lesson today for Canada seems clear: do n’t panic, do n’t be afraid to target vulnerable and politically important American industries and figure out what will make Trump happy.

In the long run, this strategy does work. However, it just makes sense in a particular circumstance. In 2016, it was possible to anticipate a flurry of Trumpism, a resumption of the Democrats ‘ influence, and a return to equilibrium.

The universe can no longer make that assumption. The Republican Party has institutionalized Trumpism. The two-party program in the US means that Republicans will ultimately regain control even if the Democrats win the presidency in 2028, which is presumptuous.

The rest of the world can now only hope for chronic, widespread volatility in the US. But it’s next to impossible to make good ideas on volatility. Canada’s position is that it can no longer depend on the standards and standards that have governed US-Canada relationships since the Second World War.

abusing the legal system

As I’ve written recently, the United States-Mexico-Canada business deal’s renewal section, embraced by both Democrats and Republicans, deprives Canada and Mexico of the defense from force that trade agreements often provide smaller countries.

Usually, this protection prevents the larger country from relying on Canada and Mexico’s market to compel smaller nations to adopt their desired policies.

However, the present agreement’s renewal clause prevents coercion, shifting North America from a treaty-based rule-of-law approach to economic relations to one centered more on natural power.

Trump’s humorous threats turbo-charge the issue of institutional coercion. A agreement that is arbitrary by one party is no agreement at all, even though the trade agreement may still be renegotiated as planned in 2026.

Another fundamental rule is likewise shattered by Trump’s commitment to keep the economies of Canada and Mexico prisoner in exchange for a offer on drug trafficking and immigration.

In a marriage as difficult as Canada’s with the United States, there will always be issues. Because of a tacit commitment between the two countries to not link unrelated issues, which prevent one party from intimidating or blackmailing the other, these have n’t previously paralyzed the relationship.

Canada was significantly protected from its larger cousin by that standard. In terms of trading with the US, Canada had some independence thanks to this norm along with conventional trade regulations.

Despite persistent issues like softwood lumber, it made it possible for the US and Canada to reach fair agreements that were backed by commitment to local laws and foreign agreements.

Some good options

The US has the authority to alter the state’s larger North American connection as necessary.

In the last 40 years, America has remade the globe. The first was its embrace of a globalization-focused free-trade unit in the late 1980s, resulting in NAFTA. Finally, post-9/11, it arbitrarily decided that border protection, rather than western financial connectivity, was its top priority.

In the event that the Americans, according to American military writer Jack Granatstein, “became unhappy with us” and “bring our business to a crashing end,” some critics and experts, who were concerned about what this new British focus on security would mean for Canada, asserted post-2001.

In the end, these doubts were overstated. When the Liberal government of the day decided against entering Iraq or joining its Ballistic Missile Defence system, two of Granatstein’s imagined dark lines, the US did not fall Canada’s economy.

In my research on the subject, which I later revised and updated to reflect my opinion of the world, Canada was protected by NAFTA, shared standards for the non-linkage of related issues, as well as the common respect for the rule of law.

Asset becomes a frailty

Those who argue in favor of peace may never believe that Canada would genuinely reintegrate with a neighboring democratic nation that is governed by shared values and the rule of law.

To sacrifice American autonomy in order to further connect with a nation that has rejected the rule of law. Heavy integration with the US, when our greatest asset, is presently Canada’s greatest risk.

Canada-US relationships experts know this connection is important to Canada’s wealth and survival. Because it has to, Canada may find a way to control this marriage.

However, it must do so when the question” Is it legal” is being posed? no longer makes sense. Instead, Canada must consider the following:” How can a liberal-democratic nation survive without the rule of law and a much more powerful country?”

The distinction between authoritarianism and politics is what distinguishes these two concerns. Canada is today positioned in this situation.

Blayne Haggart is associate professor of political knowledge, Brock University

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

Continue Reading