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The US is gearing up the long finger of its corporate airpower against a close-knit struggle with China in the Pacific by turning the ancient B-52 bomb into a cutting-edge warplane.

The US is planning major upgrades to its long-serving B-52 bomb, according to The War Zone’s report this month. These improvements may alter the bomb from the Cold War into a warplane capable of flying for a millennium after its first flight.

The B- 52 upgrades include fresh engines, a modern aircraft, AESA sensor, updated avionics, improved pylons, digital warfare enhancements and superior weapons. Upgraded B- 52s, designated the B- 52J, may be in support until the 2050s, serving alongside the B- 21 Raider.

The War Zone notes that fresh engines may significantly reduce the cost of maintenance, enhance the trip period between sorties, and offer a variety of administrative benefits when discussing the specifics of the B- 52J improve package. The Rolls-Royce F130 is the candidate for the turbine swap, according to the document.

The War Zone says the B- 52J may be upgraded with the AN/APG- 79 sensor, providing greater variety, fidelity, countermeasure resistance, positional awareness, electronic warfare capabilities and air- to- air surveillance and tracking. The B-52J will be able to follow moving water and surface targets and provide guidance for connected weapons traveling long distances thanks to the radar.

The B-52J’s targeting seed may be slaved to the new sensor, and vice versa, which will aid in physical specific recognition. It further explains that the B- 52J’s lengthy loitering period and payload flexibility work well with the new radar for surveillance and reconnaissance missions.

Regarding connectivity, The War Zone reports that the B- 52J will feature enhanced satellite communication, improved GPS, Link 16 datalinks and advanced communication suites for networked battlefield integration, enabling it to strike targets beyond the range of its sensors.

For armaments, The War Zone states that the US Air Force plans to arm the B- 52J with hypersonic weapons to engage high- priority, time- sensitive targets at standoff ranges. The B-52J’s weapons payload, which includes precision-guided bombs, naval mines, stealthy air-launched cruise missiles, swarming drones, and long-range air-to-air missiles, could be significantly increased by new underwing pylons and internal rotary missile launchers.

In explaining the B- 52’s longevity, Jeff Schogol notes in an April 2019 article for The National Interest that, unlike fighters, the B- 52 does not need to perform high- G maneuvers. According to Schogol, many B-52s worked for the US Strategic Air Command ( SAC ) during the Cold War, which meant they did n’t fly as many missions. These circumstances most likely preserved their airframe integrity to outlast their successors, the B- 1 Lancer and B- 2 Spirit.

Additionally, according to Asia Times, the B- 1 supersonic bomber was supposed to partially replace the B-52, but maintenance issues have limited its capabilities and prevented it from retiring before it is too late.

Due to the decline in close air support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the B-1 fleet’s ability to engage in low-altitude supersonic flight is constrained. This restriction reduces the main goal of the aircraft’s development, which was to launch a supersonic bomber to attack Soviet air defenses. As a result, the B- 1 fleet is scheduled to be decommissioned in 2036.

The B-2 stealth bomber was built to operate at low subsonic speeds and avoid detection by Soviet air defenses. However, due to cost concerns, the US capped production of the B- 2 at just 21 planes and halted production in 2020, in stark contrast to the 76 current- generation B- 52Hs in service. At$ 2 billion per plane, it was deemed too expensive to restart B- 2 production.

In a May 2024 TNI article, Peter Suciu points out that the B- 21 may be limited by a low production rate and limited numbers, but the B-52’s non-sealed design may restrict its use in disputed airspace.

Suciu points out that whereas the USAF anticipates 24 to 30 B-21s to be operational by the early 2030s, older bombers like the B-52 and B- 1 had a much higher annual production rate of 20 aircraft. He makes the point that the B- 21 might not be available in sufficient numbers as soon as possible.

In accordance with that, the B-52J may experience delays akin to those on the B- 21. The B-52J is facing a three-year delay, which is pushing its initial operational capability to 2033, according to a US Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) report released this month.

According to the GAO report, the delay is brought on by funding inefficiencies affecting the B-52 commercial engine replacement program, which wo n’t receive a critical design review and contract until August 2025. It mentions that additional delays are linked to the B- 52 Radar Modernization Program, which experienced a 12.6 % cost increase from its 2021 estimate. The cost now totals$ 2.58 billion.

Despite those setbacks, the GAO report notes that the AGM- 181 long-range standoff missile, which is designed to replace the B-52’s AGM- 86B ALCM, is making progress toward reaching its 2030 initial operational capability.

Additionally, China’s rapidly advancing air defense capabilities may limit the longevity of upgraded B- 52Js. According to an interactive map released by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative ( AMTI), China has all of the South China Sea and its neighbors within the reach of bombers, fighters, and surface-to-air missile ( SAM ) sites.

AMTI says that from Woody Island, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef China can launch J- 10 and J- 11 fighter jets and H- 6K bombers, with those features defended by long- range HQ- 9 SAM sites.

A Chinese fighter over the South China Sea came within 10 feet of a US B-52 bomber in October 2023. The fighter was carrying out a risky maneuver that almost sparked a collision. That action might give a hint about China’s strategy in battling other stealthy aircraft like the upgraded US B-52Js.

The South China Morning Post reported this month that China is planning to unveil its H- 20 stealth bomber, which is the US’s takeover of the B-2 and B-21, to prevent being left behind in bomber modernization.

The H- 20 is still secluded and has no confirmed launch date despite persistent rumors of its imminent readiness, according to the newspaper.

According to the SCMP, the H- 20 is anticipated to have a flying wing structure, a hard- to- detect coating and the capacity to transport both regular and nuclear weapons over a distance of at least 8, 500 kilometers. It also adds that the H- 20 will form the air- based leg of China’s nuclear triad.

The H- 20 is said to be in place of the aging H- 6 strategic bomber, which struggles to compete with contemporary US and Russian models like the supersonic Tu- 160, stealth B- 2 and long-serving B- 52.

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The People’s Liberation Army, after the frontrunner of Chinese politics, is once again being purged following the sacking of the defense minister last year, at least nine generals, and many senior military industry executives.

President Xi Jinping has pledged to “enhance the tool for punishing new types of corruption and buried problem” and to improve top army guidance.

In a statement reported by China’s position broadcast on June 19, Xi said:” Cadre at all levels, particularly older army, had show unity and have the courage to set aside their fame and introduce their deficiencies. They must greatly personal- reflect”. They had “make honest rectifications, and resolve issues at the root of their thinking”.

Xi introduced a significant transformation that significantly altered the PLA’s structure in 2015 to improve its conflict capability shortly after taking office. The control system was flattened and reorganized, giving more power to the group.

The number of military regions ( dividing PLA command over China ) was reduced from seven to five” theater commands” with joint rule over the ground, naval, air and rocket forces. This change sought to improve offensive air and naval capabilities by shifting the concept of operations from generally ground-oriented defense to cellular, coordinated movements.

Soldiers and tactical and commissioned officers were dispersed around to tear loyalty links in the chain of control and increase the PLA’s rely on its top management. Models were dismantled and reassembled.

Nevertheless, it appears that this reform did not work preferably. Rumor has it that an investigation started last season following a bubble fight study found that a lot of the corporate jet technology did not work well or at all.

A Chinese spy balloon was spotted above a US military base in early 2023, igniting a strong sense of suspicion in the country about a potential Chinese surprise attack. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken canceled a trip to Beijing as a result of this incident. China later began an investigation, possibly leading to the dismissals of Foreign Affairs Minister Qin Gang and Defense Minister Li Shangfu, after initially underestimating the alarm.

The three-day conference that ended on June 19 marked the first of its kind since 2014, when Xi held a military-political work conference in Gutian on the anniversary of the December 1929 meeting that consolidated Mao’s influence over the Red Army, the PLA’s precursor, in the same year.

In the following decade, Mao seized control of the Party through his influence over the Red Army. Unlike its Soviet counterpart, the Chinese Communist Party was primarily an army spin- off. After the Soviets gained control of Moscow, they had to establish an army to combat the loyalists of the Czar. The Chinese party struggled to gain control from the countryside after its urban insurrection.

The 2014 conference provided the first framework for the 2015 military reform. There are similarities and differences between PLA ties from previous parties here.

During the Cultural Revolution, the PLA was mainly protected from Mao’s political upheavals. The army was not punished and purged, as the majority of civil servants were. It remained the savior of Chinese politics for decades. The head of the military, Marshal Ye Jianying, engineered the coup to arrest the radical” Gang of Four” in 1976 after Mao’s death. That paved the way for Deng Xiaoping’s return to power.

Failed reform?

The 2015 PLA restructuring was in line with some reformer generals ‘ ideas. In exchange for a transformative change and a modern, combat-ready apparatus, the army relinquished its old political authority. It was also meant to alter the party- military’s relationship.

Xi Jinping is the chairman of the PLA Central Commission, and his first public career job was as assistant to Geng Biao, head of military intelligence and a close friend of his father, Xi Zhongxun, then minister of defense.

The most recent purge demonstrates that the reform did not succeed as planned. Still, last year’s dismissals and this conference demonstrate Xi’s clout over the military. Both events took place without any public outcry.

This may indicate that Xi has succeeded in overthrowing the People’s Republic of China as the first leader to overthrow the party’s rule over the military, changing the course of history.

Even so, the PLA still has political duties. The military’s duties extend to the entire Chinese territory, which is divided into five geographically distinct regions, creating additional political cohesion alongside civilian administration.

Moreover, Xi is the one person who sits at the top of the military commission, the party and the civil government. That allows him, in theory, to play the military against the party or the party against the military if necessary.

Therefore, a new power structure appears to be emerging in which Xi serves as the sole supporter of the entire architecture.

Additionally, it is noteworthy that the meeting took place just days before the party plenum, which had been delayed for a while, in July. The plenum is said to focus on economic reforms, but it might have broader implications given the military conference.

The long-running and brutal war in Ukraine, combined with rising regional tensions and US-related tensions, may have been a wake-up call for China, indicating that a conflict may not be in vain and that Beijing should be prepared.

A conflict could completely or partially stymie Chinese exports to G7 nations, which are currently a major source of surplus, and have an impact on its sprawling middle class. The Ukraine fighting also showed the new importance of hybrid warfare, with propaganda, espionage, and firing cannons all part of one scheme.

Since the end of the conflict with Vietnam, the PLA has n’t engaged in a war in 45 years. Dong Jun, the new defense minister, is a member of the navy, which is the only PLA branch with extensive active experience and is known for its global missions and patrols in the South China Sea.

Francesco Sisci, an analyst and commentator on politics with over 30 years of experience in Asia, is the director of Appia Institute, which originally published this article. It is republished with permission.

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Mass human evacuations and common death, damage, and destruction have been the result of months of constant exchanges between Israel and Lebanon’s violent team Hezbollah.

Since first June, the assault has gotten worse, with more and more heated rhetoric coming out. Both attributes have acknowledged the good severe effects of the tit-for-tat problems from escalating into a full-blown war. The question is whether this flimsy confinement will carry in the future.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the foreboding suggestion on June 23 that more of the region’s soldiers would soon be freed up and moved to the northeast to fight Hezbollah in menacing language. In order to prepare for a potential conflict with Hezbollah, Israel was moving Iron Dome chargers from the south to the north, according to a CNN report a few days before.

As a researcher on Lebanon and Israel, I have closely followed their respective local patterns.

What is in danger is significant, and the consequences I think far outweigh the continuous Israel-Hamas issue. The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel has revealed the fundamental truth: the conflict in Gaza is also a conflict over dominant energy in the Middle East in many ways. It further increases the US’s exposure to this potential darkness, which has compelled Washington to intensify diplomatic efforts to halt Israel-Hezbollah hostilities.

Regional relationships

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf state, Iran’s local competitors, are closely monitoring how Iran uses the growing crime on the Lebanon-Israel border and the Gaza conflict to expand its regional interests. Russia, supported by Iran in its war against Ukraine, is watching, also, viewing this issue as a means to undermine the United States.

In its fight for local identity with Iran, Israel, in contrast, approaches the developing problems on the country’s northeastern border from a position of greater frailty. Critics have accused Israel’s extreme right-wing state of lacking in corporate thinking regarding the current conflict’s objectives.

For proper blindness, they argue, disregards Israel’s needed to maintain good relationships with its regional and global allies, first and foremost with the United States.

Israel’s management could have used the battle to develop its connection with majority-Sunni states in the Middle East and draw on its empire with the US to ensure local assistance for the Jewish state, instead of devastating Gaza following the October 7 massacres by Palestinian militants.

However, Israel’s steadfast refusal to discuss creative political engagement with the Palestinians has a major impact on its ties to regional actors who otherwise would be willing to support the Jewish state of Iran.

Prospective for US- Iran turmoil

Iran and its proxies had probably ignite the whole region if Israel and Hezbollah launched a full-fledged war. It might also force the US to engage directly with Tehran, which is a terrible circumstance that President Joe Biden has been attempting to avoid since October 7.

A battle with Hezbollah may convince the US to provide practical fight support, as it did in April in retaliatory attacks by Iran and its proxies on Israel, in contrast to the war against Hamas, in which American support for Israel is restricted to diplomacy and arms supply.

Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hasan Nasrallah, threatened Cyprus by stating that his organization would target the island if Israel and Israel cooperated with Israel during the conflict. Hezbollah has even extended the geographic range of the conflict.

Washington is undoubtedly concerned about the repercussions of the growing fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. The US has been trying to come to an Israeli-Lebanese agreement since the beginning of the Gaza war, which would require the removal of Hezbollah’s forces from the border zone and their replacement with international forces and the Lebanese army.

Israel and Lebanon would form a boundary commission in exchange, as the American proposal suggests, to address Lebanese and Israeli grievances over the location of their shared boundary line once and for all.

Any deal made with Hezbollah is becoming more difficult as the Hezbollah-Israel attrition war continues.

The pressure on the north and the conservative and religious sectors to go to war with Hezbollah is growing in Israel. According to recent polls, the majority of Israeli Jews favor the IDF or Israel Defense Forces fighting Hezbollah” with full force.”

The IDF, on the other hand, is sending mixed messages. The decision to go to war is quickly approaching, according to its spokesman. Meanwhile, senior generals, including the chief of staff, have noted that after nine months of fighting, the IDF is overly stretched and worn out, and the opening of a front against Hezbollah cannot occur before the army is reenergized and regrouped.

Israel at a vulnerable moment

In terms of Netanyahu, the once aloof and risk-averse political realist is now taking the chance of a situation that could result in the country’s total strategic defeat, undermining the security and viability of an Israel that is integrated into regional politics. Since January, there has been a lot of concern that Netanyahu could force Israel into a full-fledged conflict with Hezbollah if he believes that a full-fledged conflict would serve his own preconceived notions. We might be getting closer to the truth about this apprehension.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, continues its pressure on Israel, increasing the gamble of full conflagration, recognizing that Israel is potentially at its most vulnerable moment– perhaps since the 1948 war.

Even with the continued economic and political downturn in Lebanon, the continuation of this attrition war is paying off, given Iran and Hezbollah’s long-term strategic objectives of eradicating Israel.

The Americans have been working hard to find diplomatic solutions to this crisis along with the French, who was the country’s former colonial master and creator. Hezbollah has stated from the beginning that it will stop its cross-border attacks in Gaza if and when a cease-fire agreement is reached.

However, neither the Hamas or Israel leadership seem particularly eager to get there at this point. Instead, it appears that the scenario Hamas hoped would materialize after October 7: that Israel’s allies in the so-called Axis of Resistance would join the conflict and launch an offensive against Israel on multiple fronts, is only more likely.

In short, the Lebanon- Israel border is at present a combustible front at risk of explosion.

Of course, Israel and Hezbollah may continue to cooperate in a similar way that the US and the Soviet Union were halted by mutually assured destruction ( MAD ) during the Cold War. Additionally, aggressive efforts are being made by US-led initiatives to tamp down the flames.

However, without any significant diplomatic breakthrough, the situation will undoubtedly continue to worsen and could lead to a war that will be even more deadly than the one that has been occurring since October 7.

At the University of Notre Dame, Asher Kaufman is the head of history and peace studies.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, lists very few nations on his current list of available global travel sites. He made the wise decision to travel to Pyongyang so that he could be feted as a friend despot and receive comfort from isolation and sanctions-imposed isolation.

However, if the South Korean government follows through on its commitment to backfill US and Polish stockpiles, Putin’s decision to mark a complete common security agreement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un might end up being an own-goal rather than a corporate breakthrough.

Putin good envisioned a rise in South Asian numbness regarding open military aid for Ukraine while expanding the range and varieties of Northern Korean weapons that were available for Russia’s war work.

In recent months, North Korea and Russia have heightened their stance on perceived US colonialism as well as Russia’s actions to put an end to the UN Panel of Experts ‘ investigation and recommendation of international sanctions for North Korean violations of majority UN resolutions involving its nuclear and missile development activities.

At a press conference on May 9th, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol reiterated his desire to keep ties with Russia” as soft as possible” and reiterated South Korea’s plan of never giving Ukraine military equipment immediately.

Regarding South Korea’s credibility as a partner with similar goals, the facetious ties that existed prior to the Kim-Putin mountain sparked a lot of inquiries from EU and British political representatives, with whom I spoke a week beforehand to Putin’s attend.

My interlocutors specifically brought up Europe’s desire to ensure South Korea’s support for Ukraine and its sorrow with South Korea’s rhetorical support, which was mainly weak in comparison to that of Japan. The United States should have put more pressure on South Korea to become more in line with the West in the fight against the war in Ukraine, the Western participants questioned.

The statement of a North Korea-Russian mutual defense treaty suggests that South Korea’s first response may help to quell Western concerns by stoking the Yoon administration’s desire to support Ukraine in essential areas like anti-missile systems and immediate munition supplies.

Following the announcement, South Korea’s memorandum to the Soviet ambassador to South Korea, Georgy Zinoviev, demanded that Russia cut off military ties with North Korea. Putin also issued a public notice that it would be a “very great error” if South Korea carried out its threat to provide munitions directly to Ukraine.

The signing of the common defense pact, which North Korea and Russia may want to exploit, has a big impact, according to Putin’s ambiguous comment: the Korean Peninsula’s reconnection risks are related to the wider geopolitical environment and worldwide geopolitical rivalries.

As a result, North Korean actions against Russia will need to consider the possibility that Russia will launch retaliation by expanding the scope and breadth of military cooperation with North Korea, including the use of cutting-edge satellite and ballistic missile technology.

However, one possible reason for Russia’s drafting of the joint defense agreement with North Korea is to encourage the development of a subsequent front for a military conflict outside of Ukraine, both as a means of inciting South Korea’s caution regarding the export of defense equipment to Ukraine and as a pretext for a wider conflict that might have an impact on US global military strategy.

The Yoon administration will have to bridge these obstacles by closing the gap in perspective and approach with like-minded Western allies and by enhancing US- Japan- North Korean military cohesion in response to tighter North Korea- Russia ties. In this respect, the schedule of Putin’s visit to Pyongyang may welcome interest and a unified response from NATO’s 75th anniversary celebrations in Washington, DC, and from the American, Japanese, and South Korean officials on the outside of those discussions.

Scott Snyder is author of&nbsp, The US- South Korea Alliance: Why It May Fail and Why It Must Not. The Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI ) is led by him as president and CEO. This article was KEI’s original publication. It is republished with permission.

The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation established by the Republic of Korea, is a registered trademark of KEI as an agent of the FARA.

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Australia is set to test-launch a US fast missile from one of its combat planes in a bold move to regain its long-range attack skills.

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF ) is scheduled to launch the US Air Force’s Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile ( HACM) test missile over Australian ranges this month, according to The War Zone.

The War Zone information that the HACM system, a cooperative effort between the US and Australia, aims to strengthen both nations ‘ atmosphere- launched hypersonic cruise missile capabilities. The missile, which has a two-stage design with a rocket booster and a scramjet cruiser, has been developed by Raytheon and Northrop Grumman since 2022, according to a US Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) report.

While The War Zone mentions that the rocket’s maximum acceleration is unknown, it is expected to surpass Mach 5, the threshold for fast rate. According to the GAO statement, flight tests may begin in October and continue until March 2027.

According to The War Zone, the determination to use RAAF F/A- 18F Super Hornets for testing was prompted by US testing infrastructure limitations. Woomera Test Range in Australia offers a safe and distant setting that is ideal for sensitive trials.

Additionally, it states that the USAF intends to incorporate HACM immediately into the F-15E Strike Eagle and possibly add it to other aircraft. The source notes that the program’s progress is carefully watched, as fast weapons are considered important for future higher- end conflicts, offering rapid, difficult- to- intercept strike capabilities.

The War Zone claims that this collaboration is a result of the US and Australia’s growing defense partnership, which is further strengthened by the AUKUS agreement, which includes cooperation in areas like unmanned aircraft and artificial intelligence.

Australia’s Defense Strategic Review 2023 ( DSR 2023 ) notes that Australia’s anti- access/area denial ( A2/AD ) strategy is often synonymous with long- range strike capability alongside undersea warfare and surface- to- air missiles ( SAM ). According to the DSR 2023, long-range strike capability is essential for a adversary’s northern approach to be in danger.

It makes note of the importance of having an A2/AD strategy in place to prevent an adversary from militarily coercing Australia and carrying out attacks against Australia without putting them in danger.

Further, in a May 2024 article in the peer- reviewed Journal of Strategic Studies, Fabian Hoffman argues that long- range strike weapons can become strategic deterrents by fulfilling counter- population, strategic interdiction, counter- leadership and counterforce roles.

Hoffman mentions that long-range counter-population strikes are carried out against civilian targets to lower an opponent’s morale. For strategic interdiction, he says that long- range strikes aim to destroy an adversary’s war- making capability, such as industrial infrastructure, supply chains, and transportation nodes.

He adds that counter- leadership long- range strikes aim to target and neutralize an adversary’s leadership. According to Hoffman, such strikes can annihilate hardened command and control nodes, and advances in hypersonic and sensor technology make them more effective against time-sensitive targets.

Hoffman points out that conventional counterforce long-range strikes can be used to “lock out” an opponent from the battlefield by overwhelming the use of force at the operational and tactical levels or to paralyze an adversary by knocking out critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ) nodes.

Since retiring its F-111s in 2010, Australia has lacked long-range strike capability. Additionally, it has canceled its plans to equip its Collins-class submarines with Tomahawk cruise missiles, leaving it with no such capability.

However, Andrew Davies claims in a March 2021 paper for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute ( ASPI ) that intermedia-range hypersonic cruise weapons may be a viable way to restore Australia’s long-range strike capabilities, which were previously provided by the F-111, despite the threat calculus during the Cold War being significantly different from today.

Davies mentions that Australia’s 1960s decision to acquire the F- 111 was driven by an assessed risk of aggression from Indonesia, which was countered by the capability to strike anywhere in the archipelago.

He asserts that there is a chance that China will respond in kind with its long-range strikes against Australian targets from forward-deployed systems if Australia uses long-range strike capabilities as part of its deterrence posture against China. &nbsp,

In a 2021 Lowy Institute analysis, Thomas Shugart claims that China can already strike Australia with long-range weapons like the DF- 26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles ( IRBM ), H6 K bombers armed with land-attack cruise missiles ( LACM) from Mischief Reef, and aerial-refueled H- 6N bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles ( ALC M) from the Chinese mainland.

However, reviving Australia’s air- based long- range strike capabilities faces many challenges including cost, limited firepower, difficulty of achieving economy of scale and dependence on the US for crucial ISR capabilities.

Marcus Hellyer and Andrew Nicholls claim in a December 2022 ASPI paper that hypersonic weapons may be deceptively expensive, that each missile’s price tag rises with range, and that all of its exquisite components are non-recyclable. &nbsp,

Although hypersonics are more challenging to defeat than conventional ballistic or cruise missiles, Hellyer and Nicholls claim that they do n’t carry much explosives. The weapons will always cost money, despite the fact that scale reductions may eventually lower the cost of hypersonic missiles. Australia might not be able to launch these missiles in sufficient numbers to cause a decisive effect.

Veerle Nouwens and other authors note that while Australia is investing in ISR capabilities and ISR data fusion, its long-range strike capabilities are most likely to remain dependent on US support in an article published in January 2024 for the International Institute for Strategic Studies ( IISS).

Nouwens and others claim that Australia’s prospects for independent space-based ISR capabilities are uncertain because the government’s plans to launch four observation satellites have been targeted for budget cuts.

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Foreign officials are in the method of wrapping up a two- month” flower clean” of the region’s social media.

The most recent Qinglang” clean and bright” campaign, which was launched on April 23, 2024, by the China’s Cyberspace Administration, aims to punish Foreign internet celebrities who are allegedly showcasing wealthy individuals or purposefully promoting lavish lifestyles to entice followers and customers. Japanese influencers are also affected by its reach, which extends beyond coast social media users ‘ behavior.

China is not the only country to express established concern about the negative effects of social media. On June 17, the US government made a statement about the need to place warning names on platforms like Instagram and TikTok. The emphasis of Beijing’s assault is on the well-being of China’s culture, and regulators that are going beyond mere warnings, despite US efforts being framed as protecting the emotional health of users.

Following the Cyberspace Administration of China’s law, several Chinese social media platforms blocked the accounts of celebrities like as Wang Hongquanxing, who has earned the nickname” China’s Kim Kardashian”.

Wang’s alleged talking about his luxurious clothes and other luxury goods has been censored. And he is n’t alone. Bo Gongzi, a celebrity influence, received a similar reward for displaying Hermes luggage, Porsches, and another scarce and expensive accessories. And Baoyu Jiajie vanished from Chinese social media after exposing her beautiful lifestyle and food.

Violation of virtual appearance?

The assault was defended by Chinese official media as a move to stop money-wapping and” toxic customers,” or attracting online fans to earn money.

Analysts claim that the removal of wealth-favoring influencers is not just a result of a need to uphold public morality, as Yao-Yuan Yeh, a Chinese professor of political science from St. Thomas University, has done. Instead, it serves the purpose of mitigating the Taiwanese public’s growing sense of comparative socioeconomic deprivation, exacerbated by China’s present downturn.

Although Ye’s argument is valid, China was punishing wealth-flounting celebrities before concerns about the state of the nation’s economy began to emerge. Beijing’s general concern that social media could be used to spread views it views as oppressive is reflected in the standard criticism.

It ramped up in 2014 with the withdrawal of Guo Meimei. Guo is a famous online adolescent known for her luxurious lifestyle, including driving a Mercedes and owning a large castle.

The measures against wealth flaunting come amid a more basic crackdown on what Beijing sees when morally hazardous behaviors, such as viewing pornography, gambling, drug use, rude livestreaming and displaying contempt for lower- income citizens. Although the official campaign has a large following among the usually conservative electorate, it is not just being forced from the top.

In this regard, Chinese social conservatism draws inspiration from a centuries-old custom of ensuring equal wealth distribution, as expressed in Confucian maxims that political leaders should” not worry about scarcity, but rather unequal distribution” ( ).

And some polls indicate that the Chinese government is highly regarded as trustworthy and well-liked by the populace.

According to Lily Tsai, a political scientist at MIT, the Taiwanese people’s help for their authoritarian government is not merely a result of a fear of social retaliation or satisfaction with long-term financial success. Instead, the Chinese Communist Party is given praise for satiating the government’s fervent wish for reparative fairness.

That is, Taiwanese people generally support their government for punishing those who violate moral principles, which are shared by both leaders and common people, even though it restricts some private liberties.

Chinese bloggers

This public support for policies that ban social media use that is against Chinese beliefs also serves as a social device to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s view.

We have observed that China is putting pressure on Chinese social media influencers in special in order to counteract its campaign against elaborate online wealth displays. In general, China is using social media to promote political support and advance its goals for the reconciliation of the island democracy and mainland China.

By directly or indirectly putting pressure on famous people and celebrities to formally support pro-government principles and guidelines, the Chinese government has tightened the rules of cyberspace.

Despite some Japanese voters ‘ concerns about his pro-independence policies, Lai Ching-te, the new president, was elected in January.

In his annual presidential address on May 20th, Lai reaffirmed that” the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China are not superior to one another” – a statement that should be seen as an defiant insistence on Taiwan’s independence.

Official Chinese media outlet China Central Television issued a warning message on its social media page to the Lai management that Taiwan’s independence is a possibility and will never be. China will ultimately achieve full reunification”.

Many Japanese entertainment celebrities, who operate mainly on the island, shared the CCTV blog with their followers to show their support of China’s unification with Taiwan. CCTV in switch reposted their emails, praising the “patriotic” Japanese artists. Another Taiwanese celebrities were directly pressured to declare their views on reunification.

According to recent research, Chinese celebrities typically repost established messages less often than those from mainland and Hong Kong. However, Chinese social media users frequently use democratic rants, which suggests that popular culture is becoming more politicized.

An online military

Both the crackdown on online displays of wealth and the pressure on Chinese bloggers reflect acknowledgment in Beijing of the power of social media.

As of 2022, China had the largest amount of internet and social media consumers – about 1.02 billion. President Xi Jinping, who came to power in 2012, is also aware of the fact that Chinese citizens rely on various social media platforms like Weibo, Twitter, Xiaohongshu, and Douyin for news and information.

The most recent” flower clean” of Taiwanese social media was not under Xi’s view, and it is unlikely to be the last. Officials in Beijing know that, if regulated firmly, social media can be used to intensify its concept, but if left unchecked, it could result in an increasingly provocative and turbulent cyberspace.

Dan Chen is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Richmond, and Gengsong Gao is an associate professor of Chinese studies there.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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