Time for an AI arms control agreement? – Asia Times

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Strategic security is seriously impacted by AI’s growing reputation on the field. The reported use of AI for targeting in the continuing conflict in Gaza does raise alarms and spur even greater efforts to be made to regulate and control weapons.

It is only a matter of moment before similar issues become apparent in the Indo- Pacific, where some states are violently raising their military spending&nbsp, despite financial difficulties. The case of Gaza illustrates how in an environment where there are no restrictions on the development and use of military AI, Indo-Pacific says may be bystanders.

Using AI to target individuals

In a recent&nbsp, report, &nbsp, 972 Magazine – an online publication run by Israeli and Palestinian journalists – drew on anonymous insider interviews to claim that the Israel Defense Forces ( IDF) have been using an AI- based system called” Lavender” to identify human targets for its operations in Gaza. Worryingly, the identical report claimed that “human workers often served simply as a” rubber mark” for the computer’s choices”.

The IDF clarified in a statement that it does not “use an artificial intelligence system to identify criminal operatives or attempts to predict whether a person is a terrorist” in response to these assertions.

But, a&nbsp, report&nbsp, by&nbsp, The Guardian&nbsp, has cast doubt on the IDF’s response by referring to film footage from a meeting in 2023 where a reporter from the Army described the use of a resource for destination recognition that bears similarity to Lavender.

Given how forces continue to look at how to incorporate AI to enhance existing skills and create new ones, it is a major problem that we lack the ability to independently verify the accuracy of claims made by any area.

Unfortunately, current efforts to regulate military AI and limit its proliferation appear unlikely to catch up, as well, at least in the short term. Even though&nbsp, 972’s exposé has garnered global attention, it will not have a tangible impact in terms of encouraging arms control for AI. Major powers that lack incentives to impose limits on the proliferation of military AI still have the power to make progress on that front.

This will become even more complicated by the difficulty in separating the governance of military AI from other issues, such as conflicting claims over the South China Sea and tensions relating to Taiwan and North Korea, in the context of the Indo-Pacific.

According to complex political and security calculations, the chances of the Indo-Pacific powers making significant progress on these issues will wane and the chances of dialogue will wane.

AI on the battlefield and human control

It should come as no surprise that militaries are pursuing AI despite well-known concerns about its potential for errors and biased output. States are effectively unrestrained when deploying these technologies, even if they have committed to their responsible use, because there is no international law or arms control regime that regulates or prohibits military AI.

Another crucial factor in determining responsible military use of AI is whether its application merely automates a task according to well-defined rules or allows for decisions to be made autonomously. It is crucial to assess the degree of autonomy when AI-based systems can make autonomous decisions by determining the level of human involvement in the decision-making process.

For responsible military AI, it is crucial to have human control over the decision-making process of autonomous AI-based systems. However, as the Lavender example demonstrates, without a legally binding arms control regime it is quite meaningless to develop verification and enforcement mechanisms.

Additionally, these are still voluntary frameworks aimed at developing norms despite a recent increase in dialogue between states on responsible military AI, such as through platforms like the Responsible AI in the Military Domain ( REAIM ) Summit and US-led, Political Declaration, on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy.

Indo- Pacific participation in these platforms is still quite uneven – for example, India has not signed the REAIM&nbsp, Call to Action&nbsp, or the US Political Declaration. Participation by ASEAN member states has also been limited, with the exception of Singapore.

Arms control for AI

Armes control is a difficult task, as history has already demonstrated with nuclear weapons. Beyond major powers wanting to avoid restrictions on the military use of AI, there are many  barriers  in place of major barriers when it comes to developing an arms control regime for it.

These include a number of procedural difficulties that would make reaching consensus a very difficult task and a time-consuming process. Regrettably, trust between major powers – between the US and China in particular – is also in short supply at present.

The ongoing effort to stop the proliferation of lethal autonomous weapon systems ( LAWS ) at the UN demonstrates many of these obstacles. More than 120 states have been a part of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons since 2014, which has since been the subject of discussions on LAWS. An open-ended group of governmental experts ( GGE ) was established in 2017 and has since met regularly.

Although the GGE agreed to a set of&nbsp, 11 guiding principles&nbsp, on regulating LAWS in 2019, it has struggled to overcome divergence among major powers over the need for a new, legally binding instrument. At its most recent meeting in March 2024, the GGE on LAWS already encountered&nbsp, disagreement&nbsp, over how to interpret its recently revised mandate to conclude a legally binding instrument by 2026.

Lavender’s impact

The report on Lavender by 972 Magazine has probably been the most important outcome, highlighting the dangers from military use of AI and the potential difficulties that an arms control regime for AI will have to deal with.

Given the chaotic urgency of war, the implications are particularly concerning because AI-based systems can quickly increase a military’s ability to identify and kill targets beyond what human personnel tasked with oversight can realistically assess.

Any arms control system focused on LAWS would only cover some, if not all, of the use of AI because it blends into the background of military hardware and software. Instead of a lethal autonomous weapon system, lavender would be categorized as an AI-based decision-support system.

When existing efforts focused solely on LAWS have already struggled to reach a meaningful conclusion even after a decade of discussion, this poses an additional obstacle to the development of an arms control regime for AI aimed at covering a wider range of applications.

There is a significant risk that advances in regulation and governance of civilian AI will leave behind efforts to build up military AI, despite the historic and resolution on AI that was adopted without a vote by the UN General Assembly in March 2024.

Even the European Union’s landmark AI Act passed earlier this year has a&nbsp, national security exemption, which highlights the difficulty posed by AI’s inherently dual- use nature for governance.

A question mark also remains regarding the participation of the private sector in a upcoming arms control regime for AI. In contrast to nuclear weapons, which were primarily developed through state-led initiatives, AI’s development and applications were fueled by the private sector.

Even though states have been eager to establish their legal authority over tech companies through legislation in recent years, it is unclear how they would impose restrictions on civilian technology and applications used in the military. If anything, the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine have demonstrated that private tech companies have played a key role in contemporary warfare, whether willingly or not.

Indo-Pacific nations who are determined to stop the spread of military AI should concentrate on strengthening the broad base of state and governance capacity in addition to US efforts already underway.

This is a particularly lucrative market for the EU, which has consciously chosen the Indo-Pacific as its area of focus. The EU would have little chance of gaining from capacity building, especially among states in South and Southeast Asia, which are still in their early stages of thinking about military AI.

Manoj Harjani&nbsp, ( [email protected]. Sg ) &nbsp is the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore’s Military Transformations Program’s coordinator.

This article was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission.

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US cheats more than China on free and fair trade – Asia Times

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In May, US President Joe Biden sharply increased tariffs on Chinese-made goods, claiming that the” Taiwanese government has cheated by pouring money into Foreign corporations… hurting opponents who play by the rules.” The tariffs are 25 % on steel and aluminum, 50 % on semiconductors and solar panels and 100 % on electric vehicles.

Under Biden’s president, the US has put together an ambitious plan to revive American high-tech companies and reduce its reliance on foreign exports, particularly from China.

In addition to this approach, the silicon and renewable energy sectors received sizable subsidies. Those who have followed US business and industrial policy over the years if n’t come as a surprise when they learn that these price increases are a part of this strategy.

But the double requirements of these policies, especially the new levies, need to be addressed. Democratic and Republican US administrations have worked to establish a multilateral trading system that restricts the use of mercantilist policies for years while promoting the benefits of free trade to the rest of the world.

The WTO’s establishment serves as a prime example of this. A small cluster of strong states led by the US and influenced by large US companies – used their power and influence to modify the guidelines of international business to their benefits during the years of negotiations that led to the formation of the WTO.

In an effort to boost local production, the Biden administration is imposing tariff increases on imported solar cells from China. &nbsp, Photo: Jim Lo Scalzo / EPA via The Talk

The system they built was widely touted as a form of” fair play” in the global economy that would benefit all of the participating nations.

But, in truth, WTO rules obviously made it easier for US- based corporations to develop their dominance in the world market. Limiting protectionism, mainly in developing nations, has enabled US- based companies to develop their control.

The income that US- based transnational corporations have collected from their foreign affiliates, measured as a share of their total worldwide net income, increased from 17 % in 1977 to 49 % in 2006. And in 2010, Walmart, one of the nation’s largest financial firms, ranked as China’s seventh- largest buying companion, ahead of the UK.

The US is home to the largest corporations in the world, even when the balances are somewhat more favourable now in favor of China.

Dangerous effects

The US has also used the WTO foundation to support the revenue of US-based pharmaceutical companies, preventing the production of life-saving vaccinations from reaching developing nations in the process. The most obvious illustration of this was the crisis.

There was a significant controversy between WTO associate states about whether Covid vaccine patents may be revoked in the first half of 2021. WTO regulations aim to encourage more creativity by protecting patents and trademarks everywhere.

Ironically, this rule does n’t support the flow of technological knowledge, which is in some ways contrary to the idea of free trade. The WTO operates in accordance with the rule, which protects the interests of US-based companies.

The way this works is easy. On report, WTO rules seek to protect one’s intellectual property. However, these regulations benefit large corporations in wealthy nations with excellent research and development facilities and de facto monopolies on intellectual property because development is highly skewed worldwide.

The justification for quashing the inventions was that it would be cruel and extortive to avoid developing nations from having access to the best vaccine recipes in case of a global pandemic.

What was the result of this discussion? The US, along with a couple more large- money countries, voted to stop the exemption on vaccine patents. This prevented many developing nations from having access to the vaccine formulas from companies like Pfizer.

Having early access to the recipes could have saved thousands of lives in these nations, especially in those with respectable vaccine production capacities like India.

In fact, a study published in 2023 found that more than 50 % of Covid deaths in low and middle-income nations could have been avoided if people had had the same access to vaccines as wealthy states.

Indian people wearing masks as they queue waiting to be vaccinated against COVID.
People in Rajasthan, India, standing in long queues as they wait to receive their COVID vaccine. Image: Sumit Saraswat / Shutterstock via The Conversation

The US is once more trying to bend and make changes to the rules of international trade work in its favor by raising tariffs on Chinese-made goods. The US is now turning around after tirelessly attempting to establish a system of free trade and has imposed some of the most severe tariffs a major economy has ever seen in recent years.

US trade policy has always been about protecting the interest of US- based corporations, so this should not come as a surprise. However, Biden’s administration’s hypocrisy must be exposed.

China has not entirely adhered to the rules in the current rules-based multilateral trading system. China has n’t attempted to alter the rules as much as the US has, though. So, who’s really cheating here?

Jostein Hauge is Assistant Professor in Development Studies, University of Cambridge

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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China going all-in on drone-led seizure of Taiwan – Asia Times

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China is putting more advanced stealth drones, aircraft carriers, and book unmanned underwater vehicles ( UUV) in its military arsenal, which would indicate a move to a drone-focused naval strategy in the wake of a potential US-led Taiwan conflict.

The People’s Liberation Army-N)’s ( PLA-N) future air wings have been spotted in mockups of China’s stealthy GJ-11 Sharp Sword unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV ) at a site on Changxing Island in Shanghai, according to a report from The War Zone this month.

The templates, sited near the development of the Model 076 marine ship, suggest preparations for aircraft and amphibious assault ship operations, The War Zone statement said.

The report notes that the GJ- 11, known for its stealth capabilities, may considerably improve China’s marine aviation, especially with the PLA- N’s newest carriers and large deck amphibious assault ships. The site may also be used as a testing and training facility for board controlling and maneuvering of the UCAVs, according to it.

The War Zone notes the importance of the GJ- 11 vehicle’s proximity to China’s marine shipyards, highlighting its significance in China’s military expansion, especially regarding carrier- based variants and uncrewed aircraft.

The Changxing Island site’s GJ- 11 mockups, while not specifically linked to marine ambitions, clearly demonstrates China’s commitment to advance its provider and amphibious assault ship capabilities with covert jet-powered drones.

Additionally, Asia Times reported this month that China’s Model 076 amphibious assault ship can house UCAVs and another fixed-wing drones that transport aircraft and assault forces in a possible Taiwan conflict.

Built at the Hudong- Zhonghua factory in Shanghai, the Type 076 signifies a significant development in China’s marine style. It bridges the area between the nation’s biggest marine war vessel, the Type 075, and its cutting- border aircraft carrier, the Fujian.

The Type 076 is about 864 feet long and 141 feet wide, with a more extensive flight deck than previous models. It might also have electromagnetic catapults and arresting gear, indicating a shift toward a naval strategy that is more focused on drones.

Compared to conventional aircraft carriers, drone carriers have advantages over conventional aircraft carriers in terms of power projection. These benefits are made possible by enabling unmanned aerial operations to go far beyond national borders, thereby allowing for more tactical, operational, and strategic options.

Unmanned systems are also safer, more cost- effective and suitable for high- risk missions. Drone carriers provide a practical and affordable way for middle-income countries that lack land-based facilities to increase aerial capabilities over long distances. However, drones have limitations in settings with robust air defense systems and electronic warfare capabilities.

China is likely to use drone swarms from land and sea to overthrow Taiwan’s air defenses in a potential conflict, which could lead to more powerful airs and missile launches and a potential amphibious assault.

China is also working on a new kind of underwater drone that, if it is developed after the prototype stage, will give the PLA-N new underwater warfare options and options.

South China Morning Post (SCMP ) reported this month that China has developed a soft-body UUV that moves in a manner that resembles manta rays.

SCMP points out that despite initially being small and being used for monitoring coral reefs, work is being done to create a bigger model with integrated reconnaissance and strike roles. According to the report, the larger models will be able to expand their range and endurance, collect more data, and be clustered together.

It mentions that the UUV is fitted with cameras, sonar and the BeiDou navigation system, enabling it to transmit real- time video and location information to scientists, with an impressive feat of reaching a 1, 000- meter depth.

SCMP points out that the UUV will have special gel coatings to address biofouling problems and stop microorganism attachment that could harm its performance.

A similar US project may have inspired China’s UUV. The US Manta Ray UUV, which is referred to as an “extra- large glider,” was first described as an “extra- large glider” in April 2024, and is equipped with rear propellers for propulsion. It mimics the movement of a manta ray.

The UUV is said to be geared toward long-range missions in challenging ocean environments and has an autonomous operating system. It uses the thermal gradient of the ocean to support longer missions and has novel “data bubbles” for sending large amounts of data to satellites or ships, increasing its operational independence.

The source notes that while the UUV’s exact dimensions and launch methods remain undisclosed, its manufacturer, Northrop Grumman, emphasizes the system’s ease of shipment and assembly worldwide.

These developments may be integrated into a larger, drone-focused military strategy intended for a quick and decisive victory in a small-scale operation. This strategy could involve seizing one of Taiwan’s frontline islands, Kinmen and Penghu, in conjunction with a blockade of the main island.

In a report from Asia Times in February 2024, China revealed a plan to modernize its military strategies by incorporating cutting-edge drone technology, focusing on their use for special operations in potential wartimes, such as a Taiwan conflict with the US.

Scientists are working with the PLA to develop drones that can land on top for an extended period of time and travel long distances.

In a hypothetical 2035 scenario, the PLA plans a limited conflict with a neighboring country using small arms, boats, drones and anti- aircraft guns. They aim to attack crucial enemy installations, including command and supply centers deep within enemy territory, quickly and covertly.

Special operations UAVs need to operate alone or in groups, fly at low altitudes, navigate obstacles, engage beyond visual range and eliminate enemy forces.

Inspired by US military tactics, the PLA requires advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to hover over the battlefield after a first strike, evaluate the damage, and decide if more action is necessary.

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China targets EU pork in tit-for-tat trade spat – Asia Times

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After the union announced the addition of new taxes on Chinese energy cars, China has launched an anti-dumping investigation into meat imports from the European Union. &nbsp,

The research could ultimately lead to an increase in China’s levies on EU meat products, hitting Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and France.

Already, China charges a 12 % tax on the EU’s beef imports. According to some analysts, many European exporters will experience the heat of the trade war if the levy is increased to 20 %. They claimed that meat manufacturers in the EU may not be able to make up for their loss in China, yet if they look into new markets like Vietnam and the Philippines.

China’s Ministry of Commerce said Monday that its research will focus on meat imported from the Union for human use, including fresh, dried, smoked, preserved, warm and freezing whole cuts, as well as animal intestines, stomach and vessels. It said the sensor will start immediately.

The China Animal Husbandry Association filed a complaint on June 6 on behalf of the home meat industry in China, according to the report.

It advised those whose alleged dumping actions should get in touch with the Ministry of Commerce’s Trade Remedy and Investigation Bureau to start the research. They were told to give their thoughts to the ministry within 20 days of Monday. &nbsp,

In 2023, China consumed a complete of 57.94 million tons of meat and pork by-products, compared to just 1.55 million lots imported.

About half of China’s meat exports came from Europe. From 2014 to 2020, China’s meat goods continued to grow. After the number peaked at 4.39 million plenty in 2020, it has declined steadily. It fell to 1.55 million lots next month. &nbsp,

Cailianpress.com, a Chinese economic news site, said meat imported from the EU only accounted for a small portion of China’s full meat usage, so a decline in source from the region will not have a big impact on pork prices in China. It said, on the contrary, many pig farms in the EU will suffer as they wo n’t be able to find new buyers for their pig internal organs, trotters, tails and ears, which are not generally used in European dishes. &nbsp,

In Chinese food, animal intestines, stomach and vessels often go into “dim amount” to be consumed in a pho. Ginger and vinegar are used to cook pork knuckles. Pig lungs, tails and ears are for making soups. &nbsp,

Chronology of retaliation

The Chinese government may launch an anti-dumping investigation into EU-sourced pork imports on May 26 according to the state-owned Global Times. Wang Wentao, the head of Chinese commerce, traveled to Spain on June 1st and claimed that the EU’s anti-subvention investigations into Chinese EVs and other products were carried out using fabricated pretexts like Chinese overcapacity and unfair competition.

However, Beijing’s warnings failed to stop the EU from imposing a 17.4- 38.1 % tariff on Chinese EVs on June 12.

Last year, Spain exported about 560, 000 tons of pork products worth 1.2 billion euros ( US$ 1.29 billion ) to China, according to Interporc, the country’s pork producers ‘ association. &nbsp,

Spain has called for trade talks since China launched an investigation into the EU’s pork imports. Luis Planas, the minister of agriculture in Spain, expressed his hope that negotiations will allow for the removal of tariffs on agricultural and food products. &nbsp,

Apart from Spain two other countries, the Netherlands and Denmark, will also be hit by China’s latest anti- dumping probe as they exported to China pork products worth US$ 620 million and US$ 550 million, respectively, in 2023.

The European Commission’s spokesperson stated that the EU is not concerned about China’s anti-dumping investigation and will act decisively to make sure that the investigation adheres to World Trade Organization regulations.

China’s pork supply

China’s pork prices have been declining since September 2020, according to an article in the Economic Daily that published earlier this year, with the exception of a slight increase between April and November 2022. &nbsp,

According to Li Pengcheng, an analyst at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, many pig farms were losing money as a result of the sector’s protracted downturn. &nbsp,

The decline in pork prices also suppressed China’s consumer price index, which increased only 0.2 % year- on- year in 2023, compared with the average 2 % growth in 2016- 2019.

Since April this year, China’s pork prices have regained growth momentum. On Monday, Sichuan Online, a state- owned news website, said many pig farmers in Sichuan province turned profits this month, meaning that the pork industry may have entered an up cycle. &nbsp,

Some commentators predicted that Beijing will have more bargaining chips in a trade negotiation with the bloc because of the rising pork demand in China, which is attractive to the EU. They added that if China needed more pork products, it might also think about bringing them from Brazil and Russia. &nbsp,

Read: China to retaliate if Europe raises EV tariffs&nbsp,

Read: Chinese EV firms can absorb EU tariffs: expert

Follow Jeff Pao on X: &nbsp, @jeffpao3

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Why is NATO expanding its nuclear force? – Asia Times

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Jens Stoltenberg, &nbsp, the 13th director general of NATO, says that the empire is in talks to build more nuclear weapons and upgrade their distribution systems. &nbsp, Stoltenberg told the&nbsp, Telegraph&nbsp, in the UK: &nbsp,” I wo n’t go into operational details about how many nuclear warheads&nbsp, should be operational and which should be stored, but we need to consult on these issues. That’s exactly what we’re doing” .&nbsp, Stoltenberg emphasized that NATO is a “nuclear alliance”.

He explained:” N​ATO’s goal is, of course, a world without nuclear arms. However, because a universe where Russia, China, and North Korea have nuclear weapons and N ATO does not, we will continue to be a nuclear empire.

​The Russians say that Stoltenberg’s atomic weapons pronouncement was &nbsp, “bully techniques”.

Without extensive collaboration with the United States, Stoltenberg was unable to take action against NATO’s radioactive barrier. Consequently, the Biden administration’s plan and software must be the NATO enlargement of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear sharing in NATO

​NATO’s nuclear deterrence is based on radioactive sharing agreements. &nbsp, As&nbsp, described publicly,

NATO’s nuclear deterrent strategy also depends on the skills and system provided by friends and the United States ‘ forward-deploying nuclear weapons in Europe. A number of NATO member nations provide a dual-capable aircraft (DCA ) capability to the Alliance. These aircraft are essential to NATO’s nuclear deterrence vision, and they are available for nuclear functions at several readiness levels. In their radioactive part, the aircraft are equipped to take nuclear weapons in a discord, and staff are trained appropriately. &nbsp,

While Supporters provide military aid for the DCA vision using conventional forces and capabilities, the United States maintains complete control and custody of their atomic weapons forward-deploying in Europe. ​

While NATO’s atomic weapons are American, the UK and France have nuclear arms also.

Nuclear weight weapons that the US has stored in Europe are nuclear weapons that can be launched both by NATO plane or by the US working independently of NATO.

Essentially, atomic weight weapons fall into the category of tactical nuclear weapons. &nbsp, The US, UK and France likewise deploy tactical nuclear weapons in and around Europe. &nbsp, The UK has around 225 nuclear weapons ( more than half in store ) for its Trident nuclear submarine system. The European nuclear capacity requires US coordination.

Nuclear underwater HMS Vanguard arrives again at HM Naval Base Clyde, Faslane, Scotland following a guard. Photo: YouTube

France is the only NATO member to possess a nuclear arsenal that is entirely separate. It includes a small number of cruise missiles with nuclear weapons and ballistic missile ships. &nbsp, The French&nbsp, have floated the idea of replacing the US atomic deterrent&nbsp, with a French one and there have been conversations with Germany about the idea.

Stoltenberg’s decision to strengthen NATO’s nuclear empire might be seen as a counterweight to European force to turn away from the US-led barrier in Europe.

Due to the possibility of a nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States, there has long been a skepticism in Europe regarding the US’s decision to not build nuclear weapons to defend Western territory. The US’s use of tactical nuclear weapons ( under US control ) is intended to reduce the risk of a strategic nuclear exchange with Russia, to an unknown extent.

However, it is undoubtedly true that Stoltenberg’s reliance on NATO as a nuclear ally was generally intended to quell concerns that Russia might use nuclear weapons to resolve the Ukraine issue. &nbsp, Compared with the US, Russia has a huge army of tactical nuclear weapons. Additionally, many of its military weapons have nuclear warheads in them. In fact, the Ukrainians have warned Europe that this is exactly what Russia may do.

Russians claim to have deposited nuclear weapons in Belarus, but none have been discovered there as of yet. They have been conducting nuclear exercises it. &nbsp, Also the US has been flying its tactical bombers close to Russia’s territories, as a US notice.

Additionally, Ukraine has attacked two highly vulnerable sensor points, which are crucial components of Russia’s early warning system. Why these goals were chosen by Ukraine or NATO, which provides these attacks with intellect and weapons, is unclear. &nbsp,

NATO relies on nuclear weight weapons for punishment. NATO aircraft would be used to deliver these weapons to Russian goals. &nbsp, &nbsp, About 150 weapons are stored at six foundations: &nbsp, Kleine Brogel&nbsp, in Belgium, &nbsp, Büchel Air Base&nbsp, in Germany, &nbsp, Aviano&nbsp, and&nbsp, Ghedi Air Base&nbsp, in Italy, &nbsp, Volkel Air Base&nbsp, in the Netherlands and&nbsp, Incirlik&nbsp, in Turkey. &nbsp, These are part of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement.

A ceremony was held inside an aircraft shelter with an (empty ) underground nuclear weapons vault during a F-22 Raptor visit to RAF Lakenheath in 2016. There are 33 cellars at the bottom. Image: US Air Force

In contrast, the US announced in January that it was upgrading elements of the&nbsp, RAF Airbase at Lakenheath, Surrey, in the UK. There a particular regiment, the 48th Security Force, of F- 35s may be capable of carrying B- 61 weight weapons. To protect workers at the bottom, the US is installing unique mechanical loading ramps, upgrading storage facilities, and installing a atomic” shield.”

These F-35s will be flown entirely by US pilots and are not permitted to participate in NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement, which means that their mission may be related to NATO’s security and deterrence but may also be used outside of any common NATO agreement.

B61 Thermonuclear Bomb. The B61&nbsp, atomic bomb&nbsp, is designed for vehicle by&nbsp, aircraft&nbsp, at&nbsp, hypersonic flight speeds&nbsp, and is the primary&nbsp, nuclear weapon&nbsp, in the&nbsp, U. S. &nbsp, hoard since the ending of the&nbsp, Cold War. The tool was designed and built by the&nbsp, Los Alamos National Laboratory&nbsp, in&nbsp, New Mexico&nbsp, beginning in 1961 and has been produced in various types. Photo: Wikipedia

A modernization program ( Mod 12 ) for US B-61 gravity bombs is about to be finished. The B- 61 is a “dial- a- offer” weapons, meaning that the weapon produce can be adjusted to meet certain targets. &nbsp, The US even may keep some Mod 11 B- 61 weapons.

The Mod 11 B- 61 is regarded as a basement buster weapon and is not&nbsp, “dial a offer” .&nbsp, It has a special 400 megawatt weapon. About 30 of these weapons were manufactured. &nbsp, It is not obvious if they are deployed in Europe.

The Mod 12 B- 61 can select yields&nbsp, ( in kilotons ) from.3, 1.5, 10 or 50 kt. &nbsp, For assessment functions, the Hiroshima weapon was between 11 and 16 gigawatts.

The development of the B- 61 requires the development of the shipping techniques, including changes in the airplane’s electronics. There is very little information available about how fast improvements and modifications may be made. &nbsp, New F- 35s may have B- 61 weapons if they are equipped to do so. &nbsp, It is n’t known how many of the F- 35’s delivered to Europe are nuclear capable.

Some unanswered issues

It is important to point out that neither the US nor NATO has any agreement obligation, or any other duty, to defend Ukraine from a nuclear attack. &nbsp, So NATO punishment, at least inasmuch as it is understood, does not use to Ukraine in any conventional manner. &nbsp, But that does not imply that Stoltenberg, and by proxy the United States, is never shifting the alliance to extending a nuclear umbrella over Ukraine.

The NATO-US decision to unleash long-range weapons in Ukraine on Russian country is one reason to think that there may be a change in strategy being considered.

Prior to the surrogate war in which case Ukraine was involved, the US and Russia have been careful to avoid attacking each other immediately. Truman argued that this is why he opposed US troops entering the Yalu River in Korea, why neither China nor Russia were attacked in the Vietnam War, and why President John F. Kennedy refused to launch a nuclear strike on Cuba and the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis.

However, there were instances when hostilities increased to the point where they reached nuclear boundary. That was particularly true in 1973 when Russia threatened to use nuclear weapons in the Yom Kippur war and when the US issued a DEFCON- 3 notice.

NATO-approved attacks on Russian country appear to cross a dangerous red column in the context of power competitions, proxy wars, and other issues ( the Cuban Missile Crisis was not a substitute issue but a direct clash between the US and USSR ).

When combined with the no- negotiations, no- talks, no- peace posture of the US and most of Europe regarding Ukraine, the danger of an expanding conflict – even one involving nuclear weapons – is increasing. In that context, upgrading nuclear arsenals adds fuel to the fire.

Stephen Bryen served as the Near East Subcommittee of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee&nbsp and as the deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. &nbsp,

This&nbsp, article was first published on his&nbsp, Weapons and Strategy&nbsp, Substack and is republished with permission.

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China retail surge hints at economic rebalancing – Asia Times

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China’s new economic data presents a mixed, but promising, image of its ongoing and growing financial recovery. &nbsp,

Financial spending increased above forecasts, suggesting a possible lowering of the heavy imbalances that have long plagued China’s economy, despite technological growth showing signs of slowing in May. &nbsp,

This development points to the potential impact that government initiatives may have on Chinese families.

Industrial production rose 5.6 % year- on- year, falling short of April’s 6.7 % increase and the median forecast of 6.2 % from a Bloomberg survey. &nbsp,

This decline might immediately appear disconcerting. But, when viewed in the broader context of China’s economic environment, it reveals a critical tilt from an depending on industrial production to a more balanced, customer- driven growth model.

The retail sales data, which increased by 3.7 % and outperformed the forecast of 3 %, is the real story. This uptick is a major indicator of shifting financial dynamics as opposed to just a quantitative blip. &nbsp,

For decades, China’s progress has been greatly dependent on producing and exports. The vulnerability of this type was highlighted by the global pandemic, which prompted the government to redouble its efforts to encourage private consumption.

Beijing has taken a number of steps to promote consumer spending, including tax breaks and subsidies, direct cash transfers, and e-vouchers. &nbsp,

These guidelines aim to increase disposable earnings and lessen homes ‘ financial burdens, thus encouraging spending. These steps are beginning to keep some fruit, according to the most recent financial data.

The rise in retail sales may appear to indicate a growing sense of confidence in Chinese users. Households appear to be starting to use their wallets after a period of careful investing caused by economic uncertainty and the pandemic’s lingering effects. &nbsp,

This cognitive change is crucial to maintaining long-term financial growth. The possible lowering of deep-seated economic imbalances is one of the most important implications of new data. &nbsp,

For decades, China’s market has grappled with the issue of rebalancing development drivers. The need to maintain a strong domestic consumption center has frequently been overshadowed by the overreliance on commercial production and infrastructure investment.

The slowdown in commercial production growth, while apparently bad, does so signal a good structural shift. &nbsp,

In addition, the improved retail sales figures align with broader economic objectives. A healthy consumer market encourages innovation and job creation while stimulating demand for a wide range of goods and services. This, in turn, leads to higher incomes and further boosts consumption, creating a virtuous cycle of growth.

The appetite for spending appears to be increasing in China despite domestic challenges and global economic headwinds. This resilience is underpinned by several factors, including rising urbanization, an expanding middle class and ongoing digitalization.

Although the most recent data provide reasons for optimism, it is crucial to acknowledge that the road to a fully balanced and resilient economy is long and full of difficulties. The government must continue to encourage consumer confidence and spending through targeted policies and structural reforms.

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Albanese-Li meeting not all peaches and cream – Asia Times

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In their extensive meeting on Monday, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese claimed that he and Chinese Premier Li Qiang discussed improving military-to-military connections to prevent potential conflicts involving their armed forces.

This follows a previous incident where American Navy divers were shot with sonar last year and flares were dropped on an American Navy helicopter this year. Albanese had indicated in advance that he would bring up the issues in his discussions with Li.

Albanese said at a press conference following the meeting that he had already spoken with Defense Minister Richard Marles about moving this ahead.

The perfect minister did not give more details. It actually came out of a conference hours earlier. That was part of the discourse”.

The declaration on the meeting’s results said the rulers agreed to continue or increase relationship in, among other areas, “defense coordination speech”.

Chinese foreign meddling in Australia and Yang Hengjun’s position, which he denies, are two different controversial topics that were discussed.

Cheng Lei’s lens views are blocked by Chinese authorities.

Chinese officials earnestly tried to stop American journalist Cheng Lei, who was released from a long detention in China next year, from being in front of the camera prior than Albanese and Li were together signing diplomatic agreements. Yet after she moved her seats, the meddling persisted.

Albanese told his news conference, which Cheng Lei ( a Sky News presenter ) attended, the two had exchanged smiles during the event but” I’m not aware of those issues”.

” It’s significant that people be allowed to participate fully and that’s what may happen in this]parliament house ] building or anywhere else in Australia”.

It was” not credible,” according to James Paterson, a spokesman for the opposition’s home affairs department. Albanese was not informed of what had transpired.

” We do not figure stop journalists from filming in our legislature house, and it shows disrespect for our legislature and our traditions for Taiwanese authorities to behave in this manner in our nation.” And honestly, I think there should be an explanation from the Chinese group for this conduct”, Paterson said.

Li, who likewise met with opposition leader Peter Dutton, did not give a media event, or provide any additional option for advertising issues.

Albanese asked at his press conference if he had any more info about Yang about whether it was “unappropriate to talk about an individual and their conditions in terms of privacy.” ( Yang’s supporters say he has waived privacy considerations. )

On Sunday, Yang followers said in a speech,” Yang’s health conditions remain serious and unanswered. We have no cause for doubt that he is receiving the appropriate medical care because there is no clarity.

When asked whether he believed the leaders of China to carry out their promises, Albanese responded,” I have had productive conversations with Premier Li and those discussions have had results. We do n’t deal with that in a transactional way. We offer our opinion, and I must admit that the leading even offers his opinion.

However, according to the Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party spokesperson, “mutual goodwill between the individuals of both countries is on the increase” as diplomatic relations stabilize.

According to the most recent study conducted by the Global Times Institute in collaboration with the Beijing Foreign Studies University’s Australian Studies Center, this is true. The online study, done in late May and beginning June, had specimens of 1, 200 in China and 1, 075 in Australia.

” The Taiwanese responders have reported a significant improvement in how they view Australia.” The typical goodwill score has increased by seven points to 69.2 in 2024 in comparison to the previous study conducted in 2022, which is in line with the latest Anthony Albanese government’s policy adjustment, according to the Global Times post.

” In the same way, the American interviewees have shown a rise in their receptiveness toward China. The study results in a goodwill tally of 40.9, slightly higher than the most recent Lowy Institute polls ‘ average.

According to the post, the Lowy Institute’s data itself indicates a stabilization and a small increase in good sentiment toward China between 2022 and 2024, following a substantial decline in 2019.

The early this month Lowy surveys has a less encouraging outlook. It states that “despite China’s recent political re-engagement over the past two years, the government still has a very low opinion of China.”

Only 17 % of Australians believe they have a “very good sense” or “very good faith” in China to behave appropriately in the world. Trust in China reached a record low of 12 % in 2022, which is unchanged from 2023. However, it still stands in sharp contrast to just six years ago, when half ( 52 % ) of Australians trusted China.”

Michelle Grattan is Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Putting China’s science surge in proper perspective – Asia Times

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The Economist has a good story on the rise of Chinese science. In terms of “high-impact” (i.e. highly cited) publications, China has soared past the US and Europe:

Source: The Economist

Now, these numbers have to be taken with a grain of salt. Measuring the impact of papers by looking at how many other papers cite them can be a biased measure of true impact — you can have a bunch of researchers who all cite each other copiously and thus inflate the metric.

Qiu, Steinwender, and Azoulay have a recent paper in which they argue that this phenomenon is especially common in China:

We highlight a novel source of bias in citations that is particularly relevant for cross-national comparisons: home bias, i.e., the tendency of researchers to excessively cite researchers from their own country…

We find that China exhibits by far the largest home bias among all countries. This is not a recent phenomenon. While China’s home bias has been steadily increasing over the past twenty years, Chinese citations were already strongly home biased in 2000, the start of our observation period. In addition, China’s home bias is not driven by any particular research field. Rather, China exhibits the strongest home bias in 18 out of 20 broad scientific fields…

Finally, we find that home bias has exaggerated the rise of China in science. While China ranks second behind the US in terms of raw citations, it falls back to the fourth position behind the US, the UK and Germany once we use our de-biased metric. Homedebiasing citation counts might be seen as especially informative if one believes that home citations are especially prone to reflect political or strategic considerations, rather than the acknowledgement of scientists cumulatively building on the ideas contained in the articles they choose to cite.

The researchers basically just identify “home bias” by controlling for a country’s size. Their measure of home bias still displays some apparent size dependence, with small European countries at the bottom end of the scale and large countries at the top end. So I do wonder if they controlled for size correctly. But China still definitely sticks out above all others, including India:

Source: Qiu et al. (2024)

So while I think the authors’ conclusion that the UK is still ahead of China in high-impact science seems pretty suspect, there really does seem to be something going on here in terms of Chinese researchers citing each other an awful lot.

You can interpret this in a couple of different ways. One possibility is that Chinese science is just much more high-quality than people outside China realize and non-Chinese speakers fail to cite these high-quality Chinese papers due to the language barrier.

An alternative interpretation — which Qiu et al. suggest — is that China’s government told the country’s researchers to go out and write papers that get a ton of citations, and the researchers basically responded by establishing implicit or explicit citation rings. And, of course, it could be some combination of these two explanations.

(Update: In the comments, Zhicheng Lin, who has done research on authorship inflation and who has worked with Chinese scientists, suggests another explanation. Chinese researchers, he argues, are under greater pressure than researchers elsewhere to cite senior researchers within their own departments.)

Also, it’s not clear that China is outspending the developed world when it comes to science. As The Economist article shows, China’s R&D spending has grown rapidly since the 1990s:

Source: The Economist

But that’s partly because its economy grew rapidly; the percent of GDP China spends on R&D has also been increasing, but so far it’s just converging to the global norm of 2.5-3.5%:

Source: World Bank

(Note that the real research spending powerhouse here is South Korea, and the real laggard is France.)

And on top of that, the national R&D spending numbers that The Economist touts are actually mostly R&D spending by corporations, not by the Chinese government:

Much of this research is done in the corporate labs of state-owned enterprises, which took over much of the research function of Chinese government labs back in 1999. But the share of R&D output attributable to Chinese universities is fairly small, and has actually shrunk recently:

Source: CSIS

So China’s domination of global science, either in terms of citations or spending, isn’t really quite as dramatic as the Economist article makes it out to be.

But in the applied physical sciences — especially in materials science, chemistry, and engineering — China has definitely zoomed ahead of the West, even if you accept the “debiasing factors” from Qiu et al. (2024):

Health care is great and China is doing its people a disservice by skimping on health spending. But applied physical sciences are the key input to the export-oriented high-tech manufacturing industries — computer chips, EVs, and so on — that the US wants to foster.

And applied physical sciences are also crucial to winning wars — to building high volumes of highly accurate and destructive missiles and other weapons, and so on. The Economist certainly thinks military strength is a big factor behind China’s science push:

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made agricultural research—which it sees as key to ensuring the country’s food security—a priority for scientists…“Engineering is the ultimate Chinese discipline in the modern period,” says Professor Marginson, “I think that’s partly about military technology and partly because that’s what you need to develop a nation.”

So it would seem like a good idea to beef up the US’ prowess in the physical sciences, not just because it improves the world and raises US GDP, but also in order to help keep the US and its allies strong.

Can US actually get more federal funding for science?

Discussions about science funding usually focus on the federal government. This is partly because government funding is simply the easiest policy lever to pull when you want something to change. It’s also because government funding is the weak link in the US research ecosystem. Over time, US private-sector R&D spending has risen steadily, while government funding for science has fallen relentlessly as a share of GDP:

Source: NSF

Even within universities, the government’s role has shrunk over the last decade:

Source: Babina et al. (2020)

So it seems like we should do the obvious thing, and boost federal funding for science.

But there are a few reasons to be skeptical of increased federal funding as a silver-bullet solution. First of all, in an age of austerity like the one the US is probably headed into now, federal R&D funding is likely to suffer. The reason is that R&D funding doesn’t have much of a natural political constituency to go to bat for it on Capitol Hill — its benefits are diffuse and long-term.

You could see this play out in 2021-22. The CHIPS and Science Act started out as the Endless Frontier Act, a bold vision for increasing government research funding:

First introduced last year by Senators Chuck Schumer and Todd Young, the bill would have established a new Technology Directorate at the National Science Foundation (NSF) with a DARPA-like program structure equipped with flexible hiring and grant-making authorities.

With a $100 billion budget over five years, the Directorate would have been empowered to use grants, contracts, prizes, and cooperative agreements with industry, academia and research institutes to push the frontiers of US innovation in ten broad areas, ranging from cutting-edge technologies like Artificial Intelligence and quantum computing, to more mature but no less important sectors like robotics, manufacturing, biotechnology, advanced energy technology and material sciences.

That idea was based in part on the work of Jonathan Gruber and Simon Johnson, whose excellent book “Jump-Starting America“ was a clarion call to boost federal R&D spending to 1980s levels (this was before Johnson pivoted to calling for the government to slow down progress in artificial intelligence). Researchers from the Brookings Institution, as well as growth economists like Paul Romer, had also called for a big boost in government R&D.

It never happened. Congress significantly downsized the science spending in the bill, renaming it as the CHIPS and Science Act to reflect the shift in focus. There was still some science spending in there, but then Congress failed to appropriate most of the money for it, effectively gutting the remainder of the old Endless Frontier plan:

Two years in, Congress has fully funded subsidies for chipmakers. The big boost in science, however, is way off target…Congress has gnawed away at the law’s ambitions on fundamental research and development aimed at staying ahead of China and other rivals in competitive fields like artificial intelligence…

The latest example is the spending package lawmakers advanced over the past week: Biden’s signature enacts deep cuts to the National Science Foundation and stalls key offices in the Commerce and Energy departments that are supposed to deploy CHIPS money, turning a promised cash infusion of $200 billion over a decade into a humiliating haircut…

“These aren’t the numbers I’d like to see. I’m disappointed that we can’t provide funding to match what we authorized in CHIPS and Science,” House Science Chair Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) told Politico in an email. “Unfortunately, in our current fiscal environment we have to make difficult decisions and that’s reflected in the budgets for these agencies.”

It’s important to remember that when a bill passes Congress that “spends” an amount of money, that amount is only “authorized” — it’s actually just a notional target. The money isn’t really certain to be spent until it’s “appropriated” later. So basically Congress passed a bill promising to spend a bunch of money on science, and then just didn’t do it:

Source: Politico

So you can see what an uphill battle this is.

Is direct federal funding all the US needs?

Then there’s the question of direct federal funding versus incentives for companies to fund research at universities. As you can see from the graph above, the percentage of federal funding in university science has been falling and is now just over 50%. But what we don’t really know is whether this is a good thing or a bad thing, on balance.

In fact, that’s an area of active debate in the economics world. For example, Fieldhouse and Mertens (2023) conclude that the economic returns to government-funded science are really large.

They do this by making a model in which government research creates “government R&D capital” which is then an input into the economy as a whole. Matching their model to the data, they find that government non-defense R&D is basically supercharges productivity growth:

[W]e find that a positive shock to appropriations for nondefense R&D robustly leads to a delayed and gradual increase in aggregate TFP that becomes highly statistically significant at long forecast horizons (8 to 15 years). For a shock that induces a one percent increase in government R&D capital, our baseline estimates show eventual increases in the level of TFP of about 0.2 percent. Positive shocks to nondefense R&D also induce increases in various indicators of innovative activity, such as patent grants, the number of doctoral recipients in STEM fields, the number of researchers engaged in R&D, or the number of technology publications.

This is a very big effect. The authors find a much smaller effect for defense R&D, but argue that this might be because the research results are kept secret for military purposes.

That’s a cool result, but there are lots of pieces of this analysis that might be wrong — the basic model relies on some theoretical assumptions, the time horizon is really long to be able to identify anything, etc. And there are some other papers that seem to contradict some of the conclusions. For example, Babina et al. (2020) find that federally funded university research is less likely to be commercialized:

[A] higher share of funding from federal sources reduces patenting activity…[A] 10% increase in the mean share of federal funding reduces the probability of any patenting by 0.4 percentage points, about half the mean.

The authors also find that more federal funding tends to keep researchers in academia, although it does also tend to increase their likelihood of starting startups.

Meanwhile, Arora et al. (2023) find similar results to Babina et al., and argue that federal research funding tends to crowd out private-sector research:

[W]e find that abstract public knowledge per se— publications in scientific journals—has little effect on the various components of corporate R&D. This means that corporate innovation is largely unresponsive to “pure” knowledge spillovers.

Second, public invention reduces corporate R&D. An increase in relevant university patents of one standard deviation reduces corporate patents by about 51%, corporate publications by approximately 33%, and the employment of AMWS scientists by about 8%. Further, we find that an increase in public invention reduces the firm’s profits, suggesting that, on balance, public inventions compete with corporate inventions more than they serve as inputs into corporate innovation…[F]irms on the technology frontier appear to respond less to public invention as compared to followers…

Taken together, our findings indicate that the public science that matters for corporate innovation—the science developed into patented inventions and embodied in the human capital of people—is both excludable and rivalrous. Thus, the expansion of public science may not lead to the sustained productivity growth that standard models of economic growth would predict.

Now your response to these findings may be something along the lines of: “Who cares about the private sector? Who cares about commercialization? For that matter, who cares about economic growth? The purpose of science is to discover the secrets of the Universe and increase human knowledge, not to make profit for some shareholder, you neoliberal shill!”

But regardless of your viewpoint on the value of discovering the secrets of the Universe, it’s probably the case that if research spending never makes its way into the creation of new commercializable products, it’s less likely to raise material living standards or to strengthen the national defense. So if we want to use science as a tool to enrich and strengthen the nation, we should be concerned about results showing that federal research spending is not the best way to do that.

So there are some conflicting results about whether federal R&D funding is the best way to fund science. I think a safe bet would be to go with a mix of direct federal funding and incentives for universities to work with corporations.

How else can the US support science?

The final question in my mind is whether there’s something else the US can be doing other than just spending more money on research. I think it’s instructive to realize that the meteoric rise of Chinese materials science, chemistry, and engineering has happened despite universities representing a slightly smaller share of China’s research spending.

That doesn’t mean more money for Chinese labs isn’t part of the story here — it is. China’s universities have reaped a share of the benefits of China’s rapid economic growth, even though corporate labs reaped an even larger share. But the fact that China is able to dominate the applied physical sciences without making academia more important in their system raises the question of whether the US might be able to accomplish something similar.

One possibility is that China focuses more on STEM education than the US. In fact, about 41% of Chinese college students major in STEM, compared to only 20% of Americans. But because more Americans go to college, the two countries have almost exactly equal STEM graduates as a percent of population:

Source: CSET

If you multiply the US number by 4.26 (the population ratio between the countries), you come up with a number almost exactly the same as China’s.

Which raises the question: Maybe China is doing well in research just because it’s really, really big? Just as we couldn’t expect Germany to equal America’s scientific output in the long run, maybe it’s unrealistic to expect the US to keep pace scientifically with a country that has four times as many people. (Insert obvious pitch for mass high-skilled immigration here.)

In other words, maybe China is just becoming an average developed country along the dimensions of R&D spending and STEM education, but because it’s so huge, it looks like it’s doing better. I find this to be a common mistake Westerners make when looking at China — not realizing how many of its seeming outperformance is really just a function of size.

Even if size explains China’s overall R&D performance, though, there’s the question of whether the things China is researching are more important than the things the US and Europe are researching.

American and European research is much more biased toward life sciences, while Chinese research is much more biased toward applied physical sciences. So an important question is whether the US and its allies should shift spending out of biology and into materials science, engineering and chemistry.

In the US, this would probably involve diverting money from the NIH (part of the Department of Health and Human Services) to more physical science-focused agencies like the NSF and the Department of Energy. Currently, NIH utterly dominates nondefense research spending:

Source: GAO

Changing that balance could be the key to competing with China in the applied physical sciences.

Anyway, I think the reports of China’s scientific dominance shouldn’t be causing policymakers in the West to panic. But it’s becoming pretty undeniable that China has now taken a commanding lead in applied physical science research and Western leaders need to ask themselves whether they can really afford to cede leadership in those fields.

This article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion Substack and is republished with kind permission. Read the original here and become a Noahopinion subscriber here.

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China’s war with Taiwan is already underway – Asia Times

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KINMEN, Taiwan– The Shun Da was kilometers off program. Authorized by China’s Maritime Safety Administration to&nbsp, excavate the seafloor&nbsp, for a new gate near Xiamen, the Taiwanese- marked vessel was rather buzzing the Chinese coast guard on Taiwan’s Dadan Island, about 16 kilometers to the southwest.

A Chinese tourist boat guide a blogger through the constrained lake and within a few hundred feet of the Shun Da’s harsh, Asheng, a deckhand, said,” It’s never supposed to be here. ” But it happens all the time“, he added.

As the People’s Liberation Army wrapped away two days of military exercises around Taiwan next month, which China’s military called a&nbsp, “dress rehearsal” &nbsp, for a complete- scale assault, the self- governing island’s leaders were focused abroad: On the margins, in the dark spaces where Beijing’s “gray zone” tactics slowly encroach on Chinese sovereignty.

One senior government official who spoke on condition of anonymity said,” It has become a regular reality that we have to deal with,” given the seriousness of the situation. ” Not just the military drills and exercises but near daily encroachment” into Taiwan’s airspace, sea lanes and even its politics.

China is advancing more aggressively, making it harder to see than kinetic tactics but no less threatening. As Taiwan’s new president, Lai Ching- te – William Lai –&nbsp, seeks to maintain a delicate peace across the Taiwan Strait, China is doubling down on efforts to wage political, cognitive and maritime assaults.

Its goal? To upend the status quo without firing a shot, claim observers.

Taiwan President Lai Ching- te is in Beijing’s crosshairs. Photo: X Screengrab / Taipei News Photographer Association

” The Chinese communists ‘ pressure on Taiwan is all- encompassing, especially diplomatically”, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia- lung&nbsp, said recently. The Chinese communists are still attempting to alter the status quo, according to wikipedia. They are creating a new normal, pressing on at every stage, trying to nibble away and annex (us )”.

One instance of that nibbling is The Shun Da’s unlicensed passage through Taiwanese-controlled waters. There are countless others.

Scholars from the Taiwanese military-affiliated Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a Taiwanese military-affiliated think tank, presented a half-dozen gray zone tactics that China frequently employs to repress Taiwan’s sovereignty during a briefing to journalists last month. These actions fall just below the threshold of a conventional conflict. These include economic coercion, critical infrastructure sabotage, harassment by drone and boat, and cyberattacks.

Beijing even wages” cognitive warfare”, disinformation campaigns meant to shape public opinion in China’s favor. Favorite topics include casting the United States as an unreliable partner to drive a wedge between Taipei and Washington, and branding Taiwan’s leaders” separatists” intent on declaring Taiwanese independence.

” We are certainly seeing an increase in gray zone activities, and we’re probably going to keep seeing more and more intrusions closer and closer to Taiwan, with a view to sending a signal that the Lai administration cannot defend Taiwan’s sovereignty”, said J Michael Cole, a Taipei- based security analyst.

” The danger in this is that the closer they get, the more traffic there is, the higher the possibility at some point of miscommunication, collision, or accidents. Then, that could cause a lot of escalation. I have no idea how China would de-escalate in that kind of a situation.

Incidents of gray zone incursions have spiked in recent months, as Chinese spy balloons, drones and civilian boats have traversed Taiwanese- controlled&nbsp, territory. Two people were killed when a Chinese fishing boat pursued by Taiwan’s coast guard capsized in February, raising tensions. China’s coast guard made an apparent retaliation by inspecting a tourist boat in Taiwan close to Kinmen a day later.

Incursions have continued in the month since President Lai’s inauguration. A Chinese man was detained last week after being caught piloting a motorboat into a harbor at the mouth of the Tamsui River, which leads to Taipei’s capital. According to military observers, these incidents are meant to put Taiwan’s defenses to the test and make the island’s response impossible.

Taiwan is a renegade province and an integral component of the People’s Republic, according to China. While Taiwan was never under PRC control, Beijing has vowed to “reunify” Taiwan, by force if necessary.

Yet a kinetic war would be costly. Bloomberg Economics estimates war over Taiwan would erase some US$ 10 trillion, roughly 10 %, from the global economy. Given the stakes, gray zone warfare may be more appealing.

Beijing could use such tactics, led by its coast guard and law enforcement, to simply quarantine Taiwan, according to a recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington DC-based think tank. Taiwan and its allies would have to work against blocking access to even one port, like Kaohsiung in the south.

The possibility of such scenarios has received little attention, but in the short run, a quarantine is more likely than an invasion or a military blockade, according to the report. Additionally, it would raise questions about how Taiwan and the world can effectively respond.

The best defense of China’s actions, according to Taipei’s leaders, is to increase defense spending and strengthen ties with allies. ” We need to increase our arsenal …and learn from Ukraine”, said Wang Ting- yu, a senior lawmaker for Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party. ” Enough is never enough. We need to]strengthen ] our indigenous capacity”.

On the frontline island of Kinmen, where the Shun Da recently sliced through Taiwan’s restricted waterways, concern over China’s moves is more muted.

A Taiwanese military outpost on Shihyu Islet, seen past anti- landing spikes along Lieyu Island in the Kinmen Islands, August 10, 2022. Image: Twitter / Screengrab

Officials here speak of cooperation with China, Kinmen sits just a few kilometers off the mainland’s coast. On day two of Beijing’s recent military exercise, Kinmen County’s deputy mayor was visiting China to discuss a cross- Strait swimming competition.

” Do I worry about a Chinese invasion? Of course I worry”, said the deputy mayor, Li Wen- Liang. However, we should n’t shut down the communication channels we’ve constructed out of fear.

Ahming, a tanned, white- bearded Taiwanese fisherman in Kinmen, was even more relaxed. He claimed that his work has been largely impacted by China’s recent activities in the gray zone.

Chinese trawlers are no longer entering Taiwan’s waters in large numbers because the Taiwanese coast guard regularly patrols the waters where he fishes, he claimed.

After a day at sea, Ahming deftly untangled his fishing net,” I do n’t think China is as bad as people think.” ” They’re always taking an inch, giving an inch. If they really want to use force, we can do nothing”.

Greg C Bruno is a journalist, editor and author of” Blessings from Beijing: Inside China’s Soft- Power War on Tibet”. He serves as the project manager for the Taiwan Reporting Project.

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China’s long and fuzzy history of ‘panda diplomacy’ – Asia Times

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Chinese Premier Li Qiang announced that two “equally lovely, energetic, sweet, and younger” penguins had been given to Australia to remove Wang Wang and Fu Ni, who have resided in Adelaide for 15 years.

The loaning of pandas to different nations has long been a component of Chinese diplomacy. But what precisely is this particular take on Foreign soft energy? Why does it work? And how will it affect current Australian-China ties significantly?

China’s tiger politics from Mao to then

The Women’s Republic of China’s practice of dragon politics began in the 1950s when Chairman Mao Zedong, the newly established communist regime, began distributing panda to its socialist supporters to bolster ideological relationships and develop political kindness.

Ping Ping and Qi Qi, China’s first panda “ambassadors”, arrived in the Soviet Union in 1957 to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, when the Bolshevik party seized power in Russia.

Then, in 1972, a pivotal moment occurred. Following US President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing, two pandas, Ling- Ling and Hsing- Hsing were gifted to the United States. This gesture exemplified a strategic change in China’s foreign policy, which is to engage with Western countries and lessen Cold War tensions.

Later that year, Japan also received two pandas, Kang Kang and Lan Lan, after normalizing diplomatic relations with China.

By 1984, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, panda diplomacy transitioned from outright gifts to long- term loans, embodying China’s market- orientated economic reforms.

In accordance with the lease model, pandas were loaned for significant amounts, typically US$ 500, 000 to US$ 1 million annually, with the proceeds going toward conservation projects in China. Additionally, these agreements typically lead to joint panda conservation research projects, which foster scientific collaboration while also fostering diplomatic relations.

Adelaide’s Wang Wang and Fu Ni, the only giant pandas currently in the Southern Hemisphere, came to Australia under such a deal in 2009.

Panda diplomacy has been frequently used as a symbol of China’s willingness to strengthen bilateral relations with other countries under current Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

For instance, Malaysia received two pandas in 2014 to mark the 40th anniversary of its diplomatic ties with China. Likewise, two pandas were sent to Indonesia in 2017 as part of the 60th anniversary of the countries ‘ relations.

The loan of two pandas to Germany in 2017 coincided with Xi’s visit to Berlin. He and then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel also attended the Zoo Berlin’s official opening ceremony.

Even the recent tensions between the US and China have n’t derailed panda diplomacy. Last year, the US returned three pandas – Tian Tian, Mei Xiang, and their American- born son Xiao Qi Ji ( which means” Little Miracle” in Mandarin ) – from the Smithsonian Zoo in Washington to China.

However, Xi promised to install two additional giant pandas later this year, calling them “friendship ambassadors between the Chinese and American peoples.”

Why pandas? And what are the challenges?

If it’s not already obvious, pandas are cute and charismatic. Because of their gentle demeanor, pandas have been seen as symbols of peace and friendship.

However, there is more to pandas than just their charm. They are distinctively Chinese; they are unique only in China, but they are universally recognisable. They have long drew attention to endangered and vulnerable species around the world, raising concerns like climate change. The World Wildlife Fund’s logo, in fact, is a panda, further demonstrating its appeal as a universal symbol for conservation movements.

Despite their effectiveness as ambassadors, pandas are incredibly difficult to breed in captivity, with narrow mating windows and complex needs. Wang Wang and Fu Ni, for instance, have failed to conceive at Adelaide’s zoo, despite considerable efforts.

Another difficulty is how much financial pressure pandas can put on host nations to meet the stringent standards for care.

This raises the question of whether the funding should be diverted to other initiatives that would require additional funding.

How successful will Li’s panda diplomacy be in Australia?

Li’s first stop on his tour of Australia, where he stopped in Adelaide Zoo, embodies China’s desire to stabilize and strengthen its relationship with Australia.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese requested pandas be kept in Australia during his November trip to China, and Li’s gesture is a significant diplomatic move in response to that country’s long, icy relations.

According to an empirical study conducted in the United States, panda diplomacy has been largely successful in fostering positive attitudes toward Chinese culture, people, and government.

However, pandas can only do so much. Despite improving diplomatic relations over the past year, Australians are still cautious of China’s government, according to a recent poll.

And significant difficulties are anticipated to be in store for Australia-China relations, such as the US’s strengthened security alliance, Yang Hengjun‘s imprisonment, and recent clashes between the Chinese and Australian militaries.

As such, some commentators have warned Albanese not to allow Li’s trip to become a “propaganda boon” for China. Beyond the panda diplomacy symbolism, the true measure of success of any bilateral relationship will depend on tangible policy changes and mutual trust.

Yu Tao is Associate Professor in Chinese Studies, The University of Western Australia

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