Bolen C (Page 21)

Northeast Asia is beginning to become a more significant market in the drama of the 21st-century geopolitics. The US-led Indo-Pacific plan – once hailed as the basis of regional security and economic structures – is now facing new turmoil amid shifting world relationships.

Important issues arise as fresh alignments start to form: Is the United States gaining sway in the area? Is China succeeding in bringing in conventional US allies like South Korea and Japan, in a provocative way?

New advancements, including the Korea-China-Japan Trilateral Foreign Ministers ‘ Meeting held in Tokyo and the Expert Dialogue held at South Korea’s National Assembly, suggest that seismic shifts are shifting – albeit slowly and cautiously. The language used during these political engagements raises both opportunities and concerns for global stakeholders as a subtle but significant re-abundance of strategic positions in the region.

Winds of change: the multilateral conference in Tokyo

On the 22nd of this month, in Tokyo, the foreign ministers of South Korea, China, and Japan convened for their first trilateral gathering in over 16 weeks. The meeting was important not just because it took place after a protracted hiatus, but also because the geopolitical environment was changing, which made it necessary.

The doorway is now open for a more multilateral political environment as South Korea and Japan both react to what many perceive as a deprioritization of the place by the Trump management.

The conference emphasized participation in sectors directly impacting residents ‘ everyday lives – such as medical, disaster relief, aging populations, industry and science and technology. Importantly, the joint commitment to holding a summit between Korea and China immediately speaks volumes about the momentum behind this multilateral initiative.

However, this was more than just a governmental gathering. Beneath the bureaucratic strengthen lay a calm but notable recalibration. Although Seoul and Japan are also fully bound to each other, they appear to be more and more willing to cooperate with Beijing in traditionally strategic areas. This may not be a tilt, but it does genuinely reflect a trading strategy that acknowledges China’s expansion while slowly offsetting for uncertainties in Washington’s commitment.

A simple change in corporate thinking

The softerening of political speech in Seoul and Tokyo around China is especially presenting. The tone and content of the Tokyo meet clearly indicated a preference for security and multilateralism, rather than fight, despite persistent conflicts, particularly in regards to traditional problems, territorial issues, and North Korea’s actions.

However, Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul of South Korea directly stated,” We agreed to strengthen meaningful assistance in areas strongly linked to people’s daily lives”. This is more than just a political saying; it is a growing consensus that the region needs to establish institutional frameworks that are independent of external forces.

The recognition that the Asian Peninsula’s” shared responsibility” includes peace and stability more strengthens the idea that a Northeast Asian community is in charge of its destiny.

The US Indo-Pacific plan: losing grip?

Through strategic alliances and military partnerships, the US-led Indo-Pacific technique, which was developed under the Trump presidency and continued with modifications while under Biden, sought to counter China’s growing influence. The main tenet was to strengthen relationships with local forces, most notably Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia, while maintaining a “free and empty Indo-Pacific.”

However, this platform has encountered some headwinds. First, the Trump administration’s interpersonal foreign policy threatened long-standing relationships by repressing military agreements and demanding more cost-sharing. Friends began to question their strategic autonomy as a result of this, which eroded trust in the safety offers made by the US.

Next, the Biden administration, while artistically recommitting to the area, has been preoccupied with catastrophes somewhere – especially Ukraine and the Middle East – leading to concerns about corporate speed. In addition, America’s home polarization and economic difficulties have caused its foreign policy to appear unpredictable and reactive rather than coherent and lasting.

In light of this, China’s patient and consistent politics, which emphasizes economic integration, people-to-people ties, and local institutions, offers an alternative and appealing outlook for Asia. This perception, while not without its challenges, appears extremely attractive to places tired of being caught in the crossfire of wonderful power rivalry.

China’s tactful diplomacy: pulling without pushing

The Chinese approach to Northeast Asia has been notably nuanced. Rather than aggressively confronting US allies, Beijing has focused on building bridges in areas of mutual interest – such as climate change, pandemic recovery and trade. An illustration of this is the recently held Trilateral Expert Dialogue at the National Assembly of South Korea.

Ambassadors from both Japan and China were present at the forum, which was jointly organized by the Bipartisan Forum for Advanced Diplomacy and the Institute for Global Strategic Cooperation, underscoring a symbolic shift toward dialogue even despite differences. Sessions focused on regional resilience, economic frameworks, climate change and cooperative diplomacy. Security issues were not neglected, but there was a clear emphasis on pragmatic cooperation rather than ideological alignment.

Notably, academics and policymakers advocated for the establishment of trilateral mechanisms that could withstand political upheaval and global shocks. If such frameworks are developed and sustained, they may gradually evolve into an East Asian community with its own norms, priorities, and rules of engagement – potentially diminishing US leverage in the long run.

North Korea: There is a persistent divergence

North Korea continues to be a significant divergence despite the convergence of many issues. Both South Korea and Japan voiced strong concerns about Pyongyang’s nuclear provocations and its growing military cooperation with Russia. Minister Cho emphasized the necessity to fully abide by UN Security Council resolutions and to avoid giving North Korea any strategic advantage, especially in the wake of the Ukraine war.

Takeshi Iwaya, Japan’s foreign minister, also expressed concern about illicit arms deals, nuclear threats, and cryptocurrency theft. However, China’s position remained more measured, emphasizing dialogue and denuclearization without assigning explicit blame to North Korea or addressing its ties with Russia.

This divergence highlights a crucial restriction on trilateral cooperation. While South Korea and Japan continue to work with Washington on important security issues, their willingness to accept divergent viewpoints on North Korea in a trilateral setting demonstrates a growing diplomatic flexibility.

Strategic autonomy or subtle realignment?

The big question is: is this trilateral engagement a step toward strategic autonomy or a subtle shift in focus on China?

The answer is currently somewhere in between. South Korea and Japan are not abandoning their alliances with the United States. Their military and intelligence cooperation with Washington is still strong. However, their growing engagement with China in the fields of business, technology, and society suggests a reversal toward greater autonomy.

This pragmatic balancing act reflects both geopolitical necessity and domestic pressure. No South Korea nor Japan can afford a zero-sum option because China is their largest trading partner and the US as their primary security ally. Instead, they appear to be creating a middle ground, one that allows for international cooperation while upholding national interests.

The road ahead: a multipolar Northeast Asia?

The proposed trilateral summit could serve as a litmus test for this evolving regional alignment as it waits to resolve South Korea’s domestic political instability. If held, it could signal the start of a new era in which East Asian powers increasingly control their own affairs, moving beyond the binary strategic choices that were made during the Cold War.

This change presents both a challenge and an opportunity in the eyes of US strategic planners. Washington must be aware that its allies in Asia may not necessarily be abiding by the US-led order, but rather are seeking greater freedom and agency in navigating an increasingly complex global landscape. A more consultative, less transactional US approach – one that acknowledges and respects regional aspirations– could help revitalize America’s presence in the region rather than render it obsolete. Washington is now playing the ball.

The development of a multipolar Northeast Asia seems to be getting more and more likely. If trilateral cooperation between Korea, China, and Japan continues to institutionalize, it could lay the foundation for a new regional architecture – one that may operate independently of, yet not necessarily in opposition to, existing security alliances. This could result in a more stable and balanced regional order.

Other regional players, especially India, should take note of these undercurrents. The geopolitical environment in East Asia is shifting rapidly, and clinging to outdated narratives or rigid alliance structures could prove counterproductive. India needs to be adaptable, updating its approach to strategic planning and foreign policy to reflect the changing dynamics of a multipolar Asia. In addition to safeguarding its interests, doing so will make it a stronger player in the regional transformation process.

The recent diplomatic overtures among regional powers signal a quiet yet consequential shift in the geopolitics of East Asia. The US Indo-Pacific strategy may not be outdated, but it is unquestionably in need of some serious attention and is in need of some serious attention. China’s diplomatic approach, which is grounded in economic pragmatism, multilateral cooperation, and non-interference rhetoric, is gradually changing the strategic decisions of America’s closest allies.

Whether this shift results in a permanent realignment remains to be seen. One thing is becoming increasingly obvious, though, is that the US’s dominance over Asia is quickly waning. A more intricate, multipolar order is emerging in its place, one where diplomacy, economic interdependence, and regional cooperation may carry more weight than traditional military alliances.

Navigating this new equation will require vision, flexibility, and a deep understanding of regional sensitivities. The authors of Asia’s strategic future won’t be by force alone, but by those who can create inclusive institutions, foster trust, and adapt appropriately to the changing tides of global power.

Continue Reading

In response to the growing threat of dynamic Chinese action, Taiwan’s first indigenous equipped sea drone represents a significant step toward developing asymmetric warfare capabilities.

Multiple media outlets reported that Taiwan’s state-backed shipbuilder CSBC Corporation unveiled the Endeavor Manta, its first domestically developed military-grade uncrewed surface vehicle ( USV), at Kaohsiung’s Singda Harbor this month.

In light of rising tensions with China, Taipei’s efforts to develop asymmetric warfare features are important.

The trimaran-hulled vehicle, which was built from fiber-reinforced plastic and is designed to work in the Taiwan Strait, measures 8.6 meters in length and 3. 7 feet in diameter. It can carry more than one parameter ton of cargo, including mild torpedoes and explosives, at a top speed of 35 tangles.

In earlier 2024, CSBC began developing the Manta after Ukraine’s usage of USVs against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. The vessel has advanced capabilities, including AI-assisted targeting, automatic routing, collision avoidance, and swarming control, as well as four different remote communication modes, including 4G, radio frequency, and satellite.

If compromised, it is programmed to go back to basic or self-destruct. All techniques are produced locally, away from satellite and engine components that are imported from abroad.

In light of the growing confidence of the Chinese army, the launch of The Mantra highlights Taiwan’s emphasis on indigenous defense innovation.

Scott Savitz makes a deeper analysis of the potential military responsibilities of Taiwan’s Manta USV because they strike at the waterline and carry violent payloads significantly heavier than those of the former type in a RAND commentary from January 2023.

Savitz claims that the People’s Liberation Army Navy ( PLAN ) fleet could be overrun by swarms of low-profile USVs that are difficult to spot and counter. He mentions that they could also be used to force an opponent fleet to embrace slower and more resilient formations in place of naval minefields. Additionally, he claims that USVs had deliver loitering munitions or explosive materials for further damage.

Additionally, Eric Rosenbach and other authors mention USVs ‘ potential long-duration missions, including mine-laying, electronic warfare, and intelligence gathering in environments very dangerous for manned systems, in a February 2025 Belfer Center report.

Rosenbach and some claim that these systems would work independently in electromagnetically restricted environments where PLA electronic warfare would be in jeopardy.

In an article in the November 2021 Trials, Karl Flynn mentions that USVs could be used for supplies. USVs enable distributed forces to be redundant and simultaneously replenished, which is especially useful in settings like those on Taiwan’s front islands, including Kinmen and Matsu.

Taiwan’s USVs may not be the war-winning know weapons some might claim them to be, as with the Ukraine conflict. USVs, for instance, lack the variety, endurance, firepower, versatility, and range of staffed warships. But, their autonomous nature and lower cost help to significantly offset these drawbacks.

Also, if they encounter complex issues in a sea environment, there is no way to fix them. Electronics and equipment that are sympathetic may be affected by water apply and salinity. Taiwan’s Manta has a self-destruct process, but there is still the possibility of having its encrypted codes compromised and a faulty product being discovered and analyzed.

In a June 2024 report for the Center for a New American Security ( CNAS ), Stacie Pettyjohn and other authors make the claim that a defense of Taiwan must rely on a “porcupine strategy” built on numerous smaller, easily concealed weapons, such as USVs, to lower the cost of such aggression.

According to Pettyjohn and others, suicide USVs carrying big, violent payloads can harm big warships and can be used by aerial drones or other USVs gathering intelligence to take their prey.

Additionally, they suggest that Taiwan deploy USVs to give early notice about an invading fleet’s progress and determine resilient troop transports. Additionally, they claim that USVs you create minefields that could “kill zones” for an invasion fleet that are prone to air- and land-based missile strikes.

Taiwan’s aircraft sector is still developing. Jane Rickards notes that Taiwan is aware of China’s major lead in aircraft manufacturing but also hopes to get up. In a December 2024 article for The Strategist, Rickards writes that Taiwan is aware of this fact.

Su Tzu-Yun of Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research ( INDSR ), who asserts that Taiwanese drone makers are generally better at hardware but are generally weak at system integration and design, quotes Rickards.

More, she quotes IMSAR, a US manufacturer of superior radars, as Richard Weir, vice chairman for international strategy and authorities relations, who claims that Chinese drone makers are more reluctant to recognize missions, weapons, and sensors for the drones before they are created.

Additionally, Harun Ayanoglu mentions that Taiwan is struggling to grow its drone industry in a January 2025 article for the Central European Institute of Asian Studies ( CEIAS ).

Ayanoglu points out that Taiwan’s manufacturers are deprived of administrative comments and profit because, unlike Turkey and Israel, Taiwan may export its drones to active combat zones due to political restrictions.

Taiwan’s drone strikes do not change the fact that US military intervention would be necessary for the self-governing island’s survival in the event of a Chinese invasion, on a strategic level. ” Strategic ambiguity” is a factor in US policy on Taiwan, but this may serve to cover up indecisiveness over the issue.

In a February 2025 Foreign Policy article, Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim make the claim that direct US military action could have disastrous effects on people and economies, including potential nuclear escalation.

The authors point out that the US is under pressure to defend Taiwan in order to maintain its credibility, but such a move could lead to China’s escalation. Additionally, they point out that Taiwan’s defense strategy is insufficient because it relies more heavily on expensive items like frigates and fighter jets than on asymmetric capabilities.

They claim that the US relies on regional allies and strategic clarity to navigate these complex issues in order to help Taiwan avoid becoming too deeply involved in a larger conflict.

However, Michael Schiffer asserts in a Financial Times (FT ) article this month that China’s coercive strategy through military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, and economic entanglement has lost effectiveness as a result of its increasing military asymmetry.

Schiffer claims that China no longer fears a flimsy US response, and that Taipei grows increasingly anxious over inconsistent signals, especially given Trump’s foreign policy’s volatility. He contends that the US’s anti-China strategy is insufficiently weighed against its military deterrence.

He claims that the US must adopt strategic clarity, detail the effects of Chinese aggression, and strengthen Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, and informational support without breaking the” One China” framework.

Continue Reading

The White House says Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a ceasefire in the Black Sea, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky asserting the truce was effective immediately while also accusing Russia of lying about the deal’s terms.

Needless to say, it’s far from clear that United States President Donald Trump’s supposed “Art of the Deal” negotiating skills are enough to broker sustainable peace between Russia and Ukraine given the protagonists’ unwillingness to make concessions and the volatile nature of attempts to broker a peace agreement.

The war waged by Russia has reached the stage where both Russian and Ukrainian officials fear losing face if they make concessions.

Both view their enemy as an existential threat. Russian President Vladimir Putin has argued Russian defeat would spell “the end of the 1,000-year history of the Russian state,” while Zelensky says Russia’s protracted assault is an overt existential threat and the absence of US support threatens the very survival of his country.

Both sides have seemed prepared to fight until the bitter end. The involvement of a mediator in the form of the United States, therefore, could potentially change the deadly dynamics of the conflict.

‘Love to beat them’

Trump declares being up to this formidable task. He positions himself as a mediator occupying a middle ground between the protagonists, unlike his predecessor in the Oval Office who supported Ukraine.

In his ghost-written book “The Art of the Deal“, Trump claimed to enjoy these sorts of challenges:

“In New York real estate… you are dealing with some of the sharpest, toughest and most vicious people in the world… I happen to love to go up against these guys, and I love to beat them.”

But if mediators, including Trump, are to successfully persuade opposing sides to make a deal, they need to properly understand each side’s motives. To what extent is each side malleable so some common ground can be found? Making a deal always requires compromises and concessions.

Trump is well aware of this, saying recently of any prospective Russia-Ukraine agreement: “You’re going to have to always make compromises. You can’t do any deals without compromises.”

Understanding motivations

David McClelland’s theory of human motivation may be relevant in terms of attempts to broker peace between Ukraine and Russia. The social psychologist argued that three motives — the need for achievement, the need for affiliation and the need for power — explains most human behavior:

1. The need for achievement explains the desire to be productive and get results;
2. Concern about establishing, maintaining or restoring a positive relationship with another person or people underpins the need for affiliation;
3. The will to dominate, to have an impact on another person or people, is the essence of the need for power.

McClelland predicted that when the need for power significantly exceeds the need for affiliation, conflicts and wars are likely. He viewed a high “power-minus-affiliation” gap as indicative of what he called the “imperial power motive syndrome.”

The metaphor of an empire lies at its origin. The empire’s declared mission is to enlighten, civilize and bring order to its subjects. Leaders with the imperial power motive syndrome show reformist zeal to save others, whether they like it or not.

The social psychologist Robert Hogenraad subsequently adapted McClelland’s theory for computer-assisted content analysis by developing dictionaries of the three needs.

If the words associated with the need for power — control, domination, victory, for example — occur more often in a text, speech or news reports than words associated with the need for affiliation — like love, family, friends — then the speaker has the imperial power motive syndrome.

Hawks vs. doves

My recently published analysis of war-related speeches delivered by Russian, Ukrainian, American, British and French leaders during the three years of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine gives some clues about the motivations of the parties involved.

Compared with their Western counterparts, Putin and Zelenskyy exhibit the strongest imperial power motive syndrome and are “hawks.” Their need for power, as expressed through their public speeches, significantly exceeds their need for affiliation.

Trump, however, appears similar to that of his arch-rival, former president Joe Biden. Both are closer to the “dovish” end of the scale. The preliminary outcomes of talks on a potential ceasefire reveal the challenges faced by mediators.

First, the talks being held in Saudi Arabia were bilateral, with American officials meeting separately with Russian and Ukrainian delegations, as opposed to trilteral.

Second, no joint statement followed the talks, although it was widely expected. Third, the White House issued two separate statements, one on talks with Ukraine’s representatives and the other on discussions with Russia’s representatives.

The Ukraine statement includes the commitment to continue the exchange of prisoners of war, the release of civilian detainees and the return of forcibly transferred Ukrainian children, whereas the statement on the talks with Russia does not mention any of this.

This is despite the fact that the International Criminal Court has accused Putin of committing war crimes via the unlawful deportation of children.

Trump’s antipathy toward Zelensky

The prospects of a peace agreement is further complicated by the history of Trump’s attempts to broker deals in Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine actually began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and a proxy war in Donbas. Trump was elected president two years later.

His discourse about Ukraine did not differ significantly from Obama’s and Biden’s until his first impeachment in 2020 for soliciting “the interference of a foreign government, Ukraine, to benefit his re-election.”

His call to Zelensky in July 2019 triggered the impeachment. He pushed for two investigations aimed at helping his re-election bid — one into Hunter Biden’s business dealings in Ukraine and another into the hack of Democratic National Committee servers in 2016 — in exchange for releasing about US$400 million of military assistance already approved by Congress and inviting Zelensky to the White House at that time.

During and after the first impeachment, Trump’s language on Ukraine significantly diverged from Obama’s and Biden’s. He began using words like “corruption,” “lies” and “hoax” in relation to Ukraine.

Moving forward

All this suggests that Trump’s first impeachment has had a lasting impact on his perception of Ukraine and its leader.

And so, in addition to dealing with two protagonists who are unwilling to make concessions, Trump, as a mediator, faces challenges related to his past.

One protagonist, Zelensky, may remind him of one of the darkest moments in his political career — his first impeachment. This fact should be kept in mind when trying to make sense of the treatment received by Zelensky during his most recent visit to the White House and Trump’s references to him as a “dictator.”

To truly succeed in mediation, Trump must move forward, leaving biases and prejudices related to Ukraine and its leader in the past. But can he?

Anton Oleinik is professor of sociology, Memorial University of Newfoundland

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

As part of his efforts to show the UK’s security features as tensions with Russia continue, prime secretary Keir Starmer just boarded one of the UK’s four nuclear-armed submarines for a picture phone.

Starmer has a problem, though. The US is a significant running mate for the underwater and the rest of the UK’s atomic ship. This is not appropriate at a time when the US becomes extremely unreliable under the leadership of a completely transactional president. The US has the power to successfully turn off the UK’s nuclear deterrent if it so chooses.

Nuclear record of the United Kingdom and the United States is unmistakably linked. Under the 1943 Quebec contracts and the 1944 Hyde Park secretary essay, the US and the UK worked together on the Manhattan job. The initial nuclear weapons ever developed from this work were used in 1945 against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Additionally, it caused the second fracture. The US made British citizens “foreign” citizens in 1946, preventing them from carrying out covert nuclear operations. Collaborating with the UK ended right away.

The UK made the decision to create its own nuclear army. The” Grapple Y” gas bomb’s successful ignition in April 1958 established its status as a nuclear power.

But, Russia’s 1957 launch of the Sputnik dish demonstrated the lethal range of Russian nuclear technologies. This restored the atomic partnership between the US and the UK.

The basis of an atomic collaboration that endures to the present moment is a series of discussions on how to combat the Soviet threat. The UK now has access to the most recent nuclear systems and a trustworthy American ally thanks to this common defense agreement, which was signed in 1958.

The US-UK working relationship has changed, and the convention has been modified and adapted over time to reflect these changes, and the two are now so trapped that it is difficult to leave the co-dependent relationship.

Both factors have benefited from protection and security, particularly during the Cold War. Trump’s new” special relationship” with Vladimir Putin from Russia has, however, altered the world’s politics.

Given the uncertainty and possible instability of the new US management, major problems are now being raised about the UK’s nuclear power. Trump may use a show of power or threat to renounce the contract in a show of hatred.

The atomic submarines in the UK

Four Vanguard nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered boats make up the UK’s Trident nuclear deterrence software. Because it is technically independent and decides when to start, the UK has some freedom.

There is no viable option because the atomic technology at the heart of the Trident program were US-designed and leased by Lockheed Martin, making it still rely on the US as a source of support. Thus, the Trident method relies on the US for support and maintenance.

The UK’s present system is currently being upgraded. However, its choices appear limitless. The UK would either have to create its own arms internally, work with France or Europe, or destroy if the US violated its agreements.

Each circumstance brings about brand-new problems for the UK. For instance, making nuclear arms from damage in the UK would be a time-consuming and labor-intensive endeavor.

Technical engagement with France seems to be the most likely backup plan at this time. A radioactive cooperation agreement has already been put in place between the two nations. France has used a comparable submarine-based barrier to deter crime as the UK, and French President Emmanuel Macron has suggested that it could be applied to other European nations.

A second option would be to spread the expense across Europe and establish a German deterrent, but both approaches only serve to re-embed the UK’s existing nuclear dependency.

Although these arms may inhibit a hostile nuclear attack, they have failed to stop more extensive acts of aggression. Nuclear weapons have been banned from use in combat for 80 times. Maybe it’s time to break the UK’s nuclear deterrent completely and permanently and think about other forms of defense.

The maintenance of the UK’s atomic army is costly. Trident replacement costs are estimated to cost £205 billion ( US$ 265.3 billion ). The Ministry of Defense reported in 2023 that the anticipated costs associated with funding the nuclear deterrent would be more than$ 7.9 billion ($ 10.2 billion ) in the ten years.

This money could be used to address more pressing safety issues like climate change, terrorism, and cybersecurity.

If the UK is unable to work independently, nuclear arms will be effectively obsolete. The UK’s ability to respond has become contested as NATO and the US dominate the global atomic scene. The time has come to consider whether the US is actually our colleague or a brand-new rival.

Becky Alexis-Martin, University of Bradford, is a professor of harmony research and global growth.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Learn the article’s introduction.

Continue Reading

Japan’s unquestionable contributions to the world are indisputable both technologically and scientifically. Japan has long been at the forefront of scientific advancement, from the creation of the blue LED that advanced power performance to the creation of high-speed road.

Despite these improvements, Japan has not positioned itself as a global medical authority in the same way that the United States, Germany, or perhaps China have done. This is not due to a lack of skills, but instead a deeply rooted proper alternative influenced by history, culture, and politics.

Japan’s refusal to assert itself as a scientific power is the result of a combination of post-war peace, risk aversion, business interests, and political caution.

Technology as a device of empire

Japan’s refusal to highlight its scientific leadership dates back to its royal past. Science and technology were directly linked to the military-industrial complex during the Meiji era ( 1868-1912 ) and through World War II.

Japan’s rapid development was motivated by a need to overtake the West, and its scientific advancement was closely linked to its royal interests.

Japan’s partnership with technological advancement was profoundly affected by the war experience, especially the renowned Unit 731’s natural warfare experiments and the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings.

Following the war, Japan renounced war under its pacifist constitution, and any claim to medical authority, particularly in those involving martial applications, became politically vulnerable.

Japan used science to assert world dominance in contrast to the US and the Soviet Union, which both prioritized economic recovery and professional growth over geopolitical prestige.

Japan has always felt more at ease presenting itself as an industrial strength than a medical one. Instead of making important discoveries in physics, science, or science, the nation excels in applied sciences, especially in robotics, detail production, and materials science.

Japan, for instance, has fewer Nobel laureates in basic science than the United States or Europe, despite having top universities like the University of Tokyo and Kyoto University.

Instead, Toyota, Sony, Panasonic, and Fujitsu, its business R&amp, D divisions, focus on commercializing technology rather than making strong theoretical advances.

This is why Japan is frequently viewed as a leader in technological and engineering applications as opposed to medical theory and research. The Shinkansen ( bullet train ) is a marvel of engineering, but it was built on foundational railway and physics principles rather than a breakthrough in scientific theory.

Similar to that, Japan’s success in semiconductors and high-quality optics is due to its high level of manufacturing precision rather than the creation of novel clinical paradigms.

Fear of failure, and risk dislike

Culturally speaking, Japan values progressive development over destructive innovation. Although this method has resulted in top-notch quality control in sectors like electronics and automobiles, it has also decreased Japan’s willingness to invest in high-risk, high-reward clinical research.

In comparison, the United States thrives on clinical moonshots, whether it was the Human Genome Project, the Apollo program, or Silicon Valley-led AI study. Through billions of dollars spent on quantum computing, space exploration, and biotech, China also aggressively pursues medical dominance under its Made in China 2025 effort.

On the other hand, Japan continues to be cautious about taking risks, preferring to improve and perfect existing technologies over to indulge in high-stakes clinical research.

This explains why, despite having the technical prowess, Japan has no dominated the fields of space exploration, classical computing, or artificial intelligence, which are currently dominated by the US, China, and the EU.

Japan’s reluctance to present itself as a medical energy is also reflected in its political reality. Japan is bound by its pacifist Constitution ( Article 9 ), which forbids its use of scientific discoveries for military purposes, in contrast to the US, China, or Russia.

Japan, for instance, has chosen not to develop nuclear weapons despite the fact that it probably has the technical know-how to do so in a matter of months. Japan also has top-notch storage systems, but it hasn’t engaged in the kind of military place culture that the US and China are.

Japan has a determined approach even in areas of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, afraid of being seen as a country aiming for strategic technological dominance. Japan has become hesitant to assert its technological superiority due to the fear of stoking regional hands races, especially with China and South Korea.

Passive power of science

Japan is undoubtedly a scientific powerhouse, but it has never explicitly claimed that subject. Its reluctance is brought on by historic prudence, business priorities, cultural danger aversion, and geopolitical constraints.

Japan has chosen to remain calm in leadership rather than engage in significant technological revolutions, excelling in precision engineering, robotics, and commercial applications.

Japan’s strategy may seem unmotivated in a world where scientific dominance is extremely shaping global power. But, it is also tactical.

Japan has carved out a niche as a silent medical leader by placing emphasis on real-world problems rather than theoretical advances, which shapes worldwide sectors without making loud claims about its authority.

May Japan continue to play this peaceful function as a true scientific superpower as geopolitical tensions fall and modern competition develops, or will it be forced to do so as a true scientific superpower?

Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is a senior research fellow at the University of Malaya’s Asia-Europe Institute and professor of ASEAN studies at the Islamic International University Malaysia ( IIUM).

Continue Reading

I have spent years researching and teaching Chinese manga, looking at how its stories relate to cultural, philosophical, and religious practices. One of the most intriguing aspects of Asian anime is how to juggle intense action with challenging moral and spiritual issues.

The Chinese box office record-breaking film” Demon Slayer: Mugen Train” is a primary example of how anime deals with these profound themes. It ended up being the world’s top-grossing film in the world in the year. It’s a good idea to look at how” Demon Slayer” integrates the traditions of Buddhism, Shinto, and Samurai into a tale of heroism, impermanence, and moral struggle as” Demon Slayer” continues to be popular worldwide.

Religious styles can be found in animation.

Drawing on Japan’s religious practices to study themes of death, self-sacrificing, and the conflict between desire and responsibility, anime frequently explores religious and philosophical issues.

For instance, Prince Ashitaka, who is cursed by a beast and may travel to find a solution in Hayao Miyazaki’s” Princess Mononoke,” follows him. His search leads him into a fight between the developed Irontown, which purges its forests and the souls of the natural world, including the Deer God, a divine being who rules life and death.

By portraying character as divine and inhabited by “kami,” or spiritual beings, the movie embodies Shinto guidelines. It emphasizes how destructive it is to maintain human-environment cooperation.

In her book,” Transcendence and Spirituality in Japanese Cinema,” academic Melissa Croteau points out how Miyazaki’s films critique contemporary detachment from the sacredness of the environment.

Similar to this, his 2001 animated picture” Spirited Away” embodies animist concepts in Chinese culture, which are believed to encase spirits in both natural and artificial objects. 10-year-old Chihiro, who was once nervous and afraid of change, learns to understand this secret world and changes along the way in a enigmatic Japanese bathhouse filled with “kami.”

The introduction of a poisoned river spirit, which initially appears as a nasty, sludge-covered creature but later emerges as a once-pristine river god burdened by individual waste, is a crucial scene in the movie. This image embodies the ancient theory that all things have a soul and must be respected. It even reinforces an economic message: When character is polluted or neglected, it loses its strength, but it can be restored with care and respect.

The iconic Japanese anime television line” Neon Genesis Evangelion,” which aired from 1995 through 1996, explores complex theoretical concepts, particularly existentialist questions of identity and function. The sequence follows 14-year-old Shinji Ikari as she is recruited to pilot a massive mechanical weapon known as an evangelion to protect humanity against enigmatic beings known as Angels. Set in a desolate world.

The series explores designs of loneliness, self-worth, and the difficulties of forming near, significant relationships as Shinji and his own pilots conflict with their roles. It draws inspiration from both Heretical and Buddhist thought, which emphasize the importance of internal spiritual knowledge and the idea that clinging very tightly to the material world leads to suffering. According to Evangelion, struggling is brought on by commitment and the inability to develop meaningful relationships.

Rengoku: Noble heroism at its best.

What distinguishes” Mugen Train” from other films is how it concentrates on the internal problems of its characters, which are exemplified by their wars with spirits. These monsters represent people suffering and devotion, designs that have been profoundly influenced by Buddhist thought. Kyojuro Rengoku, a monster killer who embodies unwavering generosity and honor, serves as the movie’s central figure. Rengoku’s flame-breathing forms can be found at https ://www.youtube .com/embed/wurz7urUGtM?wmode=transparent&amp ,start=0

Rengoku’s fire-based combative type has a profound symbolic meaning. Fire is associated with both rebirth and renewal in Chinese society. A Shinto tradition that involves the transporting large torches through the roads to ward off evil and clean the land is known as the Kurama Fire Festival, which takes place every year on October 22 in Kyoto.

Similar to Buddhist goma fire ceremonies, priests burn divine wood sticks to represent the end of all desire and knowledge. This duality is reflected in Rengo’s unique techniques: His flames purge the world of wicked while expressing his unwavering spirit. https ://www.youtube .com/embed/itz80UqyV54?wmode=transparent&amp ,start=0 Goma fire ritual.

The warrior code of honor, Bushido, underpins Rengoku’s figure. This password emphasizes loyalty, self-sacrificing, and the obligation to protect others, which is rooted in Chinese ethics, Zen Buddhism, and Shinto values. His every move is guided by his mother’s advice, which is that the powerful must protect the weak, and that it reflects the Chinese ideals of filial devotion and the moral obligation to serve community.

Rengoku’s unwavering commitment is further shaped by Bushido’s connection to Zen Buddhism, which places a focus on skill and the popularity of emptiness, and its Shinto influences strengthen his role as a caretaker upholding a sacred duty.

Rengoku maintains his steadfast acceptance of emptiness, or “muj,” a basic Buddhist theory that sees beauty in life’s transience even as it approaches death. His surrender teaches that the true strength of a person lies in their selflessness and social integrity.

Akaza: A sign of commitment and suffering

Akaza, a monster who opposes Rengoku, embodies the devastation of holding onto energy and immortality. Akaza, who was once a man, turned into a demon because of his obsession with strength and unwillingness to accept the permanence of life.

His refusal to acknowledge dying is in line with Buddhist principles that cause suffering as a result of connection and desire. A theme that Akaza’s character powerfully reflects is how Buddhist texts depict clinging to existence as a basic source of suffering, while have scholars like Jacqueline Stone and Jacqueline Stone explored.

Akaza’s imagery is reinforced by aesthetic elements. His body is covered in tattoos that evoke the traditional Chinese system art known as “irezumi,” which is generally associated with violence and suffering. In the Edo-era of Japan, tattoos were frequently used to identify thieves and portray them as marginalized members of society.

In some parts of Japan, irezumi continues to be stigmatized, with some common bathhouses, gyms, and swimming pools barring people with obvious tattoos because of their historical ties to the yakuza. Tattooed characters usually represent a troubled past or internal turmoil in modern anime, strengthening Akaza’s role as a character trapped by his own suffering and harmful path.

In addition to highlighting his comparison with Rengoku’s free flames, Akaza’s irezumi artistically depicts his trapping in cycles of suffering.

A fight involving people triumphs

Rengoku and Akaza’s conflict is more than just a conflict between good and evil; it is also a conflict between two worldviews, generosity and altruism, acceptance versus attachment. Universal people problems are tapped into by” Mugen Train,” which resonates far beyond Japan.

The movie’s investigation of emptiness, social work, and the quest of meaning contributes to anime’s broader reputation as a moderate that entertains while stimulating thorough philosophical reflection.

As” Demon Slayer” continues to attract people around the world, as evidenced by the excitement around its new projects and the persistent passion of fans, its victory highlights how well anime can juggle actions with profound themes.

” Mugen Train” is a timeless reflection on what it means to live with purpose and integrity, whether it be through Rengoku’s selfless courage or Akaza’s tragic downfall.

Coastal Carolina University’s Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies is led by Ronald S. Green, a professor there.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the article’s introduction.

Continue Reading