US aircraft carriers adrift as China surges at sea – Asia Times

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Production delays, rising threats and shrinking numbers are putting the US’s traditional aircraft carrier dominance on a knife’s edge just as China surges ahead at sea.

This month, in a hearing before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, US Navy officials acknowledged schedule setbacks for two Ford-class aircraft carriers under construction.

The USS John F Kennedy (CVN-79), which is almost 95% finished, is under heavy pressure to meet its scheduled delivery date of July 2025. This pressure is mainly due to Advanced Weapons Elevators and the Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment issues.

While the initial design issues that plagued the class have been resolved, as demonstrated by the USS Gerald R Ford’s (CVN-78) successful 2024 deployment, production-specific hurdles continue to delay progress on CVN-79.

Meanwhile, construction of the USS Enterprise (CVN-80), currently 44% complete, is also running behind schedule.

The delay is attributed to late-sequenced critical material, which US Navy officials say will “significantly delay delivery past the contractual date.” The US Navy works closely with shipbuilder Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding (HII-NNS) and critical path vendors to mitigate the schedule risks.

Although no updated delivery dates were given for either ship, the testimony emphasized that insights gained are being utilized to enhance operational efficiency in CVN-80 and the USS Doris Miller (CVN-81).

Despite the persistent construction obstacles, the US Navy is concentrating on reaching the quickest route to having a combat-ready aircraft carrier, crew and air wing.

Underscoring the urgency of having the CVN-79 and CVN-80 ready as soon as possible, Tal Manvel mentions in a February 2025 Proceedings article that the Nimitz-class carriers urgently need replacement as they approach decommissioning due to limitations in power, space and weight highlighted during a 1995 system analysis.

Manvel warns that retiring the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) in 2026 and the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) in 2027—without promptly initiating the next Ford-class dual buy for CVN-82 and CVN-83—will reduce the fleet below the legally required 11 aircraft carriers and disrupt shipyard efficiency by creating a costly seven-year production gap.

Despite debates over their relevance, the US’s continued building of aircraft carriers ensures their place as a centerpiece of force projection, regardless of their growing vulnerability.

Underscoring the point, Mark Cancian and other writers mention in a January 2023 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank that the US lost two carriers in a simulation of a US-China conflict over Taiwan.

Further, Steve Balestrieri mentions in a March 2025 article for 1945 that while China and Russia have hypersonic missiles that can sink US carriers, the US has no effective defense against such weapons. Balestrieri adds that stealthy conventional submarines can evade a carrier’s defenses, possibly sinking the latter.

In line with those threats, Cancian and others note that the US only avoided losing its carriers in optimistic Taiwan war scenarios when it didn’t push its fleet forward as a deterrent signal. Nevertheless, US carriers may still have a role to play in such a conflict, provided they are kept out of harm’s way.

In a February 2022 article for The American Sea Power Project, Thomas Mahnken proposes that carriers could be part of an “outside force” in the Second Island Chain that acts as a strategic reserve to prevent China from projecting power beyond the First Island Chain while supporting US offensive operations.

Alternatively, Trevor Phillips-Levine and Andrew Tenbusch mention in a July 2024 article for the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) that the US could use its carriers as a “fleet-in-being” decoy to tie down significant Chinese resources and weapons that could otherwise be used against the US in a war over Taiwan.

While the US may have the world’s largest carrier fleet at 11 ships, that number might not be enough for great power competition with China. Kyle Mizokami mentions in a March 2021 article for Popular Mechanics that during the Cold War, the US had 13 to 15 carriers, compared to today’s minimum mandated strength of 11 ships.

Mizokami points out that the rule of thirds typically governs carrier deployments—one-third of the fleet is on patrol, one-third is returning from patrol, and one-third is undergoing repair and maintenance. With the US having just 11 carriers, he says four might be available for operations, but that number could surge to five or six in an emergency.

As of April 2025, Newsweek reports that the US has three carriers deployed in the Pacific: the USS George Washington (CVN-73), based in Japan; the USS Nimitz (CVN-68), moving into the Western Pacific to replace the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70); and the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), operating in the Eastern Pacific.

Mizokami mentions that the US Atlantic and Pacific carrier fleets are already overstretched and that adding a 12th carrier could alleviate some of the strain. He also suggests that the US could decide that it doesn’t need carriers in certain regions all the time and scale down deployments, but that risks degrading deterrence against potential adversaries such as Iran and China.

But could the US put 12 carriers at sea? In an August 2024 article for The National Interest (TNI), Peter Suciu mentions that a Ford-class carrier costs around US$13.3 billion and requires hundreds of millions of dollars to maintain.

Suciu notes that carriers’ complexity and cost make them tempting targets, and if they were to be damaged or lost in combat, that would mean a waste of billions of dollars and seriously impair US force projection capabilities.

Moreover, a report from the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) from January 2025 indicates that although the US Navy plans to ultimately deploy 12 aircraft carriers as a part of its projected 381-ship battle force fleet, there are considerable obstacles to reaching and maintaining this target.

According to the report, the US Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan projects reaching 12 carriers in only three years within the FY2025–FY2054 timeframe—2025, 2029, and 2032—with the carrier fleet dropping to nine by 2047 in some scenarios. It notes that barriers include budget constraints, delays in ship construction and industrial base limitations.

While the US struggles with building and maintaining its carriers, China seems to be progressing apace.

Kris Osborne mentions in a March 2025 article for 1945 that China, with the world’s largest navy, now has three carriers in the Pacific and is building a fourth, the Type 004, which could be its first nuclear-powered carrier to rival or even be larger than the US Ford class.

Osborne notes that while China faces the same arguments regarding the utility of carriers in modern naval warfare, the construction of the Type 004 shows that it still sees these ships as relevant.

He mentions China’s development of ship-based defenses and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to detect incoming anti-ship missiles, underscoring its military planners’ belief that carriers could provide unique and extremely valuable advantages in war. 

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The real bond vigilantes hounding Trump are Asian – Asia Times

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TOKYO – The dollar extended its biggest plunge in three years on Friday after China raised tariffs on the US to 125% from 84%, a tit-for-tat step that has gold surging, markets everywhere gyrating and investors more uncertain than ever about the global economic and financial outlook.

It’s now US President Donald Trump’s move. Does the Trump 2.0 White House double down and increase its own tariff rate, now at 145%, on Asia’s biggest economy? Trump, after all, has threatened before a 200% levy on certain Chinese products.

Perhaps most interesting about this week is what global investors learned about the Trump 2.0’s pain threshold. Punters learned – to their horror – that Trump is willing to stomach epic stock market losses but not telltale signs of distress in the bond market.

Posterity will show that it wasn’t the US Congress, the judiciary or voters that forced the US president into a more relational tariff policy. It was bond traders.

In Asian trading hours on April 9, the so-called “bond vigilantes” pushed the yield on 30-year US Treasury bonds above 5%, Bloomberg reported. That — and memories of events from the mid-1990s, mid-2000s and the Silicon Valley Bank bust in 2023 — saw Trump beat a hasty and rare retreat on most tariffs.

Yet it’s concerns about the next round of vigilantes to take on the Trump White House that made him blink: Asian central banks.

Central banks in the region hold roughly US$3 trillion of US Treasuries, with Japan and China, the top holders, sitting on a combined $1.9 trillion. If they were to start selling on a significant scale, who could pick up the slack? Other than the largest global banks buying steadily, arguably no one.

That’s why chatter in bond trading pits this week that Japan, China and other Asian monetary authorities might be selling so alarmed top US Treasury Department officials. For years, traders feared China might dump its trove of US T-bills in retaliation against US sanctions and restrictions. That day may have arrived.

China, after all, has an incentive to show that “it won’t hesitate to cause turmoil in the global financial market in order to improve its negotiating power against the US,” says strategist Ataru Okumura at SMBC Nikko Securities.

Reporting was that dire warnings from household name financiers like Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase & Co broke through the Trumpian bubble.

The years Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent spent working in hedge fund circles came in handy. For all Trump’s public bluster, another Long-Term Capital Management-like crash could have been catastrophic for global markets and the US economy.

LTCM’s 1998 collapse was partly due to surging Treasury debt yields. Triggering a repeat in 2025, with Trump’s tariffs upending all asset classes and China flirting with deflation, could make the 2008 Lehman Brothers crash look tame by comparison.

Yet the risk that Trump’s policies might repel Asian central banks is growing by the day. This threat is imparting a unique leverage point for the Bank of Japan, the People’s Bank of China and other top Asian monetary authorities.

Asia’s main leverage over Washington right now is bonds, currencies and trade in services. This latter category refers to America’s deep dependence on Asian markets for exports of financial services, technology and intellectual property.

The mechanics of Trump’s tariff-heavy trade war suggest an imperfect understanding of the US economy’s Asia-related vulnerabilities.

Bond traders, the kinds that take matters into their own hands when a government’s policy mix seems out of whack, are all over the debt and currency realms.

“The bond vigilantes have struck again,” says Ed Yardeni, founder of Yardeni Research, who coined the phrase. “As far as we can tell, at least with respect to US financial markets, they are the only 1.000 hitters in history.”

Even though “the stock vigilantes were clearly telling President Donald Trump that his tariff policy was misguided late last week, his advisers touted falling oil prices and bond yields as ultimately helping Main Street America,” Yardeni notes. “That changed as the 10-year Treasury yield surged.”

Yardeni has been a keen observer of this phenomenon for decades. In 1983, Yardeni said, “bond investors are the economy’s bond vigilantes. … So if the fiscal and monetary authorities won’t regulate the economy, the bond investors will. The economy will be run by vigilantes in the credit markets.”

A decade later, James Carville, then a strategist for US President Bill Clinton, made his famous observation about how he’d like to be reincarnated as the bond market. “You can intimidate everybody,” he quipped.

This was back during balanced-budget negotiations. At the time, debt investors were hypersensitive to the slightest hint, good or bad, about zigs and zags in Washington’s fiscal policy debates.

Today, as the US national debt approaches US$37 trillion, Asia has very valid reasons to worry about Washington’s fiscal health. Trump’s Republican Party, for example, is angling for another multi-trillion tax cut that could hasten the path to the $40 trillion national debt mark.

At the same time, disarray in Congress has lawmakers playing politics over the debt ceiling and funding the government even more so than in 2011. That was the year S&P Global Ratings yanked away Washington’s AAA credit rating.

That market-rattling step came two years after then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao voiced concern about Washington’s trustworthiness to safeguard vast Chinese state wealth sitting in dollars. Wen was particularly worried about the scale of bailouts amid the Lehman Brothers crisis.
 
“We have made a huge amount of loans to the United States,” Wen said in 2009. “Of course, we are concerned about the safety of our assets. To be honest, I am a little bit worried.” He urged Washington “to honor its words, stay a credible nation and ensure the safety of Chinese assets.”

At the time, the US debt was less than $12 trillion, two-and-a-half times lower than when Fitch Ratings downgraded the US in 2023. Today, Moody’s Investors Service is mulling whether to maintain Washington’s last AAA rating with the US debt three times what it was in 2009.

There are long-standing fears that Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s government might dump dollars as a retaliation play against Trump’s tariffs, now at 145% after a series of escalations.

It would be a Pyrrhic victory, of course. Any surge in borrowing costs would boomerang back China’s way as US households suddenly consume less.

Nor would it be in Beijing’s interest if global investors decided the US budget deficit is a train wreck in slow motion. The potential contagion effects could make the 2008 Lehman Brothers crisis seem tame by comparison.
 
Even so, Xi’s Communist Party may have calculated that the US has far more to lose in the event of a Global Financial Crisis 2.0. China pulling the plug now would catch US markets decidedly off-balance, amplifying the fallout.

In 1997, then-Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto admitted to a New York audience that “several times in the past, we have been tempted to sell large lots of US Treasuries” to make a point. One such episode was the heated auto negotiations a few years earlier.

This time, the intrigue involves the Trumpian turmoil already on full display.

“Why is this happening?” Yardeni asks. “Fixed-income investors may be starting to worry that the Chinese and other foreigners might start selling their US Treasuries.” The bond market, he adds, worries “the Trump administration may be playing with liquid nitro.”

Count the ways this White House might damage the dollar’s credibility and the perceived sanctity of Treasuries, the linchpin of global finance.

They include: sticking with an inflationary tariffs arms race; meddling with the Federal Reserve’s independence; neutering the Internal Revenue Service; and seeking trillions of new tax cuts that Trump World assumes Washington’s Asian bankers will dutifully finance.

This last assumption is highly dubious considering reports Asian central banks are already limiting their exposure to the US. But eyeing Trump’s exploits — which could easily imperil America’s credit rating — from 7,000 miles away is causing serious anxiety among Asian policymakers.

One irony is Asia watching Trump’s government do many of the things the US chastised Asia for a quarter of a century ago. Back in 1997-98, when Hashimoto was spooking bond traders, US officials were counseling Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila and Seoul against crony capitalism, oligarch-dominated economic systems and extreme opacity.

Now it’s Asia’s turn to watch Washington torch its once-vaunted financial institutions with bewildering speed. This has policymakers busily gaming out how Trump’s tariffs and general erraticism might upend their economies. For now, it seems the trauma that Trump has delivered to stocks might be less than it will be for debt.

“Though stocks rose following Trump’s pause, Treasury yields haven’t fully recovered from the sharp moves of earlier this week, reflecting some potential damage to the US economic brand,” notes Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group.

“The dollar has continued falling, too. The political ramifications of this are potentially more widespread than any market drops, as the higher yields make it more difficult for small businesses to access loans, with knock-on effects for the US economy,” Bremmer said.

The ways Trump is imperiling US growth as alarm bells ring about a possible recession would normally cheer debt markets. But given the inflation fallout from tariffs, bond traders are viewing Trump 2.0 policies dimly.

Markets worry the Trump administration has “arguably shown a greater tolerance for causing a recession than many might have thought,” notes Thomas Mathews, head of Asia-Pacific markets at Capital Economics. But the bond-market fallout is forcing Team Trump to turn tail.

The question is when the biggest of the bond vigilantes – central banks – start actively selling Treasuries. Japan and China are Washington’s biggest bankers, followed by the UK, Luxembourg, Cayman Islands, Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, Switzerland, Taiwan and Hong Kong.

If markets got a whiff of any of their central banks either aggressively selling debt or just halting new purchases, the result could be bedlam in global credit markets. If Trump understands this risk, he’s done little to demonstrate it to the Asian central bankers who effectively hold the deed to the US economy.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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China is entering a golden age of innovation Asia Times

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This article is the second part of a commentary published by Guancha.cn. Hao Ping, which means “good commentary”, is the Guancha column’s title. Asia Times editorial elucidation notes are in brackets. It is republished with permission.

Many people in China realized that a long-term change was now taking place in the country when it first witnessed a wave of technological innovations, ranging from movies and video games to arbitrary intelligence and modern fighter jets.

China’s rapid change is brought on by its tactical resolve, market vitality, and societal cohesion. Although this transition has been continued, it is eventually being made known to the world. Its final outcome may be more than what people may think. It&nbsp will continue to develop and establish a new era of industrial society.

DeepSeek’s founder, Liang Wenfeng, previously provided a compelling description of this quick change.

In a distant Guangdong city in the 1980s, I was raised in a small town. My parents taught in the major institution. Individuals had a lot of opportunities to make funds in Guangdong in the 1990s. Some parents came to our home and said that knowledge was futile. These beliefs have now fully changed. Because it has become more difficult to make money, even if you can’t afford to work as a cab driver. Everyone has changed in just one era.

Hardcore technology will continue to be a key component of the future. Because society demands substantial outcomes, this might not be widely understood at this time. Society’s overall attitudes will change when those who achieve hardcore development are powerful and recognized. More effective situations and more time are required.

Two notable guests to the American National Exhibition in Moscow’s Sokolniki Park during the summer of 1959 were US Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

The two engaged in the historical” Home Discussion” in front of a model apartment adorned with contemporary furniture and appliances.

According to Nixon, the majority of American blue-collar employees could afford for a home and its devices, with homes generally being replaced every 20 years as consumers switched to better ones. He claimed that the British program is meant to profit from recent discoveries and methods.

But, Khrushchev defied Nixon’s argument and focused his criticism on the economic benefits of supply. The goal of the Cold War [the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 ] provided a gradual solution to this discussion a few years later.

American consumer goods improvements from McDonald’s to Coca-Cola, Hollywood to Nike proved more successful than [the Soviet Union’s ] missiles or nuclear weapons in influencing the world’s thoughts and fostering a common desire for a particular way of life.

What’s great about this state is that America started&nbsp, the custom that allows the richest consumers to purchase basically the same things as the poorest, as Andy Warhol, the father of pop art previously said.

” You can be watching Coca-Cola on television and realize that Liz Taylor and the president both consume Coke, and you also realize that you can also consume Coke.” No amount of money you substitute for the bottle of Coke the arse on the spot is drinking, because a Coke is a Coke. All Brand are the same and are great, too.

The modern society Nixon had happily promoted as the pillar of America’s greatest victory in the battle for hearts and minds.

Due to their better value and lower costs, Chinese goods, from TikTok, Shein, BYD, and DJI, are now amazing.

China could safely state that:” The Chinese system is designed to take advantage of new ideas and new methods if a fresh” Kitchen Controversy” were to take place immediately. Some Americans, or those who support America’s ideology, may become provoked by making this claim.

They might say that “innovation and creativity cannot be planned, followed by obscurity theories of Ronald Coase, a British economist ( 1910-2013 ), whose theories focused on the nature and effectiveness of companies, creating an” amusement atmosphere.”

People made fun of the poor scholar Kong Yiji, who likes to use outdated Confucius words, in a brief story by Chinese author Lu Xun in 1919, which created an “amusement atmosphere.”

Why did the “visible hand” [which refers to the Chinese government’s significant position and direct involvement in the economy ] defeat the “invisible hand” suggested by British economist Adam Smith in 1759?

The change in Made in China is proving to be more and more obvious. Although corporate profits overwhelmingly orient America’s top talent toward a select few industries, China’s professional policy has evolved way beyond pre-existing stereotypes.

The government is focused on addressing market problems and sharing development costs with specific businesses by fully utilizing market forces and empowering private companies. Additionally, US socialism has long been shifting its focus away from the manufacturing industry.

The impact of China’s industrial policy is powerfully illustrated by the contrast between US and Chinese R&D purchases.

National businesses invested$ 692.7 billion in R&D in 2022, while China invested$ 354 billion, according to the US National Science Foundation. Even after purchasing power parity was adjusted, the distance was important.

However, a closer examination reveals the uneven distribution of the United States ‘ investment in development: just slightly over half of its business R&amp, D paying went to production, and about one-third of that amount was invested in the pharmaceutical industry.

In contrast, manufacturing received over 80 % of China’s corporate R&amp, D investment, with the information and communication technology ( ICT) sector accounting for 20 % of the investment, making it the largest investment among all other manufacturing sectors.

The investment plan that” concentrates on a particular business and diversifies on companies” not only ensures a healthier supply of skills and financial resources, but also creates an environment where Chinese companies may leverage comparative advantages, much like the old strategy of” Tian Ji’s horse racing. ” &nbsp,

Chinese strategist Sun Bin suggested that Tian Ji, a general of the Qi state, arrange the horses ‘ deployments so that Tian’s strongest horse could defeat Tian’s average horse in the King’s weakest horse. The King lost the race overall, despite the fact that Tian’s weakest horse was still ahead of the King’s strongest horse. Sun was later appointed as the King’s top military adviser.

What is more crucial is that the collaboration between the traditional and the emerging industrial sectors can foster synergy and foster effective innovation.

The rise of China’s new energy vehicle industry is a good illustration of how the country’s ICT and machinery manufacturing sectors have contributed to this growth.

China is currently at the height of innovation. A diverse corporate ecosystem is being supported by billions of yuan in annual R&amp, D investments, both domestically and internationally, and billions of yuan in STEM graduates from its universities.

Difficulty supergiants, hundreds of unicorns, and nearly 15, 000 specialized and creative “little giants” are included in the ecosystem. ” Made in China” or” Created in China” are developing in terms of depth and resilience.

This multidimensional innovation network avoids the stifling of central planning in the Soviet Union and the harmful effects of America’s laissez-faire mindset. A new paradigm of modernization is born out of this. [ The Kitchen Debate ] in 1959 appeared to be a true prophecy.

The world is witnessing a quiet but profound paradigm shift when Chinese new-energy vehicles shine at the Munich Auto Show, DJI’s drones fly over the Amazon rainforest, and TikTok fosters a sense of belonging among young people across ideological and linguistic divides.

This is neither a straightforward race for technological supremacy nor a ideological conflict in the vein of the Cold War. Instead, it is humanity’s reimagination of innovation and progress that is inclusive in the digital era.

A development miracle can occur when technological innovation becomes accessible and affordable, and industrial upgrading opens up new opportunities. This is the lesson of” Made in China 2025.” &nbsp,

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Detained on arrival: Why US is no longer safe for tourists – Asia Times

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One of the best three countries in the world has the highest visitor numbers. For decades, foreign visitors have drawn drawn from cities like San Francisco, New York, and Chicago, as well as national parks like Yosemite. In addition, it had 66.5 million readers in 2023, which is expected to be higher than that number in 2024 due to its position as a worldwide business powerhouse.

However, a lot has changed in recent months, and the statistics for 2025 may not be as accurate. The global attitudes toward the US are starting to change as a result of Donald Trump’s reelection as president in 2024, along with the repercussions of changes in international politics and relationships, as well as internal cultural shifts, attitudes that appear to be having an impact on tourists ‘ desire to travel there.

In a recent report released by tourism economics, inbound travel to the US is now projected to decline by 5.5 % this year as opposed to the nearly 9 % that was previously anticipated. Further tax and trade wars could lead to further declines in global tourism, which could result in a$ 18 billion annual decline in visitor spending by 2025.

There is already some proof of go delays. The number of Canadians driving across the border at some intersections has decreased by up to 45 %, on some days, since Trump announced 25 % tariffs on many American goods. The main source of foreign visitors to the US is Canada. As demand declines, Air Canada has announced it will start reducing airlines to some US vacation destinations, including Las Vegas, starting in March.

Leger, a researcher in French markets, found that 36 % of Indians who planned trips to the United States had previously canceled them in a March poll. In comparison to the same period last year, customer tickets on Canada to US pathways have decreased by over 70 %, according to statistics from the aviation analytics firm OAG.

The US Travel Association issued a warning that even a 10 % drop in inbound travel from Canada could cause a US$ 2.1 billion in spending loss, putting 140, 000 hospitality jobs in danger.

An unfriendly setting

Some prospective visitors have cited an unfriendly political climate as a drawback of visiting the US, including irrational language about immigrants, LGBTQ people, and hostile rhetoric. According to the Tourism Economics statement, “polarizing Trump Administration policies and rhetoric” are also cited as a contributing factor to go omissions.

Travelers from western Europe, which accounted for 37 % of all overseas travel to the US last year, may be affected by other factors, such as this. These include US taxes that drive domestic prices higher, and the US government’s alleged co-operation with Russia in the Ukraine conflict.

YouTube video

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Visits by Canadians to the US are declining.

According to a study conducted by YouGov in March, attitudes toward the US have changed in Western Europe since Trump’s election in November.

More than half of Britons ( 53 % ), Germans ( 56 % ), Slovaks ( 63 % ), and Danish ( 74 % ) currently have negative views of the US. The US desirability rate is at its lowest level since polling began in November 2016 in five of the seven polled nations.

Borders security measures

Tourists might get turned off by some well-known incidents at the US borders. A European woman was subject to handcuffs and more than ten days of detention by US Customs Enforcement in March due to a immigration issue.

A French visitor was detained the same month after attempting to maintain her immigration at the US-Mexico border. She was imprisoned for 12 days in filled jail cells and even put in stores during the confinement.

Mexico has the second-largest outbound traveling market in the US. According to Tourism Economics, concerns about new border police regulations will pique the interest of prospective Mexican visitors. Mexican travel to the US decreased by 3 % during Trump’s second term in office. By the end of February this year, Mexico’s air journey had now decreased by 6 % compared to 2024.

Some nations, including Canada, have updated their journey tips for the US. For instance, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office updated its guidance for customers to the US on March 15 by enforcing that “you may be liable to be arrested or detained if you break the rules.”

The tips in its earlier form, which was updated in February, made no mention of imprisonment or detention. Following some Europeans who were just detained for weeks by US frontier officials, Germany has updated its travel advice.

Numerous Western nations, including France, Germany, Denmark, and Norway, have issued specific travel instructions to trans and non-binary citizens as a result of US officials ‘ mandate that travellers state their biological sex at birth on card applications.

This comes as the US stops issuing documents with an X indicator, which are frequently used by those identifying as non-binary, for its own people.

directed somewhere

Other sites are experiencing a spike in interest as hundreds of travelers make US travel arrangements. As Canadians relocate business and leisure travel from the US, hotels in Bermuda have reported a rise in inquiries, with some predicting a 20 % increase in visitor revenue.

According to some reports, Europe has seen a 32 % increase in summer reservations compared to last year, with rental properties experiencing a 32 % increase in this category.

The US, Canada, and Mexico-based teams ‘ participation in the 2026 female’s Fifa World Cup are now gaining in popularity due to visa and entry restrictions that are already causing problems for fans and players.

Some nations, like Brazil, Turkey, and Colombia, have up to 700 time to apply for permits. The 2028 Olympic Games in Los Angeles have also raised questions for the International Olympic Committee, despite US officials insisting that” America may be opened.”

The United States is in danger of losing its charm as a top holiday destination as a result of growing card difficulties, stronger border enforcement, and growing fears over human right and anti-minority language. The long-term effects on the country’s tourism sector may prove challenging to slow.

Ross Bennett-Cook is a PhD scientist at Leeds Beckett University’s Carnegie School of Sport.

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Trump has no monopoly on trying to restore vanished factory jobs – Asia Times

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The first ten days of April have seen the United States single-handedly rewrite the underlying paradigm for global trade – but while it is fair to say that the methods are extreme, the underlying goal of the policy is not unique to the US.

Indeed, the push to support, and expand, domestic manufacturing through policy intervention is experiencing a resurgence not seen since the 1970s.

Many people believe the COVID pandemic exposed weaknesses in global supply chains. In reality, the pandemic simply accelerated an existing trend of slowing of integration.

Growing concerns around trade wars and risks from climate shock existed prior to COVID with both policymakers and firms rethinking globalisation strategies.

Countries were also becoming concerned about the manufacturing dominance of China and the potential weaponisation of economic activity.

The risks of rising concentration

The expansion of international trade has led to massive efficiencies in production.

But it has also led to concentration of certain sectors in certain regions. Examples include software development in Silicon Valley, semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan and critical minerals processing in China.

This geographic concentration started to raise concerns for many countries. Reasons include climate events disrupting supply chains, pandemics and increasingly, geopolitical concerns.

In response to the rise in economic concentration, countries as diverse as Japan, South Korea, the European Union, India, Brazil and the US introduced policy actions to promote or return certain critical sectors to domestic production.

Australia’s Future Made In Australia plan is a prime example of this.

Trade disruptions

Even before the Trump tariffs, the US and other countries were alarmed by China’s control over key manufacturing sectors and its associated ability to disrupt trade and commerce.

Australia experienced this first-hand when China imposed significant tariffs on wine and barley in response to Australia’s call for a Covid inquiry.

China’s willingness to use its economic position was demonstrated on Friday when it announced not just retaliatory tariffs, but export restrictions on seven categories of rare earth minerals. These are critical to strategic US sectors affecting companies like Apple and defense contractor Lockheed Martin.

Government support on the rise

This shift to increased economic resilience through self-reliance has led to a big surge in government intervention through industrial policies.

The objective of industrial policy is to target certain sectors in order to change the structure of economic activity within a country. It uses government policy to promote investment in sectors deemed under-served by markets.

While all countries have used some level of industrial policy, historically it was mainly confined to developing economies. It has been used sparingly since the 1970s. Between 2009 and 2017, the total number of industrial policies used by countries was less than 200.

Between 2017 and 2023 the use of industrial policy increased nine-fold. In 2023, there were roughly 2,500 industrial policy interventions put in place with two-thirds introduced by advanced economies. Almost 48% were concentrated in three: China, the EU and the US.

Intervening in markets

Generally, industrial policy has been out of favor with mainstream economists. It is very hard to get right as it relies on an in-depth knowledge of industries as well as an ability to predict the future.

Providing funding for one sector means less funding available for others. This could undermine new technologies or other as-yet unseen opportunities. It involves shifting resources from existing, efficient uses to less efficient uses.

It rarely works. A prime example: the many countries that have spent billions of dollars trying to recreate their own domestic Silicon Valleys with no success.

However, Trump is trying to do just that, on an economy-wide scale, mainly through tariffs. The tariffs announced also imply the US will go it alone. The approach takes fragmentation to a new level, where bilateral negotiations are the name of the game.

Shifting global alliances

Meanwhile the response from other nations such as Canada, Southeast Asian economies and even Europe is to diversify and form new alliances without the US.

Indeed, the Canadian Prime Minister’s first trip overseas was not, as tradition dictates, to the US, but to Europe and the UK, which he dubbed “reliable” partners.

Becoming more isolated and pushing other countries to China may not be what the US intends, but it is happening.

Last week, Japan and South Korea announced a joint strategy with China to promote regional trade. The EU’s trade representative went to Beijing shortly after the tariff announcement where the two nations announced plans to “deepen trade and investment” ties.

The risks of highly integrated supply chains in the face of security concerns, or changes in a trading partner’s domestic policy, have become glaringly clear.

How countries choose to address these concerns, especially through the widespread use of industrial policy, will create further disruption to markets. While it is considered politically expedient for security concerns, this will raise prices and limit choice in domestic markets. As the old adage reminds us, there is no free lunch.

Susan Stone is the Credit Union SA chair of economics at the University of South Australia.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Lingering resentment at unequal treaties stiffens Chinese resolve – Asia Times

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Donald Trump has partially walked back on his so-called “liberation day” tariffs on nearly all US imports after fears mounted that the move would result in a global recession and much higher borrowing costs for the US government. On Wednesday, April 9, a mere 13 hours after his higher rate of “reciprocal tariffs” had come into effect, Trump announced they would be paused for 90 days.

“I thought that people were jumping a little bit out of line, they were getting yippy, you know … a little bit afraid,” Trump said to reporters outside the White House. Markets soared immediately upon hearing the news.

But at the same time, a volatile new stage in America’s trade war with China has emerged. The White House has excluded China from the pause and has hiked tariffs on all Chinese imports to 125%. This, Trump says, is because Beijing has shown “disrespect” to Washington and global markets.

Beijing, which has declared it will “fight to the end if the US side is bent on going down the wrong path”, was quick to respond. It has announced duties of 84% on American products and services, and has even floated the possibility of banning the import of Hollywood films.

What China’s response has shown is that it is no longer the same country as it was in 2017, when Trump managed to obtain some trade concessions from it by imposing tariffs. Beijing seems more willing to strike back at Washington, as well as showing signs of being more proactive in its response to American measures.

The impact of China’s response has not yet been fully realized, but tariffs have already raised the specter of increased prices in the US. Many of the clothing and consumer electronics that Americans buy are shipped from China. It’s possible that far from boosting Trump’s popularity, these tariffs may eventually end up reversing it.

At a fundraising dinner in Washington, less than a day before he shelved plans to hike tariffs on US trading partners, Trump insisted: “I know what the hell I’m doing.” But his subsequent loss of face in pausing tariffs for other countries may mean he has no option but to double down on a tit-for-tat trade war with China.

China is his administration’s go-to villain, and any delay or reversal in responding to Chinese retaliation will be a humiliation to Trump’s strongman image. This suggests a tumultuous period ahead for relations between China and the US.

Expect more hostility

The tariffs will probably have a mobilizing effect on the Chinese population. A 2022 survey on public opinion in China found that people born after 1990 are more likely than previous generations to hold an unfavorable view of the US. The survey concluded that Trump’s actions during his first term were much more to blame than propaganda.

Beijing has also traditionally invoked the history of the “unequal treaties” forced upon its ailing Qing dynasty in the late 19th century as a means to mobilise its population against western policies. This has been aided by how the economic demands made by Trump to China are, in the mind of the Chinese leadership, reminiscent of the demands made by the western powers of that period.

Fears of again falling prey to foreign powers play a significant role in Beijing’s policies, encapsulated by what is known as China’s “never again mentality.” This mentality could be used as a means to unify the Chinese population against an outside enemy in a way similar to how many US politicians have attempted to cast China as a foe.

Beijing appears to be banking on the Chinese population’s supposed ability to withstand greater hardships than Western consumers as being able to give it a key advantage over Washington. However, with China’s prosperity being a comparatively recent development, this ability will be put to the test.

Trump’s tariffs against traditional American allies will also play into Beijing’s hands on the international stage. Tokyo has discussed reducing its holdings of American treasuries, while simultaneously bolstering trade ties with China. These moves would have been unthinkable even a year ago – Japan has long been a key US ally and a regional rival of China.

Equally unthinkable is the possibility that the EU will follow a similar path. Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sanchez, has called on Brussels to review its relationship with China. Moves aimed at sidelining China may end up isolating the US instead.

And, perhaps most concerningly, the tariffs may also undermine America’s ability to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. One of the key factors deterring an invasion was the threat of a 100% tariff on Chinese goods. With Trump’s tariffs on China already exceeding this, Beijing has less incentive to not go after Taipei.

What liberation day has shown us is that the Chinese-American relationship has entered a stage of protracted competition, a phase that Beijing has been preparing for over the past decade. Faced with a choice between humiliation on the international stage or economic disaster at home, it would appear neither side is willing to back down.

Tom Harper is a lecturer in international relations at the University of East London.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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US-China trade war: economic fallout and strategic realignment – Asia Times

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The intensifying trade war between the United States and China has moved beyond a bilateral economic dispute, evolving into a global geopolitical confrontation with profound implications for East Asia. The economic fallout from escalating tariffs is expected to have wide-ranging consequences, including the restructuring of global supply chains and a realignment of strategic relationships in the region.

Although the US launched the trade war in an effort to curb China’s economic rise, the outcomes thus far indicate a reversal of those goals – strengthening China’s position in global trade, eroding US influence among key regional allies, and accelerating the shift toward a multipolar order in East Asia.

It is time for Washington to pause and fundamentally reconsider its strategy.

Disruption of the post-war global trading order

The US-China trade war now represents the most significant disruption to the global trading system since the formation of the post-World War II liberal economic order. Triggered by the imposition of steep tariffs – up to 125% by the US and 84% by China – the conflict now affects over $650 billion in bilateral trade, encompassing a wide range of consumer and industrial sectors.

And this may be just the opening salvo. No one can say with certainty where both countries will ultimately end up, as neither side appears willing to back down

Initially intended to rebalance trade flows and counter China’s perceived economic aggression, the trade war has instead generated widespread economic uncertainty and strategic dislocation – especially across East Asia.

The World Trade Organization projects an 80% reduction in US-China trade volumes, sending shockwaves through global markets. The OECD has revised its global GDP growth forecasts downward, predicting 3.1% growth in 2025 and 3.0% in 2026. US economic growth is expected to decline to 2.2% in 2025 and farther to 1.6% in 2026, reflecting not only trade-related headwinds but also rising inflation and waning investor confidence.

Tariffs have driven up import costs, particularly in sectors such as electronics, pharmaceuticals and retail. Financial markets have reacted negatively, with major stock indices experiencing notable declines.

Economic forecasts are becoming increasingly cautious, with growing concerns about the possibility of a recession. These trends point toward a heightened risk of stagflation – a troubling mix of economic stagnation and rising inflation.

Multinational corporations have begun reconfiguring their supply chains, shifting some production to other alternative countries. However, these alternatives lack China’s scale, efficiency, and integration, leaving global supply chains in flux and emerging markets vulnerable to further disruptions. The OECD warns that continued fragmentation could inflict lasting damage on global productivity.

China’s resilience and strategic position

Contrary to US expectations, China has not been economically crippled. As of 2024, it remains the world’s leading trading nation, accounting for 14.5% of global exports – far surpassing the United States’ 8.5%. Exports to the United States make up only 12.3% of China’s total exports, which amounted to almost $3.6 trillion.

This underscores Beijing’s strategic diversification and deep integration into global value chains. US leadership may be overestimating the significance of American imports in sustaining the economic strength demonstrated by the Chinese economy.

China supplies the US with critical goods, including semiconductors, rare earth minerals, and pharmaceuticals. Any further restrictions by Beijing in these sectors would have immediate and severe repercussions for US industry.

Strategic implications in East Asia

East Asia is witnessing a quiet but significant realignment. Major US allies such as South Korea and Japan are increasingly drawn toward China due to its economic size and geographic proximity. In 2023, China-South Korea trade reached $310 billion, and China-Japan trade exceeded $330 billion. In contrast, both countries traded only around $230 billion with the United States. This trend underscores a shift driven by economic pragmatism over ideology.

The ongoing trade war has started eroding the credibility of US-led alliances in the region. Participation by South Korea in China-led initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) signals a growing tilt toward Beijing.

Economic dependence is translating into diplomatic flexibility, with potential implications for long-standing security alignments. The region may never be the same again.

Should Washington continue with protectionist policies without offering viable economic alternatives, regional allies may begin to hedge their bets. This could result in reduced participation in US-led defense initiatives, joint military exercises, and diplomatic forums – marking a profound transformation in the region’s geopolitical landscape.

The US may be overestimating regional countries’ commitment to shared political values. That bond may not be strong enough to hold them together in the face of mounting economic hardships and rapidly shifting geopolitical dynamics.

US miscalculation and the rise of a multipolar Asia

Instead of curbing China’s rise, the trade war is catalyzing a broader realignment. China’s economic resilience, assertive diplomacy, and expanded global trade ties are accelerating its emergence as a rival superpower. Meanwhile, the US risks strategic overreach and diminishing relevance in a region it once dominated.

The Cold War-era architecture of US leadership is increasingly ill-suited for a world defined by economic interdependence. China sees this confrontation not merely as a trade dispute but as a strategic test of its national resolve. Far from backing down, Beijing is doubling down – confident that it can emerge from the conflict stronger and more globally engaged.

The way forward

The notion that the United States can bring China to its knees through a trade war is outdated. That window closed a long time ago. China is now the world’s largest trading nation – a status it has held for over a decade – and its share of global exports reflects a deeply embedded position within global supply chains.

It is crucial for American leadership to realistically assess the current role of US trade with China in driving China’s continued growth. Washington appears to be stuck in the past, when American investment and trade played a major role in China’s economic expansion. Today, China’s growth is increasingly sustained by diversified global partnerships and domestic innovation.

In 2024, China’s exports to the US accounted for a small portion of its total exports, underscoring its reduced dependence on the American market. On the other hand, the US remains heavily reliant on Chinese imports across critical sectors, from electronics and pharmaceuticals to rare earth minerals and consumer goods. A disruption in Chinese exports would paralyze major American companies and fuel inflationary pressures.

Moreover, China holds the ability to retaliate by targeting key US exports such as agricultural products, aircraft and luxury goods, which would hurt American farmers, exporters, and manufacturers. This could ripple across global markets, destabilize supply chains, and weaken US competitiveness.

In this multipolar landscape, China is no longer a subordinate player. It is a superpower with diversified markets, resilient trade networks, and growing geopolitical reach. The US strategy of using trade as a weapon – originally intended to constrain China – is now ironically enabling its rise.

Given these realities, the United States must fundamentally rethink its trade and strategic posture. Rather than continuing to rely on punitive tariffs, Washington should adopt a strategy of constructive engagement that reflects the complexities of a multipolar, interconnected global economy.

This requires a renewed commitment to work through multilateral trade institutions, ensure fair competition and promote transparency. Simultaneously, the US must lead the formation of inclusive regional trade agreements that offer its allies viable economic alternatives to dependence on China – thereby reinforcing trust and shared prosperity.

At the same time, Washington should deepen its partnerships in the  region by investing in joint ventures in digital infrastructure, green technology and next-generation innovation.

Domestically, the United States must enhance its economic strength by investing heavily in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, clean energy, and workforce development. These sectors will define global leadership in the 21st century, and the US must lead not merely through power, but by setting the pace of innovation.

Ultimately, preserving American competitiveness and credibility requires a comprehensive and forward-looking strategy. The challenge is no longer about winning a trade war with China – it is about whether the United States remains a central architect of the future global order or is gradually forced to cede that role to China

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This chart shows why Trump backflipped on tariffs – Asia Times

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The Trump administration has announced a 90-day pause on its plan to impose so-called “reciprocal” tariffs on nearly all US imports. But the pause does not extend to China, where import duties will rise to around 125%.

The move signals a partial retreat from what had been shaping up as a broad and aggressive trade war. For most countries, the US will now apply a 10% baseline tariff for the next three months. But the White House made clear that its tariffs on Chinese imports will remain in place.

So why did President Trump back away from the broader tariff push? The answer is simple: the economic cost to the US was too high.

Our economic model shows the fallout, even after the ‘pause’

Using a global economic model, we have been estimating the macroeconomic consequences of the Trump administration’s tariff plans as they have developed.

The following table shows two versions of the economic effects of the tariff plan:

  • “pre-pause” – as the plan stood immediately before Wednesday’s 90-day pause, under a scenario in which all countries retaliate except Australia, Japan and South Korea (which said they would not retaliate)
  • “post-pause” after reciprocal tariffs were withdrawn.

As is clear, the US would have faced steep and immediate losses in employment, investment, growth, and most importantly, real consumption, the best measure of household living standards.

Heavy costs of the tariff war

Under the pre-pause scenario, the US would have seen real consumption fall by 2.4% in 2025 alone. Real gross domestic product (GDP) would have declined by 2.6%, while employment falls by 2.7% and real investment (after inflation) plunges 6.6%.

These are not trivial adjustments. They represent significant contractions that would be felt in everyday life, from job losses to price increases to reduced household purchasing power. Since the current US unemployment rate is 4.2%, these results suggest that for every three currently unemployed Americans, two more would join their ranks.

Our modelling shows the damage would not just be short-term. Across the 2025–2040 projection period, US real consumption losses would have averaged 1.2%, with persistent investment weakness and a long-term decline in real GDP.

It is likely that internal economic advice reflected this kind of outlook. The decision to pause most of the tariff increases may well be an acknowledgement that the policy was economically unsustainable and would result in a permanent reduction in US global economic power. Financial markets were also rattled.

The scaled-back plan: still aggressive on China

The new arrangement announced on April 9 scales the higher tariff regime back to a flat 10% for about 70 countries but keeps the full weight of tariffs on Chinese goods at around 125%. Rates on Canadian and Mexican imports remain at 25%.

In response, China has announced an 84% tariff on US goods.

The table’s “post-pause” column summarizes the results of the scaled-back plan if the pause becomes permanent. For consistency, we assume all countries except Australia, Japan and Korea retaliate with tariffs equal to those imposed by the US.

As is clear from the “post-pause” results, lower US tariffs, together with lower retaliatory tariffs, equal less damage for the US economy.

Tariffs applied uniformly are less distortionary, and significant retaliation from just one major partner (China) is easier to absorb than a broad global response.

However, the costs will still be high. The US is projected to experience a 1.9% drop in real consumption in 2025, driven by lower employment and reduced efficiency in production. Real investment is projected to fall by 4.8%, and employment by 2.1%.

Perhaps we should not be surprised that the costs are still so high. In 2022, China, Canada and Mexico accounted for almost 45% of all US goods imports, and many countries were already facing 10% reciprocal tariffs in the “pre-pause” scenario. Trump’s tariff pause has not changed duty rates for these countries.

YouTube video

[embedded content]

US President Donald Trump discusses the 90-day tariff pause.

What does this mean for Australia?

Much of the domestic commentary in Australia has focused on the risk of collateral damage from a US-China trade war. Given Australia’s economic ties to both countries, it is a reasonable concern.

But our modelling suggests that Australia may actually benefit modestly. Under both scenarios, Australia’s real consumption rises slightly, driven by stronger investment, improved terms of trade (a measure of our export prices relative to import prices), and redirection of trade flows.

One mechanism is what economists call trade diversion: if Chinese or European exporters find the US market less attractive, they may redirect goods to Australia and other open markets.

At the same time, reduced global demand for capital, especially in the US and China, means lower interest rates globally. That stimulates investment elsewhere, including in Australia. In our model, Australian real investment rises under both scenarios, leading to small but sustained gains in GDP and household consumption.

These results suggest that, at least under current policy settings, Australia is unlikely to suffer significant direct effects from the tariff increases.

However, rising investor uncertainty is a risk for both the global and Australian economies, and this is not factored into our modelling. In the space of a single week, the Trump administration has whipsawed global investor confidence through three major tariff announcements.

A temporary reprieve

Tariffs appear to be central to the administration’s economic program. So Trump’s decision to pause his broader tariff agenda may not signal a shift in philosophy and may just be a tactical retreat.

The updated strategy, high tariffs on China and lower ones elsewhere, might reflect an attempt to refocus on where the administration sees its main strategic concern while avoiding unnecessary blowback from allies and neutral partners.

Whether this narrower approach proves durable remains to be seen. The sharpest economic pain has been deferred. Whether it returns depends on how the next 90 days play out.

James Giesecke is professor, Centre of Policy Studies and the Impact Project, Victoria University and Robert Waschik is associate professor and deputy director, Centre of Policy Studies, Victoria University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Pakistan mercilessly removing its Afghan refugee crisis – Asia Times

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Since November 2023, Pakistan’s Illegal Foreigners Return Program ( IFRP ) has resulted in the deportation of over 800, 000 Afghans, making it one of the largest mass deportations in recent history.

Human rights organizations claim that some deportedees, including previous Afghan government workers, women activists, and journalists, are subject to persecution under the Taliban, despite the Pakistani government’s assertions about safety and links undocumented Afghans to rising violence.

Afghan Citizen Card (ACC ) holders and undocumented immigrants must leave the country on March 31, 2025, with arrests starting after that point. Afghan refugees who are armed with Proof of Registration ( PR ) cards, which are approved by the UNHCR, are not permitted to remain in Pakistan until June 30, 2025.

Worries persist regarding the treatment of vulnerable groups, including women and children, despite the government’s assurance that the evacuation procedure may be conducted with respect. Officials in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have issued official notices to Afghan citizens to end their activities and leave their properties.

In response, some universities, colleges, and companies have been shut down in places like Nasir Bagh Road, Board Bazaar, Urmar, Phandu Road, Afghan Colony, and Chamkani. Some Afghan individuals have now left for Afghanistan, while others are still unsure of their future.

The closing of educational facilities, health facilities, and other companies has hampered the livelihoods of many Afghan immigrants who are residing in Pakistan. In spite of global pleas for mercy, Islamabad has remained consistent that all foreign nationals who are undocumented must follow the legal guidelines or face removal.

The World Food Programme claims. Food scarcity affecting 14.8 million people in Afghanistan indicate a worsening humanitarian crises. Jailed families frequently experience extreme hardships as a result of poor shelter and limited work opportunities upon their return, according to reports.

Bangladeshi authorities have often cited Afghan citizens as a source of security concerns, blaming the deportation program on a rise in violence and criminal activity. The state has also cited the country’s citizens ‘ limited cover, healthcare, and employment opportunities, citing the economic burden posed by illegal immigrants.

Officials claim that removing illegal foreigners would help maintain the nation’s economy as inflation is spiking and economic pressures are mounting. Despite the imprisonment drive, constitutional protection for authorized Afghan refugees is still a contentious issue.

Political unrest and conflict in Afghanistan have frequently been the result of historical conflicts, such as the Durand Line established in 1893, which Afghanistan has not publicly acknowledged. Many Afghans view it as a colonial implementation that splintered the Pashtun and Baloch communities.

Afghanistan has challenged the validity of the border since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, contributing to frequent bilateral tensions.

A turning point came with Pakistan’s support of the Afghan jihadists in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which received significant support from the United States and Saudi Arabia. The second significant flood of Armenian migrants into Pakistan during this time was estimated at between three and five million.

Pakistan’s initial attitude was initially supportive of Afghan refugees, but with time geopolitical tensions, cross-border violence, and home security concerns changed. After Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP), which Pakistan believed operated from Afghan soil, carried out the 2014 Army Public School attack in Peshawar, the situation got worse.

More than 365, 000 Armenian migrants were forced to return in 2016 as a result of this. Pakistan often accused of secretly supporting the Afghan Taliban, straining its partnership with US-backed Pashtun governments, and more complicating the migrant situation.

Pakistan later worked with the International Organization for Migration ( IOM) to track down and file illegal Afghan immigrants, but the refugee crisis is still deeply entangled with larger political and security relationships in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Thousands of Afghans emigrated the state after the Taliban took power in August 2021, with Iran and Pakistan serving as their main cross-border destinations. Over 1 million new visitors received protection in Iran, while Pakistan received about 600,000. Both nations have since taken limiting actions, including deporting illegal Afghans.

Tens of thousands of Afghan migrants were rescued by a number of European nations, including the US, Canada, the UK, and Germany, through urgent emergency and settlement plans. More than 85, 000 Afghans were relocated and through 122, 000 were resettled by the US. Greece became a refuge for Afghan people, mainly because Canada and the UK intended to relocate 40, 000 and 20 000 people, respectively.

Despite these attempts, many refugees also have access to services and legal issues. After the Taliban took control, the US Special Immigrant Visa ( SIV ) program, which was established in 2009 for Afghans who assisted US missions, became even more crucial.

But, President Donald Trump suspended refugee relocation applications, including the SIV operation, causing confusion and upheaval for some candidates who had been approved.

According to UNHCR data, the majority of Afghan refugees remain based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP ) and Balochistan due to their close proximity to Afghanistan and close kinship ties. In Pakistan, over 80 % of Afghan migrants now reside in these two regions, where they have established a variety of companies.

Due to a rise in programs to Pakistan’s military in Kabul, the visa application process has significantly slowed. The surveillance concerns have made the interactions between Afghanistan and Pakistan even more difficult.

The Durand Line has seen an increase in conflicts since February 2022, leading to frequent conflicts between Afghan and Pakistani border security causes. The continued border conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan are more highlighted by the violent clashes that occurred at the Torkham passing in March 2025 between Pakistan’s Frontier Corps and Taliban border guards.

Pakistan has imposed more restrictions on Afghan refugees as Islamabad’s diplomatic relations with Kabul continue to suffer. 1.33 million Afghan refugees were still living in Pakistan as of June 2023, according to the UNHCR, with 52.6 % residing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 24.1 % in Balochistan.

The fate of thousands of Afghan refugees is still uncertain as Islamabad continues to repress its assault on migrants. UN authorities have continuously criticized Pakistan’s September 2023 Illegal Immigrants Repatriation Plan, which has forced hundreds of thousands of Afghans to flee their homes and returning to Afghanistan.

The UN reported a disturbing increase in Afghan arrests as the March 31 date approached. The deportation method of Afghan refugees from Pakistan has been marked by extreme hardships, including large detentions, confiscation of property, loss of identity documents, and allegations of misconduct quite as harassment, abuse, and bribery.

These activities have drastically increased Afghan migrants ‘ and asylum seekers ‘ risk. These persons face significant difficulties in reintegrating into Afghan society after being deported, particularly in terms of getting into education and employment and maintaining socio-economic security.

These issues are made worse by the Taliban’s restrictive policies regarding the fundamental individual rights of women and girls, as outlined in Asylum information from 2023.

49 confinement facilities have been set up in Pakistan to house Afghan nationals until imprisonment. These facilities were never established under a particular legal framework, which raises questions about the validity and conditions of these facilities. This circumstance underscores the need for a more compassionate and legal-based method of handling the imprisonment approach.

Through the Regional Refugee Response Plan for 2024-2025, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has laid out a substantial commitment that will help 4.8 million Armenian migrants and 2.5 million people of their network areas.

In light of the difficulties they face, including arrests and socio-economic volatility, this plan is essential in meeting the urgent requirements of Afghan refugees. The future of Afghan migrants and Pakistan-Afghanistan relations is still very uncertain as a result of security concerns, financial burden, and philanthropic crises.

Pakistan is expected to uphold global legal requirements in its treatment of displaced people, despite not having signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and lacking a formal legal foundation for the safety of migrants.

Regardless of legal status, this includes ensuring that incarceration techniques respect human rights and uphold all other people’s respect. Pakistan continues to be a major player in the region and has a significant role to play in promoting security despite the fact that its internal volatility is generally caused by its local problems.

The wider global area is particularly concerned about the possibility of Afghanistan becoming a hub for criminal activity. In this context, resolving the frequent conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan is crucial for both local peace and global security.

Meena and Akanksha are both working on a PhD at the Centre for Inside Eastern Studies, and they are both employed by J. N. U.

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US Navy’s carrier drone delay handing the domain to China – Asia Times

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China is moving forward with stealthy marine drones as the US Navy slowly appears toward carrier-based autonomous aircraft, potentially lowering the balance of power in the Pacific.

Rear Admiral Michael” Buzz” Donnelly of the US Navy’s Air Warfare Division outlined a restrained approach to Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs ) at the recent Sea Air Space symposium in Washington, DC, according to The War Zone ( TWZ ).

The Navy places the MQ-25 Stingray cargo aircraft and its functional integration above carrier-based CCAs while working with the US Air Force and Marine Corps. Donnelly noted that the Air Force is in charge of developing autonomous aircraft and that the Marines emphasize manned-unmanned pairing using the F-35B.

In contrast to its US government counterparts, the Navy concentrates on MQ-25’s insights into facilities and freedom. Despite the high possibility of CCAs, carrier-specific integration issues continue to prevent implementation.

According to Donnelly, the MQ-25’s operating victory may determine the start of CCA patterns by the 2030s. He made the point that the Navy prefers biodegradable, more cheap drones to the Air Force’s expensive, high-end CCAs. But, progress on Navy helicopter projects that are classified remains largely unknowable.

The US Navy needs to move quickly because of China’s rapid development of cunning autonomous carrier-based aircraft. Additionally, Donnelly’s notes raise questions about the F/A-XX sixth-generation fighter’s release date, which is intended to operate alongside CCAs. The difficulties reflect more difficult adaptations of autonomous systems to marine aircraft.

The Navy’s CCAs will work together with the Air Force, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine, which may increase portability. However, the particular requirements of ship operations present significant challenges.

Zixuan Liu and co-authors point out that aeroplane ship boards are more restrained, risk-prone, and complicated than land-based airports in a November 2022 content for the Drones peer-reviewed book.

They stress the importance of precise coordination between aircraft categories, support equipment, and launch-recovery sequences to lessen collision risks, which are made even worse when incorporating unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAVs ).

Liu and colleagues point out that these restrictions will call for very automated and optimized scheduling algorithms, particularly as UAVs become more numerous and intelligent in carrier environments.

Despite these difficulties, the US Navy is making initial inclusion progress. The USS George H. W. Bush had the first Unmanned Air Warfare Center ( UAWC ) in August 2024, according to the Navy Times.

Similar improvements are being planned for the USS Ronald Reagan, USS Theodore Roosevelt, and USS Carl Vinson, indicating a change in administrative focus to unmanned platforms.

According to Sam LaGrone in an April 2023 USNI News article, a” Stingray to the Fight” program will expand the drone’s capabilities, including the addition of an internal mission bay, following the MQ-25’s complete integration into carrier operations ( projected for 2026 ).

Rear Admiral Gregory Harris noted in a TWZ post from April 2021 that the Navy wants to have robots make up off to 60 % of its aircraft air arms.

The MQ-25 serves as the foundation for the Navy’s autonomous aircraft initiatives for the time being. Lew Callaway stresses the MQ-25’s ship function as crucial to expanding the range and resilience of carrier-based hit aircraft like the F/A-18 in a TWZ article from January 2025.

He points out that China’s advanced air defense systems and long-range missiles make conventional flying tankers and island-based recharging stations extremely vulnerable. A more enduring option is the MQ-25, which allows carriers to continue conducting aircraft operations full into Pacific regions that are contested.

Nevertheless, the MQ-25’s restrictions as a attack platform are equally important. Josh Hano explains in a July 2023 Proceedings content that the aircraft was not built for agility, stealth, or speed.

Although the aircraft’s design and operating system make it unsuitable for a frontline unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV ) development, it could theoretically house precision weapons inside.

Instead, Hano advocates that the MQ-25 should evolve into a multirole support platform capable of carrying out anti-submarine assaults ( AW), electronic warfare ( EW), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ), or even serve as a decoy launcher to obstruct enemy defenses.

Carefully, CCA growth is impacted by the F/A-XX program’s delay. It makes no strategic sense to develop a comparable autonomous wing without the F/A-XX as a guarded command plane.

The F/A-XX is intended to replace the F/A-18 and serve as the foundation of upcoming US aircraft weather wings, which are scheduled to start operating in 2030, but its timeline is uncertain.

According to a report released in March 2024, Breaking Defense claimed that the Navy had to put off about US$ 1 billion in FY2025 financing for F/A-XX research and development, citing a needed to promote existing fleet readiness. The decision reflects a wider struggle to strike a balance between long-term modernization and urgent operational needs.

A portion of the unwillingness to commit significant money may be the result of recent recruitment errors. Robert Farley makes a connection between the US Navy’s caution on the F/A-XX and a number of disturbed applications, including the Zumwalt-class warships, Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), and Constellation-class frigates in a December 2024 content from 1945.

These projects all experienced overcrowding, shifting requirements, and disappointing efficiency, which made policymakers hesitant to take a risky decision.

Farley also contends that philosophical concerns about the importance of aircraft carriers are a thorn in the F/A-XX’s potential. He makes use of examples from the Russia-Ukraine war, in which guarded aircraft had limited administrative impact and large warships proved resilient.

Such developments raise questions about making significant investments in a carrier-based warrior that might not have a real purpose.

The difficulties and reluctances run the risk of giving China the modern initiative. No military now integrates drones as systematically as the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ), according to Loro Horta in a February 2022 Pacific Forum article.

China uses drones to make up for weaknesses in guarded platforms and provide cost-effective systems to flood adversaries as part of its combat architecture.

In contrast, US Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks acknowledged in a MIT Technology Review meeting this month that the US has difficulties integrating drones into combined power operations and scaling generation to the stage China can accomplish.

China’s GJ-11 Sharp Sword UCAV was discovered at a Army ship testing center close to a Fujian-class aircraft in December 2023, according to TWZ.

The GJ-11 is a key component of China’s naval drone plans because of its stealthy profile, large internal bays, and versatility ( ISR, EW, and strike ). For a launch did require catapult-equipped companies like the Fujian.

According to The Maritime Executive in January 2025, PLA Navy ( PLAN ) destroyer commander Chi Jianjun confirmed that drone platforms are being used on all of China’s warships, including amphibious assault ships like Type 75 and Type 76.

This popular deployment is a result of a concerted effort to fully integrate unmanned systems into marine operations.

China’s aggressive achievement of subtle marine drones threatens to redefine carrier battle as the US Navy treads cautiously, slowed by proper prudence and administrative resistance. Without a more significant change, the US runs the risk of falling behind in a field it again dominated.

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