Time for Australia to think the unthinkable about America – Asia Times

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how the world changes. The older economic and geopolitical attempt has been altered in Donald Trump’s less than three weeks since he entered the White House.

The United States is no longer seen as the foundation of a rules-based international order ( RBIO ). Instead, it is perceived as its main adversary. Despite China’s potential being the primary goal of Trump’s taxes, strangely enough, it is the Person’s Republic that has seized the opportunity to position itself as the doubtful champion of globalization.

These are particularly head-spinning times for less potent, trade-dependent says like Australia. They are unsure of how Trump’s changing tariffs will develop next. The whole rationale of Australia’s strategic placement is being questioned, and not just that Australia’s financial future is in the balance.

It is long overdue to reconsider Australia’s unquestionable respect to the US. However, Canberra’s corporate elites are reluctant to consider the unthinkable because they are unable to take into account a world where the US is not a dominant and trustworthy force in both economic and strategic affairs.

The notion that the US was the only credible pillar of stability was always a myth, though it was comforting for generations of American politicians who were hesitant to embrace the concept of intellectual independence or true nationwide sovereignty.

In fact, the US has a terrible habit of starting unwanted wars and undermining the RBIO. The Trump presidency is quickly resigning or defunding culture and support organizations it doesn’t want to be a part of because the US has always been a representative of important international bodies like the International Criminal Court.

When he declared that foreign frontrunners had “kiss his ass,” Donald Trump helped to dispel any lingering doubts with his usual political awareness if politicians outside the US were still in doubt about his attitude toward other nations, whether they were alleged allies or speculative foes.

However, it is not just that Trump is an economical ignorant surrounded by obsequious flunkies and chancers that makes his administration but risky and destructive.

The Trump administration’s policies may have serious effects on the rest of the world, as the manipulations in the world’s stock and bond markets demonstrate, which is contrary to the sheer weight of the British market.

There is very little possibility that Trump may be concerned about the harm he inflicts on Southeast Asian markets that are extremely exposed to trade, unless, of course, it has an impact on the US.

An exceedingly probable recession will have an impact on everyone in the long run, but Trump is obviously not a long-seeker, aside from his own durability and the possibility of a second presidential term.

American policymakers don’t ease themselves by anticipating that things will return to normal, even though this is an unlikely possibility, not least because of Trump’s era. As America flirts with totalitarianism and the renowned political guardrails are gradually being destroyed, it’s not even clear if there will ever be another election at this point.

The US is no more a trustworthy companion, and Australia’s financial and strategic future will depend on how closely it ties to the region. If there is one thing that should be made clear, it is that.

Strategic and economic elites have had to work together to form lasting, fruitful relationships with their fast, middle-class neighbors. In the face of a shared risk to the established get, from which both nations have profited, it is even more improbable to think Australia accepting China’s present of” joining hands.”

Quite naturally, Defense Minister Richard Marles rejected the idea right away. One of the president’s most fervent supporters of the AUKUS submarine job in particular and the alliance in general is Marcelles.

Despite this, China is attempting to maintain the outdated economic order while the US is overturning it. Maybe policy thinking should be likewise novel in such unprecedented circumstances.

It’s not necessary to think about forming a strategic partnership with China in order to send important signals to both the PRC and the US regarding Australia’s willingness to follow the kind of’transactional’ strategy that Trump favors.

This is especially true when some critics are concerned about the knowledge sharing that Trump’s policies involve and the impact his policies are having on long-standing and long-suffering supporters like Australia. They actually needn’t care at this point.

American policymakers can’t possibly imagine anything else the Trump administration does to the region, which has fought alongside the US in all of its pointless conflicts of option.

However, it is entirely possible that the Trump administration may leave the Indo-Pacific place if it is determined that it is in America’s “national interest” to do so.

Even if the US maintains a proper hold, it will probably anticipate extremely exigent contributions from the allies who make up America’s growing memorial system. Which raises the question of whether the Taiwanese translation could be any worse.

The Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney, employs alternative doctor Mark Beeson.

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Why is the Israel lobby so anxious? – Asia Times

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Last May, on a trip to the United States, world-renowned Israeli–Jewish historian Ilan Pappe was detained by Homeland Security and held for two hours.

Aged 69 at the time, he was, among other things, asked about his views on Hamas and whether Israel’s actions on the Gaza Strip amount to genocide (he said yes). He was then asked to provide phone numbers of his contacts in the Arab–American and Muslim–American communities.

In December, months after his interrogation by Homeland Security in the US, Pappe was removed without explanation from the BBC podcast, The Conflict, about the Middle East on the day he was supposed to record his contribution.

Pappe is one of Israel’s “New Historians”, who look for the truth about the 1948 Israeli “war of independence.”

The war began when Israel declared its independence following the partition of Palestine. Though it was quickly recognised by the US, the Soviet Union and other countries, it was immediately attacked by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. When the war ended in July 1949, the new state controlled one-fifth more territory than the original partition plan, to which it refused to return.

Palestinians mourn the 1948 war as the Nakba: their violent mass displacement and dispossession. (It created about 750,000 Palestinian refugees.)

One of the world’s most prominent scholars of the entwined histories of Israel and Palestine, Pappe is an urgent advocate of Palestinian rights and author of a groundbreaking 2007 book on the formation of the state of Israel, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine.

A man with shirtsleeves rolled up behind a podium, speaking into a microphone
Jewish–Israeli historian Ilan Pappe is an urgent advocate of Palestinian rights. Photo: Hossam el-Hamalawy/Flickr, CC BY

His latest book, Lobbying for Zionism on Both Sides of the Atlantic, seeks to understand how a pro-Israel lobby has formed, both in his country of residence, the United Kingdom, and in Israel’s most powerful and ardent supporter, the US.

Pappe’s book is worth heeding: he is both a scholar of the Israel lobby and a recent victim of its attempt to deplatform pro-Palestinian perspectives.

An ‘aggressive’, anxious lobby

This is the story of an “aggressive” lobby that eagerly seeks to stamp out narratives of Palestinian dispossession and suffering – in case they legitimize Palestinian claims for statehood, or attract sympathy for Palestinians’ lack of political and civil rights in the Occupied Territories.

This lobbying force began in the 19th century and took on more concrete forms after 1948. Much of Pappe’s book is devoted to parliamentary lobby groups, such as Labour Friends of Israel (LFI) and Conservative Friends of Israel (CFI) in the UK, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in the US. The latter spends considerable resources ensuring the US government aligns with Israeli objectives.

In this book, Pappe argues the aggressive Israel lobby is beset by anxiety. Few other states are so keen to “convince the world and their own citizens that their existence is legitimate.”

On the anniversary of the October 7 Hamas attacks, Guardian columnist Jonathan Freedland, whose mother was born in Israel, wrote:

To most outsiders, Israel is a regional superpower, backed by a global superpower. It is strong and secure. But that is not how it looks from the inside. Israelis see their society as small – the size of New Jersey – besieged and vulnerable.

Explaining this discrepancy, he wrote that while Israel is “a state with a daunting military”, on October 7, Israeli Jews felt “powerless as their ancestors in the shtetl”.

When Pappe writes about the Israel lobby, he is not describing a monolithic entity, but multifaceted “groupings of ideas, individuals and organizations.” When he speaks of the Zionist lobby, he means individuals or groups spreading pro-Israeli propaganda, while seeking to discredit anyone “condemning or criticising Israel or Zionism.” But these groups change their composition, orientation and methods over time, Pappe writes.

His book tells a story of organizations and “committed” individuals who, from the 19th century on, worked to convince policymakers and governments of the need for a Jewish homeland.

Colonialism and apartheid

From the early 20th century, Zionism has adapted to contemporary circumstances. It presented itself as a movement for national self-determination, fitting a “minority rights” model.

Pappe draws on the work of Palestinian–American critic and activist Edward Said to argue Zionism increasingly allied itself to the story of Western modernity and progress. In doing so, he argues, it helped perpetuate Orientalism: a Western understanding of the Arab and Islamic Middle East as underdeveloped and backward.

From the late 19th century, Palestinians were perceived as “at best, an exotic spectacle and, at worst, an ecological nuisance”, Pappe writes. Recently, US President Donald Trump has dismissed Palestinians’ connection to the land in Gaza, calling it a “big real estate site”.

As antiracism has become a cultural norm in the West, Israel, like other nations, has become wary of comparisons to apartheid South Africa.

However, those comparisons have existed for a long time. In recent decades, the Israel lobby has amplified claims of antisemitism as a defense against them, “weaponizing anti-Semitism to procure public support for Israel”, Pappe argues.

Israel had a close military alliance with apartheid-era South Africa, before the anti-apartheid African National Congress came to power in 1994. Last year, South Africa argued at the International Court of Justice in The Hague that Israel is responsible for apartheid against Palestinians.

In a searing account, Pappe charts an intensive campaign by the Israel lobby against former UK Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, who called for the immediate recognition of a Palestinian state.

The newspaper The Jewish Chronicle, for example, accused Corbyn of associating with “Holocaust deniers, terrorists and some outright anti-Semites”, he writes. Corbyn stepped down in 2019.

In 2020, a report by the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) found the culture within the Labour Party under Corbyn “at best, did not do enough to prevent anti-Semitism and, at worst, could be seen to accept it.”

Antisemitism in the UK Conservative Party gets much lighter treatment, Pappe argues. For example, former frontbencher Jacob Rees-Mogg described Jewish members of his party as “illuminati who are taking power to themselves.”

Pappe believes the reason for this discrepancy in treatment is that Corbyn was in a position of power “that could affect British policy towards Israel.”

The Israel lobby intensively campaigned against former UK Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn (pictured with now prime minister Keir Starmer), Pappe writes. Photo: Matt Dunham / AAP via The Conversation

The lobby and the US

In the book’s second half, Pappe shifts his attention to the US, now Israel’s major geopolitical sponsor. He argues that the US is intent on exempting Israel from any reckoning with international law.

He details the emergence of the American Zionist Emergency Council, a forerunner of AIPAC that emerged in the 1950s. These organisations’ early successes included US recognition in 1947 of the UN’s Assembly Resolution 181, which called for the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem as a separate, internationally governed entity.

This led to the 1948 Arab–Israeli war, which ended with an enlarged and consolidated state of Israel. Rapid US recognition of the new state was another early success for the lobby. Signature achievements include the constant flow of arms and aid to Israel.

Another is the US using its position on the United Nations Security Council (and its power and influence more generally) to enable Israel to avoid complying with numerous UN resolutions.

However, Pappe shows the lobby has by no means always had its way. Since its inception, it has come up against the more sceptical, “pro-Arab” US State Department, which employs Middle East experts who are more sympathetic to its various populations. There have been periods of friction with Israel, including in the 1950s, when the US temporarily suspended economic aid.

Lobbying strategies developed since the 1950s are noteworthy. If the US executive branch of government wavers on unconditional support, the Israel lobby cultivates the Congress. In the UK, the lobby curries favour with MPs in the Labour and Conservative parties, including organising trips to Israel through allied groups, such as Labour Friends of Israel and Conservative Friends of Israel.

In the US, AIPAC funds the campaign of pro-Israel candidates and holds lavish conferences, high on pomp and display, at which legislators and politicians (including Trump, former president Joe Biden and former vice president Mike Pence) profess their identification with Israel.

The lobby vs civil society

Pappe argues that the lobby’s cultivation of political elites threatens to widen the gap between political and media elites on one side, and global civil society (trade unions, churches, academic associations, non-government organisations, and activist groups) on the other. We can certainly see this happening today against the backdrop of the current war in Gaza.

In recent decades, dissent over Israel’s actions has also increased within the US Jewish community. A significant segment of the Jewish diaspora is reasserting itself and its progressive values, derived from the Jewish experience of victimisation and statelessness, in relation to Israel.

Pappe draws attention to the emergence in 1996 of Jewish Voice for Peace, which calls itself “the largest progressive Jewish anti-Zionist organization in the world”, and the liberal Zionist lobby J Street, which works towards a democratic Jewish homeland in Israel, with a negotiated resolution, agreed to by Israelis and Palestinians.

J Street wants to normalize Israel as a democratic Jewish state committed to a two-state solution and is uncomfortable with Israel as an occupying power. In its own words, it “rejects any proposal to have Israel and the United States forcibly displace the people of Gaza and/or occupy the Strip.”

Pappe notes that active support for the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement is strong in UK civil society. Perhaps this is due to Britain’s postcolonial guilt, after enabling the creation of the state of Israel before then largely vacating the diplomatic field.

The UK Israel lobby, which is frequently given voice in the Murdoch media in particular, consistently attempts to align antisemitism and criticism of Israel in the public consciousness.

Disenchanted up close

Despite its current influence, Pappe does not think the lobby’s future as a political force is necessarily guaranteed.

Throughout the book, he insists the Israel lobby is driven, at its heart, by his country’s lack of ethical foundations. As a careful historian, he tellingly believes most of the lobby’s efforts are at war with truth itself.

The Israel lobby, for example, likes to present supporters of the rights of Palestinians as antisemitic. But in fact, they are typically driven by a sense of injustice at the Palestinians’ occupation and an understanding of their struggle for civil and political rights.

Of course, that’s not to say antisemitism doesn’t exist. And it can exist alongside criticisms of Israel.

As Dennis Altman wrote last year, “the passions aroused by Israel’s escalating response to the Hamas attacks have revived centuries-old stereotypes of Jews as both alien and all-powerful” and sometimes “the distinction between opposition to Israel and hatred of Jews becomes blurred”.

Ta Nehisi Coates. Nina Subin

But the ranks of the disenchanted have included former US President Jimmy Carter and John Lyons, global affairs editor of the ABC and a former Middle East foreign correspondent.

Lyons reflected in his book, Balcony Over Jerusalem, on once being “exposed to all the myths pushed by Israel’s lobby groups”. Now, he is a vocal advocate for the rights of Palestinian people, after covering the conflict at close quarters.

For African American writer Ta-Nehisi Coates, a May 2023 trip to Palestine opened his eyes to a system he compared to both apartheid and America’s Jim Crow South.

No more plucky underdog

There can be no more talk, Pappe suggests in the final chapter, of an Israeli plucky underdog David, fighting for its life against an Arab Middle Eastern Goliath. Of course, this talk has sustained many of Israel’s supporters since the Holocaust. It relies on a conception of Jewish people as actual or potential victims, regardless of evolving power dynamics.

One of the world’s most respected Holocaust historians, Israeli-American Omer Bartov, warned in November 2023 of “genocidal intent” increased by dehumanizing political rhetoric in Israel’s actions in Gaza.

South Africa’s prosecution of the case of genocide against Israel and recent initiatives by the International Criminal Court to arrest Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are further signs the international “shield” that protects Israel from its “violations of justice and humanitarian law” has serious cracks in it, as Pappe argues in the book’s afterword.

In a January interview with Al Jazeera, Pappe described events of the past 15 months as “an attempt by a new leadership of Zionism to complete the work that they started in 1948, namely of taking over officially the whole of historical Palestine and getting rid of as many Palestinians as possible”.

He believes Israel’s military supremacy will increasingly rely on the “extreme right of the Global North”, including the Trump administration, as well as authoritarian and dictatorial regimes in the Global South.

As Israeli colonialism, suppression of the Palestinians and military activity to depopulate Palestinian areas intensifies, Pappe believes Israel will be almost entirely abandoned by what remains of progressive civil society and the educated intelligentsia, including renowned scholars of genocide whose reflections and warnings we should heed. I agree.

It is important Pappe’s book is not ignored, and that we clearly see the Israel lobby’s challenge to free expression and solidarity with the oppressed.

Ned Curthoys is associate professor of English and Literary Studies, The University of Western Australia

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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ASEAN must act as Myanmar’s junta weaponizes quake disaster – Asia Times

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The earthquake that struck Myanmar on March 28 was not just a natural disaster; it has become yet another weapon in the military junta’s brutal campaign to consolidate power. 

Instead of facilitating aid and relief for those affected, the country’s ruling military junta has reportedly used the chaos to target resistance-controlled areas, bombing opposition strongholds and blocking humanitarian assistance.

This blatant exploitation of the disaster underscores the regime’s sustained repression over the past three years and the urgent need for a decisive regional response.

At next month’s 46th ASEAN Summit, the bloc faces a defining moment in its handling of the situation in Myanmar. Malaysia, the current chair, has the opportunity to lead a meaningful response, but doubts remain over its ability or willingness to do so.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s choice of advisors – Cambodia’s former Prime Minister Hun Sen and Thailand’s ex-leader Thaksin Shinawatra – suggest that democracy and human rights may not be the priority they should be in addressing the crisis. 

Since 2021, Myanmar has been embroiled in a bloody civil war, following a decision by the military to cancel election results won resoundingly by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy and abandon the country’s tentative steps towards democratization.

The junta has faced sustained resistance from ethnic armed groups and newly formed People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), leading to significant territorial losses for the military regime.

However, the recent earthquake has provided an unexpected opportunity to reverse the tide. Instead of facilitating humanitarian aid, the junta has reportedly bombed resistance-held areas under the pretext of maintaining control, exacerbating the already dire humanitarian crisis.

In a familiar pattern, the regime has demonstrated its willingness to manipulate crises to tighten its grip on power. Given that the junta had already delayed elections several times, most recently pushing them to December 2025 or January 2026, this disaster may serve as yet another excuse to further postpone a return to civilian rule.

The international community has been hesitant to take decisive action against the junta’s abuses and relied on ASEAN member countries to lead efforts. However, as a collective, this response has been lackluster at best, and posed fresh questions about the association’s relevance as a regional body tasked with upholding peace and stability.

During Cambodia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2022, Hun Sen controversially engaged directly with Myanmar’s junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, despite his exclusion from ASEAN summits. This move fractured the bloc’s already fragile unity and signaled to the junta that ASEAN was willing to engage with it despite its continued repression.

Given Cambodia’s history of authoritarian rule and its use of crises – such as the Covid-19 pandemic – to silence opposition, Hun Sen’s inclusion as an advisor suggests that ASEAN is not prioritizing a democratic resolution to the coup-caused crisis.

His decades-long rule was marked by the dismantling of democratic institutions, media censorship and the persecution of opposition figures, raising serious concerns about his influence on ASEAN’s approach to Myanmar.

Many of Cambodia’s key opposition leaders are currently living in exile following political persecution, a situation which mirrors that of Myanmar’s exiled National Unity Government.

Similarly, Thaksin’s controversial political history in Thailand does little to inspire confidence in ASEAN’s commitment to democratic principles.​ Both figures represent a legacy of strongman politics that stands in stark contrast to the democratic aspirations of Myanmar’s opposition forces.

ASEAN cannot afford to repeat past mistakes. With Myanmar’s crisis deepening, the bloc needs leadership that prioritizes democracy and human rights over political expediency. The selection of Hun Sen and Thaksin as advisors risks signaling to the junta that ASEAN remains divided and unwilling to take a firm stance.

ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis has been defined by its stillborn Five-Point Consensus policy, which the junta has repeatedly ignored. The consensus, which calls for an end to violence, dialogue among all parties, and humanitarian assistance, has failed to yield tangible results, largely because ASEAN has not enforced it with meaningful consequences.

Malaysia, as ASEAN’s current chair, has a critical opportunity to rectify this failure and implement the five point consensus, imposing sanctions on the junta should it continue to ignore it.

This should include rejecting the junta’s manipulation of aid and ensuring that humanitarian assistance reaches all affected areas in Myanmar, including those controlled by resistance groups. This may require bypassing the junta and working directly with local organizations or international NGOs.

Malaysia, as current ASEAN chair, has the opportunity to reassert the association’s relevance by prioritizing democratic values over political expediency. This means ensuring that its advisors reflect principles of good governance and human rights rather than strongman tactics.

If ASEAN continues to align itself with figures who have undermined democracy in their own countries, it risks not only its credibility but also the security and stability of the region.

Allowing Myanmar’s junta to exploit crises unchecked sets a dangerous precedent for the region, potentially encouraging authoritarian tendencies among other member states. ASEAN’s response to the current situation is thus a litmus test of its relevance and influence. 

The people of Myanmar have endured immense suffering and deserve decisive action that prioritizes their aspirations for democracy and freedom. ASEAN must rise to this occasion, not only for Myanmar but for the integrity and future of the entire Southeast Asian region.

Samady Ou is a Cambodian youth activist, Human Rights Foundation Freedom Fellow, and youth ambassador for the Khmer Movement for Democracy.

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How the Pacific Islands can respond to the Trump administration – Asia Times

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This content was originally published by Pacific Forum, and it is now available for resale.

People who followed President Trump’s second word and his statements on the way to a second word can be absolutely unsurprised by the adjustments to his foreign policy made in the first few months of this term. The confusion and speed of this government’s redirection have not only planted doubt around the world.

They also raise the question whether this represents a fundamental long-term shift in America’s generational devotion to a leading global role, our allies and partners, and the political issues of our century, or a short-term adjusting motivated ( or purposefully increased ) by legitimate British voting concerns at the costs and sharing of that responsibility.

To be completely honest, I think it’s the former. The key is how best to adjust to this pattern over the long term as opposed to overreacting right away into much worse scenarios.

Come get started by being specific about what’s happening. The Trump presidency is engaged in a clean of perceived evils in American foreign policy and wasting, motivated by the perception that the US economy and authorities are leaving too many of our own driving.

We can debate the underlying reasoning, but I don’t think it’s because we are totally engaged in the world. Instead, I think the US business and government are leaving too many of our individual behind. Fact is that this attitude is what propels the Trump president’s actions.

This also bear in mind the dramatic shift’s effects in the real world. The attempted demise of the US Agency for International Development ( USAID ) &nbsp, as well as other related organizations and NGOs, is a blow to global partners ‘ most intractable challenges, including those in health, economic development, and more.

The island and coast nations, in particular, are ignored in any program that deals with climate change because it ignores the real-world, frequently existential issues. &nbsp,

Initiatives that have been in the works for years —such as a Standard Weapons Destruction initiative in Papua New Guinea, the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership in Fiji and other parts of the country, and a Samoa drinkable water system—have been instantly canceled.

Although these particulars matter, each with its own history, what should and should be most concerning is the deterioration of trust and relationship built up over years between the US and nations that share our values and objectives for a quiet, prosperous, and democratic earth. In the vast Indo-Pacific and the Pacific Islands themselves, this is undoubtedly the case.

With this unexpected gift&nbsp, which keeps coming, it would be understandable that the US-Pacific Islands relationship, itself, and our geopolitical rivals, particularly the People’s Republic of China, are very busy doing just that.

However, it’s more accurate to say that these first months are its own overreaction, to say that it’s inflamed and well-manipulated, and that American domestic political concerns, however misplaced and misinformed, will eventually come to right out of mutual adjustment and necessity, security and otherwise.

For context, the United States has for decades been committed to advance Pacific priorities through unified and cohesive political leadership, including as , a founding Pacific Islands Forum dialogue partner , and otherwise.

Under various American administrations, the nature of that commitment varied, from Hillary Clinton’s appointment as the first US-Pacific Islands Summit to President Obama’s address at the 2016 Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders and Leaders to the establishment of a Pacific Islands directorship in the National Security Council, President Biden holding the first US-Pacific Islands Summit, creating the first Pacific Partnership Strategy, and appointing the first US Envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum in 2022.

Although its overall direction has been positive, US foreign policy has always changed in response to domestic and international political realities that are changing. Although disheartening, the current administration’s initial and initial approach to foreign aid and its relationship with the Pacific Islands is just the most recent chapter in this wider narrative, which, in my opinion, will prove to be absurd.

This readjusting will take place for a variety of reasons. First, the political fever will dissipate and mainstream American sentiments will resurface as geopolitical realities become more real. Second, a broader coalition will need to address the issues facing the Pacific Islands, and they won’t go away on their own. Third, the alternative world that the PRC presents will prove insurmountable and unacceptable to the majority of nations and will compel another resentment for mutual defense purposes.

There are three&nbsp, aspects&nbsp, that remain critically important as we all weather this cycle. First, there are numerous members of the administration, Congress, and the wider community who continue to support the US-Pacific Islands relationship. They must be supported in their efforts to keep the importance of the region on the national agenda.

Second, like-minded nations with strong or developing relationships with the Pacific Islands, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Germany, must squander as much of the slack as possible.

Third, the Trump administration needs to hear from the Pacific Islands in a way that is both pertinent to both the administration’s concerns and those of American society for which it claims to speak.

Consider the claim that Europe is not contributing enough to its own defense, and extend that thread to other areas. US assistance cannot be seen as enabling an avoidance of responsibilities that should be borne by individual countries. The PRC faces a real challenge, and there must be a way to fill the gap. US engagement abroad benefits both the US and the US, including by ensuring the security and economic prosperity of the US population.

The administration’s initial attempt to withdraw from generational commitments to the world, including the Pacific Islands, is a huge error, fueled by misguided domestic political priorities. It is not necessary and necessary for most Americans to understand and support an entire system of international citizenship.

These are very difficult times, and surviving them will be challenging. However, there are abundant opportunities and ways to become stronger and better than before.

Representative Ed Case represents Hawaii’s first congressional district as the representative.

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Troubled automaker Nissan has a new CEO – but can he do the job? – Asia Times

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Nissan faces a challenging road ahead, including questions about whether its mostly non-automotive board of directors is even remotely qualified to lead the disturbed automaker and whether its new CEO, Ivan Espinosa, is capable of leading the troubled automaker.

As things stand now, a week after the 46-year-old professional actually replaced Makoto Uchida, much is still known about Espinosa other than that he is Mexican-born, one of the youngest CEOs in Chinese vehicle business background, the second-youngest stranger, and worked in product preparing for most of his career at Nissan including the last eight years in Japan.

He appeared friendly and talented in a late-March meeting with Automotive News, but his begin didn’t much help. To job, he uses a Z-car. He’s married with two children, plays tennis and golf, but gave little indication about what his duties were as chief preparing officer, a position he held between April 2024 and April 2025, or why Nissan’s post-Carlos Ghosn restructuring program, Nissan NEXT, failed but significantly.

When Uchida made the announcement in May 2000, he had fiscal 2023 goals for a 5 % operating profit margin, a 6 % global market share, and 4.3 million in global revenue.

Additionally, he established a million electrical and electric vehicle revenue goal.

One year after the program ended, Nissan’s operating&nbsp, profit margin through December had fallen to 0.5 %. Global market share decreased below 4 %. In historical terms, the global market share for Carlos Ghos n’s final full year at Nissan stood at 6.2 % in fiscal 2017.

While Nissan succeeded in cutting manufacturing capability by to 5.4 million products, it failed drastically, by more than a million units, to reach its sales goal. Utilization at the Fiscal plant in 2024 was 60 %, not the goal’s goal of 80 %.

Only one of Nissan’s 15 major crops was operating at 80 % of capacity in governmental 2023, the last year of the Nissan NEXT program, according to former Tokyo scientist Koji Endo.

It is not clear what part Espinosa played in the unsuccessful restructuring program — Ashwani Gupta, Nissan’s past COO, served equally as general planning officer — but his titles since 2017 as a top executive in Nissan’s international product strategy and product planning division indicate that he would have been involved.

One former Nissan executive who has followed Espinosa’s career said,” It’s not clear whether he’s been blocked by others in the organization.” However, it is obvious that he failed to deliver.

Gupta would be caught up in a scandal reportedly involving a female employee and forced to resign in June 2023.

Other important members of the restructuring team are being fired. Asako Hoshino, Kunio Nakaguro, and Hideyuki Sakamoto are just a few of them. Hoshino was Nissan’s chief brand and customer officer, a position she has held since April 2020. Sakamoto was the chief monozukuri ( roughly, manufacturing and supply chain ), and Nagoro was the chief technology officer. &nbsp,

Nakaguro and Sakamoto joined the executive committee with Hoshino in June 2019. In charge of manufacturing and supply chain management, Sakamoto was elevated in 2020 to the board.

People who know the trio have been extremely critical of their performance, despite the automaker’s insistence that they are to blame for Nissan’s failures in the marketplace.

Uchida and Sakamoto will formally leave the board at the automaker’s June general shareholders meeting on June 20 to be replaced by Espinosa and some still-to-be-disclosed others.

Who might take Sakamoto’s place on Nissan’s board is still a mystery. According to rumors, Guillaume Cartier, Nissan’s newly appointed chief performance officer, will be one of those chosen to fill a board vacancy. Others, given Nissan’s weak performance globally, will be more difficult to choose.

Can the new team recover from five years of lost time?

Carlos Ghosn. Photo: ABC News

Nissan’s global market share for fiscal 2018 was 6.0 % on yearly sales of 5.5 million units, the year Carlos Ghosn was removed from management and imprisoned in November.

Since then, sales have decreased to 3.2 million and market share has fallen to less than 4 %, with the US, China, and Europe all experiencing significant volume and share losses.

” They’ve had five to six years to fix the problem”, said Chris Richter, managing director in Tokyo at CLSA.

” They can’t say that Carlos Ghosn is to blame for the problems we have today. Too long has passed.

Meanwhile, the three largest credit rating agencies — Fitch, Moody’s and S&amp, P Global — have downgraded Nissan’s credit rating to junk status. &nbsp,

S&P Global Ratings dropped its long-term credit rating for Nissan to’BB’ on March 7, falling short of every major automaker outside of China, including Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi Motors, Hyundai, Kia, General Motors, Ford, Stellantis, BMW, Mercedes, Volkswagen, and Renault. Toyota received an A rating, Honda, Hyundai and Kia A-, Mitsubishi Motors and Renault BB .

” Prospects for a quick improvement in Nissan’s automotive business are now unknown,” S&amp, P Global, said. Our assessment of the company’s creditworthiness may continue to decline as a challenging operating environment prevents the company’s profitability improvement and free cash flow losses.

” We expect it will take about two years before Nissan can reap the full cost-savings from restructuring. From fiscal 2025 to fiscal 2026, the 400 billion yen cost reduction measures will be in effect. In fiscal 2026, some plant closures and job cuts will be made.

S&amp, P Global&nbsp, expects the competitive environment to remain challenging, costs from inflation to rise. It anticipates pressure on profitability as EV sales rise. Even if cost reduction initiatives are carried out as planned, we do not anticipate the company’s EBITDA margin to increase to 6 % in the next one to two years.

The forecast did not include the impact of US tariffs on Nissan’s Mexican holdings, where the automaker operates two vehicle plants and a large transmission plant.

It did account for the additional$ 5 billion in debt due in 2026.

Could Honda still be a business partner? Not likely, according to our sources. Although discussions between the two automakers were widely reported in December, there was never a feasible way to implement a merger without Nissan shutting down factories and production lines. Their model lineups are overly duplicative, in my opinion. &nbsp,

With only two auto executives on its 12-member board, Nissan has had to have two auto executives. There is also a large gap between the management groups ‘ compositions. Six Honda employees work for Honda on average for 37 years. One of Honda’s outside directors is a former public prosecutor. &nbsp,

They might be able to work together on electric cars, where both are trailing behind industry rivals. Or there might be small projects such as joint truck production in Mississippi and Alabama, where both have assembly plants.

Integrating their global operations is a non-starter because both are virtual non-players in Europe and both are experiencing sales declines in China over the past five years.

We are unsure what a merger of Honda and Nissan would accomplish because both companies appear to be sinking ships, warns Richter. We do not see scale as the solution to their problems in China.”

Given the steep decline in both manufacturers ‘ sales volumes, we wonder if Honda and Nissan might be among the first to consider folding the company in the towel.

On paper, Nissan’s new management team appears to be more effective than it was in the past. Then again, none of them are Carlos Ghosn. None, in fact, have had success in any marketplace. &nbsp,

Christian Meunier, &nbsp, who&nbsp, quit Nissan in April 2019 and was part of the brain drain leaving Nissan after Ghos n’s ouster, joined Jeep as president and CEO of the brand in May 2019. Jeep sales in the US had dropped 30 % by the time he left, in October 2023. In 2024, they dropped another 9 %.

Meunier rejoined Nissan as chairperson of the management committee for the Americas in January. If US President Donald Trump does not reverse his decision to impose 25 % tariffs on Mexican and other foreign-built vehicles, including Japanese ones, there can be no benefit to the automaker’s business. &nbsp,

Of Nissan’s fiscal 2024 sales total in the US, more than 40 % – an estimated 413, 500 units– were imports, two-thirds from Mexico. Sentras, Versas, and Kicks were the most common compact and subcompact vehicles made in Mexico. They will require a lot of time and money to move them to the US.

Nissan earlier had announced plans to cut 9, 000 jobs from its global workforce, including 2, 000 in the US. According to media reports, those plans have now been put off. Additionally, it is unclear how tariffs might affect the timing of Nissan’s new and updated model lineup, which was unveiled in late March.

Jérémie Papin, who became the executive committee’s chief financial officer, was in charge of the US market crash in terms of sales and market share. Nissan’s share in the North American market was 6.9 %, and in the US market, 6.2 %, when Papin was appointed president of Nissan North America Inc. and chairperson of the management committee for the Americas. &nbsp,

Stephen Ma, who will lead Nissan’s China unit, previously held the position of CFO at Dongfeng Motor Corporation, but has little marketing or sales experience.

And Espinosa does not have any practical experience, according to his critics. And there is no one on Nissan’s board who has. &nbsp,

Espinosa wasn’t chosen to succeed Uchida, according to Shukan Diamond, a weekly business magazine, and his nomination was split by the Nissan’s nomination panel.

METI Car Company: Is Nissan’s non-automotive board up to the task?

Nissan might not have any solutions if not for an outside automaker with big pockets that steps in and takes control. This is simpler to say than to do, and it is thought to be one of the reasons Honda backed out of a proposed merger in February.

Talks with Foxconn, reportedly another potential partner, should only be taken seriously if Nissan is making a full-throated move into electric vehicles ( it can’t ) or if it wants to bring back Jun Seki in some capacity. &nbsp,

On November 1, 2019, Nissan announced that Makoto Uchida would lead the company, and Ashwani Gupta would become its CEO. The automaker also named Seki as its deputy COO. Seki left Nissan in December as the odd man out in the post-Carlos Ghosn board restructuring. He is currently 64 years old and head of Hon Hai Technology Group, a Taiwanese electronics company.

There is only one major media article about Nissan’s board, which voted unanimously to promote Uchida in October 2019 and then, with many of the same members, voted unanimously to elevate Espinosa, a largely untested executive, in March of this year, in spite of all the reporting about Uchida’s firing and Ivan Espinosa’s hiring. &nbsp,

If the article in Shukan Diamond is accurate, Nissan’s board is split on how to proceed, including whether to try to form a Honda subsidiary. Yasushi Kimura, a retired executive in the energy sector, is one of at least three directors who appear willing to take the action.

Roger Schreffler is a veteran Japan automotive writer and a former president of the Foreign Correspondents ‘ Club of Japan.

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Big question: Can China or the US endure greater trade war pain? – Asia Times

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China continues to fight back against US tariffs, challenging the US to start a complete trade war that was stagnate both of its economies. Which country may experience greater pain, in your opinion?

Contrary to the US, China does not face elections from the president or completely property markets. This enables Beijing to endure months or years of constant pressure, making socioeconomic difficulties the result of American hostility.

In contrast, President Donald Trump’s guidelines could receive probable local support.

China is making a strategic move to protect itself, putting a bet on the US’s unpreparedness for a serious business issue that threatens international commerce. Beijing anticipates that America will struggle to deal with a potential business collapse, rising prices, and recession, which will weaken Trump’s most important technique against China, which is financial decoupling.

The Taiwanese economy is” an sea, not a lake,” according to President Xi Jinping. Premier Li Qiang also asserted that China is prepared to weather the trade war and won’t fall prey to US taxes during a conference with EU President Ursula von der Leyen.

China has been working on a subtle plan B for years that resembles North Korea’s self-sufficiency model. Stopping imports of US soybeans or maize, which are important creature supply, is a part of this strategy, which includes demonstrating willingness to avoid these commodities, at least partially, that some US strategists deemed crucial for China.

complicated web

Additionally, the political landscape is complex. Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict is reportedly being strained by China’s sending of individuals, which could complicate any possible partnerships between President Vladimir Putin and the US.

Because its soldiers haven’t seen combat in 45 years, China’s role in Ukraine gives them valuable combat experience.

Because of political efforts, these tough decisions come with a variety of options. Trump could benefit from an Iranian nuclear deal, which would give him a diplomatic advantage, though one that might strain his ties with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who might reject any deal with Tehran.

China presents a défendable place on a global scale. Although tariffs are a response to the country’s trade surplus, Beijing has taken the lead in terms of international perceptions as a result of the US’s extreme tariff policies, which have changed that perception.

Given Putin’s reticence for peace, what are the crucial issues still to be resolved: Is the US willing to support Ukraine? Does China be resisted by an inflationary crisis? Does the US have a long-term plan for navigating this complex geopolitical landscape, which includes both economic and military conflicts, aside from business?

Without preparation, the US could suffer possible disgrace and unexpected consequences, necessitating a prompt reassessment of its position on China.

A chaotic outcome is good if Trump is never prepared. If he is, the ground will be set for a protracted and difficult deal cold war.

China has unwavering policies, but is the West prepared? What course of action does the US intend to take? Was Trump prepared for a shootout, simply carrying a carrot?

Home patterns

This political chess match features important home dynamics. My 30- to 40-year profession, if I had been an assistant to Xi Jinping, may have taught me two points: to defend my place and to second-guess my better.

Also, the group method essentially favors intellectual bias: supporting too far left with a traditional Leninist and anti-American strategy results in few or no penalties.

Leaning too far to the right, with democratic and pro-American perspectives, on the other hand, has risks because it conflicts with the party’s intellectual adversary, the Western capitalist system.

What guidance may I give the Chinese president regarding how to deal with a near-confrontation with the US? Suggesting gentle, right-leaning alternatives carries many risks. In contrast, putting forth difficult, left-leaning solutions may offer a number of advantages.

If my right-leaning plan were to be put to the test, it would be deemed a failure because it posed a threat to my job and was later adopted. In contrast, a left-leaning proposal could also show strength and tenacity for the nation if it were to fail.

An assistant is more likely to recommend robust measures and left-leaning suggestions in these circumstances as opposed to soft ones.

Additionally, if I were in the lower echelons and my communist guidance was successful, I may say credit. If it failed and Xi was in trouble as a result of internal criticism, it does offer the chance to reshape power dynamics.

Mafia economy

Trump has been accused of using a “mob manager” strategy in world markets, according to Gideon Rachman, according to Gideon Rachman. Trump, a bourgeois, was elected with the aid of tycoons who paraded at his opening, in contrast to the crowd manager, who lacks an unruly Congress, an independent press, an independent judiciary, and votes.

The royal mafia struggled to reintegrate into a bourgeois completely market system. Its main strategy involves dividing the place, levying taxes on firms, and imposing royal rules on a market-based program. When a business expands, place and taxes does become burdens rather than producing substantial profits. Capitalists are often tempted to cut corners, part the business, and become aristocratic lords, but capitalism works better than feudalism.

America’s problem lies in having much held the reins of the capitalist system and been in charge of all financial activities. Without adequate tenacity and perseverance in an attempt to cut corners and reform the market, one could lose widespread power and have it transferred to another fingers, like China’s.

As an alternative to SWIFT, China recently introduced a new economic transfer system with nations in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Re-industrialization and managing loan are the genuine problems facing America. Although some taxes does have a purpose, a general requirement that nations negotiate with the US is misplaced because businesses operate autonomously of any bourgeois world’s power.

The strength of Wall Street is good for the US unless a would-be expert misinterprets the industry. The US has the authority to impose a significant financial and commercial reform, but it also needs a strategy to avoid going through discomfort for a while. Without it, we might be in the dark when the ancient order is no longer in effect but the novel is also possible.

Francesco Sisci, an Italian researcher and political commentator with over 30 years of practice in China and Asia, is the director of the Appia Institute, which was the source of this article’s original publication. With agreement, it can be republished.

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Lack of trust looms over high-stakes Iran-US nuclear negotiations – Asia Times

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The US and Iran’s prepared discussions in Oman come as a significant development, especially given their history of distrust and hostility that has characterized their interactions.

Whether the discussions about Iran’s nuclear capability creation will be direct or indirect will be in the air. Steve Witkoff, the US’s Middle East minister, may meet with Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, according to the US. If the discussions fail, Donald Trump has made it known that Iran will be in “great harm.”

Iran has in the past stated that discussions may be conducted through an entity. It is” because many an opportunity as a analyze,” aghchi said. The game is in America’s hands.

Even with the risk of US or Israeli military activity hovering over Iran, this apparent conflict in messaging before the deals have also begun is not the best sign of their success. On April 8, members from Iran, China, and Russia reportedly met in Moscow.

China’s foreign ministry reiterated to the world that the US was the one who unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 nuclear package or joint comprehensive plan of action and” caused the current condition.” It emphasized the need for Washington to” present political honesty, work in the nature of mutual regard, engage in dialogue and conversation, and put a stop to the threat of force and maximum stress.”

This was in response to messages from Washington that were largely focused on the possibility of power and maximum pressure. Trump addressed the issue of Iran’s nuclear weapons in a press conference after meeting with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying:” If the discussions aren’t successful, I really think it will be a very bad time for Iran if that’s the case.”

The US government’s frequently debated transactional approach to politics, as represented by Witkoff, a former real estate developer, is likely to have a significant impact on how discussions turn out. Trump’s Middle Eastern political goals include extending the Abraham Accords. Those deals aimed to restore normalcy between Israel and several Muslim nations, including the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.

The drafting of the treaties in 2020 was viewed as a significant accomplishment of Trump’s first administration’s foreign coverage, particularly in light of America’s commitment to halt Iran in the region.

Saudi Arabia is currently being constantly incorporated by the US. In that regard, acknowledging that local geopolitics would undergo a radical change as a result of Riyadh’s participation. Trump also intends to use significant investment initiatives and trade agreements to make financial dependencies that promote diplomatic normalization.

Iran, on the other hand, is having serious financial issues. High inflation, a degrading currency, and widespread poverty are the hallmarks of the nation’s current crisis-ridden economy. These circumstances have been made worse by private policy failures and foreign sanctions. In consequence, Iran is in desperate need of monetary compromises, which could be a major source of liquidity for the US.

Over the past 18 times, Tehran’s political influence has significantly decreased. In addition to the demise of crucial allies and leaders in organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, military setbacks in 2024 have weakened Iran’s ability to assert its position in its area.

Iran’s negotiating position will be affected by this weakened place. Instead of pursuing intense policies, it might increase the likelihood that Iran’s negotiators will seek financial assistance and diplomatic solutions. However, if concessions are not forthcoming, force from hardliners within Iran may lead to a more dramatic strategy.

Rocky street awaits you.

The lower level of trust between the two events is a major factor in the discussions. Relations between the United States and the Gaza turmoil have become more disturbed, including Trump’s controversial plan to clear the area of Palestinian territory to allow for a potential redevelopment. The new US attack on Yemen’s Houthi separatists, supported by Iran, has done the same.

Iran is likely to view additional threats of this kind as being aggressive and aggressive, and Trump’s most recent rhetoric didn’t have helped. This may unavoidably lower the likelihood of trust between the parties.

Iranian parliamentarians are interested in the prospect of nuclear talks with the US, according to https ://www.youtube .com/embed/62hN3E5ZCwA ?wmode=transparent&amp ,start=0.

Iran’s suspicion is a result of past events where financial aid vows were broken. Trump’s decision to withdraw from the US atomic deal from 2015 in 2018 serves as an illustration. Iran has grown hesitant to enter new treaties without receiving specific assurances as a result of this perceived breach of trust.

The talks are given a new layer of complexity thanks to the local perspective. The actions of Israel in Gaza are likely to be hampered by American aid. The populations of the majority of the Gulf states are firmly in favor of Arab self-determination, and they are scandalized by the US president’s apparent approval of Israel’s resumption of warfare.

Iran’s approach to the discussions is likely to be heavily influenced by its domestic politics. The “hardliners,” spearheaded by high chief Ali Khamenei, and the “reformists,” who are comparatively more diplomatic toward the US and Europe, are at a major political polarization in the nation. Hopes that Iran may be open to negotiations with Washington immediately faltered after last year’s surprise election of liberal Masoud Pezeshkian when he realigned his place to correspond with Khamenei’s immediately faltered.

The hardliner-dominated congress forced Pezeshkian to remove two significant reformists from the government in March 2025, including the vice-president Mohammad Javad Zarif and the market minister Abdolnaser Hemmati. This partisan politicking will make it more difficult for Iran to make a united front of the table in negotiations, which could be a significant boon for the US. However, it also strengthens the desire of hardliners to demand things that the US finds unacceptable.

Loughborough University professor of Middle Eastern and foreign relations Ali Bilgic.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

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Trump’s tariffs won’t ever restore US manufacturing glory – Asia Times

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The “Liberation Day” tariffs announced by US president Donald Trump have one thing in common – they are being applied to goods only.

Trade in services between the US and its partners is not affected. This is the perfect example of Trump’s peculiar focus on trade in goods and, by extension, his nostalgic but outdated obsession with manufacturing.

The fallout from Liberation Day continues, with markets down around the world. The decision to apply tariffs on a country-by-country basis means that rules about where a product is deemed to come from are now of central importance.

The stakes for getting it wrong could be high. Trump has threatened that anyone seeking to avoid tariffs by shifting the supposed origin of a product to a country with lower rates could face a ten-year jail term.

The White House initially refused to specify how it came up with the tariff levels. But it appears that each country’s rate was arrived at by taking the US goods trade deficit with that country, dividing it by the value of that country’s goods exports to the US and then halving it, with 10% set as the minimum.

It has been noted that this is effectively the approach suggested by AI platforms like ChatGPT, Claude and Grok when asked how to create “an even playing field.”

Economically, Trump’s fixation on goods makes no sense. This view is not unique to the president (though he feels it unusually strongly). There is a broader fetishization of manufacturing in many countries. One theory is that it is potentially ingrained in human thinking by pre-historic experiences of finding food, fuel and shelter dominating all other activities.

But for Trump, the thinking is likely related to a combination of nostalgia for a bygone (somewhat imagined) age of manufacturing and concern over the loss of quality jobs that provide a solid standard of living for blue-collar workers – a core part of his political base.

Nostalgia is not a sensible basis for forming economic policy. But the role emotions play in international affairs has been receiving more attention. It has been identified as an “emotional turn” (where the importance of emotion is recognised) in the discipline of international relations.

Of course, that’s not to say that the concern over jobs and the unequal effects of globalzsation is misplaced. It is clear that blue-collar workers have suffered in the US (and elsewhere) for the last 40 to 50 years, with governments paying little attention to the decline.

Man in a cowboy hat holding a sign saying 'UAW on strike'.
Many blue-collar workers, like these GM car plant employees in Missouri, have paid a high price for globalisation. Jon Rehg/Shutterstock

Data on weekly earnings in the US split by educational level show that wages for those without a degree have declined or stagnated since around 1973, particularly among men. This is the cohort that disproportionately voted for Trump. Globalization has created many benefits, not least to the United States, but these tend to be concentrated among the better educated.

All too often, the service-sector jobs that have filled the gap left by declining manufacturing have been precarious. That means low wages, low security, lack of union representation and few opportunities for moving up the ladder. It is unsurprising that there has been a backlash.

Can’t turn back the clock

So will Trump’s tariffs plan address this? The great tragedy is that there is little reason to think that they will.

The loss of manufacturing jobs is partly about globalisation, which Trump is seeking to reverse. But research shows that trade and globalisation are often more of a scapegoat than a driving force, responsible for only a small chunk of job losses (typically said to be about 10%).

The main cause of manufacturing’s decline is rising productivity. Today it simply requires fewer people to make goods due to the relentless increase in automation and the associated rise in how much each worker produces.

If the whole US trade deficit were rebalanced through expanding domestic industries, this would increase the share of manufacturing employment within the US by about one percentage point, from about 8% today to 9% according to US Bureau of Labor Statistics figures. This is not going to be transformative.

The effects of tariffs are also double-edged. They will probably shift some manufacturing back to the US – but this could be self-defeating. More US steel production is good for workers, but the higher cost of US steel feeds through to higher prices for the products manufactured with it.

This includes the cars Trump obsesses about. Less competitive prices means lower exports and a loss of jobs.

The 1950s were a unique time. By the end of the Second World War, the US was a manufacturing powerhouse, accounting for one-third of the world’s exports while taking only around a tenth of its imports.

There were few other industrialised countries at the time, and these had been flattened by the war. The US alone had avoided this, creating a world of massive demand for US exports since nowhere else had a significant manufacturing base. That was never going to last forever.

The other point about that time in history is that the economic system had been shaped by colonialism. European powers had used their position of power to prevent the rest of the world from industrialising. As those empires were dismantled and the shackles came off, those newly independent countries began their own processes of industrialization.

As for the US today, President Trump is mistaken if he really believes that tariffs will bring a new golden age of manufacturing. The world has changed.

James Scott is reader in international politics, King’s College London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Neither US nor China ready for once-in-a-lifetime trade war – Asia Times

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Donald Trump’s trade war with China is producing one of the most tantalizing split screens in the history of global economics.

On one, the US president is going full bore against China and threatening a 104% tariff. This includes Vice President JD Vance dismissing the 1.4 billion-plus people generating the gross domestic product of Asia’s biggest economy as “Chinese peasants.”

On the other is Trump’s apparent willingness to talk to Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and other nations cowering in fear over reciprocal tariffs.

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba rushed key economic ministers, including Finance Minister Katsunobu Kato, to Washington to try to talk Trump out of tariffs sure to deal a huge blow to Japan’s export-heavy economy. 

As US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Fox News, “Japan is a very important military ally. They’re a very important economic ally, and the US has a lot of history with them. So I would expect that Japan is going to get priority just because they came forward very quickly.”

South Korea is doing the same. On Tuesday, Korea’s acting President Han Duck-soo said he and Trump had a “great call” about tariffs — Trump slapped a 25% tax on Seoul — and potential deals in energy and shipbuilding.

“We have the confines and probability of a great deal for both countries,” Han says. On social media, Trump said, “things are looking good.”

Trouble is, these two split-screen dramas will collide in short order as the “Tariff Man” attempts to knock China, the center of Asian trade, off its economic axis.

At least one thing seems certain: the odds of a giant US-China “grand bargain” trade deal are falling even faster than Trump’s approval rating.

Trump threatening to add another 50% to China’s already crushing 54% tariff level is the last thing Asia needs.

So far, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is pushing back against the Trumpian onslaught. Along with responding in kind to Trump adding a 34% tariff to the earlier 20% — imposing a 34% tax on US goods — Xi is signaling there will be no backing down.

Xi’s China is calling Trump’s bluff in ways Bessent and Trade Representative Jamieson Green clearly didn’t expect. And upping the odds that a clash of the titans in Washington and Beijing might lay waste to the global financial system.

Here, the US should be careful about what it wishes for. Neither nation is as ready for this economic brawl as their respective policymakers seem to project.

A Fitch Ratings downgrade last week reminded investors that China isn’t in a state-of-the-art financial position. Fitch downgraded China’s sovereign rating to ‘A’ from ‘A+’ amid concerns about shaky public finances.

“The downgrade reflects our expectations of a continued weakening of China’s public finances and a rapidly rising public debt trajectory during the country’s economic transition,” says Fitch analyst Jeremy Zook.

Zook adds that “in our view, sustained fiscal stimulus will be deployed to support growth, amid subdued domestic demand, rising tariffs and deflationary pressures. This support, along with a structural erosion in the revenue base, will likely keep fiscal deficits high.”

At the same time, Zook notes, “we expect the government debt/GDP to continue its sharp upward trend over the next few years, driven by these high deficits, ongoing crystallization of contingent liabilities and subdued nominal GDP growth.”

In other words, China has fiscal space to protect its 5% growth. But it’s not unlimited and deploying the stimulus “bazooka” yet again could come at a high cost in the long run.

The US, meanwhile, is carrying a US$36 trillion-plus national debt into this fight as recession talk heats up. Even worse is the self-inflicted nature of the US reckoning to come, one punctuated by a $10 trillion stock market loss so far.

As Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, notes, it “feels like we’re being pushed into recession – it’s recession by design.”

Hedge fund manager Bill Ackman, meanwhile, warns of a self-inflicted “economic nuclear winter” in Trump’s America.

“By placing massive and disproportionate tariffs on our friends and our enemies alike and thereby launching a global economic war against the whole world at once, we’re in the process of destroying confidence in our country as a trading partner,” says the Trump-supporting billionaire founder of Pershing Square.

Ackman adds that “business is a confidence game. The president is losing the confidence of business leaders around the globe. The consequences for our country and the millions of our citizens who have supported the president — in particular low-income consumers who are already under a huge amount of economic stress — are going to be severely negative. This is not what we voted for.”

Larry Fink, head of BlackRock, the globe’s largest asset manager, notes that “most CEOs I talk to would say we are probably in a recession right now.”

Over the weekend, economists at Goldman Sachs assigned a 45% probability of the US falling into a formal recession within the year, up from 35% a week earlier.

Nobel economics prize laureate, Paul Krugman, observes that “Donald Trump burned it all down,” adding that “Trump isn’t really trying to accomplish economic goals. This should all be seen as a dominance display, intended to shock and awe people and make them grovel.”

Only China is not bending the knee, much to Trump’s surprise. The People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s official newspaper, reports that Beijing is no longer “clinging to illusions” of striking a giant trade deal with the US.

Ray Dalio, the billionaire founder of Bridgewater Associates, warned that investors are too narrowly fixated on tariffs and not paying enough attention to the bigger “once-in-a-lifetime” breakdown occurring in major monetary, political and geopolitical orders.

“It is obviously incongruous to have both large trade imbalances and large capital imbalances in a deglobalizing world in which the major players can’t trust that the other major players won’t cut them off from the items they need (which is an American worry) or pay them the money they are owed (which is a Chinese worry),” he wrote on X.

On Tuesday (April 8), China’s commerce ministry criticized the “blackmail nature of the US” trade war and vowed Beijing will “fight till the end.” It called Trump’s threat to layer another 50% tariff on China “a mistake on top of a mistake.”

Hong Kong’s leader John Lee calls Trump’s trade war “reckless” and representative of “ruthless behavior” that’s imperiling the city’s economy.

“The reckless imposition of tariffs affects many countries and regions around the world with huge tax rate increases and covering a wide range of goods, disrupting the world’s economic and trade order, bringing great risks and uncertainties to the world,” Lee says.

These provocations, he adds, have Hong Kong pivoting toward increasing trade with Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

All this has President Xi ramping up moves to bolster the domestic economy. The People’s Bank of China has been cautious about rate cuts this year amid concerns about yuan weakness.

The PBOC has latitude to ease amid weak pricing power in the $18 trillion economy. Especially with China suffering from deflationary forces and fending off rampant “Japanification” talk as China lowers its inflation target to 2% from 3% in 2024.

Fears of sending the yuan tumbling have dominated PBOC discussions. The central bank also wants to safeguard the progress Beijing has made in deleveraging the financial system in recent years. PBOC Governor Pan Gongsheng worries that cutting rates might incentivize bad lending and borrowing decisions.

At the same time, a weaker yuan might trigger defaults among property developers as it becomes more expensive to make bond payments on offshore debt. Already, global investors are keeping close tabs on liquidity problems at major Chinese developers.

Putting yuan internationalization in jeopardy is another concern. For nearly a decade now, Xi’s government has been working to increase the yuan’s use in trade and finance.

Beijing stepped up cooperation with the BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa — and Global South nations to pivot away from the dollar-centric world order.

Pivoting back to the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the past might alarm international funds and tarnish the yuan’s chances of securing global reserve currency status.

A weaker yuan might have Japan, South Korea and other top Asian economies believing they have a green light to weaken exchange rates, too.

That would not go unnoticed by the Trump White House, which is escalating the biggest trade war in world history. If the White House concludes Beijing is manipulating the exchange rate, Trump might target China with even bigger tariffs.

Japan also is in Trumpian harm’s way. Corporate Japan was already reeling over Trump’s 25% import tax on all foreign-made automobiles when he hit the nation with a 24% import tax.

Hence Ishiba dispatching a trade negotiation team to Washington to secure a lower levy or buy Japan some time. Korea, too.

For Seoul, “it’s clear that major export products such as automobiles will be hit hard, and exports to the US through production bases in Vietnam will also be hit hard,” says Park Sang-hyun, an economist at iM Securities.

Late last month, trade ministers for China, Japan and Korea met for the first high-level economic dialogue in five years. The theme: beefing up regional trade as Trump’s White House supersizes its tariffs regime.

The nations’ trade ministers pledged to “closely cooperate for a comprehensive and high-level” process to create a three-way free trade agreement centered on “regional and global trade.”

Trump tossing new tariffs at the global trading system has officials in Seoul and Tokyo so worried that they’re talking despite historical enmities. 

Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party is turning to Beijing as the US, once Japan’s most reliable partner, becomes wildly unpredictable. Ditto for Seoul, which has had a decidedly rocky relationship with the Xi era.

Yet Trump’s apparent determination to hit China Inc harder and harder will send shockwaves through Tokyo, Seoul and beyond. In Asia, the collateral damage zone is growing as we speak.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Why of all days is Xi visiting Cambodia on April 17? – Asia Times

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Was Xi Jinping, the president of China, have chosen a more awkward time to fly into Cambodia than April 17? The 1975 march by the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge into the investment, Phnom Penh, is also commemorated.

Cambodia’s biggest and most divine national holiday, Khmer New Year, occurs when the cities are completely clear for the entire year ( although technically it’s only a vacation between April 13 and April 16 ), and the inhabitants presumably heads to the provinces.

Anyone who has spent more than two years in Cambodia is aware of the rule of silence during the Khmer New Time. The towns are deserted. The stores have been closed. Authorities are taking vacations. The authorities are off to statewide karaoke bars to spend their “tea money.”

Many bureaucrats have complained to me that they will now be working next week, and that they will have to travel back to the capital shortly to control the state visit.

But, the schedule seems to have been made very carefully. The meaning of the Khmer New Season is well known in Beijing. It is aware of how the ASEAN institutions handle their schedules. Cambodia and China both rarely make state visits during the Lunar New Year, and I have trouble remembering when they did during the trip.

So why would an “ironclad friend” decide to ruin your most significant getaway of the year? A demonstration of the energy imbalance, or a show of force? Cambodia’s plan of action was unknown. Politly decline the attend? ” We’re too hectic that week, Mr. Xi, sad. ” How about another time,”

Nevertheless, the visit was planned months in advance, so Beijing’s attitude may not have been the same as it is now. Let’s say the day was chosen in January or February. Beijing was especially angry with Southeast Asian governments at the time for reasons that are too numerous to address.

In January, when news broke that the Chinese artist Wang Xing had been abducted and forced to work in a fraud element in Myanmar, that was particularly true. The Chinese government, which had just launched a glitzy anti-scam advertising campaign, was immediately facing queries it didn’t like.

Therefore, it is possible that Beijing, as a passive-aggressive stretch, chose April 17 as the visitation time a few months ago. It’s not known whether Xi arrives in Phnom Penh in a bad feelings. One can only speculate that Xi will have some heartfelt words to say to the Big Man ( Hun Sen) and the Big Boy ( Hun Manet ) about the Cambodian authorities ‘ continued efforts to stop cyberscamming.

However, international politics have changed. The majority of Donald Trump’s actions since January have probably improved China’s standing in Southeast Asia, not least of which because the White House has confirmed all of Southeast Asia’s worst concerns about Trump 2.0. The environment has been particularly altered by the rough 49 % tariffs applied to Cambodia.

According to one viewpoint, America is now in a solid place to press on Phnom Penh to break its ties with China or to weaken them. Well, but. Yes, it has a solid position, but only if Phnom Penh believes the condition is worse than the cure.

The main lesson I learned from talking to a few people in Phnom Penh in recent days was that Trump’s taxes are more likely to bring Cambodia yet closer to China.

First of all, at the moment, Chinese ideologues aren’t required to do a lot of concoctions. They are absolutely correct when they say that Beijing presently appears much more trustworthy than Washington.

Trump is bullying as well as being unstable. In the unlikely event that Phnom Penh goes to war right away and offers Washington the majority of its needs in exchange for tariff relief, Trump won’t put in even more requirements in six months or a month. Just put, there is no way that Phnom Penh, nor any other country, will ever really believe in Trump.

Next, this isn’t primarily an economic issue. Phnom Penh would ( surely ) have offered much more and concessions to America than it currently does if it were just economic. The nation that purchases more than a third of your imports is nothing more crucial to the business.

However, it’s also social. One can speculate that Beijing is urging Phnom Penh never to “give in” to Washington. In fact, Beijing will likely view this as the best time to break even more relations between Cambodia and the US.

In terms of Phnom Penh, for decades, its reaction to any significant opposition from a foreign government has been to create a fantastic claim, wait for the heat to subside, and then do very small. Discuss loudly, and leave nothing.

Beijing is enraged, however, over Phnom Penh’s failing to combat its connivanced business. Washington is upset about Phnom Penh’s unwavering disregard for its commitment to reconciliation. Trump also has an unusual passion for trade deficits, making him angry.

Cambodia should be damned if it does, and should be damned if it doesn’t, so I don’t see how it can get out of this particular circumstance. ( Maybe, though, the Trump administration will accept the financial/trade reforms Phnom Penh has proposed, but that seems unlikely. )

And when you’re stuck, the natural inclination is to look for the simplest way to get free, which is China for Phnom Penh. According to one cause, at least Xi is showing up, but Trump don’t point to Cambodia on a chart.

This content was originally published on David Hutt’s Cambodia Unfiltered Substack, and it has since been republished. Subscribe to Cambodia Unfiltered right away below.

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